Victorias Milling Company v SSS (1962) Circular No.

22 mere administrative interpretation

WON Circular 22 is a rule or regulation as contemplated in Sec 4a of RA 1161 empowering the SSC to adopt, amend, and repeal subject to the approval of the President such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act

There can be no doubt that there is a distinction between an administrative rule or regulation and an administrative interpretation of a law whose enforcement is entrusted to an administrative body. When an administrative agency promulgates rules and regulations, it "makes" a new law with the force and effect of a valid law, while when it renders an opinion or gives a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law. Rules and regulations when promulgated in pursuance of the procedure or authority conferred upon the administrative agency by law, partake of the nature of a statute, and compliance therewith may be enforced by a penal sanction provided in the law. This is so because statutes are usually couched in general terms, after expressing the policy, purposes, objectives, remedies and sanctions intended by the legislature. The details and the manner of carrying out the law are often times left to the administrative agency entrusted with its enforcement. In this sense, it has been said that rules and regulations are the product of a delegated power to create new or additional legal provisions that have the effect of law. A rule is binding on the courts so long as the procedure fixed for its promulgation is followed and its scope is within the statutory authority granted by the legislature, even if the courts are not in agreement with the policy stated therein or its innate wisdom . On the other hand, administrative interpretation of the law is at best merely advisory, for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means. It will thus be seen that whereas prior to the amendment, bonuses, allowances, and overtime pay given in addition to the regular or base pay were expressly excluded, or exempted from the definition of the term "compensation", such exemption or exclusion was deleted by the amendatory law. It thus became necessary for the Social Security Commission to interpret the effect of such deletion or elimination. Circular No. 22 was, therefore, issued to apprise those concerned of the interpretation or understanding of the Commission, of the law as amended, which it was its duty to enforce. It did not add any duty or detail that was not already in the law as amended. It merely stated and circularized the opinion of the Commission as to how the law should be construed. 1wph1.t Nowhere in any of the above-quoted pertinent provisions of R.A. 720 nor in any other provision of R.A. 720 for that matter, is the monetary Board authorized to mete out on rural banks an additional penalty rate on their past due accounts with Appellant. Administrative rules and regulations have the force and effect of law. There are, however, limitations to the rule-making power of administrative agencies. A rule shaped out by jurisprudence is that when Congress authorizes promulgation of administrative rules and regulations to implement given legislation, all that is required is that the regulation be not in contradiction with it, but conform to the standards that the law prescribes. he recognition of the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the implementation of the statute, as necessarily limited to what is provided for in the legislative enactment. In case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule or regulation issued to implement said law, the basic law prevails because said rule or regulation cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law. Thus, while there is now a basis for the imposition of the 10% penalty rate on overdue accounts of rural banks, there was none during the period that Appellee contracted its loans from Appellant, the last of which loan was on July 30, 1963. Surely, the rule cannot be given retroactive effect. The construction given to a statute by an administrative agency charged with the interpretation and application of Page 1

Tayug Rural Bank v Central Bank of the Phil (1986) Memo Circular DLC-8 and Secs nd 147&148(2 par) are invalid for exceeding that which is provided in RA 720

whether or not the Central Bank can validly impose the 10% penalty on Appellee's past overdue loans beginning July 4, 1965, by virtue of Memorandum Circular No. DLC-8 dated December 23, 1964. NO

Nestle Philippines v CA (1991) Admin/Muyot

WON the SEC is correct in interpreting

Sec 6a of the Revised Securities Act to determine whether or not Nestle is exempt from registration and payment of fees when it issued previously authorized but unissued capital stock YES

that statute is entitled to great respect and should be accorded great weight by the courts, unless such construction is clearly shown to be in sharp conflict with the governing statute or the Constitution and other laws. The rationale for this rule relates not only to the emergence of the multifarious needs of a modern or modernizing society and the establishment of diverse administrative agencies for addressing and satisfying those needs; it also relates to accumulation of experience and growth of specialized capabilities by the administrative agency charged with implementing a particular statute. The courts give much weight to contemporaneous construction because of the respect due the government agency or officials charged with the implementation of the law, their competence, expertness, experience and informed judgment, and the fact that they frequently are the drafters of the law they interpret. he reading by the SEC of the scope of application of Section 6(a) (4) permits greater opportunity for the SEC to implement the statutory objective of protecting the investing public by requiring proposed issuers of capital stock to inform such public of the true financial conditions and prospects of the corporation. By limiting the class of exempt transactions contemplated by the last clause of Section 6(a) (4) to issuances of stock done in the course of and as part of the process of increasing the authorized capital stock of a corporation, the SEC is enabled to examine issuances by a corporation of previously authorized but theretofore unissued capital stock, on a case-tocase basis, under Section 6(b); and thereunder, to grant or withhold exemption from the normal registration requirements depending upon the perceived level of need for protection by the investing public in particular cases. In fine, only Sections 4(f), 11 and 46 are ultra vires, beyond the authority of the DOH to promulgate and in contravention of the Milk Code and, therefore, null and void. The rest of the provisions of the RIRR are in consonance with the Milk Code. The DOH, through its co-respondents, evidently arrogated to itself not only the regulatory authority given to the IAC but also imposed absolute prohibition on advertising, promotion, and marketing. Yet, oddly enough, Section 12 of the RIRR reiterated the requirement of the Milk Code in Section 6 thereof for prior approval by IAC of all advertising, marketing and promotional materials prior to dissemination. Sections 11 and 4(f) of the RIRR are clearly violative of the Milk Code. However, although it is the IAC which is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations for the approval or rejection of advertising, promotional, or other marketing materials under Section 12(a) of the Milk Code, said provision must be related to Section 6 thereof which in turn provides that the rules and regulations must be "pursuant to the applicable standards provided for in this Code." Said standards are set forth in Sections 5(b), 8(b), and 10 of the Code. With regard to Section 46 of the RIRR providing for administrative sanctions that are not found in the Milk Code, the Court upholds petitioner's objection thereto. In the present case, neither the Milk Code nor the Revised Administrative Code grants the DOH the authority to fix or impose administrative fines. Thus, without any express grant of power to fix or impose such fines, the DOH cannot provide for those fines in the RIRR. In this regard, the DOH again exceeded its authority by providing for

PHAP v Duque III (2007)

WON the DOH acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and in violation of the Constitution in promulgating the RIRR of the Milk Code in certain provisions only

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such fines or sanctions in Section 46 of the RIRR. Said provision is, therefore, null and void.

Lupangco v CA (1988)

1) 2)

WON RTC has jurisdiction over PRC YES WON Resolution 105 of the PRC is unconstitutional YES

The respondent court erred when it place the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Professional Regulation Commsision in the same category. As alraedy mentioned, with respect to the Securities and Exchange Commission, the laws cited explicitly provide with the procedure that need be taken when one is aggrieved by its order or ruling. Upon the other hand, there is no law providing for the next course of action for a party who wants to question a ruling or order of the Professional Regulation Commission. Unlike Commonwealth Act No. 83 and Presidential Decree No. 902-A, there is no provision in Presidential Decree No. 223, creating the Professional Regulation Commission, that orders or resolutions of the Commission are appealable either to the Court of Appeals or to theSupreme Court. Consequently, Civil Case No. 86-37950, which was filed in order to enjoin the enforcement of a resolution of the respondent Professional Regulation Commission alleged to be unconstitutional, should fall within the general jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, now the Regional Trial Court. What is clear from Presidential Decree No. 223 is that the Professional Regulation Commission is attached to the 8 Office of the President for general direction and coordination. Well settled in our jurisprudence is the view that even acts of the Office of the President may be reviewed by the Court of First Instance. The clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication. The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. An example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of President Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a law does not affect the public although it unquestionably does not apply directly to all the people. The subject of such law is a matter of public interest which any member of the body politic may question in the political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in the courts of justice. In fact, a law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest even if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and t to the public as a whole. We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. administrative rules and regulations must a also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation. Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties UH8l.

Tanada v Tuvera (1986)

WON publication is an indispensable requirement for laws to be binding and effective YES

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Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place. All presidential decrees must be published, including even, say, those naming a public place after a favored individual or exempting him from certain prohibitions or requirements. The circulars issued by the Monetary Board must be published if they are meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce We agree that publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws. As correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the mere mention of the number of the presidential decree, the title of such decree, its whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication requirement. This is not even substantial compliance. In order that a special civil action of certiorari may be invoked in this jurisdiction the following circumstances must exist: (1) that there must be a specific controversy involving rights of persons or property and said controversy is brought before a tribunal, board or officer for hearing and determination of their respective rights and obligations. (2) the tribunal, board or officer before whom the controversy is brought must have the power and authority to pronounce judgment and render a decision on the controversy construing and applying the laws to that end. (3) the tribunal, board or officer must pertain to that branch of the sovereign power which belongs to the judiciary, or at least, which does not belong to the legislative or executive department. It is clear, however, that it is the nature of the act to be performed, rather than of the office, board, or body which performs it, that determines whether or not it is the discharge of a judicial or quasi-judicial function. It is evident, upon the foregoing authorities, that the so called committee on the rating of students for honor whose actions are questioned in this case exercised neither judicial nor quasi judicial functions in the performance of its assigned task. From the above-quoted portions of the decision cited, it will be gleaned that before tribunal board, or officer may exercise judicial or quasi judicial acts, it is necessary that there be a law that give rise to some specific rights of persons or property under which adverse claims to such rights are made, and the controversy ensuing therefrom is brought, in turn, before the tribunal, board or officer clothed with power and authority to determine what that law is and thereupon adjudicate the respective rights of the contending parties. As pointed 3 out by appellees, however, there is nothing on record about any rule of law that provides that when teachers sit down to assess the individual merits of their pupils for purposes of rating them for honors, such function involves the determination of what the law is and that they are therefore automatically vested with judicial or quasi judicial functions. Worse still, this Court has not even been appraised by appellant of the pertinent provisions of the Service Manual of Teachers for Public Schools appellees allegedly violated in the composition of the committee they constituted thereunder, and, in the performance of that committee's duties. The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter. The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., Page 4

Santiago, Jr. v Bautista (1970) The Committe on the Rating of Students For Honor not a body exercising judicial functions

WON the Committe on the Rating of Students For Honor is a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions against which an action for certiorari may lie NO

Carino v CHR (1991) CHR has no judicial or quasijudicial power

WON the CHR has the power under the Constitution to try and decide, or hear and determine, certain types of cases, like alleged human rights violations involving civil or political rights

Admin/Muyot

receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. 21 This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have. Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into, research on, study. The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to observe or study closely: inquire into systematically. "to search or inquire into: . . . to subject to an official probe . . .: to conduct an official inquiry." 27 The purpose of investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts established by the inquiry. The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" 28 "to inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn describe as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; . . . an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters." 29 "Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of issues raised: . . . to pass judgment on: settle judicially: . . . act as judge." 30 And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: . . . to award or grant judicially in a case of controversy . . . ." 31 In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. . . . Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment." 32 Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the merits" (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and it cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been transgressed.

Antipolo Realty Corp. V NHA (1987)

WON the NHA has jurisidiction to settle cases involving specific performance of contractual obligations, such as that bet. petitioner and Mr. Yuson YES

It is by now commonplace learning that many administrative agencies exercise and perform adjudicatory powers and functions, though to a limited extent only. Limited delegation of judicial or quasi-judicial authority to administrative agencies (e.g., the Securities and Exchange Commission and the National Labor Relations 7 Commission) is well recognized in our jurisdiction, basically because the need for special competence and Page 5

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experience has been recognized as essential in the resolution of questions of complex or specialized character and because of a companion recognition that the dockets of our regular courts have remained crowded and clogged. In general the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial powers which an administrative agency may exercise is defined in the enabling act of such agency. In other words, the extent to which an administrative entity may exercise such powers depends largely, if not wholly, on the provisions of the statute creating or empowering such agency. 10 In the exercise of such powers, the agency concerned must commonly interpret and apply contracts and determine the rights of private parties under such contracts. Thus, the extent to which the NHA has been vested with quasi-judicial authority must be determined by referring to the terms of Presidential Decree No. 957, known as "The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers' Decree." Presidential Decree No. 1344 12 clarified and spelled out the quasi-judicial dimensions of the grant of regulatory authority to the NHA.

Azarcon v Sandiganbayan ( 1997)

WON petitioner has become public officer when he agreed to act as depositary of the garnished dump truck of Ancla such that the Sandiganbayan then has the jurisdiction over the petitioner NO

t is axiomatic in our constitutional framework, which mandates a limited government, that its branches and administrative agencies exercise only that power delegated to them as "defined either in the Constitution or in 34 35 legislation or in both." Thus, although the "appointing power is the exclusive prerogative of the President, . . ." the quantum of powers possessed by an administrative agency forming part of the executive branch will still be limited to that "conferred expressly or by necessary or fair implication" in its enabling act. Hence, "(a)n administrative officer, it has been held, has only such powers as are expressly granted to him and those necessarily 36 implied in the exercise thereof." Corollarily, implied powers "are those which are necessarily included in, and are therefore of lesser degree than the power granted. It cannot extend to other matters not embraced therein, nor 37 are not incidental thereto." For to so extend the statutory grant of power "would be an encroachment on powers expressly lodged in Congress by our Constitution." However, we find no provision in the NIRC constituting such person a public officer by reason of such requirement. The BIR's power authorizing a private individual to act as a depositary cannot be stretched to include the power to appoint him as a public officer. A private individual who has in his charge any of the public funds or property enumerated therein and commits any of the acts defined in any of the provisions of Chapter Four, Title Seven of the RPC, should likewise be penalized with the same penalty meted to erring public officers. Nowhere in this provision is it expressed or implied that a private individual falling under said Article 222 is to be deemed a public officer. From the foregoing discussion, it is evident that the petitioner did not cease to be a private individual when he agreed to act as depositary of the garnished dump truck. Therefore, when the information charged him and Jaime Ancla before the Sandiganbayan for malversation of public funds or property, the prosecution was in fact charging two private individuals without any public officer being similarly charged as a co-conspirator. Consequently, the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the controversy and therefore all the proceedings taken below as well as the Decision rendered by Respondent Sandiganbayan, are null and void for lack of jurisdiction. PLDT has cited in full the authority and powers given by Presidential Decree No. 1 to the Board of Communications, now National Telecommunications Commission. There is nothing in the Commission's powers which authorizes it Page 6

Bosier v CA (1983) Admin/Muyot

Whether the jurisdiction to hear and decide controversies arising from the

operation of telephone systems falls under the NTC or the CFI CFI

to adjudicate breach of contract cases, much less to award moral and exemplary damages. Clearly, therefore, what the petitioner is questioning is an order which does not merely involve "a purely internal transaction of a telecommunications company" but one which would necessary affect rights guaranteed it by the contract allegedly violated. The Board of Communications has been renamed National Telecommunications Commission. The NTC has no jurisdiction, and the PLDT has made no showing of any, not even by necessary implication, to decide an issue involving breach of contract. And as we stated in RCPI v. Board of Communications, "if in the two cases before us, complainants Diego Morales and Pacifica Inocencio allegedly suffered injury due to petitioner's breach of contractual obligation, ... the proper forum for them to ventilate their grievances for possible recovery of damages against petitioner should be in the courts and not in the respondent Board of Communications." Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or the law. This Court held that "the NPC is not the proper authority . . ., not only because the subject matter of the hearing is a matter involving the NPC itself, but also because the law has created the proper administrative body vested with authority to conduct a hearing." As may be gleaned from said provisions, the ERB is basically a price or rate-fixing agency. Apparently recognizing this basic function, Republic Act No. 7638 (An Act Creating the Department of Energy, Rationalizing the Organization and Functions of Government Agencies Related to Energy, and for Other Purposes), which was approved on December 9, 1992. It is our opinion that only the non-price regulatory functions of ERB under Section 3 of E.O. 172 are transferred to the DOE. All the powers of ERB which are not within the purview of its "non-price regulatory jurisdiction, powers and functions" as defined in Section 3 are not so transferred to DOE and accordingly remain vested in ERB. The foregoing sufficiently indicates that it is now the Department of Energy that has jurisdiction over the regulation of the marketing and the distribution of energy resources. It may be true that this function formerly belonged to the ERB, by virtue of the "Cabinet Policy Reforms in the Energy Sector" embodied in the Cabinet Memorandum of January 23, 1987, and EO 172 issued May 8, 1987. However, pursuant to Section 18 of RA 7638, which was subsequently enacted by Congress on December 9, 1992, the non-rate-fixing, jurisdiction, powers and functions of the ERB have been transferred to the Department of Energy. The applications for the NPC's direct supply or disconnection of power involve essentially the distribution of energy resources, not by any incident the determination of power rates. Consequently, these applications must be resolved by the DOE.

Energy Regulatory Board v CA (1990)

WON the Energy Regulatory Board has jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving direct connection issues

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