Katri Mehtonen

Corresponding author:
Katri Mehtonen
Water Resources Laboratory
Helsinki University of Technology - TKK
P.O. Box 5200
FIN-02015 TKK, Finland
Email: katri.mehtonen@gmail.com
Water Resources Laboratory, Helsinki University of Technology, Finland
DO THE DOWNSTREAM COUNTRIES OPPOSE
THE UPSTREAM DAMS?
It is often argued that China builds dams on the upstream Mekong despite the opposition of the
downstream countries. Particularly the media have reported the situation as if the downstream nations
wished China to stop the damming. However, the opposing voices represent mostly the civil society and the
NGOs, and not the national governments. Actually, all of the Mekong countries are involved in the plans
for regional power trade, in which the Yunnan province of China will be a net exporter.
Therefore, the criticism towards upper Mekong damming should be
directed towards all the parties involved in the projects.
Currently, China is constructing a signicant
dam cascade on the upper Mekong River, and
plans exist to develop the upper Salween as well.
These projects cause concerns in the downstream
countries because of their possible social and
environmental impacts. The picture is however
not as simple as that, particularly what comes to
cross border energy trade. In addition to China,
there are several parties involved in the plans for
energy connection and trade, which are strongly
based on hydropower. Therefore, the downstream
countries views of the upper Mekong dams
were studied - in particular those of the national
governments. Even though different groups within
a country often think very differently of the dams,
reports of a country having a certain opinion are
usually understood to describe the opinion of the
national government.
Regional energy trade is strongly linked to the
Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) program,
which is a regional body between the six Mekong
riparian countries of Laos, Myanmar, Thailand,
Cambodia, Vietnam and China (the Yunnan
province is Chinas representative). The program
was established in 1992 mainly to promote
economic growth in the Mekong region. One of
the GMSs key issues is the lack of adequate energy
1 Introduction
2008 TKK & Mehtonen ISBN 978-951-22-9102-1
Kummu, M., Keskinen, M. & Varis, O. (eds.): Modern Myths of the Mekong, pp. 161-173
Water & Development Publications - Helsinki University of Technology
AB
Gas
41 %
Hydro
32 %
Coal
8 %
Lignite
7 %
Diesel
7 %
Fuel oil
4 %
mport
1 %
162
2.1 China
Chinas energy need is signicant, and is in
substantial growth. The biggest needs appear in the
economic centers of the east cost. According to the
Chinese Energy Research Centre at the National
Development and Reform Commission, Chinas
energy demand is expected to rise from 1.4 billion
tons of standard coal (2002) to 2.4-3.2 billion tons
by 2020 (Peoples Daily, 2003). Difculties in
electricity distribution, caused by long distances
and poor infrastructure, hamper fullling the
basic requirements. Regional differences are
substantial, and a signicant rural population has
not yet an access to electricity.
2 Energy and Hydropower in the GMS
There are great differences between the GMS
countries both in terms of electricity demand and
supply potential. However, in general, the energy
supply. Hydropower is the most signicant energy
resource in the GMS, but only a minor share of the
total potential has been so far harnessed.
This paper starts by describing the current energy
situation in the Mekong countries, based on the
available gures. Thereafter, the future aspects are
analyzed, including the plans for regional energy
trade and particularly energy imports from China.
Finally, the power setting between the countries,
the real opinions of the national governments, and
the reasons for their approaches are discussed.
The study was done by considering the following
questions:
What kind of picture does the media and other
readily available sources give from the upper
Mekong hydropower development and the
different players included in it?

What is the real approach of the Mekong
countries national governments to hydropower
development in the region - particularly
in China - and what are the reasons for the
stands the governments have taken?
Figure 1 Installed generation capacity and the shares of
different energy forms in the GMS countries. Chinas share
represents only Yunnan. (ADB 2003)
supply is inadequate to satisfy the needs of basic
development. In many countries, electrication
is still at a very low level (Table 1). Particularly
the rural people lack electricity, which would
be needed to improve living conditions and
agricultural production. The major constrains
for supply are the lack of generation capacity and
problems in transmission and distribution (ADB
2003).
Hydropower with its 32 % share of the total
installed capacity in the GMS region (Figure 1)
is an important component in bringing electricity
to the region. There are several signicant
rivers owing through the region, including the
Mekong, Salween, Irrawaddy and Red River.
The total hydropower potential is estimated to
be approximately 168,000 MW, of which 11,200
MW had been installed by 2001 (Yu, 2003). The
potential is mainly situated in Laos, Myanmar,
some parts of Vietnam and the Yunnan province of
China, which all have large untapped hydropower
potential far exceeding their own demand.
The relevant information of the GMS countries in
terms of energy needs and supply is summarized
in the Table 1 and in the following chapters. The
issue of future energy needs has raised a lot of
different opinions. The Asian Development Bank
(ADB) is one of those making energy predictions.
According to the ADB, the GMS economies
require signicantly more energy in the future to
fuel development (Table 2).
Modern Myths of the Mekong - Part IV: Politics and Policies
163
Supply requirements
in 2000 (GWh)
Supply requirements
in 2020 (GWh)
Annual growth
(%)
Per capita requirements
in 2000 (kWh)
Per capita requirements
in 2020 (kWh)
Thailand 96781 328429 6.3 1576 5349
Laos 865 4438 8.5 160 822
Cambodia 586 5720 12.1 52 511
Vietnam 26722 169428 9.7 335 2123
Myanmar 4400 16400 6.8 96 360
Yunnan 31635 91689 5.5 755 2188
Total (MW) Hydropower (MW) Share of hydro (%) Electrication level
(%)
Thailand 21 873 2 886 13,2 96
Laos 642 628 97,8 34
Cambodia 129 1 0,8 15
Vietnam 6 675 3 291 49,3 70
Yunnan 7 569 5 150 68 92
Myanmar 1 240 360 29 15
Table 1 Installed power generation capacities and electrication levels of 2001 (ADB, 2003).
Chinas main domestic energy resources are coal
and hydro. Coal accounts for about two-thirds of
Chinas total energy usage and for about 70-80
% of electricity generation (CSLF, 2005). Today,
hydropower and other renewable energy forms
receive growing attention particularly because
of environmental concerns. Chinas hydropower
potential is the largest in the world. According
to a government survey, the commercially viable
hydropower capacity is around 400,000 MW
Table 2 Supply requirements in the GMS countries in 2000 and 2020 (ADB, 2003).
Dams Catchment
area (km
2
)
Mean
annual
inow
(m
3
/s)
Cross
storage
inow
(MCM)
Net
storage
(MCM)
Low ow
increase
(m
3
/s)
Dam
height
(m)
Installed
capacity
(MW)
Resettlement
(persons)
Completion
(year)
Conguoqiao 97 200 985 510 120 8 130 750 n.a. n.a.
Xiaowan 113 300 1210 15 650 11 500 565 300 4 200 32 737 2012-2013
Manwan 114 500 1230 1110 410 26 126 1 500 3 513 1996
Dachaoshan 121 000 1342 940 240 15 110 1 350 6 054 2003
Nuozhadu 144 700 1771 7300 300 212 254 5 000 23 826 2017
Jinghong 149 100 1850 97 220 14 118 1 500 2 264 2003-2010
Ganlanha 151 800 1984 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Mengsong n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Table 3 The Upper Mekong projects (Plinston et al., 2000; Akatsuka et al., 1996).
2.1.1 Southwest Chinas hydropower plans
Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and the Yunnan
province are the major regions where the upper
Mekong (Lancang in Chinese) and other southwest
(Interfax, 2006). Hydropower currently provides
about a quarter of the nations total electricity
supply, while majority of the capacity still remains
untapped. Consequently, signicant increases of
hydropower production have been planned.
Mehtonen - Do the downstream countries oppose the upstream dams?
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
CHINA
THAILAND
INDIA
LAOS
VIETNAM
MYANMAR
CAMBODIA
BANGLADESH
BHUTAN
MALAYSIA
Hue
Hanoi
Dhaka
Lhasa
Bangkok
Rangoon
Kunming
Guiyang
Chengdu
Haiphong
Mandalay
Vientiane
Chongqing
Phnom Penh
Ho Chi Minh City
105E 100E 95E
30N
25N
20N
15N
10N
500
km
Legend
! Cities
Major rivers
country
Irrawaddy Basin
Salween Basin
Chao Phraya Basin
Mekong Basin
Red River Basin
South China Sea
Gulf of Thailand
Andaman Sea
Z
Salween
Chao
Phraya
Mekong
Red River
Irrawaddy
164
Chinas transboundary rivers ow (Figure 2).
Majority of these rivers cross the national border
in Yunnan. Yunnan is located close to Chinas
east coast and Southeast Asia, and therefore has
particularly great prospects for energy exports.
Yunnan has so far developed only a minor share of
its massive potential installed hydropower capacity
of about 100,000 MW, which accounts for about
24 % of the Chinas hydropower potential (Dore.,
2007). Of the total potential of the province,
around 20,000 MW is situated at the Mekong.
Yunnan already provides about 10 % of the
national hydropower production and due to the
massive reserves, this share might double in the
future (Dore & Yu, 2004).
Figure 2 Transboundary rivers in Yunnan.
Modern Myths of the Mekong - Part IV: Politics and Policies
165
2.2 Thailand
Despite the different opinions, Thailand seems
to be the principal energy market in the Mekong
region. According to the ADB (2003), the annual
energy consumption per capita will triple from
2003 until 2020. According to the Vice Minister
for Energy of Thailand, the country will need to
increase the generating capacity by roughly 77 %
during the next 10 years (Bangkok Post, 2006a).
Currently, the electricity production in Thailand
relies on thermal and combined cycle generation.
Of the total electricity generation, about 9 % is
based on large-scale hydropower (JGSEE, 2006).
There is still a large untapped hydropower potential
in the country, but due to the fact that electricity
2.3 Vietnam
In addition to Thailand, Vietnam has a rapidly
developing economy and the countrys energy
demand is increasing fast. During 1995-2004, the
demand rose by an average of 15 % a year (VNA,
2005). Due to the high oil costs, hydropower is
expected to take up a growing share in Vietnam.
The country is already reliant on 40 % hydropower
and plans to build more plants, as well as to import
hydro electricity (Reuters, 2006).
In northern Vietnam, hydropower is abundant
while the south has to rely on diesel-red
generation. The country basically emphasizes self-
sufciency in energy supply (Yu, 2003), but it still
seems cross-border trade will have a signicant role
in the future. The country is expected to import
electricity from Laos and the Yunnan province
Currently, China is implementing a cascade
of seven or eight large dams on the Mekong
within Yunnan. The upper Mekong cascade will
provide a total installed capacity of about 15,000
MW (Table 3). Manwan and Dachaoshan dams
are already in operation. The massive Xiaowan
arch dam with a height close to 300 m is well
advanced, and construction at Jinghong began in
2003 (Dore & Yu, 2004; Makkonen, 2003). The
impacts of the upper Mekong dams have created
serious concerns. Roughly said, the Chinese argue
that the impacts will be mainly positive and will
only reach the stretch between China and Laos.
However, particularly the lower basin communities
are concerned about the changes in the natural
ow regime, which is critically important for local
livelihoods (Dore & Yu, 2004).
There are also solid plans for the upper Salween
River within Yunnan. A proposal of 13 dams with
a total installed capacity exceeding 20,000 MW
was presented in 2003, but the approval process
was later halted because of the exceptionally
strong public opposition. Salween is one of the
last pristine rivers in Asia and the Three Parallel
Rivers area, where the Salween, Irrawaddy and
Mekong run side by side, has been designated as
a UNESCO World Heritage Site. Currently, it
seems that a slimmed-down version of four dams
will be rst allowed (Interfax, 2006; He, 2005).
supply has become a major environmental and
social issue in the country, further development
is difcult (see eg. Bakker, 1999). Consequently,
Thailand intends to develop hydropower for its own
needs in the neighbouring countries, particularly
in Myanmar and Laos (see eg. Reuters, 2006).
The national power development plan for 2003-
2016 includes among other things signicant
increase in hydropower imports from Laos.
(Paichit Thienpaitoon, 2005). However, the
projections in the plan have been criticised for
being based on an unrealistic economic growth
and for overestimating the future power demands
(Bangkok Post, 2006a).
Already from the beginning of the planning,
Thailand has showed clear interests towards
Chinas upper Mekong dams. The EGAT was
originally planning to fund the Jinghong power
plant (Xinhua News Agency, 2000 in Magee,
2006). This funding scheme was not implemented
due, among other things, to a speedier timeline
than the original one and the economic slow down
in Thailand (Magee, 2006). However, Thailand
later made initial commitments to joint develop
the Nuozhadu dam (China Electrical Equipment
Industry, 2002, in Magee, 2006).
Mehtonen - Do the downstream countries oppose the upstream dams?
166
of China, and to export to Cambodia. In 2006,
Vietnam already increased power imports from
China signicantly to avoid problems during the
dry season (Reuters, 2006).
2.4 Laos
Compared to its own needs, Laos has a huge
exploitable hydropower potential of about 23,000
MW (Lao National Committee for energy, 2004).
There are currently 49 dams with a total installed
capacity of only 690 MW (Vientiane Times,
2006). Therefore, the country has an active policy
for export-orientated energy projects. Laos has
exported hydropower to Thailand since 1970s
and in 2000, close to 80 % of the generation was
exported to Thailand (ADB, 2003).
In addition to China, Laos is expected to be
the main hydropower exporter in the Mekong
region. The country is poor and landlocked, and
hydropower is one of the very few natural resources
it has. Consequently, hydropower is seen by many
as a major tool to boost development and to raise
the country out of poverty.
2.5 Cambodia
Cambodia has a substantial hydropower potential
of about 8,000 MW (Yu, 2003), but the country
is undeveloped and therefore the level of
energy consumption is still extremely low. As a
consequence, there is no adequate demand to
boost the development of the existing resources.
Therefore, Cambodias electricity consumption
is largely based on imported high-cost diesel oil,
making the cost of electricity one of the highest in
the world (ADB, 2003).
2.6 Myanmar
With a technical potential up to 100,000 MW,
hydropower is estimated to be Myanmars main
source for future energy supply (Piyasvasti, 1999).
The main challenge in developing hydropower
is the lack of nancial and technical resources.
Because of the lack of the supply capacity, power
shortages continued to be a major problem in
the 1990s (Yu, 2003). Myanmar already exports
signicant amounts of natural gas to Thailand,
generating 20 percent of all electricity in Thailand.
In the future, Thailand plans to buy an additional
8,200 MW from Myanmar, most of which is likely
to come from hydroelectric power plants on the
Salween River. (International Herald Tribune,
2007). The Salween hydropower projects have
created much criticism due to their expected
social and environmental impacts.
3 The myth of the downstream
countries opposition
It is often argued that China is building the
upstream Mekong dams despite the opposition of
the downstream countries. Many media sources
in particular have reported that the downstream
countries oppose Chinas dams, or at least would
want to oppose but may not dare to criticize their
stronger neighbour.
Even though the opinion of a country can be
understood in many ways, the rst image a reader
gets is the national governments thinking. For
example, the Bangkok Post (2003) described the
situation in a following way:
Downstream countries are increasingly alarmed
by Chinas attempts to improve the Mekong
River Thailand is examining plans to protect
its Mekong water reserves for its northeast
territories. Vietnams investments and projects
in the Mekong delta will be affected by any
reduction of the Mekongs waters. Cambodians
worry that a lower Mekong level will kill the
Tonle Sap Agriculture and industry ofcials
(of the downstream countries) worry that Chinese
dams on the Mekong will give China the upper
hand in controlling water supply to industries,
farms, plantations, and vital food production
and supply centres. Trade and security ofcials
have held closed-door conferences on how
China could use this combination of river access
and water control as a bargaining power to force
the Mekong-dependent countries to bend to its
future wishes.
Modern Myths of the Mekong - Part IV: Politics and Policies
From: Yunnan Laos Myanmar ThaiIand Cambodia Vietnam
To:
Laos x
Myanmar x x
ThaiIand
3000 MW
(2017)
3000 MW
(2008)
> 8200
MW x
Cambodia x x x
Vietnam x 3000 MW
1000-2000
MW
(2010) x
GMS:
Focus on economic
deveIopment
MRC:
Focus on
water and
environment
167
Figure 3 GMS regional power trade options, consisting
mainly of hydropower. (International Herald Tribune, 2007,
Enerdata, 2006, The Nation, 2006a; ADB 2003; Yu, 2003)
The report later describes how the downstream
countries are by practical reasons forced to dance
to Chinas tune. This way, an image of opposing
downstream governments has been given.
Another report by the same paper talked about a
meeting between China and the other Mekong
countries that was going to discuss the conicts
over water rights and the ecological impact of
dam construction in China (Bangkok Post,
2004). According to the report, the downstream
countries are upset about changes in the river ow
and decreasing water levels, for both of which the
reason is believed to be Chinas dams.
Another example is the International Rivers
Network (IRN), which also emphasizes the
downstream states unhappiness about Chinas
dams. In their report, it was stated (IRN, 2004):
But not everyone is singing the praises of these
(Chinas) development strategies. downstream
states, worried about the potential impacts of
Chinas dam-building on water supplies for their
thirsty populations, are all now questioning
the wisdom of Chinas plans to re-plumb its
southwest.
These examples are from media and NGOs that
sometimes tend to be rather biased. However,
the issue of the downstream countries opinion
is many-sided, as even some ofcials have been
quoted on claming China. For example, the
Washington Post (2004) reported the comment of
a Cambodian cabinet minister who heads a team
that is devoted to Mekong policy:
China, they will work for their own country.
We are downstream, so we suffer all the negative
consequences (of the dams). . What can we
do? They (China) are upstream. They are a
richer country operating in their own sovereign
territory. How can we stop them?
In addition, an environmental scientist who
belongs to a think-tank at Cambodias Cabinet
of Council Ministers was quoted by Asia Times
(2002) saying:
We are very concerned with the (Chinas) dam
construction. the dams release or ow of water
during the monsoon season creates more ooding
in Cambodia.
Often the sources conclude that despite their
basic resistance, Chinas downstream neighbours
are not saying anything because they prefer to
promote trade, and possibly have plans to develop
hydropower or buy it from China (eg. Washington
Post, 2004). For example, John Dore and Yu
Xiaogang state in their famous report (Dore & Yu,
2004):
Mehtonen - Do the downstream countries oppose the upstream dams?
168
The concerns of downstream nations do not
seem to have been taken into account, but this
is no surprise given the reticence of any of the
downstream government elites to make any
serious representations to their more powerful
upstream neighbour, and in several cases,
increasingly important patron.
This kind of reporting pattern leaves the reader with
a strong image of China building the dams despite
the downstream governments opposition, even
though sometimes hidden. Particularly when the
reports relate to the statements of the ofcials, the
reader concludes that talking about downstream
countries opposition means talking about the
ofcial opinion of the national governments.
4 The Other Side of the Picture:
Widely Planned Cross-border Trade
By reading the reports quoted above, it seems as
if the downstream national governments consider
Chinas dams as harmful to them. However, many
of the governments have a pretty interesting
position. For example, Thailand has on one hand
complained about the negative effects of Chinas
dams while on the other hand is asking to buy
electricity produced by them (Interfax, 2005).
According to many sources, energy needs appear to
grow strongly in all the Mekong countries. Due to
this and the uneven distribution of resources, the
countries plan various power trade arrangements
with each other. Cross-border energy trade appears
to play a growing role in the future regional energy
balance, as all the GMS countries are involved in
plans to either import or export electricity.
Figure 3 highlights some of the power trade
agreements and Memoranda of Understanding
(MOUs), mainly based on hydropower. As it can
be noted, the interconnections are complicated,
and China is far from being the only player in this
game. Thailand, Laos and Vietnam are actually
planning to import electricity from Yunnan.
Furthermore, if the upper Salween dams are built,
some of their electricity will be transferred to
Myanmar.
The other major hydropower exporter, Laos,
already provides electricity to Thailand and
signicant increase has been planned. In addition
to Thailand, Vietnam has signed a MOU to
purchase hydropower from Laos. By 2020, Laos
plans to generate altogether about 8,000 MW
of hydro power and to sell it to its neighbours
(Bangkok Post, 2006c).
Thailand and Myanmar have signed a MOU for
electricity transfers between the two countries,
largely based on the lower Salween dams that
would generate totally about 12,700 MW (The
Nation, 2006b). Thailand is altogether involved
with several bilateral power-purchase agreements.
The country already imports 20 MW from
Cambodia. By 2008, Thailand is buying 3,000
megawatts from Laos, by 2010 1,500 MW from
Myanmar, and by 2017 3,000 MW from China
(Enerdata, 2006; The Nation, 2006a). Recently,
Laos has proposed increasing the amount of
exports to Thailand to 4,000 MW, or even to 5,000
MW. Both parties appear willing to increase the
power trade between the two countries. (Bangkok
Post, 2006c; Vientiane Times, 2006).
In addition to pure exports and imports, the
countries are getting more and more involved with
investing in the neighbouring countries energy
industries. Vietnam and Laos have established the
Viet-Lao Electricity Development and Investment
Joint Stock Company, which builds dams in
Laos (Vietnam News Agency, 2006). Chinese
companies have agreed with the Lao, Vietnamese
and Cambodian governments on developing
hydropower industry in the three countries. On
the other hand, the Vietnamese plan to invest in
the facilities on the Chinese side. (KPL, 2006;
China Daily, 2006; BBC, 2006). The Chinese are
also active in the lower Salween River and have
signed a MOU with the EGAT to develop the rst
dam in a series of ve (China Economic Daily
and International Business Daily, 2006). The
EGAT, with its existing and planned subsidiaries,
is interested in hydropower production and
transmission projects Laos, southern China,
Myanmar and Cambodia (Bangkok Post, 2006b;
Dow Jones, 2006).
Modern Myths of the Mekong - Part IV: Politics and Policies
169
5 Discussion
Pressures to boost economic development are
high in all the GMS countries. Consequently,
factors that support economy are often given
priority. Energy production is one of these factors
and therefore an important issue. In several
countries, the supply capability is far behind the
needs. Economically, the most viable option is to
buy electricity from where its production is most
protable. This becomes particularly clear if the
privatization of the energy sector continues in
the GMS countries. The trade agreements and
the planned extension of power grids show that
cross border power trade can be expected to grow
sharply in the close future.
For Southwest China, electricity exports are
becoming more and more tempting. There is a
growing energy demand both in Chinas eastern
provinces and in mainland Southeast Asia, and
the Yunnan province has both a large untapped
hydropower potential and a suitable location
to serve exports. With the domestic demand,
willingness of the neighbouring countries to import
electricity from China, and the development
A regional power market, stressed by the World
Bank and supported by the ADB, would facilitate
power transfers (ADB, 2003; Yu, 2003). The
development banks claim that a regional grid
would bring signicant benets. According to
the ADB, extending regional power trade will
increase hydropowers share both in absolute
terms and in percentage. In 2005, the Regional
Power Trade Coordination Committee (RPTCC),
comprising of the six GMS countries, ADB, and
other development partners, endorsed a Work Plan
for 20052008. The outputs of the Plan include
reviewing and updating the proposed GMS power
interconnection projects with high potential
for regional trade. (ADB, 2005). Construction
of the rst transmission line under the Plan,
linking Cambodia and Vietnam, commenced
in 2003. Other components of the grid include a
transmission line via Laos between Thailand and
China, and a transmission line to interconnect
Thailand, Vietnam and Laos. (IRN, 2006).
banks the eagerness to build a regional power
grid, developing hydropower seems protable.
Considering the downstream nations interests for
Yunnanese hydropower, China alone is not the only
one to blame for the upper Mekong and Salween
development. If one really wants to inuence
Chinas actions on the two rivers, the demands
should be directed to all stakeholders involved
in the hydropower play. Chinas construction
plans are clearly inuenced by the involvement
of the other Mekong nations. They, Thailand in
particular, have a signicant role in the matter
and their plans to import electricity from Yunnan
signicantly increase the protability of the upper
Mekong schemes.
There are, of course, many voices in the Mekong
countries opposing hydropower development in
the upstream. They are, however, at least partly
muted by the fact that China is in many senses
a dominating country in the region, and is also
supporting its smaller neighbours signicantly.
China has become a generous trading partner and
is also promoting security cooperation among the
GMS countries. For example, the relations between
China and Cambodia used to be pretty hostile due
to Chinas support to the Khmer Rouge regime.
However, China has now become Cambodias
largest foreign investor and a major trade partner,
and has offered the country signicant donations
and loans. Consequently, it appears that no
major Cambodian leaders openly dare to criticise
China (Chicago Tribune, 2006; Bangkok Post
2006d). Even though some Cambodian ofcials
have complained about the impacts of the upper
Mekong dams, as the examples of the Washington
Post (2004) and the Asia Times (2002) quoted
above show, the Cambodian government as such
has not dared to express ofcial complains.
In terms of Thailand and Myanmar, the two
share the Salween River with China and might be
affected by Chinas upper Salween plans. However,
partly for the reasons described above and for the
fact that they have their own damming plans for
the river, the two may not want to criticise Chinas
dams. Furthermore, particularly Thailand has
Mehtonen - Do the downstream countries oppose the upstream dams?
170
This study was funded by the Sven Hallin
Foundation and the Academy of Finland under
the project 211010. The study was done as a part
of the Young Scientists Summer Program of
the International Institute for Applied System
Analysis (IIASA), as well as a part of the authors
PhD Dissertation at the Helsinki University of
Technology (TKK). The author is grateful to Dr.
Olli Varis and Professor Pertti Vakkilainen at TKK,
as well as to Dr. David Wiberg and Dr. Mahendra
Shah at IIASA.
Acknowledgements
clear interests for buying Yunnanese hydropower
and therefore it is not unexpected that the Thai
government silently approves the upper Mekong
damming.
The aspect of staying quiet for its own projects
also applies to Laos, which is tied to its own
hydropower development, and also welcomes
the Chinese getting involved in the construction
works. Moreover, Laos is very much dependent on
external donations as almost 20 % of the countrys
GDP comes from international donors and aid
contributes up to 70 % of public investments. By
2001-2002, China had become the second largest
bilateral donor. Furthermore, bilateral trade
and Chinese investments in Laos have grown
signicantly. (China Development Brief, 2006).
In terms of Vietnam, the Vietnamese prime
minister expressed some careful concern over the
upstream developed in the second GMS summit
in 2005. The minister emphasized that the overall
exploitation of the Mekong basin needs to take into
account the legitimate interests of the countries
in the region and should not compromise the
interests of those countries situated at the lower
part of the basin (Vietnamese Ministry of foreign
affairs, 2005).
Considering all this, it is pretty clear that the
Mekong national governments have shown green
light to the hydropower development on the upper
Mekong and Salween rivers. It is also clear that
there are many parties strongly opposing the dam
projects and these parties sometimes include even
individual government ofcials. However, all the
arrangements made for the regional energy trade
show that the myth of the downstream countries
opposition towards Chinas upper Mekong dams
is not true as far as talking about the national
governments. Nevertheless, a reader not familiar
with all the aspects gets a very different picture
when trying to follow the situation through media
and other sources. According to this picture, or the
myth, the downstream national governments do
oppose the upper Mekong dams.
Modern Myths of the Mekong - Part IV: Politics and Policies
171
References
ADB, 2005. Proposed Technical Assistance, Greater
Mekong Subregion Power Trade Coordination and
Development. Asian Development Bank Technical
Assistance Report, Project Number: 39594, Nov 2005.
ADB, 2003. Indicative master plan on power
interconnections in GMS countries. TA No. 5920-
REG Asian Development Bank, Manila. Consultant:
Norconsult International AS.
Akatsuka, Y. & Asaeda, T., 1996. Econo-political
environments of the Mekong basin: Development and
related transport infrastructures. In: Asian International
Waters, Biswas A.K. & Hashimoto T. (Eds.), 1996.
Oxford University Press, New Delhi.
Asia Times, 2002. River of controversy. Asia Times, Aug
9, 2002. Available online at www.atimes.com/atimes/
Southeast_Asia/DH09Ae01.html
Bakker, K., 1999. The politics of hydropower: developing
the Mekong. Political Geography 18 (1999), p. 209232.
Bangkok Post, 2006a. Consumer activists urge review
of 2006 plan. Bangkok Post Aug 30, 2006, by Amornrat
Mahitthirook.
Bangkok Post, 2006b. Egat International Co established
to invest in energy projects overseas. Bangkok Post Aug 19
2006, by Yuthana Praiwan.
Bangkok Post, 2006c. More purchases from Laos could
help Thailand cut costs. Bangkok Post May 30, 2006.
Bangkok Post, 2006d. Perspective Falling into Beijings
orbit. Bangkok Post March 12, 2006.
Bangkok Post, 2004. Talks with China on Mekong river
- Water rights, dams on informal agenda. Bangkok Post,
Nov 4, 2004, by Ranjana Wangvipula.
Bangkok Post, 2003. The rape of a river. Perspective, Jan
5, 2003.
BBC, 2006. Chinese Firm to Build Hydroelectric Dam
in Cambodian South. BBC Monitoring Asia Pacic Feb
23, 2006.
Chicago Tribune, 2006. China winning hearts and minds.
Chicago Tribune March 30, 2006, by Evan Osnos.
China Daily, 2006. Chinese rm to build hydroelectric
dam in Cambodia. China Daily Feb 23, 2006.
China Development Brief, 2006. Chinas Aid to
Laos: Communist capital ows downstream. China
Development Brief, February 2006.
China Economic Daily and International Business
Daily, 2006. Chinas Sinohydro and EGAT to jointly
develop Hat Gyi dam project. China Economic Daily and
International Business Daily June 27, 2006. Translated
by Kevin Li.
China Electrical Equipment Industry, 2002. Thailand
Looks Favorably on Hydropower Construction Market in
Yunnan. China Electrical Equipment Industry, No. 8,
2002.
CSLF, 2005. An Energy Summary of China. Carbon
Sequestration Leadership Forum. Available online at
http://www.cslforum.org/china.htm
Dore J., YU X. & Li , K.Y., 2007. Chinas Energy
Reforms and Hydropower Expansion in Yunnan. In:
Democratizing Water Governance in the Mekong
Region, Lebel L., Dore J., Daniel R. & Koma Y.S. (Eds.),
2007. Mekong Press, Chiang Mai.
Dore, J. & Yu, X., 2004. Yunnan Hydropower Expansion
- Update on Chinas power industry reforms & the Nu,
Lancang & Jinsha hydropower dams. Working paper,
Chiang Mai Universitys Unit for Social & Environmental
Research & Green Watershed, Kunming, PR of China.
March 2004.
Dow Jones, 2006. Thai Ratchaburi Electricity Eyes 4 Laos
Hydropower Projs. Dow Jones Feb 17, 2006. Available
online at http://sg.biz.yahoo.com/060217/15/3yrgg.html
Enerdata, 2006. Market research, Sample report.
Enerdata October, 2006. Available online at http://www.
enerdata.fr/enerdatauk/products/reports/demo.pdf
Fuggle, R., Smith, W.T., Hydrosult Canada Inc. &
Agrodev Canada Inc., 2000. Large Dams in Water
and Energy Resource Development in The PRC. World
Commission on Dams (WCD), Cape Town.
He, D., 2005. Personal communication. Asian
International Rivers Center, Yunnan University,
Kunming, China.
IEA, 2000. Chinas worldwide quest for energy security.
International Energy Agency, Paris.
IHA, 1997. World Atlas & Industry Guide. International
Journal on Hydropower and Dams, Sutton.
Interfax, 2006. Develop and be dammed - China to
build on virgin river. March 15, 2006, by David Stanway.
Available online at http://www.threegorgesprobe.org/
TgP/index.cfm?DSP=content&ContentID=15036.
Mehtonen - Do the downstream countries oppose the upstream dams?
172
Interfax, 2005. Feature: Chinas hydropower development
is an issue for all of southeastern Asia. Interfax, July 5,
2005, by David Stanway.
International Herald Tribune, 2007. Regions energy
needs enable Myanmar junta. By Thomas Fuller,
October 1, 2007. Available online at http://www.iht.
com/articles/2007/10/01/news/yangon.php
IRN, 2006. Trading away the future the Mekong power
grid. World Rivers Review, May 2006.
IRN, 2004. Dam-Building on the Roof of the World -
Yunnan Province is Front-and-Center in Chinas Energy
Development Plans. World Rivers Review, Volyme 19,
no 1, Feb 2004. International Rivers Network, by Peter
Riggs.
JGSEE, 2006. Power Development Plan in Thailand.
Web pages of the Joint Graduate School of Energy and
Environment (of Thailand), JGSEE. Available online at
http://www.thaienergy.org/index.php?option=com_con
tent&task=view&id=39&Itemid=86.
Lao National Committee for energy, 2004. (Lao PDR)
Energy Resources. Powering Progress, Website of the
Lao National Committee for energy. Available online
at: www.poweringprogress.org/energy_sector/energy_
resource.htm
KPL, 2006. Chinese interest in electricity in Laos. Lao
News Agency (KPL) Aug 29, 2006. Available online at
http://www.kplnet.net/english/news/edn4.htm
Magee, D., 2006. Powershed Politics: Yunnan Hydropower
under Great Western Development. The China Quarterly
185, pp. 23-41. Cambridge University Press. March
2006.
Makkonen, K., 2003. Chinas role in IWRM in South
and Southeast Asia. Masters Thesis. Helsinki University
of Technology, Espoo, Finland.
Paichit Thienpaitoon, 2005. Thailands Statement on
Energy Infrastructure Development Plan. Presentation
by Mr. Paichit Thienpaitoon, Vice Minister for Energy
of Thailand at the ASEAN Energy Minister - CEO
Dialogue Session. ASEAN Energy Business Forum
2005. July 14, 2005. Available online at http://www.eppo.
go.th/inter/asean/AMEM23/AEBF2005-ThaiMinister.
html
Peoples Daily, 2003. Energy demand set to double by
2020. Peoples Daily Nov 19, 2003. Available online at
http://english.people.com.cn/200311/19/eng20031119_
128567.shtml
Piyasvasti, A., 1999. Development of a regional energy
market in the Mekong area. Presentation, Energy Week,
7 April 1999, Washington D.C.
Plinston, D. & He, D., 2000. Water resources and
hydropower in the Lancang River Basin. ADB TA 3139:
PRC, Policies and strategies for sust. development of the
Lancang River Basin. Lancare Research New Zealand
Ltd.
Reuters, 2006. Asian hopes for hydropower may add to
oil reliance. Reuters Aug 04, 2006, by Neil Chatterjee.
Available online at: http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/
newsdesk/SP292812.htm
The Nation, 2006a. Impact of power projects in
neighbouring countries needs assessment. The
Nation Aug 29, 2006. Available online at http://
nationmultimedia.com/2006/08/29/national/national_
30012245.php
The Nation, 2006b. China-Thai to build hydropower
plant in Myanmar. The Nation June 28, 2006. Available
online at http://nationmultimedia.com/breakingnews/
read.php?newsid=30007530.
Vientiane Times, 2006. Thailand wants more power from
Laos. Vientiane Times Feb 7, 2006.
Vietnam News Agency, 2006. Song Da corp. to build
hydropower project in Laos. Vietnam News Agency
March 04, 2006.
Vietnamese Ministry of foreign affairs, 2005. PM
addresses second GMS summit. Web site of the
Vietnamese Ministry of foreign affairs. Available
online at http://www.mofa.gov.vn/en/nr040807104143/
nr040807105001/ns050706090918
VNA, 2005. World Bank grants 200M-dollar loan to
develop Vietnams power system. Vietnamese News
Agency website, Jul 30, 2005. Reprodused by BBC
Monitoring.
Washington Post, 2004. Manipulating the Mekong -
Chinas Push to Harness Storied Rivers Power Puts It at
Odds With Nations Downstream. Washington Post Foreign
Service, December 30, 2004; Page E01, by Goodman
P.S. Available online at www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/articles/A35167-2004Dec29.html?sub=new
Xinhua News Agency, 2000.PRC, Thailand Agree
To Build Jinghong Power Station on Lancang River.
Xinhua News Agency, June 7 2000.
Yu, X., 2003. Regional cooperation and energy
development in the Greater Mekong Sub-region. Energy
Policy, Volume 31, Issue 12, September 2003, Elsevier
Science Ltd. New York
This publication is available electronically at
water.tkk./global/publications
Modern Myths of the Mekong - Part IV: Politics and Policies