The International

Journal
DiVeRSiTy
in ORGAniSATiOnS,

cOMMUniTieS & nATiOnS

Volume 7, Number 4

Urban Schism, Social Strains: Exploring the Collective Identities of Youth in Contemporary Belfast
David Drissel

www.diversity-journal.com

THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF DIVERSITY IN ORGANISATIONS, COMMUNITIES AND NATIONS http://www.Diversity-Journal.com First published in 2007 in Melbourne, Australia by Common Ground Publishing Pty Ltd www.CommonGroundPublishing.com. 2007 (individual papers), the author(s) 2007 (selection and editorial matter) Common Ground Authors are responsible for the accuracy of citations, quotations, diagrams, tables and maps. All rights reserved. Apart from fair use for the purposes of study, research, criticism or review as permitted under the Copyright Act (Australia), no part of this work may be reproduced without written permission from the publisher. For permissions and other inquiries, please contact <cg-support@commongroundpublishing.com>. ISSN: 1447-9532 Publisher Site: http://www.Diversity-Journal.com THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF DIVERSITY IN ORGANISATIONS, COMMUNITIES AND NATIONS is a peer refereed journal. Full papers submitted for publication are refereed by Associate Editors through anonymous referee processes. Typeset in Common Ground Markup Language using CGCreator multichannel typesetting system http://www.CommonGroundSoftware.com.

Urban Schism, Social Strains: Exploring the Collective Identities of Youth in Contemporary Belfast
David Drissel, Iowa Central Community College, IA, USA
Abstract: This article investigates how urban spatial changes have influenced the construction, negotiation, and transformation of collective identities in contemporary Belfast, Northern Ireland, and features an ethnographic study of local teenagers and young adults (ages 15 to 28). Spatially splintered for years by an ideologically driven conflict known as the Troubles, Belfast was bifurcated primarily along ethno-religious lines. However, the citys socio-spatial structure was modified to some extent beginning in the late 1990s as a result of major political developments such as the enactment of Northern Irelands Good Friday peace accord. The continued existence of in-group/out-group perceptions among young people in post-Troubles Belfast is a major focus of this article. In addition, the construction of shared (non-oppositional) spaces populated mostly by youth is explored, based on the theory that the presence of alternative subcultures and related neo-tribes in such spaces effectively reconfigures social boundaries and diminishes the salience of traditional identification categories. Though sectarian perceptions were discovered to exist among many respondents, traditional social barriers were found to have eroded in certain settings. In particular, recently constructed shared social spaces have been utilized by youth to effectively blur schismatic distinctions and at least partially transform their collective identities. Keywords: Collective Identity, Urban, Belfast, Northern Ireland, Youth Subcultures, Neo-Tribes, Schism, Strains, Urban Space, Social Stratification, Stereotypes, Ethnography

Introduction
UMEROUS CITIES AROUND the world have experienced extended periods of sociospatial division, as various governments and non-state actors have systematically segregated entire neighborhoods situated within urban settings. From Birmingham, Alabama in the 1960s to Baghdad in the current era, cities have been divided on the basis of such factors as race, ethnicity, religion, and political ideology. In this regard, Belfast, Northern Ireland,1 was spatially splintered for decades by an ideologically driven conflict that bifurcated the city primarily along ethno-religious lines. Like the rest of Northern Ireland, Belfast was plagued by a de facto civil war known as the Troubles that pitted Irish Catholic nationalists against Protestant unionists and British troops. During this period, most of Belfasts neighborhoods were rigidly segregated according to sect. However, the citys socio-spatial structure was modified to some extent beginning in the late 1990s as a result of major political developments such as the enactment of Northern Irelands Good Friday peace accord and related legislative power-sharing agreements. This article investigates how urban space has influenced the construction, negotiation, and transformation of collective identities in contemporary Belfast

and features an ethnographic study of teenagers and young adults (ages 15 to 28). The continued existence of in-group/out-group perceptions among young people in post-Troubles Belfast is a major focus of this article. In addition, the construction of shared (non-oppositional) spaces populated mostly by youth is explored, based on the theory that the presence of alternative subcultures and related neo-tribes in such spaces effectively blurs social boundaries and diminishes the salience of traditional identification categories. In this article, I first examine many of the major theories of collective identity and inter-group relations in urban space. Next I briefly trace the history of political conflict and related socio-spatial changes that have occurred in Belfast over the course of the last several decades. At this point, I recount my own recent experiences in exploring the citys socio-spatial contours and include selected excerpts of openended interviews with teenagers and young adults that I randomly encountered in various public settings. As I walked the citys streets by day and explored pubs by night, I talked to young people about their sense of identity and place. Recognizing that group antipathies have continued to linger, I asked about dichotomous perceptions of the urban other, including group stereotypes and related social strains. I conclude with a discussion of my findings, analyzing selected comments made by respondents. Pro-

Belfast has a population of 277,391 people, with a total of 579,554 in the metro area, according to 2001 census figures. THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF DIVERSITY IN ORGANISATIONS, COMMUNITIES AND NATIONS, VOLUME 7, NUMBER 4, 2007 http://www.Diversity-Journal.com, ISSN 1447-9532
Common Ground, David Drissel, All Rights Reserved, Permissions: cg-support@commongroundpublishing.com

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spects for a radical reconfiguration of urban space and related changes in the collective identities of Belfast youth are assessed.

Socio-Spatial Constructions of Collective Identity

Based primarily on the shared experiences of everyday life, collective identity refers to an individuals cognitive, moral, and emotional connection with a broader community, category, practice, or institution (Polletta and Jasper 2001:285). Though perceptions of collective identity typically impact ones personal identity, individual feelings alone cannot bring about a collective identity. Rather, a communal identification that extends beyond the self and encompasses some sort of cohesive group orientation must be present. In order for individual identities to become collective, they must first encapsulate primary rather than merely secondary or tertiary status by the individuals involved, since people often maintain a plurality of real and potential identities. As Castels notes, collective identities involve the process of construction of meaning on the basis of a cultural attribute or related set of attributes, that is/are given priority over other sources of meaning (1997:6). Collective identities are directly related to the formation of specific group boundaries and an oppositional consciousness designed to articulate grievances and resist domination (Heath 2003:426). Longstanding differences between adversarial groups can be very important in this regard, as the positioning of a meaningful past infuses group consciousness with a narrative of continuity that effectively links past grievances to present-day circumstances (Neill 2001:5). However, such narratives tend to exaggerate differences between groups, while minimizing differences within groups. The urban other is often depicted as monolithically impure, deviant, and even dangerous, particularly when compared to the ingroup (Sibley 1995). This is especially the case when a substantial degree of social distance exists between groups (e.g., segregated neighborhoods and job sites). Paraphrasing the contact hypothesis, prejudice tends to flourish in such an insulated urban atmosphere (Allport 1954). Collective identities are thus relational concepts, clearly tied to real and imagined social differences between groups of people (Mandaville 1999, Sack 2003). Any major changes in the spatial patterns of social interaction ultimately impact the construction and transformation of collective identities. As Gotham observes, space is a social construction that shapes social action and guides behavior (200:723). Rejecting essentialist conceptions of space and place, this approach provides subjective insights into the ways in which various social actors interact in urban

spatial environments (Gilbert 2000:66). Space matters, Heikkila contends, because it mediates the experiences of people in places and further, it shapes the structure of the opportunity set available to them (2001:266). Recognizing that power is spatially constructed and often wielded through an economy of discourse, several social theorists have emphasized the dynamic character of urban space. As Foucault contends, space is fundamental to any form of communal life; space is fundamental to any exercise of power (1984:252). In contrast to monolithic depictions of urban life that generally depict social spaces as onedimensional or strictly dualistic (e.g., the oppressed and the oppressors), this approach emphasizes a diversity of overlapping urban interests and unequal power relations, all tied to various social spaces. Rather than depicting segregated groups as being contained in fixed ghettoized stasis, such groups are said to possess agency. As a result, certain groups act to ameliorate or even overcome social constraints through the productive use of space (Gotham 2003:727-728). Indeed, space is both visibly and invisibly stratified, with frequent struggles waged between adversarial groups over segmented urban assets and territory. Group members continually mark spatial boundaries and view alterations in existing borders as politically divisive acts (Shirlow 2006:103). Aside from overtly confrontational forms of intraurban conflict, various social groups are also involved in tacit negotiations to expand or delimit spatial boundaries and related collective identities. As McGrellis (2005b:517) has noted: Central to these negotiations is the creation, transgression and sometimes evasion of boundaries. Such boundaries not only mark where it is possible to go, but also who it is possible to be. In this respect, identity formation is an active, creative course of action. The identity negotiation process includes what Pierre Bourdieu has described as codes of spatial performance, which occur through social situations and dialogic interactions on the urban stage. Various fields within the city are established and contested, with groups of actors producing place-specific forms of identity, consciousness, and knowledge (cited in Gotham 2003:724). The utilization of peripheral spaces within and between social cityscapes is particularly noteworthy in this regard. To paraphrase Paul Routledge, such terrains of resistance frequently pose major challenges to the geopolitical status quo (cited in McGrellis 2005a:58). From this vantage point, space is filled not only with borders, but also borderlands altern-

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ative spatial domains that tend to blur and conflate hegemonic distinctions (Tajbakhsh 2000: 164). One significant way in which new or modified collective identities may emerge within urban borderlands is through the creation of informal subcultures, frequently tied to youth, whose members tend to share an affinity for particular types of music, fashion, argot, and recreational activities. Such subcultures are particularly appealing to marginalized or alienated urban youth since they can confer varying degrees of status and prestige among cohorts, depending on fairly specific in-group variables. Thornton has coined the term subcultural capital to refer to this process,2 noting that such capital confers status on its owner in the eyes of the relevant beholder (1997:202). Appropriate style and slang, for instance, are embodied forms of subcultural capital often linked to competing conceptions of urbanity. Exhibiting appropriate knowledge of relevant musical genres and artists, dance styles, sports and games, and subcultural symbols are often highly prized by subcultural cohorts. Consumption of particular products or objects (e.g., clothes, hairstyles, foodstuffs, nightclubs, websites) and utilizing particular phrases or expressions are also important in this regard. Whether or not the growing presence of subcultural capital has effectively weakened or supplanted the more traditional, spatially bounded, collective identities of youth in Belfast will be addressed at the conclusion of this article.

The Evolution of Socio-Spatial Change in Belfast

Belfast (like the rest of Northern Ireland) has experienced dramatic socio-spatial changes over the years. Colonized by Scottish and English Protestant settlers beginning in the eleventh century, Northern Ireland eventually became a majority-Protestant enclave within a predominately Roman Catholic island. Following a series of popular uprisings by Irish nationalists in the early 1920s, the mostly Catholic southern 26 counties of Ireland gained their independence from the United Kingdom. The Irish Free State (and eventually the Republic of Ireland) was established with Dublin as its capital. During the same period, Northern Ireland (i.e., Irelands northeastern six counties sometimes referred to as Ulster) was officially separated from the rest of the island, becoming an integral part of the U.K. At the time of partition in 1921, Catholics composed a majority of Irelands overall population, though they represented a distinct ethno-religious minority in the Protestant-dominated North. This is
2 3

still true today, with approximately 53.1% of Northern Irelands population identifying as Protestant and 43.8% as Roman Catholic.3 Belfast, which serves as Northern Irelands provincial capital, is more evenly divided than the rest of the province, with 48.6% identifying as Protestant and 47.2% as Catholic.4 The conflict in Northern Ireland has been fueled not so much by religious intolerance per se, but by political disputes between two adversarial ethno-national movements that use religion as a boundary marker (Shirlow and Murtagh 2006:15). In this regard, the two major sides are the pro-British unionists and the pro-Irish nationalists, who traditionally have held antithetical positions on the appropriate constitutional status of Northern Ireland. On the one hand, the unionists (mainly Protestants) want to retain the British-dominated union of Northern Ireland with the U.K. In this respect, the most devout unionists claim to be loyal British subjects. On the other hand, the nationalists (mainly Catholics) seek to reunify the North with the rest of the island. One of the main sources of Irish nationalist dissatisfaction with the status quo has been the perception of discriminatory practices in employment, housing, social services, law enforcement, and insufficient representation in provincial and local government bodies (Ginty, Muldoon, and Ferguson 2007:5). Over the years, the Irish nationalist movement grew in strength and became increasingly confrontational. By the late 1960s, nationalists had adopted many of the tactics of the American civil rights movement such as engaging in peaceful protest, while demanding equal rights for Catholics. But an often-violent crackdown by British troops and Protestant-dominated police departments ensued, leading to fierce reprisals by militant Irish nationalists known as republicans. As the most dogmatic wing of the Irish nationalist movement, republicans increasingly embraced terrorist-style tactics in an attempt to expel British troops. Meanwhile, the extreme loyalist wing of the unionist movement adopted similar tactics. Consequently, the so-called Troubles of Northern Ireland had begun. During this period, Northern Ireland witnessed a dramatic escalation of sectarian violence orchestrated largely by paramilitary groups such as the Provisional Irish Republican Army and the Irish National Liberation Army (on the nationalist/republican side) and the Ulster Defense Association and the Ulster Freedom Fighters (on the unionist/loyalist side).

Thornton draws heavily on the work of Bourdieus related concept of symbolic capital (Weinzierl and Muggleton 2003:9). According to 2001 census figures. 4 Ibid.

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Belfast in particular became a very violent place during the Troubles, with more than 1,500 people killed5 and tens of thousands injured within the city alone (Shirlow 2006:100). Paramilitary groups rigidly delimited space throughout Belfast during this period, as neighborhoods became increasingly segregated on the basis of ethnocentric ideologies. Competing discourses justifying territorial control became paramount, with boundary markers such as murals, flags, and curb paintings becoming commonplace. Paramilitaries portrayed themselves as the guardians of particular neighborhoods, effectively demonizing the ethno-sectarian other. Such groups even exaggerated the alleged politico-religious homogeneity of segregated places in order to operationalize the difference between republican/nationalist and unionist/loyalist spaces (Shirlow and Murtagh 2006:19). There was an apparent hardening of ethno-national identities during the 1970s and eighties, as a British identity for Protestants and an Irish one for Catholics became increasingly popular (Muldoon, Trew, Todd, Rougier and McLaughlin 2007:90). In essence, Belfast became almost completely bifurcated into two distinct politico-spatial realms. Despite their physical proximity within the same city, Protestants and Catholics experienced markedly different forms of socialization. Virtually every public accommodation was segregated to some extent from schools and recreation centers to hotels and pubs. Most obviously, numerous so-called defensive walls or peace lines were constructed in various Belfast areas. These concrete interface structures were ostensibly designed to serve as buffer zones between violent-prone sectarian neighborhoods. In reality, such walls sharply reduced mobility and everyday contact between Catholics and Protestants, generating even more suspicion, avoidance, and hostility (Shirlow and Murtagh 2006:57). One of the largest and longest peace lines, constructed during the height of the Troubles in the 1970s, continues to divide the Shankill (Protestant) community from the contiguous Falls Road (Catholic) neighborhood. Marking space discursively with such walls has served only to generate greater social distance between the two ethno-religious communities. Progress was gradually made in the political sphere during the 1990s, beginning with intermittent paramilitary ceasefires and culminating in the multiparty Good Friday peace agreement of April 1998.
5

This agreement dramatically modified the political status quo in Belfast and throughout Northern Ireland. Ratified by a popular referendum in May 1998, the agreement included a revamped Northern Ireland legislature with proportional power-sharing guarantees for both major sects,6 a new pan-Irish (NorthSouth) council, a British-Irish council, and other moderate reforms (Ginty, Muldoon, and Ferguson 2007:7). Since that time, terrorism has largely dissipated and the sectarian civil war has effectively ended. However, Belfast continues to be highly segregated, with around 80 percent of Catholics and Protestants living in neighborhoods that are populated by more than 60 percent of the same sect (Shirlow 2006:102). Despite the official decommissioning of weapons by the Provisional IRA7 and the Loyalist Volunteer Force,8 paramilitary groups continue to wield substantial power, particularly in low-income areas. Violent conflicts between rival paramilitary factions (often involved in organized crime) have continued unabated, though mostly at a relatively low level of intensity. Such altercations are particularly common in interface zones bordering predominately Protestant and Catholic areas. Sectarian rioting in segregated neighborhoods, targeted killings, assaults, and vandalism perpetrated upon traditional symbols and institutions of rival factions, have largely replaced the terrorist campaigns of the Troubles (Shirlow and Murtagh 2006:3).9 Significantly, Protestant-Unionists and CatholicNationalists have maintained their own separate cultural infrastructures since the Good Friday agreement (Craith 2003:48). Each side has retained their own highly segregated schools,10 sports teams, businesses, leisure activities, newspapers, etc. Both major population groups also continue to propagate negative stereotypes about the ethno-sectarian other, including a distinct version of history that paints the out-group as untrustworthy (Ginty Muldoon, and Ferguson 2007:7). Though there is substantially more mixing of people from different demographic backgrounds in Belfast today than in recent memory, residents still perform their social life along largely sectarian lines (Shirlow 2006:102).

Throughout of all of Northern Ireland, approximately 3,500 lives were lost as a result of the major sectarian violence during the Troubles (McGrellis 2005a:53). 6 The new culturally inclusive Northern Ireland Assembly, located at Stormont in Belfast, was officially inaugurated in 1999, though it has been temporarily suspended several times. However, a major compromise agreement between the major parties was instituted in May 2007. 7 Other breakaway factions of the IRA have refused to decommission their weapons. 8 Significantly, the vast majority of loyalist paramilitary groups have not yet decommissioned their weapons. 9 According to recent figures, 167 deaths have occurred due to sectarian violence in Northern Ireland since 1995. There have been over 2,500 paramilitary style attacks during the same time period (McGrellis 2005a:53). 10 Ninety percent of Northern Irelands youth attend segregated schools, according to recent data (Lovell and Cummings, 2001:5).

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Examining the Collective Identities of Belfast Youth

During my two-week stay in Belfast (June 2006), I conducted informal open-ended interviews with 38 teens and young adults (including twenty Catholics and eighteen Protestants).11 I was particularly eager to talk with Belfast youth about their perceptions of Roman Catholic (largely Irish Nationalist/Republican) and Protestant (mostly British Unionist/Loyalist) sources of identification. With the Troubles ending somewhat tenuously as a result of the Good Friday agreement, there was bound to be changes in the socio-spatial configuration of the city. But given the fact that massive peace walls had continued to separate many of Belfasts segregated neighborhoods, how would contemporary youth perceive the ethno-sectarian other? Would religion continue to be a primary boundary marker of collective identity among Belfasts post-Troubles generation? One of the first places I visited was a rock/metal nightclub known as the Venue, located in the relatively safe city center of the new Belfast.12 I quickly noticed that many young people were milling about in an alleyway outside the club. Most of the youth were alternative looking with gothic, punk, or heavy metal fashion accessories. Deirdre, a darkhaired 22-year old with heavy makeup dressed in a black miniskirt, told me that she was born and raised a Catholic but now considers herself non-religious. She refused to characterize herself as Irish, British, or Northern Irish. As she explained, religion and nationality mean nothing to me and I don't use it to choose between people. I also talked to one of Deirdres closest friends, Stuart, a 24-year old nominal Catholic and self-professed heavy metal guitarist. He seemed uncomfortable discussing his ethno-religious identity, disdainfully referring to such matters as politics. Stuart and Deirdre along with a Protestant youth have formed a metal band called The Backstreet Sluts. Stuart proudly noted that his favorite band in the world is Guns n Roses and that his dream is to someday sign a recording contract for his band with a record company in Los Angeles. Stuart and Deirdre explained that many young people regularly hang out in the alleyway before going into the Venue. Numerous other youths approached us, with some appearing to be as young as 13. Ryan, a 15-year old Protestant boy who grew up in a highly segregated West Belfast neighborhood,
11

clearly indicated his ethno-religious identity when asked. Short in stature and sporting reddish-brown hair and freckles, he seemed innocent at first glance. But he quickly joked about how he and his friends had thrown firebombs at police recently. One of Ryans friends, a 16-year old youth named Tommy, noted that things have started to heat up again in Belfast, especially since the city was in the midst of the loyalist marching season that occurs every July.13 Such marches often venture into predominately Catholic areas, frequently sparking violence. Though Tommy and Ryan seemed excited by this prospect, at the same time they claimed not to have any sectarian hatred or malice. As Tommy explained: Its the cops we dont like and also some of the crazy paramilitary buggers that live in this town. I grew up around this shit and cant forget about it. I was raised a Protestant, you know. Sometimes I get so angry and just want to hurt somebody. But its not a Catholic or Protestant thing for me really. Not anymore. Some of my friends here at the Venue are Catholic, you see. Inside the Venue, I talked to other youths. Connor, an 18-year-old sporting a black Mohawk, plays in a punk rock band irreverently called the Troubles. Raised in a Catholic family, he told me that he had become an atheist by around age 12 or 13. Growing up in a violent-prone segregated area and witnessing first hand sectarian discord had caused him to question and eventually reject religion altogether. He continues today to live near the Peace Line that separates the predominately Catholic Falls Road area from Protestant Shankill. In terms of his ethno-nationality, he prefers to identify as Northern Irish. This is more of a neutral ethno-national term, in contrast to the more polarizing classifications of either Irish or British. When asked about his personal relationships with Protestants in Belfast, he stated: I personally get on well with them; some of my friends are from Protestant backgrounds and neighborhoods. But Im not sectarian anymore so Im not bothered. The general relations between the two groups still arent great but theyre better than ever before. There are a bunch of places where skaters, metalers, punks and stuff all hangout at the weekends, from all sorts of religious and political backgrounds.

In order to insure confidentiality, I have used pseudonyms for all respondents. In recent years, there has been an official effort by government officials and urban planners to reinvent Belfast as a post-modern, postconflict capital, capable of asserting itself economically and culturally within the global flow of resources and knowledge (Murtagh and Keaveney 2006:189). 13 This is when the largest marches are held each year, celebrating the victory of the Protestant English king, William of Orange, over the Catholic king he deposed, James II, at the Battle of the Boyne in 1690. This battle confirming British supremacy in Ireland thus is celebrated annually by many Protestants especially of the loyalist variety.
12

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Connor said that he usually prefers to frequent another downtown club, the Front Page, which has special punk nights and occasionally features his band performing live. He explained that he feels at home in such an environment, particularly since it is largely detached from ethno-sectarianism. The punk rock subculture has significantly impacted the evolution of his identity, as he explained: Punk rock is not caring about any of the political crap that divides the community. Just doing your own thing even if people think its odd or drastic. We're just out to have a good time, but a lot of people get in the way. A few days after my conversation with Connor, I visited the Front Page club on a techno night that included a well-known local DJ spinning records for the crowd. Upon entering, I witnessed frenetic dancing with pulsating kaleidoscopic lighting that included a mixed subcultural crowd of ravers, club kids, goths, skinheads, punks, preppies, and various bohemian types. As I participated in the syncopated dance rituals, I felt a sense of unity within the crowd, which focused on repetitive but irresistibly hypnotic dance beats orchestrated by a seemingly messianic DJ. In the bar area later I talked to both Catholic and Protestant youths, with conversation often focusing on the then-in-progress World Cup for soccer. Paddy, a 19-year-old Irish Catholic raver and avid soccer fan, explained that the Front Page attracts a wide variety of people from throughout Belfast. As he noted, Were kind of a motley lot in here, you know. I talked to other young adults at a more conventional establishment, the Crown Bar, located very close to the heart of the city. Judging by the pubs title, I assumed that it was a Protestant unionist establishment. However, I soon met a few Catholics at the bar including Robert, a 28-year old journalist. He explained that according to local legend, the original owner of the pub was a Catholic man married to a Protestant woman. The couple argued over what to name the pub, with the wife eventually prevailing. In spite of this, the owner exacted his revenge by having a British crown etched onto the floor of the pubs entrance, guaranteeing that everyone would trample over the monarchy when entering or exiting the pub. Given the establishments reputedly ecumenical yet iconoclastic origins, it has attracted a mixed crowd especially since the end of the Troubles, Robert claimed. He explained further that though he was raised a Catholic and has long identified with the goals of Irish republicanism, he opposes violence. As he stated: I sometimes felt like an outsider and secondclass citizen growing up, because of my religion

and political beliefs. Protestants and Catholics are different in many ways, but I dont discriminate. Indeed, Robert seemed quite at ease as he talked with a wide variety of patrons at the pub. A young married interfaith couple soon joined us for some conversation and beer. Emma, a 24-year Catholic woman and Jack, her 26-year old Protestant husband, were regulars at the pub. During the Troubles, such interfaith marriages were extremely rare and often stigmatized. Jack explained that they first met at a rock concert in Belfasts city center several years ago, soon after the Troubles ended. They had only returned to the city after living in Dublin for the past few years. I asked how they were treated in Belfast, to which they responded nonchalantly at first. Living in the integrated city center has helped a great deal, they explained. Emma noted that religion is rarely discussed in their household, though she continues to attend mass on occasion. Jack stressed that he felt uncomfortable describing himself as either Irish or British, but sometimes used the term Northern Irish instead. As he explained: You see I dont feel any real allegiance to the British crown or unionism. But I grew up in a segregated Protestant neighborhood and so I guess I believed in all the Orangemen stuff for a while. I even marched in a parade once or twice when I was younger. But after I got engaged to Emma, several folks wouldnt talk to me anymore. A paramilitary even threatened me with a beating. Thats one reason why we moved to Dublin for a few years. As I ventured into various segregated neighborhoods (e.g., Falls Road, Shankill), I found that there were many large intricate murals on display with militant messages and often-violent imagery, such as militiamen with rifles and the bloody severed hand of a legendary national patriot. As Shirlow has observed, such murals and graffiti are a recognizable form of territorial marking and an illustration of territorialized power (2006:103). In contrast to such outlying areas, I could not find any examples of sectarian graffiti or murals within the city center. Rather, graffiti was mostly hip-hop influenced with typical tag names written on walls in elaborate spray-can colors. Very little of the city centers graffiti was overtly political, though I did find a few examples of wall art emphasizing peace and one calling for class war. It seemed as though the city center was politically neutral, even while other parts of town continued to be deeply politicized. In this regard, I observed a large open courtyard near City Hall on Donegall Square, where many youths were congregating. Dozens were skateboard-

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ing in the square, while others were just milling about. Looking around, I saw mostly teenagers, many of whom were clad in t-shirts emblazoned with American or British rock or rap artists. Several youths were dressed in gothic black, while others sported spiked hair and punk attire and/or hip-hop influenced baggy pants and sports clothing. Many of the youths with which I talked indicated that an awareness of sectarian identity still exists, though such feelings are vastly understated in such shared urban spaces. For instance, Gerry, a 21-year-old Irish Catholic and amateur graffitist, said he was proud of his heritage and highly resented the way in which the British had treated the Irish. However, he was equally critical of sectarian violence that continues to plague certain areas, especially in the interfaces of segregated neighborhoods. As he stated: The Troubles may be over, but the Moaning continues. Significantly, Gerry noted that his hip-hop style graffiti crew, which operates almost exclusively within the city center, includes both Catholics and Protestants. John, an 18-year old Protestant from a low-income North Belfast neighborhood whose older brother is a former member of the Ulster Young Militants,14 claimed that he could often distinguish Catholics from Protestants based on the type of sports jersey or cap worn. Such athletic attire acts as a kind of signifier for ethno-religious identity. Gaelic football and hurling are almost always associated with Catholic/Irish nationalism, while rugby and cricket are mostly linked to Protestant/Unionist pursuits, he explained. Soccer, despite its Anglophile origins, has spread to both major communities but often involves strong competing allegiances for different teams; largely depending on ones sect.15 John admitted that he and several of his friends had once attacked a Catholic youth who ventured into their neighborhood wearing the wrong jersey. However, he claimed to have largely abandoned his own paramilitary leanings in recent months after being around Catholic youth in the city center. I stopped and talked to three youths sitting together on a bench at Donegall Square two girls and a boy. As numerous skateboarders sped by on the nearby courtyard, I asked each teen about their lives. Sheila, a shy blond 17-year old Protestant girl sporting a Sex Pistols t-shirt, told me that she was huge punk rock fan. My dad used to play his punk records for me when I was little, she said. Now I listen to the music because it makes me feel good about who I am. Martin, a 16-year old lad who had grown up in a Catholic household, professed his allegiance to American rap music. Wearing a Boston
14

Celtics cap and Tupac Shakur t-shirt, Martin explained why he liked rap music so much: Its because of the gangsta image and the black lifestyle in general. Black people were oppressed and had to struggle, just like the Irish. When asked about the traditional Catholic-Protestant divide, Sheila stated that in the city center no one really cares about your religion. Martin nodded his head in agreement, adding that Catholic and Protestant labels are rarely used among youths who hang out at the square. Even though they still attend religiously segregated schools, Sheila and Martin stated that they felt absolutely no hostility towards people of other creeds or faiths. Skateboarding brings down barriers, Martin explained, whereas official school-sponsored sports remain mostly segregated and often associated with a particular sect. When I skateboard, I can hang with anyone, Martin added. When asked if they would consider marrying someone of a different faith, all three youths answered in the affirmative. Other teens at the square expressed similar views. Jewell, a punkish17-year old with small red spikes atop his otherwise black head of hair, explained that he and his friends were hanging out drinking cider and killing time. Proudly sporting a large Al Gore for President button from the 2000 U.S. election, Jewell claimed that George W. Bush and other religious fanatics had stolen that election. Those are the same kind of crazy religious people that are trying to mess things up here in Belfast, he proclaimed. Luke, 16-years old with shaggy hair and an expressed affinity for rap music, made another comparison with the U.S., noting that the Irish historical experience has a great deal in common with that of African Americans. The Irish have been the victims of discrimination, he stated. Pat, 15-years old and clad in a Metallica t-shirt, smiled and indicated his agreement. What was especially interesting is that both Luke and Pat are Protestant, while Jewell is Catholic. I had accidentally stumbled across another group of young interfaith friends. Jewell commented that he and his friends really dont care about religion anyways. Seeming a bit surprised by my line of questioning, he added, Why should I pick my friends based on religion? How stupid is that?

This is the youth wing of the loyalist paramilitary group, the Ulster Defense Association. This violent-prone group is composed of teenagers and young adults with headquarters in Belfasts Shankill neighborhood. 15 For more on the sectarian history of sports in Northern Ireland, see Sugden and Harvie (1995).

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Conclusion: Transforming Collective Identities

This article has examined the extent to which collective identities are being negotiated and transformed in Belfast, a city that has recently undergone dramatic socio-spatial changes. For decades, most residents were deprived of normal everyday contact with people from the other side of the city, leading to mutual suspicion and growing hostility. In large measure, Belfasts citizens existed in bounded geopolitical space that defined and delimited their collective identities. The city contained dual political/cultural infrastructures and institutions for years, thereby further bifurcating the socio-spatial milieu. Residents experienced a growing hardening of dichotomous collective identities as political tensions escalated during the Troubles. Eventually, the city officially restored some semblance of governmental cohesiveness, though the sociological sources of division have continued to linger. Significantly, the vast majority of teens and young adults interviewed for this study indicated that they identify (or had identified) to some extent, however limited, with Belfasts traditional bipolar categories (i.e., British/Protestants or Irish/Catholics). Most of the respondents stated that they had experienced some sense of oppositional consciousness at a certain point in their lives (particularly in their childhood or early adolescence), recognizing that their own identity had been defined in contradistinction to the urban other. In spite of major shifts in the socio-spatial status quo in recent years, a majority of respondents indicated an awareness of difference from the other major ethno-religious group, based largely on externally applied categories and labels. Certainly, various social strains resulting from years of dichotomous classification have impacted many of the young people studied. As a historically marginalized group, Irish Catholics seemed most deeply troubled by the perpetuation of negative stereotypes. Feelings of frustration and resentment for being perceived as different or second class citizens were expressed to this researcher. However, virtually all of the young people interviewed indicated some degree of dissatisfaction with predominate forms of social stratification. Even most Protestant youths expressed disapproval of continued groupbased stereotyping or discrimination based solely on ethno-religious origins. In fact, several respondents refused to apply the bipolar classification scheme to their own present-day identity, preferring another (more neutral) category such as Northern Irish.16 A few respondents preferred atheist or non-reli-

gious, apparently indicating their disapproval of sectarianism in general. By far the most common method observed for collective identity reclassification among respondents was through an expressed or tacit identification with various youth subcultures. For instance, skateboarders represent a highly popular subculture that has largely transcended traditional sectarian classification schemes. Young people that have grown up in de facto segregation are now able to interact freely in largely integrated subcultural pursuits. Punks, ravers, hip-hoppers, club kids, goths, headbangers, skinheads and other youth subcultures, though potentially problematic in certain respects (such as an increased risk for deviant or delinquent behavior), nevertheless tend to congregate in shared spaces and often interact with ethno-religious others. Many such subcultures even offer a viable ideological alternative to the ethnocentric status quo. The anarchist-tinged ideology of punk, for example, is intensely critical of any form of social exclusion or oppression, thereby attracting disaffected youth from all walks of life. The fact that such subcultures are transnational in origin, rather than overly place-specific (in contrast to many paramilitary youth organizations and violent street gangs), leads to the deconstruction of localized boundaries. At the same time, hybridization occurs as various transnational subcultural frames are synthesized with national-local interests and concerns. Rap music, for instance, was found to be particularly popular with Belfast youth who view the African American experience as a relevant frame for understanding Irelands social history. Such subcultural frames and identities effectively blur the social boundaries between Catholics and Protestants. Certainly, an acute awareness of dichotomous distinctiveness remains, but such sectarian categorization often becomes secondary or tertiary at best. In this respect, the collective identities of many young people are being transformed at least in part; with alternative subcultures beginning to overtake the more exclusively defined urban categories. One of the apparent incentives for identifying with such subcultures is the potential to receive new forms of prestige and status from significant others. Demonstrating the ability to play guitar in a heavy metal band or write elaborate graffiti, for instance, can generate subcultural respect and fame. In many respects, such subcultural capital is based on what Austin (2001) calls a prestige economy. As he notes, status and rank within subcultures (or communities of familiars) are dependent upon groupbased recognition. In effect, young people are rewarded for abandoning spatially restricted ideologies

16

There is actually some statistical evidence indicating that a Northern Irish identity is emerging as an alternative to the traditional Catholic-Irish or Protestant-British classifications (Ginty, Muldoon, Ferguson 2007:8).

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and instead identifying with spatially expansive subcultures. Such subcultural capital can be transformed potentially into financial capital too, adding to the allure of collective identity reconfiguration. For instance, club DJs, rock musicians, artists, and fashion designers may benefit financially from subcultural recognition and related social ties. Rather than existing in fixed ghettoized stasis, many Belfast youth are using space productively to overcome traditional social constraints. In this respect, they possess social agency. Having found alternative spatial domains in which to interact, they exist outside the hegemonic purview of any single groups territorial control. Like young pioneers, they migrate daily into non-adversarial borderlands (and away from segregated neighborhoods) that allow for wide-ranging forms of interaction, expression, and consumption. Personal contact with the urban other is not only permitted in such spaces, but also often encouraged. Though many young people reportedly bring their inter-group biases with them as they enter neutral spaces, they often express regret about possessing (or having possessed) such attitudes. In this respect, hegemonic forms of classification have been diluted among youth, though not overturned completely. Interpersonal contact in the shared spaces observed include not only youth from divergent ethno-religious backgrounds, but also different subcultures. For in-

stance, it was noteworthy that Donegall Square, the Front Page, the Venue, and other sites featured a wide assortment of punks, ravers, goths, headbangers, hip-hoppers, and others who interacted and mingled in mostly friendly fashion. Essentially, intersubcultural neo-tribes17 have formed that appear to reflect the eclectic hybridity of post-modern identities of Belfast youth. 18 In sharp contrast to traditional ethno-religious urban categories, neo-tribal identities tend to be experimental and transitory. As Bennett has noted, neo-tribalism allows for the shifting nature of youths musical and stylistic preferences and the essential fluidity of youth cultural groups (1999:614). The negotiation of new collective identities within Belfast is buttressed by a growing fusion of global popular culture with local issues of concern. Belfast youth subcultures and related neo-tribes are not merely the passive products of globalization, but rather agency-laden groups serving as communitybased laboratories for cultural syncretism and reconciliation. As new identities are sifted and embraced by youth in shared urban spaces, traditional dichotomous classification schemes become less relevant. Indeed, many teenagers and young adults in Belfast are reinventing their collective identities and in the process radically reconfiguring the sociospatial milieu of the city.

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17 18

Andy Bennett (1999) coined this term, drawing on theories originally enunciated by the French sociologist Michel Maffesoli. For more on the modern phenomenon of youth hybridity, see Nilan and Feixa (2006).

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About the Author

Prof. David Drissel David Drissel is an associate professor of social sciences at Iowa Central Community College in Fort Dodge, Iowa. His undergraduate work included a double-major in political science and sociology and his graduate studies focused on comparative politics, international relations, and social change and development. Research interests include the global politics of Internet governance, transnational social movements, post-communist/postsocialist countries in transition, computer-mediated communication and society, youth subcultures and social deviance, and the utilization of interactive media and popular culture in mobilizing social networks. Professor Drissel is a two-time Fulbright Scholar who has studied extensively in China and the Czech/Slovak Republics, among many other countries. He is an alumnus of the Oxford (University) Roundtable in Great Britain, where he presented a paper on Internet governance. A frequent speaker and conference participant, he has had several papers published in various academic journals and compilations.

THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF DIVERSITY IN ORGANISATIONS, COMMUNITIES AND NATIONS EDITORS Mary Kalantzis, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, USA. Paul James, RMIT University, Australia EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD
Ien Ang, University of Western Sydney, Australia. Samuel Aroni, University of California, Los Angeles, USA. Duane Champagne, University of California, Los Angeles, USA. Guosheng Y. Chen, RMIT University, Melbourne, Australia. Jock Collins, University of Technology, Sydney, Australia. Bill Cope, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, USA. Heather Marion D'Cruz, Deakin University, Geelong, Australia. James Early, Smithsonian Institution, Washington, DC, USA. Denise Ega-Kuehne, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, USA. Amareswar Galla, Australian National University, Canberra, Australia. Barry Gills, University of Newcastle, UK. Jackie Huggins, University of Queensland, Australia. Andrew Jakubowicz, University of Technology, Sydney, Australia. Ha Jingxiong, Central University of Nationalities, Beijing, China. Peter McLaren, University of California, Los Angeles, USA. Joe Melcher, Xavier University of Louisiana, New Orleans, USA. Greg Meyjes, Solidaris Intercultural Services L.L.C, Falls Church, VA, USA. Walter Mignolo, Duke University, USA. Brendan O'Leary, University of Pennsylvania, USA. Aihwa Ong, University of California, Berkeley, USA. Peter Phipps, RMIT University, Melbourne, Australia. Ronald Prins, Managing Director, Bos en Lommer Neighbourhood Council, The Netherlands. Peter Sellars, Theatre, Opera and Film Director. Michael Shapiro, University of Hawai'i, USA. David S. Silverman, Valley City State University, North Dakota, USA. Martijn F.E. Stegge, Diversity Platform, City of Amsterdam, The Netherlands. Geoff Stokes, Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation, Deakin University, Melbourne, Australia. Terry Threadgold, Cardiff University, Wales, UK. Mililani Trask, Indigenous Expert to the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues for the Economic Council of the UN Assembly, Hawaii, USA. Marij Urlings, Dean, School of Health Inholland University, Amsterdam-Diemen, The Netherlands. Joanna van Antwerpen, Director, Research and Statistics, City of Amsterdam, The Netherlands. Grethe van Geffen, Seba Cultuurmanagement, Amsterdam, The Netherlands. Rob Walker, Keele University, UK. Ning Wang, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China. Owens Wiwa, African Environmental and Human Development Agency, Toronto, Canada.

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