Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 42, No.

6, 945 964, November 2006

The Strategic Depth Doctrine of Turkish Foreign Policy

ALEXANDER MURINSON
Given the boost provided by a promise of admission to the European Union on 17 December 2004, the regional standing of Turkey is bound to increase in the coming decades. This new stature will aect Turkish relations not only with the Arab neighbours and Israel, but also with Iran, Central Asia, South Caucasian and Balkan states. This article analyzes the institutional and intellectual sources of a new vision that animates contemporary Turkish foreign policy. The main sources of the traditional foreign policy of the Turkish Republic are the historical experience of the Ottoman empire (the tradition of the balance of power); the nationalist Kemalist revolution and creation of the republic itself (hence, isolationism); western orientation expressed in the policy of Europeanization and ` modernization; the suspicion of foreign powers and interests (the Sevres syndrome). There were two other ideological sources of this traditional foreign doctrine, which surfaced in the pre-First World War years: pan-Turkism and pan-Turanism. PanTurkism was a movement to unify the eastern (Central Asia and Caucasus) and the western (Anatolian) Turks. Following Russian expansionism in the Balkans under the banner of pan-Slavism in the later half of the nineteenth century, pan-Turanism arose as a romantic idea to unify Turkic, Mongol and Finnish-Ugorian peoples. It later served for a short time as a basis for the TurkishHungarian collaboration during the rst two decades of the twentieth century to stem the Russian threat. These movements gained some inuence among the Young Turks in the years preceding the First World War. During the cold war Turkey generally avoided any potentially long-term entanglements in the Middle East with the exception of the asco of the Baghdad Pact. Since the end of the Cold War, Turkish foreign policy, which had been rmly anchored upon the verities of Kemalism for 70 years, has also undergone a transformation. This transformation hinges upon a growing embrace of the philosophy of neo-Ottomanism. If this philosophy originally was employed as a response to the domestic challenge of ethno-national conict with the Kurdish separatists led by the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan) it later organically infused the foreign policy thinking of contemporary Turkish policy makers.1 As theorists of international relations concur, foreign policy became an extension of domestic policy and the transformation in domestic policy has also aected the foreign policy doctrine.2 Turgut Ozal, the rst president of Turkey in the post-cold war era laid the foundations of this new foreign policy concept. However, a new doctrine took its more mature and comprehensive shape
ISSN 0026-3206 Print/1743-7881 Online/06/060945-20 2006 Taylor & Francis DOI: 10.1080/00263200600923526

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under the Adalet ve Kalkinma (AK Justice and Development) Party government lead by Recep Tayip Erdogan. This doctrine, known as the Strategic Depth doctrine, found particular resonance among the AK party leadership and its core electorate. The acceptance of such a dramatic shift in foreign policy vision is also due to the changed perceptions of the foreign policy establishment and the military of external circumstances (Syria and Iran ceased to be viewed as enemies after the resolution of the TurkishSyrian crisis in 1999) and heightened domestic empathy with Muslim causes such as the Palestinian cause and the opposition to the American occupation of Iraq. According to Graham Fuller, [S]trategically, Turkey has become part of the Middle East.3 Ahmet Davutoglu, who occupies a position of chief foreign policy advisor to the Prime Minister Erdogan, has become the architect of the new Turkish foreign policy concept. His thinking was compared with the strategic vision of American neo-conservatives. But Ahmet Davutoglu responded to this charge: A comparison with neo-cons does not seem very accurate to me. Especially in view of developments to do with the Middle East and its surroundings, we may agree that the neo-cons produce speculative ideas but I have serious doubts about whether they construct theories having objective validity and rational frameworks.4 Firstly, this article will outline the institutional, philosophical and ideological sources of this new foreign policy conception, and then it will focus on its specic prescriptions. In the third part this article will reect on the new practical aspects of the new Turkish foreign policy conducted by the AK party leadership. Turkish foreign policy has undergone a paradigmatic shift from Kemalism to neo Ottomanism under the leadership of Turgut Ozal during his tenure, rst as prime minister from 1983 through 1989 and then president from 1987 until his death in 1993. His era as a Turkish leader was characterized by his singular involvement in the restructuring of the Turkish economy and robust internal and activist foreign policy. His style of governance had so many common themes with the concurrent rule of the British prime minister, Margaret Thatcher, that some in Turkey called it Ozalism. Prior to the break-up of the Soviet Union, the Turkish Republic was guided by the maxim Peace at Home, Peace Abroad promulgated by the founder of the modern Turkey, Kemal Ataturk. This saying essentially enunciated the era of isolationism in foreign policy and rejection of the claims of pan-Turkist movement for political union with external Turks (Turkic-speaking peoples of Caucasus and Central Asia). The dissolution of the Soviet Union, which brought independence to the Turkic republics of Central Asia and Azerbaijan, oered new unprecedented possibilities for Turkish foreign policy. The conict in Balkans also stirred historical connections with the Muslim population of the region. All these events amplied historical parallels of the current position of Turkey with the glory of the Ottoman Empire.5 Since 1991 Turgut Ozal has supported and provided political stature to the Yeni Osmanlicaler (neo-Ottomanist) movement also known as Ikinci Cumhuriyetciler (the Second Republicans).6 The term neo-Ottomanism was introduced by a leading Turkish columnist and academic Cengiz Candar. This was an intellectual movement that advocated Turkish pursuit of active and diversied foreign policy in the region based on the Ottoman historical heritage. The neo-Ottomans envisioned Turkey as a

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leader of Muslim and Turkic worlds and a central power in Eurasia.7 Since that period the Turkish body politic has increasingly embraced the philosophy of neoOttomanism. In 1993, Candar told the Washington Post, I think Kemalism makes Turkey turn in on itself. The time has come to reconsider the policy. A decade later, Ali Bayramoglu, in the Islamist daily Yeni Safak, wrote that the partisans of neoOttomanism . . . are increasing every day.8 Turgut Ozal was the rst Turkish leader to challenge the role of the military in the sphere of high politics. He also put his personal stamp on foreign policy making in Turkey. He achieved this by changing the institutional framework of foreign policy decision making. Ozal also used his prerogative as president to remove some powers from the Foreign Ministry.9 Turgut Ozals party Anavatan (The Motherland) in many respects served as an ideological precursor of the AK party. Anavatan Partisi was a nationalist and conservative party, devoted to national and moral values, and had a liberal outlook based on free market and free enterprise.10

The leadership of the AK party demonstrates a renewed zeal for involvement in the aairs of the Middle East, the Balkans, Caucasus and Central Asia, but it acts much more cautiously than its Islamist predecessor Refah (Welfare) party. When we consider the ideational content and symbolic signicance of the name of the ruling party, we need to recognize its historical referent.11 The name of the new party reects in the Turkish public consciousness and in its core outlook its identication with the Ottoman past. When Recep Erdogan became prime minister in March 2003, as a result of the overwhelming victory of his AK party in November 2002, he again assumed an activist prime-ministerial role in Turkish foreign policy. Prime Minister Erdogan elevated the oce of Ahmet Davutoglu, the prime ministers chief advisor on foreign policy, from the traditional status of a small bureau, which provides day-to-day counsel to the prime minister, to the source of strategic thinking and ideological support for the new foreign policy based on the Islamist roots of the current government. The key role which he plays in Prime Minister Erdogans decision making regarding foreign policy issues has been stressed in an article in the daily Vatan, in which he was called one of the important persons [in Turkey] on vital subjects, such as Iraq, Cyprus and the EU.12 Even though he provides strategic advice to the prime minister, Davutoglus avoidance of the press and his disinclination to share his views publicly is reected in one of the rare interviews with Vatan which commented that Davutoglu has nally broken his silence, which he kept for a long time.13 Since becoming the chief foreign policy advisor, Ahmet Davutoglu has utilized the concept of strategic depth to guide the foreign policy of Recep Erdogans government. This concept is eponymous with the title of Davutoglus book.14 The origins of this doctrine can be traced to Ozals neoOttomanism, the muliti-dimensional foreign policy of the Erbakan government and Davutoglus innovative approach to geopolitics.15 The main thesis of this doctrine is that strategic depth is predicated on geographical depth and historical depth. Consequently, Turkey, as a result of its historical legacy of the Ottoman Empire, possesses great geographical depth. According to Davutoglu, This geographical depth places Turkey right at the centre of many geopolitical areas of inuence.

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The strategic depth doctrine calls for an activist engagement with all regional systems in the Turkeys neighbourhood.16 Ahmet Davutoglu is a truly original neo-Ottoman thinker. Until involvement in the current Turkish government, he served as the head of the international relations department at Beykent University. Davutoglu obtained a doctorate in philosophy from Bogazici University. His interests embrace not only politics and international relations, but also philosophy, history, geography, especially its specialized branch geopolitics, as well as cultural studies and economics. The nucleus of a new foreign approach appeared in an article titled The Clash of Interests: An Explanation of the World (Dis)Order which appeared in 1998. In this article he calls for the reassessment of the role of the US hegemony in global aairs and for the establishment of inter-civilizational dialogue in order to prevent future conagrations. It is dicult to overestimate the views expressed in this article for elucidating the evolution of the current Turkish foreign policy doctrine. In this article a former Turkish academic proposes an alternative to the two dominant Eurocentric theories, which attempted to explain the ongoing global processes. This article was devoted to a critique of Huntingtons and Fukuyamas views of globalization and the post-cold war era. In response to Fukuyamas thesis about the End of History brought about by the end of the cold war global ideological confrontation, he states: Fukuyamas thesis, which glories the universalization of the political values and structures of western civilization, furnished the principal perspective in evaluating the political aairs in the post-Soviet and pre-Bosnian era. According to Davutoglu, the Bosnian crisis exposed the shallowness of the end of history thesis; because it revealed the imbalances of western civilization and also the deformities of the existing world order.17 Davutoglu also criticized Huntingtons thesis about the Clash of Civilizations. He noted, Huntington also neglects the fact that the most destructive global wars of human history were the intra-civilizational wars among the systemic forces of Eurocentric western civilization which were wars fought to decide who will provide systemic leaderships, whose rules will govern, whose policies will shape systemic allocation processes, and whose sense or vision of order will prevail.18 In the same article the current Turkish chief foreign policy advisor devotes a signicant place to his views on the contemporary geopolitics. He explains that the strategic balance promoted by the United Stated during the cold war based upon the Charter of the United Nations ended after the First Gulf War. He cites the example of the conict over the predominantly Muslim Bosnia, which precipitated the readjustment of the geopolitical status quo.19 The article characterizes this conict as an intra-systemic conict between the US and Europe and predicted the asco of the American New World Order doctrine. He concludes that the western failure to prevent the genocide in Bosnia was caused by the medieval prejudices of Europe.20 The name of Kemal Ataturk and ideas associated with his vision traditionally had the place of honour in the republican historiography and nationalist political discourse in the Turkish Republic. It is noteworthy that in the whole of Davutoglus article there is not even one mention of the Turkish Republic or the precepts of Kemalism. By some accounts it is quite a departure from the views expressed by a senior Turkish government ocial. But what captures the imagination of the Turkish academic is the prominent position of the Muslim world or the Muslim civilization in the global scheme of things: The Muslim world, which became the

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intersectional arena of these two phenomena, civilizational revival and strategic competition, becomes the focal point in international relations.21 In his geopolitical vision, Davutoglu combines two geographic areas: The region from the Northern Caucasus in the north to Kuwait in the south and the southern ank of Central Asia. He stresses their being part of the Islamic civilization provides commonality to this imagined community, which is full of inconsistencies between internationally recognized territories and de facto realities.22 Thus he elevates the unity of Muslim global umma to the status of the ideal geopolitical structure and deprecates the notion of the nation-state. In his writings, Davutoglu substitutes umma, a term with religious connotations, by the more neutral term Islamic civilization, but he preserves the emphasis on the religious aspect of civilizational clash. He concludes that: The purported cultural and civilizational clashes are very minor reasons for this chaotic atmosphere because this region is an integral part of the same civilization, namely the Islamic civilization, with the exceptions of Armenia and the Christian parts of Georgia. The issue of Karabakh and the invasion of Azeri lands by Armenian forces is the only real cultural/civilizational clash in this region.23 This article also contained a veiled criticism of the West and Kemalist establishment, especially the army as the self-appointed guardian of the secularist republican order and a strong proponent of the membership in NATO and the alliance with the United States. With reference to military/civilian relations in Turkey Davutoglu writes, a democratic system in the Muslim world may create Islamic regimes with anti-western sentiments . . . The corrupt military/political elite in some Muslim countries exploited this fear and co-operated with the global systemic forces of the democratic West in order to destroy democratic processes in the Muslim world.24 The author pays special attention to the critical geographical location of the states which share this Islamic civilization. Widely borrowing from Alfred Thayer Mahan, the father of American geopolitics, Davutoglu emphasizes the importance of the socalled chokepoints.25 He notes that, this geographical location brought about a great advantage to the Muslim world enabling it to control the choke points which divide the warm seas of the world, while also bringing an extensive risk of attracting intra-systemic competition.26 He points to the fact that eight out of the sixteen strategically most important choke points the Suez Canal, Bab el-Mandeb (the exit from the Red Sea), the Strait of Hormuz (the exit from the Persian Gulf), the Strait of Malacca, the Sunda Strait (between Sumatra and Java), the Lombok Strait (between Bali and Mataram), and the Bosphorus and Dardanelles (exits from the Black Sea) are under the full control of Muslim countries, while one of them (the Strait of Gibraltar) separates a Muslim state (Morocco) and a European state (Spain). He dismisses Huntingtons contention that the Muslim world presents a challenge to western core countries: it is very dicult to argue that the Muslim world can develop an independent global strategy as an anti-systemic force which enjoys some sort of power of choice in its involvement in the world system. Muslim states, in general, rank close to the bottom in the pecking order of the world system.27 As a result of the new constellation of geopolitical, geo-economic and

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strategic realities or [sic] potentialities, Davutoglu suggests that the West, and in particular the United States, has created a myth of the Muslim threat to provide an ideological justication for strategic and tactical operations in order to have control over these potentialities.28 Davutoglu criticizes the American New World Order strategy for its inconsistency and the lack of resolve to uphold the United Nations principles of collective security. In particular, he chooses the example of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The polemist criticizes Western-led globalization and accuses it of being an attempt to homogenize diverse cultures, if not completely destroy non-western civilizations, and calls instead for dialogue of civilizations. He writes: The rst and the most important prerequisite of the rst condition is the recognition of the right to survival of several dierent civilizational identities in an atmosphere of coexistence. The existing civilizational crisis could only be overcome by a civilizational dialogue and a free exchange of values. Unicultural monopolization has been the main dilemma of modern western civilization and has led to the destruction of traditional civilisations. The current revival of traditional civilizations is a reaction against this uni-cultural monopolization.29 He suggests that in order for Turkey to become a Muslim regional power it needs to practise caution and to calibrate Turkish foreign policy within strategic parameters set by the great powers. In the article he counsels the United States against the confrontational categorizations based on the provocations of civilizational dierences, such as West versus Islam or West versus Rest.30 He proposes that the United Nations needs to be restructured and the collective security mechanism ought to be revised to enable it to respond adequately to global strategic adventurism. Finally, he concludes that the United States needs to cooperate with Muslim and Confucian countries to prevent virulent nationalism of [sic] Europe and Russia from threatening global stability.31 For 70 years since the foundation of the Turkish Republic, the Kemalist leadership extended tremendous eorts to maintain a pro-western orientation and the secular character of the Turkish state. Kemalists dened modern Turkey as a western society in juxtaposition to its Islamic, Asian or Middle Eastern alternatives. The strict nationalist and secularist dogmas of Kemalism were institutionalized in the dominant bureaucratic-authoritarian apparatus of state.32 The rst assault on the Kemalist ideology was undertaken under the leadership of Turgut Ozal. Ozal reintroduced into political discourse in Turkey the concept of the TurkishIslamic synthesis.33 The Turkish-Islamic synthesis school of thought emphasized Turkish nationalism and Islam as key contributors to the international standing of Turkey. It emphasized the historical legacy of the Ottoman past and ourishing Islamic culture as a source of the soft power of the modern Turkish state. All these themes found their way into a novel foreign policy doctrine, which animates the foreign policy vision of the current Turkish government. Ahmet Davutoglus intellectual antagonism to the process of westernization in Turkey and

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its philosophical critique found their expression in his reinvigorated neoOttomanism. The academic anti-western rhetoric is coated in anti-colonialist phraseology. He made a general claim that the process of secularization can be seen as a direct threat to the self-perception of non-Western societies.34 He blamed the nationalist pattern of modernization and secularization imposed by the Kemalist elite on Turkish society for the social phenomenon of the divided self. He provided a periodization for the evolution of non-western (i.e. Muslim) societies in the twentieth century. Davutoglu distinguished between the period of early modernization in the rst half of the twentieth century and the period of civilizational revival closer to the end of the twentieth century. The rst period was marked by the preeminence of the early modernizers who tried to achieve national or civilizational self-preservation against the attacks of colonial powers.35 The second period is characterized by the predominance of civilizational revivalists who are attempting to revive their authentic stance in order to re-dene their ontological and historical existentiality as a result of the crisis of the western secular ontology. He described the transnational character of the Muslim civilization that produced a universal system and surpassed the nation-state paradigm as a ction of the western mind. In his theorizing he stressed the importance of the universalism of Muslim community or umma: The main factor of this universality of the Islamic civilization is an ontological consciousness which directly penetrates each individual humans mind regardless of his ethnic and regional origin. Common cultural and political responses to colonialism and modernity in dierent parts of the Muslim World are themselves the indicators of this consciousness. The rise of Islamic identity and its socio-cultural reections in the lands which were recently governed by atheist Soviet authoritarianism serves to conrm the impact of this ontological consciousness.36 As a general solution to the inter-civilizational tensions he called for acceptance and coexistence of plurality of civilizations. These trends of thought eventually crystallized in Ahmet Davutoglus Stratejik Derinlik (Strategic Depth) doctrine. This conception of foreign policy is eponymous with the title of Davutoglus book, which was published in 2000.37 One Turkish Daily News editor observed that the book aims to fully dene Turkey and its immediate neighbours and it diers from other books on the subject due to its local viewpoint.38 In his book the author proposes a new geo-strategy for Turkish policy makers. Prime Minister Erdogans chief foreign policy advisor criticizes the Kemalist foreign policy for its failure to appreciate the advantages oered by the countrys rich history and geographic space. The main thesis of this doctrine is that the strategic depth is predicated on historical depth and geographical depth. Davutoglu denes historical depth as a characteristic of a country that is at the epicentre of [historical] events.39 He identies eight former empires Britain, Russia, AustroHungary, France, Germany, China, Japan and Turkey as countries with historical depth. In his comparative analysis, he comes to the conclusion that these countries experience similar problems of ethno-nationalism, separatism and general antiimperialist dissension in their respective regions. As a result, Turkey, due to its

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historical legacy of the Ottoman Empire, possesses a great geographical depth. With reference to Turkey, he notes: Geographical depth is a part of historical depth. For instance, Turkey is not just any old Mediterranean country. One important characteristic that distinguishes Turkey from say Romania or Greece is that Turkey is at the same time a Middle Eastern and a Caucasian country. Unlike Germany, Turkey is as much a European country as it is an Asian country. Indeed, Turkey is as much a Black Sea country as it is a Mediterranean one. This geographical depth places Turkey right at the centre of many geopolitical inuences.40 Regarding membership in the European Union, Davutoglu argues that Turkey cannot wait forever at the EU door, and needs to develop a genuinely multidirectional foreign policy by utilizing its geostrategic advantages. Davutoglu advances a proposition that Turkish involvement both in the Balkan crisis after the end of the cold war and the continuing Middle East crises was deemed necessary because of Turkish embeddedness or, as he denes it, the historic depth in both regions. In his book Davutoglu identies several areas of the cross-border spheres of inuence. He uses a concept of Turkeys contiguous land basins that include the Balkans, Caucasus and the Middle East to describe Turkeys potential spheres of inuence. He enumerates the Black, Eastern Mediterranean, Caspian seas and the Persian Gulf or the Gulf of Basra as a natural extension of Turkeys maritime basin. He also stresses a shift in geopolitical status of Turkey from a barrier, predicated on its NATO membership during the cold war, to a bridge to a new regional system, which extends beyond Erzurum Plain and includes states of Caucasus and Eurasia. He also notes that the concept of the continental basin allows Turkey to gain strategic depth in Asia, and projection into Europe and Africa.41 Prime Minister Erdogans foreign policy advisor explains why historical and geographical aspects are so important during periods of transition such as the postcold war period: It is important to make a rational evaluation from a historical and geographical perspective when it comes to evaluating a country or societys potential and its ability to adapt to new conditions.42 He points to the critical signicance of the historic period in the life of a nation when strategic thinking is being formulated (in the case of Britain it was the period of the English Civil War in the middle of seventeenth century; in the case of Germany it was during the rst unication after 1870, the American Civil War period in the case of the United States). In order to assess the Turkish place in the world, he recommends a look back to Turkeys Ottoman past. He proposes, We are a society with historical depth, and everything produced in historical depth, even if it is eclipsed at a certain conjuncture in time, may manifest itself again later.43 He calls upon Turkish leadership take into account the historical responsibilities towards the Balkans, Caucasus and the Middle East when formulating foreign policy. Davutoglu criticizes the Kemalist establishment for missed opportunities during the past 50 years to redirect Turkish foreign policy towards these land basins. He stresses that as a result of an increased rate of globalization with the concomitant eects of advanced communications, and economic and social interdependency, Turkey now has a new opportunity to engage in these sub-regions. In this book Davutoglu particularly criticizes the failures of

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Turkish foreign policy towards the Turkic republics of the former Soviet Union in the early 1990s. He refers to this policy by the pan-Turkist slogan From the Adriatic to the Great Wall [of China] enunciated by Prime Minister Suleiman Demirel in his Turkic world speech in 1992. Davutoglu points to the wrong-headedness of this approach based on Turkist sentiments.44 He blames the Turkish foreign policy establishment of the 1990s for its inability to formulate all-embracing policies towards all regional issues. He notes also the dearth of academics in Turkey with knowledge in geopolitical regional balance as well as the absence of appropriate intellectual understanding of this foreign policy failure. The strategic depth doctrine calls for an active engagement with all regional systems in Turkeys neighbourhood. In his book he argues that Turkey needs to ` rediscover its historic and geographic identity and reassess its own position vis-a-vis regional and global issues. In an interview with the Turkish daily Vatan, Davutoglu said, 2003 was the year of making up for a loss in foreign policy. In the same interview he claimed that 2004 will be a year when Turkey will be brought onto the international agenda.45 This would allow Turkey to lead an assertive foreign policy and form its own axis. Davutoglu called for re-engagement with the Middle Eastern region, in particular with Iran, Syria and the Gulf States. In the Balkan region he stressed the importance of Greece and Bulgaria, while in Caucasus he pointed to robustness of GeorgianTurkish relations.46 In view of the transatlantic split in the wake of the second Gulf War, the architect of Erdogans foreign policy advised developing a balanced approach towards all global and regional actors. He emphasized the importance of economic interdependency in the globalizing world and the need to build strong economic linkages with all regional states. In the nal analysis, he envisioned that Turkey would transform itself into a global actor.47

Since the AK party government came to power in November of 2002, the Turkish government pursued the realization of the neo-Ottoman doctrine in its foreign policy. The contemporary Turkish leadership attempts to assume a more assertive role of regional player and to mediate regional conicts. One of important goals of Erdogans government is to preclude further intervention of the United States in Middle Eastern aairs (in particular Turkey objects along with European Union countries to the American Greater Middle East Initiative). In order to accomplish this Turkey calls upon its neighbors to undertake political and economic reforms themselves. Foreign Minister Gul warned Arab countries in an interview with a London Arab-language daily Al-Hayat, If we dont take the reins . . . and prefer to cover up and ignore them [our problems], then others [the United States] will try to solve them their way and interfere in our aairs.48 He criticized the potential American approach to solving problems in the region: And this interference will take place in the wrong way because they dont understand our sensitivities, our habits, our cultures and our social structure.49 Turks used the neo-Ottoman discourse in projecting the image of a just and impartial arbiter in foreign policy towards the Middle East. In particular Turkey extended new diplomatic eorts to bringing peaceful resolution to the SyrianIsraeli and IsraeliPalestinian conicts. Turkey has undertaken bold steps to mediate regional conicts in the Middle East. The new Turkish government demonstrated its

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willingness to reconcile with the Muslim world. In particular, the Erdogan government took an activist approach in its relations with its neighbours to the east (Iran) and south (Iraq, Syria), while the bilateral relations with Israel entered a cooler period.50 The war in Iraq served as a political opportunity for the new Turkish foreign policy. One Turkish commentator observed, Iraq is becoming a unifying factor in the region. Turkish diplomacy is trying to mobilize public opinion in the region now. This gives Turkey the opportunity to play the role of a regional power.51 The rst important test of Turkish dynamism, inspired by the new spirit in Turkish foreign policy, was the crisis in Iraq in the winter of 2003. The possibility of war in Iraq and its dismemberment raised the spectre of the creation of an independent Kurdish state in Northern Iraq and separatist demands among the Turkish Kurds. Turkey pursued all avenues to prevent this occurring. During the Saddam Hussein regimes stand-o with Western weapons inspectors, who sought to identify and demolish Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the Turkish leadership took the initiative to convene Iraqs neighbours in Istanbul on 23 January 2003. The objective of this meeting was to prevent hostilities in the wake of the Second Gulf War. The foreign ministers of Saudi Arabia, Iran, Syria, Jordan, Egypt and Turkey were invited to Cirag Palace Hotel to call on Iraqs former president Saddam Hussein to cooperate with arms inspectors from the UN Monitoring, Verication and Inspection Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency. The symbolism of a convention of representatives of Muslim states in an Ottoman-era Palace52 was not lost on the Middle Eastern audience. The Lebanese Daily Star commented, Turkeys prime minister, Abdullah Gul, may look like a budget version of Rak Hariri, but he hosted an old-fashioned Ottoman parley on Wednesday at Istanbuls Ciragan palace.53 The Muslim neighbours urged Iraq to continue cooperating with the arms inspectors from the UN Monitoring, Verication and Inspection Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency. At the conclusion of this conference Turkish Foreign Minister Yasar Yakis stated We call solemnly on the Iraqi leadership to move irreversibly and sincerely towards assuming its responsibilities in restoring peace and stability in the region.54 The timing and place of the Istanbul conference with Turkey as a convener indicated renewed dynamism in Turkish attempts to become a regional leader and mediator of the conicts in the region, which was a patrimony of the Ottoman Empire. Addressing his counterparts, Yasar Yakis warned about the impending war: There is a re which is moving towards our homes. Praying to Allah to spare us from a war is an approach, but exerting all our eorts to prevent war, knocking on all doors and exploring every possible means that could prevent a war is another approach.55 The earnestness and consistency with which the AK government pursued its policy to avert the military action in Iraq was attested to by the last-ditch attempt at unconventional diplomacy. Iraqi Vice President Taha Yasin Ramadan was secretly brought to the meeting at the Cirag Palace hotel, but he did not accept the demand for political restructuring in Iraq and this caused the failure of Ankaras initiative.56 The behind-the-scenes inuence of Ahmet Davutoglu on political developments related to the foreign policy in Turkey was underlined by the rejection of a bill to allow American troops to pass through Turkey on their way to Iraq in Milli Mejlis on 3 March 2003. The chief foreign policy advisor to the Turkish prime minister objected to the American troops deployment through south-eastern Turkey.57

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In post-war Iraq the attention of Turkish foreign policy makers was brought to bear on the former Ottoman possessions in the modern Iraq.58 The inability of the Turkish army to curb Kurdish rebellions in these territories and British pressure forced Ataturks government to withdraw claims on oil-rich Mosul and Kirkuk in 1926. As Omar Taspinar succinctly concluded, Imbued with the painful memory of Western powers partitioning Ottoman-Turkish lands, the Kurdish question came to be seen as the last chapter of a conspiracy written in Western capitals.59 Turkish activism in the post-war Iraq put Turks on a collision course with US interests.60 In particular, contention erupted regarding the fate of Mosul and Kirkuk provinces. These two provinces in northern Iraq are predominantly populated by Kurds. The crux of this issue is the presence of major Iraqi oil elds of Mosul and Kirkuk provinces, which could potentially provide an economic foundation for a Kurdish autonomous entity.61 Turkish military and civilian decision makers perceive such an eventuality as a direct threat to the stability of the Turkish state.62 Americans are concerned about the emergence of an additional focus of violence and instability, if Turkish troops were to engage Peshmerga, the Kurdish militia, on Iraqi soil. Turkey expresses vocal support for increased inuence of the Turcoman minority which also populates the cities of Kirkuk and Mosul. Turkey has raised international alarm that the Kurdish leaders might conduct ethnic cleansing of Turcomans from the provincial urban areas.63 On the eve of the rst democratic elections in Iraq in January 2005, the Turkish authorities openly threatened that it would intervene militarily, if the Iraqi Kurdish authorities would attempt to change the ethnic makeup of Kirkuk by articially increasing the citys Kurdish population.64 In order to ` provide a plausible explanation for their military posture vis-a-vis Kirkuk, the Turkish government accused the city government, controlled by representatives of the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), of harbouring PKK guerrillas in the city.65 The Turkish side perceives these attempts at population changes in the Kurdish favour as a policy to integrate Kirkuk into the Kurdish autonomous region which would serve as a territorial base for the creation of an independent Kurdish state. Suppressing the painful memories of the division of the Ottoman Empire, the Turkish political elite promotes Turkey as the guarantor of peace in contemporary Iraq.66 Following with great anxiety the Kurdish assertiveness in the northern Iraqi provinces, Turkey objects to the upcoming referendum in 2007 that will determine if Kirkuk will join the Kurdish autonomy or will stay with the rest of Iraq. In January of 2006, Yigit Alpogan, secretary-general of Turkeys National Security Council, remarked that Turkey views these developments as extremely dangerous a threat to Iraqs security, territorial integrity, and long-term existence. Kirkuk is Iraqs lynchpin; if the city is attached to a specic region of the country, it will be dicult to hold Iraq together.67

In congruence with the new foreign policy doctrine the Erdogan government is pursuing a dramatic improvement in its relations with neighbouring Syria. After a decade of animosity, which peaked with the Ocalan aair and the trans-border military build-up in 1998,68 the Erdogan government initiated a diplomatic oensive to reach a new understanding with the Syrian government, among other Arab countries.69 Over the last few years relations between the two countries drastically improved. In Ankara in July 2003 the two countries signed a signicant number of

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bilateral agreements in the Sixth TurkishSyrian Protocol, which covers the economic sphere, duty-free trade, tourism and educational exchange.70 In December 2003 a Turkish parliamentary delegation visited Syria to restart a bilateral dialogue on the contentious issue of Hatay province and terrorism.71 This exchange was followed by a state visit by President Bashar Assad in January 2004. In was the rst visit to Turkey by a Syrian head of state in 57 years. Both heads of states declared their intention to forge an alliance against terrorism and agreed on a common vision as allies on how to ensure peace in the Middle East. Bashar Assad described this dramatic improvement after meeting with Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer during this three-day visit: Our relations are ready to reach the highest level. The Syrian leadership also recognized the international legal framework of the acceptance of Turkish borders and the territorial integrity of Iraq.72 Such a precipitous departure in Turkish foreign policy from the decades of suspicion and animosity is also driven by pragmatic regional considerations. Both countries share a deep concern over the Kurdish aspirations for autonomy in northern Iraq and the possible negative repercussions for Turkish and Syrian Kurdish minorities. According to the daily Zaman, the newly obtained shared regional perspectives caused the Arab press to describe the TurkishSyrian rapprochement as the Strategic Convergence.73 The Lebanese Daily Star reported on the visit with the headline Is it a new era between two states? The article commented that there were war clouds between the two states until 1998 but Turkey is now prepared to play a signicant role in Syrian politics with the political convergence developed between Ankara and Damascus alongside the free trade agreement.74 In particular, the most recent visit by Turkish President Sezer to Damascus in April 2005 became a source of controversy. As American and European pressure mounted on Syria to withdraw its troops and intelligence forces from Lebanon, President Sezer announced that he would proceed with his state visit to Syria. The US ambassador in Ankara, Eric Edelman, then publicly called upon Turkey to join the international consensus on Syria. This was widely understood in Turkish diplomatic circles as an American warning to cancel the Syrian trip. The Turkish president made a visit that caused consternation on the part of the American administration and was hailed by Syrian President Bashar Assad as evidence that NATO member Turkey is ready to stand up to the United States on issues of national interest.75 Ahmet Sezer conveyed a message to Bashar Assad that Syria must implement the United Nations resolution and pull out all its troops from Lebanon by the end of April 2005. Turkish and Syrian sides underline their common interests and historical links as the basis for their new relationship. They share unanimity about the preservation of the territorial integrity of Iraq. At a press conference held in Damascus, the Syrian president pointed out that they had also reached a consensus about Iraq, We want Iraq to exercise its right of national self determination. Shortly after the visit, in order to mend fences with its American NATO ally, Turkey approved the long-pending decision to extend the use of the Incirlik base by the NATO forces involved in the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.76

The Erdogan administration also attempted to open a new era in TurkishIranian relations. During the AK government this relationship experienced a turnaround.

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It was just in May 2001 that a former Turkish prime minister, Tansu Ciller, described the bilateral relations as neither black nor white, but a shade of gray. In particular she cited Iranian support for terrorist activities of the PKK inside Turkey and pursuit of WMD as persistent causes for tension in TurkishIranian relations. She said that, Turks are approaching these latest developments [with Iran] very cautiously.77 Ciller reiterated the necessity for the US-imposed policy of double containment.78 Over three years the rhetoric of the Turkish leadership changed signicantly. After the Second Gulf War, Turkey and Iran found a common enemy in the Kurdish militancy, in particular the PKK, which found a safe haven in Kurdish-dominated northern Iraq. In July 2004 Prime Minister Erdogan visited Teheran and signed a multi-dimensional cooperation scheme that included a joint commitment to security cooperation with Iran in the struggle against the PKK and a series of economic agreements. Economic cooperation involved agreements about deliveries of Iranian gas to Europe through Turkish territory and of a pricing dispute over natural gas supplied by Iran to Turkey. In response to American diplomatic warnings that business contracts with Iran were punishable by sanctions under US law, the Turkish prime minister said: Just as all other countries in the world develop relations with their neighbours, so too will Turkey develop its relations with its neighbours. And it is determined about this.79 In a broad reference to the Strategic Depth doctrine he added at the press conference in Teheran: Before we came to power, we promised that we would develop relations with our neighbours and included this in our action plan. We did not make any discrimination among our neighbours. The regional peace will be set up in this way. Just like how all the worlds countries develop relations with their neighbours, Turkey will also develop its relations with its neighbours. It is determined about this.80 In fact trade between the two countries reached $2.3 billion in 2004. But there were some drawbacks to further development of bilateral trade and friendly relations between the two countries. Turkcell, the largest Turkish mobile phone operator, led a foreign consortium that concluded the largest commercial deal with Iran worth more than $3 billion over 15 years to provide digital cellular phone service based on the Global System for Mobile (GSM) technology. This deal was blocked by the Iranian parliament because of the alleged Zionist links of Turkcell. Another important business venture, the operation of Tehrans Imam Khomeini international airport by the Turkish Tepe-Akfen-Vie (TAV) consortium, collapsed when the Turkish operator was blocked by Iranian tanks over suspicions of Israeli involvement in the project. During the 2004 visit Prime Minister Erdogan was lectured by Iranian Foreign Minister Kharazi about burgeoning Turkish relations with Israel and the United States. In particular, the Iranian ocial accused Israel of stirring Kurdish separatism in northern Iraq.81 TurkishIranian security cooperation ourished as both countries joined eorts to defeat Gol Congress (the former PKK) insurgency. Irans ambassador to Turkey Firouz Dowlatabadi even indicated that Iranian and Turkish military forces could participate in joint operations against the PKK if planned in advance and if certain protocols were signed. On this occasion, Dowlatabadi again tried to turn his Turkish hosts against Israel. He stressed: Israels nal objective is the establishment of an independent Kurdish government in Iraqs Kurdistan Province and although such reports are being broadcast today, the Israeli regime, in collaboration with the CIA

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and the Intelligence Service, has been pursuing that objective for 20 years.82 In February 2006, Turkish and Iranian security forces signed a memorandum of understanding to cooperate on counter-insurgency issues to promote further coordination and security measures against the PKK.83 At the end of May 2006 Iranian forces entered Iraqi territory and shelled Kandil Mountain, the alleged location of the headquarters and military camps of the PKK. The Iranian Interior Minister Mustafa Pur Mohammadi explained this action as a part of the Iranian campaign to prevent PKK inltration into Turkey. Turkeys ambassador to Tehran, Gurcan Turkoglu, praised the TurkishIranian security cooperation. He denied that Turkey amasses its troops on the Iraqi border as a show of force to Iran, rather than to ght against a possible threat to Turkey and Iran.84 Over allegations that Turkish Special Forces also conducted a cross-border hot pursuit operation in northern Iraq, the Iraqi government sent a note of protest to the Turkish authorities. As a stronger response, Iraqi President Jalal Talabani warned Iran and Turkey against intervention in Iraqs domestic aairs.85 The AK government gave a new impetus to Turkish eorts to mediate conict between Syria and Israel. The conict dates back to the Six Day War of 1967, when Israel occupied the Golan Heights. The Syrian government intends to exchange peace for the return of the Golan Heights.86 The Erdogan administration made several attempts to mediate between the warring parties. During the rst summit in January 2004 between Erdogan and Bashar Assad, Israel used the good oces of Prime Minister Erdogan to pass a message to the Syrian leader.87 Prime Minster Erdogan personally got involved in the diplomatic eort. After Bashar Assads visit, he met the Israeli ambassador to Ankara, Pinhas Avivi and relayed that, Syrian President Bashar Assad said he is serious in his intention to renew peace talks with Israel, and intends taking all the necessary steps to reach a peace agreement in the Middle East.88 Furthermore, Israel itself might be very interested in Turkeys intercession with Syria. With reference to an emerging reality in the post-Saddam Middle East, a former Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netaniahu commented on the prospects of the Syrian track: I think there is the opportunity today to explore possible contacts with Syria.89 However, very soon Turkey exhausted its diplomatic eorts over divergence of positions on both Syria and Israel. The Turkish Foreign Minister commented in February of 2004: Turkey will not play the role of mediator between Syria and Israel, though it is a state with excellent relations with both parties.90 From the beginning of the Peace Process at the Madrid Conference in 1991, and especially after the Oslo Accords of 1993, Turkey advocated an even-handed approach to the resolution of the IsraeliPalestinian conict. However, the strategic axes with Israel which evolved from 1996 derogated the Palestinian cause to a secondary consideration. In 2000, when al-Aqsa intifada started, the Turkish government was forced by domestic pressures to distance itself from Israel.91 When the AK party came to power in Ankara the attitude towards the plight of the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza became a prominent factor in Turkish foreign policy and this inevitably aected TurkishIsraeli ties. Initially in spring 2003 Prime Minister Erdogan delayed his visit to Israel for an indenite period. Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul suggested upgrading diplomatic relations with the Palestinian Authority to an ambassadorial level. But a drastic deterioration in

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relations occurred in May 2004 as a result of extreme Israeli military actions in Gaza with numerous civilian deaths. Erdogan expressed open criticism of Israeli policies and called Israel a terrorist state.92 He also temporarily recalled the Ankara ambassador in Israel to express his protest. However, economic and military cooperation between Turkey and Israel continued. Turkey and Israel signed a multimillion water deal for 20 years. Turkey had bought US$3 billion worth of Israeli weapons from 1996. In May 2004 a contract worth $800 million was signed by Prime Minister Erdogan for Turkish companies to build three gas plants in Israel. In a reversal of his earlier rejection of the invitation to visit Israel and an attempt to improve the climate of USTurkish relations, Erdogan made his rst ocial visit to Israel with a large delegation of state ministers and businessmen on 1 May 2005. He discussed with Prime Minister Ariel Sharon a possible participation of Turkey in the solution of the IsraeliPalestinian conict, the regional situation in the Middle East and an agreement on Turkish air force modernization by the Israeli military industry. Another important discussion was a joint TurkishIsraeli project to build a pipeline to deliver Russian gas to Israel through Turkish territory and under Mediterranean waters. Sharon oered to convene an international peace conference in Turkey at a future date, and oered to allow Erdogan a role in the Gaza Strips economic development after the Israeli pullout. Erdogan and Sharon made a commitment to strengthen TurkishIsraeli intelligence cooperation to combat terrorism. The establishment of a hot line between the two leaders to discuss urgent regional developments was a highlight of the visit.93 After the election victory of Hamas (the Islamic Resistance Movement) of January 2006 in the Palestinian territories, Israel faced the prospect of the Palestinian leadership composed of the members of the Palestinian Islamist organization openly committed to the destruction of the Jewish state. The rst task of Hamas was to nd international recognition, especially because it was designated as a terrorist organization by the United States and the EU. The Turkish leadership made an unexpected faux pas by inviting Khaled Mashal, the ocial representative of Hamas in Damascus, to visit Turkey for a meeting with Turkish ocials, including Abdullah Gul. The avowed goal of Turkey was to mediate between Israel and the Hamas leadership. But this attempt at unsolicited mediation was seen as hostile and deleterious to TurkishIsraeli relations. Israel was deeply concerned by Turkeys holding talks with Hamas as this provided Hamas with undeserved legitimacy. Raanan Gissin, the spokesman of the Israeli Prime Ministers Oce, commented during an interview on Turkish television: It is a serious mistake; this visit could have consequences for our links that could be hard to repair. He asked what the Turkish reaction would be if Tel Aviv had invited Abdullah Ocalan, the now imprisoned leader of the pro-Kurdish terrorist group the PKK, to Israel for talks. The Turkish Foreign Ministry described the comparison as completely groundless and wrong. Turkish ocials explained that in their talks they urged Hamas to renounce violence and adopt a conciliatory attitude towards Israel. Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul said the meeting with Hamas fullled the governments international responsibilities in trying to steer the Palestinians towards peace.94 The meeting by Turkish ocials with a Hamas representative caused grave consternation within the Bush administration and the Israeli government.

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Since the eruption of the international crisis regarding the violations by Iran of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and Iranian intentions to create nuclear weapons in 2004, Turkey initially defended the Iranian nuclear programme as a pursuit of the peaceful development of nuclear energy.95 As the United States and European powers started to raise the alarm about Iranian evasions of the monitoring of its nuclear sites by the International Atomic Energy Agency, Turkish diplomats attempted to convey messages of concern to their Iranian counterparts. However, under international pressure the Erdogan government began to change its attitude towards the Iranian nuclear programme. In January 2006 at a press conference in Ankara, the Turkish prime minister exerted diplomatic pressure on Iran. He called for adoption of a more moderate and amenable approach in the diplomatic negotiations over its nuclear programme. The continuation of Irans nuclear programme for peaceful ends is a natural right, but it is impossible to support it if it concerns [the development] of weapons of mass destruction.96 At the same time, the Turkish prime minister did not want to antagonize its main natural gas supplier and important trade partner. As the debate about policy towards Iran reached a critical point in the Turkish foreign policy establishment, a rift occurred among the Kemalist politicians, military and security community on the one hand and the Islamist circles in the government on the other. Turkish diplomats publicly expressed their opinion that the Turkish approach is in line with Europe, i.e. seeking the diplomatic solution to this crisis. But in the end, as Sami Kohen concludes, There is an understanding between the US and Israel and Turkey on the perception that Iran may become a threat if it develops nuclear weapons. There is also a common understanding with the rest of the world that [Iranian President Mahmoud] Ahmadinejad is becoming a dangerous leader with his very provocative and aggressive statements.97 Meanwhile, Turkey decided to seek its own nuclear power to counterbalance Iran and prevent an increasing dependence on gas as a source of energy.98

As Ahmet Davutglu admits, since the AK party became the party of the government with the dominant position in the Turkish parliament in November 2003, a new paradigm emerged in Turkish foreign policy. Using the Islamist discourse, this inuential policy advisor advances a new vision of Turkey as playing a decisive role as a participant in an emerging multi-dimensional world order, being still in a positive relationship with the United States and Israel, but also an active player in Europe, the Middle East and Central Asia. Reecting the neo-Ottomanist trend in Turkish intellectual life, Davutoglu proposed a deliberate revival of the Ottoman past, both as a matter of cultural enrichment, but also as a source of an enriched Turkish identity as a political actor.99 According to Richard Falk, Davutoglu emphasizes the accommodative character of the Ottoman Empire at its height.100 The Erdogan governments foreign policy under Davutoglus guidance seeks a zero conict foreign policy for Turkey, as well as a balance between relations with Europe, the Middle East, Asia, and with the United States. Erdogans energetic drive towards the European Union in spite of cautionary signals by the military indicates the increased

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autonomy and critical role which the current prime minister has come to play over the domain of foreign policy. This new foreign policy course has caused a deep split within the foreign policy establishment in Turkey itself.101 The recognition of the validity of this new approach by the military establishment emboldened the current Turkish leadership to deviate from blindly following the American line. This growing gap between positions of the United States and Turkey on the Middle East drew criticism from some American analysts associated with the Bush administration. Former assistant to Deputy Secretary of Defense Michael Rubin wrote, The damage done by Erdogans positions extends far beyond hurt diplomatic feelings. His grandstanding has done lasting damage to Turkeys security.102 According to the same source, some regional actors were irritated by the neo-Ottoman discourse adopted by the current Turkish leadership. Neo-Ottomanism, as manifested in the Strategic Depth doctrine, has become a signicant feature of Turkish foreign policy. But Turkeys attempt to reassert its historical role as the bridge between the West and the Muslim world has its share of inuential adherents and critics. So Turkey will proceed haltingly in this oldnew role in deference to the Ottoman tradition.

Notes
1. Ozal attempted to revive the Ottoman millet system in order to give recognition to separate religious and ethnic identities, including a Kurdish identity. He intended to redene the character of the modern Turkish nation on the Ottoman multi-ethic model. M. Ataman, Ozal Leadership and Restructuring of Turkish Ethnic Politics in 1980s, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.34, No.4 (October 2002), pp.1278. 2. See R.D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, International Organization, Vol.42 (1988), pp.42760; C. Kegley, N. Richardson and G. Richter, Conict at Home and Abroad: An Empirical Extension, Journal of Politics, Vol.40 (1978), pp.74252; Z. Maoz, Joining the Club of Nations: Political Development and International Conict, 18161976, International Studies Quarterly, Vol.33 (1989), pp.199231; T.C. Morgan and K. Bicker, Domestic Discontent and the External Use of Force, Journal of Conict Resolution, Vol.36 (1992), pp.2552. 3. G. Fuller, Turkeys Strategic Model: Myths and Realities, The Washington Quarterly (Summer 2004), p.59. See also A. Tas getiren, Davudolunu okumak, Yeni Safak, 28 January 2003. g 4. A. Han, The World of Business Now Spearheads Foreign Policy, an Interview with Ahmet Davutoglu, Turkish Times, AprilMay 2004. 5. M. Ataman, Leadership Change: Ozal Leadership and Restructuring in Turkish Foreign Policy, Alternatives, Vol.1, No.1 (Spring 2002), p.12. 6. See a discussion of these movements in M. Ataman, Ozal and Turkish Ethnic Policy, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.34, No.4 (October 2002), p.133. 7. Ibid. 8. A. Bayramoglu, Yeni Safak. Quoted in M. Rubin,Shifting Sides? The Problems of NeoOttomanism, National Review Online, 10 August 2004, available at http://www.meforum.org/ article/628 9. Ataman, Leadership Change, p.13. 10. Anavatan Partisi II, Olaan Buyuk Kongresi Faaliyet Raporu, 1819 Haziran 1988, Ankara Ataturk Spor Salonu. 11. The Turkish word adalet has its historical precursor in the Arabic concept of adala, that is the central function of the ruler or sultan to guarantee justice for his subjects. This political ideal provided legitimacy for sultans in the Ottoman Empire. This concept was widely held in Islamic political theory and has roots in Arabic and Persian traditions. See The Ottomans: Origins, available at http://www.wsu.edu:8080/*dee/OTTOMAN/ORIGIN.HTM 12. Turkey expects to obtain an important trump card relating to Cyprus after the talks between Erdogan and President Bush, Vatan, 7 January 2004.

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13. Ibid. 14. A. Davutoglu, Stratejik Derinlik/Turkiyenin Uluslararasi Konumu [The Strategic Depth: The Turkish International Location] (Istanbul: Kure Yayinlari, 2000). 15. According to Philip Robins, multi-dimensional foreign policy doctrine during the Erbakan period (199697) constituted a pursuit of improvement bilateral relations with Asian countries such as Iran, Pakistan, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia and African countries such as Egypt, Libya and Nigeria. The conceptual content of this policy was to build ties with signicant middle powers to the east, without jeopardising Ankaras traditional ties with the West. P. Robins, Turkish Foreign Policy, Madeleine Feher Annual European Scholar Lecture, publication of Begin-Sadat for Strategic Studies, August 1999, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan. 16. Vatan, 7 January 2004. 17. A. Davutoglu, The Clash of Interests: An Explanation of the World (Dis)Order, Perceptions Journal of International Aairs, Vol. 2, No. 4 (Dec 1997Feb 1998), p.1. See also W. Thompson, On Global War: Historical-Structural Approaches to World Politics (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1988), p.7. 18. Davutoglu, op. cit. 19. Ibid. 20. Ibid. 21. Ibid. 22. Ibid. 23. Ibid. This perceptional frame is poignant in view of clashes between Muslim Shiites, Kurds and Sunnis in the contemporary Iraq. 24. Ibid. 25. Ibid. Cf. Mahans conceptualization in A. Westcott, Mahan On Naval Warfare (Boston: Little, Brown, 1948), p.77. 26. Ibid. 27. Ibid. 28. Ibid. The earlier American entanglement in Sudan and the current occupation of Iraq certainly provide substance to this argument. 29. Ibid. 30. Ibid. 31. Ibid. 32. Ataman, Leadership Change, p.17. 33. B. Yeilada, Turkish Foreign Policy toward the Middle East, in A. Eralp et al. (eds.), The Political and Socioeconomic Transformation of Turkey (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993), pp.16992. 34. A. Davutoglu, Its only natural, Al-Ahram Weekly, No.564, 1319 December 2001. 35. Ibid. 36. Ibid. 37. Stratejik Derinlik. 38. See The Strategic Depth that Turkey Needs, An Interview with Ahmet Davutoglu, The Turkish Daily News, 15 September 2001. 39. Ibid. 40. Ibid. 41. Ibid. 42. Ibid. 43. Ibid. 44. Ibid. Others criticized the Turkish policy towards newly independent Turkic states as opportunistic and short-termist. Nilufer Narli characterized this policy as a de facto (reactive) foreign policy. In J. Naegele, Turkey: Foreign Policy Objectives Part Two, 13 August 1998, available at http:// www.b-info.com/places/Bulgaria/news/98-08/aug13b.rfe 45. Vatan, 7 January 2004. 46. Ibid. 47. Han, op. cit. 48. Gul says Arab states should press on with domestic reforms, Al-Hayat. As quoted in Al-jazeera, 18 February 2004. 49. Ibid.

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50. J.C. Helicke, Turkeys closer ties with Syria, Iran highlight changing regional role, Associated Press, Istanbul, 17 January 2004, available at http://www.Turks.us 51. Ibid. 52. Ciragan Palace was completed in 1857, after Abdulaziz acceded to the throne. Sultan Abdulaziz demanded his palace to be built in Arab style as a memorial to his reign. 53. M. Young, Lebanon: Clueless on Iraq, Daily Star, 25 January 2003. 54. Iraq told to actively cooperate with UN: Regional conference in Istanbul, Dawn Internet edition, 24 January, 2003, available at http://signs-of-the-times.org/signs/signs70.htm 55. Ibid. 56. Vatan, 7 January 2004. 57. Ibid. 58. The territorial settlements that followed the collapse of the Ottoman Empire after the First World War, apportioned these two former Ottoman villayets to the British-dominated Iraqi Mandate. When the British found oil in the early 1920s, Turks attempted to obtain some reparations for the loss of the oil-producing provinces. In compensation, Turkey was to receive a portion of the oil revenues including those from transportation and other petroleum products out of Mosul for 25 years, but instead Turkey agreed to a 500,000 buyout. The post-war settlement also denied Turkish claims to large parts of northern Iraq, which holds substantial populations of Turcomans, ethnic Turks. See also D. Pipes, Hot Spot: Turkey, Iraq, and Mosul, Middle East Quarterly, September 1995; Back-to-Iraq website, http://www.back-to-iraq.com/archives/000129.php 59. Turkeys Kurdish question, Daily Times, 4 June 2003. 60. Dangers in Northern Iraq, The New York Times, 2 March 2003. United States and Great Britain made a commitment to support the Kurdish regional autonomy in northern Iraq. See Guardian, 7 January 2004. 61. D. Filkins, Turkey Assesses Question of Kurds, The New York Times, 21 February 2003. See also Turkey Wants Say Over Kirkuk, Agence France Presse, 14 October 2004. 62. J.-C. Peuch, Turkey: Ankara Moves To Vote On Second U.S. Motion In Hope Of Containing Kurds, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 19 March 2003. 63. Ibid. 64. The Turkish deputy head of the General Sta, General Ilker Basbug, warned in a televised news conference that if that the signicant change in the demographic structure of the oil-rich city of Kirkuk should occur, Such a development would pose an important security problem for Turkey, 27 January 2005, available at http://www.Turks.us 65. Turkeys accusations is an introduction for invading Kurdistan, Al Hayat, 26 July 2005. 66. See in particular the articles of the Sevres Treaty related to the status of the Kurdish peoples, Articles 6264, Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Turkey signed at Sevres, 10 August 1920, available at http://www.hri.org/docs/sevres/part3.html#89 67. Y. Alpogan, Turkey: Between the West and the Middle East, PolicyWatch, No.1074: Special Forum Report, The Washington Institute for the Near East Policy, 31 January 2006. It is unlikely that Turkey would get involved militarily in northern Iraq, if only for the reason that such involvement would endanger its ocially touted pursuit of the membership in the European Union. 68. See Turkey Warns Syria Again Not To Support Rebel Kurds, International Herald Tribune, 6 October 1998; Syria Calls Turkish Threat a Plot, The Washington Post, 2 October 1998; S. Kinzer, Syria Agrees to Stop Supporting Kurds, Defusing Crisis With Turkey, The New York Times, 22 October 1998; and Turkish-Syrian Discussions, Al-Ittihad (Abu Dhabi), 30 October 1998. 69. Very daring ideas, Al-Ahram, 915 January 2003. 70. See the Protocol of the Sixth Session of the TurkishSyrian Joint Commission for Economic, Scientic, Technical and Commercial Cooperation, Ankara, 2429 July 2003. 71. Suriyede ilk kez Hatay denildi, Zaman, 11 December 2003. 72. H. Koylu, Suriye ile mutlu gun, Zaman, 7 January 2004. 73. Strategic Convergence, Zaman, 26 December 2004. 74. Quoted ibid. 75. Turkish President, Ahmed Cezer, Visits Syria Amid U.S. Unease, Al-Jazeerah, 13 April 2005. It is noteworthy that Turkey did not raise objections to the sale of Russian short-range missiles to Syria in March 2005. These missiles were purportedly to be used against Israel with which Turkey signed

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the military cooperation treaty in 1996. The Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov denied that anti-aircraft Strelets missiles can threaten Israel. See USTurkish Relations Go Wobbly Now Over Syria, 23 March 2005, available at http://www.Turks.us Turkey: Period for Usage of Incirlik Base Extended, 25 April 2005, available at http:// www.Turks.us. The Turkish government imposed severe restrictions on the use of the Incirlik base facilities, including the right of control for each ight and if any operation is seen as being against the national interests of Turkey. No Incirlik blank cheque for US, 3 May 2005, available at http:// www.Turks.us T. Ciller, Turkey: Todays Political and Economic Realities, PolicyWatch, No.534: Special Forum Report, WINEP, 15 May 2001. Ibid. Turkeys Iranian Relations Unaected by US, 29 July 2004, available at http://www.Turks.us Iran, Turkey set to boost cooperation, IRNA (Iran News Agency), 30 July 2004. Turkey, Iran seal cooperation, 30 July 2004, available at http://www.Turks.us Irans envoy: Tehran-Ankara security cooperation expanding, IRNA, 21 July 2004. Iran, Turkey Sign Security Pact, Middle East News online, 25 February 2006, available at http:// www.menewsline.com/stories/2006/february/02-26-1.html Iran Strikes PKK Camp on Mt. Kandil, 2 May 2006, available at http://www.Turks.us Iraq president Talabani warns Turkey and Iran, 30 May 2006, available at http://www.Turks.us See S.G. Hajjar, The IsraelSyria Track, Middle East Policy, Vol.VI, No.3 (February 1999), pp.223. Hilal Koylu, op. cit. A. Benn and A. Harel, Turkish PM to Israel: Assad serious about renewing talks, Haaretz, 8 January 2004. Ibid. Turkey wont be IsraelSyria peacemaker, Al-Jazeera, 18 February 2004. L. Martin, Turkeys Middle East Foreign Policy, in L. Martin and D. Keridis (eds.), The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2004), p.185. Turkish PM: Israel a terrorist state, Al-Jazeera, 27 May 2004. The timing of this diplomatic attack against Israel was not accidental. At the time of the crisis in Gaza, a Turkish candidate was considered for nomination to the post of the secretary-general of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). The vigorous verbal attack by the Turkish prime minister on Israel swayed the OICs vote in Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglus favour. This was the rst time that Turkish representative was elected to be the leader of the largest Islamic intergovernmental organization. This position signicantly enhanced the status of the Turkish republic in the Muslim world. Comments by an unidentied Turkish state ocial, Personal interview. See also Emergency Meeting of OIC: Turkish State Minister Atalay: We Should Use our Inuence to Resume Talks, Anadolu Agency, 22 April 2004. Prime Minister of Turkey Arrived in Israel, Mignews.com, 1 May 2005; A. Benn, Visiting Turkish PM sees Role in Peace Process, Haaretz, 2 May 2005. Turkey Rejects Israeli Criticism, BBC News, 17 February 2006. Erdogan Terms Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy Irans Right, IRNA, 30 July 2004. Quoted in Y. Schleifer, Caught in the Fray: Turkey Enters Debate on Irans Nuclear Program, The Christian Science Monitor, 2 February 2006. Ibid. WP: Iranian Crisis Forces Turkey to Resort to Nuclear, 8 March 2006, available at http:// www.Turks.us R. Falk, Reconsidering Turkey, Zaman, 6 October 2004. Falk describes this neo-Ottomanist foreign policy as based on the willingness to appreciate and respect civilizational and ethnic diversity, and to deal with political conict in a spirit of compromise and reconciliation. Ibid. You can see a split between the people who run the foreign ministry and the people who run foreign policy for the AKP and thats really a struggle for the future course of Turkish foreign policy, said an Ankara-based western diplomat, who asked not to be named because of the sensitivity of the issue. Quoted in Y. Schleifer, Turkey Aims to Bridge West and Middle East, Eurasianet, 6 April 2006. Rubin, op. cit.

76.

77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92.

93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100.

101.

102.