STATCON Case Digests for June 7, 2012 CALTEX (PHILIPPINES) Inc. vs. ENRICO PALOMAR G.R. No.

L-19650 FACTS: In 1960, Caltex (Philippines) Inc. conceived and laid the groundwork for a promotional schemecalculated to drum up patronage for its oil products. Denominated Caltex Hooded Pump Contest, itcalls for participants therein to estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump at each Caltexstation will dispense during a specified period. Employees of the Caltex Inc., its dealers and itsadvertising agency, and their immediate families excepted, participation is to be open to all motorvehicle owners and/or licensed drivers. For the privilege to participate, no fee or consideration isrequired to be paid, no purchase of Caltex products required to be made. Entry forms are to be madeavailable upon request at each Caltex station where a sealed can will be provided for the deposit of accomplished entry stubs.Forseeing the extensive ust of the mails not only as amongst the media for publicizing thecontest but also for the transmission of communications relative thereto, representations were made byCaltex with the postal authorities for the contest to be cleared in advance for mailing, having in viewsections 1954(a), 1982 and 1983 of the Revised Administrative Code. ISSUES: 1. Whether the petition states a sufficient cause for declaratory relief; 2. Whether the proposed Caltex Hooded Pump Contest violates the Postal Law. HELD: This conclusion firms up in the light of the mischief sought to be remedied by the law, resort tothe determination thereof being an accepted extrinsic aid in statutory construction. Mail fraud orders, itis axiomatic, are designed to prevent the use of the mails as a medium for disseminating printed matterswhich on grounds of public policy are declared non-mailable. As applied to lotteries, gift enterprises andsimilar spirit and to corrupt public morals (Com. vs. Lund, 15 A. 2d., 839, 143 Pa. Super. 208). Since ingambling it is inherent that something of value be hazarded for a chance to gain a larger amount, itfollows ineluctably that where no consideration is paid by the contestant to participate, the reasonbehind the law can hardly be n of property by lot or chance does is derived, directly or indirectly, form theparty receiving the chance, gambling spirit not being cultivated or stimulat and Phrases, perm, ed., p. 695, emphasis supplied).we find no obstacle in saying the same respecting a gift enterprise. In the end, we are persuadedto hold that, under the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law which we have heretofore examined, giftenterprises and similar schemes therein contemplated are condemnable only if, like lotteries, theyinvolve the element of consideration. Finding none in the contest here in question, we rule that theappellee may not be denied the use of the mails for purposes thereof.Recapitulating, we hold that the submitted bythe appellee does not transgress the provisions of the Postal Law.

People v. Mapa GR L-22301, 30 August 1967 (20 SCRA 1164)En Banc, Fernando (p): 9 concur Facts: Mario M. Mapa was charged for illegal possession of firearm and ammunition in aninformation dated 14 August 1962 in violation of Section 878 of the Revise Administrative Codein connection with Section 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by CA 56 andas further amended by RA 4. Accused admits to possession of firearm on ground of being asecret agent of Governor Feliciano Leviste of Batangas. On 27 November 1963, the lower courtrendered a decision convicting the accused of the crime and sentenced him to imprisonment for one year and one day to two years. As the appeal involves a question of law, it was elevated tothe Supreme Court. Issue: Whether or not a secret agent duly appointed and qualified as such of the governor isexempt from the requirement of having a license of firearm Held: The law is explicit that it is unlawful for any person to possess any firearm, detached partsof firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to be usedin the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition except when such firearms arein possession of such public officials and public servants for use in the performance of their official duties; as those firearms and ammunitions which are regularly and lawfully issued toofficers, soldiers, sailors or marines, the Philippines Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincialtreasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails.It is the first and fundamental duty of courts to apply the law; Construction and interpretationcome only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate withoutthem. The law cannot be any clearer, there being no provision made for a secret agent.Reliance in the decision in People v. Macarandang is misplaced, and the case no longer speakswith authority to the extent that the present decision conflicts with. It may be note that in Peoplev. Macarandang, a secret agent was acquitted on appeal on the assumption that the appointmentof the accused as a secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns anddetection of crimes sufficiently put him within the category of a peace officer equivalent evento a member of the municipal police expressly covered by section 879, Thus, in the present case,therefore, the conviction must stand.The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed judgment.

Daoang v. Municipal Judge of San Nicolas GR L-34568, 28 March 1988 (159 SCRA 369)Second Division, Padilla (p): 4 concurring Facts: On 23 March 1971, spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy filed a petition with theMunicipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte seeking the adoption of minors Quirino Bonillaand Wilson Marcos. However, minors Roderick and Rommel Daoang, assisted by their father and guardian ad litem, the petitioners herein filed an opposition to the said adoption. Theycontended that the spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy had a legitimate daughter namedEstrella Agonoy, oppositors mother, who died on 1 March 1971, and therefore said spouses weredisqualified to adopt under Article 335 of the Civil Code, which provides that those who havelegitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children or children by legal fiction cannot adopt. Issue: Whether the spouses Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos are disqualified to adopt under paragraph 1 of Article 335 of the Civil Code. Held: The words used in paragraph (1) of Article 335 of the Civil Code, in enumerating the persons who cannot adopt, are clear and unambiguous. When the New Civil Code was adopted,it changed the word descendant, found in the Spanish Civil Code to which the New Civil Codewas patterned, to children. The children thus mentioned have a clearly defined meaning in lawand do not include grandchildren. Well known is the rule of statutory construction to the effectthat a statute clear and unambiguous on its face need not be interpreted. The rule is that onlystatutes with an ambiguous or doubtful meaning may be the subjects of statutory construction. Inthe present case, Roderick and Rommel Daoang, the grandchildren of Antero Agonoy andAmanda Ramos-Agonoy, cannot assail the adoption of Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos bythe Agonoys.The Supreme Court denied the petition, and affirmed the judgment of the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte (Special Proceedings 37), wthout pronouncement as to costs.

Floresca v. Philex Mining GR L-30642., 30 April 1985 (136 SCRA 142)En Banc, Makasiar (p): 7 concurring, 1 on leave, 2 took no part, others dissenting Facts: Several miners were killed in a cave-in at one of Philex Mining Corporations mine sites.The heirs of the miners were able to recover under the Workmans Compensation Act (WCA).Thereafter, a special committee report indicated that the company failed to provide the minerswith adequate safety protection. The heirs decided to file a complaint for damages before theCourt of First Instance (CFI) of Manila. Philex filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that theaction was based on an industrial accident which is covered under the WCA and, therefore, theCFI has no jurisdiction over the case. Philex argues that the work connected injuries arecompensable exclusively under Sections 5 and 46 of the WCA; and that the WCA covers work-connected accidents even if the employer was negligent as the WCA under Section 4-A imposesa 50% additional compensation in the event that the employer is negligent. The heirs, however,contend that the CFI has jurisdiction, as their complaint is not based on the WCA but on theCivil Code provisions on damages arising out of negligence. The CFI dismissed the complaintfor lack of jurisdiction. The heirs questioned the dismissal before the Supreme Court.Amici curiae submitted their respective memoranda, pursuant to the resolution of 26 November 1976, involving the issue whether the action of an injured employee or worker or that of his heirsin case of his death under the Workmens Compensation Act is exclusive, selective or cumulative; i.e. (1: Exclusive) whether an injured employee or his heirs action is exclusivelyrestricted to seeking the limited compensation provided under the Workmens CompensationAct, (2: Selective) whether an injured employee or his heirs have a right of selection or choice of action between availing of the workers right under the Workmens Compensation Act and suingin the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual, moral and/or exemplary)from the employer by virtue of negligence (or fault) of the employer or of his other employees,or (3: Cumulative) whether an injured employee or his heirs may avail cumulatively of bothactions, i.e., collect the limited compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act and suein addition for damages in the regular courts. The opinions of the amici curiae are diverse.The Court in this same decision agreed with the argument that the action is selective, i.e. that theinjured worker or his heirs have the choice of remedies, but that they cannot pursue both coursesof action simultaneously and balance the relative advantage of recourse under the WorkmensCompensation Act as against an ordinary action. It further held that the petitioners who hadreceived the benefits under the Workmens Compensation Act, such may not preclude them from bringing an action before the regular court, as the choice of the first remedy was based onignorance or a mistake of fact, which nullifies the choice as it was not an intelligent choice, butthat upon the success of such bids

before the lower court, the payments made under theWorkmens Compensation Act should be deducted from the damages that may be decreed intheir favor. Issue: Whether the Supreme Court, in determining the action to be selective, is guilty of judiciallegislation. Held: The Court, through its majority, defended itself by holding that the Court does notlegislate but merely applies and gives effect to the constitutional guarantees of social justice thensecured by Section 5 of Article II and Section 6 of Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution, andlater by Sections 6, 7, and 9 of Article II of the Declaration of Principles and State Policies of the1973 Constitution, as amended, and as implemented by Articles 2176, 2177, 2178, 1173, 2201,2216, 2231 and 2232 of the New Civil Code of 1950. Further, it reiterated its ruling in People vs.Licera: that judicial decisions of the Supreme Court assume the same authority as the statuteitself, pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which decrees that judicialdecisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of this jurisdictionslegal system. It argues that the application or interpretation placed by the Court upon a law is part of the law as of the date of the enactment of the said law since the Courts application or interpretation merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the construed law purports to carry into effect. Yet, the Court argues that the Court can legislate, pursuant toArticle 9 of the New Civil Code, which provides that No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws. Thus, even thelegislator himself recognizes that in certain instances, the court do and must legislate to fill inthe gaps in the law; because the mind of the legislator, like all human beings, is finite andtherefore cannot envisage all possible cases to which the law may apply.