Advanced Level March 2012

Foundation Briefs
Advanced Level March Brief
Resolved: The United States should suspend all assistance to Pakistan.
March 2012
Table of Contents
Table of Contents
Table of Contents .................................................................................................................................................... 1 The New Foundation Brief ................................................................................................................................. 4 Key Organizational Changes .............................................................................................................................. 5 Hierarchical Sections ...................................................................................................................................... 5 Hierarchical Evidence ..................................................................................................................................... 5 Definitions............................................................................................................................................................... 6 Topic Analysis ........................................................................................................................................................ 7 Defend Your Source ............................................................................................................................................... 9 Author Index ..................................................................................................................................................... 10 Organization Index ........................................................................................................................................... 11 Laying the Foundation .......................................................................................................................................... 13 The Current Status of Pakistan and Relations .................................................................................................. 13 U.S. Interests ..................................................................................................................................................... 13 U.S. Aid Levels ................................................................................................................................................. 14 Pakistans Nuclear Issue ................................................................................................................................... 14 Pro Evidence ......................................................................................................................................................... 15 General .............................................................................................................................................................. 16 A brief note regarding the organization of Pro evidence: ............................................................................. 16 Pakistan Has Different Objectives .................................................................................................................... 18 Pakistan Actually Views the US as Threat .................................................................................................. 19 Toleration of Insurgents and Extremists ........................................................................................................... 20 Pakistani Intelligence Aids Insurgents/Extremists ........................................................................................... 25 Support for the Haqqani Network ..................................................................................................................... 27 Allegations of Aiding Taliban .......................................................................................................................... 29 Significant Negative Impact on Afghanistan .................................................................................................... 31 Inability To Find Bin Laden ............................................................................................................................. 32 Aid Creates Perverse Incentives ....................................................................................................................... 34 foundationbriefs.com Page 1 of 114
March 2012 Table of Contents Military Uncooperative ..................................................................................................................................... 36 U.S. Must Force Change ................................................................................................................................... 37 Pakistan Heavily Dependent On Aid ................................................................................................................ 39 Aid Itself is Flawed and Should Be Avoided ................................................................................................... 40 Aid Hurts Democracy ................................................................................................................................... 40 Pakistans Military Too Powerful ..................................................................................................................... 41 Lack of Civilian Governance Makes Humanitarian Aid Ineffective and Wasteful .......................................... 43 Anti-Americanism Shows that Aid is Ineffective/Impossible .......................................................................... 45 Aid Cannot Fix Pakistan ................................................................................................................................... 46 Moderate Levels of External Aid Unlikely to Help .......................................................................................... 47 Aid Used Inefficiently/Corruptly ...................................................................................................................... 48 Aid Goes to Fund Nuclear Program ................................................................................................................. 51 Military Aid Not Effective Counterinsurgency ................................................................................................ 52 Aid Has Yielded Poor, Often Negative, Results ............................................................................................... 53 India Should Be Our Priority ............................................................................................................................ 54 Our Alliance With Pakistan Hurts/Prevents Our Alliance With India ......................................................... 55 Suspending Aid Doesnt Mean No Help .......................................................................................................... 58 Pakistan Apparently Does Not Need the Aid ................................................................................................... 60 Con Evidence ........................................................................................................................................................ 61 General .............................................................................................................................................................. 62 More Engagement, Not Less ............................................................................................................................ 64 Suspending All Aid Would Worsen the Situation ............................................................................................ 65 Consistency is Essential .................................................................................................................................... 66 Cutting Aid Failed Last Time ........................................................................................................................... 68 Risk of Nuclear Proliferation ............................................................................................................................ 69 Security Concerns ............................................................................................................................................. 73 Pakistan Too Important to Lose ........................................................................................................................ 74 Pakistans Importance to Afghanistan .............................................................................................................. 75 Pakistan Necessary to Stopping Terrorism ....................................................................................................... 77
foundationbriefs.com
Page 2 of 114
March 2012 Table of Contents Aid to the Military Remains Essential .............................................................................................................. 78 Civilian/Humanitarian Aid is Essential ............................................................................................................ 79 Education Aid Is Critical .................................................................................................................................. 83 Pakistan Facing a Critical Moment Due to Demographics ............................................................................... 84 Cuts Would Hurt the Civilian Government Most ............................................................................................. 86 Control By The Pakistani Military Would Be Worse ....................................................................................... 87 Ties to China ..................................................................................................................................................... 88 Aid Needed to Counter Chinese Influence ................................................................................................... 89 Ties With Iran ................................................................................................................................................... 90 Ties With Saudi Arabia..................................................................................................................................... 93 Pro Counters.......................................................................................................................................................... 95 Risk of Nuclear Proliferation Overstated.......................................................................................................... 96 Cutting Military or Civilian Aid (But Not Both) Is Not Feasible ..................................................................... 99 Afghan Supply Lines Dont Depend on Pakistan ........................................................................................... 100 Suspension Will Not Cause Gov. Collapse .................................................................................................... 101 Conditionality Not the Answer ....................................................................................................................... 102 Humanitarian Aid Not Effective ..................................................................................................................... 103 Con Counters ...................................................................................................................................................... 104 China/Iran Not Willing to Ally Too Closely .................................................................................................. 105 Military Aid is Productive .............................................................................................................................. 106 Pakistani Military Not To Blame .................................................................................................................... 107 Pakistan is Increasingly Fighting the Taliban ................................................................................................. 108 Conditional Aid Would Succeed .................................................................................................................... 109 Contentions ......................................................................................................................................................... 110 Pro Contentions............................................................................................................................................... 111 Con Contentions ............................................................................................................................................. 113
Page 3 of 114
March 2012
The New Foundation Brief

Here at Foundation Briefs, we came into the 2011-12 season determined to completely reimagine our brief and make it even easier to use while introducing more content, better analysis and a broader scope. We encourage you to read through the following pages carefully so that you know how everything is structured, why evidence appears in the order it does, and even where to look for sections of analysis. We are always looking to improve and cannot do so without your help and guidance. After all, you are the debater and we are simply here to support you. So email us at fdbriefs@gmail.com and let us know what you thinkgood or bad. Redesigning the brief required the introduction of new and exciting sections. They are listed below with a brief explanation of what is packed into each section and why we made the transition.
Topic Analysis
This is a general reflection on the resolution. It will provide to you an impression of the topic at hand, challenges you will face while debating, and a picture of where we see the debate headed.
Framework
Often times, the most important part of the debate is to actually win before the debate begins. With this section, we will set you up for such a feat. With unique analysis on how to lay the conditions for victory, you will be guaranteed to begin battle already with an advantage.
Strategy Sections
Foundation Briefs is committed to making sure you understand the evidence provided to you. We will never simply throw quotes at you and hope you can understand what we are trying to imply. That is where the Strategy Section comes in. At the beginning of all major sections (i.e. the section in the brief regarding alQaeda) there will appear a small section of original Foundation Briefs analysis to tell you how we see the evidence being used, what rhetoric will please the judge and which counterarguments to be prepared for.
Defend Your Source

Sometimes just telling a judge the source of your information doesnt quite convey its validity. Having debated countless rounds, we realize that there is nothing as credible as being able to tell the judge exactly who the author is and what he or she does or why your judge should listen to the organization being quoted. Foundation Briefs provides you with this information for each and every author and organization we quote unless it is a source we know is credible and everyone has heard of (i.e the New York Times or CNN). Just look for the red text below the source to tell you what to look up in the Defend Your Source Section.
Page 4 of 114
March 2012
Key Organizational Changes

Just as we introduced a number of key sections to revolutionize our brief, we have done the same with organizational features. They too are listed below so you know exactly how to find what you are looking for. With the new Foundation Brief, there is no questioning how important a piece of evidence is or how we think it should be usedevery single piece of evidence is where it is for a reason. See below to understand our reasons.
Hierarchical Sections
As with last season, all of the evidence in each Foundation Brief will be broken down into sections. The most crucial arguments will come first. It is our intention that these sections will serve as excellent foundations for contentions throughout the month. Although these sections were a feature of our briefs last year, we have renewed our commitment to making sure that the most relevant sections come first.
Hierarchical Evidence
Arguably the most important change we made to our organization is that evidence is now organized from most to least important. This means that if you only want the most crucial sources and the most relevant ideas, you will see such evidence in the first few sources of each section. These essential sources of each section are considered the Core Evidence Section, what you will want to include in your contentions. Following the core will be the Supporting Evidence Section, which will give you greater understanding and further nuance to the argumentdont ignore this section! Evidence in this section is still very important; it just might not be ideal to put in your time-constrained ~1 minute contentions. Finally, the Counter Evidence Section will come at the end of the brief.
Important note: Webpages and online articles that are long and continuous will always be cited as page one (1).
Page 5 of 114
March 2012
Definitions
Definitions
Should
used to indicate obligation, duty, or correctness indicating a desirable or expected state - Oxford English Dictionary
Suspend
temporarily prevent from continuing or being in force or effect defer or delay (an action, event, or judgement) - Oxford English Dictionary to debar temporarily especially from a privilege, office, or function to cause to stop temporarily to set aside or make temporarily inoperative to defer to a later time on specified conditions - Merriam-Webster Dictionary
Assistance
Assistance to foreign nations ranging from the sale of military equipment to donations of food and medical supplies to aid survivors of natural and manmade disasters. US assistance takes three forms--development assistance, humanitarian assistance, and security assistance. - Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. US Department of Defense 2005 the activity of contributing to the fulfillment of a need or furtherance of an effort or purpose - Princeton University
Page 6 of 114
March 2012
Topic Analysis
Topic Analysis
For over a decade now, Pakistan has been elevated to top importance in the United States foreign policy priorities. These two nations refer to each other as allies publicly, but their relationship has been strenuous and in the last year incredibly fragile. The United States relies on Pakistan to combat terrorism within Pakistans own borders as well as Afghanistan. Indeed, many experts on the Middle East believe that a long-term solution to peace in Afghanistan cannot be achieved without Pakistans help. However, such ideal cooperation now seems increasingly wishful thinking the separate aspirations and identities of the two nations clash. In May 2011, the United States killed Osama bin Laden deep within Pakistans borders, raising questions as to Pakistans knowledge of the Al-Qaeda leader but also enraging Pakistanis for violating their nations sovereignty. Since then, relations have deteriorated as one crisis after another pushes diplomacy to collapse. The United States is becoming increasingly willing to publicly state that the Pakistani military is actively supporting terrorismthe exact opposite of what nearly $20 billion in U.S. aid over the last decade has tried to encourage it to do. Moreover, a November 26, 2011 incident between U.S. forces and Pakistani soldiers left 24 Pakistanis dead after confusion between the two forces lead to a firefight. This has greatly damaged relations. Pakistan has shut off supply lines to Afghanistan and the United States is threatening to withhold military funding. This resolution attempts to address this growing tension and explore the best route for the United States to pursue with Pakistan. The Pro side will attempt to argue that relations are currently strained to the point that only drastic action will push relations back on track. In looking at the resolution, there are a few key terms that shape the debate in important ways. First, we are debating the suspension of assistance. This implies that withholding aid is temporary. This is so crucial to the Pro side because the argument becomes not about abandoning Pakistan, but instead more about trying to encourage Pakistan to modify its behavior. Thus, the Pro will need to clearly outline the goals it hopes to achieve in suspending assistance. Additionally, the resolution is dealing with all assistance. This is quite a burden of proof for the Pro side and makes the resolution much more about the theory of diplomacy than about targeted programs we ought to reevaluate. By affirming this resolution, the United States would make a very strong statement (which the Pro will argue is necessary). After reviewing the evidence, debaters will quickly come to realize that the United States is, at the very least, justified in withdrawing its assistance to Pakistan. There is strong evidence that Pakistan neglects counter terrorism efforts, and in fact supports certain terror networks. What is important though is not whether the United States is justified in suspending assistance, but whether it should. These are two very different things. While Pakistan has not been an outstanding ally, the Con will be able to make convincing arguments that suspending assistance will only make matters worse. They can do this while still acknowledging the imperfect nature of assistance. Therefore, it is advisable for both sides, but Pro especially, not to spend large amounts of
Page 7 of 114
March 2012 Topic Analysis time listing the faults of Pakistan but instead focusing on the causal link between suspending assistance and better achieving U.S. policy objectives. The general direction that the Pro will take is explaining the truly fundamental differences in Pakistan and U.S. interests. Much of U.S. policy dealing with Pakistan is very wishful and essentially ignores harsh realities in the hope that somehow Pakistan will help the United States. In reality, Pakistan sees an unstable Afghanistan, and a good relationship with the Taliban, as vital to Pakistani security. Additionally, no matter how much the U.S. would like Pakistan to focus its military efforts on counter terrorism, this is not likely to happen beyond defeating militants that pose direct threats to the Pakistani military and government. Instead, the deep historical rivalry with India will continue to be the emphasis of Pakistans military strategy. The Pro must highlight these deep differences and conclude that such differences are too big a gap to bridge. Aid to Pakistan simply cannot persuade Pakistan to abandon their longstanding objectives. On the Con it will be hard to ignore these assertions. However, the Con must argue that despite these differences, assistance to Pakistan still remains the best strategy to achieve U.S. policy objectives. The United States does not have much choice in its alliance with Pakistan, and providing robust assistance allows the United States to better monitor Pakistans nuclear arsenal and carry out its own counter terrorism operations. While Pakistan supports some terrorist organizations, U.S. assistance also contributes to the legitimate effort from Pakistan to fight militants in its own border and has led to the capture or killing of high level Al-Qaeda operatives. The Con will not try to portray the alliance as perfect, but rather as a necessity to combat terrorism and one that is primarily kept intact through financial assistance. This seems to be one of the more interesting topics of the year, and we wish you luck in your debates.
Page 8 of 114
Defend Your Source
Page 9 of 114
March 2012
Author Index
Author Index
Nancy Birdsall
Nancy Birdsall is the founding president of the Center for Global Development (CGD) in Washington, DC, USA, and former executive vice-president of the Inter-American Development Bank. She co-founded CGD in November 2001. Prior to becoming the President of CGD, Birdsall served for three years as Senior Associate and Director of the Economic Reform Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Her work at Carnegie focused on issues of globalization and inequality, as well as on the reform of the international financial institutions.
Bill Keller
Bill Keller is a writer for the The New York Times, of which Keller was the executive editor from July 2003 until September 2011.
Sumit Ganguly
Sumit Ganguly holds the Rabindranath Tagore Chair in Indian Cultures and Civilizations and is a Professor of Political Science at Indiana University in Bloomington.
Daniel Markey
Senior Fellow for India, Pakistan, and South Asia at the Council of Foreign Relations.
Moeed Yusuf
Moeed W. Yusuf is the South Asia adviser at the United States Institute of Peace Center in the Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention and is responsible for managing the Institutes Pakistan program. Yusuf will be engaged in expanding USIPs work on Pakistan to cover aspects that remain critical for the U.S. and Pakistan to better understand the others interests and priorities. His current research focuses on youth and democratic institutions in Pakistan, and policy options to mitigate militancy in the country.
Page 10 of 114
March 2012
Organization Index
Organization Index
Belfer Center
The Belfer Center is the hub of the Harvard Kennedy School's research, teaching, and training in international security affairs, environmental and resource issues, and science and technology policy.
Brookings Institution
The Brookings Institution is a nonprofit public policy organization based in Washington, D.C. in the United States. One of Washington's oldest think tanks, Brookings conducts research and education in the social sciences, primarily in economics, metropolitan policy, governance, foreign policy, and global economy and development. It is one of the most respected such think-tanks in the world having been founded in 1916.
Center for Strategic and International Studies

Since 1962, CSIS has been dedicated to finding ways to sustain American prominence and prosperity as a force for good in the world. After 50 years, CSIS has become one of the worlds preeminent international policy institutions focused on defense and security; regional stability; and transnational challenges ranging from energy and climate to global development and economic integration.
Combating Terrorism Center at West Point

Situated at the nexus of theory and practice, the Combating Terrorism Center serves as an important national resource that rigorously studies the terrorist threat and provides policy-relevant research while moving the boundaries of academic knowledge. The CTCs distinguished scholars, international network of experts, and access to senior U.S. government leadership set it apart from any other like enterprise.
Congressional Research Service

The Congressional Research Service (CRS) serves as shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. CRS experts assist at every stage of the legislative process from the early considerations that precede bill drafting, through committee hearings and floor debate, to the oversight of enacted laws and various agency activities.
Page 11 of 114
March 2012
Organization Index
Council on Foreign Relations

The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher.
Foreign Affairs
Since its founding in 1922, Foreign Affairs has been the leading forum for serious discussion of American foreign policy and global affairs. It is published by the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), a non-profit and nonpartisan membership organization dedicated to improving the understanding of U.S. foreign policy and international affairs through the free exchange of ideas.
The Heritage Foundation

Founded in 1973, The Heritage Foundation is a research and educational institutiona think tankwhose mission is to formulate and promote conservative public policies based on the principles of free enterprise, limited government, individual freedom, traditional American values, and a strong national defense.
INSCT
The Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism (INSCT) at Syracuse University provides cutting-edge interdisciplinary research, graduate-level education, and public service on law and policy challenges related to national and international security.
Rand Corporation
RAND Corporation is a nonprofit global policy think tank first formed to offer research and analysis to the United States armed forces by Douglas Aircraft Company. Rand has been in business since 1948 and currently is comprised of over 1,700 employees from all around the world. It is currently financed by the U.S. government and private endowment corporations including the healthcare industry, universities and private individuals. The organization has long since expanded to working with other governments, private foundations, international organizations, and commercial organizations on a host of non-defense issues. RAND aims for interdisciplinary and quantitative problem solving.
Page 12 of 114
March 2012
Laying the Foundation
Laying the Foundation

The Current Status of Pakistan and Relations
Kronstadt K, Alan.Pakistan-U.S. Relations. Rep. Congressional Research Service, 6 February, 2009. Web. 1 Feb. 2012. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33498.pdf Please see the Congressional Research Service in the Organization Index for more info. Pakistan is the most dangerous country in the world today. All of the nightmares of the twenty-first century come together in Pakistan: nuclear proliferation, drug smuggling, military dictatorship, and above all, international terrorism. Terrorist bombings and other militant attacks have become a near-daily scourge in 2008. (Pg. 1)
"Civilian Aid to Pakistan Continues despite Growing Tensions, U.S. Says." CNN. 21 Jan. 2012. Web. 10 Feb. 2012. <http://articles.cnn.com/2012-01-21/asia/world_asia_uspakistan-aid_1_civilian-aid-american-drone-strikes-islamabad?_s=PM:ASIA>.
Relations between the two countries have worsened since the U.S. airstrike in November killed 24 Pakistani soldiers along the border with Afghanistan. "Civilian assistance to Pakistan continues and has not been interrupted since the tragic November 26 incident,"
Provost, Claire. "Sixty Years of US Aid to Pakistan: Get the Data." The Guardian. 11 July 2011. Web. 10 Feb. 2012. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/povertymatters/2011/jul/11/us-aid-to-pakistan>.
The Obama administration has announced it will withhold more than one-third of all military assistance to Pakistan - an aid envelope worth some $800m (498m). The withheld aid includes funding for military equipment and reimbursements for selected Pakistani security expenditures - including a payment of $300m for counterinsurgency programmes.
U.S. Interests
Kronstadt K, Alan.Pakistan-U.S. Relations. Rep. Congressional Research Service, 6 February, 2009. Web. 1 Feb. 2012. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33498.pdf Please see the Congressional Research Service in the Organization Index for more info.
Page 13 of 114
March 2012 Laying the Foundation A stable, democratic, prosperous Pakistan is considered vital to U.S. interests. U.S. concerns regarding Pakistan include regional and global terrorism; Afghan stability; democratization and human rights protection; the ongoing Kashmir problem and Pakistan-India tensions; and economic development. (Pg. 0)
U.S. Aid Levels

Kronstadt K, Alan.Pakistan-U.S. Relations. Rep. Congressional Research Service, 6 February, 2009. Web. 1 Feb. 2012. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33498.pdf Please see the Congressional Research Service in the Organization Index for more info. Pakistan is among the worlds leading recipients of U.S. aid, obtaining more than $5.3 billion in overt assistance since 2001, including about $3.1 billion in development and humanitarian aid. Pakistan also has received about $6.7 billion in military reimbursements for its support of counterterrorism efforts. (Pg. 0)
Pakistans Nuclear Issue

Kerr, Paul K., and Mary Beth Nikitin. Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues. Rep. Congressional Research Service, 30 Nov. 2011. Web. 1 Feb. 2012. <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34248.pdf>.
Please see the Congressional Research Service in the Organization Index for more info. Pakistans nuclear arsenal probably consists of approximately 90-110 nuclear warheads, although it could be larger. Islamabad is producing fissile material, adding to related production facilities, and deploying additional delivery vehicle.
Page 14 of 114
Pro Evidence
Page 15 of 114
March 2012
Pro: General
General
A brief note regarding the organization of Pro evidence:
The Pro evidence is broken up into two primary sections that appear in the most logical order possible. First, we provide you with evidence that the United States would be justified in suspending Pakistans aid based on a number of factors such as support of terrorists, differing objectives the inability to find Bin Laden. Next, evidence is provided to prove that the US is not only justified in suspending aid, but that it in fact should. While this distinction is minimal semantically, it is essential. Evidence to support the fact that the US should suspend aid include things such as Aid Provides Perverse Incentives etc.
Vira, Varun, and Anthony Cordesman. Pakistan: Violence vs. Stability. Rep. Center for Strategic and International Studies, 5 May 2011. Web. 8 Feb. 2012. <http://csis.org/files/publication/110504_stabilizing_pakistan.pdf>.
See the Center For Strategic and International Studies in the Organization Index for more info. Pakistan pursues its own agenda in Afghanistan in ways that provide the equivalent of crossborder sanctuary for Taliban and Haqqani militants, and that prolong the fighting and cause serious US, ISAF, and Afghan casualties. This assessment shows, however, that Al Qaida and the Taliban are only part of the story. There are many other movements and tensions that feed violence and extremism in Pakistan, and which grow out of a government that has consistently failed to meet the needs of Pakistans people over a period of decades. (Pg. ii) There are tremendous shortfalls in the Pakistani governments capacity and willingness to provide for its citizens in ways that discourage a rising tide of violence and separatist movements. These failures interact with a growing wave of Sunni-Deobandi radicalization that manifests in anti-state violence and sectarian intolerance. A significant resulting uptick in terrorist violence has been accompanied by a gradual perversion of the Pakistani social fabric, intimidating secularism at the expense of militant Islam. (Pg. ii) Pakistani military operations too have not been ideal from the US context. The selective counterinsurgency approach adopted by the military has attempted to delineate between groups actively hostile to Pakistani interests, and those like the Haqqani Network and the Afghan Taliban -- that may have future strategic utility in reestablishing Pakistans sphere of influence and helping contain its external enemies. (Pg. iii) As senior US officials and officers have made all too clear along with some Afghan counterparts this means some elements of the Pakistani governance and forces are supporting groups that are actively at war with the United States and Afghanistan. This strategy is causing a steady deterioration in Pakistani and US relations, and complicating the prospects for future US aid. It also is helping to strengthen extremists who ultimately may become an active threat to Pakistan. (Pg. iii)
Page 16 of 114
March 2012
Pro: General
Kronstadt K, Alan.Pakistan-U.S. Relations. Rep. Congressional Research Service, 6 February, 2009. Web. 1 Feb. 2012.
Please see the Congressional Research Service in the Organization Index for more info. There exist widely-held suspicions among foreign governments and independent analysts alike that Islamabads civilian government does not fully control the army, that the army does not fully control the intelligence agencies, and that the these intelligence agencies have lost their ability to rein in the very militant groups they helped to create. Moreover, anti-American sentiments are widespread in Pakistan, and a significant segment of the populace has viewed years of U.S. support for President Musharraf and the Pakistani military as an impediment to, rather than facilitator of, the process of democratization there. Underlying the anti-American sentiment is a pervasive, but perhaps malleable perception that the United States is fighting a war against Islam. (Pg. 2)
Krasner, Stephen. Talking Tough to Pakistan. Foreign Affairs; Jan/Feb2012, Vol. 91 Issue 1. Web.
Please see Foreign Affairs in the Organization Index for more info. The country is the world's worst nuclear proliferator, having sold technology to Iran, Libya, and North Korea through the A. Q. Khan network. Although Islamabad has attacked those terrorist groups, such as al Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban, that target its institutions, it actively supports others, such as the Haqqani network, the Afghan Taliban, and Hezb-i-Islami, that attack coalition troops and Afghan officials or conspire against India. Pakistan also hampers U.S. efforts to deal with those groups; although many Pakistani officials privately support the drone program, for example, they publicly exaggerate the resulting civilian deaths. Meanwhile, they refuse to give the United States permission to conduct commando raids in Pakistan, swearing that they will defend Pakistani sovereignty at all costs. (2-3) Washington's current strategy toward Islamabad, in short, is not working. Any gains the United States has bought with its aid and engagement have come at an extremely high price and have been more than offset by Pakistan's nuclear proliferation and its support for the groups that attack Americans, Afghans, Indians, and others. (3)
Page 17 of 114
March 2012
Pro: Different Objectives
Pakistan Has Different Objectives

Fitzgerald, Erin, and Varun Vira. US and Iranian Strategic Competition in Afghanistan, Central Asia and Pakistan. Rep. Center for Strategic and International Studies, 12 Sept. 2011. Web. 10 Feb. 2012. <http://csis.org/files/publication/110914_Iran_Ch_9_AfPakCentAsia.pdf>.
See the Center For Strategic and International Studies in the Organization Index for more info. A decade into the war, however, it has become increasingly apparent that Pakistan has a fundamentally different set of strategic priorities from the US, a fact that US experts have privately recognized since long before 9/11. Pakistan continues to focus on the Indian threat, does not trust the US, and sees it as a temporary actor that will again abandon the region in 2014 if not before. As a result, Pakistan is perceived to continue maneuvering independently to secure its interests in a post-American Afghanistan. (Pg. 8)
Keller, Bill. "The Pakistanis Have a Point." The New York Times. 14 Dec. 2011. Web.
What America had in mind for Afghanistan was antithetical to Pakistans self-interest. The only time period between 1947 and the American invasion of Afghanistan that Pakistanis have felt secure about Afghanistan is during the Taliban period, from 1996 to 2001, says Vali Nasr, an American scholar of the region who is listened to in both academia and government. Now the Bush administration would attempt to supplant the Taliban with a strong independent government in Kabul and a muscular military. Everything about this vision is dangerous to Pakistan, Nasr says. Pakistans military ruler at the time, Pervez Musharraf, saw the folly of defying an American ultimatum. He quickly agreed to the American demands and delivered on many of them. In practice, though, the accommodation with the Taliban was never fully curtailed. Pakistan knew Americas mission in Afghanistan would end, and it spread its bets. The Bush-Musharraf relationship, Vali Nasr says, was sort of a Hollywood suspension of disbelief. Musharraf was a convenient person who created a myth that we subscribed to basically that Pakistan was on the same page with us, it was an ally in the war on terror and it subscribed to our agenda for Afghanistan. (7)
Please see Foreign Affairs in the Organization Index for more info. Still, there is a much more straightforward explanation for Pakistan's behavior. Its policies are a fully rational response to the conception of the country's national interest held by its leaders, especially those in the military. Pakistan's fundamental goal is to defend itself against its rival, India. Islamabad deliberately uses nuclear proliferation and deterrence, terrorism, and its prickly relationship with the United States to achieve this objective. (4) foundationbriefs.com Page 18 of 114
March 2012 Pro: Different Objectives Pakistan's double game with the United States has been effective, too. After 9/11, Pakistan's leaders could hardly resist pressure from Washington to cooperate. But they were also loath to lose influence with the insurgents in Afghanistan, which they believed gave Pakistan strategic depth against India. So Islamabad decided to have things both ways: cooperating with Washington enough to make itself useful but obstructing the coalition's plans enough to make it nearly impossible to end the Afghan insurgency. This has been an impressive accomplishment. (4)
Pakistan Actually Views the US as Threat

Goldberg, Jeffrey, and Marc Ambinder. "The Ally From Hell." The Atlantic. Dec. 2011. Web.
There is evidence to suggest that neither the Pakistani army, nor the SPD itself, considers jihadism the most immediate threat to the security of its nuclear weapons; indeed, General Kayanis worry, as expressed to General Kidwai after Abbottabad, was focused on the United States. According to sources in Pakistan, General Kayani believes that the U.S. has designs on the Pakistani nuclear program, and that the Abbottabad raid suggested that the U.S. has developed the technical means to stage simultaneous raids on Pakistans nuclear facilities. In their conversations, General Kidwai assured General Kayani that the counterintelligence branch of the SPD remained focused on rooting out American and Indian spies from the Pakistani nuclear weapons complex, and on foiling other American espionage methods. The Pakistani air force drills its pilots in ways of intercepting American spy planes; the Pakistani military assumes (correctly) that the U.S. devotes many resources to aerial and satellite surveillance of its nuclear sites. (4-5)
Page 19 of 114
March 2012
Pro: Toleration of Terrorists
Toleration of Insurgents and Extremists

Kronstadt K, Alan. Pakistan-U.S. Relations. Rep. Congressional Research Service, 21 October, 2011. Web. 1 Feb. 2012. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33498.pdf Please see the Congressional Research Service in the Organization Index for more info. Most independent analysts view the Pakistani military and intelligence services as too willing to distinguish among Islamist extremist groups, maintaining links to some as a means of forwarding Pakistanis perceived security interests. Top U.S. officials have offered public expressions of acute concerns about Islamabads ongoing apparent tolerance of Afghan insurgent and anti-India militants operating from Pakistani territory. The May 2011 revelation that Al Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden had enjoyed apparently years-long and relatively comfortable refuge inside Pakistan led to intensive U.S. government scrutiny of the now deeply troubled bilateral relationship, and sparked much congressional questioning of the wisdom of existing U.S. foreign assistance programs to a government and nation that may not have the intention and/or capacity to be an effective U.S. partner. Pakistan is among the leading recipients of U.S. aid both in FY2011 and in the post-9/11 period, having been appropriated about $22 billion in assistance and military reimbursements since 2001. With anti-American sentiments and xenophobic conspiracy theories rife among ordinary Pakistanis, persistent economic travails and a precarious political setting combine to present serious challenges to U.S. decision makers. (Pg. 0) Still, there are few signs that Pakistans current civilian leaders are willing and able to seriously address the outcomes of their countrys security policies and move them in the direction of moderation. Even in internal discussions these leaders continue to shirk responsibility for increased rates of extremism there, and they continue to place the bulk of blame on the United States. This perspectiveapparently widespread among the Pakistani public, as wellarguably omits enthusiastic official Pakistani participation in supporting Islamist militancy in the region (including the provision of vital support to Afghanistans Taliban regime throughout most of the 1990s). By nearly all accounts, this support continues, albeit selectively, to date. (Pg. 3)
While the hostility and distrust have increased of late, the relationship between the two countries has been shot through with rage, resentment, and pretense for years. The relationship has survived as long as it has only because both countries have chosen to pretend to believe the lies they tell each other. Pakistans lies, in particular, have been abundant. The Pakistani government has willfully misled the U.S. for more than 20 years about its support for terrorist organizations, and it willfully misleads the American government when it asserts, against the evidence, that rogue elements within the ISI are responsible for the acts of terrorism against India and U.S. forces in Afghanistan. Most American officials are at this late stage convinced that there are no rogue elements of any size or importance in the ISI; there are foundationbriefs.com Page 20 of 114
March 2012 Pro: Toleration of Terrorists only the ISI and the ISI assets that the ISI (with increasing implausibility) denies having. (The ISIs S Wing, the branch of the service that runs anti-India activities, among other things, is said to have a very potent alumni association, in the words of Stephen P. Cohen, a leading American scholar of Pakistan based at the Brookings Institution.) A particular challenge the ISI poses is that while it funds and protects various jihadist groups, these groups often pick their own targets and the timing of their attacks. The ISI has worked for years against American interestsnot only against American interests in Afghanistan, but against the American interest in defeating particular jihadist networks, even while it was also working with the Americans against other jihadist organizations. (6) The past two U.S. National Intelligence Estimates on Pakistan which represent the consensus views of Americas 16 spy agenciesconcluded with a high degree of certainty that Pakistani support for jihadist groups has increased over the past several years. (7) The ISI also helps foment anti-Americanism inside Pakistan. American and Pakistani sources allege that the ISI pays journalists in the Pakistani press, most of which is moderately to virulently anti-American, to write articles hostile to the United States. An American visitor to Pakistan can easily see that a particular narrative has been embedded in the countrys collective psyche. This narrative holds that the U.S. favors India, punishes Pakistan unjustifiably, and periodically abandons Pakistan when American policy makers feel the country is not useful. America is a disgrace because it turns on its friends when it has no use for them, says General Aslam Beg, a retired chief of staff of the Pakistani army, in an efficient summation of the dominant Pakistani narrative. A Pew poll taken after the Abbottabad raid found that 69 percent of Pakistanis view the U.S. as more of an enemy; only 6 percent see the U.S. as more of a partner. (7) Sympathy for jihadist-oriented groups among at least some Pakistani military men has been acknowledged for years, even inside Pakistan; recently a brigadier, Ali Khan, was arrested for allegedly maintaining contact with a banned extremist organization. While we were reporting this story, militants invaded a major Pakistani naval base near Karachi, blowing up two P-3C Orion surveillance planes and killing at least 10 people on the base. Pakistani security forces required 15 hours to regain control of the base. Experts believe that nuclear weapon components were stored nearby. In a series of interviews, several Pakistani officials told The Atlantic that investigators believe the militants had help inside the base. A retired Pakistani general with intelligence experience says, Different aspects of the military and security services have different levels of sympathy for the extremists. The navy is high in sympathy. (8) The U.S. government has lied to itself, and to its citizens, about the nature and actions of successive Pakistani governments. Pakistani behavior over the past 20 years has rendered the State Departments list of state sponsors of terrorism effectively meaningless. The U.S. currently names four countries as state sponsors of terror: Sudan, Iran, Syria, and Cuba. American civilian and military officials have for years made the case, publicly and privately, that Pakistan is a state sponsor of terrorismyet it has never been listed as such. In the last 12 months of the presidency of George H. W. Bush, for example, Secretary of State James Baker wrote a letter to the Pakistani prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, accusing Pakistan of supporting Muslim terrorists in foundationbriefs.com Page 21 of 114
March 2012 Pro: Toleration of Terrorists Indian-administered Kashmir, as well as Sikh terrorists operating inside India. We have information indicating that [the ISI] and others intend to continue to provide material support to groups that have engaged in terrorism, the letter read. At this same time, a talking-points memo read to Pakistani leaders by Nicholas Platt, who was then the American ambassador to Pakistan, asserted, Our information is certain. The memo went on: Please consider the serious consequences [to] our relationship if this support continues. If this situation persists, the Secretary of State may find himself required by law to place Pakistan on the state sponsors of terrorism list. The Baker threat caused a crisis inside the Pakistani government. In his book Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military, Husain Haqqani, the current Pakistani ambassador to Washington, writes that Javed Nasir, who was the ISI chief during this episode, told Prime Minister Sharif, We have been covering our tracks so far and will cover them even better in the future. The crisis was resolved, temporarily, when Nasir was removed as ISI chief the following year. (8-9) In 2008 Mike McConnell, who was then President Bushs director of national intelligence, confronted the ISI chief, General Ahmed Shuja Pasha, with evidence that the ISI was tipping off jihadists so that they could escape in advance of American attacks against them. According to sources familiar with the conversation, McConnell accused Pakistan of not doing everything it could to rein in the Pakistani Taliban; he asserted that American intelligence had concluded that most Pakistani assets were still deployed against India. How dare you tell me how our forces are deployed?, Pasha said to McConnell. McConnell then provided Pasha with evidence to back up his assertion. (10) Lashkare-Taiba, like other groups supported and protected by the Pakistani government, does not have a perfect record of complying with ISI instructions, according to a Pakistani source familiar with the relationship. Even though Lashkar cells maintain contact with ISI officers, they operate according to their own desires and schedules. The ISI funds them and protects them, but doesnt always control their choice of targets and timing, the Pakistani source says. (16)
Page 22 of 114
March 2012
See the Center For Strategic and International Studies in the Organization Index for more info. Pakistans political leadership has shown far too little courage in the face of radical extremism, often choosing appeasement, over principle. The silence in the aftermath of the assassinations of two prominent liberal lawmakers - Salman Taseer, the governor of Punjab, and Shahbaz Bhatti, the Minorities Minister has been deafening and has allowed the intimidation of all but the most courageous of progressive politicians and activists. Few government officials attended the funerals,81and some such as Interior Minister Rehman Malik have publicly sided with the religious right, including Maliks declaration that, I will shoot a blasphemer myself. In the aftermath of the assassination too, it now appears that the Minorities Ministry post that Bhatti headed will be abolished, in another blow against religious minorities. Even before their assassinations, Salman Taseer, Shahbaz Bhatti and another legislator Sherry Rehman, were some of the only supporters of reform. They were afforded virtually no support from their own parties, and today, Sherry Rehman, the last still alive, remains bunkered down in her Karachi home and has since withdrawn her amendment proposal. Many politicians have chosen to pander to radical Islamist extremists, or the criminal underworld for political advantage. President Musharraf recently labeled Nawaz Sharif a closet Taliban, in reference to his Islamist leanings, a perception shared in some circles in Washington. The Sharifs in Punjab for example have links to various Sunni Islamist groups, which have influence in their voting districts
Bajoria, Jayshree. "A Tougher U.S. Tack on Pakistan." Interview by Daniel Markey. Council on Foreign Relations. 26 Sept. 2011. Web.
Please see Council on Foreign Relations in the Organization Index for more info. From a Pakistani point of view, it's very clear to them that this doesn't end with Haqqani, which is part of the reason for their reluctance. Pakistanis ask me, "Look if we cede ground on one group, you'll be coming at us again on another." Where does this end? And why does the United States, from their perspective, get to define who the threats are? So it makes them skeptical about what we're actually up to. The problem is within the Pakistani security establishment, that they continue to believe that arming and working--actively and passively--with various militant groups serves their purposes. And they continue not to believe that these groups are necessarily dangerous to Pakistan or counterproductive to regional security. (1)
Page 23 of 114
March 2012
"Pakistan Suspected of Tipping off Insurgents." United Press International. 11 June 2011. Web.
Marc Grossman, U.S. special representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan, and CIA Deputy Director Michael Morell gave overhead surveillance video and other information on the guerrilla locations in mid-May to Pakistani army chief Gen. Ashfaq Kayani and Lt. Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha, head of the Inter-Services Intelligence spy agency, officials told The Washington Post. The information was shared in a "trustbuilding" campaign after the Osama bin Laden killing, but when Pakistani troops raided the sites in North and South Waziristan June 4, they found them abandoned. U.S. officials suspect the ISI of tipping off the extremists (1)
The evidence above is a robust account of the various state activities that suggest Pakistan is an active participant (or a willing blind eye) in terrorism. The reasons for supporting terror networks are clear: Pakistan does not see all terrorists as fundamentally dangerous. Instead, it seeks to turn some to its own advantage, particularly against India and to destabilize Afghanistan. Continuing assistance will only perpetuate this problem. The United States has for years tried to work with top Pakistani officials to stop such actions, but has thus far failed. This is because the U.S. has no credibility in its threatsit has so far only used words. Suspending assistance would be an effective step in communicating for the first time that the United States will not tolerate a lenient policy on terrorism.
Page 24 of 114
March 2012
Pro: Pakistani Intelligence Aids Terrorists
Pakistani Intelligence Aids Insurgents/Extremists

Kronstadt K, Alan. Pakistan-U.S. Relations. Rep. Congressional Research Service, 21 October, 2011. Web. 1 Feb. 2012. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33498.pdf Please see the Congressional Research Service in the Organization Index for more info. There appears to be ongoing conviction among U.S. officials that sanctuaries in Pakistan have allowed Afghan militants to sustain their insurgency and that elements of the ISI continue to support them. The ISI is also regularly linked to anti-India terrorist groups, including the Lashkar-e-Taiba, responsible for the November 2008 attack on Mumbai in which some 165 people were killed, six Americans among them. As discussed below, recent attention has focused on ISI links with the Pakistan-based Haqqani Network of Afghan insurgents. Pakistani officials regularly provide assurances that no elements of the ISI are cooperating with militants or extremists. However, to many independent observers, Pakistans security services increasingly appear to be penetrated by Islamist extremists. (Pg. 11) The circumstances of OBLs death brought renewed and intensive focus on purported ISI links with Islamist extremism. Following the May 1 raid, Pakistan sought to crack down on its own citizens who were found to be working with the CIA. Islamabad also asked for further reductions in the U.S. military footprint and moved to close three joint intelligence fusion cells only recently established in Quetta and Peshawar. The top U.S. military officer called the cuts very significant. The Obama Administration reportedly pressed Pakistan to reveal the identities of senior ISI operatives as part of the investigation into how OBL was able to find refuge inside Pakistan for five years. Pressure was increased to allow American investigators access to bin Ladens three widows in Pakistani custody. Such access was subsequently granted. One week after OBLs death, a Pakistani newspaper seen as close to the countrys military and intelligence services published the purported name of the CIAs Islamabad station chief. This was the second time in six months that the top covert American operative in Pakistan had been publically named, and U.S. officials reportedly believe such disclosures were being made deliberately by the ISI to demonstrate its leverage and to express anger at U.S. policies. (Pg. 12) After the OBL raid, the ISI leadership was confronted more frequentlyand more publicallywith U.S. evidence of collusion between Pakistani officials and Afghan insurgents. Such evidence notably included instances in which the CIA alerted Islamabad about the existence of two bomb making facilities in Pakistans Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), only to have Pakistani army units find the sites abandoned by the time they arrived. This led U.S. officials to assume that the targets had been tipped off about upcoming raids, a charge called totally false and malicious by the Pakistani military, which declared that some of the intelligence provided proved to be incorrect. Still, U.S. officials repeated the accusations after militants fled two other bomb-making facilities; these officials reportedly believed that Pakistans insistence on gaining permission from local tribal elders before entering the area allowed militants to escape. (Pg. 12)
Page 25 of 114
March 2012
Pro: Pakistani Intelligence Aids Terrorists
Please see Foreign Affairs in the Organization Index for more info. In 2008, the CIA blamed Pakistan's ISI for aiding the bombing of the Indian embassy in Kabul. In July 2011, two months after U.S. Navy seals raided Osama bin Laden's compound near the prestigious Pakistan Military Academy, Admiral James Winnefeld, vicechair of the Joint Chiefs, told the Senate Armed Services Committee, "Pakistan is a very, very difficult partner, and we all know that." And in an October press conference with Afghan President Hamid Karzai, Clinton noted that the Obama administration intended to "push the Pakistanis very hard," adding, "they can either be helping or hindering." (2)
Page 26 of 114
March 2012
Pro: Support for Haqqani Network
Support for the Haqqani Network

Kronstadt K, Alan. Pakistan-U.S. Relations. Rep. Congressional Research Service, 21 October, 2011. Web. 1 Feb. 2012. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33498.pdf Please see the Congressional Research Service in the Organization Index for more info. The terrorist network led by Jalaluddin Haqqani and his son Sirajuddin, based in the FATA, is commonly identified as the most dangerous of Afghan insurgent groups battling U.S.-led forces in eastern Afghanistan. Islamabad officials have consistently deferred on urgent and longstanding U.S. requests that the Pakistani military launch operations against the Haqqanis North Waziristan haven, saying their forces are already stretched too thin. Most observers believe the underlying cause of Pakistans inaction is the countrys decadeslong relationship with Jalaluddin Haqqani and a belief held in the army and ISI that his group represents perhaps the best chance for Islamabad to exert Pashtun-based influence in post-ISAF Afghanistan. (Pg. 20) But it was a September 13 attack on the U.S. Embassy compound in Kabul that appears to have substantively changed the nature of U.S.-Pakistan relations. The well planned and executed assault sparked a 20-hour-long gunbattle and left 16 Afghans dead, five police officers and at least six children among them. Although U.S. officials dismissed the attack as a sign of the insurgents weakness, the ability of militants to undertake a complex raid in the heart of Kabuls most protected area was seen by many as a clear blow to a narrative which has Afghanistan becoming more secure. (Pg. 20) U.S. and Afghan officials concluded the Embassy attackers were members of the Haqqani network. Days after the raid, Adm. Mullen called on Gen. Kayani to again press for Pakistani military action against Haqqani bases. Apparently unsatisfied with his counterparts response, Mullen returned to Washington, DC, and began ramping up rhetorical pressure to previously unseen levels, accusing the ISI of using the Haqqanis to conduct a proxy war in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, Secretary Panetta issued what was taken by many to be an ultimatum to Pakistan when he told reporters that the United States would take whatever steps are necessary to protect our forces in Afghanistan from future attacks by the Haqqanis. Then, during September 22 testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Mullen issued the strongest and most direct U.S. government statement on Pakistani malfeasance of the post-2001 era, saying, The Haqqani network, for one, acts as a veritable arm of Pakistans Inter-Services Intelligence agency. With ISI support, Haqqani operatives plan and conducted that [September 13] truck bomb attack, as well as the assault on our embassy. We also have credible evidence they were behind the June 28th attack on the Intercontinental Hotel in Kabul and a host of other smaller but effective operations.... In choosing to use violent extremism as an instrument of policy, the government of Pakistan, and most especially the Pakistan army and ISI, jeopardizes not only the prospect of our strategic partnership but Pakistans opportunity to be a respected nation with legitimate regional influence.... By exporting violence, theyve eroded their internal security and their position in the region. They have undermined their international credibility and threatened their economic wellbeing. (Pg. 20-21) foundationbriefs.com Page 27 of 114
March 2012
Pro: Support for Haqqani Network
Please see Foreign Affairs in the Organization Index for more info. On September 22, 2011, Admiral Mike Mullen, then chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, made his last official appearance before the Senate Armed Services Committee. In his speech, he bluntly criticized Pakistan, telling the committee that "extremist organizations serving as proxies for the government of Pakistan are attacking Afghan troops and civilians as well as U.S. soldiers." The Haqqani network, he said, "is, in many ways, a strategic arm of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Agency [ISI]." In 2011 alone, Mullen continued, the network had been responsible for a June attack on the Intercontinental Hotel in Kabul, a September truck-bomb attack in Wardak Province that wounded 77 U.S. soldiers, and a September attack on the U.S. embassy in Kabul. (1)
When asked why the U.S. doesnt target the factories located on Pakistani territory that produce the improvised explosive devices deployed by the Taliban against American troops inside Afghanistan, the same senior Obama-administration official said: What we want to do, above all else, is not lose progress on the core goal of defeating al-Qaeda, a goal that calls for continuing to cooperate with, and to fund, the ISI. So: the U.S. funds the ISI; the ISI funds the Haqqani network; and the Haqqani network kills American soldiers. (17)
Page 28 of 114
March 2012
Pro: Allegations of Aiding Taliban
Allegations of Aiding Taliban

Sommerville, Quentin. "Pakistan Dismisses Nato Report on Afghan Taliban Links." BBC News. 1 Feb. 2010. Web. 2 Feb. 2012.
The report - State of the Taliban - is based on material from 27,000 interrogations with more than 4,000 captured Taliban, al-Qaeda and other foreign fighters and civilians. The BBC's Quentin Sommerville in Kabul says the document is painful reading for international forces and the Afghan government. The report says the Taliban are helped by Pakistani security services. It claims the insurgents remain defiant and have wide support among Afghans. Our correspondent says the report fully exposes for the first time the relationship between Pakistan's ISI intelligence service and the Taliban. It notes: "Pakistan's manipulation of the Taliban senior leadership continues unabatedly." It says Pakistan is aware of the locations of senior Taliban leaders. "Senior Taliban representatives, such as Nasiruddin Haqqani, maintain residences in the immediate vicinity of ISI headquarters in Islamabad," it said. And the Taliban's second in command, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, was captured in a raid on a madrassa near Karachi nearly two years ago. It quotes a senior al-Qaeda detainee as saying: "Pakistan knows everything. They control everything. I can't [expletive] on a tree in Kunar without them watching. The Taliban are not Islam. The Taliban are Islamabad." Our correspondent says the report seems to suggest that the Taliban feel trapped by ISI control and fear they will never escape its influence. Pakistan is finding it harder to convince outsiders it is not helping the Afghan Taliban and giving safe haven to its leaders. In effect, the accusation is that Pakistan is betting on the insurgents being the strongest power in Afghanistan and most likely ally once Nato leaves - something Islamabad of course strenuously denies. The leak of this report comes at a particularly sensitive time. Pakistan is already blocking the supply route to coalition forces in Afghanistan, following a Nato attack in which 24 Pakistani soldiers were killed. With increasing pressure being heaped on Pakistan, public support here for formally ending co-operation with the West simply grows. foundationbriefs.com Page 29 of 114
March 2012
Pro: Allegations of Aiding Taliban
According to a secret 2006 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate on Afghanistan, Available evidence strongly suggests that [the ISI] maintains an active and ongoing relationship with certain elements of the Taliban. A 2008 National Intelligence Estimate concluded that the ISI was providing intelligence and financial support to insurgent groupsespecially the Jalaluddin Haqqani network out of Miram Shah, North Waziristanto conduct attacks against Afghan government, [International Security Assistance Force], and Indian targets. By late 2006, according to the intelligence historian Matthew Aid, who documents the dysfunctional relationship between the ISI and the CIA in his forthcoming book, Intel Wars, the U.S. had reliable intelligence indicating that Jalaluddin Haqqani and another pro-Taliban Afghan warlord, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, were being given financial assistance by the ISI (which of course receives substantial financial assistance from the United States). (9)
Pakistan provides assistance to the Haqqani network and to the Taliban in Western Pakistan. They do this to destabilize Afghanistan. This is a security strategy that Pakistan has employed for a long time, which it believes fits into its vital interests. Pakistan believes that U.S. troop withdrawal from Afghanistan is imminent, and that Afghanistan will quickly become a violent region once again. As such, Pakistan funds these groups so that it an have influence and some sway over the situation. This fits in with the historical approach that Pakistan previously took. Pakistan supported the Taliban when they were in power because the Taliban were able to limit violence on the Pakistan border. Thus, such support from Pakistan is in the hope that future results are the same. Assistance must be withheld because this evidence shows that Pakistan is working to undermine U.S. interests in the regionAfghanistans stability is a top priority. Moreover, this deeply held interest by Pakistan shows that assistance is unlikely to change Pakistans long-term goals and the money is only being used to eventually kill U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan.
Page 30 of 114
March 2012
Pro: Negative Impact on Afghanistan
Significant Negative Impact on Afghanistan

Kronstadt K, Alan. Pakistan-U.S. Relations. Rep. Congressional Research Service, 21 October, 2011. Web. 1 Feb. 2012. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33498.pdf Please see the Congressional Research Service in the Organization Index for more info. Despite some warming of Pakistan-Afghanistan ties in 2010 and early 2011, Afghan officials still openly accuse Pakistan of aiding and abetting terrorism inside Afghanistan. Pakistans mixed record on battling Islamist extremism includes an ongoing apparent tolerance of Afghan Taliban elements operating from its territory, the Quetta Shura Taliban (QST) of Mullah Omar and the Haqqani Network leading among these. (Pg. 18) In another clear indication that Islamabad has substantive influence over top Afghan insurgents, the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan has suggested that Pakistan is hesitant to allow Taliban leaders to travel to Kabul for reconciliation talks. He asks that Pakistan support the process by allowing those willing to talk to be given the opportunity to do so. Afghan President Karzai has echoed these complaints, saying insurgent leaders inside Pakistan are not sufficiently independent of Pakistani control to enter into negotiations on their own. (Pg. 18-19) At the time of this writing, Pakistan-Afghanistan relations are at a new nadir. On September 20, Afghan High Peace Council chairman and former Afghan President Burhanuddin Rabbani was assassinated in his Kabul home by a suicide bomber, dealing a major blow to hopes for reconciliation talks. Afghan officials suspect the ISI played a role in the murder, saying the attacker was Pakistani and the attack had been planned in Quetta. They also criticize Islamabad for its alleged failure to cooperate in the related investigation. Pakistani officials denied playing any part in the assassination, but the Afghan president has continued to accuse Pakistan of using terrorism as official policy. Most recently, in October, Afghan intelligence officials claimed to have halted a plot to assassinate Karzai himself and said the alleged culpritsan Egyptian and a Bangladeshiwere based in the FATA and affiliated with both Al Qaeda and the Haqqanis. (Pg. 19-20)
Public pronouncements to the contrary, very few figures in the highest ranks of the American and Pakistani governments suffer from the illusion that their countries are anything but adversaries, whose national-security interests clash radically and, it seems, permanently. Pakistani leaders obsess about what they view as the existential threat posed by nuclear-armed India, a country that is now a strategic ally of the United States. Pakistani policy makers The Atlantic interviewed in Islamabad and Rawalpindi this summer uniformly believe that India is bent on drawing Afghanistan into an alliance against Pakistan. (Pervez Musharraf said the same thing during an interview in Washington.) Many of Pakistans leaders have long believed that the Taliban, and Taliban-like groups, are the most potent defenders of their interests in Afghanistan (6)
Page 31 of 114
March 2012
Pro: Inability to Find Bin Laden
Inability To Find Bin Laden

Kronstadt K, Alan. Pakistan-U.S. Relations. Rep. Congressional Research Service, 21 October, 2011. Web. 1 Feb. 2012.
Please see the Congressional Research Service in the Organization Index for more info. On May 1, Al Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden was located and killed in the mid-sized Pakistani city of Abbottabad, a military cantonment in the northwest Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, in a compound one-half mile from the countrys premier military academy, just 35 miles north of the capital of Islamabad (see Figure 1). The location and circumstances of OBLs death exacerbated Washingtons long-held doubts about Pakistans commitment to ostensibly shared goals of defeating religious extremism, and brought calls to curtail U.S. assistance to Pakistan. The news of OBLs whereabouts led to immediate questioning of Pakistans role and potential complicity in his refuge. President Obamas chief counterterrorism advisor, John Brennan, told reporters it was inconceivable that Osama bin Laden did not have a support system in Pakistan. For a wide array of observers, the outcome of the years-long hunt for OBL left only two realistic conclusions: either Pakistani officials were at some level complicit in hiding the fugitive, or the countrys military and intelligence services were grossly incompetent in their search for top Al Qaeda leaders. In either case, after many years of claims by senior Pakistani officialsboth civilian and militarythat most-wanted extremist figures were finding no refuge in their country, Pakistans credibility suffered a serious blow. (Pg. 6) Parliament subsequently issued a strong condemnation of the U.S. raid and again called for a halt to U.S.launched drone strikes in western Pakistan. It also threatened to close land lines of communication through Pakistan that are vital to supplying NATO troops in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, public demonstrations took a bellicose, anti-American cast. (Pg. 7-8)
Page 32 of 114
March 2012
Pro: Inability to Find Bin Laden
Please see Foreign Affairs in the Organization Index for more info. A case in point was the raid that killed bin Laden. Rather than embrace the move, Pakistani officials reacted with fury. The police arrested a group of Pakistani citizens who were suspected of having helped the United States collect intelligence prior to the operation and delayed U.S. interrogations of bin Laden's three wives for more than a week. Lieutenant General Ahmed Shuja Pasha, head of the ISI, condemned the U.S. raid before a special session of parliament, and the government passed a resolution pledging to revisit its relationship with the United States. Of course, the operation was embarrassing for the Pakistani military, since it showed the armed forces to be either complicit in harboring bin Laden or so incompetent that they could not find him under their own noses. But Pakistan could easily have saved face by publicly depicting the operation as a cooperative venture. (3) The fact that Pakistan distanced itself from the raid speaks to another major problem in the relationship: despite the billions of dollars the United States has given Pakistan, public opinion there remains adamantly antiAmerican. In a 2010 Pew survey of 21 countries, those Pakistanis polled had among the lowest favorability ratings of the United States: 17 percent. The next year, another Pew survey found that 63 percent of the population disapproved of the raid that killed bin Laden, and 55 percent thought it was a bad thing that he had died. (3)
Page 33 of 114
March 2012
Pro: Aid Creates Perverse Incentives
Aid Creates Perverse Incentives

Aaron, David. "The World after Bin Laden." RAND Corporation. 3 May 2011. Web. 10 Feb. 2012. <http://www.rand.org/commentary/2011/05/03/WP.html>.
Please see The Rand Corporation in the Organization Index for more info. The evidence is mounting that Pakistan was complicit in sheltering bin Laden. He was, in large part, Pakistan's meal-ticket to billions of dollars in U.S. aid. Islamabad has been doing just enough to keep the money flowing but not enough to kill the golden goose. This is no longer tenable. Did Pakistan ever seriously intend to stop al Qaeda and the Taliban from using its territory as a sanctuary?
Bandow, Doug. "Foreign Aid, Or Foreign Hindrance." Forbes. 22 Feb. 2011. Web. 16 Feb. 2012. <http://www.forbes.com/sites/dougbandow/2011/02/22/foreign-aid-or-foreignhindrance/>.
The problems run deep. Alejandro Quiro Flores and Alastair Smith of New York University charged that The aid dynamic is similar to that of Pakistans war against insurgents: as long as the United States is willing to pay Pakistan ever more to eradicate extremists, Pakistan will not decisively defeat them; the graft that counterterrorism aid brings outweighs the political cost of some continuing violence. Aid incentives are all wrong. Observed Tate Watkins of the Mercatus Center: Systematic foreign aid creates opportunities for corruption, cultures of dependency, and disincentives to development. The aid faucet misaligns incentives between donors and recipients, making it extremely difficult to turn off the flow.
Yusuf, Moeed. "Rational Institutional Design, Perverse Incentives, and the US-Pakistan Partnership in Post-9/11." Defence Against Terrorism Review 2.1 (2009): 15-30. Web.
Please see author index for bio. The post-9/11 U.S. policy towards Pakistan has entailed a six-pronged approach: (i) coerce Pakistan; (ii) buyout Pakistan; (iii) do it ourselves; (iv) emphasize the seriousness of the threat faced by Pakistan itself; and (v) ensure that Pakistans tensions with India remain in check. (19) The buy-out approach had two negative spin-offs. First, the Bush administration used the Pakistani ruler cum Army Chief, Parvez Musharraf as their point man, in the process undermining the mainstream democratic forces in the country.11 In the final outcome, the US lost goodwill with the Pakistani masses as it was largely seen as having contributed to the sustainability of a dictatorship. Second, the overwhelming focus on coalition
Page 34 of 114
March 2012 Pro: Aid Creates Perverse Incentives support funds as reimbursement for Pakistani efforts in the War on Terror meant that US aid was doing little to alleviate the economic plight of the Pakistani masses. (20) In fact, the Pakistani establishment was equally adept at realizing the client-based nature of the relationship and internalized the aid as little more than direct reimbursement for the costs of fighting the War. In a text book example of perverse incentives, the transactional nature of the arrangement had in fact created an incentive for Pakistan to prolong the effort as much as possible; the longer Pakistan remained involved in tactical operations, the higher the reimbursements would be. (23) The incentive structure laid out by the US to goad Pakistan into aligning its strategies with American goals needs an urgent overhaul. Indeed, such is the level of perverseness of the framework that a rational actor model would predict maximum Pakistani gains if it were to choose a policy option somewhere between impressing upon the Afghan Taliban to negotiate with the Obama administration while the US is still in a position of relative weakness to actively supporting the Taliban in increasing the misery of Coalition troops in Afghanistan in the hope that it would lead to their forced withdrawal. (26)
Page 35 of 114
March 2012
Pro: Military Uncooperative
Military Uncooperative
See the Center For Strategic and International Studies in the Organization Index for more info. Despite these bonds, the Armys limited cooperation with the American in Afghanistan has reflected significant problems. The initial operations in the FATA were widely interpreted in the ranks as subservience to the US, which caused deep consternation. Low willingness to fight fellow Muslims led to several humiliating incidents, including the surrender of over 200 soldiers to a small group of militants in September 2007. Similarly earlier operations in 2004 led to desertions amongst the paramilitary Frontier Corps, and helicopter pilots refused to bomb targets. Some soldiers found themselves dishonored in their local communities, which is not surprising given the fact that the army and the militants recruit from the same areas, particularly in the Punjab. Lieven points to this trend as one of the most dangerous, pointing out that when men from a high-status institution such as the army have trouble finding suitable brides, it points to a significant change in its perceived role in society.
Page 36 of 114
March 2012
Pro: US Must Force Change
U.S. Must Force Change

Curtis, Lisa. "After Bin Laden: Bringing Change to Pakistan's Counterterrorism Policies." The Heritage Foundation. 12 May 2011. Web. 9 Feb. 2012. <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/05/after-bin-laden-bringingchange-to-pakistan-counterterrorism-policies>.
Please see the Heritage Foundation in the Organization Index for more info. The onus is now on Pakistan to demonstrate that it is willing to work more closely with the U.S. to target other terrorists sheltered within its borders and to cooperate more fully with the U.S. goal of stabilizing Afghanistan. Without a change in perspective from Pakistans security establishment on these crucial issues, the relationship would seem to be poised for failure. Simply maintaining the status quo is no longer feasible. Pakistans decision to side with the U.S. in the aftermath of 9/11 was halfhearted. This became clear to the world when bin Laden was killed in a Pakistani garrison city 10 days ago. Pakistan must decide whether it will finally throw its full weight into the fight against global terrorism. The outcome of its decision will determine the future of relations with the U.S. as well as Pakistans regional strategic position and standing among civilized nations.
Please see Foreign Affairs in the Organization Index for more info. Washington's tactic--criticism coupled with continued assistance-- has not been effectual. Threats and censure go unheeded in Pakistan because Islamabad's leaders do not fear the United States. This is because the United States has so often demonstrated a fear of Pakistan, believing that although Pakistan's policies have been unhelpful, they could get much worse. Washington seems to have concluded that if it actually disengaged and as a result Islamabad halted all its cooperation in Afghanistan, then U.S. counterinsurgency efforts there would be doomed. Even more problematic, the thinking goes, without external support, the already shaky Pakistani state would falter. A total collapse could precipitate a radical Islamist takeover, worsening Pakistani relations with the U.S.-backed Karzai regime in Afghanistan and escalating tensions, perhaps even precipitating a nuclear war, between Pakistan and India. (2) Despite Pakistan's ongoing problematic behavior, however, aid has continued to flow. Clinton even certified in March 2011 that Pakistan had made a "sustained commitment" to combating terrorist groups. Actions such as this have undermined American credibility when it comes to pressuring Pakistan to live up to its side of the bargain. The United States has shown that the sticks that come with its carrots are hollow. (5) The only way the United States can actually get what it wants out of Pakistan is to make credible threats to retaliate if Pakistan does not comply with U.S. demands and offer rewards only in return for cooperative actions foundationbriefs.com Page 37 of 114
March 2012 Pro: US Must Force Change taken. U.S. officials should tell their Pakistani counterparts in no uncertain terms that they must start playing ball or face malign neglect at best and, if necessary, active isolation. Malign neglect would mean ending all U.S. assistance, military and civilian; severing intelligence cooperation; continuing and possibly escalating U. S. drone strikes; initiating cross-border special operations raids; and strengthening U.S. ties with India. Active isolation would include, in addition, declaring Pakistan a state sponsor of terrorism, imposing sanctions, and pressuring China and Saudi Arabia to cut off their support, as well. (5) A combination of credible threats and future promises offers the best hope of convincing Islamabad that it would be better off cooperating with the United States. In essence, Pakistan would be offered a choice between the situation of Iran and that of Indonesia, two large Islamic states that have chosen very different paths. It could be either a pariah state surrounded by hostile neighbors and with dim economic prospects or a country with access to international markets, support from the United States and Europe, and some possibility of detente with its neighbors. The Indonesian path would lead to increased economic growth, an empowered middle class, strengthened civil-society groups, and a stronger economic and social foundation for a more robust democracy at some point in the future. Since it would not directly threaten the military's position, the Indonesian model should appeal to both pillars of the Pakistani state. And even if Islamabad's cooperation is not forthcoming, the United States is better off treating Pakistan as a hostile power than continuing to spend and get nothing in return. (7)
Markey, Daniel. "The Gloves Come Off." Foreign Policy Magazine. 23 Sept. 2011. Web.
Please see author index for bio. Washington believes it has relatively little to lose in its bilateral relationship with PakistanU.S. officials peer into the future, they see little reason to expect that relations with Islamabad are likely to improve. Indeed, there's precious little evidence to suggest that the trajectory of the U.S.-Pakistan relations will go anywhere but downhill. If there is already a realistic chance that this relationship will rupture and that the benefits of bilateral cooperation will eventually be lost, why not press Pakistan now while Washington still enjoys some positive leverage and before relations hit rock bottom? Of course, for Washington's coercion to work, it has to be credible. Tough talk alone is not about to sway the generals in Islamabad. But today's threats are already more serious than those of the past because they have been made in public -- and because Congress has already signaled that it will make assistance to Pakistan conditional upon action against the Haqqani network. (1)
Page 38 of 114
March 2012
Pro: Pakistan Heavily Dependent on Aid
Pakistan Heavily Dependent On Aid

Pakistan, for its part, can afford to lose neither Americas direct financial support, nor the help America provides with international lending agencies. Nor can Pakistans military afford to lose its access to American weapons systems, and to the trainers attached to them. Economically, Pakistan cannot afford to be isolated by America in the way the U.S. isolates countries it considers sponsors of terrorism. (18)
Abbas, Hassan. "A Low in Cycle of U.S.-Pakistan Ties." Interview by Bernard Gwertzman. Council on Foreign Relations. 23 May 2011. Web.
Please see Council on Foreign Relations in the Organization Index for more info. U.S. support to Pakistan is crucial in so many different ways: help with getting rid of the debt burden, supporting the Pakistani military, and now for the past two or three years the economic- and disaster-relief aid packages to Pakistan, which is the most significant help that Pakistan is receiving. If you look at the balance sheet of Pakistan's economy, the amount of investment by the U.S. and U.S. allies--whether it be direct aid to Pakistan, loans to Pakistan, or the IMF's support--the United States plays a major role. The European Union also follows the United States' lead when it comes to aid or support for Pakistan, and Pakistan has been getting some support from Saudi Arabia as well. But my understanding is that even if you add the total amount of aid or support that Pakistan gets from Saudi Arabia, China, and some of the other Gulf states, U.S. support is much larger in magnitude. The Pakistani military loves China, but they love the U.S. military equipment more. Pakistan's army has some Japanese SUVs and once they bought some Ukrainian tanks, but otherwise the United States is the prime military supplier. (1)
These points are important in creating the idea of a credible threat when suspending assistance. For example, if Pakistan did not receive or heavily rely on our assistance, then it would make little difference if that assistance were revoked. However, because they do indeed derive much benefit from our assistance, they will not want it to stop. Therefore, suspending the assistance will send a clear message to Pakistan and will allow them to experience what it is like without our aid. This will push them back under our influence and motivate Pakistan to better carry out U.S. policy objectives. Page 39 of 114
March 2012
Pro: Aid is Flawed and Should Be Avoided
Aid Itself is Flawed and Should Be Avoided

Fair, Christine. "A Better Bargain for Aid to Pakistan." RAND Corporation. 30 May 2009. Web. 11 Feb. 2012. <http://www.rand.org/commentary/2009/05/30/WP.html>.
Please see The Rand Corporation in the Organization Index for more info. One likely reason is that aid itself corrupts and corrodes. Foreign aid lessens the requirement for a government to forge a bond with its citizens by raising revenue and redistributing those funds as services. Such a social contract is fundamental to Pakistan's emergence as a robust democracy that provides for its people. Some estimates suggest that of 180 million Pakistanis, fewer than 1.5 million pay taxes. Pakistan should be encouraged to reform its tax code and commit to collecting what is owed -- even from recalcitrant politicians, savvy business executives, feudal landlords and other well-connected tax evaders. The massive infusion of foreign aid has also allowed Pakistan to avoid having to choose between guns and butter. Such choices define the democratic process. But successive Pakistani governments have successfully wagered that chronic instability and the imminent dangers of terrorism and nuclear black-marketeering would leave the world with no choice but to bail them out, regardless of their failures.
Aid Hurts Democracy

Putnam, Candace. "Should U.S. Continue Aid to Pakistan?" Council of Foreign Relations. 17 May 2011. Web. 9 Feb. 2012. <http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/should-us-continueaid-pakistan/p25015>.
See the Council on Foreign Relations in the Organization Index for more info. Many Pakistanis believe U.S. military aid to Pakistan has been detrimental for the country's democratic potential.
Page 40 of 114
March 2012
Pro: Pakistans Military is Too Powerful
Pakistans Military Too Powerful

See the Center For Strategic and International Studies in the Organization Index for more info. Various analysts have paraphrased Voltaire to declare that while many states have an army, Pakistans army has a state. The Army has primacy in Pakistan; it has ruled Pakistan for over half its existence and has never yet allowed a civilian government to complete its term. It acts as the primary guarantor of Pakistans stability and remains the countrys most powerful institution, with its power largely untouched despite the rise of a new civilian government. Many analysts continue to believe that the Army is the glue holding Pakistan together without which Pakistan would disintegrate into anarchy. However, its preeminence is also widely regarded to have greatly restricted the growth of democratic institutions as well as ensured that the narrow interests of military elites drive foreign and security policy. (Pg. 1) The armed forces seem to have de facto control of key budgetary allocations, and its defense expenditure in FY 2010-2011 officially made up as much as 13.5 percent of all budget outlays for the period. These significant burdens on the economy are exercised without any transparency. 2008 marked the first year where the armed forces broke down their annual requirements, instead of submitting a single, incontestable line entry for their annual demands (Pg. 2) Each previous period of military rule further weakened civilian institutions, and conditioned political elites to maximize rents during their brief tenures instead of focusing on governance. Similarly, military rulers have often staffed civilian institutions with military officers to ensure control, as during the Musharraf-era when the bureaucracy was heavily militarized. While Zia is often seen as the symbol of a destructive military intervention, Musharraf introduced quotas for military representation in the civil service, appointed army officials to key civilian positions including agriculture, education and medicine, and created army monitoring teams for oversight and evaluation purposes. Despite some positive moves to limit the armys role in civilian governance and politics, it continues to have primacy in many sectors of decision-making, most notably in all levers of security and foreign policy. Upon his election, and in the aftermath of the Mumbai attacks in 2008, the Zardari government made improving relations with India a central strategy, an effort the army sharply undercut. It severely limited Zardaris attempts to exercise greater control over security institutions such as the ISI. Hours after PM Gilani issued a decree ordering the ISI to be brought under the control of the Ministry of the Interior, his government was forced to rescind the order after the Army signaled its displeasure. The Army similarly rebuffed Zardaris offer to send the ISI to India to collaborate with the Mumbai investigation, and refused to reduce the nuclear-alert status as a goodwill gesture to reduce tensions with India. foundationbriefs.com Page 41 of 114
March 2012 Pro: Pakistans Military is Too Powerful An embassy cable released by Wikileaks dated one day before the Mumbai attacks, also noted that Kayani was the sole obstacle preventing an Indo-Pakistan deal on Kashmir, claiming that Zardari and Singh were ready, and there was text on paper. The army also publicly campaigned against the Kerry-Lugar Bill, a US economic assistance package, because it felt the bill had conditions hostile to its interests that were tied to the flow of US aid. The Army also played a key role shaping talks with the US in Islamabad in March 2010, including setting the agenda, summoning heads of civilian institutions to Army headquarters to discuss details, and presiding over meetings with federal secretaries. (Pg. 7)
See the Center For Strategic and International Studies in the Organization Index for more info. In over 60 years of independence, no democratically elected Pakistani civilian government has yet served out its full term, and been replaced by another. This history underlines the challenges facing President Zardaris Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP)-led incumbent government, and any US-supported democratization strategy. It also helps explain the deep damage that has been wreaked upon civilian institutions by repeated periods of military rule.
Page 42 of 114
March 2012
Pro: Lack of Civilian Governance
Lack of Civilian Governance Makes Humanitarian Aid Ineffective and Wasteful

Perlez, Jane. "US Aid Plan for Pakistan Is Foundering." The New York Times. 1 May 2011. Web. 10 Feb. 2012. <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/02/world/asia/02pakistan.html?_r=1>.
A multibillion-dollar aid plan that the Obama administration hoped would win over Pakistanis and buttress the weak civilian government is foundering because Washingtons fears of Pakistani corruption and incompetence has slowed disbursal of the money, undermining a fundamental goal of the United States in Pakistan, officials from both nations say. The aid program promoted by Senator John Kerry, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, promised Pakistan $7.5 billion over five years, much of it delivered through the civilian government. But so inadequate is Pakistans civilian bureaucracy and so rife are United States fears of corruption in the government that American officials, constricted by layers of their own rules, have struggled to find safe places to actually invest the money available. Instead of polishing the tarnished image of America with a suspicious, even hostile, Pakistani public and government, the plan has resulted in bitterness and a sense of broken promises. In a scathing report, the Government Accountability Office said that only $179.5 million of the first $1.5 billion of the five-year program had been disbursed by last December. But the Americans have run into problems of corruption and incompetence on the civilian side. After nearly a decade of military rule in Pakistan the military has run Pakistan for about half of its six decades the threeyear-old civilian government is deeply unpopular, having failed to provide a better life for Pakistanis. The economy is failing. Education, health care and other services are almost nonexistent, while civilian leaders from the landed and industrialist classes pay hardly any taxes. Pakistanis see the aid as a crude attempt to buy friendship and an effort to alleviate antipathy toward United States drone attacks against militants in the tribal areas. Last month, the chief minister of Punjab, Shahbaz Sharif, said that if America did not stop the drones, Pakistan should turn down the aid package. U.S.A.I.D. officials point to a report by the agencys Office of the Inspector General that highlighted the difficulties of operating effective, corruption-free projects in Pakistan. The first two years of a $750 million development program begun in the tribal areas in 2008 were plagued by allegations of corruption and the
Page 43 of 114
March 2012 Pro: Lack of Civilian Governance limitations of sending Americans to such a dangerous area. Only 53 percent of the planned projects had been carried out, the assessment said. Another big goal for the $1.5 billion was to reconstruct schools in the Swat Valley, where the Pakistani Army fought the Taliban two years ago, leaving a devastated economy and hundreds of schools destroyed. Of 115 schools that the aid agency promised to rebuild, none have been completed, said Ziauddin Yousafzai, the principal of a private school, who has watched the school program closely.
Page 44 of 114
March 2012
Pro: Anti-Americanism
Anti-Americanism Shows that Aid is Ineffective/Impossible

Anti-American sentiment in Pakistan has also been fueled by anger over the U.S. raid that killed Osama bin Laden at a compound in Pakistan last May, and continued American drone strikes on targets in the nation. Despite the massive U.S. aid program, a poll by the Pew Research Center last June found that 68% of Pakistanis saw the United States more as an enemy, while only 6% considered it a friend. Since 2002, the U.S. has given Pakistan approximately $18 billion in military, civilian and coalition support, Mark Stroh, a State Department official in Islamabad, told CNN. Ibrahim, Azeem. US Aid to Pakistan: US Taxpayers Have Funded Pakistani Corruption. Rep. Belfer Center: Harvard University, July 2009. Web. 8 Feb. 2012. <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Final_DP_2009_06_08092009.pdf>. In some parts, the United States is unpopular. Some aid agencies have found it counterproductive to reveal that the development programs are funded by the United States. In these cases, they are administered anonymously. (Pg. 16)
See the Center For Strategic and International Studies in the Organization Index for more info. Pakistans leverage in dissuading American pressure is further increased by the fact that the US is deeply unpopular in Pakistan This creates major problems for both the US and Pakistan in finding some practical way to create a truly effective strategic relationship, as well as making the success of economic and military aid uncertain, and sharply restricting the future ability for the US to transform its role from one of constant pressure on Pakistan to that of a real strategic Partner. (Pg. vi)
Page 45 of 114
March 2012
Pro: Aid Cannot Solve
Aid Cannot Fix Pakistan

See the Center For Strategic and International Studies in the Organization Index for more info. Money alone is no guarantee of success, particularly when entrenched corruptions and inefficiencies in the bureaucratic system provide diminishing returns to investments. Developing a focused set of metrics to accurately capture progress will be essential, and should reorient focus away from quantity to quality. Simply building schools in the tribal regions for example, has no bearing on the number of educated graduates if the schools lack capable teachers, better curriculums and more relevance to the labor market. (Pg. v) The fundamental realties of Pakistans external relations are all too similar to those of its internal problems. Only Pakistan can save Pakistan. This can never happen as long as its leadership elite pursues policies where their definition of victory really means defeat. (Pg. vi)
Page 46 of 114
March 2012
Pro: Moderate Levels Insufficient
Moderate Levels of External Aid Unlikely to Help

Ibrahim, Azeem. US Aid to Pakistan: US Taxpayers Have Funded Pakistani Corruption. Rep. Belfer Center: Harvard University, July 2009. Web. 8 Feb. 2012. <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Final_DP_2009_06_08092009.pdf>. Please see the Belfer Center in the Organization Index for more info. The region which has been the focus for Islamist extremists is the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA), on the border with Afghanistan. The challenges of providing development aid there are considerable. The FATA is a remote area with a forbidding landscape, over which the Pakistani state does not exert full sovereignty and the rule of Pakistani law is not enforced. There are minimal traditional state structures. Power is concentrated in the hands of leaders of the most powerful tribes, only some of whom are members of the Jirga. (Pg. 16) Partly for this reason, most aid agencies rely on contractors to implement the building projects. However, for this reason, much of the money which was intended to help Pakistan actually ends up in the contractors countries. There have been concerns that this aid does not constitute an investment in Pakistan. The Center for Strategic and International Studies concludes that the process of building schools and opening health clinics is unlikely to produce development in any broad sense. What is more likely is that the system of patronage used to maintain political authority will also co-opt the development funds provided to the tribal areas.... Although a few residents may benefit from the assistance, the money may not alleviate poverty in the tribal areas in any meaningful way. (Pg. 16)
Page 47 of 114
March 2012
Pro: Aid Used Inefficiently/Corruptly
Aid Used Inefficiently/Corruptly

Ibrahim, Azeem. US Aid to Pakistan: US Taxpayers Have Funded Pakistani Corruption. Rep. Belfer Center: Harvard University, July 2009. Web. 8 Feb. 2012. <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Final_DP_2009_06_08092009.pdf>. Please see the Belfer Center in the Organization Index for more info. Sadly, it seems that Pakistans military and security services have for many years been a black hole for U.S. funds. They have enriched individuals at the expense of the proper functioning of Pakistani institutions and the countrys ability to fight its extremist enemies and provided already kleptocratic institutions with further incentives for corruption. Many of the incentives for Pakistani army corruption are longstanding, institutional, and remain in place today The Pakistani military did not use most of the funds for the agreed objective of fighting terror. Pakistan bought much conventional military equipment. Examples include F-16s, aircraft-mounted armaments, anti-ship and antimissile defense systems, and an air defense radar system costing $200 million, despite the fact that the terrorists in the FATA have no air attack capability. Over half of the total funds54.9 percentwere spent on fighter aircraft and weapons, over a quarter26.62 percenton support and other aircraft, and 10 percent on advanced weapons systems The United States provided $1.5 million to reimburse Pakistan for damage to Navy vehicles which had not been used in combat, $15 million for the Pakistani army to build bunkers for which there is no evidence that they exist, and about $30 million for Pakistani road-building for which there is no such evidence either. Fifty-five million dollars was provided for helicopter maintenance for the entire national helicopter fleet which was not performed. Pakistan continued to receive around $80 million per month for military operations during ceasefire periods when troops were in their barracks. U.S. officials visiting the FATA found Pakistani 6U.S. Aid to PakistanU.S. Taxpayers Have Funded Pakistani Corruption Frontier Corps units poorly equipped, one reporting that he saw members of the Corps standing in the snow in sandals, with several wearing World War Iera pith helmets and carrying barely functional Kalashnikov rifles with just 10 rounds of ammunition each. At one point, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf himself complained that Pakistans helicopters needed more U.S. spare parts and support, despite reports from U.S. military officials that the United States had provided $8 million worth of Cobra parts over the previous six months. The great majority of the Coalition Support Funds given by the United States to reimburse Pakistan for counterterrorism operations was reportedly diverted to the Ministry of Finance, with only $300 million reaching the Army in the financial year ending 2008. This is evidence of corruption at the highest level. The result is that, after eight years of funding, many Pakistani troops in the FATA lack basic equipment such as sufficient ammunition, armored vests, and shoes. For many years, U.S. officials ignored clear evidence that the military was not using U.S. funds to further U.S. foreign policy objectives.
Page 48 of 114
March 2012 Pro: Aid Used Inefficiently/Corruptly Pakistani counterterrorism failed until 2009. During the years 2001 to mid-2009, significant parts of the FATA were under Taliban control, and according to the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate, al Qaeda has reconstituted a safe haven in the FATA. Tellingly, when the Pakistani army did launch an effective operation in Malakand in mid-2009, it was primarily in response to public pressure within Pakistan, not U.S. aid.
Flores, Alejandro, and Alastair Smith. "Pakistan's Flood of Cash." Foreign Affairs. 28 Nov. 2010. Web. 11 Feb. 2012.
Please see Foreign Affairs in the Organization Index for more info. The argument here is that Pakistan was unable to use aid given for the explicit purpose of flood relief. How then can we expect them to use aid given to generally improve the lives of citizens? In the months that followed, government relief was so ineffectual, corrupt, and biased, that many civil society groups organized their own efforts. Amanullah Kariapper, a software engineer who marshaled students to collect aid and set up a camp for the homeless in southern Punjab, said, "We don't donate to the government, because we know it's mainly a way for government officials to make money." Although local organizations have tried to limit the opportunities for government graft, the international community has not. The United Nations' Financial Tracking Service reports that, as of November 1, 2010, Pakistan has been given $1.7 billion in emergency assistance. That is about $83 per affected person and 20 times more per person than was given for comparable flooding in relatively poorer Benin. Pakistans failure is due in part to its political institutions. As we argued in "Disaster Politics" in July democratic states are better at protecting their citizens from the effects of natural disasters than autocratic governments because leaders need the support of citizens to stay in office. Democratic leaders are highly sensitive to disaster-related causalities and, therefore, take measures to prevent and mitigate disasters and provide relief if they happen. In contrast, disaster-related deaths have little effect on the tenure of autocratic leaders, who, in turn, feel no need to provide relief. Autocratic governments disregard for public welfare is exacerbated by international relief assistance. As the scale of a natural disaster increases, the international community provides them with more aid. Unfortunately, this creates perverse incentives for the recipient nondemocratic governments, which depend on buying off the support of influential individuals to stay in power. Aid provides just such funds, and, as the citizens of Pakistan are aware, the government is all too ready to divert relief funds to this cause. Emergency assistance is perhaps particularly vulnerable, because it is given so rapidly and with less oversight, but it is not unique. According to some estimates, of the $6.6 billion in military aid the United States gave Pakistan between 2002 and 2008, only $500 million ever made it to the military. Indeed, the aid dynamic is similar to that of Pakistans war against insurgents: as long as the United States is willing to pay Pakistan ever more to eradicate extremists, Pakistan will not decisively defeat them; the graft that counterterrorism aid brings outweighs the political cost of some continuing violence. foundationbriefs.com Page 49 of 114
March 2012 Pro: Aid Used Inefficiently/Corruptly The United States needs to radically change the way it distributes aid to change nondemocracies calculations. In Pakistan, for example, the United States should stop providing ongoing aid, much of which is subsequently stolen. Instead, it could set up an international escrow account that would be accessible to Pakistan's government only if problems remain fixed. In normal circumstances, nondemocratic governments destroy an important source of income if they effectively protect people from disasters or end insurgencies. But under an escrow plan, funds could be withheld should insurgencies resume or natural disasters cause excess damage.
Page 50 of 114
March 2012
Pro: Aid Goes to Fund Nuclear Program
Aid Goes to Fund Nuclear Program

Ibrahim, Azeem. US Aid to Pakistan: US Taxpayers Have Funded Pakistani Corruption. Rep. Belfer Center: Harvard University, July 2009. Web. 8 Feb. 2012. <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Final_DP_2009_06_08092009.pdf>.
Please see the Belfer Center in the Organization Index for more info. President Obama has set a goal of enacting a global cutoff of the production of weapons-grade nuclear material. Pakistan is an obstacle to this goal, having recently added to its supply of such nuclear material and expanded its plutonium separation capabilities. Given that Pakistan has had consistent budgetary issues and a low-tax base, and given the reports of military corruption, it is likely that U.S. aid has itself funded this expansion in part. This would mean that the United States would be funding an obstacle to its own stated policy of reducing the production of weapons-grade nuclear material. This must stop. (Pg. 27)
Page 51 of 114
March 2012
Pro: Aid Not Effective Counterinsurgency
Military Aid Not Effective Counterinsurgency

Bajoria, Jayshree. "Realigning Pakistan's Security Forces." Council on Foreign Relations. 18 June 2009. Web. 14 Feb. 2012.
Please see Council on Foreign Relations in the Organization Index for more info. Pakistani Army Chief Ashfaq Parvez Kiyani said the country had developed a full range of counterinsurgency training facilities for low-intensity conflicts. "[E]xcept for very specialized weapons and equipment and [advanced] technology, no generalized foreign training is required," he said. This reflects an overarching problem for U.S. policymakers, says the RAND Corporation's C. Christine Fair: "Pakistan's army does not want to become a counterinsurgency force." Shuja Nawaz, director of the South Asia Center at the Atlantic Council of the United States and an expert on the Pakistani military, says the army hasn't made the decision yet to become a counterinsurgency force and instead only seeks better equipment from the United States for what it calls fighting a "low intensity" conflict. (1) RAND's Fair says the Pakistani army is wary of the U.S. military directly training FC [Frontier Corps] troops. Those troops operating in North West Frontier Province and the tribal areas are largely Pashtun recruited from the region. Given the Pashtun separatist demands and historical problems the Pakistani state has had with the tribal region, Fair says the Pakistani army is "hesitant to let the Frontier Corps become more efficient." There are also questions of loyalty, as FC was historically used to train the Taliban. (1)
Page 52 of 114
March 2012
Pro: Poor Results
Aid Has Yielded Poor, Often Negative, Results

Ibrahim, Azeem. US Aid to Pakistan: US Taxpayers Have Funded Pakistani Corruption. Rep. Belfer Center: Harvard University, July 2009. Web. 8 Feb. 2012. <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Final_DP_2009_06_08092009.pdf>. Please see the Belfer Center in the Organization Index for more info. The new military commitment to counterterrorism in mid-2009 came in response to public pressure within Pakistan, not U.S. aid. Public pressure achieved what eight years of U.S. largesse could notit persuaded the Pakistani military to take counterterrorism seriously. Pakistani deaths from terrorist violence have skyrocketed. There were 189 in 2003, 648 in 2005, and 3,599 in 2007. Pakistans economy has not benefited from the budget support; only an IMF loan in late 2008 prevented it from collapsing. Pakistan is less secure both regionally and internally. Pakistan did not remand one high-value Taliban asset until the summer of 2007and then only did so reluctantly and after sustained pressure from Washington. The Afghan Taliban have not yet been the targets of effective Pakistani military action. According to RAND analyst Christine Fair, Pakistan has not launched massive offensives against the Afghan Taliban in Pakistan. Notably, the Taliban leadership council, aka the Quetta shura, located in the Pakistani city of Quetta, remains unmolested and free to act. Despite the billions of U.S. aid for the purpose, the Pakistani troops in the FATA lack basic equipment. They are understandably demoralized. Anti-Americanism remains high. A poll in 2008 found that over half of Pakistanis hold the United States responsible for recent violence in Pakistan, and most Pakistanis74 percentdo not support action against Taliban and al Qaeda militants. Far from having reduced, Islamist extremism in Pakistan has risen. According to the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate, al Qaeda has reconstituted a safe haven in the FATA. (Pg. 23-24)
The hope was that after September 11, 2001, Pakistan would clear terrorists from within its own borders, prevent them from using the areas in northwest Pakistan as a safe haven, and help to bring the al Qaeda leaders to justice. Despite over $12 billion towards these aims, none have been achieved. (Pg. 24) Nearly two thousand Pakistani troops have died fighting terrorist militants. However, the high levels of corruption within the Pakistani military and security services means that in practice, it is not clear that Pakistan, on aggregate, supported or hindered U.S. foreign policy objectives between 2001 and 2008. (Pg. 24)
Page 53 of 114
March 2012
Pro: India
India Should Be Our Priority

Ganguly, Sumit. "Afghanistan Is Now India's Problem." Foreign Policy. 19 July 2011. Web. 6 Feb. 2012. <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/07/19/afghanistan_is_now_indias_problem>. Please see Author Index for bio. India is a significant player in Afghanistan. It has the world's fifth-largest aid program there, having committed $1.5 billion in developmental assistance. It has played a key role in reconstruction and has developed training programs for Afghan civil servants and police. India has made these investments in the country because its policymakers are keen on ensuring that a radical Islamist regime does not return to the country, that Pakistan not wield a disproportionate influence on any future government, and that Afghanistan might But as the U.S. military drawdown has begun, there is growing apprehension in New Delhi that India's investments may be at risk. These fears are far from chimerical; India's past experiences with the Taliban regime provide much basis for serious anxieties -- and not just due to the radical movement's long-standing ties to Pakistan. Above all, India fears that a reconstituted Taliban regime would allow a host of anti-Indian terrorist groups, most notably Lashkar-e-Taiba, to find sanctuaries and training grounds in Afghanistan. Some astute New Delhibased analysts also worry that a resurgent Taliban may actually help broker a peace agreement between the Pakistani regime and Pakistani domestic terrorist groups like Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan. That, they argue, could redirect the collective wrath of various jihadi organizations from internecine conflict and focus it on India, and more specifically Indian-controlled Kashmir. Finally, they are concerned that a Taliban-dominated regime would forge links with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and other jihadi groups in Central Asia, thereby adversely affecting India's quest for access to energy resources and markets in the region. Yet New Delhi also sees the writing on the wall. In mid-June this year, India dropped its previously unyielding opposition to any form of reconciliation with the Taliban when Prime Minister Manmohan Singh suggested that India would be open to any form of reconciliation that is Afghan-led. This concession was far from trivial, and reflects India's recognition that it needs to demonstrate a degree of flexibility as the U.S. withdrawal approaches to ensure that its interests are not wholly ignored. According to an ABC poll conducted in December 2008 and January 2009, India is popular in Afghanistan, despite its past mistakes during the Soviet invasion and occupation of the country. Yet without security, it is far from clear that India will be able to maintain its current profile in the country. Thanks to Pakistani intransigence (with America's acquiescence), India has been unable to place any viable security contingent in Afghanistan and has also shied away from training the Afghan army. Even its substantial diplomatic presence within the country has been subject to routine Pakistani diplomatic barrages and, in all likelihood, at least one Pakistan-linked
Page 54 of 114
March 2012 Pro: India attack on its embassy in Kabul, in October 2009. Despite these pressures, India has stuck to its guns in the country and has continued with its developmental activities. India will not easily walk away from Afghanistan. Kronstadt K, Alan. Pakistan-U.S. Relations. Rep. Congressional Research Service, 21 October, 2011. Web. 1 Feb. 2012. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33498.pdf Please see the Congressional Research Service in the Organization Index for more info. When Afghan President Karzai made a long-planned trip to New Delhi in early October and inked a new strategic framework with IndiaKabuls first such 21st century agreement with any countryPakistans fears of strategic encirclement became more acute, especially in light of the Afghanistans acceptance of future Indian assistance in training and equipping its security forces. Kabuls floundering efforts to find rapprochement with the Taliban may be behind Karzais decision to link Afghanistan more closely to India. (Pg. 30) Simply put, the fact that India is signing strategic frameworks and providing assistance to train and equip the Afghan security force is reason enough to consider India a top ally in the effort to rebuild and secure Afghanistan.
Our Alliance With Pakistan Hurts/Prevents Our Alliance With India

Kronstadt K, Alan. Pakistan-U.S. Relations. Rep. Congressional Research Service, 21 October, 2011. Web. 1 Feb. 2012. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33498.pdf Please see the Congressional Research Service in the Organization Index for more info. Three full-scale warsin 1947-1948, 1965, and 1971and a constant state of military preparedness on both sides of their mutual border have marked more than six decades of bitter rivalry between Pakistan and India. The acrimonious partition of British India into two successor states in 1947 and the unresolved issue of Kashmiri sovereignty have been major sources of tension. Both countries have built large defense establishments at significant cost to economic and social development. A bilateral Composite Dialogue reengaged in 2004 realized some modest, but still meaningful successes, including a formal cease-fire along the entire shared frontier, and some unprecedented trade and people-to-people contacts across the Kashmiri Line of Control (LOC). The dialogue is meant to bring about peaceful settlement of all bilateral issues, including Jammu and Kashmir, to the satisfaction of both sides. Yet 2008 saw significant deterioration in Pakistan-India relations, especially following the large-scale November terrorist attack on Mumbai, India, that killed some 165 civilians and left the peace process largely moribund. More broadly, militarized territorial disputes over Kashmir, the Siachen Glacier, and the Sir Creek remain unresolved. In 2010, conflict over water resources has emerged as another exacerbating factor in the bilateral relationship. (Pg. 29)
Page 55 of 114
March 2012 Pro: India Ibrahim, Azeem. US Aid to Pakistan: US Taxpayers Have Funded Pakistani Corruption. Rep. Belfer Center: Harvard University, July 2009. Web. 8 Feb. 2012. <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Final_DP_2009_06_08092009.pdf>. Please see the Belfer Center in the Organization Index for more info. For six decades, Pakistan has regarded India as its main security threat. The Pakistani military services have traditionally been both trained to fight a conventional war and conditioned to see India as their main threat. This mindset coexists with a tendency for the military to underestimate the danger from Islamist terrorism and for some members of the security services to sympathize with extreme Islamist groups. Under this scenario, it was perhaps to be expected that the Pakistani military might have sought to spend U.S. funds on weapons for use against India. But it could not be expected that Pakistan would be so open about this. It could furthermore not be expected that Pakistan would procure so much conventional equipment with limited use against terrorists, which was evidently not in line with stated U.S. policy aims. (Pg. 21) Security assistance money is often justified to Congress as providing weapons that play a critical role in the War on Terror. In the event, over half of the money54.9 percentwas spent on fighter aircraft and weapons, over a quarter26.62 percenton support and other aircraft, and 10 percent on advanced weapons systems. In his testimony to the Senate investigating committee, Lawrence J. Korb said the vast majority of our foreign military financing (FMF) has gone toward the purchase of major weapons systems such as F-16 fighters and other aircraft, anti-ship, and antimissile capabilities. It is clear that Pakistan is not using the majority of U.S. money to fight terrorism or advance the U.S. foreign policy aims for which it was allocated. (Pg. 21) Many of these seem to be of dubious use, such as F-16s, aircraft-mounted armaments, anti-ship and antimissile defense systems, and an air defense radar costing $200 million, despite the fact that the terrorists in the FATA have no air attack capability. In 2009, after billions of dollars supplying the Pakistani army with equipment to be used for counterterrorism since 2002, a U.S. report argued that the Pakistani army still lacks modern night vision devices to monitor the border and helicopters to carry troops rapidly and engage a mobile militant force. (Pg. 21)
Page 56 of 114
March 2012
Pro: India
See the Center For Strategic and International Studies in the Organization Index for more info. Pakistans focus on the challenge from India affects virtually every aspect of its external relations. This plays out in Afghanistan in the form of a competition for influence over the Afghan government where Pakistan attempts to use its ties to the Afghan Taliban, Haqqani network, and other movements to ensure its influence over the future of Afghanistan and to limit any threat of Pashtun independence movements. (Pg. iv) The end result is a fundamentally different perception of Pakistans national interest from the US focus on Afghan security and stability. It is the reality behind the rhetoric of ally and strategic partner that has led to constant tension with the US. Cross-border violence into Afghanistan is a major irritant, and has resulted in deteriorating US-Pakistani relations. (Pg. iv) Similarly, the Indo-Pakistani border is one of the most tense on the planet, and secured on both sides by nuclear weapons. Cross-border violence into India can greatly escalate the prospects of large-scale war. Many Kashmiri militant groups have splintered, as in south Punjab, and the growing risk of militant proxies operating autonomously cannot be discounted, particularly to divert Pakistani military attention away from the tribal areas. (Pg. iv) The end result is that a concern with self-defense, and a threat from India, diverts massive amounts of resources and security forces away from far more serious internal problems and threats. Pakistans current policies not only feed a major arms race with India, and tensions with Afghanistan and the US, they waste so many critical resources in the name of security that they have become a threat to the state and the future of the Pakistani people. (Pg. iv)
Please see Council on Foreign Relations in the Organization Index for more info. This gets to the heart of a major criticism of Pakistan's use of U.S. security assistance, that Islamabad is using this aid to bolster conventional capabilities against India while paying insufficient attention to counterinsurgency capacity. For example, "of the nearly $1.6 billion in Foreign Military Financing provided to Pakistan from FY2002-FY2008, more than half has been used by Islamabad to purchase weapons of limited use in the context of counterterrorism," notes Kronstadt of the Congressional Research Service. These include maritime patrol aircraft, anti-armor missiles, surveillance radar, upgrade kits for F-16 combat aircraft, and selfpropelled howitzers. Some experts argue equipment like F-16s may not be directly relevant to the fight against terrorism but must be provided to Pakistan because they have become connected to the Pakistani military's capacity to trust the U.S. military. "We may not like that or accept that but it is a fact from the Pakistani perspective," says CFR's Markey. "We ignore that fact at our own peril." (1) foundationbriefs.com Page 57 of 114
March 2012
Pro: Other Ways to Help
Suspending Aid Doesnt Mean No Help

Kronstadt K, Alan. Pakistan-U.S. Relations. Rep. Congressional Research Service, 21 October, 2011. Web. 1 Feb. 2012. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33498.pdf Please see the Congressional Research Service in the Organization Index for more info. A key aspiration for Pakistani leaders is to acquire better access to Western markets. With the security situation deterring foreign investors, exports, especially from the key textile sector, may be key to any future Pakistani recovery. Islamabad has continued to press Washington and European capitals for reduced tariffs on textile exports, especially following massive flood damage to Pakistans cotton crop. By some accounts, the textile sector directly employs 3.5 million Pakistanis and accounts for 40% of urban factory jobs. Pakistani officials and business leaders estimate that abolishing American tariffs, which currently average 17% on cotton apparel, would boost their countrys exports by $5 billion annually. Along with Pakistani leaders, the Obama Administration has continued to support congressional passage of a bill to establish Reconstruction Opportunity Zones (ROZs) in western Pakistan that could facilitate development in Pakistans poor tribal regions, perhaps to include textile manufacture. (Pg. 32)
Page 58 of 114
March 2012
Pro: Other Ways to Help
See the Council on Foreign Relations in the Organization Index for more info. Despite our efforts, American aid to date has engendered far more resentment and suspicion in Pakistan than it has public appreciation. Our policymakers have had difficulty deciding how best to get political mileage and effectively spread aid. Threatening to end the assistance might be the kind of shock treatment Pakistan needs to bring about the level of domestic revenue-extraction policies that would make the country less dependent on foreign assistance. A good case can also be made that the United States could accomplish more with trade concessions than with financial aid.
Much of the evidence so far in the brief has demonstrated that Pakistan mishandles monetary assistance. Much of it is lost to corruption or spent on ineffective programs. At the same time, a huge potential exists to greatly fortify the foundation of the Pakistani economy and help the average citizen prosper. Having legitimate economic opportunity is a major deterrent of terrorism, and trade policy is the way to achieve this. Currently, Pakistan faces huge tariffs, especially in its textile industry, when trying to trade with the United States. The United States should decrease barriers of trade while suspending its current assistance to send a strong message to Pakistan. That message would be one of promoting the average Pakistani citizen who wants a better life through hard work, while discouraging a hugely unpopular government rife with corruption. Withholding assistance in this strategy would thus encourage reform in the government while still changing public opinion in a positive manner.
Page 59 of 114
March 2012
Pro: Pakistan Does Not Need the Aid
Pakistan Apparently Does Not Need the Aid

Ahmed, Issam. "Pakistan Says It Doesn't Need US Military Aid." The Christian Science Monitor. 11 July 2011. Web. 10 Feb. 2012. <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/AsiaSouth-Central/2011/0711/Pakistan-says-it-doesn-t-need-US-military-aid>.
Pakistans Army said Monday that a US military aid cut worth some $800 million wont affect its ability to conduct combat operations. Analysts call the cuts the strongest indicator yet of the deteriorating nature of the relationship between the two countries and say it could cause the Pakistani military to retreat to a more hostile anti-US position. "The Army in the past, as well as at present, has conducted successful military operations using its own resources without any external support whatsoever, Army spokesman Maj. Gen. Athar Abbas, told the AFP. He added that the Army had not received any official correspondence from the US on the matter. General Abbas's statement might be a stretch, but according to Ayesha Siddiqa, military analyst and author of Military Inc, the symbolism of the cut is likely to outweigh the operational significance, despite the fact that the cut would account for roughly 40 percent of the $2 billion in military assistance America gives Pakistan annually.
Page 60 of 114
Con Evidence
Page 61 of 114
March 2012
Con: General
General
Please see Foreign Affairs in the Organization Index for more info. The U.S.-Pakistani relationship has produced a few modest successes. Pakistan has generally allowed NATO to transport supplies through its territory to Afghanistan. It has helped capture some senior al Qaeda officials, including Khalid Sheik Mohammed, the 9/11 mastermind. It has permitted the United States to launch drone strikes from bases in Baluchistan. (2)
American strategists like [Brookings Institution Stephen] Cohen argue that the U.S. must maintain its association with a nuclear Pakistan over the long term for three main reasons. The first is that an unstable and friendless Pakistan would be more apt to take precipitous action against India; the second is that nuclear material, or a warhead, could go missing; the third, longer-term worry is that the Pakistani state itself could implode. One of the negative changes weve seen is that Pakistan is losing its coherence as a state, Cohen said. Its economy has failed, its politics have failed, and its army either fails or looks the other way. There are no good options. (11-12)
See the Council on Foreign Relations in the Organization Index for more info. But to now abruptly reduce assistance to Pakistan would jeopardize American military forces in Afghanistan and weaken the Pakistani army's capacity to confront those domestically ensconced terrorist groups that threaten us both. It could also leave us less confident about the disposition of Pakistan's nuclear assets. A revised U.S. aid policy should aim at empowering those groups and institutions most inclined to recognize that Pakistan's real security threats lie within--from its extremists and the country's unmet social and economic problems. Our programs need to resource those areas of civil society, the private sector, and government most inclined to initiate political reforms and long-term economic growth. While assistance to the military must continue, it should be more conditioned to prevent bad behavior and increase opportunities for a greater civilian role in directing foreign policy. American aid should, then, be an investment and stimulus aimed toward realizing a more self-reliant, democratic Pakistan. That way, ending it can lay the basis for a more genuine strategic relationship rather than be seen as punishing Pakistan.
Page 62 of 114
March 2012
Con: General
Please see Council on Foreign Relations in the Organization Index for more info. I would like to see the credible threat provoke a shift on Pakistan's part. If we can see that, then we can begin to really turn the tide in this relationship. It worries me about going too far in shutting down opportunities for assistance to Pakistan. [Aid] suspensions are smart, conditionality--if narrowly targeted--makes sense. But if you turn off assistance and you don't maintain the prospect that you might turn it back on again--if you begin to put into place a whole array of obstacles to future engagement--then the Pakistanis will have even less reason to believe that some brighter future is possible for them. (1)
Markey, Daniel. "How Cuts Affect U.S.-Pakistan Ties." Council on Foreign Relations. 11 July 2011. Web.
Please see Council on Foreign Relations in the Organization Index for more info. Alone, cutting U.S. military assistance will not force Pakistan to reassess its strategic posture. Pakistan's generals probably benefit from the assistance more than they claim, but they can also do without it. And antiAmerican sentiment in Pakistan is so intense at the moment, including within the ranks of the army, that Pakistan's generals can hardly appear to bow before U.S. pressure. So if Obama administration officials believe that assistance cuts and public rebukes offer enough leverage to coerce a Pakistani about-face, they will be sorely disappointed. (1)
Jones, Seth. "Focus on Economic Aid to Pakistan." RAND Corporation. 10 May 2011. Web. 12 Feb. 2012. <http://www.rand.org/commentary/2011/05/10/NYT.html.html>.
Please see The Rand Corporation in the Organization Index for more info. It makes little sense to abandon Pakistan and cut off all financial assistance, which would make it even harder for the U.S. to target Al Qaeda leaders in Pakistan. But America could reduce part of its security assistance, focusing instead on economic and humanitarian aid. There is a range of other options, including placing U.S. security assistance into an escrow account until cooperation improves. Washington can provide some carrots, like supporting Pakistani efforts to stabilize Baluchistan and defeat insurgents there. But it may need sticks as well. There are inherent risks in this strategy, which could cause further deterioration in U.S.-Pakistani cooperation, which has waxed and waned over the decades. But decreasing security assistance is not likely to terminate the relationship. Today, the threats to Pakistan and the United States are serious and real, and they require substantive cooperation. The true mettle of policymakers is whether they can effectively deal with today's threats despite their disagreements and conflict over recent events.
Page 63 of 114
March 2012
Con: More Engagement, Not Less
More Engagement, Not Less

Kronstadt K, Alan. Pakistan-U.S. Relations. Rep. Congressional Research Service, 21 October, 2011. Web. 1 Feb. 2012. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33498.pdf Please see the Congressional Research Service in the Organization Index for more info. Figures from both major parties expressed disbelief at Pakistans allegations of ignorance and called for greater oversight and accountability for future U.S. assistance to Pakistan. Still, senior Members tended to take a more measured view, with the House Speaker voicing the opinion that circumstances called for more engagement [with Pakistan], not less. Such sentiments tracked well with the view of many independent observers that despite ample reasons for discouragement and distrustthe United States has had no good options other than continuing to engage Pakistan in what many analysts have described as a bad marriage. (Pg. 8)
Few policy makers believe that cutting aid to Islamabad is practical, especially while American troops in Afghanistan depend on supplies trucked through Pakistan. Even Admiral Mullen, who has been disillusioned by the behavior of Pakistans ruling generals, argued before the Senate Armed Services Committee just prior to his retirement that the U.S. must not give up on its relationship with Pakistan. Now is not the time to disengage from Pakistan; we must, instead, reframe our relationship, he said. A flawed and strained engagement with Pakistan is better than disengagement. (17-18)
Page 64 of 114
March 2012
Con: Suspending Aid Worse
Suspending All Aid Would Worsen the Situation

Curtis, Lisa. "After Bin Laden: Bringing Change to Pakistan's Counterterrorism Policies." The Heritage Foundation. 12 May 2011. Web. 9 Feb. 2012.
Please see the Heritage Foundation in the Organization Index for more info. The U.S. must avoid abrupt action like stopping all aid, which would come at a steep price to U.S. interests in the region. Pakistan could react by cutting off NATO supply lines that run through Pakistan to coalition troops in Afghanistan. It could also expel U.S. intelligence officials from the country, thus denying the U.S. access to valuable information that helps the CIA track terrorists. The U.S. also has a broader interest in maintaining steady relations with Pakistan and encouraging stability in the nuclear-armed nation of 180 million that sits at the crossroads of the Middle East and South and Central Asia. If the U.S. were to cut aid to Pakistan and prevail on the International Monetary Fund and World Bank to do the same, the Pakistani economy would teeter on the brink of collapse. The chance of Pakistans nuclear arsenal falling into terrorist hands, while currently remote, would increase in the context of a deteriorating political and economic situation.
See the Council on Foreign Relations in the Organization Index for more info. The fact that Osama bin Laden hid in Pakistan for five years demonstrates that Pakistan's military was either complicit or incompetent. Either prospect is deeply troubling, but another abrupt cut in U.S. aid will only endanger security cooperation that has been effective, if insufficient, in making America safer.
Armitage, Richard, Samuel Berger, and Daniel Markey. U.S. Strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan. Independent Task Force Report No. 65. Council on Foreign Relations,
Please see Council on Foreign Relations in the Organization Index for more info. Containing the terrorist threat from Pakistan would be challenging if the Pakistani and U.S. governments were at odds, intelligence sharing were reduced, and U.S. officials were forced to operate from neighboring countries. NATOs presence in Afghanistan would be jeopardized without a secure logistics route through Pakistan. At the same time, Pakistans fragile political and economic stability would be undermined by greater tensions with the United States. Pakistans military would suffer from the loss of U.S. assistance and restricted access to training, technology, and spare parts for American-made weapons and vehicles. In general, U.S. coercion and containment of Pakistan could accelerate dangerous economic, political, and social trends inside Pakistan. Americans must recognize that as frustrating and difficult as Pakistans situation may be today, it has the potential to get even worse. (46) foundationbriefs.com Page 65 of 114
March 2012
Con: Consistency is Essential
Consistency is Essential
See the Council on Foreign Relations in the Organization Index for more info. Last but not least, Pakistan has paid a heavy price for supporting the U.S.-led "war on terror" since 9/11--both in terms of facing a brutal backlash from a variety of militant and terrorist groups as well as a negative impact on its economy. While Pakistan itself played a major role in its drift toward extremism, U.S. mistakes also contributed to the current situation. Therefore, cutting off aid, especially development aid, at this hour will be immoral and damaging for U.S. policy objectives.
Please see Author Index for bio. Pakistan the afterthought was the theme very late one night when I visited the home of Pakistans finance minister, Abdul Hafeez Shaikh. After showing me his impressive art collection, Shaikh flopped on a sofa and ran through the roll call of American infidelity. He worked his way, decade by decade, to the war on terror. Now, he said, Pakistan is tasked by the Americans with simultaneously helping to kill terrorists and the newest twist using its influence to bring them to the bargaining table. Congress, meanwhile, angry about terrorist sanctuaries, is squeezing off much of the financial aid that is supposed to be the lubricant in our alliance. Pakistan was the cold-war friend, the Soviet-Afghan-war friend, the terror-war friend, the minister said. As soon as the wars ended, so did the assistance. The sense of being discarded is so recent. (6)
Page 66 of 114
March 2012
Con: Consistency is Essential
Kharas, Homi. "U.S. Aid to Pakistan: Time for a New Approach." Brookings Institution. 25 Aug. 2010. Web. 8 Feb. 2012. <http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/0825_pakistan_aid_kharas.aspx/>.
Please see The Brookings Institution in the Organization Index for more info. The second point is that economic development assistance must be reliable, predictable and substantial to have an impact. Currently, U.S. aid to Pakistan displays none of these characteristics. The U.S. has periodically announced large aid packages for Pakistan and aid commitments have been high, albeit very volatile as shown in the chart below (see the red line). But actual U.S. development assistance to Pakistan has been minimal since the large aid programs of the 1960s and early 1970s (the hey-day of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship). At that time, U.S. development assistance helped build roads, power stations and a vibrant agricultural economy. Since then, Pakistan has seen little cash for development projects from the United States. In some cases, pledges were never translated into actual projects or were left unimplemented and later simply cancelled or forgotten. In other instances, the money never went to Pakistan or Pakistanis, but went straight to U.S. contractors to execute programs designed by the United States. In fact, the actual programmable cash-flow from the U.S. to Pakistan gross aid disbursements excluding technical cooperation (where no money flows to Pakistan), food and humanitarian assistance (not designed for long-term development purposes), debt relief (write-offs on bad commercial loans that would not have been repaid anyway), and interest and principal repayments on past aid was negative for almost 25 years between 1975 and 2000 (see the blue line). This meant that more money was being paid from the Pakistan budget to the United States Treasury than vice-versa in these years. In 2008, the last year of fully reported data, the actual net disbursement of programmable money for development projects in Pakistan by the U.S. amounted to $204 million, or about $1.10 per Pakistani. Small wonder that very few Pakistanis believe that U.S. assistance has benefited them significantly over the last 40 years.
Page 67 of 114
March 2012
Con: Cutting Aid Failed Last Time
Cutting Aid Failed Last Time

See the Council on Foreign Relations in the Organization Index for more info. America has cut off aid before, with disastrous results. We funneled millions through Pakistan to oust the Soviets from Kabul, but we later cut all assistance for twelve years under nuclear-related sanctions. After 9/11, we came back with primarily military aid and demands they fight the Taliban. Today, the Pakistani people distrust us as a fair-weather friend that supports military dictators. The rising generation of Pakistani generals, barred under sanctions from U.S. training, remains wary of cooperation just when we need them to help us defeat al-Qaeda. As tensions escalate between the two countries, demands across the United States are growing for Washington to cut off aid to Pakistan. However, history reminds us of the dangers of walking away. Deeply concerned about Pakistan's clandestine nuclear program, we did that in the 1990s. As relations with the United States deteriorated, Pakistan pursued ties with the Taliban--part of its "strategic depth" initiative to counter India and bring "stability" to Afghanistan after the Soviet occupation. It also continued an aggressive nuclear program too, complete with disastrous global proliferation. Cutting off aid to Pakistan proved especially detrimental in the post-1980s, Afghan Jihad era. During the 1990s, the internal situation in Afghanistan went from bad to worse and A.Q. Khan's nuclear proliferation racket boomed when both states were going through a difficult bilateral phase.
Armitage, Richard, Samuel Berger, and Daniel Markey. U.S. Strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan. Independent Task Force Report No. 65. Council on Foreign Relations, 2010. Web.
Please see Council on Foreign Relations in the Organization Index for more info. In past crises, when the possibilities of leveraging unwelcome choices on Pakistans decision-makers were far better than at present, and when faced with far more concerted, top-down U.S. pressures, Pakistans leaders successfully parried Washingtons pressures to take actions that were perceived to be unacceptable on national security or domestic political grounds. This track record, as reflected in Pakistans pursuit of nuclear weapon capabilities, its protection of unconventional military options to influence Afghanistans future, and its policies to keep India off-balance, provides a cautionary tale of Washingtons ability to successfully manipulate carrots and sticks. To hold out the expectation that, this time around, with such a heavy U.S. military presence in Afghanistan dependent on Pakistani logistical support, Washington can coercively manipulate Pakistans orientation toward the Lashkar-e-Taiba, the Afghan Taliban, Kabul, and New Delhi, seems unwise. (70)
Page 68 of 114
March 2012
Con: Risk of Nuclear Proliferation
Risk of Nuclear Proliferation

Please see the Congressional Research Service in the Organization Index for more info. Chronic political instability in Pakistan and Islamabads military efforts against the Taliban and al-Qaeda have raised concerns about the security of Pakistans nuclear weapons. Some observers fear that Pakistans strategic nuclear assets could be obtained by terrorists or used by elements in the Pakistani government. (Pg. 1)
Farrar-Wellman, Ariel. "Pakistan-Iran Foreign Relations." IranTracker. 5 July 2010. Web. 10 Feb. 2012. <http://www.irantracker.org/foreign-relations/pakistan-iranforeign-relations>.
Please see the Congressional Research Service in the Organization Index for more info. The security of Pakistans nuclear arsenal, materials, and technologies continues to be a top-tier U.S. concern, especially as Islamist militants have expanded their geographic influence there. Pakistan has in the recent past been a source of serious illicit proliferation to aspiring weapons states. While most analysts and U.S. officials believe Pakistans nuclear security is much improved in recent years, there is ongoing concern that Pakistans nuclear know-how or technologies remain prone to leakage. Moreover, recent reports indicate that Pakistan is rapidly growing its nuclear weapons arsenal, perhaps in response to recent U.S. moves to engage civil nuclear cooperation with rival India, which the Obama Administration wants to see join major international nonproliferation regimes. This comes at a time that China is planning to build two new nuclear reactors in Pakistan in apparent violation of Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines. The proposed deal poses a dilemma for the Obama Administration, which has requested that Beijing justify the plan and seeks its approval through international fora. (Pg. 30-31)
Pakistan would be an obvious place for a jihadist organization to seek a nuclear weapon or fissile material: it is the only Muslim-majority state, out of the 50 or so in the world, to have successfully developed nuclear weapons; its central government is of limited competence and has serious trouble projecting its authority into many corners of its territory (on occasion it has difficulty maintaining order even in the countrys largest city, Karachi); Pakistans military and security services are infiltrated by an unknown number of jihadist sympathizers; and many jihadist organizations are headquartered there already. There are three threats, says Graham Allison, an expert on nuclear weapons who directs the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard. The first is a terrorist theft of a nuclear weapon, which they take foundationbriefs.com Page 69 of 114
March 2012 Con: Risk of Nuclear Proliferation to Mumbai or New York for a nuclear 9/11. The second is a transfer of a nuclear weapon to a state like Iran. The third is a takeover of nuclear weapons by a militant group during a period of instability or splintering of the state. (2) Nuclear-weapons components are sometimes moved by helicopter and sometimes moved over roads. And instead of moving nuclear material in armored, well-defended convoys, the SPD prefers to move material by subterfuge, in civilian-style vehicles without noticeable defenses, in the regular flow of traffic. According to both Pakistani and American sources, vans with a modest security profile are sometimes the preferred conveyance. And according to a senior U.S. intelligence official, the Pakistanis have begun using this lowsecurity method to transfer not merely the de-mated component nuclear parts but mated nuclear weapons. Western nuclear experts have feared that Pakistan is building small, tactical nuclear weapons for quick deployment on the battlefield. In fact, not only is Pakistan building these devices, it is also now moving them over roads. What this means, in essence, is this: In a country that is home to the harshest variants of Muslim fundamentalism, and to the headquarters of the organizations that espouse these extremist ideologies, including al-Qaeda, the Haqqani network, and Lashkar-e-Taiba (which conducted the devastating terror attacks on Mumbai three years ago that killed nearly 200 civilians), nuclear bombs capable of destroying entire cities are transported in delivery vans on congested and dangerous roads. And Pakistani and American sources say that since the raid on Abbottabad, the Pakistanis have provoked anxiety inside the Pentagon by increasing the pace of these movements. In other words, the Pakistani government is willing to make its nuclear weapons more vulnerable to theft by jihadists simply to hide them from the United States, the country that funds much of its military budget. (5) But nuclear experts issue a cautionary note: it is not clear that American intelligence can identify the locations of all of Pakistans nuclear weapons, particularly after the Abbottabad raid. Anyone who tells you that they know where all of Pakistans nukes are is lying to you, General James Jones, President Obamas first nationalsecurity adviser, has said, according to a source who heard him say it. (When asked by the authors of this article about his statement, General Jones issued a no comment.) Another American former official with nuclear expertise says, We dont even know, on any given day, exactly how many weapons they have. We can get within plus or minus 10, but thats about it. (15) South Asia remains the most dangerous nuclear-confrontation zone in the world, and these are not issues we can solve unilaterally, says Toby Dalton, the deputy director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a former Department of Energy representative at the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad. We share a common goal with Pakistan, in preventing nuclear war and preventing terrorists from gaining access to a nuclear weapon. We have to work with them on nuclear security and have meaningful technical exchanges on best practices. This has to continue.
Page 70 of 114
March 2012
Con: Risk of Nuclear Proliferation
The United States must, for its own security, keep watch over Pakistans nuclear programand thats more easily done if we remain engaged with the Pakistani government. The U.S. must also be able to receive information from the ISI about al-Qaeda, even if such information is provided sporadically. And the U.S. will simply not find a way out of Afghanistan if Pakistan becomes an open enemy. (18)
See the Council on Foreign Relations in the Organization Index for more info. Closing terrorist safe-havens and keeping Pakistan's nuclear weapons out of terrorist hands requires sustained Pakistani action.
Gregory, Shaun. Terrorist Tactics in Pakistan Threaten Nuclear Weapons Safety. Rep. Combating Terrorism Center, 1 June 2011. Web. 10 Feb. 2012. <http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/terrorist-tactics-in-pakistan-threaten-nuclearweapons-safety>.
Please see The Combating Terrorism Center in the Organization Index for more info. Aside from the intricate politics of international arms control, the steady rise in the size of Pakistans nuclear arsenal presents the rather more prosaic, though arguably more serious, challenge of ensuring the physical security of an ever increasing number of nuclear assets. This is not a simple matter. Safeguarding 100 weapons is a significantly greater challenge than safeguarding 50 weapons because strategic and operational realities require that those weapons are dispersed and that dispersal locations are adapted to the complex requirements of safely and securely storing nuclear weapons in various degrees of operational readiness.[3] As Pakistans nuclear arsenal grows in the years ahead, these challenges will multiply. As many as 70,000 people in Pakistan reportedly have access to, or knowledge of, some element of the Pakistani nuclear weapons production, storage, maintenance, and deployment cycle, from those involved in the manufacture of fissile material, through those engaging in nuclear weapons design, assembly and maintenance, to those who transport and safeguard the weapons in storage and would deploy the weapons in crises.[4] That number will also rise steadily as the size of the nuclear arsenal grows. In this context, given that nuclear weapons and delivery systems demand construction and other visible physical necessities (such as road widening, unusual levels of security, and bunker construction), and given that the growth of the Pakistani nuclear arsenal will significantly expand the construction of nuclear weapons infrastructure and the number of individuals with nuclear-related roles, it is simply not possible that the location of all of Pakistans nuclear weapons can remain unknown to terrorists in perpetuity.[15]
Page 71 of 114
March 2012 Con: Risk of Nuclear Proliferation As evidence of this, on August 28, 2009, the U.S. Federation of American Scientists published the first open source satellite imagery of a suspected Pakistani nuclear weapons storage facility near Masroor airbase outside Karachi.[16] Within its perimeter walls, the satellite image shows three potential storage bunkers linked by looping roads.[17] The fact that this image is available online, and that the unusual configuration of the base is clear, argues strongly that knowledge of the location of at least some nuclear weapons storage and other related facilities has reached terrorists in Pakistan. As the number of nuclear weapons facilities grows, and the number of those with access to nuclear weapons or related components rises, the complex challenge of assuring the security of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons components will become ever more difficult. Terrorist groups have now shown themselves capable of penetrating even the most securely defended of Pakistans military bases and of holding space within those bases for many hours even against the elite SSG, more than enough time with the right equipment and sufficient numbers to carry out terrorist acts with enormous political or destructive pay-off, from video broadcasts with the attention of the worlds media, through potentially destroying by explosions nuclear weapons or materials and the creation of a radiological hazard, to the possibility of the theft of nuclear weapons components or materials for subsequent terrorist use. Indeed, on May 22-23, 2011, only about 15 miles from the suspected nuclear weapons storage facility near Masroor, a major terrorist attack targeted the naval aviation base at PNS Mehran in Karachi. Early reports suggest that between six and ten terrorists stormed the high security base from several entry points, that they had knowledge of the location of intruder detection cameras that they were able to bypass, and that they penetrated deep inside the base before using rocket-propelled grenades, explosives and small-arms to destroy several aircraft and take hostages. It took the base security and additional Pakistan Army rangers and commandos more than 18 hours to end the siege. At least 13 people were killed. A frontal assault of this kind on nuclear weapons storage facilities, which are the most robustly defended elements of Pakistans nuclear weapons cycle, is no longer an implausible event. The successful location and penetration of such a site by terrorists, even if they were ultimately unsuccessful in accessing nuclear assets, would itself be a transformative event both in terms of the U.S.-Pakistani nuclear relationship and in terms of international anxiety about the security of Pakistans nuclear weapons. Such an assault would also critically undermine Pakistans reassurances about the security of nuclear weapons elsewhere in the weapons cycle, particularly in transit. As the number of Pakistani nuclear weapons inexorably continues to rise, and as the nuclear weapons security challenges thereby steadily multiply, the odds that Pakistans nuclear weapons security will eventually be compromised continue to rise.
Page 72 of 114
March 2012
Con: Security Concerns
Security Concerns
Kronstadt K, Alan. Pakistan-U.S. Relations. Rep. Congressional Research Service, 21 October, 2011. Web. 1 Feb. 2012. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33498.pdf Please see the Congressional Research Service in the Organization Index for more info. On May 22, a team of heavily armed militants penetrated security barriers and stormed Pakistans premier naval base, the Mehran Naval Station near Karachi. Ten security personnel and four militants were killed in the ensuing 16-hour-long gun battle; two other militants are believed to have escaped before Pakistani commandos regained control of the base. The militants were able to destroy two U.S.-supplied P-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft in their hangar. The attack, which the Pakistani Taliban claimed was taken in revenge for the killing of bin Laden, was the second major embarrassment of the month for the beleaguered Pakistani military, which seemed at a loss to explain how such a damaging breach could occur. The ability of a handful of attackers to wreak such havoc left the security services open to scathing criticism from the generally pro-military Pakistani media, and also brought into question the safety and security of Pakistans nuclear weapons and materials. (Pg. 8)
Page 73 of 114
March 2012
Con: Pakistan Too Important
Pakistan Too Important to Lose

See the Center For Strategic and International Studies in the Organization Index for more info. Pakistan is a pivotal regional player, whose problems affect the security of other countries in the region, and that of the United States. It has the potential to be either a major disruptive force or a major source of stability, in assisting end to violence in Afghanistan, in assisting in the peaceful rise of India, and helping constrain Irans bid for Middle Eastern hegemony. (Pg. vi-vii) At present, Pakistan seems to be on a downward course. Its leadership is not adequately addressing either the causes of Pakistan's internal violence, or the needs of its people. Its politics are corrupt and self-serving, and far too many indicators reflect its failure to adopt policies that serve popular needs or meet popular expectations. It is playing a form of the great game which forces it to confront India on a region-wide basis and into a nuclear arms race. It has unleashed levels of religious extremism that not only threaten its Shiite minorities but also its moderate Sunni majority. At the same time, it continues a long history of shifting the blame for its own actions to other states, and relying on political rhetoric as a substitute for effective action. (Pg. vi-vii) This presents major problems for the United States both in finding some favorable outcome to the Afghan conflict, and in helping to create some form of regional stability in South Asia a greater US strategic interest than the future of Afghanistan and Central Asia. However, US options are limited. US military intervention inside Pakistan is deeply resented by both the Pakistani people and its leadership elite. US military assistance has so far won only grudging and limited support and economic assistance has failed to win broad support or achieve any major objectives. Cross border sanctuaries -- which are tolerated by at least some elements of the Pakistani security establishment -- remain significant havens for Taliban insurgents. (Pg. vi-vii) At the same time, the US, its allies in ISAF, and the Afghan government need every bit of military, and counterterrorism cooperation from Pakistan they can get. Even limited Pakistani intelligence support is crucial in providing them with an understanding of militant dynamics. They are also dependent on a logistic tail that keeps them reliant on a transit route through Pakistan. (Pg. vi-vii)
Page 74 of 114
March 2012
Con: Importance to Afghanistan
Pakistans Importance to Afghanistan

Kronstadt K, Alan. Pakistan-U.S. Relations. Rep. Congressional Research Service, 21 October, 2011. Web. 1 Feb. 2012. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33498.pdf Please see the Congressional Research Service in the Organization Index for more info. It is widely held that success in Afghanistan cannot come without the close engagement and cooperation of Pakistan, and that the key to stabilizing Afghanistan is to improve the longstanding animosity between Islamabad and Kabul. (Pg. 18)
See the Council on Foreign Relations in the Organization Index for more info. We cannot fight in Afghanistan without the 80 percent of fuel and dry goods shipped through Pakistan. A responsible withdrawal of U.S. forces depends on an Afghan political solution that Pakistan will influence.
"U.S. Costs Soar for New War Supply Routes." Navy Times. 19 Jan. 2012. Web. 8 Feb. 2012. <http://www.navytimes.com/news/2012/01/ap-us-costs-soar-for-new-warsupply-routes-011912/>.
The U.S. is paying six times as much to send war supplies to troops in Afghanistan through alternate routes after Pakistans punitive decision in November to close border crossings to NATO convoys, the Associated Press has learned. Islamabad shut down two key Pakistan border crossings after a U.S. airstrike killed two dozen Pakistani soldiers in late November, and it is unclear when the crossings might reopen. Pentagon figures provided to the AP show it is now costing about $104 million per month to send the supplies through a longer northern route. That is $87 million more per month than when the cargo moved through Pakistan.
Page 75 of 114
March 2012
Con: Importance to Afghanistan
The previous two sections speak to one of the most important issues in this resolutionPakistans regional importance. Simply put, American cannot expect to lose Pakistan but win the War in Afghanistan or the War on Terror in general. Not only is Pakistan essential from a logistics standpoint, but the poorly-secured border between Pakistan and Afghanistan is truly the epicenter of the worlds remaining terror networks. If Pakistan drops from the fight against these groups, the War in Afghanistan will have been in vain as the groups we worked so hard to expel from Kabul and Kandahar will simply take up residence in the FATAs.
Given the time and money that the United States has put into the War on Terror, losing it at this stage is
undoubtedly the biggest impact in the round.
Page 76 of 114
March 2012
Con: Necessary to Stopping Terrorism
Pakistan Necessary to Stopping Terrorism

See the Council on Foreign Relations in the Organization Index for more info. Closing terrorist safe-havens and keeping Pakistan's nuclear weapons out of terrorist hands requires sustained Pakistani action.
Americans who know the area well concede that, for all our complaints, Pakistan doesnt push harder in large part because it cant. The Pakistan Army has been trained to patrol the Indian border, not to battle hardened insurgents. They have comparatively crude weaponry. When they go up against a ruthless outfit like the Haqqanis, they tend to get killed. Roughly 4,000 Pakistani troops have died in these border wars more than the number of all the allied soldiers killed in Afghanistan. (9)
Anderson, David, and Heather Maki. Pakistan's Nuclear Defense Ambitions and US Relations. Rep. Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, 2008. Web.
The War on Terror in the Afghan/Pakistan border region must be placed increasingly on Pakistan to be truly effective. However, the U.S. must assist Pakistan in winning over the hearts and minds of Pakistanis and FATA tribal leaders, and ultimately try to return ownership of their tribal area. This will require continuous dialogue and (again) military/economic assistance. Violence in the tribal areas must be addressed through dialogue and military means before economic means can ultimately work. Capacity-building programs for the provincial governments and greater coordination and integration of the various security forces in the tribal areas must be implemented. Pakistans effort in the War on Terror is vital. Over 85,000 Pakistani troops are currently deployed along the Afghan-Pakistan border, and more than 1,200 of them have already sacrificed their lives in counterterrorism operations, as compared to the approximately 500 U.S. casualties in Operation Enduring Freedom. Pakistan has granted overflight rights, allowed the U.S. forces use of two Pakistani airfields, and shared intelligence about suspected terrorists. They have worked with the FBI to capture suspected Al Qaeda and Taliban fugitives who fled into northern Pakistan and in some cases, committed its own troops to hunt down Al Qaeda operatives such as Khalid Sheikh Muhammad and Rams Binalshibh to disperse further into Pakistan where their surroundings are less congenial to their extremist ideologies. These collective efforts and results have now made Islamabad a target for terrorist activities from multiple groups.
Page 77 of 114
March 2012
Con: Aid to Military is Essential
Aid to the Military Remains Essential

Anderson, David, and Heather Maki. Pakistan's Nuclear Defense Ambitions and US Relations. Rep. Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, 2008. Web.
Pakistans military is one of the most important, respected, and oftentimes the only effectively functioning institution in the country. Although troubled by corruption and ethnic, sectarian and linguistic divisions, Pakistans military still reliably operates in the national interest.54 The relationship between the military and Pakistans population is vital to maintaining a moderate Islamic state. The insurgents attempts to exploit situations to cause conflict between the two elements could cause real damage to Pakistans stability, and the military is cognizant of this fact.55 The U.S. should focus on building Pakistans capacity to fight this insurgency and bridging the differences between Afghanistan and Pakistan, emphasizing Pakistans sovereign responsibility to combat threats to international peace and security within its borders. The U.S. should significantly increase current military assistance to the Frontier Corps above the levels proposed by U.S. Special Operations Command to train and arm tribal leaders to fight Al-Qaeda and Taliban and provide a $750 million aid package for improving law enforcement and local security capacity along the border area over the next five years.56 In other words, the United States can help by refocusing its military assistance to Pakistan on equipment and training for counterinsurgencynot additional supplies of supersonic strike aircraft.
Page 78 of 114
March 2012
Con: Humanitarian Aid Is Essential
Civilian/Humanitarian Aid is Essential

The United States is committed to "a strong, mutually respectful relationship with Pakistan" and will continue to provide civilian aid, the U.S. State Department said, despite tensions between the two nations. Relations between the two countries have worsened since the U.S. airstrike in November killed 24 Pakistani soldiers along the border with Afghanistan. "Civilian assistance to Pakistan continues and has not been interrupted since the tragic November 26 incident," State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland said in a statement Friday in response to a question about aid. "We consider bilateral U.S. civilian assistance to be an important component of that relationship and believe it can help Pakistan become a more prosperous, stable, and democratic state, which serves the national interests of both the United States and Pakistan." The United States is a major provider of aid to Pakistan, and has doled out a total $2.2 billion in civilian assistance, including about $550 million in emergency humanitarian assistance, since October 2009. About $855 million of that was in the 2011 fiscal year, not including emergency humanitarian aid, the statement said.
Please see the Heritage Foundation in the Organization Index for more info. On the other hand, the U.S. should allow the civilian aid to flow, albeit with improved accountability standards and sharpened monitoring mechanisms. The U.S. has provided more than $6 billion in economic assistance to Pakistan over the past nine years, but Pakistanis complain that there is little to show for it. Continuing civilian aid programs demonstrates that the U.S. is not a fickle partner and is genuinely committed to a prosperous and stable Pakistan, even if the military/intelligence relationship between the two countries is fraying.
Page 79 of 114
March 2012
Please see Foreign Affairs in the Organization Index for more info. The one significant policy change since 2008 has been the retargeting of aid to civilians. Under the Obama administration, total assistance has increased by 48 percent, and a much higher percentage of it is economic rather than security related: 45 percent in 2010 as opposed to 24 percent in 2008. The Enhanced Partnership With Pakistan Act of 2009, which committed $7.5 billion to Pakistan over five years, conditioned disbursements on Pakistan's behavior, including cooperation on counter-terrorism and the holding of democratic elections. (5)
See the Council on Foreign Relations in the Organization Index for more info. The harsh reality is that Pakistan is too strategically important, and too dangerous a situation, for the United States to ignore. It behooves the United States to remain involved in the areas that can make the most difference, particularly economic reform, energy, and education--especially girls' education. At its current fertility rate, Pakistan's population of 180 million will double in less than three decades--meaning every social, economic, educational, health, and environmental issue will only increase. On the security front, the United States must admit that Pakistan will never give up the Taliban and will continue to divert U.S. military aid to its eastern border with India rather than its western border to fight the Taliban. Any military engagement that assumes otherwise is a fool's errand.
Armitage, Richard, Samuel Berger, and Daniel Markey. U.S. Strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan. Independent Task Force Report No. 65. Council on Foreign Relations, 2010. Web.
Please see Council on Foreign Relations in the Organization Index for more info. Washington should target support to partners and institutions that share common goals. For instance, the United States should encourage more effective governance by funneling a portion of its assistance through government ministries and local government agencies that demonstrate transparency and efficiency. This can strengthen deserving partners and show that the United States is not complicit in corruption or in siphoning U.S. aid to foreign contractors. (53) In areas of Pakistan where security forces have recently cleared the Taliban and other militant groups, it is particularly important for the United States to offer assistance and training for local civilian institutions. Limited administrative capacity in these areas threatens to jeopardize hard-fought military victories. (53) foundationbriefs.com Page 80 of 114
March 2012
Birdsall, Nancy, Wren Elhai, and Molly Kinder. Beyond Bullets and Bombs: Fixing the U.S. Approach to Development in Pakistan. Rep. Center for Global Development, June 2011. Web.
Please see Author Index for bio. In March of 2009, the Obama administration announced a comprehensive new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Explaining that a campaign against extremism will not succeed with bullets or bombs alone, President Obama pledged significant increases in civilian efforts in both countries and declared supporting a vibrant economy that provides opportunity for the people of Pakistan and a stable constitutional government to be central objectives of U.S. policy.1 Congress endorsed this new approach. In May 2009, Senators John Kerry and Richard Lugar and Representative Howard Berman introduced the Enhanced Partnership for Pakistan Act, now better known as the Kerry-Lugar-Berman bill. Signed into law in October 2009, the legislation authorized a tripling of economic assistance to Pakistan to a total of $7.5 billion over five years (4) Support for Pakistans development is a low-cost, stunningly sensible addition to the United States portfolio of risk-reducing measures in Pakistan. The risks associated with an aid program are serious but small compared to the risks of military engagement overseas and counterterrorism at home. Development investments, like preventive health care, are less expensive and far less risky than dealing with emergencies later. However, such investments do take time and persistence to yield a return. Development does not happen overnight and often happens in fits and starts. Done well, the U.S. aid program can seed investments in people, institutions, and programs that have the potential to pay off over the long term. (10) To pay for things that are working well, we suggest that the United States be much more open to cofinancing projects with other bilateral and multilateral donors. In the education sector, for example, the World Bank and Df ID have programs in Punjab and Sindh provinces that are delivering results.41 Additional resources for these programs from the United States could produce significant benefits, with no need for USAID to duplicate work others have already done well. The United States has partnered with Df ID to advance the work of the Pakistan Education Task Force, an independent group that features prominent members from Pakistans government and civil society. It should seize this opportunity to further the movement for education reform by putting significant resources into the special fund the task force has created to fund innovations in education. (33)
Jones, Seth, and John Gordon. "Flagging Ally: Pakistan's Lapses Are Hurting the War on Terror." RAND Corporation. 18 Mar. 2007. Web. 5 Feb. 2012. <http://www.rand.org/commentary/2007/03/18/SDUT.html.html>.
Please see The Rand Corporation in the Organization Index for more info. The development gap in Pakistan's Pashtun areas needs to be addressed. It is also a root cause of extremism. Government institutions in the tribal areas are weak, and social and economic conditions are among the lowest in the world. Currently, U.S. and international reconstruction and development assistance has focused on the
Page 81 of 114
March 2012 Con: Humanitarian Aid Is Essential Afghan side of the border. But this strategy is a half-measure. U.S. and other international assistance need to be directed toward Pakistan's tribal areas, not just Afghanistan.
Page 82 of 114
March 2012
Con: Aid for Education is Critical
Education Aid Is Critical

Winthrop, Rebecca. "Pakistan Does Have an Education Crisis Despite Questions About Mortensons Three Cups of Tea." Brookings Institution. 18 Apr. 2011. Web. 16 Feb. 2012. http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/0418_pakistan_education_winthrop.aspx/
Please see The Brookings Institution in the Organization Index for more info. One in 10 of the worlds primary school-age children who are not in school live in Pakistan, making Pakistan one of the top two countries in the world with the largest numbers of out of school children. Only 23 percent of Pakistans youth are enrolled in secondary school. At the current rate, the province of Balochistan will only be able to enroll all its children in school by the year 2100. With half the country under the age of 17, this poor state of education is a significant economic and security liability. Increasing access to quality education is likely to reduce Pakistans risk of conflict as cross-country estimates show that increasing educational attainment is strongly correlated with conflict risk reduction.
Page 83 of 114
March 2012
Con: Demographic Challenge
Pakistan Facing a Critical Moment Due to Demographics

See the Center For Strategic and International Studies in the Organization Index for more info. These various political and religious tensions are only part of the forces shaping modern Pakistan and its future. Like most of the developing world, demographics are a key issue. As Figure 1.1, shows, Pakistans population has made massive increase since 1950, and is more than four times larger in 2010 than it was then. It rate of population has slowed, but its population is still estimated to nearly double Between 2000 and 2030, and Pakistans population is projected to grow to 335 million, making it one of the worlds most populous countries. (Pg. 29) Pakistan youth is also shown in Figure 1.2 and it is clear just how much the need to create jobs and acceptable careers, governance, and social conditions for youth is critical Pakistans stability. The CIA estimates that Pakistans mean age is only around 21 years of age, and that some 2,238,000 males and 2,105,000 females will reach the age where they will enter the labor force in 2010. Other estimates indicate that half of its population of over 187 million is under 20 years of age, and 66 percent is under 30. (Pg. 30) The CIA also estimates that the present Pakistani labor force is around 55.8% of the total population -- a relatively low number for so large a population, in spite of extensive exportation of labor to regions like the Middle East. It has an unusually high percentage working in very low productivity agriculture and service jobs (agriculture: 43%, industry: 20.3%, services: 36.6% (2005 estimate). (Pg. 30) Direct unemployment is at least 15%, and under and disguised unemployment almost certainly raise this figure closer to 30% in terms of meaningful productivity gain. At least 24% of the entire population (and probably now closer to 30%) is at or below the poverty line, and the wealthiest 10% of the population is responsible for some 27% of all domestic consumption versus less than 4% for the poorest 10%. (Pg. 30) Pakistan cannot begin to address its economic and social needs as well as move solidly towards political stability - until it first addresses the dire state of the existing educational sector. Pakistan is one of the only countries in the world where the number of illiterates is rising. Some 6.8 million of its children are out of school and only 16.8% of Pakistanis have a secondary education. (Pg. 31)
Page 84 of 114
March 2012
Con: Demographic Challenge
As the evidence in this section point out, Pakistan is at a critical period in its history. An astonishing number of Pakistanis are young, uneducated and out of work. These are the primary conditions that breed discontent and extremism throughout the Arab World.
As such, the demographics of Pakistan suggest that now is the wrong time to walk away from Pakistan. Doing so will exacerbate the perception that we are fair-weather friends and that we truly do not care for the Pakistani people. This is a dangerous idea to lend credibility to especially given the already high levels of anti-Americanism.
Page 85 of 114
March 2012
Con: Would Hurt Civilian Government
Cuts Would Hurt the Civilian Government Most

Ahmed, Issam. "Pakistan Says It Doesn't Need US Military Aid." The Christian Science Monitor. 11 July 2011. Web. 10 Feb. 2012. <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/AsiaSouth-Central/2011/0711/Pakistan-says-it-doesn-t-need-US-military-aid>.
Cyril Almeida, a political analyst and Assistant Editor at Dawn, Pakistans leading English daily, says the cuts could harm Pakistans civilian government more than the military. The Army will dig in its heels. Its going to call up the Finance Ministry and ask them to cut a check, and they will cut them a check, which will be financed by the State Bank or loans from private sector. Perversely, at the very time US aid is flowing, this will guarantee that things will deteriorate more [for the economy]. The cuts could also have a harmful impact on Pakistans democracy, adds Siddiqa. Historically, [foreign aid] is one of the reasons why political governments have been tolerated [by the military] in the first place. If they are not bringing in money, then why have them? Popular opinion in Pakistan is overwhelmingly in favor of less US involvement in the region and the Army may now be tempted to reassess its key partnerships, according to Saeed Shafqat, Director of the Centre for Public Policy and Governance at the Foreman Christian College University in Lahore.
Page 86 of 114
March 2012
Con: Military Control Would Be Worse
Control By The Pakistani Military Would Be Worse

Kronstadt K, Alan. Pakistan-U.S. Relations. Rep. Congressional Research Service, 21 October, 2011. Web. 1 Feb. 2012. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33498.pdf Please see the Congressional Research Service in the Organization Index for more info. Developments in 2011 have for many analysts only validated a preexisting view that Pakistani behavior is unlikely to change given the long-held geostrategic perspectives of decision makers there. If true, this means Pakistan will continue to tolerate safe havens for friendly militant groups regardless of U.S. aid levels or more overt threats. By many accounts, Pakistans apparently schizophrenic foreign policy behavior is a direct outcome of the Pakistan militarys perceived strategic interests. This leads some analysts to encourage fullthroated U.S. support for Pakistans civilian authorities as the only viable means of reducing conflict both inside Pakistan and between Pakistan and its neighbors. The current U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan, Cameron Munter, is among those who has in the past insisted that Pakistan requires a strong civilian government and that common U.S.-Pakistan successes can be achieved only with a strong partner in Pakistans democratically elected government. (Pg. 3)
Page 87 of 114
March 2012
Con: Ties to China
Ties to China
Kronstadt K, Alan. Pakistan-U.S. Relations. Rep. Congressional Research Service, 21 October, 2011. Web. 1 Feb. 2012. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33498.pdf Please see the Congressional Research Service in the Organization Index for more info. Pakistan and China have enjoyed a generally close and mutually beneficial relationship over several decades. Chinese companies and workers are now pervasive in the Pakistani economy. Beijing intends to build two new civilian nuclear reactors in Pakistan in what would be an apparent violation of international guidelines. During Chinese Premier Wen Jiabaos December 2010 visit to Islamabad, the governments signed 12 Memoranda of Understanding covering a broad range of cooperative efforts and designated 2011 as the Year of ChinaPakistan Friendship. Pakistani and Chinese businesses also signed contracts worth some $15 billion covering cooperation in oil and gas, mining, space technology, heavy machinery, manufacturing, and other areas. This added to the nearly $20 billion worth of government-to-government agreements reached. (Pg. 27) As U.S.-India ties deepen and U.S.-Pakistan ties appear to deteriorate, many observers see Islamabad becoming more reliant than ever on its friendship with Beijing. U.S.-Pakistan acrimony in the wake of OBLs death appears to have increased Pakistans reliance on China as a key international ally. Pakistani leaders have become notably more and perhaps overly effusive in their expressions of closeness with China in 2011. Prime Minister Gilanis May travel to China elicited no major new embrace from Beijing, but the Chinese government did insist that the West must respect Pakistans sovereignty, and it agreed to expedite delivery to Pakistan of 50 JF-17 fighter jets equipped with upgraded avionics (Islamabad is also negotiating with Beijing for the purchase of six new submarines for as much as $3 billion in what would be the largest-ever bilateral defense purchase). The Islamabad government suffered some embarrassment when its defense minister, upon returning from the same trip, claimed that the Chinese would assume control of the deep-water port at Gwadar that it had helped to build and, further, that Beijing would convert the port for military use. The Chinese Foreign Ministry expressed having no knowledge of the purported plans. There were concerns among some in Congress and independent analysts that wreckage from a previously unseen stealth helicopter used by U.S. Special Forces in the OBL raid would be examined by Chinese officials, potentially providing them with valuable intelligence on secret U.S. military technology. Beijing apparently did express interest in examining the wreckage and, despite Pakistani assurances that no Chinese officials had been given access to it, U.S. intelligence sources reportedly believe that Chinese military engineers were, in fact, given access to the wreckage before it was returned to U.S. custody. (Pg. 27) Pakistan appeared to react quickly and with purpose in August when Beijing publically blamed Islamist militants trained in Pakistan for terrorist activities in Chinas western Xinjiang province. ISI Director Pasha was dispatched to Beijing with the apparent aim of assuaging China. (Pg. 27)
Page 88 of 114
March 2012
Con: Ties to China
Aid Needed to Counter Chinese Influence

Pakistans military chiefs are aware that Americas military has developed plans for an emergency nucleardisablement operation in their country, and they have periodically threatened to ally themselves with China, as a way to undercut U.S. power in South Asia. In a recent statement quite obviously meant for American ears, Pakistans prime minister, Yousuf Raza Gilani, described the Pakistani-Chinese relationship as higher than the mountains, deeper than the oceans, stronger than steel, and sweeter than honey. (15)
Page 89 of 114
March 2012
Con: Ties to Iran
Ties With Iran

Farrar-Wellman, Ariel. "Pakistan-Iran Foreign Relations." IranTracker. 5 July 2010. Web. 10 Feb. 2012. <http://www.irantracker.org/foreign-relations/pakistan-iranforeign-relations>.
Over the past several years, Pakistan has increasingly called for peaceful reconciliation on the international nuclear standoff, despite increasing concern from the UN and Washington.[9] In a February 2010 meeting with her Iranian counterpart, Pakistani National Assembly Speaker Fahmida Mirza said that Pakistan is against any kinds of sanctions against Iran and believes that Iran's nuclear disputes should be resolved peacefully and through dialogue."[10] In a separate meeting with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Mirza reiterated her earlier remarks and assured him that Pakistan supports Iran's independence and progress in all the areas, especially in utilizing peaceful nuclear energy. She also highlighted IranianPakistani commonalities in religion, history, and culture, and added that extremism and terrorism is a common threat to the stability and progress of the entire region. Since 2005, Islamabad has increasingly turned to Tehran to supply Pakistans growing energy needs. In August 2008, Iran agreed to finance a robust energy project that would allow Pakistan to import 1,000 megawatts of electricity to overcome its power shortage.[17] The project, a $60 million endeavor, consists of running a 100kilometer electric line to help augment the 40 megawatts of electricity Pakistan already receives daily from Iran. In April 2010, Iranian Ambassador to Pakistan Mashallah Shakeri spoke before the Rawalpindi Chamber of Commerce and Industry, stressing Irans commitment to economic relations with Pakistan. According to the envoy, Iran intends to supply the 1,000 megawatts to Pakistan at a discounted rate.[18] In May 2009, Iran and Pakistan signed a purchase agreement stipulating that Iran will initially transfer 30 million cubic meters of gas to Pakistan per day, with the volume eventually increasing to 60 million. The deal, to which India was not a party, ensures gas supplies to Pakistan for a period of 25 years.[23] On June 13, 2010, the two sides formally concluded the $7.5 billion agreement over the objections of US Special Representative for Pakistan and Afghanistan Richard Holbrooke, who cautioned that although the US understands that Pakistan faces [a] major energy crisis... new sanctions on Iran can impact Pakistan.[24] According to a previous Pakistani Petroleum Ministry statement in May 2010, the capital cost for the Pakistan section is estimated at 1.65 billion dollars[and] the first gas flow is targeted by end 2014 with Iran completing the project ahead of schedule.
Page 90 of 114
March 2012
Con: Ties to Iran
Fitzgerald, Erin, and Varun Vira. US and Iranian Strategic Competition in Afghanistan, Central Asia and Pakistan. Rep. Center for Strategic and International Studies, 12 Sept. 2011. Web. 10 Feb. 2012.
See the Center For Strategic and International Studies in the Organization Index for more info. Pakistan and Iran have growing trade ties, particularly in the energy sector. Cooperation regarding energy has increased since the 1990s and has helped provide the foundation for a bilateral trade network between Iran and Pakistan. In 2009, Pakistan increased its non-oil exports to Iran by 80 percent, reaching $279 million. Similarly, Iranian non-oil exports to Pakistan increased by 11 percent, totaling $278 million for the year. In May 2009, Iran and Pakistan signed a purchase agreement stipulating that Iran would initially transfer 30 million cubic meters of gas to Pakistan per day, with the volume eventually increasing to 60 million. The deal was concluded over the objections of US Special Representative for Pakistan and Afghanistan Richard Holbrooke, who cautioned that although the US understands that Pakistan faces [a] major energy crisis... new sanctions on Iran can impact Pakistan. Pakistan, and reported that 1,000 of the 1,100 km of the IPI pipeline on Iranian soil had now been completed. Iranian-US competition has impacted on these growing energy ties. In particular, the US has opposed the proposed construction of a 2,600-kilometer, $7.5 billion Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline (IPI) that would pump gas from Irans South Pars field to Pakistan and India. Tentative talks on the pipeline began in 1994; however, tense political relations between India and Pakistan as well as significant US pressure have frustrated realization of the project to date. The US favors the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline instead, although instability in Afghanistan and tensions between India and Pakistan continue to be crucial obstacles. (Pg. 12)
Kfir, Isaac. "Iran-Pakistan Relations and Their Effect on Afghanistan and the U.S." Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism (INSCT). 25 Oct. 2011. Web. 12 Feb. 2012.
Please see INSCT in the Organization Index for more info. As things stand, Pakistani policymakers know that an intimate Iran-Pakistan relationship is a major concern for Washington, as better relations may lead Pakistan to share its nuclear technology with Iran.[9] From a realpolitik perspective, playing the Iranian card may encourage Congress to think twice before it cuts US aid to Pakistan, as doing so may simply compel Pakistan to search for alternate means of raising money.[10] In the context of Afghanistan, both Pakistan and Iran have vested interest in the country Although Pakistan and Iran would benefit from a stable Afghanistan and politicians from both sides have sought to aid in the process powerful stakeholders within Iran and Pakistan want a weak, unstable and violent Afghanistan. These actors the Pakistani ISI and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, designated in 2007 by President Bush as specially designated global terrorists, see an unstable Afghanistan as the way to undermine U.S. South Asian foreign policy goals, making Afghanistan a proxy for those actors that see the United States as the enemy. For these individuals Afghanistan can bleed the United States and undermine its prestige in the world. foundationbriefs.com Page 91 of 114
March 2012
Con: Ties to Iran
"Pakistan Says Sanctions Cannot Affect Tehran-Islamabad Ties." Press TV. 7 Feb. 2012. Web. 8 Feb. 2012. <http://www.presstv.ir/detail/225385.html>.
Iran and Pakistan have bolstered their relations in political, economic and cultural fields and no obstacle can prevent the two nations from promoting the amicable relations, which are based on goodwill and mutual respect, Bashir said on Sunday. Meanwhile, the director of the Federation of Pakistans Chamber of Commerce and Industry (FPCCI) Senator Haji Ghulam Ali downplayed the Western sanctions against Iran and said such restrictions against Iran would not affect the growing relations between Tehran and Islamabad, particularly in trade and economic fields. Pakistan is an independent country and will not permit foreign powers to sway the countrys decisions, he added. Iran and Pakistan are determined to increase the value of bilateral trade to five billion dollars within the next 2-3 years, the Pakistani official emphasized.
Page 92 of 114
March 2012
Con: Ties to Saudi Arabia
Ties With Saudi Arabia

Riedel, Bruce. The Brookings Institute. Rep. Dec. 2011. Web. 15 Feb. 2012.
Please see The Brookings Institution in the Organization Index for more info. Despite President Obamas efforts to build ties with the Saudis, the royal family has soured on the President. They believe he has promised but not delivered on the Israeli-Palestinian process and done too little to counter Iran, especially in Bahrain Pakistan has received more aid from Saudi Arabia than any country outside the Arab world since the Sixties. For example, in May 1998 when Pakistan was deciding whether to respond to Indias test of five nuclear weapons, the Saudis promised 50,000 barrels of free oil per day to help it cope with the economic sanctions that might be triggered by the Pakistani counter test. The Saudi oil commitment was a key to then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif s decision to proceed with testing. It considerably cushioned the subsequent US and EU sanctions on Pakistan. Official aid is matched by large investments from Saudi princes and from religious institutions. Much of the Pakistani madrassa educational system is Saudi-funded by private donors connected to the Kingdoms powerful Wahhabi clerical establishment. In turn Pakistan has provided military aid and expertise to the Kingdom for decades. It began with help to the royal Saudi Air Force to maintain and pilot its first jet fighters in the Sixties. Pakistani air Force pilots flew rSaF Lightnings that repulsed a communist South Yemeni incursion into the Kingdoms southern border in 1969. In the Seventies and eighties, up to 15,000 Pakistani troops were stationed in the Kingdom, some in a brigadesized combat force called the Khaled bin Walid brigade stationed near the Israeli-Jordanian-Saudi border. during the first Gulf war in 1991, a Pakistani brigade guarded the Kingdoms southern flank against Yemen while most of the American, Saudi and other forces faced Iraq in the north. The close ties continue between the militaries today. This fall, Saudi and Pakistani troops held joint training manoeuvres in Pakistan. (Pg. 20) In October 2003, then Crown Prince abdallah visited Pakistan for a state visit. Several experts reported after the trip that a secret agreement was concluded that would ensure Pakistan would provide Saudi arabia with nuclear technology and a bomb if Saudi arabia felt threatened by a third party nuclear programme in the future. Both countries, of course, denied the stories.assuming an agreement exists, it is likely the two have practiced the deployment of Pakistani warheads to Saudi Arabia for use with Saudi delivery systems. It would also make sense for rSaF and Pakistani pilots to jointly train for their use. More frequent exercises would help assure riyadh that it can count on Islamabad in a crisis and that any deal is for real. Saudi arabias Chinese-made intermediate range missiles, now increasingly obsolete, are also widely assumed to be a possible delivery system for Pakistani warheads in a crisis. Some reports allege the rSaF keeps a couple of aircraft permanently deployed in Pakistan to be able to deliver the bomb to riyadh on short notice if the King asks for them. It is impossible to know if these reports have any veracity but the idea makes sense.
Page 93 of 114
March 2012
Con: Ties to Saudi Arabia
Given the history of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan sharing military information in exchange for energy and trade channels, it seems that pushing Islamabad away from Washington and towards Riyadh is the last think one would want to do.
This is all the more true given the current tension over Irans nuclear program and Saudi Arabias understandable fear of a nuclear-armed Iran. Simply put, the changce that Pakistan will give Saudi Arabia a nuclear weaponalthough slimis greatly increased by a decision to suspend aid and alienate Pakistan.
Page 94 of 114
Pro Counters
Page 95 of 114
March 2012
Pro Counters: Risk Overstated
Risk of Nuclear Proliferation Overstated

Please see the Congressional Research Service in the Organization Index for more info. More recently, Gary Samore, National Security Council Coordinator for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, stated in an April 2011 interview that The Pakistani government takes the nuclear security threat very seriously, and theyve put a lot of resources into trying to make sure that their nuclear facilities and materials and weapons are well secured. Theres no lack of recognition that this is a very important issue, and theres no lack of incentive on the part of the Pakistani government to maintain control (Pg. 2) As noted, other U.S. officials have also conveyed confidence in the security of Islamabads nuclear weapons. General Petraeus stated on May 10, 2009, that [w]ith respect to thethe nuclear weapons andand sites that are controlled by Pakistan we have confidence in their security procedures and elements and believe that the security of those sites is adequate. Admiral Mullen echoed this assessment during a May 14, 2009, hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee. More recently, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated in a January 21, 2010, interview that the United States is very comfortable with the security of Pakistans nuclear weapons. (Pg. 16) More recently, a Pakistan Foreign Office spokesperson, responding to a report detailing alleged U.S.-Pakistani discussions regarding contingency plans for U.S. forces to help secure Islamabads nuclear weapons, stated November 8, 2009, that Pakistan does not require any foreign assistance in this regard. Pakistan will never allow any country to have direct or indirect access to its nuclear and strategic facilities, the spokesperson said, adding that no talks have ever taken place on the issue of the security of Pakistans nuclear arsenal with US officials. (Pg. 18) Former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage confirmed in a November 2007 interview that there has been U.S. assistance in this area, explaining that the United States was unlikely to intervene militarily in a crisis in Pakistan because we have spent considerable time with the Pakistani military, talking with them and working with them on the security of their nuclear weapons. I think most observers would say that they are fairly secure. They have pretty sophisticated mechanisms to guard the security of those. (Pg. 19)
Please see Foreign Affairs in the Organization Index for more info. Meanwhile, previous U.S. efforts to help tighten Pakistan's command-and-control systems have been hampered by mutual distrust. Any new such efforts would be, too. Finally, since India has both a first- and a second-strike foundationbriefs.com Page 96 of 114
March 2012 Pro Counters: Risk Overstated capability, Pakistan would not likely strike India first in the event of a crisis. In any case, even if things did escalate, there is not much that the United States, or anyone else, could do--good relations or not. From a U.S. perspective, then, there is no reason to think that malign neglect or active isolation would make Pakistan's behavior or problems any worse. (6)
Pakistani leaders have argued forcefully that the countrys nuclear weapons are secure. In times of relative quiet between Pakistan and India (the country that would be the target of a Pakistani nuclear attack), Pakistani officials claim that their weapons are de-matedmeaning that the warheads are kept separate from their fissile cores and their delivery systems. This makes stealing, or launching, a complete nuclear weapon far more difficult. (2) during Senate hearings for her confirmation as secretary of state in 2005, Condoleezza Rice, who was then President Bushs national-security adviser, was asked by Senator John Kerry what would happen to Pakistans nukes in the event of an Islamic coup in Islamabad. We have noted this problem, and we are prepared to try to deal with it, Rice said. Those preparations have been extensive. According to military and intelligence sources, any response to a Pakistani nuclear crisis would involve something along the following lines: If a single weapon or a small amount of nuclear material were to go missing, the response would be small and contained Abbottabad redux, although with a higher potential for U.S. casualties. The United States Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) maintains rotating deployments of specially trained units in the region, most of them Navy SEALs and Army explosive-ordnance-disposal specialists, who are trained to deal with nuclear weapons that have fallen into the wrong hands. Their area of operation includes the former Soviet states, where there is a large amount of loose fissile material, and, of course, Pakistan. JSOC has units and aircraft and parachutes on alert in the region for nuclear issues, and regularly inserts units and equipment for prep, says a military official who was involved in supporting these technicians. Seizing or remotely disabling a weapon of mass destruction is whats known in military jargon as a render-safe missionand render-safe missions have evidently been successfully pulled off by JSOC in the past. In his memoir, Hugh Shelton, who chaired the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1997 to 2001, recalls an incident from the 1990s in which the CIA told the Special Operations Command that a ship had left North Korea with what Shelton describes as an illegal weapon on board. Where it was headed, the U.S. didnt know. He wrote: It was a very time-sensitive mission in which a specific SEAL Team Six component was called into action. While I cannot get into the tactical elements or operational details of this mission, what I can say is that our guys were able to immobilize the weapon system in a special way without leaving any trace. (14) Much more challenging than capturing and disabling a loose nuke or two, however, would be seizing control ofor at least disablingthe entire Pakistani nuclear arsenal in the event of a jihadist coup, civil war, or other catastrophic event. This disablement campaign, as one former senior Special
Page 97 of 114
March 2012 Pro Counters: Risk Overstated Operations planner calls it, would be the most taxing, most dangerous of any special mission that JSOC could find itself tasked with JSOC would take the lead, however, accompanied by civilian experts, and has been training for such an operation for years. JSOC forces are trained to breach the inner perimeters of nuclear installations, and then to find, secure, evacuateor, if thats not possible, to render safeany live weapons. At the Nevada National Security Site, northwest of Las Vegas, Delta Force and SEAL Team Six squadrons practice Deep Underground Shelter penetrations, using extremely sensitive radiological detection devices that can pick up trace amounts of nuclear material and help Special Operations locate the precise spot where the fissile material is stored. JSOC has also built mock Pashtun villages, complete with hidden mock nuclearstorage depots, at a training facility on the East Coast, so SEALs and Delta Force operatives can practice there. At the same time American military and intelligence forces have been training in the U.S for such a disablement campaign, they have also been quietly pre-positioning the necessary equipment in the region. In the event of a coup, U.S. forces would rush into the country, crossing borders, rappelling down from helicopters, and parachuting out of airplanes, so they could begin securing known or suspected nuclear-storage sites. According to the former senior Special Operations planner, JSOC units first tasks might be to disable tactical nuclear weaponsbecause those are more easily mated, and easier to move around, than long-range missiles. In a larger disablement campaign, the U.S. would likely mobilize the Armys 20th Support Command, whose Nuclear Disablement Teams would accompany Special Operations detachments or Marine companies into the country. These teams are trained to engage in what the military delicately calls sensitive site exploitation operations on nuclear sitesmeaning that they can destroy a nuclear weapon without setting it off. Generally, a mated nuclear warhead can be deactivated when its trigger mechanism is disabledand so both the Army teams and JSOC units train extensively on the types of trigger mechanisms that Pakistani weapons are thought to use. According to some scenarios developed by American war planners, after as many weapons as possible were disabled and as much fissile material as possible was secured, U.S. troops would evacuate quickly because the final stage of the plan involves precision missile strikes on nuclear bunkers, using special hard and deeply buried target munitions. (14-15) According to American sources, China has, in secret talks with the U.S., reached an understanding that, should America decide to send forces into Pakistan to secure its nuclear weapons, China would raise no objections. (15)
Page 98 of 114
March 2012
Pro Counters: Cut Both
Cutting Military or Civilian Aid (But Not Both) Is Not Feasible

Please see the Heritage Foundation in the Organization Index for more info. Some U.S. congressional officials have called for cutting civilian, but not military, aid to Pakistan. This makes little sense, however, since it is the militarynot the civilian leadershipthat controls Pakistans policies toward the Afghan Taliban, Haqqani network, and Lashkar-e-Tayyiba terrorist organization, all of which have links to al-Qaeda. Other Members of Congress have noted more credibly that strengthening Pakistans democratic institutions and civilian authorities offers the best chance to develop a functional, mutually beneficial relationship between the two countries.
Page 99 of 114
March 2012
Pro Counters: Supply Lines
Afghan Supply Lines Dont Depend on Pakistan

Please see Foreign Affairs in the Organization Index for more info. Nearly 60 percent of the NATO supplies sent into Afghanistan are already routed through the north, through Russia and Central Asia. The U.S. military is hoping to increase that number to 75 percent. Without Pakistan, therefore, the coalition could still support a substantial force in Afghanistan, but not one as big as the current one of 131,000 troops. The basic objective of that force would necessarily be counterterrorism, not counterinsurgency. Counterterrorism is less personnel- and resourceintensive because it aims only to prevent the country from becoming a haven for Islamist extremists, not to transform it into a well-functioning democracy. Given the Obama administrations current plans to withdraw 24,000 U.S. troops by the summer of 2012, with many more to follow, such a strategy is already inescapable. (6)
Page 100 of 114
March 2012
Pro Counters: No Collapse
Suspension Will Not Cause Gov. Collapse

Please see Foreign Affairs in the Organization Index for more info. Washington must shed its fear that its withdrawal of aid or open antagonism could lead to the Pakistani state's collapse, a radical Islamist takeover, or nuclear war. Pakistanis, not Americans, have always determined their political future. Even substantial U.S. investments in the civilian state and the economy, for example, have not led to their improvement or to gains in stability. With or without U.S. aid to Pakistan, the Pakistani military will remain the most respected institution in the country. In a 2011 Pew poll of Pakistanis, 79 percent of respondents said that the military was having a good influence on the country's direction, compared with 20 percent who said that the national government was. As for the possibility of an Islamist takeover, the country's current power centers have a strong interest in maintaining control and so will do whatever they can to keep itwhatever Washington's policy is. It is worth remembering that Pakistan has already proved itself able to take out the terrorist networks that threaten its own institutions, as it did in the Swat Valley and the district of Buner in 2009. Moreover, government by radical Islamists has not proved to be a popular choice among Pakistanis. In the last general election, the Muttahida Majlise- Amal, a coalition of Islamist parties, won only seven out of 340 seats in the National Assembly. (6)
Page 101 of 114
March 2012
Pro Counters: Not The Answer
Conditionality Not the Answer

Ibrahim, Azeem. US Aid to Pakistan: US Taxpayers Have Funded Pakistani Corruption. Rep. Belfer Center: Harvard University, July 2009. Web. 8 Feb. 2012. <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Final_DP_2009_06_08092009.pdf>. Please see the Belfer Center in the Organization Index for more info. There is little chance that Pakistan will acquiesce to the stated demands, which puts the United States in an awkward position of having to execute waiver authority to continue funding Pakistan if needed. She argues that this would have a doubly negative effect. First, it would continue the well-worn cycle of the United States bending its commitment to its own laws to accommodate the importance of dealing with Pakistan. Second, it would leave Pakistan confident that it could fail to meet these conditions and still be a recipient of U.S. money, because Pakistan remains ever confident that Washington cannot cut off a partner as important as Pakistan, irrespective of the severity of divergence in national priorities or policies. (Pg. 26)
Page 102 of 114
March 2012
Pro Counters: Humanitarian Not Effective
Humanitarian Aid Not Effective

Birdsall, Nancy, Wren Elhai, and Molly Kinder. Beyond Bullets and Bombs: Fixing the U.S. Approach to Development in Pakistan. Rep. Center for Global Development, June 2011. Web.
Two years later, the U.S. development program in Pakistan is not yet on course. There has been little serious attention paid to the potential for U.S. trade and investment policy to spur growth and create jobs in Pakistan. Meanwhile, the aid program has not yet delivered. Observers in Pakistan and in Washington identify the same set of weaknesses in its design and implementation. No one is sure what the United States is trying to accomplish in the development space. Because of a debilitating lack of transparency in the aid program, no one is even sure what the United States is doing. (4) Unfortunately and inevitably, the United States desire to make quick progress (including on the diplomatic and security fronts)and the perception that American aid has produced few visible benefits in the past two years creates strong pressure for hasty disbursement. That pressure must be resisted. Indiscriminate aid spending can do harm in at least three ways. First, spending limited aid resources on programs or projects that are not likely to be effective or sustainable has an opportunity cost. Such spending crowds out more effective projects. To the extent that the aid program can affect public opinion in Pakistan, reports of aid money going to waste can only further sour perceptions of the United States. Second, aid can directly fuel corruption and create new flashpoints for conflict. That is especially a risk in the most insecure regions of Pakistan. Evidence from Afghanistan suggests that the sorts of aid deployed as part of counterinsurgency doctrine often enrich local elites while creating resentment among those who are not lucky enough to reap the benefits. While aid has not been shown to buy goodwill (studies in Afghanistan found overwhelmingly negative perceptions of aid among the Afghan people36), it represents a flood of cash, amounting to a significant percentage of local economic activity in targeted districts.37 That amount of spending in an environment not conducive to close oversight encourages corruption (as was observed last year in one of USAIDs largest contracts in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas) and the erosion of local institutions. Third, aid spending can, by plugging fiscal and other holes in the short run for Pakistan, make it too easy for Pakistans own policymakers to put off tough decisions. (30-31) For these reasons, we recommend that much of the $7.5 billion Kerry-Lugar- Berman aid package not be disbursed immediately. Especially in sectors where serious flaws in public administration are the binding constraints to success, it would be better to backload the bulk of this extraordinary aid investment, to wait until critical policy questions are resolved. This caution is most advisable in sectors where the United States has committed to disbursing its aid funding primarily through government channels. So-called conditionality in aid spending is an extremely sensitive subject, carrying the implication that donors are using the threat of withholding aid as a stick to force their desired outcomes in Pakistani political debates. That is not the intent of our proposal. In fact, we are highly cognizant of the fact that aid does not buy leverage over domestic policies even if that were its aim. Rather, we believe that the pure act of delaying disbursement in certain sectors will benefit both the Pakistani reform process and the ultimate effectiveness of U.S. aid. (32) foundationbriefs.com Page 103 of 114
Con Counters
Page 104 of 114
March 2012
Con Counters: No China Alliance
China/Iran Not Willing to Ally Too Closely

Kronstadt K, Alan. Pakistan-U.S. Relations. Rep. Congressional Research Service, 21 October, 2011. Web. 1 Feb. 2012. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33498.pdf Please see the Congressional Research Service in the Organization Index for more info. Yet Beijings willingness to take Islamabad more fully under its wings appears limited. The hesitation is rooted at least partly in Chinas concerns about the rise of Islamist extremism in Pakistan and some disappointment with progress in developing the Gwadar port, which suffers from a poor road network and geographical isolation. The Chinese government reportedly is unlikely to place itself in the middle of any U.S.-Pakistani rift, nor has it shown any desire to replace Washington as Islamabads primary foreign benefactor. (Pg. 27)
Please see Council on Foreign Relations in the Organization Index for more info. Pakistan has been pretty clear, and this is certainly true after the bin Laden raid, that they see China as their closest international partner. They reached out to China to fill in whatever gaps, in terms of military or other assistance, might be left should the U.S. relationship break down. My sense, though, is that China is reluctant to fill those gaps. China doesn't make a practice of providing the scale or type of assistance that the United States has provided; China isn't in a position to provide some of the higher technology that the United States has provided. It therefore is only a partial means to fill that gap that the United States would leave behind. Iran is even more inadequate, incapable of helping Pakistan in some very important ways. Of course, this would be a direction that the United States would think is troubling, should Pakistan slide into Iran's camp, or firm up its relationship with China at our expense. But the current situation is also not good from a U.S. perspective. So the hope is that by placing pressure on Pakistan now, Pakistan will make an about-face rather than find itself in camp with the Irans of the world. Pakistan doesn't want to be a rogue state. (1)
Page 105 of 114
March 2012
Con Counters: Military Aid Productive
Military Aid is Productive

Please see Council on Foreign Relations in the Organization Index for more info. Frontier Corps (FC): This federal paramilitary force of eighty thousand troops has been heavily involved in military actions in the tribal belt since 2003. The force has suffered significant casualties fighting militants, which analysts attribute to the force's poor training and equipment. The United States has been working to reform the force with Pakistan's cooperation. In 2008, Pakistan received $75 million for establishing training centers, raising twelve new Frontier Corps units, and supporting so-called Border Coordination Centers that allow the Pakistani army to share intelligence and coordinate with the Frontier Corps. In 2009, the United States will provide $25 million for things such as soldier equipment, vehicles for medical help, and communications equipment to improve the FC's surveillance capabilities. (1) The police force in Pakistan is also hugely underresourced, including lacking adequate number of personnel. Abbas points out that in the North West Frontier Province, the 55,000-member police force mans 217 police stations. In reality, he explains, this means only "one police station for every 133 square miles of some of the world's most dangerous terrain." The U.S. embassy in Islamabad announced its plan to provide police equipment to the province worth $4.1 million (1)
Page 106 of 114
March 2012
Con Counters: Military Not To Blame
Pakistani Military Not To Blame

See the Center For Strategic and International Studies in the Organization Index for more info. The military, however, cannot fully be blamed for many of its past actions. It responded to a failing and dysfunctional civil governments and politics, and took power with extensive popular support, driven by the populations disenchantment with its civilian rulers
Page 107 of 114
March 2012
Con Counters: Pakistan is Fighting Taliban
Pakistan is Increasingly Fighting the Taliban

Curtis, Lisa. From Strategy to Implementation: Strengthening U.S.-Pakistan Relations. Rep. The Heritage Foundation, 8 July 2009. Web.
Please see The Heritage Foundation in the Organization Index for more info. There has been a significant change in the Pakistan military's attitude toward confronting the Pakistani Taliban in the northwest part of the country in the past ten weeks. Just one week after Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari approved the Swat Valley peace agreement following passage of a parliamentary resolution urging him to do so, the Taliban took over the neighboring district of Buner in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) in mid-April. On April 24, under both Pakistani public and U.S. pressure, the Pakistan army deployed paramilitary troops to the region and Chief of army Staff (COAS) General Ashfaq Kayani sent a warning to the militants that the army would not allow them to "impose their way of life on the civil society of Pakistan." The statement was a positive first step in clarifying Pakistani policy toward the militants and was followed by aggressive military operations that have ousted the Taliban from the Swat Valley. The Pakistan government says its military has killed more than 1,600 militants in the past eight weeks in the Swat operation. The fact that both anti-Pakistan and pro-Pakistan militants reside in the tribal areas highlights the complexities of partnering effectively with Pakistan to defeat the terrorists as well as the fluidity of the situation as Pakistani leaders increasingly recognize the gravity of the threat posed by the various terrorist groups to the stability of the Pakistani state. The U.S. also has stepped up its drone missile strikes in the region in the last two weeks, apparently with the support of Pakistani intelligence. More than 60 were killed in a drone strike in South Waziristan two weeks ago that apparently missed Baitullah Mehsud by a matter of hours. Pakistani jets last week bombed suspected militant hideouts in North Waziristan, where militants had killed at least 30 Pakistani soldiers in an ambush on an army convoy the week before. During my recent visit to Afghanistan, several NATO commanders expressed the view that Pakistani military operations in the tribal areas are beginning to pay dividends in terms of reducing the flow of militants and weapons into Afghanistan. This demonstrates that a strategy of coaxing the Pakistanis to do more against the terrorist threat in the tribal areas while continuing to support the country through economic and military assistance may be working. A recent combination of events, including the Taliban declaring democracy in Pakistan as "infidel," has begun to change the Pakistani public's attitude toward the Taliban and given the army the public support it requires to fight them militarily.[1] COAS General Kayani said last Friday that, "While external threats continue to exist, it is the internal threat to Pakistan that needs immediate attention." The U.S. must focus on helping sustain the Pakistani momentum against the Taliban by supporting them through military assistance as well as generous economic and humanitarian aid that helps resettle and rebuild the lives of those civilians displaced by the fighting. foundationbriefs.com Page 108 of 114
March 2012
Con Counters: Conditional Aid
Conditional Aid Would Succeed

Ibrahim, Azeem. US Aid to Pakistan: US Taxpayers Have Funded Pakistani Corruption. Rep. Belfer Center: Harvard University, July 2009. Web. 8 Feb. 2012. <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Final_DP_2009_06_08092009.pdf>. Please see the Belfer Center in the Organization Index for more info. Aid without conditionality has not worked. For too long, the lack of conditions and weak agreements on how the aid was to be used resulted in its being perceived as a blank check. This in turn meant that it was ineffective in countering terrorism. After eight years and $12 billion in aid, Pakistani deaths from terrorist violence have skyrocketed, Pakistan is less secure both regionally and internally, too many Pakistani troops in the FATA lack basic equipment, Islamist extremism in Pakistan has risen, al Qaeda has reconstituted a safe haven in the FATA (according to the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate), and significant parts of the FATA have come under Taliban control, thanks to both Pakistani government truces with Islamists and Taliban military advances. Conversely, the threat of conditions seems to have encouraged the Pakistani military to act against the militants. During the George W. Bush administration, Pakistan did not launch significant offensives against the Taliban in Pakistan. In spring 2009, when it became clear that the Obama administration was more open to the idea of conditionality than its predecessor had been and that future aid may be withheld, the military launched U.S. Aid to PakistanU.S. Taxpayers Have Funded Pakistani Corruptionoffensives against Pakistani Taliban militants in and around the Swat Valley in May 2009, ending the peace deal negotiated between Islamic cleric Sufi Mohammed and the local government in North West Frontier Province. Between 2001 and 2009, a large proportion of U.S. aid consisted of cash transfers to the Pakistani government. These became Pakistani sovereign funds and thus were beyond U.S. oversight. The United States neither has access to records of how these funds are spent nor has the right to ask for such records. This is the status quo to which the Pakistani government has become accustomed. To a large extent, the negative reaction which any conditionality would engender is a response to the change in this status quo. However, given high-profile incidences of corruption such as the majority of the money intended for military use being diverted to the Ministry of Finance, estimates that 70 percent of the funds have been spent illegitimately, and the military establishments record of corruption, the status quo itself is inadequate. Objections to attaching conditions to how any future U.S. funding is used must be seen in the light of a dependent country which has begun to view aid with minimal conditionality as an entitlement. Regarding the argument that Congress is trying to micromanage U.S. policy towards Pakistan, while providing conditions which are too specific would indeed be counterproductive, aims such as countering militants and extremist curricula can only be achieved if Pakistan cooperates. It would be irrational to offer Pakistan aid for a specific purpose without insisting that it be used for that purpose; that need not constitute micromanagement. (Pg. 27) Page 109 of 114
Contentions
Page 110 of 114
March 2012
Pro Contentions
Pro Contentions
Contention One: Pakistan actively supports terrorists. Despite giving over $20 billion in assistance to Pakistan over the last decade, much of it military assistance ot combat terrorism, Pakistan actively supports terrorist networks. One such network is the Haqqani network which operates in Western Pakistan and Southern Afghanistan. As The Atlantic Magazine points out, the U.S. funds the ISI [Pakistans version of the CIA]; the ISI funds the Haqqani network; and the Haqqani network kills American soldiers. Former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mike Mullen called the Haqqani an arm of the Pakistan government. The United States has, in private, threatened and criticized Pakistan heavily for its links to terrorism, but after years nothing has changed. Thats because support for terrorism is a fundamental security strategy for Pakistan. Having control of groups that might eventually control Afghanistan after U.S. withdrawal is vital to Pakistans perceived security interests. Aid only fuels this objective. Moreover, perverse incentives only perpetuate this problem. Because Pakistan only receives money due to its terrorist problem, it has an incentive to ensure that problem remains unsolved so that the money keeps flowing. It is time to end assistance and stop this backwards logic that costs American lives. Contention Two: Assistance is misused and misallocated. Assistance should only be given to countries where goals are clearly attached and achieved. Pakistans use of assistance has largely been ineffective, lost to corruption, and misspent. First, financial assistance greatly hinders the ability of a government to be independent. As scholar Christine Fare notes, Foreign aid lessens the requirement for a government to forge a bond with its citizens by raising revenue and redistributing those funds as services. Such a social contract is fundamental to Pakistan's emergence as a robust democracy that provides for its people. Instead, the Pakistani government is relying on the United States to manage its people, and blaming us when things dont work out. Furthermore, corruption in Pakistan makes assistance largely ineffective. A report by the Government Accountability Office found that only $179.5 million of the first $1.5 billion of a new aid program had been spent, mainly because directors of the program could not find credible places in Pakistan to use to the money. It was too risky that it would be lost to corrupt officials. Finally, most of the military assistance given to Pakistan is diverted to counter its rival India. Instead of combatting terrorism, Pakistan spends our assistance on fighter jets that have no use in the war on terror and are pointed towards India. Suspending aid would send a message to Pakistan that it needed to readjust its priorities and clean up its government.
Page 111 of 114
March 2012
Pro Contentions
Contention Three: The United States must exercise credible leverage to achieve its goals. The time for action has arrived; for too long the United States has tried words of encouragement and words of criticism, but neither has been enough to change Pakistans behavior. Pakistan has been accustomed to U.S. officials criticizing them for lack of action, but then never really experiencing any true consequences. Suspending all assistance to Pakistan would show that the United States is credibleit is willing to apply pressure in order to secure itself from terrorist threats. By sending a clear message now, before terrorist networks get so strong that they truly endanger Pakistans existence, the United States can push Pakistan in the right direction and eliminate terrorist threats before they get out of hand. Indeed, suspension of assistance would be successful because, as the Council on Foreign Relations notes, U.S. support to Pakistan is crucial in so many different ways: help with getting rid of the debt burden, supporting the Pakistani military, and now for the past two or three years the economic- and disaster-relief aid packages to Pakistan. Pakistan can only go so long without our assistance; they will better align with U.S. policy objectives after the suspension.
Page 112 of 114
March 2012
Con Contentions
Con Contentions
Contention One: Pakistan is Too Important Regionally To Disengage First and foremost, the importance of Pakistan to the effort in Afghanistan is paramount. Indeed, while the United States continues to conduct combat operations in Afghanistan, Pakistan is important for everything from supply routes to border security. As the Associated Press noted in January of this year, the US is forced to pay 6 times more for transportation via the northern route as a result of Pakistan closing its border. Beyond simply \ making the war in Afghanistan more difficult to fight, suspending aid to Pakistan would also significantly increase the likelihood of terrorists being able to seek refuge in Pakistan. While the relationship between the United States and Pakistan is currently far from perfect, the consistent exchange of information as well as the ability to conduct drone strikes and surveillance is invaluable to the war effort. Moreover, beyond 2014 Pakistan will truly dictate how Afghanistan fares. For all of these reasons, simply disengaging is simply not reasonable. Contention Two: Humanitarian aid is crucial for Pakistan. The United States cannot simply walk away from the people of Pakistan. To do so would not only be immoral but it would also give rise to a whole new generation of Pakistanis who are poor, ill-educated and susceptible to anti-American propaganda and rhetoric. Indeed, the demographics of Pakistan are truly frightening, with over half of the population under 17 years of age and the majority of people living well below the poverty line. As Seth Jones of the Rand Corporation notes, The development gap in Pakistan's Pashtun areas needs to be addressed. It is also a root cause of extremism. Not only is providing aid and assistance to promote education and development essential to preventing extremism from taking root, but the US must also realize that many in Pakistan are coming to see the United States as a fair-weather friend who cannot be relied upon. This opinion is growing within all classes of society and is making anti-Americanism increasingly rampant. As the Pew Research center found, 68% of Pakistanis see the United States more as an enemy, while only 6% consider it a friend. This perception is dangerous and can only be reversed by engaging the population.
Page 113 of 114
March 2012 Contention Three: The alternative is worse.
Con Contentions
As history has shown us, cutting aid to Pakistan gets us nowhere. When the United States cut aid to Pakistan over the nuclear program in the 90s, Pakistan immediately turned to the Taliban. As the Council on Foreign Relations notes, As relations with the United States deteriorated, Pakistan pursued ties with the Taliban--part of its "strategic depth" initiative to counter India and bring "stability" to Afghanistan after the Soviet occupation. It also continued an aggressive nuclear program too, complete with disastrous global proliferation. Evidence exists to suggest that cutting aid this time would be no different. For one, Pakistans nuclear weapons are poorly secured. As the Combating Terrorism Center notes, As the number of nuclear weapons facilities grows, and the number of those with access to nuclear weapons or related components rises, the complex challenge of assuring the security of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons components will become ever more difficult. Indeed, over 70,000 people already have some degree of access to Pakistans nuclear weapons and terrorists have already proven capable of infiltrating even Pakistans most secure military bases. With the United States aid out of the picture, the security of Pakistans nukes deteriorates quickly. Next Pakistan has already established significant international ties that could make cutting aid even worse this time around. New Islamabad allies range from Iran to Saudi Arabia both of whom have expressed interest in nuclear weapons. Reports from the Brookings Institute even argue that plans already exist to share weaponry with the Saudis. Clearly, driving Pakistan further away by cutting aid is not the right thing to do given the huge risk for proliferationeither by design or by accident.
Page 114 of 114

Advanced Level March 2012

Загружено:

Сведения о документе

Исходное описание:

Авторское право

Доступные форматы

Поделиться этим документом

Поделиться или встроить документ

Параметры публикации

Этот документ был вам полезен?

Это неприемлемый материал?

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

Advanced Level March 2012

Загружено:

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

Foundation Briefs

Advanced Level March Brief

Resolved: The United States should suspend all assistance to Pakistan.

The New Foundation Brief

The New Foundation Brief

Defend Your Source

The New Foundation Brief

Key Organizational Changes

Defend Your Source

Center for Strategic and International Studies

Combating Terrorism Center at West Point

Congressional Research Service

Council on Foreign Relations

The Heritage Foundation

Laying the Foundation

Laying the Foundation

U.S. Aid Levels

Pakistans Nuclear Issue

Pro: Different Objectives

Pakistan Has Different Objectives

Pakistan Actually Views the US as Threat

Pro: Toleration of Terrorists

Toleration of Insurgents and Extremists

Pro: Toleration of Terrorists

Pro: Toleration of Terrorists

Pro: Pakistani Intelligence Aids Terrorists

Pakistani Intelligence Aids Insurgents/Extremists

Pro: Pakistani Intelligence Aids Terrorists

Pro: Support for Haqqani Network

Support for the Haqqani Network

Pro: Support for Haqqani Network

Pro: Allegations of Aiding Taliban

Allegations of Aiding Taliban

Pro: Allegations of Aiding Taliban

Pro: Negative Impact on Afghanistan

Significant Negative Impact on Afghanistan

Pro: Inability to Find Bin Laden

Inability To Find Bin Laden

Pro: Inability to Find Bin Laden

Pro: Aid Creates Perverse Incentives

Aid Creates Perverse Incentives

Pro: Military Uncooperative

Pro: US Must Force Change

U.S. Must Force Change

Pro: Pakistan Heavily Dependent on Aid

Pakistan Heavily Dependent On Aid

Pro: Aid is Flawed and Should Be Avoided

Aid Itself is Flawed and Should Be Avoided

Aid Hurts Democracy

Pro: Pakistans Military is Too Powerful

Pakistans Military Too Powerful

Pro: Lack of Civilian Governance

Lack of Civilian Governance Makes Humanitarian Aid Ineffective and Wasteful

Anti-Americanism Shows that Aid is Ineffective/Impossible

Pro: Aid Cannot Solve

Aid Cannot Fix Pakistan

Pro: Moderate Levels Insufficient

Moderate Levels of External Aid Unlikely to Help

Pro: Aid Used Inefficiently/Corruptly

Aid Used Inefficiently/Corruptly

Pro: Aid Goes to Fund Nuclear Program

Aid Goes to Fund Nuclear Program

Pro: Aid Not Effective Counterinsurgency