UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ************************************************ LEON R.

KOZIOL, individually and as natural parent of Child A and Child B, Plaintiff, -against-

KAREN PETERS, THOMAS MERCURE, ROBERT ROSE, JOHN LAHTINEN, EDWARD SPAIN, BERNARD MALONE JR, MICHAEL KAVANAUGH, LESLIE STEIN, WILLIAM McCARTHY, ELIZABETH GARRY and JOHN EGAN JR, individually and as members of the NEW YORK SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, THIRD DEPARTMENT; MONICA DUFFY, individually and as Chairperson of the COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS; PETER TORNCELLO and STEVEN ZAYAS, individually and as agents of the COMMITTEE; MICHAEL DALEY, individually and as New York judge; WILLIAM KOSLOSKY and CITY OF UTICA, Defendants.

Case No.

****************************************************************************** MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF EXIGENT RELIEF ******************************************************************************

Dated:

May 17, 2012

Respectfully submitted,

OFFICES OF LEON R. KOZIOL 1518 Genesee Street Utica, New York 13502 (315) 796-4000

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT This is an application for exigent relief prepared by a civil rights advocate and parent of two minor daughters against persons acting under color of law to impair a full range of activity protected under the United States Constitution. Until the time of his public statements and court filings critical of unethical practices in New Yorks domestic relations courts, this advocate was a successful civil rights attorney. For over two decades, he produced settlements, verdicts and judgments in difficult cases on behalf of numerous victims of race, gender, religious and other status based discrimination. His actions were featured in the news, and they included free speech retaliation, false arrest, malicious prosecution and police brutality. The defendants named in these numerous cases were as diverse as they were influential. Their reactions were wholly predictable. Retribution for the public humiliation caused by this lawyers steadfast commitment to human rights would be exacted in discreet and subtle ways until the menace could be removed. When the criticisms turned to civil rights violations of the judicial branch of state government, removal was easily achieved through actors cloaked with diverse immunities expanded to incorporate persons purporting to be engaged in legitimate conduct. This led ultimately to the condition of plaintiff in this action. During the weeks leading up to the current filing, the United States government sent its secretary of state and top diplomats to the communist nation of China to address human rights violations inflicted upon a blind Chinese lawyer. This victim was committed to house arrest, license suspension and family deprivations by local government operatives not unlike predecessor lawyer, Gao Zhisheng, as a consequence of civil rights advocacy on behalf of domestic relations victims. Chen Guangcheng was subjected to diverse cruelties for purposes of setting an example for others who would dare to challenge the party elite.

Included with this application under exhibit A is the formal complaint filed in this court which in all material respects is comparable to the petitions for relief at the American Embassy in China. Here the victim is challenging a multi-billion dollar profit center known as Family Court in which children are exploited between parents to produce lucrative controversy for the benefit of lawyers and the court system. The collective impact needlessly destroys a cooperative family structure in America to produce overburdened courts incapable of delivering due process for juvenile, criminal and civil litigants. Clearly a problem exists in the treatment applied to the plaintiff. None of it can be rationalized in the name of public or child interests. The only sensible conclusion is that it is directed to suppress long overdue reform efforts spearheaded by an aggressive civil rights plaintiff. However, no recourse is possible while immunities, jurisdictional issues and deference practices continue to be exploited to protect the violators. The American Constitution remains little more than a piece of parchment for posterity purposes. STATEMENT OF THE CASE This case is related to civil rights actions filed on February 26, 2009 and November 10, 2010 in the United States District Court. Pleadings and briefs addressing the misconduct of pertinent judges and lawyers are in the possession of counsel acting on behalf of Third Department defendants named in those actions. They are now the subject an appeal perfected before the United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, in New York City. Federal alternatives were necessitated, in part, by an order suspending plaintiffs law license on September 23, 2010. That order contained wholesale confirmations of patently false findings. These have not been remedied in the state system due to flagrant bias and retribution for the exercise of protected activities. The collective content of interrelated proceedings is

voluminous and will not be repeated here. This background is necessarily provided to avoid waiver of rights properly asserted in a separate forum. To summarize what has occurred since the member case was filed on November 10, 2010, an innocent man, knowingly convicted of ethics violations based on manufactured discrepancies and events, has been deprived of his livelihood, law license and meaningful contact with his children. He has been made subject to a reinstatement process by Third Department defendants which has additionally infringed upon the jurisdiction of this court system with investigations upon protected free speech and federal pleadings. It is a process abused well beyond any geographic and subject matter jurisdiction conferred upon these state actors. It has had the extraordinary effect of resurrecting all of the subject matter embraced by the earlier actions through inquiries and investigations of a full range of activity undertaken by plaintiff over the past several years. These include a controversial civil rights forum sponsored prior to the first license suspension order. In the factual component of plaintiffs appended complaint, a series of events have occurred which further impair plaintiffs exercise of protected activity. They will not be repeated here, but for purposes of this memorandum, it will be emphasized that they feature distinct and more egregious civil rights violations than prior ones due to further empowerments created by the May 24, 2011 district court ruling. Because that ruling dismissed the earlier consolidated case, heightened retributions have followed. In an unprecedented move, the defendants here have now taken aim at the filings themselves to chill all rights of access to our federal courts. In the process, they have scrutinized plaintiffs activities to the inordinate point of requiring admissions to newly concocted facts which produce yet another catch-22 predicament for their victim. This situation must be

evaluated in the abnormal context of civil rights violations exemplified in the pleading. Appended to this memorandum is a copy of follow-up correspondence to the Chief Attorneys Inquiry received after completion of these motion papers which threatens issuance of subpoenas and additional ethics prosecutions in the event plaintiff fails to cooperate (as predicted earlier). Any response will cause plaintiff to commit the ethical violation of communicating with a represented party in ongoing federal litigation. ARGUMENT This is a retaliation case filed against persons acting under color of law to suppress plaintiffs exercise of protected activities, 42 USC section 1983, Monroe v Pape, 465 US 167 (1961); Monnell v Department of Social Services, 436 US 658 (1978); Ex Parte Young, 209 US 123 (1908); Beechwood Restorative Care Center v Leeds, 436 F.3d 147 (CA 2, 2006). It is premised upon conduct in excess of jurisdiction, scope of authority and judicial function, Stump v Sparkman, 453 US 349 (1978); Supreme Court of Virginia v Consumers Union, 446 US 349 (1980); Maestri v Jutkofsky, 860 F.2d 50 (CA 2, 1988).

I. There are no immunities or defenses to preclude the relief sought by this application. The extraordinary facts presented by the complaint and motion papers show that this case will survive any immunities, deference practices and jurisdictional defenses which might be raised by named defendants in both their official and individual capacities, Gibson v Berryhill, 411 US 564 (1973)(institutional bias dispensing with Younger abstention argument); Exxon Mobile v Saudi Basic Industries, 544 US 280 (2005)(Rooker-Feldman cases abused by lower courts beyond intended application); Marshall v Marshall, 547 US 293 (2006)(domestic relations exception, similarly abused, gave no warrant to Ninth Circuit to ignore civil rights challenge);

Koziol v Hanna, 107 F. Supp.2d 170 (NDNY 2000)(qualified immunity not available to government officials impairing established rights of free speech); Patterson v City of Utica, 370 F.3d 322 (CA 2, 2004)(stigmatizing activity designed to harm career liberty interests established by circumstantial chain of events); Oneida Indian Nation v Oneida County, 132 F. Supp.2d 71 (NDNY 2000)(parallel state and federal court actions do not impair federalism or equity principles). All remaining garden variety defenses await the progress of this case. II. The four prong test for exigent relief established by the Second Circuit is satisfied here The test established by the Second Circuit for securing pendent lite relief on appeal is essentially the same in district courts when an exigency is raised. In Mohammed v Reno, 309 F. 3d 95, 101 (2002), four elements were re-emphasized. The movant must show: (1) the likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable injury if a stay (injunction) is denied; (3) substantial injury to the party opposing relief, and (4) the public interest. Where the balancing of equities favors the relief in question, the first element can be satisfied by showing that the case features overriding questions of constitutional importance. This mitigation of an otherwise heightened burden is justified by the inherent difficulty of assessing potentially meritorious claims at the threshold stage of a case. The Second Circuit reaffirmed the substitute method recently notwithstanding indications of a contrary position by the Supreme Court in Citigroup Global Markets v VCG Special Master, 598 F. 3d 30 (2010). The current application before this court is directed to the narrow context of an open ended investigation of plaintiff designed to impair clearly protected activities of free speech, childrearing and employment freedoms, among others. There is no pending litigation in the state

court system to trigger any abstention policy, and the subject suspension order of September 23, 2010 has taken its course through a one year period completed nearly eight months ago. No appeal or petition lies under state law to implicate a Rooker-Feldman issue, and the extraordinary events described in the pleadings finish off any remaining defenses which might be raised. A conspiracy to violate federal rights is shown through a proximate relationship between protected activity and retaliatory events. Agreeing with principles long established in federal court, i.e. Beechwood Restorative, Monroe and Patterson, supra, the high court of New York emphasized that one intent on discriminating cannot be expected to declare or announce his purpose. Far more likely is it that he will pursue his discriminatory practices in ways that are devious, by methods subtle and elusive, Imperial Diner, Inc. v State Human Rights Appeal Board, 52 NY2d 72, 77 (1984). The discriminatory practices here are far more devious and elusive because they are being carried out by persons of sophistication and unfettered power. Due to his criticisms of New Yorks bench and bar practices, plaintiff has been uniquely injured in his career and childrearing interests by named defendants exercising supreme control over both subjects. Among the conditions and authority ignored by the courts to date is the consequential treatment of plaintiff as a class of one victim for equal protection purposes, see Analytical Diagnostic v Kusel, 626 F.3d 135 (CA 2, 2010). The invidious applications of ethics codes and diverse processes establish this case as a precedent setting one for civil rights purposes. Related to the foregoing, a major aspect of this case is devoted to institutional bias and discrimination. Factual precedent for this is provided in both the pleading and moving papers. For example, judges of New Yorks court system were admonished by a state judicial conduct commission in 2009 to desist from a scheme to disqualify themselves from all legislator cases in

retaliation for pay raise deprivations. Similarly, and more egregiously, the former top judge of the same court system directed taxpayer financed court staff to investigate a New Jersey lawyer to prevent his licensure in New York as part of a criminal enterprise for which he (Sol Wachtler) was ultimately convicted in the federal system. On point is the case of Gibson v Berryhill, supra, where the Supreme Court found institutional bias among colleagues evaluating ethical misconduct in the optometry profession. The court emphasized that a demonstration of actual bias was unnecessary to overcome Younger abstention applications. It was sufficient that the decision makers possessed a likely bias in their professional relationships with the victim raising First Amendment advertising claims, see also Supreme Court of Virginia, supra, regarding similar issues and fear of disciplinary retributions by lawyers in a civil rights suit against a states high court. Institutional bias is reflected in the numerous instances of systemic retributions occurring to plaintiff with each background summary made necessary in all personal petitions brought before the New York court system. A further discussion of pertinent First Amendment cases is now in order. III. Plaintiff is vindicating important federal rights in this application for exigent relief. Public criticism of our courts is a protected act even if exercised by a lawyer during a given case, Garrison v Louisiana, 379 US 64 (1964)(prosecutor convicted of judicial defamation protected by First Amendment); Santosky v Kramer, 455 US 745 (1982)(fundamental liberty deprivations subject to uniform clear and convincing standard) and Professor Tarkington, The Truth Be Damned: The First Amendment, Attorney Speech and Judicial Reputation, Georgetown Law Journal, vol. 97, pg. 1567 (2009). In this case the protections afforded under our Constitution are heightened because the defendants continue to merge distinct activity of the

plaintiff in his pro se and representation capacities. They have gone so far as to suppress public forums of the plaintiff in which no ethics issue can be discerned from the face of inquiries. However, much more is at stake because in the latter context, the independence of our civil rights bar from the bench on subjects related to judicial misconduct is crucial for the vindication of constitutionally protected rights. This is such as case. The power to issue and revoke licenses by government authorities is a profound one. It is an effective vehicle for controlling human behavior and liberty. It has been abused to suppress advertising in the legal profession, Supreme Court of Virginia v Consumers Union, 446 US 719 (1980) free expression in the literary profession, City of Lakewood v Plain Dealer Publishing, 486 US 750 (1988); Bantam Books, Inc. v Sullivan, 372 US 58 (1963) and the filing of complaints critical of a regulatory authority in the health profession, Beechwood, supra, 436 F. 3d 147 (CA 2, 2006). In the Westboro Baptist Church case handed down by the Supreme Court one year ago, Chief Justice Roberts defended the rights of church protesters at the funeral of a fallen soldier by concluding that debate on public issues should be robust, uninhibited and wide open...(it) occupies the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values, see also New York Times v Sullivan, 376 US 254 (1964). In a similar vein, criticisms of the judiciary and access to our courts for the purpose of appealing domestic relations orders should be unfettered. It occupies a similar rung in the same Amendment pursuant to the least cited final clause, see i.e. Beechwood, supra; Friedl v New York, 210 F. 3d 79 (CA 2, 2000). In this case, the debate at issue was directed squarely at the judicial branch of state government and its child control practices. Retaliation is established in the same manner as disciplinary cases are litigated on behalf prisoner clients convicted of heinous crimes, Friedl, supra; Franco v Kelly, 855 F.2d 584 (2d Cir. 1988). New York courts cannot exceed their

authority under our Constitution using a rule of necessity in pay raise litigation any more than they can to suppress plaintiff in his criticisms of that litigation through contemporaneous disciplinary action, Maron v Silver, 871 NYS2d 404 (3d Dept 2008). The father-attorney here was singled out not only because of his critical statements to the media and public gatherings regarding parenting rights but more insidiously in discreet reactions to offensive material discovered in appeal filings. Unlike the bar of the State of Virginia which sought refuge behind a consumers group in the vindication of First Amendment lawyer advertising protections, this victim placed himself personally under fire in the vindication of rights far more precious to the People under the same Constitution, see Supreme Court of Virginia, supra. The latter case has particular application here because the Supreme Court has made it clear that Virginias courts possessed authority to initiate disciplinary complaints against those who violated advertising prohibitions. In this capacity, they enjoyed no absolute immunity particularly when acting outside of any rational scope of inquiries and regulation. In New York, the same authority is found in 22 NYCRR 100.3B(3)(courts generally) and 22 NYCRR 1022.19(b)(1)(Fourth Department grievance referrals). In Konigsberg v State Bar of California, 353 US 252, 273 (1957), the Supreme Court emphasized the importance both to society and the bar itself that lawyers be unintimidated- free to think, speak and act as members of an independent bar. In New York, this freedom is subject to purposely vague regulations that can be made to encompass offensive criticisms of the profession in fee generating industries such as domestic relations. The one challenged in plaintiffs first cause of action is particularly insidious and greatly abused.

These rules can easily be exploited to punish or expel members of the bar who deviate from an unwritten norm, i.e. In re Snyder, 472 US 634, 645 (1985)(As officers of the court, members of the bar may appropriately express criticisms on a fee documentation requirement despite rude letter or lack of professional courtesy, invalidating a six month suspension). The overbroad rules referenced in the complaint and supporting papers are key examples. They were employed against plaintiff to bolster other duplicative charges much like a lesser included offense. In this way, defendants were able to secure a disproportionately excessive punishment. Virtually any conduct can come within the reach of these code provisions, thereby making them little different than the harassment and disorderly conduct laws found to be unconstitutional in Gooden v Wilson, 405 US 518 (1972) and City of Houston v Hill, 482 US 451 (1987), see also United States v Wunsch, 84 F. 3d 1110, 1117-1119 (CA 9, 1999)(declaring unconstitutional a professional conduct provision which required attorneys to abstain from an offensive personality). In this sense, attorney codes are enforced contrary to an express purpose for protecting the public, In re Singer, 738 NYS2d 38, 40 (AD 1, 2002). It is this public commitment which enables disciplinary authorities to circumvent due process protections normally accorded to comparable prosecutions, Id. However, when the public purpose is subsumed by an ulterior motive, a double impact is visited upon an unsuspecting practitioner. He or she is suppressed in protected activity and simultaneously impaired by the dilution of procedural safeguards, Koziol v Hanna, 107 F. Supp. 2d 170 (NDNY 2000). First Amendment rights do not incur a disappearing act on the steps of a state courthouse simply because an aspect of judicial power and lawyer ethics is being challenged in matters of parent-child relations. Its doors are there to be opened to petitions and expressions which do not

10

usurp the conduct of proceedings. In this case, there was no contempt implications or warnings associated with the father-attorneys divorce filings, public comment or his disciplinary defense (counter-report). The May 24, 2011 district court ruling was indistinguishable from countless other cases being disposed of each day in the federal system. Moreover, there was no rush to judgment. The retaliation claimed against the Appellate Division Justices became increasingly plain as disciplinary processes took on a bizarre countenance that yielded no other rational explanation. A relevant excerpt from the Supreme Courts opinion in Spevack v Klein, 385 US 511, 516 (1967) is on point here: The threat of disbarment or the loss of professional standing, professional reputation and of livelihood are powerful forms of compulsion to make a lawyer relinquish (a constitutionally protected) privilege. That threat is indeed as powerful an instrument of compulsion as the use of legal process to force from the lips of the accused individual the evidence necessary to convict him..., United States v White, 322 US 694, 698; Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436, 461. Lawyers are not excepted from the word person as found in the Constitution. Like the school teacher in Slochower v Bd of Education, 350 US 551 and the policeman in Garrity v New Jersey, 385 US 493, lawyers also enjoy first class citizenship. In the disciplinary processes at issue here, a series of defects rendered the dual suspension of plaintiffs law license unconstitutional. The current reinstatement process has now expanded these defects without rational scope to satisfy both exceptions to judicial immunity established by higher court precedent. It is beyond any conferred subject matter jurisdiction and it cannot be characterized as a judicial function, see respectively Maestri v Jutkofsky and Stump v Sparkman, supra. Regardless which is applied here, both procedural and substantive analyses are at play throughout this case. The process was inherently flawed at the onset by the combined nature of prosecution, judge and jury. They were all directly controlled by a single entity, In re Murchison, 349 US 133 (1955). It is this condition which harms the conscientious civil rights lawyer more than any other because it defies the very purpose for his existence.

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CONCLUSION By reason of the foregoing, the plaintiff, Leon Koziol, respectfully requests an order restraining further enforcement of defendants license suspension orders and processes and an order reinstating him to the practice of law. May 17, 2012 Respectfully submitted,

Leon R. Koziol, J.D.

12

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ************************************************ LEON R. KOZIOL, individually and as natural parent of Child A and Child B, Plaintiff, -againstCOMPLAINT

KAREN PETERS, THOMAS MERCURE, ROBERT ROSE, JOHN LAHTINEN, EDWARD SPAIN, BERNARD MALONE JR, MICHAEL KAVANAUGH, LESLIE STEIN, WILLIAM McCARTHY, ELIZABETH GARRY and JOHN EGAN JR, individually and as members of the NEW YORK SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, THIRD DEPARTMENT; MONICA DUFFY, individually and as Chairperson of the COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS; PETER TORNCELLO and STEVEN ZAYAS, individually and as agents of the COMMITTEE; MICHAEL DALEY, individually and as New York judge; WILLIAM KOSLOSKY and CITY OF UTICA, Defendants. ************************************************

Jury Trial Demand

Case No.

Plaintiff, as and for a Complaint against the above-named defendants, sets forth the following: Parties (1) Plaintiff, LEON R. KOZIOL is the natural parent of Child A and Child B with a residence in Oneida County, New York. Until the time of his public criticisms and court filings in connection with unethical practices in New Yorks domestic relations courts, he possessed an unblemished 23 year professional career as a civil rights attorney, parental advocate and public office holder where he derived income for childrearing purposes. (2) Defendants KAREN PETERS, THOMAS MERCURE, ROBERT ROSE, JOHN LAHTINEN, EDWARD SPAIN, BERNARD MALONE Jr, MICHAEL KAVANAUGH, LESLIE STEIN, WILLIAM McCARTHY, ELIZABETH GARRY and JOHN EGAN Jr, are

residents of New York State. Together, they comprise the New York State Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department located in Albany, New York. As relevant here, they failed to properly train or supervise ethics lawyers assigned to investigate plaintiff, ratifying civil rights abuses and institutional bias, and otherwise failing to define a rational scope of activity. (3) Defendant, MONICA DUFFY, is a resident of New York State and Chairperson of the Third Department Committee on Professional Standards with a principal place of business at 40 Steuben Street; Suite 502; Albany, New York. She has directed unlawful investigations of plaintiff involving a residence and protected activity outside Departmental jurisdiction. (4) Defendant, PETER TORNCELLO, is a resident of the State of New York conferred with apparent authority by above named defendants to investigate plaintiff. As relevant here, he sought to hold plaintiff accountable for nonexistent ethical violations on subject matter completely outside the scope of his authority for purposes of suppressing protected activity. (5) Defendant, STEVEN ZAYAS, is a resident of the State of New York conferred with apparent authority by above named defendants to investigate plaintiff. As relevant here, he sought to hold plaintiff accountable for nonexistent ethical violations on subject matter completely outside the scope of his authority for purposes of suppressing protected activity. (6) Defendant, MICHAEL DALEY, has a residence in Herkimer County, New York. As relevant to this action, he exceeded his scope as a former judge of the New York Unified Court System through non-judicial directives and influences upon third parties in order to orchestrate violations of plaintiffs liberty rights and prevent his reinstatement to the practice of law. (7) Defendant, WILLIAM KOSLOSKY, is a resident of Herkimer County, New York with a principal place of business at 2635 Genesee Street; Utica, New York.

(8) Defendant, CITY OF UTICA, is a municipal corporation duly organized under the laws of the State of New York with a principal place of business located at One Kennedy Plaza; Utica, New York. As relevant here, it has engaged itself in a policy, custom or practice of suppressing plaintiffs protected activities as a civil rights advocate and local business owner. Jurisdiction and Venue (9) This action is brought, in part, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and the First, Fourth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution to redress the deprivation of rights secured to the plaintiff. Jurisdiction exists by virtue of 28 U.S.C. sections 1331, 1367(a), 2201 and 2202. Declaratory relief is not otherwise available. (10) Venue is proper in the city of Albany, New York based upon a series of

disqualification orders by New Yorks Appellate Division, Fourth Department and transfers to the Third Department involving plaintiff since his motion for such relief was first granted on April 28, 2010 on consent of the respective presiding justices. Factual Background (11) On January 19, 2010, plaintiff sponsored a civil rights forum in a hotel ballroom in Utica, New York for purposes of receiving complaints from diverse victims in the community to be compiled in a report to the Justice Department. It featured presentations from AfricanAmerican victims of racist city practices, including a decorated veteran who was tackled and handcuffed by members of said department on a domestic incident call notwithstanding the fact that he was the victim shot in the hand by a woman who possessed the only firearm on the scene. (12) As a further subject of civil rights, the abuse of VAWA (Violence Against Women Act) and Title IV-D (child support) funding was emphasized because it created a dangerous imbalance and official prejudice in race relations with law enforcement agencies. Plaintiff cited

diverse misconduct of lawyers and judges in state domestic relations courts which was causing needless violence among families for revenue purposes of the state and its unified court system. (13) Plaintiff had been engaged in various ongoing test cases which formed a major subject of discourse at this public forum and others sponsored by him in recent years. These cases were filed to promote civil recourse in lieu of violence and self help remedies for victims of domestic relations abuses. Defendants jointly engaged in retributions to suppress such protected activity and are now preventing plaintiffs reinstatement to the practice of law. (14) Plaintiff was a victim himself of discriminatory practices in an uncontested and private divorce which was upended, publicized and complicated through widespread ethical misconduct of the lawyer for his ex-spouse. By the time she fired him, the process had become hopelessly tortured for the exclusive benefit of the lawyer, the state and its agents. (15) Accordingly, the divorce lawyers misconduct became the cause and necessary subject of four consolidated appeals of domestic relations orders. It was cited in support of relief before an appellate entity which possessed simultaneous authority to regulate and discipline lawyers in the same district where plaintiff was licensed to practice law. Unknown at the time, the divorce lawyer had been recently appointed by the same court to the local ethics committee. (16) On the same day as arguments on that appeal, a first time disciplinary process was commenced by this same committee not against the divorce lawyer but against the self represented plaintiff exercising his rights. It was thereafter adjourned to scrutinize plaintiffs critical response to a haphazard report assembled by a court appointed ethics lawyer in order to fish out any discrepancies that could elevate a confidential admonition to formal charges. (17) Over time, disciplinary and domestic processes involving plaintiff were invidiously merged and exploited with each public statement or court filing designed to remedy what

plaintiff described as a custodial institution of childrearing and lucrative multi-billion dollar industry that was fleecing mainstream parents and families of their hard earned assets. Such depictions appeared in plaintiffs news conferences, parenting convocations and public website. (18) Another subject of public discourse was a June, 2008 state court action in Albany, New York filed against the state and its court system on behalf of several fathers, a non-custodial mother and the National League of Fathers, Inc. It was a test case critical of bench and bar practices in domestic relations courts. This was followed by speaking engagements in New York City, Washington D.C. and elsewhere which were reported nationwide on various internet sites. (19) This test case was suppressed later the same year when formal charges were filed and precipitated by three concocted discrepancies derived from a comparison of plaintiffs hastily prepared response report and isolated responses to neglected grievances made years earlier. It was hasty because unlike the three month adjournment granted to an ethics lawyer to scrutinize this report, a similar request by plaintiff to facilitate its preparation was denied based on false statements that it was never made, contrary to official transmittals that were days apart. (20) As a consequence, the Albany test case was abandoned. To address growing

misconduct by an unethical ethics committee, as it was called, plaintiff filed a pre-hearing motion before the same appeals court in its disciplinary capacity. Relief was sought under the United States Constitution, including dismissal on misconduct grounds, transfer to an unbiased court and discovery needed to show First Amendment retaliation. This was denied on May 22, 2009 consistent with opposition papers stating the lack of any authority for such relief. (21) On May 26, 2009, plaintiff was noticed for a first appearance before defendant Michael Daley, a former state judge. Motions were confirmed that day to address threshold issues of subject matter jurisdiction, bias and transcript production. Plaintiff was two hours away,

and his appearance was accordingly satisfied by teleconference with his intern in court due to a discovered suspension of drivers license for alleged support arrears without official notice. (22) An adjournment was ordered to confirm jurisdiction when the requisite transfer order could not be found in the courts file, a transcript had yet to be produced, and recusal arguments were promised on the record for a hearing to be set by defendant Daley. Bias issues emerged from earlier recusals of the same judge involving client cases handled by plaintiff. (23) One cited in particular involved a city administrator falsely charged with felonies in a six count indictment. It was politically motivated and defendant Daley sought to coerce a guilty plea which instead resulted in a volatile exchange with plaintiff. Despite abusive cross examination and public humiliation staged before a select news reporter and lawyer in the courtroom, plaintiff refused to back down from his motion for Daleys recusal based on prejudicial conduct to the client observed in conformity with Daleys former prosecutorial role. (24) Defendant Daley ultimately recused himself and proceedings on the motion were concluded, but not before an on-record commitment by Daley to share his adverse opinions of plaintiff with a fellow Herkimer County judge specially predicted to replace him on the same case. Before anyone could exit the courtroom, defendant Daley summoned to his bench the clients boyfriend, a complete stranger, to engage him in banter as part of an ongoing scheme to cause plaintiffs discharge and a predictable ethics complaint. (25) The scheme failed and a jury trial was rescheduled before a different (senior) judge in Oneida County Courthouse where the recusal motion was properly heard. That judge then dismissed the entire indictment, thereby saving the clients career and facilitating a civil action against the city employer who filed the false charges. Relevant complaints before the states judicial conduct commission were subsequently lodged and featured on plaintiffs website.

(26) The threshold hearing committed by Daley on May 26, 2009 was neither scheduled nor conducted over an 18 month period in order to avoid a re-visitation of the embarrassing events of the preceding paragraphs which were logically contained in plaintiffs written motion for judge recusal. On the transcript, Daley conceded that he had yet to digest the papers. During this same period, a recommended jail term for support arrears was held over plaintiffs head. (27) On October 1, 2009, defendant Daley proceeded directly to the merits of plaintiffs support proceeding by issuing a summary violation order without reference to the threshold motion or his on-record commitments. It predictably resulted in a statutory suspension of plaintiffs law license before the same appeals court on February 5, 2010. Constitutional issues and Daleys misconduct were refused and excluded from consideration based on the language of the states Judiciary Law, and any record for appeal purposes was insulated from review by another state statute and the lower court Judge Daley as its final arbiter. (28) On the same transcript, defendant Daley noted a client case scheduled for the same morning. The intern present in the courtroom was thereafter admonished to keep plaintiff keenly aware of developments in that case given the same judges erratic history as demonstrated by the preceding paragraphs. Over the course of the next six months, not a single disclosure was made or court date placed on plaintiffs office calendar involving this particular client. His case was therefore dismissed due to non-appearance of plaintiff discovered after the interns discharge. (29) A motion to reopen the case based on meritorious grounds of judge and intern misconduct was thereafter frustrated by the said suspension of plaintiffs law license, Daleys continued misconduct, and substitute counsels lack of success before the same judge in July, 2011. On information and belief, this was orchestrated by conduct outside of any legitimate

judicial process in complete excess of Daleys authority. It directly caused an ethics grievance which is now being exploited to prevent plaintiffs reinstatement to his law practice. (30) Plaintiff was uniquely absent from all post-telephone discourse between defendant Daley and the intern on May 26, 2009. Unlike the earlier described felony case recusal, plaintiff could therefore not monitor events after closure of formal proceedings. Within one hour of same, plaintiffs girlfriend, now fiance, received a cell call from her business partner to the effect that defendant Daley had directed Herkimer County sheriff deputies to investigate her whereabouts. (31) None of this appeared on the record of any Family Court case limited by Article VI, section 26(k) of the New York Constitution. The business was located in the same county, and the directive was made for no logical reason other than extrajudicial intimidation. This woman was not a party, Daley had no jurisdiction order in his file, and plaintiff relied upon her for mutual support. After this date, court security and local law enforcement began monitoring plaintiff, his fiance and their vehicles. She eventually moved her business outside of the county. (32) Prior to the foregoing, a federal court action was filed on February 26, 2009 based upon an escalating level of retribution for plaintiffs exercise of protected activities and the lack of opportunity to raise constitutional claims. Three months later, the action was amended to include defendant Koslosky, and in September, 2009, it was again amended by order of the court to include defendant Daley. The case was sealed under fictitious names and titled, John Parent v State of New York principally to protect the privacy interests of plaintiffs children. (33) However the jurisdiction and privacy arrangements asserted over the subject matter were frustrated by public announcement of the license suspension of February 5, 2010 and a one year suspension issued by the Third Department on September 23, 2010. Both were featured on front page news, radio and television to upstage any resolution potentials as the retributions

escalated. After plaintiffs automobiles were seized from his home on October 19, 2010 without proper warrant and contrary to an August 23, 2010 stipulation order, a second action was necessarily filed on November 10, 2010 without need for a sealed record or fictitious parties. (34) Events occurring since that time require further recourse. Plaintiff is now being victimized by select law enforcement practices and orchestrated grounds for ethics violations outside of any legitimate judicial or official function in retribution for the above referenced federal court filings and public criticisms. It persists in order to prevent plaintiffs reinstatement to the practice of civil rights law and to otherwise discredit his reform efforts in the public eye. (35) The illegitimate nature of defendants activities is further shown by a sampling of letter inquiries being exploited to prevent reinstatement. These include grievances withdrawn or dismissed due to extortionist behavior, demands for fees already refunded, and exploitation of convicted criminals. In many instances, their sources can be traced to certain defendants or their agents who are the targets of criticism. Others have been used strictly to delay processes. (36) For example, one grievance exploited to enter the second suspension order involved another federal court action in which plaintiff filed a proper ethical motion to be discharged from a clients race discrimination case in 2003. It was granted and based upon the clients unlawful commitments to disclose confidential IAD files of the Syracuse police department to media outlets in violation of court order for purposes of coercing higher settlement figures. The convicted criminal, Curtis Brown, responded with multiple ethics charges. To this day, there has been no action taken to those lodged against plaintiff in the federal system. (37) In stark contrast, New Yorks counterpart found grounds to proceed five years later based on manufactured claims by the same client and substitute counsel, including IAD files allegedly held back by plaintiff as a means for excusing their lapsed deadlines and case

dismissal. In June, 2009, the presiding federal judge entered an order referencing plaintiffs 2003 motion and the litigants continued violations of the same order with false claims and improper complicity of substitute counsel. Both were admonished after contempt proceedings and the ten year case was dismissed, as affirmed in March, 2012, after continued lapses in court deadlines. (38) Defendants select enforcement and retributions have caused plaintiff to require signed receipts for all former client file retrievals containing an acknowledgment of every minor paper so as to avert a Brown type grievance. As evaluated here, this has placed him in a catch-22 situation. If mailed or transferred expeditiously to avoid timeliness admonitions, plaintiff is then subjected to charges of their incomplete production. Such opposite treatment is actually being employed to prevent reinstatement involving two former clients despite the lack of prejudice. (39) Client cases necessarily abandoned because of the challenged license suspension orders are now being exploited by defendants Duffy, Torncello and Zayas to assert plaintiffs purported neglect or prejudice to their success. This scheme is based not on any public purpose but upon the superior ethics and conscience exercised by plaintiff. Numerous civil rights victims and former clients have had their cases needlessly dismissed or held in limbo pending plaintiffs reinstatement after two years of suspension caused by the above summarized abuses of authority. (40) Contrasting his performance over a prior 23 year period, there has not been a substantive order, decision or appeal granted in the plaintiffs favor in the states unified court system since discovery of his public criticisms other than one in January, 2011. Defendants Mercure, Rose, Malone, Kavanagh and Stein went so far as to knowingly confirm a false finding of a disciplinary referee shown to be manufactured by a facial comparison of referenced documents in the record. In short, these defendants knowingly convicted an innocent person.

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(41) For its part, the City of Utica has long engaged in retribution practices due to plaintiffs monetary recoveries against it together with public challenges in civil rights matters. As relevant here, plaintiff argued a civil rights case before this court during the same month as the above referenced January 19, 2010 forum. Both featured a longstanding victim of racist city practices inflicted by a former city corporation counsel, current mayor and three police officers. A reserved decision resulted in a ruling against these same named defendants in July, 2010 after plaintiffs first suspension in February, 2010. The entire action was then dismissed while under representation by another lawyer in December, 2011 during the subject reinstatement period. (42) Defendant city has failed to properly train and supervise its agents to observe civil rights laws. In conformity with related invidious practices, said defendant has provided advice and tactical assistance to other adversaries acting in concert with them resulting in damage to plaintiffs domestic relations cases. It has also refused to act upon criminal charges lodged by plaintiff and joint complainants to protect business interests in contrast with those filed by others. (43) Examples include a former city mayor and his associates who were able to have city police process felony charges against a former employee for charging $16 to a city gas card as his weekly reimbursement two hours after discharge. One year later, plaintiff and his associates lodged criminal charges with the same city police department against a discharged lawyer for misappropriating more than $10,000. The first matter proceeded to a jury trial resulting in an acquittal with plaintiff as defense counsel. Gas card charges were later dismissed by district attorney motion. In contrast, the second matter involving plaintiff was referred to civil recourse. (44) Defendants select treatment enabled the lawyer criminal to continue his crimes at another law office in Syracuse. With plaintiffs assistance, he was prosecuted and convicted in

11

another county. Shortly thereafter, he became the subject of a police chase on the streets of Utica where he was eventually arrested with controlled substances found in his vehicle. (45) Despite multiple convictions and eventual disbarment, an extortionist grievance by this criminal, filed in 2005 against plaintiff, was featured in the above referenced ethics investigation and held open until recent months when it was dismissed on its face after seven years. A January 31, 2012 Internal Report personally shared by plaintiff with the defendants police chief involves similar activity. It has been neglected, treated in bad faith or otherwise left in limbo given opposite treatment to other contemporaneous complaints and a district attorney investigator who expressly noted city jurisdiction and the reports serious nature. (46) In similar invidious fashion, ethics complaints by plaintiff against lawyers which included the citys former corporation counsel were suppressed or ignored by defendant colleagues despite more egregious violations of relevant codes. In addition to the divorce lawyer and lawyer-witness complicit with the Brown client in contempt and disciplinary proceedings, defendant William Koslosky lodged charges in a scheme to impair plaintiffs reinstatement. (47) Among these is a sworn affidavit submitted to the Fourth Department court in August, 2011 which contained a manufactured claim that plaintiff had sought to revoke the higher courts authority over attorneys by seeking restoration of his law license in Family Court. Such a petition or process is nowhere to be found in any Family Court record and it could only have derived from an agreement or concerted activity with the 21st judge assigned to plaintiffs petitions. It was and remains designed to undermine plaintiffs fitness as a lawyer and advocate. (48) The support violation order was removed by the August 23, 2010 stipulation order submitted by defendant Daley to both the Third and Fourth Departments to effect a lifting of the first suspension order given the confusion and delays caused by the transfer orders referenced at

12

paragraph 10. This pattern resembled a 2009 scheme by judges of the Unified Court System to disqualify themselves from state legislator cases in retaliation for judicial pay raise deprivations. The scheme was abandoned only upon intervention by a state judicial conduct commission. (49) On January 26, 2012, the Fourth Department lifted the support-based suspension order caused by defendant Daley after the Third Department failed to act on its pertinent component in plaintiffs October 4, 2011 reinstatement application. This outcome was being cited among numerous inquiries of defendants Zayas and Torncello since the time of application. The one year suspension by the Third Department was completed on September 23, 2011, and plaintiffs reinstatement remains subject to the events described throughout this Complaint. (50) As a result, nearly eight months license suspension have already been tacked on to the earlier two periods without formal charge or legitimate cause. Such a period exceeds a six month suspension imposed upon a local attorney, G. Stephen Getman, who spent more than $7,000 in client funds. He is currently serving the defendant court system as a Family Court magistrate and his misconduct during plaintiffs support violation process was insulated by defendant Daley in his coercion of the referenced stipulation order after two years of abuse. (51) During this indefinite period, plaintiff has been made subject to a succession of inquiries, including repetitious ones and an anonymous complaint citing an anonymous post in a community gossip site (a double anonymous). This post headlined plaintiffs fictitious lawsuit against Dunkin Donuts in 2008 (when plaintiff was fully licensed). It was patently a satire upon plaintiffs civil rights actions against defendant city which warranted no official recognition. Defendants Torncello and Zayas, and those unknown persons acting in concert with them, nevertheless fished it out from public discourse to unduly burden reinstatement.

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(52) Other inquiries, resurrected from long neglected grievances, including one closed in 2002, were earlier addressed to the same defendants or found in the record transferred from the Fourth Department grievance committee. In the other half of merged processes, such transfers were further exploited to delay domestic petitions on numerous appeals caused by the institutional bias developed against plaintiff. It rendered crucial ones moot. As an additional condition, plaintiff completed a professional responsibility bar examination, with more than 25 points over the 85 passing score, which had been similarly completed a quarter century earlier. (53) These conditions produced further dilemmas impairing plaintiffs protected liberties from an economic, childrearing and mobility standpoint. The second suspension order, which referenced the earlier one, effectively upended the process undertaken by defendant Daley to repair the harm he had caused. Lifting of the earlier order was rendered moot by the second one, and the consequential employment picture necessitated a downward support petition before the 22nd trial judge (support magistrate) assigned in November, 2011 to plaintiffs petitions. (54) This petition was denied, like virtually every other one filed, through the use of a highly abused revenue generating policy known as imputed income. It is among those challenged in plaintiffs reform efforts based on Title IV-D of the Social Security Act as it enables state support magistrates to meet performance based quotas to fund their operations irrespective of the harm caused to parent-child relationships and without counsel for children. (55) As part of this non-judicial custom or practice, plaintiff was held to the same earnings capacity as he enjoyed at the conclusion of his 23 year law practice after only six weeks since the one year suspension was imposed. As relevant here, by delaying reinstatement, support arrears continue to accrue to cause yet another license suspension order to be piggy-backed on the current (third) one which is destined to cause terminal support incarceration.

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(56) Family Court review of the magistrates decision was foreclosed by transcript delays of a stenographer recommended for hire by the 21st judge in a listing handed to plaintiff in open court. As the delays continued over a period of only weeks, the production issue was relayed to the judge but the case was nevertheless dismissed days later. It was again presented to the 25th judge after further recusals and again denied in contrast with other orders. Stay relief was then denied by a Third Department judge, and the appeal was abandoned on futility grounds. (57) This institutional bias is now reflected in the reinstatement process directed by defendant Third Department judges. Due to the lack of any defined scope, it is not being monitored for timeliness purposes while plaintiff is invidiously harmed in his liberty, livelihood and childrearing interests. There is no authority under CPLR article 78 or any other state statute to review the actions of an Appellate Department and no appeal lies from the determinations or inactions of subordinate defendants. In lieu of formal action, they have issued more inquiries. (58) The latest inquiries, dated April 13, 2012, purport to assert violations of a disciplinary rule, specifically New York Code Rule 8.4(d) which vaguely prohibits an attorney from engaging in conduct which is prejudicial to the administration of justice. In plaintiffs case, this rule can and is being exploited to mean anything which defendants find offensive such as plaintiffs reform efforts which by design and recourse will prejudice their revenue sources. (59) For example, the entire Chief Attorneys Inquiry encompasses matters properly divided between the exercise of free speech prior to the first license suspension order which is subject to no state jurisdiction and self representation thereafter in a civil rights case which is uniquely the subject of federal court jurisdiction. Relevant defendants are named in that case, Parent v State, and by their inquiries, they seek to explore plaintiffs pro se litigation strategy.

15

(60) As such, these defendants are functioning as counsel of record and otherwise usurping authority exclusively assigned by federal law to the United States Second Circuit Court of Appeals where the case is now set for deliberation. In the process, additional ethics rules are being violated by defendants failure to communicate with plaintiff through attorneys representing their interests in the ongoing case. A response by plaintiff implicates the same ethics rules and any failure to respond subjects him to additional charges for lack of cooperation. (61) In addition, plaintiff is under no ethical, legal or moral duty to disclose his legal strategy in a pro se action any more than he can be compelled to divulge similar information if he was actually representing a client. The inquiries all relate to complex legal decisions of plaintiff caused by defendants joint misconduct and a precedent seeking opinion which cited a single 1984 district court ruling in another circuit on the salient issue of 11th Amendment waiver. (62) The inquiries are allegedly based upon information contained in files and records maintained by (defendant Committee). However, the first question reflects the involvement of an outside source acting on behalf of other defendants. Specifically, the disciplinary defendants challenge plaintiffs conduct in the January 19, 2010 Civil Rights Forum described earlier in this pleading as having its focus on race discrimination by the City of Utica. They then demand that plaintiff advise if (he) made the audience aware that (he) was a suspended attorney. (63) In defendants repeat prior inquiries, the first license suspension order of February 5, 2010 is expressly acknowledged and its removal was made a primary condition for reinstatement. Hence, plaintiff did not advise the audience that he was a suspended attorney because he was not a suspended attorney at the time of the public forum he sponsored. If the question was answered honestly, it would constitute an admission to contempt of defendant judges suspension order and a further ethics violation within the framework of this inquiry.

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(64)

The foregoing demonstrates defendants additional violations of ethical rules

requiring a minimal degree of competency and preparedness in paid legal services to the people of New York. It also belies any jurisdiction defined by the inquiry itself. Section 806.4 of the Third Department rules is cited for defendants authority and it requires the Chief Attorney to make a formal determination of an ethics violation as a condition for the inquiry which then serves to commence the investigation itself. No such determination was rationally made here. (65) The next 14 of 15 inquiries which complete the latest phase of reinstatement all relate directly to the content of record and decision in the above mentioned case. For purposes of this pleading, select inquiries will be identified to show the unlawful interference with federal court jurisdiction involving a pro se plaintiff against these same defendants in pending litigation. (66) Inquiry #7 requires plaintiff to explain why (he) did not meet the statutory

prerequisite of filing a notice of claim for (his) state law trespass claim (against municipal defendants), referenced at paragraph 33. In fact, plaintiff did meet this prerequisite as the relevant claim was timely filed before commencement of the November 10, 2010 (member) case. (67) The duly stamped claim is found in public records, reprinted on plaintiffs

monitored website, and contained in the joint appendix filed with the Second Circuit. As proper grounds for appeal, the lower court failed to acknowledge this claim in opposition papers to dismissal and misrepresented the record in its May 24, 2011 public opinion. Defendants appellate counsel is aware of this clear error, and it is not opposed in appellate briefs. In short, plaintiff is being held accountable for a nonexistent ethics violation caused by a federal judge. (68) Other inquiries demand explanations behind municipal policy which was properly shown by custom alternatives in the actions of state actors and ratification of superiors (i.e. county defendants Chudyk and Soldato participating in the filing of a support violation petition

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beyond any lawful jurisdiction, the defect created by case transfer to another county with the parties nevertheless residing in the same county, as confirmed by support magistrate Getman). (69) Personal involvement of other named defendants was adequately shown through peculiar and concerted actions which left no other logical conclusion. Such claims are routinely made out through a circumstantial chain of events. In plaintiffs extraordinary case, an ever complicated setting arose from events which were left unrestrained due to the money interests implicated. Federal litigation was necessitated by the lack of any other rational forum. As explained in plaintiffs brief, salient case law was nevertheless disregarded in the lower decision. (70) The balance of inquiries relate to precedent seeking endeavors continued in pro se fashion after defendants dismantled plaintiffs other test cases. One attacks plaintiffs fundraising efforts and outside requests to create a class action necessitating retention of counsel. Such a lawsuit can be certified through later motion practice. Conspiracy claims naturally flowed from systemic bias, joint counsel, police monitoring and judges conducting non-judicial functions. (71) Equal protection precedent was sought along the lines set by Thurgood Marshall when he challenged a century of established legal doctrine known as separate but equal treatment of the races. In this case, separate but unequal parenting is being challenged based on long discredited but retained tender years doctrine in play over the same period. Respect for the subject federal court decision is reflected in the pleadings here which omit virtually all of the earlier named defendants despite common facts and ripened claims since November 10, 2010. First Cause of Action (72) Plaintiff repeats and incorporates the foregoing paragraphs of this Complaint as if set forth here in full. The same paragraphs are similarly incorporated into all succeeding causes of action except where otherwise indicated.

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(73) On April 5, 2012, plaintiff delivered a letter to New Yorks chief judge at the Court of Appeals in Albany which respectfully asked for the removal of a political poster featured on the wall of the public clerks office. It lauded a disgraced former chief judge, Sol Wachtler, as a man of integrity campaigning for judgeship. Plaintiff found it offensive on multiple grounds including Wachtlers pre-conviction directives of paid court staff to investigate a New Jersey lawyer in order to prevent licensure as part of his stalking agenda and illicit love affair. (74) The poster was first discovered when serving the federal member case pleading in November, 2010 and was thereafter criticized in videos and news releases. These were featured on plaintiffs monitored website, Leon Koziol.com which defendants have cited to prevent reinstatement. Video reproductions from plaintiffs January 19, 2010 Civil Rights Forum were also featured to the time of this Complaint. A copy of the chief judge letter was submitted to defendant Mercure, and when no responses were obtained, copies were delivered to offices of the United States Congress by concerned parents as part of a recent march and lobby initiative. (75) Consistent with the entire pleading here, the Chief Attorneys Inquiry,

institutional bias, and ongoing retributions impair plaintiffs exercise of free speech, free press, free access to our public courts, and other protected activities in violation of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Ethical Rule 8.4(d), additionally exploited to facilitate these violations, is vague, overbroad and similarly unconstitutional. (76) The foregoing chain of events has led to a conclusion that defendants are

orchestrating grounds for permanent exclusion of plaintiff from the legal profession. This has necessitated alternate income development which, in turn, has been and continues to be invidiously harmed by the terms of suspension orders in effect since February 5, 2010.

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(77) Their common overbroad terms prohibit plaintiff from giving an opinion as to the law directly or indirectly in any context. Discourse with defendant Zayas intended to discern a scope for this prohibition was left to trial and speculation with no guiding authority provided. Trivial, frivolous and anonymous inquiries and complaints relevant to plaintiffs website, court filings and speaking engagements over the past two years confirm this provision to be a prior restraint on free speech and other protected activity. (78) Opinions on the law comprise a routine of the people in a diverse range of nonlawyer conduct such as teaching, lobbying and public speaking. Plaintiff has been approached to reconsider public office in light of his former employment as a city councilman, endorsed runs for state Senate and county executive, and divorce mediation in light of the aforesaid disciplinary experience of Judge Getman. Such opinions are inevitable and incidental to employment and free discourse in the community, private childrearing and a complete range of human activity. (79) As a consequence of the human rights violations here and related abuses of authority described throughout this pleading, plaintiff has suffered reputation injuries, emotional distress, economic losses and opportunity costs. He is entitled to an award of monetary damages in the amount of $25 million. Relief is also sought declaring the challenged rule, orders and processes unconstitutional on their face or as applied to plaintiff. Injunctive relief is necessitated to enjoin their enforcement and continuation. Finally, an order is sought vacating all license suspension orders, including one lifted on January 26, 2012, and an order directing reinstatement of plaintiff to the practice of law in the courts of New York and this federal district. Second Cause of Action (80) Since undertaking protected activities critical of bench and bar practices in domestic relations litigation, plaintiff has elected to avoid membership in bar associations and bar

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functions. Instead, he has associated himself with minorities and groups seeking to remedy civil rights violations and unethical practices upon children, their parents and extended families. (81) On information and belief, other lawyers mentioned in this Complaint have joined and/or participated in bar activities while avoiding association with reform minded people and groups out of a fear of retribution or in furtherance of their lucrative practices. As a consequence, they have enjoyed privileged treatment by defendant judges, disciplinary agents and New Yorks Unified Court System. The concerted and invidious treatment of plaintiff violates his rights of free association under the First Amendment to the American Constitution. Third Cause of Action (82) Due to the institutional bias and combined retributions, plaintiff is unduly impaired in his right to petition government for a redress of grievances and his rights of access to both federal and state courts. These public institutions were created by the people to substitute for anarchy and self help remedies. Defendants have individually and/or collectively violated plaintiffs rights under the final clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Fourth Cause of Action (83) The defendants collective activities have invaded every aspect of privacy enjoyed by plaintiff. With each petition, inquiry and process needlessly imposed to chill the exercise of basic rights, plaintiff was and remains forced to disclose private matter and impair sensitive relationships. The extrajudicial monitoring of plaintiff, his children, fiance and mother of his children is conduct which shocks the conscience of a civilized society in violation of the Fourth, Ninth and Tenth Amendments and other related provisions of the American Constitution. (84) Plaintiffs children cannot be deemed to have consented to defendant Kosloskys misconduct designed to reach subject matter outside the scope of state assignment authority and

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their genuine best interests. They cannot be treated as consensual citizens to a fraudulent scheme to defame and incarcerate their only natural father while functionally and permanently removing traditional parenting figures for purely vindictive, self serving and unrelated purposes. Fifth Cause of Action (85) The extraordinary events visited upon plaintiff have produced systemic retributions and institutional bias in the New York Unified Court System. Due to the exercise of a citizens rights of self representation and valid criticisms of a hybrid enterprise of state government, plaintiff cannot seek relief in the courts of his native state. Every form of relief necessitates a background of subject matter found in these pleadings. Plaintiff has consequently been remanded to a form of permanent house arrest without rational capacity for pursuing a livelihood or family. (86) Accordingly, plaintiff seeks an order declaring the processes and dispositions challenged by this Complaint to be a violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Under the same clause, plaintiff seeks a comparable order on substantive grounds based on the totality of circumstances summarized in this pleading. The bizarre scrutiny perpetrated by defendants Daley, Koslosky, Torncello, and Zayas alone has forced plaintiff to alter aspects of his daily routine as part of an ongoing chilling effect upon protected activity. Sixth Cause of Action (87) The select application of attorney ethics code has created a class of one violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiff has lodged formal and informal complaints, directly or indirectly, against the non-disciplinary lawyers identified in this pleading. Since the time of investigation arising from appellate arguments described at paragraph 15 of this Complaint, there has not been the slightest indication of disciplinary action or interest

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conveyed by the New York Unified Court System. The pertinent lawyers serious misconduct was described, among other things, as a clear prejudice to the administration of justice, to wit: (a) repeat violations of court directives resulting in protection orders issued against the lawyer, his client and entire law office; filing of papers concededly in the wrong court resulting in dismissal of his clients case and costly renewal one year later at her expense; drafting of a divorce decree, corrected by the plaintiff-father, which had his client guilty of cruel and inhumane treatment of her opponent contrary to an uncontested petition filed prior to his interference; maliciously delayed disclosure of fraudulent support bills which collapsed his clients signed settlement, causing more costly conflict; Seventh Cause of Action (88) In order to further impair and chill the plaintiffs exercise of protected activity, defendant judges, Duffy, Torncello , Zayas, Daley and Koslosky have directly, indirectly or by ratification required the plaintiff to announce himself as a suspended attorney as opposed to non-practicing attorney, former attorney or similar functional designation. Such stigma continues to be required in all public, professional and even private activity, including alternate employment searches. It has caused plaintiff to resort to confusing Dr. or J.D. titles. (89) The pretext for this peculiarity, under further penalty of incarceration, lies in a presumption of plaintiffs unlawful practice of law even in situations where it is utterly concocted, impossible to occur or incidental to casual conversation. This presumption has been invidiously applied to plaintiff to cause a dwindling of resources needed to exercise all other protected activity. By way of comparison, convicted child molesters are made subject to registration mandates but they are not required to announce their status in public speech. (90) This requirement has been caused, influenced or enforced to stigmatize plaintiffs longstanding reputation and competency as a means for discrediting and suppressing the reform 23

(b)

(c)

(d)

message described throughout this pleading. Despite long satisfaction of a one year suspension term and lifting of earlier punishments, the status label has been employed to impair background summaries released by plaintiff prior his 2011 national parenting convention, to prevent reinstatement through timeless and excessive inquiries, and to cause support incarceration through foreclosure of alternate employment endeavors after nearly a quarter century of successful law practice. As such, this requirement violates the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution in addition to the foregoing provisions.

WHEREFORE, plaintiff seeks judgment as follows: 1) An award of compensatory damages in the amount of $25 million against defendants Torncello, Zayas, Daley, Koslosky and City of Utica on the first, second and third causes of action; 2) An award of compensatory damages against defendants Torncello, Zayas, Daley and Koslosky in the amount of $25 million on the fourth, fifth and seventh causes of action; 3) An award of punitive damages in the amount of $1 million against defendants Torncello, Zayas, Daley and Koslosky on the first, second, third, fourth, fifth and seventh causes of action; 4) A judgment declaring New York Code Rule 8.4 (d) vague and overbroad on its face or as applied to plaintiff on the first cause of action and an order enjoining enforcement of same; 5) A judgment declaring defendant Chief Attorneys Inquiry dated April 13, 2012 unconstitutional and excessive on its face or as applied to plaintiff on all causes of action and an order enjoining their enforcement by defendants Duffy, Torncello, Zayas and others acting in concert with them;

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6) A judgment declaring the license suspension orders entered on February 5, 2010 and September 23, 2010 unconstitutional on their face or as applied to plaintiff together with remedial orders vacating both and permanently enjoining the processes or practices described in all causes of action against all defendants. 7) An order immediately reinstating plaintiff to the practice of law in this court and the

courts of the State of New York; 8) Orders which may become necessary to add parties and state law claims based on

discovered information and a conspiracy to violate the federal rights stated in this pleading; 9) An award of attorneys fees, costs and disbursements under the circumstances, and 10) Such other relief as may be just and proper.

Date: May 17, 2012

LEON R. KOZIOL, J.D. Plaintiff, pro se 1518 Genesee Street Utica, New York 13502 (315) 796-4000

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