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Imagine that you are looking at a red, round tomato. What properties does your
experience represent the object as having? Presumably your experience represents the
object as red and round, but does it also represent it as being a tomato, and as being
bought from Sainsbury’s as opposed to Tesco’s? Some philosophers think that visual
experience represents only a narrow range of properties, for instance, colour, shape, size
and location properties, whilst other philosophers think that visual experience represents
a much larger range of properties, including natural kind, artificial kind and semantic
properties. Philosophers in the first camp include Colin McGinn, Alan Millar and Tyler
Burge, and philosophers in the second camp include Susanna Siegel and Christopher
Peacocke. In this paper, I shall offer a new argument for thinking that the philosophers in
visual experience represents an object, x, as red, is to say that x looks red. Hence the
central question of this paper concerns which properties objects can look to have—can an
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For helpful comments and discussions, thanks to Tim Williamson, Rory Madden, Geoff Lee, Hemdat
Lerman, Susanna Siegel, David Chalmers, Matthew Soteriou, Wylie Breckenridge, Anders Nes and Bill
Brewer.
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object look to be a tomato in the same way that an object can look to be red? The notion
Hence, if x is not F, then the experience is not veridical, and if x is F, then the experience
To show that experience does not represent the property of being a tomato, I shall
Two properties that satisfy principle P are the properties of being red and being
square. Something can be red without being square; experience is capable of representing
representing it as square.
The argument for principle P consists in considering what would have to be the
case for it to be false. For P to be false, there would have to be two properties, x and y,
such that something can be x without being y, but for some reason it is not possible to
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represent x without representing y. What would explain the fact it is not possible to
Consider the property of being brown and the property of being rusty. Prima
something can be rusty without being brown, it is not clear whether something can look
rusty without looking brown. However, I do not think that these properties are a counter-
example; let me explain. Imagine a world, w1 , in which rusty things were green. There
would surely be the same inclination in w1 to say that something could look rusty and
green as there is in our world to say that something can look rusty and brown. So if
something can look rusty at all, then one should accept that it is in principle possible for
The reason for the final condition in principle P that refers to enabling conditions
of experience is due to the following case. Consider the property of being red and the
property of having a brightness level greater than zero. Something can certainly be red
without having a brightness level greater than zero, yet it seems impossible to represent
something as red without representing it as having a brightness level greater than zero.
This is because to represent anything at all you must represent it as having a brightness
level greater than zero—that is, having a brightness level greater than zero is an enabling
condition of experience. The moral of this is that whenever there are enabling conditions
of experience such that they are always represented in perception, all other properties that
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are capable of being represented will be represented alongside these enabling conditions.
I shall now turn to my main argument. Consider two properties for x and y. The
first is the property of being a tomato. The second is the property of having all the highly
specific colour and shape properties relevant to the appearance of a given tomato. I shall
call this latter property the agglomeration property, which is just an abbreviation for
certain colour and shape properties. Something can have the agglomeration property
without having the tomato property, for instance a wax tomato, and it is widely accepted
that experiences can represent the colour and shape properties contained in the
agglomeration property without the tomato property. Let us take such an experience that
is representing the agglomeration property without the tomato property. This gives rise to
a problem: how must one’s experiences change in order to start representing the tomato
property in addition to the agglomeration property? What would justify one in thinking
that one’s experiences have started to represent this extra property? In general, what is
the perceptual difference between representing the collection of colour and shape
properties of a certain tomato, and representing the property of being a tomato in addition
to the collection of colour and shape properties? I call this the perceptual difference
problem.
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One response that does not seem promising to me would to argue that, although
the tomato property is not an enabling condition for representing all properties in
does not seem plausible, however. Imagine a world in which lemons, rather than
tomatoes, had the tomato-agglomeration property (i.e. were red and round); there would
surely be just the same inclination to say that, in such a world, subjects who represented
actual world to say that subjects who represent the tomato-agglomeration property
represent the tomato property. So it is not plausible that representing the tomato property
agglomeration property.
problem, and I shall argue that none of them is successful. The first response is the
phenomenological response, on which when you know what kind of thing a tomato is,
your experiences acquire a new phenomenology that represents the property of being a
tomato. The second response is the dispositionalist response, which says that if you are
disposed to judge that something is a tomato on the basis of certain experiences, that is
sufficient for those experiences to represent the property of being a tomato. The third
response is the causal view, on which if experiences of a certain kind are normally caused
by tomatoes, that is sufficient for experiences of that kind to represent the property of
being a tomato.
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Response (1): the phenomenological response
phenomenology which represents the property of being a tomato. Similarly when you
represent respectively the properties of being Bob, being a picture of a face, being
Russian. In general, then, this view is that recognition of the object of experience
produces new phenomenological properties within the experience which are best
Let us define the new phenomenology that is produced upon visually recognizing
tomato, independently of any externalist considerations about whether there are tomatoes
in one’s environment. But, I shall argue, once an externalist component is added, the
different, from the tomato, which we can call the twin-tomato. When twin-Oscar acquires
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the concept twin-tomato and comes to recognise twin-tomatoes as twin-tomatoes, it
seems plausible that his experiences caused by twin-tomatoes will acquire the very same
new phenomenology that tomatoes acquire on earth when Oscar acquires the concept
tomato and comes to recognise objects as tomatoes. This is because there need be nothing
represents twin-tomatoes as tomatoes, and this seems implausible. After all, twin-Oscar
has just as good grounds for saying that the illusions are occurring on earth.
the property of whatever normally causes it. On earth, what normally causes the tomato-
phenomenology are tomatoes, and on twin-earth, what normally causes it are twin-
tomatoes. But, with this component, the view essentially reduces to the causal view
which I mentioned above and which I shall discuss below. What is now making the
experience represent the property of being a tomato is the causal relation holding between
instance, had there been some other phenomenology in the experience that was normally
caused by tomatoes, that other phenomenology would have represented the property of
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apples—was normally caused by tomatoes. In that world, apple-phenomenology would
represent the property of being a tomato. What is doing the representational work, then, is
amendment we have been considering, the guiding idea of the phenomenological view
has been lost, namely that the new phenomenology produced by recognizing something
as a tomato has some special role to play in explaining how experience comes to
that something is a tomato, on the basis of certain experiences, then that is sufficient for
those experiences to represent the property of being a tomato. Very similar to the
dispositional view is a view we can call the ‘recognition’ view. On the recognition view,
after one acquires the concept tomato, and becomes familiar with tomatoes, one acquires
a visual recognitional capacity for tomatoes that gets absorbed into the content of
experience in such a way that one’s experiences come to represent the property of being a
tomato. If I have read him correctly, Christopher Peacocke has recently endorsed this
view in The Realm of Reason. The recognition view seems to me the same view as the
dispositional view. Consider the twin-earth scenario again. Oscar and twin-Oscar are able
representing the very same agglomeration property of colours and shapes. What can
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explain how Oscar comes to have a recognitional capacity for tomatoes, whilst twin-
Oscar comes to have a recognitional capacity for twin-tomatoes? One option would be to
say that Oscar applies the concept tomato when he exercises his recognitional capacity
for tomatoes, whereas twin-Oscar applies the concept twin-tomato when he exercises his
of concepts, this option amounts to the dispositional view of perception. One could argue
that what makes Oscar’s and twin-Oscar’s recognitional capacities different is that they
are caused by different kinds of thing. This option would amount to the causal view,
which I shall discuss below. The important point at this stage is that the recognition view
does not count as a view distinct from either of the theories of perceptual representation
covered in this paper. For simplicity, in the rest of this section I shall assume that the
recognition view is the same as the dispositional view, rather than the causal view, and I
view held by many philosophers. I think, for instance, that it is the natural way of
construing certain claims about the shape, colour, and size constancy of perception—the
idea that an object looks the same colour under different types of illumination, or that an
object looks the same size at different distances from the subject. However, I won’t
constituted by what the subject is disposed to judge. Let us call this ‘dispositional’
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content. The various reasons why philosophers have thought that experience has a non-
conceptual content support the idea that at least some of the content of experience is not
having the corresponding dispositions to judge. For instance, it is plausible that we can
discriminate more shades of colour than we have colour concepts for; that non-concept
possessing animals can have essentially the same perceptual experiences as us; and that
we are able to acquire empirical concepts on the basis of experience, which would seem
that part of the content of experience that is not constituted by what one is disposed to
one can non-dispositionally represent colour and shape properties. Can one non-
difference argument again: assume now that one’s experiences are non-dispositionally
representing the colour and shape properties of a given tomato; how would your
of being a tomato in addition to the colour and shape properties of the tomato? The
answering this question, then we can take ourselves to have shown that, even by the
lights of the dispositional view, if experience does represent the property of being a
tomato, it does so in a different way from the way in which it represents colour and shape
properties.
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However, in what follows, I shall argue that there is no dispositional content in
paper through a red pane of glass which she knows is there. The piece of paper looks red,
but, given that the subject knows that the red pane of glass is there, she is disposed to
judge that piece of paper is in fact white. According to the above construal of the
dispositionalist theory, the experience non-dispositionally represents the paper as red, but
dispositionally represents it as white. It follows that the overall content of the experience
is that a contradictory state of affairs obtains: the experience represents that the paper is
both white and red. That the dispositionalist view entails that such an experience has a
view. It is implausible that, simply because you are disposed to disagree with the way the
world is presented to you in experience, it follows that the experience represents that a
dispositions to judge a subject may have, and yet there do seem to be constraints on what
sorts of properties a perceptual experience may represent. Consider the property of being
Tony Blair’s favourite fruit. I may be disposed to recognise tomatoes as Tony Blair’s
favourite fruit, yet it seems implausible that I would thereby perceptually represent
tomatoes as Tony Blair’s favourite fruit. What makes this implausible is that it entails
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that my experience on one such occasion would have been non-veridical had Tony Blair
woken up and decided then that he preferred pears to tomatoes that day.
The dispositionalist could try to avoid this conclusion by saying that only those
judgements that are made rational by experience become part of the content of the
significant question, but one idea would be a matter of the subject possessing evidence
that, if they were having that kind of experience, the judgement would probably be true.
But if this is the rational constraint, then it is clear that the judgement that something is
Tony Blair’s favourite fruit meets it: one can, after all, have evidence that if something
I shall now turn to consider a different view of how experience comes to represent
the property of being a tomato. On this view, if one’s Z-type experiences are normally
caused by tomatoes, then that is sufficient for one’s Z-type experiences to represent the
property of being a tomato. This view of the content of experience has been endorsed by
Let us call the content of experience that is constituted by what normally cause
the experience the ‘causal’ content. Just as when we were considering the dispositional
view, it seemed plausible that there was some content of the experience that was non-
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dispositional, equally it now seems plausible that there must be some content of the
experience that is not causal content. For instance, it seems that a stick can look bent to a
subject, owing to unusual lighting conditions, even though the subject has only ever been
in causal contact with straight things. Also it seems that something can look blue to a
subject, owing to unusual lighting conditions, even though the subject has never actually
been in causal contact with anything blue. Let us call the part of the content of the
experience that is not constituted by what experiences are normally caused by ‘non-
causal’ content. Can experience non-causally represent the property of being a tomato?
Consider the perceptual difference argument again: assume now that a subject’s
experiences are non-causally representing the colour and shape properties of a given
tomato; how must those experiences change in order to start non-causally representing
the property of being a tomato? The causal view is now ruled out as an answer to this
question. If no theory is capable of answering this question, then we can take ourselves to
have shown that, even by the lights of the causal view, if experience does represent the
property of being a tomato, it does so differently from the way in which it represents
discussing various problems facing this view. To recap, according to the causal view, if
one’s Z-type experiences are normally caused by tomatoes, then that is sufficient for
one’s Z-type experiences to represent the property of being a tomato. The first problem
with this view, which I call the ‘plurality’ problem, is due to the fact that there are many
normal causes of a given experience, and yet it is implausible to think that experience
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represents every single one of them. The second problem, which I call the ‘individuation’
problem, concerns how to choose the correct way of individuating a given experience,
since this affects what counts as the relevant normal causal relations that determine the
I shall start with the plurality problem, which I shall argue there are two kinds of,
namely a horizontal problem and a vertical problem. Firstly, the horizontal problem.
There are a number of properties which are co-extensive with the property of being a
tomato, and which are causally relevant to a subject having Z-type experiences, but
certain nitrate level. It might well be that standard tomatoes have a fairly unique nitrate
level in the actual world. That they have this nitrate level is also causally relevant to how
they look (had they had different nitrate levels, they would have looked to have different
colours and shapes). Thus experiences that are normally caused by tomatoes are also
normally caused by objects with particular nitrate levels. However it seems implausible
to think that those experiences represent the property of having certain nitrate levels.
There is, in fact, a large set of properties, all coextensive with the property of being a
tomato, and all causally relevant to how tomatoes look. The horizontal problem is the
problem of saying which of the properties in this set are represented, given that not all of
The second kind of plurality problem is the vertical problem. All human
experiences are caused by the Big Bang, yet clearly not all human experiences represent
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the property of being the Big Bang. Similarly, reddish experiences are normally caused
by light of a certain wavelength hitting the retina, but reddish experiences do not
represent the property of light of a certain wavelength hitting the retina. The vertical
problem is the problem of picking out from the causal chain of events leading from the
Big Bang to the neural stimulation in the brain, which events we should count as the ones
that the experience represents. The challenge facing the causal theorist is to find a way of
restricting the class of normal causes of an experience to just those that are relevant to
determining the content of the experience. There are strong theoretical reasons for
thinking that the vertical problem will be hard to answer. As David Lewis has argued,
picking out an event as ‘the’ cause of some event, and calling the rest mere causal factors
or causal conditions, is simply a matter of what we are interested in. (Lewis, 1993, 195-
6).
The second problem I call the ‘individuation’ problem. The individuation problem
concerns how to individuate the relevant ‘kind’ of experience whose causal relations to
the world determine the content of experience. Consider an experience of a straight stick
partially immersed in water. What counts as the normal causes of this experience depends
an experience with ‘bent-line’ phenomenology, then this kind of experience will probably
be normally be caused by bent lines, and the experience will represent the property of
being a bent line. But if we individuate the experience as an experience with ‘bent-line
phenomenology one has in at least some watery conditions, then this kind of experience
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will probably be normally caused by straight sticks partially immersed in water, and so
the experience will represent the property of being a straight stick partially immersed in
water. But this is a quite different content specifying quite different veridicality
conditions for the experience. It seems difficult in principle to decide what the correct
way of individuating the experience is, and thus what the causal content of a given
I shall mention one final problem for the causal theory. According to the causal
theory, once a subject’s reddish, roundish experiences have normally been caused by
tomatoes, then it is no longer possible to have reddish, roundish experiences that do not
represent the property of being a tomato. Yet consider the following scenario: a subject’s
green experiences have normally been caused by green squares. This does not mean that
it is no longer possible for the subject to have green experiences without representing the
property of being a green square. For consider the first green circle that the subject comes
across: the subject will represent this as a green circle, not as a green square, even though
her green experiences have normally been caused by green squares. But why is there this
difference? Why is it that if green experiences have normally been caused by green
squares, that does not mean that all green experiences henceforth will represent the
property of being a green square; yet if reddish, roundish experiences have normally been
caused by tomatoes, then henceforth all reddish roundish experiences will represent the
property of being a tomato? The causal view must concede that there is a difference here
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Conclusion
I have argued that any view which holds that experience can represent the
property of being a tomato faces the perceptual difference challenge, namely saying how
one’s experiences must change in order for them to go from representing just the colour
addition to the colour and shape properties of the tomato. I think that that the perceptual
are not colour, shape, size and location properties. And, given that all the responses to the
may conclude that experience does not represent any properties other than colour, shape,
Bibliography:
D. Lewis, 1993, ‘Causation’, in Causation, eds. Sosa and Tooley, Oxford: OUP.
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