Quickly, Carefully, and Generously

The Necessary Steps

for a
Responsible Withdrawal
from Iraq

Report of the Task Force

for a Responsible Withdrawal from Iraq
June 2008

Preface by U.S. Representative James P. McGovern (MA-03)

 Quickly, Carefully, and Generously

The Necessary Steps

for a
Responsible Withdrawal
from Iraq

Report of the
Task Force for a Responsible Withdrawal from Iraq
June 2008

Preface by
U.S. Representative James P. McGovern (MA-03)

Commonwealth Institute
Cambridge, Massachusetts
 © Commonwealth Institute, 2008

ISBN 1-881677-14-1

Print copies of this report are available for $7 ($12 to overseas addresses)
by check or money order mailed to the Commonwealth Institute at P.O.
Box 398105, Cambridge, MA 02139. The report is available online at
www.masspeaceaction.org, www.merip.org and www.comw.org/pda/.

2 quickly, carefully, and generously

Acknowledgments

This report reflects the contributions from many people of ideas, advice, facilities,
labor, and other resources. Ideas and analysis came from many sources. We are espe-
cially grateful to the members of the expert Advisory Group (listed at the end of this
report), most of whom traveled a considerable distance to spend a long day in our work-
shop. Others took time to elaborate ideas and analysis in memoranda. We thank Susan
Hackley, managing director of the Program on Negotiation at the Harvard Law School,
and Eileen Babbitt, director of the International Negotiation and Conflict Resolution
Program at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, for their help
in the planning stages. Steven Bloomfield, executive director of the Weatherhead Center
for International Affairs at Harvard University, generously hosted the workshop. Jessica
von Felbert, intern at the Project on Defense Alternatives, arrived just at the right time
from her home in Germany to play numerous essential roles in making the workshop
happen. Angela Kelly, outreach coordinator at Massachusetts Peace Action,  outlined
the proceedings on easel boards for workshop participants.  Kate Cell was a thorough
and thoughtful rapporteur. We are indebted to Helena Cobban for inspiring the title of
this report with her phrase “speedy, orderly, total, and generous” used to characterize
the manner in which complete withdrawal of US troops from Iraq should take place.
Finally, we thank Henri Barkey, Eric Davis, Cindy Buhl, Carl Conetta, Raed Jarrar,
Joshua Landis, Marc Lynch, Caleb Rossiter, and Cliff Stammerman for their helpful
comments on earlier drafts.
— The Task Force Organizing Committee

Shelagh Foreman Chris Toensing

Massachusetts Peace Action Middle East Research and Information Project
11 Garden Street 1500 Massachusetts Ave. NW, Suite 119
Cambridge, MA 02138 Washington, DC 20005
(617) 354-2169 (202) 223-3677

Charles Knight John Maher

Project on Defense Alternatives Cambridge, MA
The Commonwealth Institute
P.O. Box 398105
Cambridge, MA 02139
(617) 547-4474

a responsible withdrawal from iraq 3

Preface

I have long thought the United States needs to withdraw its military forces and
presence from Iraq. During many debates in the US Congress, I put forward
and supported proposals for a withdrawal of our forces that would take place
in a safe and orderly manner.
But I always knew that the removal of US military forces was only part
of the picture, and not all that would be required. What else does the United
States need to be doing so that our military departure is done in a way that
lessens the risk of a bloodbath and regional chaos?
In October 2007, I met with several Massachusetts friends, and I posed this
question to them. They volunteered to explore this matter with Middle East
policy experts and scholars and to pull together a conference where the many
issues surrounding a withdrawal could be discussed and debated.
And they kept their word. On March 7, 2008, I attended a roundtable con-
ference at Harvard University’s Weatherhead Center for International Affairs,
and I saw and heard an amazing discussion of the many facets of a US with-
drawal and how it might affect the Iraqi people, the people of the neighboring
region, and the future of US and international relations with Iraq.
Here is the report—one of the most comprehensive efforts that I have seen
so far to address the diplomatic, economic and political efforts that should
accompany a US military withdrawal from Iraq. Elegant in its brevity, it raises
the questions all policymakers need to come to grips with as we move toward
moving US military forces out of Iraq over the coming months.

— US Representative James P. McGovern (MA-03)

May 15, 2008

4 quickly, carefully, and generously

Executive Summary

The Task Force for a Responsible Withdrawal from Iraq was formed to
answer this charge:

The President has announced that a complete military withdrawal

from Iraq will take place over the next 12-18 months. What con-
crete policy steps can the US government take, immediately and
during the withdrawal, to encourage peace and stability in Iraq?

We do not underestimate the challenges posed by this charge. Iraq is a trauma-

tized and politically fragmented country. Neighboring states may be tempted
to intervene in Iraq’s internal conflicts to protect their own interests. The cred-
ibility of the United States is badly eroded by a war that most of the world
opposed.
The United States and the international community bear a responsibility to
contribute to the alleviation of suffering and the advancement of stability and
peace in Iraq. It was the consensus of our expert Advisory Group that there is
little the United States can do to achieve those goals as long as it maintains an
open-ended military presence in Iraq. In the context of withdrawal, however,
there are many measures the United States and international community can
take to maximize the chances for progress. In this report, we propose a set of
initiatives that, taken in the proper sequence, can help to create the conditions
for ending Iraq’s long national nightmare.

➤➤To make its intentions clear prior to withdrawal, the United States can
and should:
• Seek a short-term renewal of the UN mandate instead of a bilateral
US-Iraqi security agreement.
• Announce support for a new UN mandate to take effect in 2009 that
will legitimate and define international participation in Iraqi reconcili-
ation, reconstruction, and humanitarian aid.
• Signal that all of Iraq’s neighbors, including Syria and Iran, will hence-
forth be treated as partners in promoting stability.

a responsible withdrawal from iraq 5

 • Support the establishment of an International Support Group for Iraq.
• Inform the Maliki government that the United States will soon
announce a timetable for withdrawal and will shift toward a stance
that emphasizes neutrality and non-interference in Iraqi politics.

➤➤Subsequent to the announcement of a timetable for withdrawal, to

promote reconciliation in Iraq the United States can and should:
• Take vigorous diplomatic steps to stem the flow of arms and foreign
fighters feeding the civil war and communal violence.
• Assist Iraqi actors and the UN in convening a pan-Iraqi conference
on reconciliation, backed by an expanded writ for a UN mission in
Iraq. Among other things, that conference should seek an immediate
ceasefire and redress of the losses of refugees and internally displaced
persons.

➤➤On the international level, the United States can and should:
• Immediately re-engage Syria and Iran in non-coercive “give-and-take”
diplomacy addressing bilateral issues.
• Engage with Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey seeking their support
for peace and economic recovery efforts in Iraq.
• Work within the International Support Group to encourage Iraq’s six
neighbors to promote peace and stability in Iraq and the region.
• Strengthen the provisions of the International Compact with Iraq for
reparations and debt relief.

➤➤With regard to security, the United States can and should:

• Identify likely flashpoints and, when requested by Iraqis, factor them
into the planning for transitional US military activities during the
period of withdrawal.
• In anticipation that a blue-helmeted peacekeeping force will be needed
and requested by Iraq when the US withdraws, support the UN in
organizing and funding it.
• Assist the UN and donor states in creating disarmament, demobiliza-
tion, and reintegration programs.

6 quickly, carefully, and generously

 ➤➤With regard to economic and humanitarian issues, the United States can
and should:
• Cease pressure on Iraq to open up its oil sector and other parts of its
economy.
• Support the UN High Commissioner for Refugees in better addressing
the plight of Iraqi refugees and internally displaced persons.
• Give aid to Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon earmarked for the care of
Iraqi refugees.
• Support a plan to fund refugee resettlement in third countries.
• Donate to an Iraq Development Fund that bankrolls a labor-inten-
sive public works program and helps to fix the broken food rationing
system.
• Help to strengthen Iraqi NGOs, with special attention to women’s
groups.

In sum, the United States can and should: quickly carry out a full military with-
drawal from Iraq, carefully pursue diplomatic remedies for the Iraq crisis, and
generously give to help rebuild Iraq in the long run. The responsibilities are not
America’s alone, but America must lead.

a responsible withdrawal from iraq 7

Introduction

The war in Iraq, begun as a US-led invasion in March 2003, is now in its
sixth year. For both the United States and Iraq, it has been an immensely
destructive and costly conflict. Over 4,000 American soldiers have been
killed, and an additional 30,000 wounded, many with severely disabling inju-
ries. The great majority of these casualties came after President George W.
Bush declared an end to “major combat” on May 1, 2003.
According to the most conservative estimates, at least 83,000 Iraqi non-
combatants have died in the continuing conflict since the US invasion, and the
actual number is probably in the hundreds of thousands.1 The UN High Com-
missioner for Refugees estimates that perhaps two million Iraqis have fled their
country and that a further 2.7 million have left their homes for safer locales
within Iraq.2 Even using the most conservative figures, therefore, nearly one-
fifth of Iraq’s population has been killed or displaced by the war. In addition,
the social and economic costs have been tremendous. To cite a few: crude oil
production is below pre-war levels, Baghdad receives an average of only 7.5
hours of electricity per day, unemployment estimates range dismally between
25 and 40 percent, and half the doctors registered in Iraq before the invasion
are presumed to have left the country.3 These statistics bespeak two other great
costs of the invasion to Iraq: the collapse of the state and the resulting politi-
cal fragmentation, which is often expressed in sectarian or ethnic terms and is
manifested in a complex and ever shifting civil war.
The war has been economically costly to the United States as well. A recent
study by Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz and Linda Bilmes estimates the total
cost of the war to US taxpayers may reach $3 trillion when long-term veteran
care and assistance is factored in.

1. For the low-end estimate of 83,000, see the website Iraq Body Count at http://www.iraqbodycount.org/
database/ (accessed on April 27, 2008). Iraq Body Count bases its numbers on two or more press reports
and records only the violent deaths of non-combatants. Because the press does not report all such deaths, the
actual figure is probably much higher. A study based on fieldwork in Iraq found that there had likely been
over 650,000 “excess deaths” between the invasion and July 2006. Gilbert Burnham, Riyadh Lafta, Shan-
non Doocy, and Les Roberts, “Mortality After the 2003 Invasion of Iraq: A Cross-Sectional Cluster Sample
Survey,” The Lancet (October 11, 2006).
2. See the website of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees at http://www.unhcr.org/iraq.html (accessed on
April 27, 2008).
3. These statistics are taken from the Brookings Institution’s Iraq Index, which is updated weekly and can
be viewed online at http://www.brookings.edu/saban/~/media/Files/Centers/Saban/Iraq%20Index/index.pdf
(accessed April 27, 2008).

8 quickly, carefully, and generously

 In the face of this grim record, US officials, such as Gen. David Petraeus and
Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker in their April 2008 testimony before Con-
gress, have repeatedly told Americans that the only way to pursue peace in Iraq
is to continue prosecuting the war.
There is, of course, an alternative: to withdraw US troops while pursuing
a diplomatic and political solution to Iraq’s civil conflict. Others have often
made the case for that option, and this report does not restate it.4 Rather, we
are concerned to specify what can and should be done to minimize violence in
Iraq and soothe regional tensions as the United States leaves. We are also con-
cerned to implement alternative policies in genuine consultation and partner-
ship with Iraqis.
The departure of US troops does not—and must not—mean that the United
States abandons its responsibility to Iraq. National interests and morality
demand that the United States do everything in its power to contribute to
the alleviation of suffering and the advancement of stability and peace in the
country. The idea that an open-ended military deployment can bring progress
in Iraq is an illusion. But there are many measures the United States can take,
in the context of withdrawal, to maximize the chances for that progress.
Specifically, the United States can and should undertake initiatives to:
• Address the sources of conflict inside Iraq,
• Ameliorate the effects of conflict,
• Support peaceful conflict resolution,
• Improve the prospects for regional and international cooperation,
• Reduce potentials for regional conflict, and
• Enhance Iraqi security.

In March 2008, the Task Force for a Responsible Withdrawal from Iraq con-
vened 14 experts on Iraq and the region at the Weatherhead Center for Inter-
national Affairs at Harvard University to answer this charge:
The President has announced that a complete military withdrawal
from Iraq will take place over the next 12-18 months. What con-
crete policy steps can the US government take, immediately and
during the withdrawal, to encourage peace and stability in Iraq?

4. Four such cases are: Brian Katulis, Lawrence Korb, and Peter Juul, Strategic Reset: Reclaiming Control of
US Strategy in the Middle East (Washington, DC: Center for American Progress, June 2007); Barry Posen,
“Exit Strategy: How to Disengage From Iraq in 18 Months,” Boston Review (January/February 2006); Carl
Conetta, “400 Days and Out: A Strategy for Resolving the Iraq Impasse,” Project on Defense Alternatives
Briefing Memo 34 (July 19, 2005); and Charles V. Pena, “Getting Out: Our Strategic Interest,” TomPaine.
com, November 22, 2005.

a responsible withdrawal from iraq 9

 Our participants were diverse, but united in their considered analysis that
in Iraq the presence of US forces is an important cause of conflict and violence
(though not the only one) and that complete withdrawal is not merely desir-
able, but essential for durable progress.
There was no wishful thinking: no one believed that US withdrawal will
lead automatically to a peaceful, prosperous Iraq, or that the Iraqi civil war
will necessarily end when the US military pulls out. On the other hand, our
participants did not accept as a given the common worst-case scenario of civil-
ian massacres and military interventions by Iraq’s neighbors, leading to an
even worse humanitarian crisis, the breakup of Iraq, and/or endemic regional
warfare.
There was also a sense of humility: the credibility of the United States is
badly compromised by the Bush administration’s blunders, and, in many ways,
the ability of the United States to affect what happens in Iraq will diminish
upon withdrawal. Yet withdrawal also opens up possibilities that do not exist
at present, and will not exist as long as the United States is in Iraq.
In the course of the March 7 workshop, and in prior and subsequent con-
sultations and literature reviews, we compiled a set of initiatives for meeting
US and international responsibilities to Iraq, beginning with an early and expe-
ditious removal of US military forces and bases and their associated private
contractors from the country. Several of the initiatives outlined below can
and should be taken independent of a US decision to withdraw. In the main,
however, we believe the initiatives will work best when they can be imple-
mented together as a package in concert with a plan for US withdrawal.
We acknowledge the great difficulties for policymakers facing the present
situation in Iraq. Many of the initiatives enumerated below are subject to
uncertainties and contingencies that will bedevil the best of plans and inten-
tions. That said, we must do the best we can with the hand we have been dealt,
considering the thousands of lives at stake.

10 quickly, carefully, and generously

Section I
The Starting Point

The present UN mandate for the Multinational Force in Iraq expires on

December 31. In November 2007, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and
President George W. Bush announced that they would not seek a renewal of
that mandate and instead were negotiating a bilateral “strategic framework
agreement” which will include a status of forces agreement. They hope to
announce the precise terms in July 2008. This bilateral agreement—because
it is not a “treaty”—may not be subject to formal Senate approval. Yet it is
expected to commit the United States to keeping substantial forces in Iraq into
the next presidency with no specified end date. The agreement could therefore
have the effect of institutionalizing the US intervention in Iraq while sidelining
Congress, the next president, and the international community.

Initiative: Cease negotiations on the “strategic framework agreement,” including

basing rights, in favor of seeking a simple and short-term renewal of the
current UN mandate.
The duration of the renewed mandate should be short enough to preclude com-
placency, but long enough to allow negotiation over a longer-term arrange-
ment predicated upon the scenario of US withdrawal.5

Initiative: Begin work on negotiating a new and substantially different UN

mandate reflecting a clear timeline for withdrawal of US troops and
providing for internationalization of responsibility for aid and support to
Iraq, as specified in the other initiatives below.
Not all international initiatives relating to Iraq can be part of the new UN
mandate, but it should be as comprehensive as possible and serve as the

5. Legislation (HR 5626) was introduced in Congress in March 2008 by Representatives William Delahunt

(D-MA) and Rosa DeLauro (D-CT) providing that any agreement committing or authorizing US forces to
engage in combat on behalf of the government of Iraq be approved by Congress and urging the renewal of
the current UN mandate.

a responsible withdrawal from iraq 11

 primary legitimizing and defining instrument for international participation
in Iraqi reconstruction beginning in 2009. At the outset of talks about the
new mandate, the United States should inform the UN Secretariat and Security
Council that there will be a transformation of the overall US posture in Iraq.
The United States should announce its strong support for a new framework
emphasizing the role of regional states, the UN, and other international agen-
cies. The United States must signal that, in respect to relations with Iraq, it is
ready to play a peer role within the international community.6
Of necessity, such a new UN mandate would provide for a continued US
troop presence as the scheduled withdrawal takes place over a period of 12–18
months.

Initiative: Signal to neighboring states that the United States will henceforth
regard all of them as partners in promoting regional stability by ceasing
hostile rhetoric toward Syria and Iran and exploring a rapprochement with
both states.
The United States should also refrain from referring to Iraq as a “model” for
the region or as the main “front” in the war on terror.

Initiative: Support the establishment, as part of the existing International

Compact with Iraq, of an International Support Group comprising the
five permanent Security Council members, Iraq’s six neighbors, and a
representative of the UN Secretary General.
Initial aims of the International Support Group would include:
• Agreement on a code of conduct for outside parties’ relations with Iraq,
emphasizing the principle of non-interference, including commitment to
stop the flow of foreign fighters and arms into Iraq;
• Agreement on common goals and compromises supportive of Iraq
stabilization;
• Support for a reinvigorated internal Iraqi reconciliation process.

6. A majority of Iraqi parliamentarians signed a letter in 2007 calling for a renewed UN mandate that includes
a provision for withdrawal of foreign troops.

12 quickly, carefully, and generously

Initiative: Communicate clearly to the Maliki government that US will soon be
announcing a timetable for full withdrawal and will shift toward a stance
that emphasizes greater neutrality and non-interference in Iraqi politics.
Such communication may motivate the Maliki government to consider moving
toward forming a true national unity government and seeking accommodation
with groups that feel disenfranchised by the post-Saddam political transition.
Most importantly, the United States will have signaled its intent to remove
its forces and, in support of national reconciliation and unity, shift toward a
stance that emphasizes greater neutrality and non-interference.7

7. The International Crisis Group was an early advocate of the idea that “the Iraqi government and security
forces cannot be treated as privileged allies to be bolstered; they are simply one among many parties to the
conflict.” See International Crisis Group, After Baker-Hamilton: What to Do in Iraq (Amman/Brussels,
December 2006) and the expansion upon the above point in International Crisis Group, Iraq After the Surge
II: The Need for a New Political Strategy (Baghdad/Istanbul/Damascus/Brussels, April 2008). See also Ma-
rina Ottoway et al, The New Middle East (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
2008), p. 33.

a responsible withdrawal from iraq 13

Section II
Toward Iraqi National Reconciliation

Though national reconciliation has long been an official goal of US

policy in Iraq, successive Iraqi governments have notably failed to make much
progress toward that end. Two important reasons are that many Iraqis see the
United States as 1) an occupying power to be resisted by armed force and 2) a
meddler that plays favorites among Iraqi political factions.8 Thus the US pres-
ence fuels the civil war that has been a reality of Iraqi life since 2005.
With the announcement of US withdrawal, however, it becomes possible
to envision a process for meaningful national reconciliation—the kind of rec-
onciliation that must come to pass if Iraq is to avoid a future of intermittent
internal conflict.
It is important to acknowledge that the current US mission of “standing
up” Iraqi forces under the command of the present Iraqi government does not
serve national reconciliation. Only a minority of the units of the new Iraqi
army can be accurately described as “national” with professional leadership
and loyalties. Most units are closely allied with, and may even be peopled
with, regional or partisan militias. Other security forces, in particular the Iraqi
National Police, are thoroughly infiltrated by militias. Too often, the new Iraqi
security forces have behaved as combatants in the civil war.9

Initiative: Take steps to stem the flow of arms and foreign fighters feeding the
civil war and communal violence.
Iraq is awash in small arms and ammunition, but there are worthwhile steps to
be taken to stem the flow. The United States must cease the transfer of funds,
weapons, and military expertise to the security forces of the present Iraqi gov-
ernment, pending the rapid establishment of a security mechanism under UN
supervision. Arms control must also be central to the agenda of the Inter-

8. For arguments to this effect, see Steven Simon, “The Price of the Surge: How US Strategy Is Hastening Iraq’s
Demise,” Foreign Affairs (May/June 2008).
9. See Simon and also the International Crisis Group reports cited above.

14 quickly, carefully, and generously

 national Support Group, which will seek to curb arms flows from unofficial
sources, such as cross-border smuggling (whether state-supported or not), and
to block the entry of non-Iraqi militants into Iraq.
Establishing that the United States will no longer privilege particular fac-
tions in Iraq, as well as no longer supplying arms and training to forces who
may be loyal primarily to subnational groups, will help motivate all of Iraq’s
factions to seek a national accord. In particular, it will be a key confidence-
building measure for those factions who have been excluded to varying degrees
from the post-Saddam political transition.

Initiative: Assist Iraqi actors and the UN in convening a pan-Iraqi conference to

declare a ceasefire, resolve key points of difference, and move toward a new
national accord. Back expanding the writ of a UN mission in Iraq to address
governance, development, and security, and give it the resources to do so.
Such a pan-Iraqi conference should proceed pursuant to a UN Security Council
resolution, which would authorize the secretary-general to name a special
envoy to preside over the conference and report back at intervals to the Security
Council. The existing UN mission can be the core of the new special envoy’s
office, and many current UN efforts, such as those pertaining to the status of
Kirkuk, can be folded into the conference proceedings if they have not already
been concluded.
All relevant Iraqi players, except al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia, should be
invited to attend the summit or, much more likely, series of summits. Ideally,
the summits should also include civil society actors, such as women’s groups.
The immediate focus of the conference might be a ceasefire with the option to
extend the time frame annually.
The ceasefire should seek to encompass all armed agents, inside and outside
government, and consider the questions of amnesty and release of prisoners.10
At present, there may be as many as 50,000 Iraqis detained by the Iraqi secu-
rity forces or the US military. Beyond the ceasefire, the conference should seek
the widest possible range of Iraqi opinion and then endeavor to build consen-
sus on what kind and what amount of international security assistance should
be sought.

10. We do not imagine that this ceasefire could or would include al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia. Those al-Qaeda
elements that do not depart Iraq following the US withdrawal may attempt to derail national reconciliation
efforts, but, if those efforts are as inclusive and comprehensive as we recommend, al-Qaeda will fail.

a responsible withdrawal from iraq 15

 We do not presume to prescribe the shape of an Iraqi national accord, but
the experience of the post-Saddam era teaches that, at a minimum, such an
accord will have to address the following core issues:
• Revitalization of efforts to revise the 2005 constitution;
• Federalism, including the issue of Kirkuk;
• Provisions for the eventual disarmament and demobilization of militias;
• De-Baathification; and
• Disposition of oil revenues.
Iraqi consultations may need a dedicated UN expert support team to provide
guidance on a variety of issues. The UN will need to organize experts available
in real time to support the negotiation process. Parallel to official efforts, non-
official “Track II” initiatives will likely be essential for building confidence and
testing a broad range of new ideas.11

Initiative: Place the provisioning of Iraqi army units under UN supervision.

The international community must signal clearly that future international
assistance to Iraqi security forces will be available only to truly professional
and national forces. The United States can begin this process immediately by
transferring responsibility for provisioning the Iraqi army to the special repre-
sentative of the UN Security Council who will henceforth condition provision
to particular units  upon their meeting standards of professionalism, respect
for rule of law, and non-sectarian composition. It will be the responsibility of
the special representative of the UN Security Council to certify that there is no
leakage of arms to individuals or militias. The United States must support the
new international mission for assistance to Iraqi security forces (and its stan-
dards) during the transition period when such assistance is needed.

Initiative: Support the addressing of “sectarian cleansing” and “ethnic

cleansing,” and the redress of losses sustained by refugees and internally
displaced persons.
Many abandoned houses in Baghdad and other cities have been expropri-
ated by militias, which are using the proceeds from their newly acquired “real

11. An example of promising Track II diplomacy is the 2007/2008 Helsinki meetings of a broad range of Iraqi
leaders organized by Padraig O’Malley and hosted by the Crisis Management Initiative (www.cmi.fi).

16 quickly, carefully, and generously

estate” to buy weapons and influence. The process of returning these proper-
ties to their lawful owners or compensating the owners for their losses will
undoubtedly be long and painful, but there should be no delay in introducing
the topic into national reconciliation talks. The longer this problem festers, the
harder it will be to solve. Broaching the subject now may deter militias from
seizing further property and making the problem worse.
The United States should fund a substantial portion of the UN special envoy
office’s budget to ensure adequate staff and technical support for an arduous
mission of unknown duration. In private, the State Department should use its
ties with various Iraqi actors to encourage their good-faith participation in the
national reconciliation talks, and strongly encourage the US allies among Iraq’s
neighbors to do the same. In public, the White House and State Department
should voice generic support for  all peaceful initiatives for  resolving Iraq’s
political disputes that are consistent with the Iraqi constitution.

a responsible withdrawal from iraq 17

Section III
Toward Regional and
International Cooperation

Some have expressed concerns that US withdrawal from Iraq would be

followed by an oil and land grab on the part of Iraq’s neighbors. Others worry
that the civil conflict in Iraq will spill over its borders and embroil the entire
region in war. But several factors weigh against such outcomes.12 For all of
Iraq’s neighbors, the cost of occupying pieces of Iraq would be prohibitive.
Moreover, all the neighboring countries share with the United States and the
international community a strong interest in a stable, unified Iraq—though
they may have different visions for what that means. There are a number of
steps that might be taken to further reduce the risks.
The diplomatic challenge before the United States and international com-
munity is first to secure the complete non-intervention of neighboring states
in Iraqi affairs, particularly in any ongoing internecine conflict, and second,
to nurture a substantial international commitment to long-term Iraqi recovery
from its decades of war, sanctions, and authoritarian rule. To meet this chal-
lenge, the United States will need a new policy in the broader region, particu-
larly in respect to Iran and Syria.

Initiative: Restore normal diplomatic relations with Syria. Begin talks with Syria
and Iran regarding bilateral issues.
The United States must pursue a more constructive relationship with Syria and
Iran based on mutual respect and traditional diplomatic principles of “give-
and-take.” The scope of renewed engagement with both countries should be
wide-ranging, in order to afford the United States maximum leverage in talks
about the mutual benefits of principled non-interference in Iraq.13 Bilateral

12. See F. Gregory Gause, “Iraq 2012: The Regional Context,” testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, April 3, 2008.
13. Defense Secretary Robert Gates said before an audience of retired diplomats that “I sort of sign up” with
New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman, who wrote recently about Iran: “When you have leverage,
talk. When you don’t have leverage, get some—by creating economic, diplomatic, or military incentives and

18 quickly, carefully, and generously

 talks with Iran might encompass some of the components of a “grand bargain”
that have been outlined many times before.14 Talks of this scope would also
need to address what else Syria and Iran could do, beyond pledging non-inter-
ference in Iraq, to calm regional tensions.

Initiative: Engage Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey in bilateral talks to

emphasize the mutual benefits of playing a constructive role in Iraq.
Talks with Iran and Syria should be part of a vigorous series of “structured
engagements” with neighboring states and US allies Jordan, Saudi Arabia,
and Turkey. The engagements may need to be sequenced in particular ways to
ensure maximum confidence; Iran, for example, may need to be reassured of
Turkish pledges of non-intervention in northern Iraq. The United States should
strongly encourage Turkey to allow processes of Iraqi reconciliation to resolve
the question of Kirkuk. Bilateral talks with the neighbor states will also afford
the United States forums where it can emphasize and demonstrate its commit-
ment to an expanded International Compact with Iraq under UN auspices.15

Initiative: Work within the International Support Group to encourage Iraq’s six
neighbors to undertake concrete measures to promote peace and stability in
Iraq and the region in the longer term.
The group of Iraq’s six neighbors should work together to:
• Enact confidence- and security-building measures including measures of
transparency and routine information sharing regarding their relations
with Iraq;
• Establish a standing forum for sharing and addressing security concerns
related to developments in Iraq;

pressures that the other side finds too tempting or frightening to ignore.” Washington Post, May 15, 2008.
Gates was a member of the Iraq Study Group that recommended diplomatic engagement with Iran, suggest-
ing that he prefers incentives that Iran would find “tempting.”
14. See Atlantic Council of the United States, Thinking Beyond the Stalemate in US-Iranian Relations (Washing-
ton, DC, July 2001). See also Flynt Leverett, “All or Nothing: The Case for a US-Iranian ‘Grand Bargain’,”
testimony before the House Committee on Government Oversight and Reform, Subcommittee on National
Security and Foreign Affairs, November 7, 2007.
15. The International Compact with Iraq can be viewed online at http://www.iraqcompact.org/.

a responsible withdrawal from iraq 19

 • Counter, through legislation and statements by political and civil society
leaders, any efforts at incitement of religious, sectarian, or ethnic
animosities;
• Redouble their efforts to control their borders with Iraq, including rigor-
ous programs to crack down on recipients of smuggled Iraqi oil and any
remaining infiltration of foreign fighters.

Initiative: Back and strengthen the provisions of the International Compact with
Iraq for debt and reparations relief.
Along with Western countries and international financial institutions, Saudi
Arabia and other Gulf states can play a key role in underwriting Iraqi eco-
nomic development by forgiving the debt bequeathed to Iraq by the deposed
regime of Saddam Hussein.16 Kuwait can help significantly by canceling or
deferring payments of reparations for the 1990 Iraqi invasion ordered by Sadd-
am’s regime. Further investment and financial aid initiatives are likely to be
dependent on progress toward national reconciliation in Iraq. We offer con-
crete suggestions for these investment and aid initiatives below in the section,
“Toward Iraqi Recovery.”
We are not naïve about the magnitude and difficulty of the endeavors
described above, but, in the event of withdrawal and revised approaches to
Iran and Syria, the diplomatic arena is also where the United States will have
the greatest ­leverage.

16. The best source of information on this “odious debt” is the website of the debt relief group Jubilee Iraq:
http://www.jubileeiraq.org/blog/.

20 quickly, carefully, and generously

Section IV
Toward Security

We do not discount the dangers flowing from US military withdrawal

from Iraq. The US military is by far the greatest military power in Iraq at
present, and its departure will inevitably be destabilizing to some degree. The
US military occupation of Iraq is a major cause of violence and instability,
however, and it cannot be the cure.
Hope for restoration of peace and security in Iraq starts with removing
the one cause of violence the United States can completely control—the US
military presence. The US ability to channel other vectors of chaos in Iraq is
admittedly limited. Ultimately, Iraq’s chances for long-term peace and pros-
perity rest on the success of national reconciliation, the non-interference of
external actors, and the help of the United States and international community
in achieving comprehensive economic and social recovery. This fact does not,
however, absolve the United States and international community of the respon-
sibility to take what additional steps they can in the security realm.

Initiative: Identify likely flashpoints and factor them into the planning for
transitional US military activities during the period of withdrawal.
The United States has a responsibility to stage its withdrawal in a manner that
affords maximum protection to the lives of American soldiers and to the lives
and livelihoods of Iraqis. To the extent compatible with a safe and orderly
withdrawal and when Iraqis request support, US commanders should attempt
to concentrate  remaining  patrols and “street presence” in  neighborhoods
where further acts of “ethnic cleansing” or “sectarian cleansing” are thought
likely.  Kirkuk may be one area where a US military presence could help to
suppress violence. The Adhamiyya neighborhood in East Baghdad may be
another. 

a responsible withdrawal from iraq 21

Initiative: Explore possibilities for a blue-helmeted peacekeeping force.
Iraqis may determine that their security can be aided by the deployment of
UN peacekeepers. Yet blue-helmeted forces cannot be effective in Iraq absent
a relatively stable ceasefire in the country. The political track is therefore
paramount. Even then, we should expect spoilers to be active in targeting
blue-helmeted forces as well as Iraqis whom the forces are there to protect.
Blue-helmeted forces will therefore need to have both a robust mandate of
force protection and the requisite equipment, such as armored vehicles. It will
be a high-risk mission and there will likely be casualties. But in contrast to the
current situation, the mission and legitimacy of blue-helmeted forces will be
clear to all. A separate fund should be created for the purpose of maintaining
them with contributions from the United States, Europe, the Gulf states, and
other donors.
Should it prove possible to deploy peacekeepers, it will be vital to do it right,
given Iraq’s unhappy past experiences with UN intervention in the sanctions
era. An international force should be readied to perform selected security func-
tions. Different nations would assume distinct security tasks, governed by a
clear UN mandate and strong status of forces agreements. It is vital to delimit
the tasks of peacekeeping forces in close consultation with Iraqis, but their
tasks might include:
• Minimally, a protection force for the UN mission and diplomatic zone;
• Border patrol; and
• Forces to protect discrete areas.
The UN might consider securing the commitment of a third country to
assume the task of training of Iraqi army units that remain intact after the US
withdrawal and such additional security forces as the Iraqis choose to create
pursuant to a national compact. Transport and logistics support are other tasks
that a capable third country might assume under the UN aegis.

Initiative: Assist in designing and allocating funds for robust programs of

disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR).
Any DDR program in Iraq will be dependent on the establishment of a national
compact with substantial buy-in from contending parties. Once that is achieved
a DDR program for Iraq can be scaled up substantially, with the beefed-up UN
mission serving as the coordinating agency. Experience has shown that the

22 quickly, carefully, and generously

strongest DDR programs are those teamed with a community-based job cre-
ation program throughout the country. The most effective path to such job
creation is local—through municipal works programs and, more importantly,
through micro-credit programs that can help jump-start local business devel-
opment. The incentive for joining militias can be substantially reduced if the
United States largely finances, but does not control, a major new effort to
provide meaningful work and income to Iraqis and to provide services.

a responsible withdrawal from iraq 23

Section V
Toward Iraqi Recovery

The Iraq of 2008 is a deeply traumatized society. Under increasingly brutal

authoritarian rule since 1968, Iraq saw its once burgeoning wealth erode and
its once gleaming infrastructure crumble after Saddam Hussein’s invasion
of Iran. Hundreds of thousands of Iraqis died in that war, and the regime
crushed a Kurdish rebellion in the north with genocidal chemical weapons
attacks upon Kurdish villagers. As a result of Saddam’s 1990 assault upon
Kuwait, a US-led coalition heavily bombed water treatment facilities, power
plants, bridges, and other infrastructure. Rebellions against the regime in the
north and south were again bloodily suppressed. Perhaps of even greater con-
sequence today was that the UN Security Council imposed the most compre-
hensive economic sanctions in history, an embargo that was not to be lifted
until 2003. By the time of the US invasion, the economic and social indicators
of oil-rich Iraq mirrored those of very poor countries.
The incalculable suffering of Iraqis during the current war comes on top of
this 35-year nightmare. The international community, chiefly the United States,
owes the Iraqi people a decent chance at recovery. Moreover, efforts at bring-
ing political stability to the country will be greatly enhanced if Iraqis believe
they are on a path toward socio-economic stability. The measures below can
and should be taken immediately.

Initiative: Abandon remaining Bremer-era regulations that privilege US

oil interests. Cease pressure on Iraq to open up its oil sector to foreign
investment.
The shape of the future Iraqi economy is for Iraqis to decide. While the 2005
Iraqi constitution and subsequent laws have outmoded much of the ideological
agenda of Coalition Provisional Authority head L. Paul Bremer, public renun-
ciation of it by the United States would be an important symbolic affirmation
of Iraqi sovereignty and would help to reassure Iraqis that the destabilizing
effects of a rapid, uncontrolled economic opening will be avoided.
The challenge of rebuilding Iraq is compounded by the fact that some 4
million Iraqis are now displaced from their homes, including some 2 million

24 quickly, carefully, and generously

 who have fled Iraq entirely. The mass displacement is a humanitarian emergency
with serious political and security implications. Thus far, despite increased
attention to the refugees in 2007 and 2008, the international response has
been utterly inadequate.17 This paltry response reflects the low priority given
the issue by the Bush administration following from a refusal to acknowledge
the scope of the displacement, which reflects badly on its narrative of success
in Iraq.

Initiative: Support the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in a

cooperative and comprehensive effort to better address the plight of Iraqi
refugees and internally displaced persons.
This effort should involve Iraq, all its neighbors, other supportive nations, and
non-governmental organizations in coordinated action. This process should
build on the results of the international conference convened by the UNHCR in
2007.18 The United States should earmark large contributions to the UNHCR
for caring for Iraqi refugees and internally displaced persons, and should spear-
head efforts to secure additional contributions.19 The UNHCR should assist
the Iraqi Ministry of Displacement in caring for internally displaced persons.
The United States and international community must shoulder the bulk of the
burden, not offload it onto Iraq.

Initiative: Give substantial aid to Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon earmarked for the
care of Iraqi refugees, on a per capita basis.
Congress should lift bars on bilateral aid to Syria in support of this vital
humanitarian mission. Support for forced migrants should aim to ensure that
basic services, educational opportunities, and temporary work opportunities
are increased. And there should be efforts to ensure that treatment of refu-
gees meets international norms. Finally, Jordan and Syria, in particular, should
be encouraged to reopen their borders in the event of further refugee flows.
Iraqi refugees in these and other countries merit an open-ended commitment

17. See International Rescue Committee, Five Years Later, A Hidden Crisis (New York, March 2008).
18. The International Conference on Addressing the Humanitarian Needs of Refugees and IDPs Inside Iraq and
in Neighboring Countries.
19. On May 15, 2008, the US House of Representatives set an important precedent by passing the section of the
FY 2008 Emergency Supplemental Bill that provides for $675 million in funding—$454 million more than
the White House asked for—to address the Iraqi displacement crisis.

a responsible withdrawal from iraq 25

 from the United States, which should also commit to accepting much greater
numbers of these people itself and, if they so desire, placing them on the track
to citizenship.

Initiative: Back creation of a regional resettlement plan to fund refugee

acceptance, on a per capita basis, in third countries.
In most refugee crises around the world, the UNHCR’s preferred “durable
solution” for the refugees is repatriation. Such programs can take, realistically,
years to complete in a successful fashion. And some people, for a wide variety
of reasons, will not want to return. As Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon already host
large Palestinian refugee populations, these countries are unlikely to welcome
the Iraqi refugees as permanent residents. The search for durable solutions
must therefore include a focus on resettlement in third countries, including the
United States.
Other measures of support for Iraqi recovery are heavily dependent on
improvements in security and political progress toward national reconcilia-
tion, but should be undertaken as soon as circumstances permit.

Initiative: Support creation of a new Iraq Development Fund, under the auspices
of the International Compact with Iraq, and make significant contributions.
A new fund to support Iraqi development should be established, making loans
and aid available to development efforts under UN supervision. The UN mission
in Iraq should coordinate disbursement of grants and loans for such tasks as
rebuilding bridges, modernizing water purification plants, shoring up irrigation
systems, and expanding capacity for generation of electricity. The oil sector
is, of course, another top priority for reconstruction, and initial efforts could
focus on installing meters and other measures required to curb oil smuggling.

Initiative: Fix the broken food rationing system and promote greater food
security.
Prior to the 2003 invasion, roughly 60 percent of Iraqis were dependent for
their daily bread on the food rationing system introduced by Saddam Hussein’s
regime in 1990 and supplemented by the UN “oil for food” program after

26 quickly, carefully, and generously

 1996. Food insecurity continues to be a severe (and severely under-discussed)
problem following the invasion, and threatens to become worse with Maliki
government efforts to phase out rationing. Portions of the Iraq Development
Fund should be reserved for a revitalized food rationing program, perhaps
including new rations cards and a rebuilt and carefully audited network of
warehouses and rationing outlets. The UN should provide technical assistance
to Iraq, as requested, in designing and implementing an efficient and humane
food rationing system. Moreover, the Iraq Development Fund can be drawn
upon to revitalize the agriculture, fishing, dairy, and animal husbandry that
once flourished in Iraq—with the aim of supplying livelihoods and building,
over the long term, national food security. Iraqis should ultimately be relieved
of dependence upon rations. Key to such an economic recovery, needless to
say, will be reduction of unemployment, mandating that it be Iraqis who do
the work of rebuilding Iraq.

Initiative: Support creation of a labor-intensive public works program.

Iraq is in dire need of rebuilt and modernized roads, bridges, irrigation net-
works, water treatment facilities, power plants, and other infrastructure. At
the same time, the Iraqi people are in dire need of job opportunities. The Iraq
Development Fund can serve both of these needs with a large-scale public works
program that would employ Iraqis in the reconstruction of their own country.
Not only can such a program help to satisfy the human desire to engage in
meaningful work and earn a living wage, it can generate an economic ripple
effect through the income earned and spent by thousands of Iraqis and thereby
underwrite the stabilization of neighborhoods, communities, and entire vil-
lages and cities. In concert with national reconciliation on the political level,
public works projects can become an important source of Iraqi national soli-
darity and pride.

Initiative: Support Iraqi NGOs working to strengthen the legal rights and socio-
economic position of women. Build the capacity of Iraqi NGOs in general,
particularly in areas of governance and accounting.
Women have suffered disproportionately from the de-development of Iraq
through war, sanctions, dictatorship, and occupation. International assistance
programs should account for, and attempt to correct for, discrimination against

a responsible withdrawal from iraq 27

 women in education and employment. Special attention should be given to the
social reintegration of women who have experienced sexual abuse, who have
rejected the patriarchal structure of their communities of origin, or who are
isolated because they have been rejected by their families and/or their com-
munities of settlement. Finally, the international community should help those
many Iraqi women and men who have organized to help themselves.
One worthy goal of Iraqi women’s rights activists at present is to replace
Article 41 of the 2005 constitution, which could leave matters like divorce and
child custody in the hands of religious courts, with a codified and unified set of
laws pertaining to personal status. Women’s groups should have several seats
at the table when the new family code is formulated, as they did in Morocco,
for instance. In addition to this political support, Iraqi women’s rights orga-
nizations and other NGOs have pressing needs for operating expenses as they
acquire the training and technical tools to maximize their effectiveness. The
Iraq Development Fund should include a grants program to which Iraqi NGOs
can apply for such assistance.

28 quickly, carefully, and generously

Task Force for a Responsible Withdrawal from Iraq

Organizing Committee
Shelagh Foreman (shelagh@masspeaceaction.org) – Massachusetts Peace Action
Charles Knight (cknight@comw.org) – Project on Defense Alternatives
John Maher (john@n2nma.org)
Chris Toensing (ctoensing@merip.org) – Middle East Research and Information Project

Workshop Coordinator
Jessica von Felbert – Project on Defense Alternatives

Workshop Host
Steven Bloomfield – Weatherhead Center for International Affairs

Rapporteur and Publicist

Kate Cell – Kate Cell Consulting

Advisory Group / Workshop Participants*

Nadje Al-Ali – School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London
Henri Barkey – Lehigh University
Kayhan Barzegar – Harvard University
Carl Conetta – Project on Defense Alternatives
Eric Davis – Rutgers University
Bill Frelick – Human Rights Watch
F. Gregory Gause – University of Vermont
Raed Jarrar – American Friends Service Committee
Brian Katulis – Center for American Progress
Joshua Landis – University of Oklahoma
Marc Lynch – George Washington University
Nir Rosen – Center on Law and Security, New York University
Trita Parsi – National Iranian American Council
David Patel – Cornell University

Workshop Participants from Congress*

James P. McGovern – US House of Representatives (D-MA)
Caleb Rossiter – Counselor to William Delahunt, US House of Representatives (D-MA)
John Tierney – US House of Representatives (D-MA)

Liaison to the office of Representative James P. McGovern

Cindy Buhl – Legislative Director

* This report reflects the judgments and recommendations of the organizing committee, who are the authors. It
does not necessarily represent the views of members of the advisory group or the views of workshop participants
from Congress, whose involvement in no way should be interpreted as an endorsement of the report by either
themselves or the organizations with which they are affiliated.

a responsible withdrawal from iraq 29

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32 quickly, carefully, and generously

 Report of the Task Force
for a Responsible Withdrawal
from Iraq

. . . one of the most comprehensive efforts I have seen

so far to address the diplomatic, economic and political
efforts that should accompany a US military withdrawal
from Iraq. Elegant in its brevity, it raises the questions
all policymakers need to come to grips with as we move
toward moving US military forces out of Iraq over the
coming months.

— US Representative James P. McGovern (MA-03)