NWC 1036

THE UNITED STATES NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT

The 1982 Falklands-Malvinas Case Study By Douglas N. Hime, JMO Faculty

June 4, 2010

Acknowledgements Several important participants, experts, critics, and editors provided commentary and corrections during my compilation of this case study, and I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge the tremendous insights they provided. In particular, I would like to thank CDR Angus K. Ross, RN (Ret.)., CDR Neil J. Thompson, OBE RN, CDR Guillermo Repetto, Argentine Navy, CDR Alberto A. Soto, Chilean Navy, CAPT Michael Critz, USN (Ret.), Dean Robert C. Rubel, College of Naval Warfare Studies of the Naval War College and Professors Milan N. Vego and Albion Bergstrom of the Joint Military Operations Department, Naval War College.

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Contents Initial Argentinean Planning ...1 South Georgia Incident ...2 Operation ROSARIO ..3 Tensions Escalate 6 Argentina Invades and Britain Responds 7 Operation CORPORATE ..11 Argentine Occupation and Preparation for Defense .13 The Fighting Begins ..18 Operation SUTTON ..28 The Landings 31 Goose Green ..37 Fitzroy and Bluff Cove .42 The Push to Port Stanley ...44 Negotiations ..46 Epilogue 46 Notes .48 1982 Falklands War Timeline ..57 Order of Battle, British Units in the Falklands War .66 Order of Battle, Argentine Units ...71 Bibliography .75

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The Falklands-Malvinas Case Study Ownership of the Falklands/Malvinas Islands since their initial discovery has always been determined by force, with British control last established in 1833 following the expulsion of the Argentine gunboat Sarandi and its contingent of soldiers, convicts from the penal colony at San Carlos, and Argentine settlers. Irrespective of a definitive conclusion regarding rightful possession, Argentina continued to contest British occupation and ownershipparticularly since the 1959 signing of the Antarctic Treaty, which demilitarized the Antarctic and froze the competing claims of a number of nations, including Chile, Argentina, and Great Britain. 1 With resolution of Antarctic claims on hold, the surrounding waters became more important with regard to exploration for resourceshence, Argentina refocused on its continental shelf in the sub-Antarctic and South Atlantic, attempting diplomatically to resolve the dispute over ownership of the Malvinas beginning in the mid-1960s.2 Nearly twenty years later Argentina was under the governance of a trio of military service commanders who had ruled since 1976. Part of that leadership changed in December 1981 when General Leopoldo Galtieri, the Army Commander-in-Chief, pushed aside former President General Roberto Viola, citing failed national economic policies; Galtieri would run the country along with the head of the Navy, Admiral Jorge Anaya, and the head of Argentinas Air Force, General Basilio Lami Dozo. In addition to inheriting a failing economy and facing international condemnation over human rights abuses, the junta had recently been dealt a blow by the Pope, who had ruled against Argentina in a territorial dispute with Chile over the Beagle Channela strait separating islands of the Tierra del Fuego Archipelago at the southern end of the South American continent. Needing a quick victory, the junta turned its attention to the only national policy issue upon which it could take actionthe return of the Malvinas.3 Initial Argentinean Planning Like most militaries, the Argentineans prepared military plans for those scenarios that they felt were the most compelling for their country. National-level war planning, however, was not a joint activityexcept in times of crisis, and even then joint cooperation tended to be accomplished by ad hoc committees. For routine planning, each service prepared its own plans, and Admiral Anayas navy naturally focused on the South Atlantic, updating plans for the Malvinas that had been around since the mid-60s. In January 1982, however, Admiral Anaya quietly told the new Chief of Naval Operations, VADM Juan Jose Lombardo, to prepare a plan to take back the Malvinas without necessarily keeping them. The junta wanted to see the islands returned before the 150th anniversary of their loss to the BritishJanuary 1983. Consequently, 1982 was to be the year of the Malvinas.4 Consideration of the Malvinas was immediately given a higher priority and a joint planning group was established to think about the best way to reacquire the Malvinas should diplomacy with the United Kingdom continue to be fruitless. While the Navy had been planning and exercising the Malvinas problem at its Naval War School for years, few felt that execution of a Malvinas plan would ever be initiated. Moreover, each plan, regardless of updates, contained the same basic characteristicsa stated objective of evicting the British in order to restore Argentine 1

national sovereignty and a quick, surprise intervention with no loss of British or Islander lives. 5 With negotiations between Argentina and Britain scheduled to resume in February 1982, the joint planning group believed it had a few more months to finalize planning should negotiations fail. An invasion, if it were to occur, was likely to happen between July and Octoberthe optimum period in the South Atlantic for an incursionbecause it would be much more difficult for the British to expel occupying Argentine forces during the depths of winter, the annual class of Argentine conscripts would have completed their training, and the last permanent British maritime presence in the vicinity would have ended following the departure of the British patrol ship HMS Endurance.6 Since the British would have only the small Royal Marine garrison left to face an overwhelming invasion, Argentina hoped that a quick, bloodless capitulation would be followed by British resignation to a fait accompli and recognition of the futility of mounting an 8,000mile maritime expedition during the Southern Hemispheres worst seasonal maritime weather. Optimistic that the United States would maintain its impartial neutrality, the junta anticipated that the United Nations would be relieved that the problematic Falklands/Malvinas sovereignty issue was finally off its dockets. With time apparently on its side, the planning team assumed that repossession of South Georgia and the Sandwich Islands would automatically follow suit.7 The South Georgia Incident Unfortunately, events were soon to escalateas activities on South Georgia began to spiral out of control. They began when Constantine Davidoff, an Argentine scrap-metal merchant who had contracted in 1979 with Christian Salvesen, a Scottishbased shipping firm, to clear scrap iron over the next three years from four abandoned whaling stations in the vicinity of Leith, South Georgiaa bleak and remote Falklands Islands dependency in the South Atlanticbegan his efforts in earnest. Though Davidoff notified the British Embassy in Buenos Aires of his working partys expedition to South Georgia in March 1982 aboard the Argentine naval transport the Baha Buen Suceso, he did not obtain a landing permit, agreeing instead that his representative would report to the British Antarctic Survey base at Grytviken, which was roughly 20 miles from Leith.8 Davidoffs senior engineer, however, failed to travel to Grytviken to obtain the pass. While out on a routine survey, one of the Survey bases scientists spotted the Argentine ship, saw the Argentina flag flying over the whaling station, and heard shots being fired (subsequently claimed to be deer hunting). He reported his sighting and what hed heard to the British Magistrate at Grytviken who in turn notified Governor Rex Hunt, the British Governor of the Falklands, of the incident. Though the engineer had been told that a representative must come to Grytviken to obtain a landing permit, equipment and supplies offloading had been completed, and a harsh South Atlantic gale appeared to be developing, so the Argentinean flag came down and the Baha Buen Suceso departed, leaving the scrap metal workers behindunaware of the diplomatic storm that was brewing.9 Governor Hunt, meanwhile, had reported the Argentine territorial infringement to London, mistakenly noting that Argentine naval personnel were using a scrap-metal salvage ruse to establish an Argentine presence on South Georgia. Lord Carrington, the 2

British Foreign Secretary, formally protested to Buenos Aires demanding that the landing party be removed immediately by the Baha Buen Suceso or else Royal Marines would do it forcefully. Ordered to turn around and head for South Georgia, HMS Endurance arrived at Grytviken on 24 March and immediately put its 22 Royal Marines ashore.10 Stung by the harshness of the Carrington ultimatum and suspicious that the British were orchestrating tension to enhance their negotiating position, Argentina ordered the armed naval survey ship, Baha Paraiso, then conducting routine training near the South Orkney Islands, to land a full marine detachment of fourteen men at Leith to protect the scrap metal workers. With armed forces from both sides now just twenty miles apart, the Argentine junta was not about to be humiliated over South Georgia. It decided to abandon its carefully-planned diplomatic offensive, using this incident of British unreasonableness as an excuse to occupy the Falklands, which it hoped world support would recognize as an acceptable resolution of an on-going, intractable, minor territorial dispute.11 Operation ROSARIO On 23 March, VADM Lombardo had been directed by the junta to accelerate planning so that an invasion force could launch within 48-72 hours of notification.12 Because most of their naval transports were occupied supporting South Georgia, deploying Argentine forces would be dependent upon the surface fleet for movement to East Falkland Island. The Argentine bloodless plan envisioned persuading the British governor that there was no point in resisting.13 To ensure they recognized the futility of resisting, the Royal Marine detachment had to be prevented from retreating into the interior of the islands where its members could continue resistance indefinitely. That meant that the marines had to be captured in their barracks or stopped before they could reach Stanley, with interior routes blocked. To create an impression of overwhelming, irresistible force, the Argentine concept of operation (Figure 2 and 3) involved a coordinated amphibious and airborne assault that was preceded by infiltration, with ground forces converging on Stanley from all directions, quickly gaining control of the airport, the British marine barracks, the population, and the islands communications and warning systemsall of which required clear but flexible command and control structures.14 For the initial invasion, the Malvinas Theater of Operations was established, with General Osvaldo Garca, the commander of the Armys Fifth Corps in Patagonia, as overall commander (Figure 1).15 Under him were BG Amrico Daher, Commander, Ground Forces (Army), BG Mario Menndez, the Military Governor-designate of the Malvinas, and RADM Walter Allara (Task Force 40), who was the amphibious force commander. Under RADM Allara was naval infantry (Marine Corps) RADM Carlos Bsser, who was the landing force commander. Protecting the landing forces from a distance to their north was Task Force 20, which contained Argentinas lone aircraft carrier, Veinticinco de Mayo, as well as four destroyers and a tankerall under the command of Captain J.J. Sarcona (TF 20), who reported directly to VADM Lombardo as did RADM Allara, despite the stated command arrangements (Figure 2).16 Gen

Garcias mission, according to the Campaign Plan, was to militarily occupy and maintain the Falklands islands, South Georgia, and the Sandwich Islands.17 The plan had three phases: preliminary, military strategic maneuver and conquering of the objective, and maintenance of the objective and military government.18 Despite the plans joint imprimatur, execution would largely be in the hands of the navy, led by TF 40, under RADM Allara. TF 40 included the former American landing ship-tank (LST) Cabo San

Antonio, which was carrying nineteen amphibious landing vehicles as well as the 874man landing force from the Buzo Tctico marine commandos and the 2d Marine Infantry Battalion, all under the command of RADM Bsser. Additional forces included the destroyers Santsima Trinidad and Hrcules, corvettes Drummond and Granville, icebreaker Almirante Irizar, the transport Isla de los Estados, and the submarine Santa F.19

As described above in the concept of operations overview (see schematics at Figures 3 and 4), the Buzo Tctico marine commandos were to be the first to land, quickly capturing Government House and the Royal Marine barracks at Moody Brook, followed by the 2d Marines who would come ashore at two points (see Figure 4)one clearing the airfield and the second coming directly into Stanley Harbor to provide overwhelming force should the Buzo Tctico commandos need assistance in convincing the Brits to surrender. Strict instructions were issued to all forces to ensure there would be no Falkland civilian casualties. Once the airport runway had been cleared of any obstacles emplaced by British resistance, the Armys 25th Infantry Regiment and the 9th Engineer Company would be airlifted in, with the 25th serving as the occupation force after the marines were to be withdrawn.20 Task Force 40 departed Puerto Belgrano on Sunday, 28 March, heading south for what most believed was a planned exercise. Few among the task forces senior officers knew the precise mission or its details because operational security concerns had kept knowledge of planning to a very limited number of senior officers. En route, on the second day, the true nature of the operation was revealed to the task forces senior officers, and, while maintaining secrecy was no longer an issue, the remainder of task force personnel werent informed of the objective until 1 Aprilthe scheduled date of execution. Fierce weather early in the trip, which lasted for 48 hours, forced a delay, and Galtieri and Allara agreed upon a new landing date of 2 April. Unfortunately, the delay necessitated other changes to the execution of Operation AZUL. 5

Tensions Escalate Meanwhile, the UK Foreign Office had received word on 25 March from the Endurance that the Baha Paraiso had anchored at Leith, military landing craft and a helicopter had been spotted, and that Argentinean warships had departed Puerto Belgrano. Lord Carrington feared that Argentina might attempt to prevent the Endurance from evacuating the scrap metal workers or cut off the air service and take other actions against the Falklands. As unlikely as these measures seemed, the Foreign Secretary feared that defending the Falklands was impossible. Various compromises were considered between Lord Carrington and his ambassador in Buenos Aires, and while the Argentinean Foreign Minister, Costa Mendez, seemed open to compromise, he was not a participant in the juntas deliberations.21 The British were concerned about the ability of the Endurance to delay its departure from the South Atlantic, so the Ministry of Defence dispatched the Fort Austin, a Royal Fleet Auxiliary to replenish its ice patrol vessel. With the Prime Ministers approval, it also covertly dispatched two nuclear-powered submarines toward the Falklands to counter any possible Argentine aggression while also avoiding intentional provocation.22 Unfortunately, a British Independent Television News (ITN) reporter had viewed a separate British submarine, HMS Superb, leave exercises in Gibraltar, and ITN subsequently broadcast that this submarine was in fact en route to the Falklands. While the Ministry of Defence was pleased that this misinformation showed the world that Great Britain was indeed serious about the sovereignty of its overseas territories, the Foreign Ministry was embarrassed in its negotiations with Argentina, whose diplomatic stance immediately hardened.23 6

Galtieri and Anaya had already made up their minds that the Malvinas must be occupied preemptively before any British reinforcements, possibly already mobilized and en route, arrived. Closely monitoring the press in Great Britain, the junta was convinced that the hardliners in parliament, particularly the Falklands Lobby, were swaying the countrys debate and that British intransigence was simply a way of gaining time while its fleet readied for a renewed, perhaps indefinite presence in the South Atlantic. Convinced that it could co-opt support for diplomatic resolution from both the United States and the United Nations, the Argentine objective was straightforwardforce substantive negotiations with Britain on the sovereignty of the Malvinas by conducting a non-violent repossessiona nuance that Great Britain as well as the rest of world would fail to grasp. A prolonged occupation was neither envisioned nor desired.24 Warned by British intelligence that an Argentine submarine was reconnoitering landing beaches on East Falkland Island, Governor Hunt broadcast a period of tension warning to the populace of Stanley and ordered that the airport runway be blocked. He also retained the outgoing marine detachment that had just completed its turnover with its replacement unitin effect, doubling the Royal Marine presence normally in place in Stanley. In turn, the Argentine airline office in Stanley relayed to the Argentine government that the Falkland Islands Governor had alerted everyone that an Argentine invasion was imminent. Realizing that the British garrison in Stanley knew they were coming, General Garcia and RADM Bsser quickly began to revise the invasion plan. The main landing beach was moved to a point further westYorke Bay; the direct flight from the mainland to the airport was cancelled; forces earmarked to capture Government House were switched to seizing the airport and clearing the runway; the amphibious commandos were relieved of securing key points in Stanley and instead were tasked to capture Government Housewith a force one-half the size of the army platoon that had planned that particular takedown; and the Goose Green-Darwin operation was cancelled (see Figure 3), adding those forces to the reserves for Stanley.25 Despite the imminence of an Argentine landing, the British were hopeful that lastminute diplomatic maneuvering by U.S. President Reagan would dissuade Galtieri from launching his invasion. And, while Reagan and Galtieri did speak, the latter was adamant that what had begun could not be stopped. Indeed, an hour prior to the telephone conversation between the two leaders, the Buzo Tctico marine commandos were en route to Mullet Creek.26 In Stanley on 1 April, Governor Hunt upgraded his earlier warning to imminent danger and gave orders that if tactical landings occurred, the invading forces were to be engaged, but no fighting was to occur in the vicinity of civilian housing. He fully expected that Argentina would land a token demonstration party who would raise the Argentine flag before allowing themselves to be captured. In turn, he would give them a stern warning and a glass of sherry before repatriating them to Argentina.27 Argentina Invades and Britain Responds Landing around 4:30 a.m. on 2 April, the commandos reached the Moody Brook barracks 90 minutes later, conducting a full-scale assaulttossing smoke grenades and raking each room with machine-gun fire.28 Only because the British marines had already assumed their defensive positions were their lives spared. Finding the barracks empty, the 7

commandos joined the forces sent to capture Government House and the governor. A fierce gun battle followed that left two Argentineans dead and Government House under siege but still not defeated. Within the next couple of hours, armored troop carriers and artillery had arrived with the reinforcements, and Governor Hunt realized that offering further resistance would be futile. Nevertheless, he attempted to negotiate a truce without surrenderingto no availand he refused to shake the offered hand of General Garcia, instead donning his ceremonial gubernatorial regalia for the Argentinean C-130 trip to Montevideo, while the defeated Royal Marines were humiliatingly photographed lying face-down.29 The next morning the captain of the Bahia Paraiso at Leith, South Georgia, radioed news of the Falklands surrender to the 23-man British detachment at Grytviken, urging them to capitulate to avoid further violence. He subsequently sent a corvette and two Alouette helicopters to Grytviken, where the Royal Marines opened fire with small arms and 84 mm anti-tank rockets. Their surprise resistance damaged one of the helos and forced the corvette to retreat hastily. After two hours of heavy fighting, however, the marines, low on ammunition and facing a far superior Argentine force now established ashore, surrendered.30 HMS Endurance, at sea nearby, was preparing to come to the assistance of the marines at Grytviken, but was directed by Fleet Headquarters to refrain from engaging in offensive action and to conceal its whereabouts until given further guidance. Frustrated, it consequently turned north to rendezvous with its replenishment ship, Fort Austin.31 While Argentinean propaganda proclaimed a bloodless victory and neither Malvinas residents nor British soldiers lost their lives, the real truth was that four Argentinean military personnel had perished in the fighting and several more had been wounded.32 Nevertheless, in Buenos Aires, the populace was jubilant as an emotional Galtieri broadcast Argentinas great victory, reassuring the people of Argentina that he was simply accomplishing their will, while promising the people of the Malvinas that there would be no disruption of their lives and no breach in heretofore good relations with Great Britain. On 2 April, General Garcia issued four decrees to the people of the Malvinas: (1) asking for their cooperation with their nearly-appointed government officials, (2) notifying them that their former colonial authorities had been relieved of their governing responsibilities, (3) providing interim instructions to ensure their public and personal safety, and (4) guaranteeing them all of the freedoms promised in the Argentine National Constitution. A separate communiqu announced that BG Benjamin Menendez had been appointed as the new governor of the Malvinas.33 In London on 2 April, first news of the invasion trickled in via the BBC, which had picked up a British Antarctic Survey transmission that the Falklands had been occupied by Argentine military force. Unfortunately, the Foreign Office had only moments before informed the House of Commons that it appeared the Falklands had fallen. Conservative party members in the Commons immediately had Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and her War Cabinet on the defensive over the extent of the surprise her administration had failed to foresee. Even by late in the evening on 2 April, there was still no official confirmation on the level of resistance, casualties, or damagefor a crucial eight hours, they could offer the nation neither comfort nor leadership. . . . It was a classic demonstration of the hiatus in authority which can follow a failure in communications at the outbreak of war.34 Nevertheless, knowing that a UN resolution of 8

condemnation was being drafted and upon the advice of the Chiefs of the Air and Naval Staffs, Mrs. Thatcher and her War Cabinet agreed to send a Task Forcea decision taken as a reflection of genuine indignation at the Argentine act of aggression and a determination to demonstrate that the Government was not completely helpless.35 Suddenly, the United Kingdom was embarking on a war over a territory that most of its citizens couldnt find on a map, at a time when it was well into the process of dismantling its navy and divesting itself of overseas territorial possessions. Why? In the foreword to Admiral Sandy Woodwards One Hundred Days, the Rt. Hon. Margaret Thatcher offers the following observation: It was not very easy to take a decision which commits your country to fight a war eight thousand miles from home. At such times it is impossible to clear the mind of the inevitable heartbreak of warall warsand the grief of those families who suffer loss. But on Friday, 2 April 1982, Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands. . . . As the news hardened, I called several people together, ministers and advisers. If the islands were invaded, I knew exactly what we must dowe must get them back. Their people were our people. Their loyalty and devotion to Queen and Country had never faltered. As so often in politics the question was not, what should we do? But, how could it be done?36 While there were no doubt many factors that contributed to Mrs. Thatchers decision, the two most clearly stated: 1) were the right of self determination for the people of the Falklands, and 2) recognition that aggression must not be rewarded.37 More importantly, by arguing these two principles before both the public and parliament, the Thatcher government quickly forged the bipartisan and popular support it needed to achieve for consensus on action. Additionally, on 3 April, the UN Security Council provided further support to Great Britain when it passed Security Council Resolution 502, which demanded: 1) the immediate cessation of hostilities, 2) the immediate withdrawal of all Argentine forces from the Falklands, and which (3) called upon the governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom to seek a diplomatic solution and to respect the UN Charter.38 As it prepared to respond to the predicament in the South Atlantic, the Thatcher War Cabinet struggled with a national planning process that had atrophied in the nearly thirty years that had passed since its last international security crisis. Lord Carrington, the Foreign Minister, resigned over what was perceived to be a diplomatic failing that had allowed the crisis to escalate to the brink of war. He was replaced by Francis Pym. Other members of the War Cabinet (as it was known) included the Prime Minister (Mrs. Thatcher), the Home Secretary (Sir William Whitelaw), the Secretary of State for Defence (Sir John Nott), the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and Paymaster General (Cecil Parkinson), who was responsible for public relations. Notably absent was the Chancellor of the Exchequer (responsible for collecting taxes and managing public spending), because the Prime Minister didnt want to be hamstrung over financial concerns. Mrs. Thatcher, of course, dominated the Cabinets debates, and while reluctant to challenge military advice, she showed no hesitation in challenging diplomatic recommendations; she did, however, listen carefully to all sides before making a decision. Though not a member of the War Cabinet per se, the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), Admiral Sir Terence Lewin, was the principal military advisor to the Secretary of 9

State (for Defense), and the Chiefs of Staff Committee that he chaired became the forum for forging military advice to the War Cabinet.39 The military chain of command went from the Prime Minister directly to the CDS, bypassing the Secretary of State for Defence, and then on to the Commander-inChief Fleet (CINCFLEET), Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse, who was designated the commander of the Task Force (see Figure 5). His Land Deputy would be MG Jeremy Moore and his Air Deputy would be Air Marshall Sir John Curtiss. Immediately below

Admiral Fieldhouse , at least initially, was the Flag Officer First Flotilla, Rear Admiral John Sandy Woodward, who had operational control as the Combined Commander of all surface ships, land, and air forces as Combined Commander of the expeditionary force (CTG 317.8). Below Woodward, or so it appeared, there were three Commander Task Units (CTUs), with Woodward in command of the Carrier Battle Group (CTU 317.8.1); Commodore Amphibious Warfare (COMAW), Commodore Michael Clapp, in command of the Amphibious Task Force (CTU 317.8.3); and Brigadier Julian Thompson, Brigade Commander No. 3 Commandos in charge of the landing Group (CTU 317.8.4). Submarine operations would not be part of RADM Woodwards responsibilities; they would be tasked from Flag Officer Submarines (FOSM) at Northwood, Vice Admiral Peter Herbert.40 After April 9, for reasons that are not entirely clear, Admiral Fieldhouse amended his earlier version of the command structure. Whereas the first structure (Figure 5), had all three groups as separate but equalunder Woodward, who doubled as the Commander Task Groupin the second command structure (Figure 6), all groups appear equal. Despite Admiral Fieldhouses second command structure, Woodward was still considered the Senior Task Group Commander, and he was a two-star flag officer, whereas Commodore Clapp and Brigadier Thompson were both one-star officers. This 10

ambiguity came to a head with the arrival of MG Jeremy Moore on 30 May. Moore was above both Brigadier Thompson and Brigadier Wilson of 5 Infantry Brigade, though the relationship between Commodore Clapp and Brigadier Thompsonas Commander, Amphibious Task Force and Commander, Landing Force, respectively, was as defined in UK amphibious doctrine. While MG Moore was able to provide support for Brigadier Thompson upon his arrival in the South Atlantic, the lack of an in-theater overall commander, capable of assessing priorities and dealing directly with Northwood arguably impeded smooth command and control. Operation CORPORATE As Prime Minister Thatcher noted, putting together a maritime task force was no small task. In 1982 the Royal Navy was a force designed primarily for anti-submarine warfare against the Soviet Union in the north Atlantic. Now it was being challenged to stretch its logistics pipeline 8,000 miles without shore-based air support, well outside of its assigned North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) area, to fight against an enemy and in an area about which it knew little, without a plan or concept of operations.41 In fact, the Task Force 317s mission, as laid out in ADM Fieldhouses directive, was to proceed for such operations in the South Atlantic as may be ordered.42

The rapid nature of Britains response precluded detailed planning, except in the broadest sense, and while the Defence staff hoped for a diplomatic solution, its initial thoughts were that if military action ensued, as unlikely as that seemed, it would involve isolating the Argentine garrison in the Falklands through a blockade, followed by an amphibious landing to recover Britains sovereign territory.43 The UKs two carriers, HMS Hermes and HMS Invincible, were both in Portsmouth, as were its two assault ships, HMS Fearless and HMS Intrepid, though Invincible and Intrepid were being 11

destored in preparation for mothballing, while the Hermes was in the early stages of maintenance. Loaded to capacity and carrying the only relevant Fleet attack aircraftthe Sea Harrierthe two carriers would provide minimally-credible air support for any landings, but would still need air defense protection.44 The Type 42 destroyers were Britains most modern air defense shipsarmed with Sea Dart, and three were near Gibraltar with RADM Woodward participating in Exercise SPRING TRAINHMS Coventry, HMS Glasgow, and HMS Sheffield. For close defense, the UK depended on Sea Wolf-equipped Type 22 frigates, three of which were also with Woodward.45 On 2 April ADM Fieldhouse alerted the two carriers (with 20 Sea King troopcarrying helos and 20 Sea Harriers between them) and HMS Fearless, Alacrity, and Antelope as well as Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA) Resource and Stromness that they were on a four-hour tether. Additionally, 3 Commando Brigade was brought to 72-hour notice, with 3 Para added the next day.46 Supplementing Fearless for amphibious lift would be five LSLsSir Galahad, Sir Geraint, Sir Lancelot, Sir Percival, and Sir Tristram (this last ship was ordered to steam from Belize directly to Ascension). A few hours later on the same day RADM Woodward was directed to proceed covertly to Ascension Island with HMS Antrim, Glamorgan (both County class destroyers), Glasgow, Coventry, Sheffield (Type 42 destroyers), Brilliant and Broadsword (Type 22 frigates), Arrow, Plymouth, Yarmouth and RFA tankers Appleleaf and Tidespring.47 Other British ships participating in Exercise Spring Train but not tasked to head to Ascension crossdecked all of the surplus food, spare parts, and ammunition they had available to those vessels headed south as part of TF 317.48 Cheered by large crowds on shore, HMS Hermes and Invincible and RFA Olmeda departed Portsmouth on 5 April, preceded earlier that morning by the quieter departures of HMS Alacrity and Antelope and followed on 7 April by HMS Fearless, four LSLs, RFA Pearleaf and Stromness. Two days later MV Elk sailed from Southampton followed later that evening by the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company (P&O) cruise liner SS Canberra, which had been requisitioned by the Ministry of Defence as a troopship through the STUFT system (Ships Taken up from Trade).49 Later on, additional ships requisitioned through STUFT and sent south would include the sister roll-on, roll-off container ships (Ro-Ro) Atlantic Causeway and the Atlantic Conveyor as well as the ocean liner Queen Elizabeth II (QEII) and another P&O liner, Uganda, which was refitted and declared to the Red Cross as a hospital ship.50 Though located 3,770 nautical miles from Great Britain and nearly the same distance from the Falklands, Ascension Island was the UKs only option for a forward staging base. The haste with which the Task Force was assembled created a multitude of additional problems, not the least of which was administratively-loaded ships. Commodore Clapp, in particular, commented on how a lack of clear operational objectives aggravated [loading because] he had not had the opportunity to assess a concept of operations in any depth . . . . We have basically managed to squeeze what we considered essential into the given space.51 Major General Moore would later comment that the assault force would have been better served and equally responsive had it been tactically loaded and sailed two weeks lateravoiding the wasted efforts involved in the re-stow at Ascension. What little planning that did occur seemed more focused on the most optimum environment rather than the most likely.52

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The destroyer HMS Antrim, the frigate HMS Plymouth, and the tanker RFA Tidespringall assigned to retake South Georgiawere the first ships to arrive at Ascension on 10 April, where they picked up commandos and Special Forces troops flown there to meet them. The next day the destroyers HMS Glasgow, Sheffield, and Coventry arrived, along with frigates HMS Arrow and Brilliant. Several days later the two carriers arrived followed a day later by the amphibious force, which included HMS Fearless, Stromness, and the five LSLs. The carrier force was the first to depart on 18 April, along with a destroyer, two frigates, and two auxiliaries, but the amphibious group needed more time to assemble fully, with the main body not departing until 7 May.53 In all, there were 65 ships20 warships, 8 amphibious landing ships, and nearly 40 auxiliaries carrying supplies for 3 months and roughly 15,000 troops of which nearly 7,000 were part of the landing and ground forces.54 The Task Force en route to the Falklands departed with very little intelligence about its enemy, no doubt partly the result of a defense intelligence architecture that was heretofore focused on the Warsaw Pact and northwest Europe rather than upon a friendly nation in the southern hemisphere from whom the British Fleet acquired most of its beef products. Human intelligence and satellite imagery were particularly austere because neither Great Britain nor its closest ally, the United States, had dedicated resources for extensive looks at the southern hemisphere. Such a drastic change in focus meant that Britains military intelligence staff, particularly the Armys Intelligence Corps, which didnt have a central pool of experts to draw upon, had to add linguists, analysts, imagery interpreters, and tactical expertsno small challenge.55 Extensive signals intelligence support, however, was supposedly being provided to the United Kingdom by the U.S. National Security Agency; however, the immense amount of raw dataspecifically, radio trafficwas such that there was insufficient time and analysts to sort through it all. Nevertheless, an article in a 1984 issue of The Economist claims that 98 percent of British intelligence on Argentina came from U.S. assistance. While that may be true, from RADM Woodwards perspective, the greatest threat the Task Force would likely face would come Argentinean air and naval forces, and British data even on the number of fighter aircraft Argentina possessed was very dated.56 In fact, on 5 April Woodward sent a signal to Admiral Fieldhouse emphasizing the need for specific information on the following Argentine capabilities: 1) German-built submarines and their parameters; 2) Exocet ship fitting numbers, radar parameters, and air-launch capabilities; 3) numbers and radius of action for Argentinean Mirage 3 and 5 aircraft as well as numbers of which were night/all weather capable; 4) Canberra aircraft radius of action and armament; 5) numbers of carrier-capable Super Etendards and radius of action; 6) numbers of Lynx helicopters and levels of training; and 7) the U.S. assessment of Argentinean aircraft carriers, ASW, and replenishment at sea capabilities. 57 Some of the requested intelligence was immediately available from both France particularly, on the Exocet and Super Etendards, and the United Statesdespite the latters public even-handedness toward both Argentina and Great Britain. To Woodwards request for intelligence, Fieldhouse added that they would also need specific intelligence on those Argentinean forces now garrisoned on the Falklands. It was a wellkept secret that so little was known about Argentinean military capabilities that the lack of knowledge itself was considered highly sensitive.58

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Argentine Occupation and Preparation for Defense While the original objective of Operation AZUL/ROSARIO had been simply to land a force on the Malvinas Islands and establish an Argentinean administration, the junta soon discovered that not only was Britain responding by sending a task force with four battalion-sized units of professional soldiers trained to NATO standards and at least one aircraft carrier, HMS Invincible, but that the U.S. Government had authorized British use of its facilities on Ascension Island. 59 Unfortunately, by the evening of 3 April only half of the original assault force remained on Isla Soledad (East Falkland Island). Because no plans had been developed to deal with what was felt to be the least likely scenariodefending the Malvinas IslandsArgentina was ill-prepared for what Britain was sending its way. In fact in a post-conflict interview, VADM Lombardo offered the following observation: They [the junta] couldnt believe it. It seemed impossible that the British would go to so much trouble, to mobilize so many ships and modify so many merchant ships and liners over such a place as the Malvinas. For example, when Menndez was put in charge of the Malvinas with a large party of senior officers and politicos, no one told him that it would be his task to defend the Malvinas. I sent him a message on 8 April, telling him I was coming to see what he was doing in the military sense. Menndez

said: What the hell are you talking about? His only problems until then had been to look after the kelpers.60 The decision was quickly made to leave only a small garrison of ground troops on South Georgia since supporting and defending it from an invasion was hopeless.61

14

On 7April, General Galtieri signed National Executive Power Decree No. 700 establishing the South Atlantic Theater of Operations and designating VADM Lombardo as its commander, with authority to exercise all functions except military governorship, which would be under BG Mario Menndez. RADM Alberto Padilla was designated to be Lombardos Chief of Staff, with BG Julio Ruiz in charge of Land Forces, BG A.C. Weber in charge of Air Forces, and RADM Allara in charge of Naval Forces (see Figure 7). Interservice rivalry and separate lines of authority from the service chiefs on the junta, however, precluded any real hopes for joint command, and in reality, lines of authority occurred as depicted in Figure 8.62 A Military Committee was created that included all of the commanders from the South Atlantic Theater of Operations and the chiefs of staff of the services, while a Political Committee, the Malvinas Working Group, included the members of the junta as well as the Foreign Minister, Costa Mendez. While at the political level differences tended to be resolved smoothly, communications further down the chain of command tended to be service-stove-piped, with independent operations that spawned miscommunication, arguments, and confusion. In charge of the Malvinas Joint Command, BG Menndez divided responsibilities as shown in Figure 9. BG Amrico Daher (Commander, IX Brigade) was Chief of Staff; BG Oscar Joffre (Commander, X Brigade) was Commander of the Puerto Argentino [Port Stanley] Group of Forces, and BG Omar Parada (Commander, III Brigade) was Commander of the Malvinas Group of Forces (Goose Green and the whole of Isla Gran Malvinas [West Falkland Island]).63 On 22 April Galtieri visited the Malvinas after receiving word that British ships had departed Ascension Island. After meeting with BG Menndez and BG Joffre, Galtieri agreed to provide an additional infantry regiment; however, upon further reflection when he arrived back in Buenos Aires, Galtieri decided to send an additional brigade rather than a regiment to complement X Brigade, which was in the process of being fleshed out.64

15

Without consulting the other members of the junta, he added III Infantry Brigade, which was scheduled to arrive in the Malvinas between 24 and 29 April. Unfortunately, III Brigade had no plans to support the islands and, in fact, had been in the midst of redeploying to strengthen the contentious shared border with Chile.65 Additionally, the weather conditions at its home base in Corrientes, where it had trained, were significantly
Argentine Units in the Malvinas, 30 April 1982
Coastal Sector (Agrupacion Litoral) Brig.-Gen. O. E. Parada Puerto Argentino Sector (Agrupacion Puerto Argentino) Brig.-Gen. O. l. Joffre

Calderon Naval Air Station S. Jason Is. Pebble Is.

Port Howard

Malvinas Military Air Base Condor Military Air Base Goose Green Puerto Argentino

5th Rgmt
Fox Bay

12th Rgmt C Coy, 25th Rgmt

Units in Stanley area: 3d, 4th, 6th, 7th, and 25th Rgmts 5th Marine Infantry Bn 3d Artillery Rgmt 4th Air Mobile Artillery Rgmt B Battery, 1st Marine Field Artillery Bn 601st AA Rgmt B Battery, 101st AA Rgmt Part of Marine AA Bn 10th Armored Car Squadron 601st Combat Aviation Bn 10th, 601st and Marine Engineer Cos

8th Rgmt 9th Engineer Coy

0 0

25 40

50 miles 80 km

Figure 10. Argentine Units in the Malvinas, 30 April 1982. Source: The Fight for the Malvinas, 58-59.

different than what would be experienced in the Malvinas. Assigned troops had no 16

Sector Boundary

training for the desolate conditions they would likely meet in the Malvinas, and little thought was given to the logistics support they would need. By committing a second brigade, however, Galtieri had changed the nature of the conflicta war planned and started by Navy forces would now see the burden of defense shift to the Army.66 The first unit of X Brigade to arrive was an advance party from 3d Regiment and their initial impressions were grimtheir forces would be inadequately dressed for the harsh, unforgiving climate; there was no cover to conceal their positions; and the soggy, peaty, rocky soil was unsuitable for digging defensive trenchesthe entire brigade would be defending on open ground in various defensive sectors around Puerto Argentino. There were also command and control challenges. BG Menndez, though in charge, was the most junior of three Army brigadier-generals, Daher and Joffre being the other two. Realizing that Joffres brigade outnumbered units from his brigade, Daher proposed consolidating the land forces under one Land Forces Commander and asked BG Menndez to decide. Joffre was chosen, so Daher returned to Buenos Aires only to come back shortly thereafter as Chief of Staff to Menndez. The arrival of III Brigade further complicated command and control. BG Menndez decided he would be the Land Forces Commander and Joffre would command the units around Puerto Argentino (Agrupacin Puerto Argentino), while newly-arrived BG Paradas III Brigade would be responsible for the rest of Isla Soledad, including Goose Green, and the whole of Isla Gran Malvinas (West Falkland Island), later designated Agrupacin Litoral (Figure 10). Told that advance parties of British forces could arrive as early as April 18, Joffres land forces dug defensive positions around Puerto Argentino and began their long, uncomfortable wait.67 Because the decision to recapture the Malvinas had been kept secret from most of the Argentine military staff, the intelligence community first learned about the invasion when it was announced on public radio on April 2. Nevertheless, on that same day, Argentinean military intelligence was asked to project the likely British response. And, although military and technical intelligence on Great Britain was reasonably current, little was known about the UKs sociological, political, or economic wherewithal. Nevertheless, intelligence experts were fairly certain that U.S., NATO, and international supportparticularly in light of the recently approved 3 April UNSCRwould give Great Britain considerable freedom of action, and that she was likely to send her best troops south, first to occupy South Georgia followed by landings on East Falkland Island, though the main forces would arrive no sooner than mid May.68 Chosen to govern the Malvinas because of his conciliatory temperament, BG Mario Menndez was an unlikely choice to command the Malvinas defenses. Furthermore, as he was departing Buenos Aires, VADM Lombardo more or less told him that defense was his responsibility and that he (Lombardo) didnt want to get involved.69 And while several Falklands-Malvinas historians have commented that neither Lombardos nor Menndez headquarters conducted much post-invasion military planning beyond the distribution of troop concentrations around the Malvinas, BG Menndez did in fact issue Operations Order No. 01/82, dated 7 April 1982, from Moody Brooke Army barracks, with the following mission statement: The task forces of the Ground Command, Atlantic Theater of Operations will defend the island territories recently occupied, as of this moment, to repulse any offensive intent on the part of Great Britain in order to preserve the National Sovereignty and the integrity of our territory.70 It also included an operational concept and several annexes. On 12 April, VADM 17

Lombardos headquarters issued Plan Esquematico No. 1/82 Sa South Atlantic Theater of Operations Schematic (Operations) Plan with annexes that outlined a general scheme for defense and provided tasks for component commanders, with the following mission statement: Consolidate the reconquered zone, prevent its recovery by the opponent and support the actions of the Military Government, in order to exercise Argentine sovereignty in the Malvinas Islands, Georgia and South Sandwich and contribute to assuring its full exercise in the South Atlantic.71 While the quality and thoroughness of Argentinean planning as well as how well the plans were followed may be open to criticism, to argue that little planning was done is both unfair and incorrect. As the Argentines prepared their defenses in the Malvinas, marine engineers put minimal effort into fortifying the beaches around Puerto Argentino because their experience led them to believe that its beaches were insufficient to support much amphibious activity. Instead, their efforts focused primarily on laying mixed antipersonnel and anti-tank minefields to the west of Stanley. In addition to two brigades of Army infantry troops noted earlier, several propeller-driven, ground-attack aircraft were dispersed among Stanley airport, the grass strip at Goose Green (later designated Base Area Militar Cndor), and at Pebble Island (Base Area Naval Cadern); however, what wasnt done and perhaps should have was temporarily lengthening the runway at Puerto Argentino so that it could accept fighter aircraft, which would have significantly extended their rangea challenge the British task force would have found daunting. With a variety of helicopters from all services as well as two Coast Guard transport aircraft, the total air strength in the Malvinas came to roughly fifty aircraft by the end of April, giving BG Menndez a capable force of ~13,000 ground troops, with locallybased, ground-attack aircraft and air defense artillery. Beyond a small oil-rig tender and two small Coast Guard vessels to transport supplies between various garrisons, however, the Navy provided no additional warships to defend the island it had captured earlier in the month.72 British establishment of the Maritime Exclusion Zone (MEZ) on 12 April was viewed by the Argentines as very credible given reports that at least two British nuclearpowered attack submarines (SSNA) had begun heading south at the beginning of the month and were likely to be in place by the 12th.73 The declaration that any Argentine ships entering the zone would likely be attacked had a very sobering effect on Argentine maritime operations, and while the junta initially decided to keep the remainder of its transports tethered to the mainland, it later reluctantly allowed the transports to sail independentlyunescorted and unarmed. Even then, III Brigades equipment never arrived and two other transports that reached Puerto Argentino were unable to depart the Malvinas before hostilities started. An air bridge supplemented what little the sea transports were able to supply, but the garrisons on Isla Soledad (East Falkland Island) were still left with grave food and equipment shortages.74 The Fighting Begins While the Argentine Navy wasnt heavily involved in preparing the defenses of the Malvinas, Admiral Anaya saw to it that the Navy dispatched a composite Marine platoon of approximately 40 men aboard the obsolete submarine Santa F to reinforce Argentine forces on South Georgia and make a stand if the British attacked.75 Their 18

orders were to put up a stiff resistance and then surrender if British might proved to be overwhelming. Admiral Anayas hopes were that an easy UK victory would appease British honor and perhaps delay further violence while diplomacy was worked more earnestly. Such was not to be the case.76 The British quickly routed the Argentine garrison with gunfire support from British warships and helicopters on 26 April in Operation PARAQUET. Though they lost two helicopters in a blinding snow storm, the Brits captured 180 Argentine prisoners, seriously wounding one Argentine sailor and killing another who was thought to be attempting to scuttle the Santa F after its capture. As it was, the Santa F was so heavily damaged that it was beached and abandonedthe first ship lost to either side in the war.77 Throughout the remainder of the month of April as BG Menndez deployed his ground forces to their battle positions (Figures 11 and 12)25th Infantry Regiment and Marine battalion around Puerto Argentino, 12th Infantry Regiment helicoptered to Darwin (Goose Green) along with a battalion from the 25th, and the 8th Infantry Regiment to Puerto Mitre on Gran Malvinas (Fox Bay, West Falkland)78Argentine naval and air units exercised and practiced attacks on ships, but only in water too shallow for Britains

submarines to enter. The lone operational Argentine diesel submarine San Luis, however, entered the MEZ and established a patrol area just north of Puerto Argentino on 29 Aprilthe same day an Argentine fishing trawler spotted the British task force en route from Ascension. The next day, 30 April, the United States ended its shuttle diplomacy of attempting to dissuade both countries from pursuing a violent conflict, declaring its allegiance firmly behind the United Kingdoma diplomatic blow to Argentinas last hopes for a peaceful settlement. In turn, the British now declared that the Maritime Exclusion Zone would be a Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ), warning that both Argentine ships and aircraft were subject to attack under the UKs right of self defense in 19

accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter. In fact, the implication was that any ship or aircraft approaching the TEZ might now be considered a threat. For Argentina, a new fear was that Britain would use its declaration as justification to attack the Argentinean air base at Ro Grande in an attempt to preclude Exocet-equipped Super tendards from threatening its task force.79

Admiral Fieldhouses plan split the ships heading south from Ascension into five separate groups to achieve the following four main purposes: 1) establishment of a sea blockade around the Falklands, 2) the repossession of South Georgia, 3) establishment of sea and air supremacy around the Falklands, and 4) the eventual repossession of the Falklands.80 While the Argentine surface fleet was not considered to be a major threat, Fieldhouse and Woodward were both concerned that if the Task Force could be found, its greatest threats would come from submarines or aircraftparticularly, land-based Super tendards equipped with Exocet AM39 missiles, and air attack was considered the most likely and most dangerous threat. Of Argentinas 300 aircraft, 175 were estimated to have combat potential, of which 60 were believed to have sufficient range to pose a realistic threat. While the Exocet was a dangerous prospect, Britains military leadership was reasonably convinced that its Sea Harriers were an adequate match for the air-to-air threat that Argentina could pose, and as long as the Task Force could keep its distance from the Argentine coast, its ships would be relatively secure.81 With regard to planning for an amphibious landing, one of the Task Forces concerns was safety of the local population should an assault on Stanley be required. Additionally, the Chief of the General Staff, General Sir Edwin Bramall, was concerned about the inadequacy of planning, particularly since the Task Force did not have a ground concept of operations. Commodore Clapp and Brigadier Thompson were also concerned, but more so because there had been insufficient time to train for an amphibious assault and because all of their equipment needed to be re-stowed before departing Ascension. Clapp was also concerned about potential landing sites and the vulnerability of his ships. 20

Stanley had been ruled out as too dangerous as had West Falkland Island because of its vulnerability to air attacks and the challenge of having to across the Falkland Sound with a second landing on East Falkland. There were also tensions between RADM Woodward and his amphibious leaders, Commodore Clapp and Brigadier Thompson. Clapp had been told that he would be in charge of the amphibious assault, but Woodward was considering using some of the assault shipping in a feint. Neither Clapp nor Thompson wanted their command ship involved in decoy operations while preparing for an amphibious assault.82 Thompson described the tensions in his memoir: The responsibility for the ensuing acrimony rests largely with Northwood. It is simply not good enough to promulgate a structure of three co-equal commanders, and then arbitrarily, and without ever telling the other two, treat one of the commanders as he was the overall boss on some occasions, which they did a number of times.83 Woodward, of course, was more concerned with local air and sea superiority and what he felt were overly-restrictive rules of engagement (ROE), and Clapp and Thompson were anxious about picking the best landing site for an amphibious assault that would be followed by land operations. Woodwards concerns were made clear in a message his sent back to Fieldhouse: My unequivocal military advice from the sharp end is that . . . present ROE allow the battle to be fought in one area but not in another unless the Args choose, thereby optimising their capability while minimising mine. This is military nonsense. . . .84 While the carrier battle group would be in the TEZ on 29 April, the amphibious force would not arrive until ~16 May. These concerns were arguably minor when compared to other challenges presented by operating in the South Atlantic, not the least of which was logistics. With 5,600 men in 3 Commando and 2 Para combined and no permanent accommodations available on East Falkland Island, most of these troops would need to be housed under canvas, supplied sufficient quantities of potable water as well as necessities for drainage, sanitation, electricity, food, and other provisionsall by sea and air. Maintenance and servicing would be limited, so equipment would degrade with time while supply shipping would need to stay in unprotected anchorages. With an Antarctic winter approaching, the passing of each day would make the overall operation more hazardous and less effective.85 While RADM Woodward was contemplating his next moves, Air Chief Marshal Beetham and the Royal Air Force (RAF) were contemplating the RAFs role in the upcoming conflict and what help it could offer in support of an operation 8,000 miles away for which there were very limited forward basing options. The only RAF strike aircraft with sufficient range was the Vulcan bomberan aircraft due to be phased out of the British inventory by end of June 1982, which hadnt used its air-to-air refueling in twenty years, and which was configured only for nuclear weapons. Arguing steadfastly the merits of strategic attack, the RAF convinced the War Cabinet that Vulcan bombers carrying 1,000-lb. bombs could crater the runway at Stanley with a 90 percent probability. Of course, to do so would require ten Victor tankers to air-refuel each Vulcan bomber. 86 Irrespective of the strategic merits of employing Vulcan bombers, the debate among lower-level planners revolved around whether Vulcan bombers could do anything not already available from in-theater, carrier-based Sea Harriers. The RAF argued that 21

Sea Harriers were not well-suited for attacking runways, and employing all-weather Vulcans would conserve these scarce resources for more appropriate missions such as post-attack reconnaissance. Though the RAF arguments won the debate, the Task Force quickly found out that Sea Harriers were equally ill-suited for aerial reconnaissance, which, of course, was in high demand immediately following each Vulcan sortie.87 Operation BLACK BUCK launched two Vulcan sorties and 11 air-refueling tankers (not including spares) from Wideawake airfield on Ascension just before midnight on 30 April with the intention of denying the use of the Stanley Airport runway by high-performance Argentine aircraft. Unfortunately, one of the two bombers had a cabin pressurization malfunction and had to return to Wideawake. The other bomber released all 21 of its 1,000 lb. bombs as planned, diagonally across the runway to ensure at least one weapon would crater it. At best, one struck the runway, doing minimal damage, while another appeared to have caught the edge, with the remainder doing some damage to other airport facilitiesone warehouse and one full tank destroyed. Four of the 21 bombs were later discovered by the Argentineans unexploded and resting in peat bogs.88 Additional BLACK BUCK Vulcan sorties occurred over the next few days, including at least one involving the launch of U.S.-made, AGM-45 air-to-ground precision Shrike missiles against the Westinghouse surveillance radar at Port Stanley. Two missiles were fired and neither came closer to the intended target than 10-15 yards. While the significance of the Vulcan raids remains controversial, they did telegraph an important message to Argentinathat Britain could launch such raids from extended range and that therefore targets on the mainland could be held at risk. As a result, the Argentineans redeployed their Mirage III fighters away from possible offensive operations in the Falklands, instead to be dedicated to the defense of the mainland.89 The 1 May Vulcan attacks, however, were simply the first salvos of what would be a busy day for the attacking British forces. Following the Vulcans soon after dawn was a group of Sea Harriers that attacked Stanley airfield setting a fuel store on fire. And, although the local Argentine Air Force headquarters reported that defensive forces had downed two Sea Harriers and had crippled a third, the minor damage one sustained was immediately repaired. Other Sea Harriers destroyed three Pucars at Goose Green and cratered the grass airstrip, while British warships carried out two operationsone unsuccessfully conducting submarine sweeps near the San Luis and the other wearing down Argentine defenses along the south coast of Stanley in a preparatory landing feint. The presence of British warships so close to Stanley drew an immediate Argentine response, and the 5th Fighter Group sent four A-4Bs, the 8th Fighter Group sent four Mirage III As, and the 6th Fighter Group sent four Dagger I A Is. While all 12 aircraft reached the Falklands, neither the A-4s nor the Daggers found targets for their weapons, whereas the Mirages launched a couple of unsuccessful missile attacks at Sea Harriers. Later that same day a number of anti-ship sorties were launched from the Argentine mainland, and though no British ships were damaged, their captains quickly realized how vulnerable they were when positioned close to enemy-held land. Later on, 24 Skyhawks equipped with bombs mistakenly attacked the Argentine ELMA merchant Formosa, scoring two direct hits. One bomb bounced off the deck and fell into the sea and the other failed to detonate. A final anti-shipping air attack involved six Canberra against British war ships. One flight was intercepted by two Sea Harriers, which resulted in one downed Canberra. In air-to-air activity, a pair of Mirages in a 2-v-2 engagement with a pair of Sea 22

Harriers resulted in both Mirages being hit. One crashed into the sea and the other was shot down by Argentine air defenses as it attempted an emergency landing at Stanley Airport. Though it had been a relatively uneventful day for Great Britain, Argentina had two ships damagedone by its own aircraft, two runways cratered, four aircraft downed, 17 troops killed, and twenty-eight wounded. British casualties included minor damage to two ships and a repairable hole through the vertical fin of one Sea Harrier; however, from Argentinas perspective, it thought its air defenses had downed two Sea Harriers and its aircraft had seriously damaged at least one British warship. And, unlike the British, it knew for certain that its runway at Puerto Argentino was still operational.90 While Task Force 317 had defeated the first days Argentine air assault, it had yet to encounter any Argentine ships, though Woodward suspected that RADM Allara was preparing an attack with his forces based upon intercepted communications from Lombardo to Allara giving the latter complete freedom of action. A second intercept was Allaras order to his fleet directing the Veinticinco De Mayo carrier and escort groups

(Task Groups 79.1 and 79.2) to launch air attacks at dawn while two surface groups, Task Groups 79.4 and 79.3, the latter including the Belgrano and its Exocet-carrying destroyers, were to position themselves northwest and south, respectively, for attacks against British ships dispersing as a result of Argentine carrier aircraft attacks against the British fleet (Figure 13). Based upon this information, reported radar contacts to the northwest, and the position of the Belgrano group, which was being tracked by the submarine HMS Conqueror, RADM Woodward suspected that the Argentine fleet was positioning for a double pincer. Of particular concern to Woodward was the Belgrano group because it appeared to be preparing for a track north across the Burdwood Bank submerged ridge in the southern half of the TEZ, which was too shallow to allow HMS 23

Conqueror to follow and remain undetected. Losing track of the Belgrano under the circumstances was a risk RADM Woodward was unwilling to take.91 Consequently, he ordered HMS Conqueror to attack the Belgranoan order for which he had no authority and which was immediately vetoed by the FOSM, Vice Admiral Herbert. As anticipated by Woodward, however, his order also prompted immediate intervention by the Chiefs of Staff, and Admiral Lewin sought permission from the War Cabinet to allow attacks on any Argentine naval vessels outside of the TEZ (which had already been authorized for the Argentinean carrier). The change was approved, but only for Argentine warships.92 While the British had correctly interpreted RADM Allaras plans for a double pincer, they did not know that the winds had dropped off in the north and so, unable to launch its aircraft, the Veinticinco De Mayo was directed to cancel its attack and withdraw to a safer position farther west. In fact, RADM Allara had directed all of his task groups to return to their pre-attack locations, which meant the Belgrano was also turning to the west. Though it was known by both ADM Herbert in Northwood and by the Conquerors skipper that the Belgrano had avoided the TEZ and was in fact moving west, VADM Herbert knew that at some point the Belgrano would likely resume a track toward Task Force 317very likely again through Burdwood Bank. Consequently, the changed ROE was considered a necessary action in anticipation of a subsequent inevitability. After considerable maneuvering to achieve an optimum attack position, at mid-evening on 2 May, HMS Conqueror attacked the Belgrano with three torpedoes fired from 1400 yards scoring direct hits. Seriously damaged and on fire, the Belgrano was abandoned, eventually sinking. In all, 321 men aboard the Belgrano lost their lives. As soon as he heard the news, RADM Woodward directed the immediate withdrawal of naval gunfire support (NGS) ships en route to bombard Stanley in anticipation of an Argentine counterattack.93 Later on 2 May, following the sinking of the Belgrano, two Lynx helicopters from HMS Coventry and HMS Glasgow, when fired upon by 20-mm cannons from the Argentine patrol craft Alfrez Sobral, each fired two Sea Skua missiles in response badly damaging the Sobral. Now that it had lost two vessels, the Argentinean navy was ordered to return to the shallow waters of the mainland and ceased to be a factor in the remainder of the conflict.94 Though bad weather precluded much flying activity on 3 May, the Argentinean Air Force was still preparing to engage the British task force.95 Five Super tendards had been sent south to Ro Grande from where, refueled by an HC-130 Hercules tanker, they could operate far out to sea. And, though a NATO-imposed embargo had precluded more shipments of missiles and assistance from the French in helping train Argentinean Navy munitions technicians in arming and maintaining their five French-made, newly-acquired Exocet anti-ship missiles, the Argentineans had figured out jerry-rigged arming procedures for themselves. Following another attack on Puerto Argentino airport by British Vulcan bombers earlier that morning, two Exocetequipped Super tendards from Rio Grande Naval Air Station, vectored by a Neptune reconnaissance aircraft, fired two missiles at HMS Sheffield from 25 nautical miles (NM) early in the afternoon on 4 May, while it was operating as one of three British ships serving as a forward air-defense screen for Task Force 317. One Exocet struck HMS Sheffield and though its warhead didnt detonate, it nevertheless did extensive damage killing 20 and injuring 26 of the 281-person crew. After an unsuccessful hour of

24

firefighting, the ship had to be abandoned, and it later sank on May 10 after fruitless attempts to tow it to South Georgia for repairs.96 News of the loss of HMS Sheffield back in Great Britain brought home the seriousness of war and the realization that ships, aircraft, and lives would be lost. The British public learned of the loss of HMS Sheffield while in the midst of celebrating the sinking of the Belgrano. As Rubn Moro notes in The South Atlantic Conflict, The hot gush of popular enthusiasm was turned to a cold drip at the news from the front. From that moment on, the heady euphoria of self-righteous indignation that had buoyed the public as they saw the task force off at the piers gave way to gnawing anguish and dread over the fate of those who had sailed away so bravely.97 Nevertheless, Thatchers War Cabinet was steadfast in their resolve, which Foreign Secretary Pym relayed to Parliamentuntil Argentine troops agreed to withdraw with no preconditions regarding the sovereignty of the FalklandsTask Force 317 would stay engaged until sovereignty was returned to this remote South Atlantic territory.98 RADM Woodward, however, on-scene in the TEZ remained concerned about future naval battles and TF 317s vulnerability to additional Exocet attacks, especially now that the Argentineans had apparently mastered air-refueling Super tendards, extending their range significantly. He knew that if he lost one of his two aircraft carriers, the war was over. Moreover, it was soon discovered that the second Vulcan attack on Stanleys airfield had missed the runway, a Sea Harrier had been shot down in an attack on the airfield at Goose Green killing the pilot, and another two Sea Harriers had failed to return from a mission on 6 May. In London, the War Cabinet was likewise fretting about the vulnerability of TF 317s aircraft carriers, and after much internal debate issued a warning on 7 May to Argentina through the Swiss notifying them that any Argentinean warships or combat aircraft discovered to be beyond 12 NM of the Argentine coast would be liable to attack by Great Britain. Though not intended as such, Argentine and indeed worldwide perceptions were that Britain had extended its TEZ to the Argentine coast, which brought immediate protests from both Chile and Uruguay followed by a protest from Brazil who warned that any attack against the Argentine mainland would inflame the entire hemisphere. Even within the European Community protests of consternation and condemnation were registered. In response, the UK ambassador to the UN, Sir Anthony Parsons, personally assured UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar that rumors of an impending attack against the Argentine mainland were simply not true and, in fact, would not happen.99 Having given Argentina fair warning that its combat vessels were now fair game if detected anywhere east of the mainland, the Task Force planning now turned toward what Woodward called Enclave Theorya forward operating base from which it could pursue repossession of the Falklands with its ground forces. An enclave, however, requires a defendable airstrip of sufficient size to allow operations both for transport and fighter aircraft as well as a harbor deep enough to allow resupplying, maintenance, and repair.100 The problem was finding a suitably-protected site that could support an enclave. A large part of that challenge would be minimizing the landing forces vulnerabilities to air attack. Roughly 5,000 soldiers, all of their equipment and supplies, ammunition, and amphibious shipping would be exposed to attack by a land-based Argentinean Air Force 25

that was 200+ stronga daunting force protection challenge that would fall on 21 remaining Sea Harriers, possibly supplemented by another 14 en route. Unfortunately, Northwood was envisioning a larger problem. With word that the Armys 5th Brigade was en route aboard the Queen Elizabeth II, it appeared that a straight amphibious landing had become part of the repossession strategy rather than an enclave. Prospective beachheads were evaluated in terms of their defensibility from land, sea, and air attackboth surface and subsurface; whether or not their approaches have been mined; the slope of the sea beds and their depth; the closeness of sheltering hills that would complicate incoming air attacksa dual-edged blessing that restricted visibility on both sides; and so forth. At this point in the Task Forces planning, San Carlos appeared to be the best option. Complicating the planning calculus, however, was the presence of a shadowing Argentinean fishing trawler, the Narwal, suspected of being an intelligence gatherer. The last thing the amphibious force needed was its position telegraphed by Argentine intelligence gathering platforms. Though his ROE expressly forbade him from attacking fishing vessels and time was too short to get permission from above, on 9 May Woodward ordered two Sea Harriers to immobilize the Narwal. Subsequent boarding by Special Forces personnel confirmed the presence of an Argentinean naval lieutenant commander with code books, charts, and military radios. Prisoners were taken and the vessel was allowed to sink.101 Unfortunately, the days combat activities were not over, though relatively minor attacks between the two disputing countries would continue over the next several days. While bombarding shore targets in the vicinity of Stanley on the afternoon of 9 May, the destroyer HMS Coventry and the frigate HMS Broadsword were jumped by Argentine Skyhawks launched from San Julin on the mainland. Of the fourteen aircraft sent to attack the two British ships, ten turned back because of bad weather, but a flight of four continued. The British ships attempted to engage the aircraft at maximum range with Sea Dart and Sea Wolf missiles, but were unsuccessful. Two of the Skyhawks nevertheless perished before returning homeone crashed into the cliffs of a small island and the other apparently flew into the sea because of bad weather. Later that same afternoon an Argentine Puma helicopter from Stanley, believed to be searching for the Narwal, was shot down by a Sea Dart missile from HMS Coventry. The next evening RADM Woodward ordered HMS Alacrity to test passage through Falkland Sound, the 60-milelong channel between East and West Falkland Islands. Halfway through her trip in the midst of heavy rain, HMS Alacritys radar detected another vessel approximately six miles southwest. She engaged the Argentine naval transport Isla de los Estados with high-explosive shells, eventually sinking itthe only surface action that would occur between the two sides during the Falklands-Malvinas Conflict.102 HMS Alacrity completed the remainder of her passage through Falkland Sound uneventfully, joining up with her sister ship HMS Arrow and quickly zigzagging to the east. Unbeknownst to either ship, they both passed within striking distance of the San Luis, which attempted to manually fire two torpedoes at HMS Alacritythe first failed to fire and seconds wire guide broke causing it to miss and detonate along the sea bottom or against the coast. The subsequent afternoon, 12 May, HMS Glasgow and HMS Brilliant, having replaced HMS Coventry and HMS Broadswords bombardment positions off the coast of Stanley, were attacked by two flights of 4 each Skyhawks from Rio Gallegos. While HMS Glasgows Sea Dart system failed, HMS Brilliant shot down 26

two Skyhawks with Sea Wolfs, while a third crashed either attempting to outmaneuver the missiles or because of fragmentation from one of its exploding colleagues. Unaware of the first flights fate, the second tranche of Skyhawks engaged and survived, scoring a direct hit on HMS Glasgow.103 While the damage was serious enough to prevent Glasgow from participating in the remainder of the conflict, the bomb went through the ship without exploding. The British Task Force had been successful in drawing out Argentinean aircraft from the mainland, but it had lost two of its three Type 42 air defense ships with landings still yet to occur. From henceforth there would be no further daylight shelling by ships so close to Stanley.104 While the next two days were relatively uneventful for both sides, HMS Hermes and HMS Glamorgan slipped away from Task Force 317 on the evening of 14 May to helo in Special Air Service (SAS) commandos for a raid against the small Argentine Base

Area Naval Caldern on 18-miles long Pebble Island, located at the north-central end of West Falkland Island (see Figure 14). RADM Woodward and his amphibious commanders were concerned that the small detachment of Turbo-Mentors and Pucars stationed on Pebble Island could threaten amphibious landing forces at San Carlos, less than 50 miles east. While HMS Glamorgan provided covering fire, two Sea King helicopters delivered forty-five SAS troops who quickly destroyed all 11 Argentine aircraft before withdrawing safely back to the two warships before sunrise on 15 May. Though a few men on both sides were wounded, neither side suffered any fatalities, while the airfield was knocked out of commission for the duration of the conflict.105

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Operation SUTTON While the actions just described were occurring throughout the month of May 1982, planning continued both in the Task Force and at Northwood for the anticipated amphibious landing that would eventually take place. Foremost among concerns was the air threat that the Argentine Air Force and Naval Air posed to an amphibious landing. While achieving air superiority prior to attempting a landing was an assumed prerequisite, an analysis by RADM Woodwards task force indicated that the likelihood of accomplishing such was slim. Admiral Fieldhouse proposed cross-decking the landing forces from HMS Canberra to disperse vulnerable troops and equipment among several ships before the assault. RADM Woodwards counter, which included the advice of both BG Thompson and Commodore Clapp, was that cross-decking was a hazardous proposition in stormy seas, and doing such would become more perilous if cross-decking vessels were caught in an air attack. Even if a beachhead could be established before daylight, soon after sunrise, the landing force and any ships still tethered nearby would be exposed (landing sites considered can be seen in Figure 15). Moreover, everyone clearly understood that once the main body of the amphibious group arrived in the South Atlantic, it would become the central focus of Argentine air forces. Among the alternatives considered and discussed, and one certainly pushed by BG Thompson, was attacking mainland Argentine aircraft on the ground, a politically-sensitive and equally, if not more risky, option. In addition to requiring a dramatic change in ROE, the simple physics of pulling off such a raid were daunting. Air-refueling Vulcan strikes were considered and quickly discarded, and carrier-based airstrikes were never really considerable viable. All that seemed left were Special Forces, which, it was argued, could be inserted into the Tierra del Fuego Rio Grande base that was serving as home to the deadly Super tendards. This is precisely what CDS Admiral Lewin proposeda two stage operation consisting of reconnaissance to gather the necessary intelligence, followed by insertion of an SAS team close to Rio Grande to destroy the Super tendardsand the War Cabinet approved on 14 May.106

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On 16 May an eight-man Special Air Squadron (SAS) team was detached to HMS Invincible to be airdropped by a Sea King into Chile close to Rio Grande Air Base, where it would cross the border, sink the helicopter, carry out its mission, and exfiltrate surreptitiously on foot. HMS Broadsword and HMS Invincible departed the Task Force on 17 May for execution of this bold but risky mission. Unfortunately, bad weather, which had plagued the South Atlantic for much of the month of May, remained a challenge, and the Sea King crash-landed a few miles from the Chilean port of Punta Arenas, which was 50 miles from its objective, and the mission was scrubbed. The Chileans soon discovered the burned-out hulk of the Sea King and protested the British incursion into its sovereign territory, exposing the surprise the British were hoping to achieve. While Task Force 317 expected and prayed for another opportunity to take out the Super tendards, when it became clear that Argentina had stepped up its air base defenses, further raid planning was abandoned.107 Though still awaiting Britains main gambit, Argentine military forces had a fairly accurate picture of what they suspected was the British strategyto soften the battlespace with air attacks and SOF incursions focused on reconnaissance and sabotage, followed by an amphibious assault against an undefended area while under the protection of carrier-based air. Precisely when or where this would occur was of course unknown, but defending Argentine forces knew the arrival of the amphibious group was imminentmost likely south of Stanley, but possibly at Uranie Beach on Berkley Sound; San Carlos was considered too far west of Stanley. Command of Argentine air defenses were to be divided; mainland air attacks would control attacks on British ships while Air Force South would coordinate attacks on ground forces. The junta believed that the British planned an invasion as opposed to a siege of the islands, consequently the Argentine strategy was to avoid risky, premature engagement until its forces could engage the invaders at their most vulnerable pointduring the amphibious landings imposing costs that would force Britain to either return to the negotiating table or that would make the Thatcher government fall.108 After the semi-successful British naval shelling, Vulcan, and Sea Harrier raids of the first day, which cratered the edge of the Puerto Argentino runway and destroyed three Pucars at Goose Green, Argentine ground-based air defenses forced attacking aircraft to seek the safety of higher altitudes. This hostile air environment also meant that there would be no helicopter spottersall of which resulted in diminished accuracy of subsequent British bombing efforts and little damage to Argentine defenses. Similarly, the loss of HMS Sheffield to Super tendard-launched Exocets had restricted Task Force 17s maneuver options for approaching the Falklands. On the ground, Argentine troops easily outnumbered the anticipated British landing forces, though BG Menndez had them spread around Isla Soledad in static, fixed positions, with the preponderance of soldiers defending Puerto Argentino. Isla Soledads long and irregular coastline, with numerous possible landing sites, rendered it impossible to maintain ground defenses at every point of possible entry. Menndez also positioned a detachment of defenders near the airstrip of Goose Green with small groups deployed in secondary sectors to provide early warning. There was also a very robust air defense network around the Puerto Argentino, and on the mainland Argentine air forces remained unscathed and ready for the landings to begin.109

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Waiting out the British until they committed to an amphibious assault had its biggest risks for Menndez defending ground forces because imposition of the TEZ had effectively stopped resupply. The British Joint Intelligence Center (JIC) estimated that unreplenished Argentine ground forces would likely run out of adequate normal rations around the middle of May, though combat rationing and the slaughter of local sheep might delay culmination of rations for a few weeks longer. The JIC also guessed that a static defense was most likely, given the lack of a robust road network and the isolation of the Argentine garrison, which had undoubtedly suffered the effects of constant bombing, nasty weather, and a blockade that had closed the flow of resupply. Once Argentina knew the amphibious ships were nearing the TEZ, the Air Bridge discontinued on 29 April was resumed, and the Pucars lost to the British raid on Pebble Island were replaced by another dozen flown into Puerto Argentino. While the navy had apparently sidelined itself, the status of Argentinas submarines remained an unknown factor. The Task Force was nevertheless fairly confident that its ASW assets were up to whatever challenge enemy submarines might pose.110 Early in the planning process, the sheltered waters of San Carlos had emerged as one of the leading contenders for the British amphibious landings, but on 10 May it was confirmed and on 12 May Admiral Fieldhouse, CINCFLEET, issued Operation Order 3/82 for Operation SUTTON, which specified a six-phase operation: Phase I, CTG 317.8 maintains blockage within the TEZ; Phase II, CTG 317.8 conducts SF reconnaissance and direct actions prior to main landing; Phase III, CTG 317.0 with 3 Commando embarked, conducts main amphibious landing; Phase IV, 3 Commando conducts land operations prior to arrival of Commander Land Forces Falklands Islands (CLFFI MG Moore) and 5 Infantry Brigade; Phase V, establishment of CLFFI in HMS Fearless and landing of 5 Infantry Brigade; and Phase VI, Repossession of the Falklands Islands by the landing forces, supported by TG 317.8 and TG 317.0: Tactical command of the amphibious task group was delegated to COMAW [Commodore Clapp]. In Phases III and IV, Brigadier Thompson was nominated as the Commander of the Landing Force and was responsible for operations ashore during the landing phase. Major General Moore was nominated as CLFFI. On arrival Moore was to assume responsibilities of the Commander of the Landing Force for Phase V and VI and operational control of formations established ashore. Woodward would remain Tactical Air Controller.111 Moore gave additional guidance to Thompson tasking him to secure a bridgehead into which reinforcements could be inserted and to push inland as far as maintenance of security allowed, retaining operational control until relieved by Moore aboard HMS Fearless. What wasnt specified was the role 5 Infantry Brigade was to play or the distance inland Thompson was to push toward.112 From his perspective, Brigadier Thompson was concerned about the acknowledged lack of air superioritya supposed precondition for landing that everyone agreed simply couldnt be achieved, though which no one would openly admit: It would have been less confusing if all concerned had been told from the outset that the landing would go ahead anyway; since this was obviously the intention. . . . The operation would have been better served had there been more frankness from the beginning. . . . Plain speaking would have 30

avoided misunderstandings about how quickly Rapier firing posts would have been in action. It was exactly the situation, among others, that called for a higher level overall commander forward with the three task groups.113 Final approval for D-Day occurred two days prior to the 21 May scheduled landings, which were to begin at 0230 in the morning. The Landings By 18 May, TG 317.0 (the amphibious group) had joined TG 317.8 (RADM Woodwards carrier battle group) with the Amphib Group poised on the eastern edge of the TEZ. It consisted of two LPDs (each with 4 LCUs and 4 LCVPs) and an LSL, supported by 3 RFAs, a water carrier, and 4 escorts. In Woodwards carrier group he had a total of 31 Sea Harriers aboard his two carriers to provide air cover for the landings. While the plan called for delivering the ground forces in total aboard SS Canberra, Admiral Fieldhouse in Northwood insisted that ground forces be crossdecked to distribute 40 Commando to HMS Fearless and 3 Para to Intrepid. Even though good weather facilitated the transfer, a Sea King carrying SAS troops from Hermes to Intrepid ditched at sea and 21 SAS troops perished to include their RAF forward air controller and his laser designator. British Intelligence had confirmed the presence of an Argentine detachment at Fanning Head, which overlooked San Carlos Water and would need to be eliminated. Meanwhile, Operation TORNADO, a deception operation reinforced by spoofed communications, had begun to give the appearance that the major British effort would occur close to Stanley. This was supported by naval bombardment of Lively Island near Choiseul Sound by HMS Glamorgan and a second diversion in the Darwin area. The actual plan consisted of silent landings, with 40 Commando securing the Port Carlos

31

Settlement while 2 Para simultaneously moved to a blocking position in the Sussex Mountains. Following later in phase 2 would be 45 Commando with 42 Commando remaining as a floating reserve.114 At 0340L, 3 Special Boat Squadron (SBS) landed to the east of Fanning Head to deal with the Argentine detachment. Supported by naval gunfire from HMS Antrim and mortar fire, 3 SBS killed several Argentines and captured others in achieving their objective while 2 Para was hitting the beach at San Carlos followed by 40 Commando, who promptly raised the Union Jack. By 0800L, as the sun was rising, 45 Commando and 3 Para landed (see map at Figure 16). While the marines secured an old plant at Ajax Bay, 3 Para went ashore to secure the landing forces northern flank and other troops took the high ground to set up the 12 Rapier anti-aircraft-missile firing positions. Throughout the remainder of the day offloading continued while defensive positions were set up. Two Pucars taking off from Goose Green were engaged by gunfire from HMS Ardent and SAS with Stingers, and though both were quickly downed, the Argentine command was now aware that landings were occurring at San Carlos.115 At 0925L the first wave of nine attacking Daggers were spotted coming in from the southwest at very low altitudes. They attacked the most accessible ships, HMS Antrim and Broadsword, taking the former out of action and damaging two Lynx helicopters on the latter. The next three attacks by Argentine aircraft accomplished little but cost at least 3 aircraft, one of which attacked the already crippled Argentine vessel, Rio Carcarana. A fourth set of A4s jettisoned their wing tanks and bombs at the sight of Sea Harriers before two were downed by Sidewinders. Several more attacks occurred periodically throughout what was a costly day for both sides. None of the attacking Argentine aircraft had come with their own protective escorts, and targeting appeared more opportunistic than plannedfocusing on escorts rather than the elephant in the roomSS Canberra, which was anchored close to the western shore. Argentina lost 5 Daggers, 5 A4s, and 2 Pucars, while a number of others were taken out of action by small arms fire. Additionally, whether because of technical problems with bomb fusing or because aircraft attack profiles didnt provide sufficient time for arming, many of the bombs dropped by attacking Argentine aircraft were duds. All the same, of the seven British vessels that had entered San Carlos Water, only two were undamaged, while actual landing forces and their equipment were unscathed3,000 men and 1,000 tons of stores. HMS Antrim, Ardent, and Argonaut were badly damaged, 1 Air Force GR3 Harrier and 2 Gazelle helicopters had been lost, and 27 mariners had perished. Of greater concern to RADM Woodward, however, was the ineffectiveness of the Sea Wolf close-in-point-defense missile system when used near the land and the fact that he only had two Type 22s left, at least one of which he expected to lose in the upcoming days if battle losses continued at the same rate.116 The British landings had surprised the Argentine High Command, which still wasnt certain whether the assault was a diversionary attack or the main effort. In anticipation of an invasion, however, which seemed imminent, on 16 May guidance had been given to BG Menndez to maintain personal contact with the operational commanders to ensure more fluid cooperation among the services in defending the islands. Additionally, the South Atlantic Theater of Operations Command was moved from Puerto Belgrano to Comodoro Rivadavia to preclude delays executing a defensive strategy. Additionally, it was determined that General Garcia, the most senior among the 32

operational commanders, would have the decisive voice in making operational-level decisions (Figure 17).117 Now that the invasion had in fact occurred, BG Menndez

chief intelligence officer concluded that the British had landed less than a full brigade and that other forces might be landing elsewhere. Because of this uncertainty, the helicopterborne reserve company was withheld, though some 105-mm artillery was sent to shore up defenses at Goose Green. When General Galtieri queried BG Menndez about the magnitude of the landing at San Carlos, the latter assured him that there was no worry, It was well within our expectations. They have landed in an undefended place. And well . . . we are doing what we can.118 General Lami Dozo, who had been following the landings from his Air Force headquarters, attempted to convince the Junta that San Carlos was indeed the beachhead for the main British landing force. Menndez, however, was convinced that San Carlos was merely a diversionary tactic and successfully argued against sending forces from the Stanley area lest they been needed elsewhere to combat the main landings whenever and wherever they were to occur. His misperceptions werent entirely his fault though, because the British had intentionally been targeting Argentine helicopters at Stanley; they were the only real way of transporting troops beyond the Stanley area. The resultant confusion though, resulted in piecemeal Argentine air attacks whose sporadic nature meant that they never overwhelmed British air defenses. 119 Although SS Canberra had survived the first day unscathed, RADM Woodward didnt want to risk his amphibious ships unnecessarily. Additionally, merchant shipping could unload at only one-quarter of the pace of RN vessels. Prior to sunrise on 22 May, Woodward ordered Canberra, Norland, Europic Ferry, and RFA Stromness to withdraw from San Carlos Water until they could return under the cloak of darkness. Brigadier Thompson also moved his headquarters ashore instead of staying on board HMS Fearless. Both Thompson and Commodore Clapp clashed with RADM Woodward over protection of the landings by Sea Harriers. Naturally, Woodward wanted to keep his carriers as far from harms way as possible, which meant that Sea Harrier available loiter time over the fleet they were protecting in San Carlos Water was limited. Clapp and Thompson wanted the Sea Harriers close enough that they could respond to incoming Argentine aircraft before they attacked rather than during or after attacksparticularly since Rapier was proving to be a disappointment.120 33

The second day, 22 May, was comparatively uneventful, though an Argentine Coast Guard vessel, the Rio Iguazu, was strafed and subsequently beached near Darwin and the inter-island supply vessel, MV Monsunen, was beached after being fired upon by HMS Yarmouth. The day also witnessed another clash between Woodward and Clapp over allocation of Royal Air Force GR3 sorties, prompting an exasperated signal from Woodward chastising Clapp: Late change of plan this morning without any explanation or intelligence support resulted in lost opportunity for first light attack and confusion and frustration here. This is clearly unacceptable. Request you state reason and priority for mission in future. I may know something you do not. Your ground attack assets are ready and willing to help but they require notice, intelligence and all available targets details to obtain useful benefit.121 Part of this tension between the two commanders was due to an inadequate tasking system for allocating RAF Harrier missions. Woodward had no RAF liaison on his staff, and there was no mechanism for resolving conflicting demands between/among the Task Forces three on-scene commanders.122 On the third morning at San Carlos, 23 May, the weather was perfect for flying and TF 317 had four frigates posted at the mouth of the WaterHMS Broadsword, Plymouth, Yarmouth, and Antelope, with the damaged Argonaut still anchored nearby. There was insufficient room in the anchorage for the naval escorts, so most remained in or around Falkland Sound where there was more maneuver room and space for radar and longer-range Sea Dart engagements. Once again attacking A4s slipped across Grantham Sound, splitting into pairs for an attack on the most obvious targets rather than the most important. Two thousand-pound bombs hit Antelope, though neither exploded as one of the A-4s plowed directly into the frigates mainmast and crashed. While the ship remained afloat and still under its own power, the first bomb exploded as it was being rendered safe by munitions technicians and the vessel was quickly abandoned just before its magazine exploded. It sank the following day, though it was clear that the cliffs around San Carlos Water were proving to be a challenge for attacking Argentine aircraft whose low approaches continued to impede proper arming for the bombs being dropped. But the pilots were getting better and the attacks persisted, with clear weather continuing to favor the attackers. The following day, while a flight of Mirages distracted HMS Coventry and Broadsword, five Skyhawks swooped in low over San Carlos Water to bomb Sir Galahad, Sir Lancelot and Sir Belvedere. Once again, the weapons striking the first two vessels failed to detonate while the one that hit the third passed through without exploding. A later pass by four Daggers that strafed Fearless and Sir Galahad similarly had their weapons bounce off Sir Lancelot, though the ship did sustain some minor internal damage. Despite all the duds, RADM Woodwards fleet was slowly becoming depleted and the group led by HMS Bristol with reinforcements was still several days out.123 The Fleets losses, while minor, were nevertheless cumulative, and Woodward was still piqued with Commodore Clapp and BG Thompson, both of whom wanted their ships inshore to unload them over several days before moving them out of harms way. Thompson, in particular, wanted equipment unloaded in the proper order and proportions whereas Woodward was concerned about their vulnerability to air attack and simply wanted to minimize exposure. There was also some uncertainty about how much 34

Argentine airpower had been destroyed in their costly attacks, though British estimates of Sea Harrier successes were likely over-optimistic. Whatever sanguinity the Fleet felt, however, would soon evaporate as the events of 25 May began to unfold. At 1419L as the second wave of two attacking groups of Argentine attack rolled in on HMS Broadsword and Coventry, Coventry maneuvered into a position that in effect blocked Broadsword from firing its Sea Wolf. HMS Broadsword was struck by a bomb that ricocheted into its Lynx and Mk44 systems without exploding but Coventry was strafed portside with cannon fire followed by three bomb hits, two of which exploded, killing 17 men immediately and igniting a fire that led to an immediate evacuation before the ship capsized minutes later. A few moments after Coventry sank, two Super tendards each fired an Exocet, both of which veered directly toward chaff being dispensed by HMS Ambuscade. Unfortunately, the chaff failed to detonate the missiles and after they passed through the chaff cloud they homed in directly on the Atlantic Conveyor, striking her in her starboard quarter. Fires and dense smoke were so severe that there was little time for damage control, and the ship had to be abandoned, later sinking and taking with her the Captain and another 12 souls, 3 Chinooks, 6 Wessex helicopters, tentage for 4,500, and runway and fueling equipment for the Harrier forward operating base. This had been the worst day yet for British losses, and Woodward clearly felt that losses were now favoring the other side.124 Despite the gloom in both London and in TF 317 over their heavy losses, the battle for San Carlos was essentially over at this pointall the guns, vehicles and the bulk of the immediate stores and ammunition were ashore, as were eleven Sea Kings, four Wessex and one Chinook.125 Despite RADM Woodwards discomfort, Argentina had used up all but one of its Exocets and its pilots had run out of both targets and time. The morale of the Argentine aviators was nonetheless higher than ever, even though

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ultimate defeat may have been a foregone conclusion, because they had inflicted heavy damage on the Royal Navy and had denied TF 317 air superiority. By their tally, the Argentines had inflicted more damage than they had sustained (Figure 18).126 While the Argentine media in Buenos Aires trumpeted the successes that had occurred on their National Day, the Junta met to assess the on-going military situation and the need for better operational-level decision making. Building upon its decisions a week prior, the Military Committee decided to place General Osvaldo Garca, who had commanded the initial invasion forces, back in charge on 23 May, with unified command below him (a first)both for combat operations and logistics. Information and requests from subordinate commands would come through the Centro de Operacins Conjuntas [Joint Operations Center] (CEOPECON) to Gen Garca, ensuring that the Military Committee was kept informed. Military Committee approval of decisions wasnt

required, but they would become involved in requests for additional resources and resolution of major issues (Figure 19). One of the first orders to come out of CEOPECON was guidance to BG Menndez to provide an assessment so plans could be made for subsequent actions. Based upon reports that the consolidated beachhead had been established at San Carlos and that the landings there had been more than a diversion, the Air Force argued that attack priorities should remain 1) the aircraft carriers, and 2) the logistics chain from Ascension Islandas opposed to the beachhead itself. Additionally, BG Menndez was chastised for his inactivity: The Army seems to have only an attitude of static defence which, should it continue indefinitely, will make the men wilt in their own positions even before being able to engage in combat with the mass of enemy troops. . . . In your hands and in your future decisions rests the honour of the Argentine Army.127 Directed to adopt a more offensive attitude, Menndez simply could not do what was being asked. It was 56 miles between Stanley and San Carlos, and there was no road between them. He didnt have sufficient helicopter lift to move forces and the 8-day 36

journey by foot would require traveling over the wet, barren land that would expose his troops to attacks by British aircraft. They would also be limited to whatever ammunition, tenting (which they didnt have), water, and food they could carry on their backs and then be expected to counterattack. Menndez felt the request was so foolish that he threatened to resign rather than implement it. As an alternative, he proposed sending reconnaissance patrols and commando units to infiltrate behind British lines while reinforcing the Darwin-Goose Green area. He also had the temerity to remind Gen Galtieri that the British would have to come to Stanley and fightthrough the hardened defenses established therea plan Galtieri himself had approved.128 Goose Green In a near-similar fashion, Brigadier Julian Thompson was also getting criticism because the British Chief of Staff had promised the War Cabinet that once British forces were ashore, they would hasten toward Stanley. Now that the landing at San Carlos had occurred why wasnt Stanley under siege? In light of recent losses, particularly, HMS Coventry and the Atlantic Conveyer, London needed a victorysooner rather than later. With his helicopters tied up moving supplies ashore from still-exposed ships in San Carlos Water and air superiority yet to be established, Thompson felt a more realistic course of action was to besiege the enemy positions at Darwin and Goose Green, 15 miles marching distance to the southeast and home to several Pucar attack aircraft. Summoned by Northwood to explain his actions, Brigadier Thompson was told to engage the enemy at first opportunity. His foremost concern about moving toward Stanley was that until Mount Kent was secured he didnt want to risk what few helicopters he had delivering troops. That left little choice; an overland march of foot supported by helicopters for logistics was the only remaining alternative. With little notice, he summoned his subordinate commanders and directed 2 Para to carry out a raid against Darwin-Goose Green while 45 Commando and 3 Para, to their disbelief, were to begin the march to Stanley across the frost-baked peat marshes of East Falkland Islanda trek they feared would exhaust their forces before ever engaging the enemy.129 Part of the reason for these differences of opinion was because the Task Forces entire focus had been on getting the assault forces safely on shore. Until now, this had been a maritime operation, planned and directed from Northwood by CINCFLEET, Admiral Fieldhouse, and executed by RADM Woodward and Commodore Clapp. There was no plan for how the Falklands would be retaken once the landings had occurred. And though the land component commander, Major General Jeremy Moore, remained at Northwood with ADM Fieldhouse until the landing at San Carlos had been approved, his orders to Brigadier Thompson had been to secure a bridgehead from which subsequent operations would be conducted to repossess the Falklands once he and 5 Infantry Brigade arrived aboard the QEII. Since three more battalions and helicopters would arrive later, MG Moore saw no urgency for an accelerated breakout. With regard to the role of Brigadier Thompson and 3 Commando Brigade, once the bridgehead had been secured, their subsequent role was unclear because MG Moore and 5 Bde would be landing within a week afterwards and at that time would develop plans for repossession. Had there been direct communications among and between Fieldhouse, Moore, and Thompson, this lack of guidance would have been less a problem. However, en route aboard the QEII, MG 37

Moore was essentially incommunicado. Moreover, the D-Day plan for the landing at San Carlos, which had been approved only two days prior to its execution, reflected no immediacy for the subsequent breakout toward Stanley.130 Struggling with the loss of helicopters that severely restricted his options, Thompson was being directed to take actions by superiors who were oblivious of the logistical challenges he and Clapp shared. Preparing for the assault at Darwin/Goose Green later that night, 2 Paras troops listened as the BBC at 1300L on 27 May revealed that there is something quite big going on. Theyre saying for example that 2nd Parachute Regiment has moved South towards the Darwin area.131 Thompson passed on his disappointment and anger to Fieldhouse, who was equally angered and dismayed, but Thompson decided to continue with 2 Paras attacks anyway. And while the Argentine command had heard the BBC report, it had little effect on their defensive plans for Darwin/Goose Green.132 British intelligence knew that there was a garrison of some indeterminate size at Goose Green, and best estimates were that it contained between 300 and 500 troops making the planned attacking force of 2 Paras 600 men insufficient in terms of the superiority required for an offensive against fixed defenses. However, 2 Para would also have some artillery support, both land and naval, as well as air support, and SAS observations had confirmed the impression that defenses were seemingly light. One of the challenges Thompsons intelligence staff faced in putting together an accurate intelligence picture, particularly during the early stages of land operations, was that their security clearances were insufficient in some cases to receive the intelligence they needed to support planning. In light of some uncertainty about defenses, a helicopter lift to position forces to the south of Goose Green was considered because defenses were known to be lighter there. This was dismissed as too risky though, because of helicopter vulnerability to Pucars, and a nighttime drop was rejected because few helicopter pilots had been trained to use passive-light night vision goggles. In the end, 2 Para moved out on foot, walking to Camilla Creek Housewhich they found emptywaiting until early morning to begin their assault.133 Anticipating that a British attack on Darwin was imminent, BG Menndez had ordered BG Parada, Commander of 3 Commando Brigade and Agrupacin Litoralthe sector west of Stanleyto move his headquarters to Darwin. The move did not occur, however, because neither the Air Force nor the Navy would accept orders from Menndez without confirmation from their respective service headquarters. By the time the Chinook crew tasked to transport Parada received approval for the move, the British attack had begun, which left Lieutenant Colonel talo Piaggi, Commander of 12th Regiment, in charge with a reinforced infantry regiment of 643 plus a 43-man combat team and 202 Air Force personnel manning Condor air base. His mission was to hold the settlements, protect the airstrip, and provide a reserve battle groupdespite lacking the necessary vehicles and heavy equipment.134 Lt Col Jones, the commander of 2 Para, launched the attack against Darwin at 0230 on 28 May and made good progress until daybreak, when 2 Paras advance was stopped by focused Argentine artillery fire and attacks by Pucars. Promised air support by Sea Harriers wasnt available because sea mist had reduced visibility below launch minimums, and a jammed gun precluded naval gunfire support by HMS Arrow. Two of 2 Paras four companies were now pinned down and casualties were mounting as 38

ammunition began to run low. In attempting to maneuver to a position from which he could better observe his two forward companies, Lt Col Jones was killed, and shortly thereafter two Scout helicopters bringing in ammunition and ferrying wounded were shot down by Pucars. Eventually, 2 Para was able to advance and by late morning Darwin Hill had been secured, at a cost to 2 Para of six dead and eleven wounded, while the Argentines had lost 18 with 39 wounded. Argentine forces were still occupying key

ground positions, however, and the battle was far from over with defenses proving to be tougher and artillery fire heavier than anticipated (Figure 20). With one company assigned to hold Darwin Hill, the rest of 2 Para, under its acting commander, Major Keeble, progressed slowly, taking heavy casualties as it covered open ground without covering fire. Losing another officer and two more troops to a white-flag-surrender ruse at the settlement school by the Argentines, determined troops from 2 Para responded with ferocious counter fire until the Argentines abandoned the school and withdrew to a blocking position on higher ground. Meanwhile, Argentine Navy Aermacchis and Pucars ineffectively bombed 2 Para positions, with the Pucars missing a napalm drop only to lose one aircraft to ground fire. Finally supported by Sea Harriers with cluster bombs, 2 Para outflanked and surrounded Goose Green.135 Pushed back yet not defeated, Lt Col Piaggi nevertheless accepted Major Keebles surrender ultimatum the next day, realizing his forces couldnt hold out indefinitely. Establishing contact through the Island civil radio net, Piaggi and two other Argentine commanders formally surrendered at midday, releasing 112 civilian prisoners unharmed. 2 Para had lost 16 men in all with 36 wounded, but captured a surprising total of 961 Argentine prisoners that included 81 held at Camilla Creek House. At Northwood, Admiral Fieldhouse sent his congratulations to the acting Commander of 2 Para and expressed his relief that Britains first land offensive had been successful. Though its 39

improvised execution accomplished its objective, 2 Para had been very lucky that it had not faced a more determined adversary. In hindsight, Thompson commented that he should have taken his own tactical headquarters and mounted a two battalion attack supported by Scorpion and Scimitar light tankswhich arguably would have accomplished the mission in one-half the time and with half the casualties. The real problem was that Thompson hadnt fully appreciated the strategic importance Northwood had placed on Goose Green, which he considered a diversionary attack. Though he was aware of what Northwood had ordered, he didnt understand the reasoning behind Admiral Fieldhouses demands.136 While 2 Para was securing Goose Green, 45 Commando and 3 Para were reaching their first objective at Teal Inlet and Douglas settlement in the north, while an SAS squadron was approaching the slopes of Mount Kent, which it reached on 31 May. Mount Kent had previously been occupied by an Argentine detachment, but BG Menndez had ordered them to Goose Green a few days prior, leaving this critical piece of high terrain 12 miles west of Stanley/Puerto Argentinodefended by only 200 troops. Upon learning that Goose Green had fallen, Menndez repositioned 4th Infantry Regiment to occupy two smaller peaks southeast of Mount KentTwo Sisters and Mount Harrietin order to defend against a likely attack from the southwest. He did send out reconnaissance patrols to discern precisely what the British were doing; however, in several small skirmishes the patrols lost half their strength as Menndez and the bulk of his remaining forces dug in for the anticipated siege at Puerto Argentino.137 In Comodoro Rivadavia CEOPECON reassessed provisions in the Malvinas and ordered two naval auxiliaries to resupply Puerto Argentino with food and ammunition on 30 May, while ordering air force and naval aviation air strikes against the British particularly, against HMS Invincible.138 Two Super tendards, one carrying the loneremaining Exocet, and the other accompanying for its extra search radar, were dispatched on 30 May along with four bomb-carrying Air Force Skyhawks. The Skyhawks were to follow the Exocet attack dropping their 500-lb. bombs. As planned, the missile was launched beyond visible range and the Super tendards peeled off, while the Skyhawk pilots claim that shortly after missile launch they saw the Invincible directly in front of them. As they lined up on it, two Skyhawks were shot down while the other two released their weapons against the carrier in a midst of smokeconvinced they had scored direct hits. HMS Invincible, however, was at least thirty miles away. What the Skyhawks had attacked was HMS Avenger, a Type 21 frigate, whose actively-firing 4.5-inch gun was providing the smoke. The Avenger crew claims that both the Exocet and the bomb attacks missed completely, while it shot down at least one of the Skyhawks.139 Other Argentine air activity occurred only periodically, because its air force simply no longer had the capacity to conduct the intensive attacks that it accomplished prior to and during the landings at San Carlos. However, two C-130s, attempting to drop bombs on a British tanker they located on 29 May, did score one direct hit, though the weapon failed to explode. And two days later, another C-130 from the same unit was shot down by two Sea Harriers in a missile and cannon attack while conducting reconnaissance. The Argentines also lost one of four Lear jets on a reconnaissance flight the following week when it was engaged by a Sea Dart missile from HMS Exeter. That same week, 500 miles northeast of the Falklands, in a more bizarre attack, two Argentine Canberras bombed what they believed was a fuel tanker en route to support the British. In fact, it was the 40

Liberian supertanker Hercules, which was sailing to Alaska around Cape Horn. Only one bomb struck ityet another dudbut the owners and insurers later decided to scuttle the Hercules rather than risk attempting to remove unexploded ordnance in the midst of all that highly volatile fuel.140 With respect to ground activities, MG Moore arrived in the theater on 27 May, transferring first from QEII to HMS Antrim and then to HMS Fearless on 29 May, establishing his headquarters in the spaces vacated by HQ 3 Commando Brigade. His arrival once again changed command relationships on the ground (Figures 21 and 22).141 From Admiral Fieldhouses perspective, however, he now felt he had a commander on the ground who fully appreciated the constraints under which the British military was operating and who would know how to communicate with Northwood. Replacing MG Moore on the CINCFLEET staff was Lt Gen Richard Trant, and he would serve as Moores communications conduit with Northwood, running interference as necessary for MG Moore.142 On 1 June MG Moore issued his operations order for the recapture of Port Stanley. 3 Commando Brigade would advance on Teal Inlet to Malo Bridge to Mount Kentwhich it was already in the process of doingwhile 5 Infantry Brigade would approach from the south starting at Camilla Creek House and moving to March Ridge, Bluff Cove, and Mount Challenger, before linking up with 3 Commando Brigade. They would subsequently attrite Argentinean forces as much as necessary before capturing Stanley. Meanwhile, 40 Commando would take responsibility for securing the bridgehead at San Carlos lest the Argentines attempt to attack British forces from West Falkland Island.143

41

Fitzroy and Bluff Cove Keeping 3 Commando Brigade supplied and fed meant that MG Moore didnt have sufficient helicopters left to support moving 5 Brigade forward up the southern flank to Port Stanley via Fitzroy Settlement from Goose Green. The only settlement between Goose Green and Fitzroy was Swan Inlet House, believed to be deserted, though its telephone lines were thought to be operative. On 2 June Major Keeble of 2 Para suggested that five available Scout helicopters of 656 Squadron be used to lift a small party to Swan Inlet House, where the party could call ahead to Fitzroy to verify whether Argentineans were present. Brigadier Wilson, Commander, 5th Infantry Brigade, approved, and if Fitzroy was clear, his plan was to move 2 Para forward using the Scouts and the one Chinook that happened to be available on this particular day. Unfortunately, Brigadier Wilson did not inform MG Moore of his plans. The team arrived at Swan Inlet House, found an operative phone line, called the Fitzroy manager, and confirmed that the Argentineans had abandoned their positions at Fitzroy. By nightfall that day, two companies and the headquarters of 2 Para had been repositioned to Fitzroy.144 As one would expect, MG Moore was more than a little dismayed that Brigadier Wilson had moved 2 Para forward without supporting artillery, air defense, or the necessary logistics to support or supply them. Moreover, sufficient helicopter lift to move the rest of 5 Brigade forward simply wasnt available. Sealift, on the other hand, was accessible but there were concerns about its vulnerability so near to Port Stanley and outside the existing air defenses at the San Carlos anchorage. After 5 Brigades newlyarrived Welsh Guards abandoned their march over the rocky terrain between San Carlos and Goose Green, however, it became obvious that moving 5 Brigade from Goose Green forward was going to demand lift of some kind, and the only lift available was sealift. The compromise solution reached was to use the amphibious ships, HMS Intrepid and HMS

42

Fearless, on separate nights, having them make the journey only halfway to Bluff Cove, where they would then transfer units to landing craft for the remainder of the trip to Fitzroy (Figure 23).145 The trip with HMS Intrepid was successful despite dour weather that included 70 knot winds which slowed landing craft to 2 knots for their long, rain-soaked journey to Fitzroy. An additional complication involved communications, or lack thereofneither MG Moores headquarters aboard HMS Fearless nor BG Wilsons headquarters at Goose Green had direct communications contact with the units at Fitzroy and Bluff Cove. And, since 5 Brigade had no naval liaisons attached, when one of the Gazelle helicopters carrying 5 Brigade Signals officers was dispatched to Fitzroy to establish communications, HMS Cardiff, standing by to provide gunfire support against Argentinean targets if necessary, mistook the Gazelle for an Argentine supply helicopter and fired two Sea Darts, killing all aboard. After HMS Fearless made a semi-successful second trip on the night of August 6, leaving only half of the Welsh Guards, Admiral Fieldhouse at Northwood intervened with an order not to risk the large amphibious ships in such a perilous manner. As an alternative, Commodore Clapp proposed using the smaller and slower Sir Tristram and Sir Galahad instead, departing San Carlos at dusk so as they could be anchored at Fitzroy before dawn.146 On 7 June Sir Tristram made its trip and emptied its stores uneventfully, but Sir Galahads departure from San Carlos was delayed several hours because of shortages of helicopters and landing craft. When it arrived at Fitzroys Port Pleasant with the Welsh Guards, their equipment, and ammunition, four of the landing craft that had assisted Sir Tristrams unloading had departed and the one remaining vessel had a broken landing ramp. The malfunctioning ramp precluded moving the Welsh Guards heavy equipment, and the Guards refused to leave the ship without their equipment. In light of their earlier, unsuccessful attempted march to Goose Green, they were less than enthusiastic about the five mile jaunt to Bluff Cove, and were more than a little suspicious that their equipment might take several days to catch up with them. Unfortunately, the weather was magnificent for flying and the open presence of two ships anchored near Fitzroy were engaging targets for Argentinas otherwise currently quiet Air Force. Based on sightings by nearby Argentinean troops, eight Skyhawks from Ro Gallegos and six Daggers from Ro Grande were launched. En route to Fitzroy they spotted the British frigate HMS Plymouth in Falklands Sound, which they hit with four bombs, none of which exploded. Though there were no warships at Fitzroy, the British did have two Sea Harriers pursuing the Argentine aircraft, and both Sir Tristram and Sir Galahad had Blowpipe teams and Bofors guns neither of which is terribly effective against attacks by multiple aircraft. And, while four Rapier missile launchers had arrived that morning aboard Sir Galahad, they were protecting the supply base and 5 Brigade Headquarters. Partially sheltered because it was anchored under an overhanging cliff, Sir Tristram was struck by two bombs doing minor damage, but Sir Galahad received three direct hitson its tank deck, in the engine room and galley area, and in the officers quarters. The resultant fires, particularly on the tank deck, ultimately killed forty-eight men, thirty-two of which were from the Welsh Guards, before Sir Galahad was towed out to sea to burn out and sink. There were subsequent Argentine forays into the Fitzroy/Bluff Cove area with Skyhawks and missile-armed Mirages, one of which destroyed a British landing craft, but Sidewinder-equipped Sea

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Harriers shot down three Argentinean Sky Hawks in what would be the last air-to-air engagements of the war. 147 The Push to Port Stanley Despite setbacks for both sides, the final battle of the war had yet to occur, and BG Menndez still had the British outnumbered with ~9,000 men in prepared defenses around Puerto Argentino. Anti-aircraft batteries, however, didnt reach much beyond the city and its airfield, mainland air units had been decimated, and there were no ground attack aircraft left operable. Because he didnt know whether the British main effort would be from the west or south, Menndez had his troops spread across a broad front, though in small groups, with no forces dedicated as a reserve. Small arms ammunition was plentiful, but artillery rounds were in short supply, and troop morale was waning as winter approached and temperatures continued to drop. Moreover, promised rotations with mainland forces had failed to materialize, and Argentine ground forces were beginning to realize that reports of major British setbacks and losses had been greatly exaggerated. Menndez ace in the hole was heavy reliance on carefully-positioned defensive minefields to inhibit the British approach toward Puerto Argentino.148 As of 11 June British forces were positioned for advances that would essentially surround Stanley, with 3 Brigade now consisting of 42 and 45 Commando, 2 and 3 Para, 1st Battalion Welsh Guards supplemented with two companies of 40 Commando. After the losses sustained to 5 Brigade at Fitzroy, MG Moore had lost some confidence in Brigadier Wilsons performance and in 5 Brigade as an organization, so he placed the Welsh Guards and 2 Para under Brigadier Thompson. Additionally, he felt more weight needed to be placed on 3 Brigades attack. His plan consisted of a series of three night assaults against Stanleys outer perimeterat Mount Longdon, Two Sisters, and Mount Harrietwhich would be accomplished by 3 Para, 45 Commando, and 42 Commando respectively, with 2 Para and the Welsh Guards in reserve. Argentine defenses consisted of one company on Mount Longdon, with two companies each on Mount Harriet and Two Sisters (Figure 24).149

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The fighting on Mount Longdon was the fiercest, with 3 Para taking the most casualties of the British units participating in the 3-pronged attack. However, after an allnight, 10-hour battle, Mount Longdon was overtaken by 3 Para. Two Sisters, on the other hand had been defended by late-arriving Argentine forces in makeshift defenses that quickly wilted under fire. And the defenders on Mount Harriet, though better prepared for an anticipated assault, were quickly overwhelmed by a surprise attack from the rear that had avoided their main defenses and left them with little choice but to surrender. British losses for the nights activities were 24 dead and 65 wounded, but they had killed 85 Argentine defenders and captured 420. Some of the Argentine forces had fought valiantly and well, but once forced out of their prepared positions, they were generally ill-prepared for successful counterattacks. The next day and evening, 12 June, were spent by the British restocking their ammunition and conducting reconnaissance, with the final assault planned for the night of 13 June.150 The British plan for the 13 June attacks had 5 Brigade, now consisting of 2d Battalion Scots Guards, 1st Battalion Welsh Guards, and 1st Battalion Gurkha Rifles, attacking Tumbledown, while 2 Para attacked Wireless Ridge and the remaining Gurkhas attacked Mount William (Figure 25). Though the defenses at Tumbledown were among Argentinas most effective and well-prepared, the three-pronged attack, supported by overwhelming artillery support proved too much for the defenders, and after several hours of fighting they withdrew back to Sapper Hill. At Wireless Ridge, 2 Para, supported by light tanks, Harriers, and artillery, faced fatigued and demoralized Argentine troops whose resistance wilted after only a few hours of assault. At Mount William, the Gurkhas, who

waited until Tumbledown had been secured, attacked in daylight and watched their opposition dissolve in front of them. British forces were now positioned on the outskirts of Stanley, as 45 Commando conducted a final skirmish to take Sapper Hill. While they were 45

preparing for their final assault, the British forces were notified that a ceasefire had been ordered. The only person who continued advancing was the journalist Max Hastings, who walked into the journalistic scoop of a lifetime.151

Negotiations BG Menndez knew that his forces could no longer successfully defend Stanley and further resistance would only lead to unnecessary loss of life. He called Galtieri to make clear his plight, but Galtieri was unwilling to accept defeat. Menndez explained that he didnt have sufficient troops or ammunition to continue, and all of the high ground was now occupied by British Forces. Begrudgingly, Galtieri acquiesced, allowing Menndez to begin negotiations, you are the commanding officer, you are the commandant. You have norms to follow, rules to obey and a mission to accomplish. You have your personnel, you have the military code and you have the authority to resolve and decide. From up here, I can do nothing but suggest modes of action, but the responsibility today is with you, the Commander of the Isla Malvinas. Over.152 In anticipation of an Argentine surrender, the British forces struggled with a plan to ensure such could be accomplished without further bloodshed. It was finally decided to allow Lt Col H. M. Rose, Commanding Officer of 22 SAS Regiment, who had experience in tactics used to persuade terrorists to surrender, to contact the Argentineans though the civilian medical net, since telephone contact with the Argentine Military Headquarters could not be established. He contacted Captain Melbourne Hussey of the Argentine Navy, BG Menndez chief administrative officer, who arranged a meeting for Rose with Menndez at the Secretariat building in Stanley. Rose maintained contact directly with Admiral Fieldhouse in Northwood and his superiors aboard HMS Fearless through the SAS communications link, and explained to Menndez that the British demanded an unconditional surrender. BG Menndez left the room presumably to consult with his staff before returning to agree. He noted, however, that he could not speak on behalf of the Argentine Navy and Air Force. Fieldhouse directed MG Moore to accept Menndez formal surrender, which he did at 2359Z on 14 June. Later that morning (just after midnight), Moore signaled Northwood with the following words: Major General Menndez surrendered to me all the Argentine armed forces in East and West Falkland together with their impedimenta. Arrangements are in hand to assemble the men for return to Argentina, to gather their arms and equipment and to mark and make safe their munitions. The Falklands Islands are once more under the government desired by their inhabitants. God Save the Queen.153 Epilogue On 17 June President Galtieri announced his resignation as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and as President of Argentina. Post-surrender activities lasted for several days with one of the main challenges being accommodations for soldiers on both sidesmany of whom had been out in the open for several weeksand winter was now fully upon them. MG Moores hope was that he could return most of his prisoners to Argentina as 46

soon as possible in order to alleviate the strain that their presence imposed upon his logistics. And soon the defeated were on their way home to a nation unprepared for the military collapse that had occurred in their Malvinas. To avoid public embarrassment, the ships carrying the released Argentine soldiers were quietly docked at La Plata and Ro Santiagodeliberately isolated locations, where no official party welcomed them home. In fact, most were delayed from meeting with their families while the junta struggled with a way to release the news of their defeat. The Battle for the Falklands had cost the British 255 lives, with 777 wounded. The Royal Navy had four warships sunk and many more damaged; the Atlantic Conveyor, Sir Galahad, and one landing craft were also sunk, and the Task Force lost 24 helicopters and 10 fixed-wing aircraft. For Argentina, combat deaths were ~746, with another 1,105 soldiers listed as wounded or sick. Their material losses were also significantthe cruiser Belgrano, one submarine, the trawler Narwal, and several smaller ships, with aircraft losses in excess of 100.154 Galtieris junta was replaced by a new, transitional military junta, which appointed retired general Reynaldo Bignone as President; he immediately established the Rattenbach Commission to determine who was at fault for the failed Malvinas debacle. The Commission found all of the junta members, every senior officer involved, and the former foreign minister at fault, and all were charged with various crimes and convicted in a long procession of court appearances and appeals in the subsequent months and years. All three of the junta members were convicted and sentenced to prison; however, in 1989, Galtieri and 39 other officers of the dictatorship received pardons from then-President Carlos Menem. Galtieri subsequently died in 2003 while under house arrest for civil charges related to the disappearance of three Spanish citizens while he was president. Admiral Jorge Anaya suffered a heart attack in November 2006 while waiting to be interrogated by an examining magistrate investigating charges of human rights abuses; he was never deemed fit enough to stand trial and died under house arrest in 2008. In 2003 the Spanish justice system sought the extradition of Lieutenant General Basilio Arturo Lami Dozo to stand trial in Spain for crimes against humanity committed during the juntas reign.155

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Notes
1

Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, xxxii. Initial signatories of the Antarctic Treaty included the governments of Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, the French Republic, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, the Union of South Africa, The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America. Information about and a copy of the Treaty can be found in the U.S. State Department permanent electronic archive at http://www.state.gov/www/global/ arms/treaties/arctic1.html. 2 Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, 5. 3 Middlebrook, The Fight for the Malvinas, 2; Ibid., 3-4. 4 Middlebrook, 2. 5 Ibid., 103-5. 6 Scheina, 235. 7 Middlebrook, Task Force, 36. 8 Using naval ships for commercial purposes was a common practice in 1982not only in Argentina, but throughout South America. Schiena, 379, note 1. 9 Hastings and Jenkins, 54-55; Middlebrook, The Fight for the Malvinas, 8-9. Davidoff did not accompany his working part when it traveled to Leith in March 1982. Additionally, though the Baha Buen Suceso was an Argentine naval transport, it spent the bulk of its time on commercial charter work, and on this trip to South Georgia, it carried no Argentine naval personnel. 10 Middlebrook, The Fight for the Malvinas, 10. 11 Ibid., 12. According to former Argentinean Air Force Commodore Alberto Moro, the junta had no intention of cutting off diplomatic talks with Great Britain or in precipitating a major military confrontation; it simply wanted the UK to return to the bargaining table with a more serious-minded approach toward negotiating the status of the islands. Moro, 2. 12 Initially planned as Operation AZUL (Blue), the name was changed to Operation ROSARIO on March 31, Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, 109 and Ruiz Moreno, 21. In the Argentine Armys official 1983 critique, Informe official del Ejrcito Argentino: Conflicto Malvinas, Volumes I and II, there is no reference to either name. Martin Middlebrook, however, states the reverse in The Fight for the Malvinas, p. 25: What the Argentines called Operacin AzulOperation Bluehad already started. (It had been known as Operation RosarioOperation Rosaryduring the planning stage but this was changed to Blue, after the robe of the Virgin Mary[the protectress of the Argentinean armed forces]; the planners were anxious that the operation should be seen by the Argentine soldiers and public as a semi-religious crusade). In either case, the religious connotation was clearly important to the Argentines. See also Middlebrook, Task Force, 16. 13 The initial plan, Directive No. 1/82 contained five assumptions: 1) The operation to recover the islands would be simple; 2) the defense of the islands and control of public security could be achieved with a few men; 3) a military reaction by Britain was unlikely; 4) both countries would seek a negotiated settlement; and, 5) in the event of a military reaction by Britain, the Military Strategic Reserve would be engaged. Pazos, 9. 14 Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, 107-8; Schiena, 236; and, Informe official del Ejrcito Argentino: Conflicto Malvinas, Volume I, 22. 15 Sources differ on who the commander for the short-lived Malvinas Theater of Operations (TOO) actually was. Informe official del Ejrcito Argentino: Conflicto Malvinas, Volume I, however, the official Argentine report on the Malvinas Conflict, reviews the campaign plan, which clearly states that General Garcia was the Malvinas TOO commander until the objective is conquered, at which time the Malvinas TOO would be deactivated (estimated to occur ~D+5), 22. With regard to the specific boundaries of the two respective TOOs, none of the sources consulted discussed or provided specific geographic coordinates or boundaries, though it is reasonable to assume that such must have existed for command and control purposes. 16 Middlebrook, The Fight for the Malvinas, 15. 17 Informe official del Ejrcito Argentino: Conflicto Malvinas, Volume I, 21. 18 Ibid. 19 Middlebrook, Task Force, 41; Middlebrook, The Fight for the Malvinas, 17. 20 Middlebrook, Task Force, 42.

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21 22

Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, 65. The two submarines dispatched from the UK on 1 April 1982 were HMS Spartan and HMS Splendid; they were later joined by HMS Conqueror. Freedman, The Official History of the Falklands Campaign, Vol. II, 52. 23 Middlebrook, The Fight for the Malvinas, 21; Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, 75-7. 24 Middlebrook, Task Force, 40; Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, 73-75, 92-3, 99. 25 Middlebrook, The Fight for the Malvinas, 23-4 26 Ibid., 25-6. 27 Middlebrook, Task Force, 43-4. 28 Accounts differ on what precisely happened at Moody Brook. While all accounts agree that grenades were launched followed by automatic fire, Middlebrook suggests that the grenades were tear gas and that when the commandos discovered the barracks were empty, only then did they engage with machine gun fireunder orders from RADM Bsser to display as much firepower and noise as possible to induce a quick surrender. See Middlebrook, The Fight for the Malvinas, 30; Hastings and Jenkins, 73-4; Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, 113. 29 Despite his protestations and refusal to shake hands with General Garcia, Governor Hunt was forced to surrender. Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, 113-14; Hastings and Jenkins, 74. 30 Hastings and Jenkins, 74. 31 Middlebrook, Task Force, 61. 32 Ibid., 52. 33 A copy of each of Gen Garcias communiqus can be found in Middlebrook, Task Force, 54-55. Communiqu #3 specifically directed residents to post a piece of white cloth outside their doors should they have problems that they wanted brought to the attention of the Argentine military authorities. Middlebrook notes that nearly everyone in Stanley found a reason to hang a white cloth outside his or his residence, and without being aggressive, the populace of Stanley let it be known that an Argentine military occupation was unwelcome. Middlebrook, Task Force, 55; Hastings and Jenkins, 75. 34 Hastings and Jenkins, 75. 35 Freedman, 16. This crisis erupted in the early days of the Thatcher administration, not long after she had earned the moniker the Iron Lady, and her government had been under siege by the opposition Labour party over dire economic conditions in Great Britain before trouble in the Falklands began. The Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), Admiral Sir Terence Lewin, was in New Zealand during the early days of this crisis, but kept in touch and was dissuaded from cutting his visit short in anticipation that a diplomatic solution would be found. In his absence, the First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Henry Leach, traveled to the House of Commons to speak directly with Secretary of Defence Nott, who he feared was going to be reluctant to recommend to Prime Minister Thatcher that Great Britain should respond with force. In his intervention to Mrs. Thatcher, Leach suggested a full task force, with logistic support and an aircraft carrier, should and could be put together by the weekend. Ibid., 23-4; Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, 123. 36 Woodward, One Hundred Days, Foreword, xi. 37 Freedman, 18-20. Following the humiliating 1956 Suez Crisis, there was a presumption that the time had passed when the country would engage in military operations in areas distant from the European continent. . . . Sending a naval Task Force had once been the sort of thing British Governments did regularly; but it was a long time since anything like this had been attempted, and even longer since an attempt had been successful. 38 A copy of the entire resolution can be found at http://www.falklands.info/history/resolution502.html. 39 Ibid., 21-24. Other members of the Chiefs of Staff Committee included the First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Henry Leach; the Chief of Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal Sir Michael Beetham; and, the Chief of the General Staff, General Sir Edwin Bramall. 40 Ibid., 29-31; Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, 127. 41 Hastings and Jenkins, 83; Middlebrook, Task Force, 68. 42 Freedman, 50. 43 Ibid., 51-2. 44 As a result of the 1981 Defence Review (also referred to as the Nott 1981 White Paper), the strategic justification for Britains aircraft carriers had come under scrutiny. While the UKs two carriers arguably provided anti-submarine defense for NATO, Notts white paper argued that destroyers and frigates could

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more effectively and cheaply perform these same duties. Consequently, HMS Hermes was scheduled to be scrapped and HMS Invincible had been sold to the Australians. In fact, Nott additionally argued that amphibious ships were no longer needed for out-of-area landings, which meant that the assault ships HMS Fearless and HMS Intrepid also were to be decommissioned eventually. Hastings and Jenkins, 11. 45 Freedman, 52; Hastings and Jenkins, 83. 46 Thompson, The Lifeblood of War, 250-51. As early as 31 March, the UK supposedly had information that Argentina might invade the Falklands, and while some military forces were alerted, according to MG Julian Thompson, 3 Commando Brigade was not notified until 2 April, a day after HMS Hermes and Invincible were ordered to be ready for notice to sea. MG Thompson calls such oversight unpardonable, and when the unit was given notice, it had 72 to prepare for dispatch: At this stage no mission was given, and the problem of translating political intent into military action, that was to persist until well after the landing on 21 May, first reared its head. There were no formal plans to cater for the possibility of having to retake the Falkland Islands after their seizure by the Argentines, or anyone else. 47 Freedman, 52-4. 48 Hastings and Jenkins, 84. 49 Merchant companies, such as P&O insisted upon requisitioning rather than the chartering of their commercial vessels because of insurance rate issues associated with carrying troops and equipment into combat zones. Crews had to consist entirely of British citizens, and while ship masters were responsible for safety, the senior RN officer aboard each vessel was responsible for employment through the chain of command. Freedman, 55-6. 50 Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, 129. 51 Freedman, 54. The author also notes in The Official History of the Falklands Campaign, Vol. II, 55, that it was clear . . . that there was no risk of taking excessive suppliesleading to the principle that all available storage space must be used. In The Lifeblood of War, page 251-2, MG Julian Thompson was equally critical of administrative loading, Loading for an amphibious operation is best carried out in the following sequence: identify the mission, find out as much as possible about the enemy (intelligence), make the plan, and stow the ships so that men and loads will come off in the sequence required to meet the plan. Time constraints, however, dictated quick preparations, and, as Thompson notes, for lack of anything better, the plan for the reinforcement of Northern Norway in a time of tension was used as a planning guide. 52 For example, because the British knew there few roads in the Falklands, they intentionally took along very few vehicles, assuming helicopters would be used to move men and equipment from offshore shipping as well as to forward destinations on land. With the subsequent loss of the Atlantic Conveyer with its three Chinooks and six Wessex helicopters on 25 May, the impact of earlier logistics decisions were severely felt. Ibid., 55, 487. 53 Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, 129-30. 54 Middlebrook, Task Force, 83. 55 Great Britain, Ministry of Defence, The British Army in the Falklands, 29. 56 Americas Falklands War: A Relationship Sweet and Sour, The Economist, 3 March 1984, 29; and Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, 130-32. 57 Freedman, 72, 398-99. Freedman describes arrangements for two RAF Canberras, with Chilean markings that were sent to Chile on loan, with an option to purchase. The Canberras were operated by RAF crews during the hand-over period while they trained Chilean aircrews and carried out photographic reconnaissance (398). He also reports on an interview conducted in 1999 with General Fernando Matthei, who had been the Chilean Air Force Commander-in-Chief in 1982. Gen Matthei described an agreement with Great Britain through a secret agent, who arranged for intelligence on Argentine air movements that were relayed from an underground command center in Punta Arenas via satellite to Northwood (399). 58 Ibid., 72-4. 59 While Task Force 317 was en route both to Ascension Island and thereafter to South Georgia and the Falklands, there was a flurry of diplomatic activity, particularly, by then-U.S. Secretary of State, Alexander Haig. And, while a vitally-important part of this conflicts history, those details by design have been omitted from this Case Study because they are tangential to the operational warfare lessons and discussions this study seeks to foster. 60 Middlebrook, The Fight for the Malvinas, 48. 61 Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, 142-4.

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While Figure 7 is offered in the Argentine Armys official 1983 critique, Informe official del Ejrcito Argentino: Conflicto Malvinas, and has been corroborated by other authors, primarily British, Commodore Rubn O. Moro, the source for Figure 8, was the chief rapporteur to the Argentine Rattenbach Commission, chaired by Lieutenant General Benjamin Rattenbach, which assessed responsibilities in the FalklandsMalvinas conflict. The Commissions assessments were then used to draw charges against the junta. Additionally, Commodore Moro chaired the drafting committee for the official History of the Air War in the Malvinas. Consequently, his assessment, specifically with regard to organization of Argentinas air forces, has significant credibility. Strategic Air Command, established at the same time as the South Atlantic Theater of Operations (April 5) was in charge of Argentine Air Force offensive operations, which entrusted implementation of tactical Air Force missions to its subordinate, Air Force South, commanded by BG Ernesto Crespo and headquartered in Comodoro Rivadavia. Air defense of the mainland was the responsibility of Air Defense Command, commanded by BG Jorge A. Hughes. Moro, 78-9. 63 Middlebrook, Task Force, 88; Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, 144-5. 64 The Argentinean Air Force sent an unarmed Boeing 707 on a reconnaissance flight near Ascension on 21 April, and it picked up the British Task Force en route with 2 light aircraft carriers and 8 destroyers. A Sea Harrier recognized the Argentine Air Force plane, but British rules of engagement at that time prohibited firing under the circumstances. Galtieri, aware from news reports of the composition of British units aboard the ships, knew that he would have six conscript units facing at least four attacking professional battalionsized British units. Moreover, British helicopters would give the attackers many options. Middlebrook, The Fight for the Malvinas, 54-55. 65 III Brigade, commanded by BG Omar Parada, manned by conscripts, and stationed near the friendly border with Uruguay, was determined to be the most easily spared unit, despite having neither the equipment nor the training for cold-weather operations that would likely be faced in the Malvinas. Its troops arrived in the Falklands on a day with winds so fierce they were unable to pitch their tents. Most of their support equipmentradios, digging instruments, vehicles, rifle-cleaning equipment, and reserve ammunitionwere loaded aboard the Ciudad de Crdoba, which turned around before ever reaching Isla Soledad. Ibid., 56-57. 66 Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, 146; Middlebrook, The Fight for the Malvinas, 48. 67 Middlebrook, The Fight for the Malvinas, 53-57. 68 Scheina, 244. 69 Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, 145-47. According to Menendez, he was only prepared to be governor of the Malvinasan administrative position as he initially understood itnot responsible for the islands defense. Carlos H. Turolo, Malvinas: Testimonio de su Gobernador (Buenos Aires: Sudamericana, 1983), 46. 70 Informe official del Ejrcito Argentino: Conflicto Malvinas, Volume II, Annex 9, translated by CAPT Robert C. Rubel, USN. Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, among others, note on page 148 that: Neither Lombardos command in Puerto Belgrano nor Menendez in Stanley acted as if they expected anything other than a diplomatic resolution of the conflict. Little military planning was done. 71 Ibid., Annex 11. While the official Argentine Army report contains both BG Menndez and VADM Lombardos base plans, several of the annexes have not been includedin particular, the operations annexes. 72 Middlebrook, The Fight for the Malvinas, 62-63. The Argentineans had considered lengthening the runway at Puerto Argentino, but felt they had insufficient time in which to complete the lengthening given its heavy use by transport aircraft; moreover, the British sea blockade posed difficulties to Argentine sealift vessels that would be needed to transport the necessary heavy earth-moving equipment. They also considered a scheme to use aluminum decking, but that effort was abandoned because of higher priorities for scarce sealift. See Schiena, 259 and Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, 326. 73 Ibid., 67. What Argentina did not know at the time was that while the two UK submarines, HMS Splendid and Spartan, were in fact in place by 12 April, they had not yet received permission to engage because the British were still holding hopes that a diplomatic solution could be found. 74 Ibid., 69-71. 75 The Santa F left Mar del Plata on April 9 for Grytviken, travelling most of the way on the surface because its batteries were spent. Damaged further by winds and strong waves during the journey east, it was incapable of achieving the surprise necessary to launch its torpedoes if it had such an opportunity. Nevertheless, it did safely deliver its cargo of 40 men and their equipment into Cumberland Bay. Attacked
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by helicopters from HMS Antrim, the Santa F limped over to Grytviken where it was abandoned. Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, 222-23. 76 Throughout the buildup period, following the assault to take back the Malvinas Islands, Argentina ardently worked the UN and the Organization of American States to call the Rio Treaty (the InterAmerican Treaty of Reciprocal Aid [IATRA] for implementation of collective measures. Ultimately, it was unsuccessful, but for those interested in the details of these negotiations, a summary can be found in Moro, 55-58, Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, 224-43. 77 The British decision to retake South Georgia was one of the first made by the Thatcher War Cabinet because it would demonstrate resolve, show the public a quick victory, and hopefully improve Britains diplomatic position vis--vis Argentina. Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, 218-220; Middlebrook, The Fight for the Malvinas, 72. 78 Informe official del Ejrcito Argentino: Conflicto Malvinas, Volume II, Annex 9, Operations Order 1/82, HQ Malvinas Ground Command. 79 Middlebrook, The Fight for the Malvinas, 74-5. 80 Middlebrook, Task Force, 96. 81 Freedman, 75-79. CDR Angus K. Ross, RN (Ret.) suggests that while the Sea Harrier was an able dogfighter in a twisting fight at low level (made better by U.S. AIM 9L Sidewinder missiles), it was outclassed in its anti-air capabilities by Argentinas Mirages. Had the Mirages been able to operate without the constraints on fuel that their distance from the Argentine mainland imposed, the Sea Harriers would have had a much more difficult task. British air planners fully expected that the Argentineans would find a way around their range limitations, either by air refueling or extending the length of the runway at Stanley. Consequently, British emphasis was on protecting these scarce assets from the outset, not in using them to sweep the air. 82 Ibid., 80, 199-203. 83 Thompson, 17-18. 84 Freedman, 274. 85 Ibid., 203-5. 86 Burden, et al., 363-95; Freedman, 279-80. 87 Freedman, 282-3. 88 The initial Vulcan mission consisted of a total of 18 sorties flown by 15 Victor tankers, 2 Vulcans and a Nimrod and involved the transfer of over 2,000,000 lbs. of fuel (925 tons) during 17 separate air-refueling transfersall to put one repairable crater in one runway. Middlebrook, Task Force, 120. 89 Burden, et al., 365; Freedman, 285-6; Moro, 95. 90 Middlebrook, The Fight for the Malvinas, 76-93; Moro, 93-116; Middlebrook, Task Force, 126-141; Freedman, 286-88; Hastings and Jenkins, 143-46; and Woodward, 132-45. 91 From previous naval exercises with NATO forces, Woodward knew it was possible to get within Exocet launch range of a fully-prepared American carriera situation he was keen to avoid. Woodward, 147-49 and Freedman, 292. 92 Freedman, 290-93 and Moro, 118. British submarines, however, already had ROE allowing attacks on any submarines encountered because the Argentine 209s were sufficiently quiet that they could sneak up on a British nuclear submarine and be within torpedo range before being detected. Freedman and GambaStonehouse, 250-51. While Woodward knew he needed to foil at least one arm of the pincer, the position of the Belgrano for the moment was known whereas the precise location of the Veinticinco de Mayo was not. Had HMS Spartan located the carrier, Woodward clearly states he would have asked for permission in the strongest terms to attack both. Woodward, 149-55. 93 Freedman, 296-98; Moro, 121-25; Middlebrook, The Fight for the Malvinas, 96-116; and Woodward, 158-64. The decision to sink the Belgrano remains controversial, with each side offering differing interpretationsas one would expect. Rubn Moro summarizes the Argentinean perspective and offers no less than eight conflicting accounts and a set of conclusions regarding the British rationale behind the sinking of the Belgrano on pages 125-33. Lawrence Freedman offers the British version on 299-300 and in Chapter 49 of his official history, entitled, appropriately, The Belgrano Controversy, 743-53. Irrespective of the rationale, there were admittedly several inconsistencies and inaccuracies in initial UK Government statements that helped spawn the continuance of this controversy. Freedman, 299. 94 Middlebrook, Task Force, 152-53 and Freedman, 300-301. The Alfrez Sobral was about 100 NM north of the Malvinas searching for survivors of a ditched Canberra bomber that had been downed the previous

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day. It was one of two ships of Task Force 50, charged with air-sea rescue; the other ship was the Comodoro Somellara, which was approximately 200 NM from this incident and remained undamaged. Middlebrook, The Fight for the Malvinas, 117-18. 95 Though there was little fixed wing air activity for both sides on March 3, a Puerto Argentino-based Aermacchi out searching for British warships did crash into the sea as it was attempting to return to Puerto Argentino. Freedman, 301. 96 Freedman, 304-6; Middlebrook, Task Force, 153-66; Woodward, 165-83; and Moro, 143-60. A series of unfortunate circumstances, left HMS Sheffield more vulnerable to attack than it should have been, given the circumstancesthat the Belgrano had just been sunk and the Argentineans were undoubtedly seeking an opportunity for revenge. Nevertheless, HMS Sheffields anti-air-warfare officer and three of his cell of eight were either out of the room or away from their stations when HMS Glasgow sent out a warning that it had picked up radar emissions from the incoming aircraft. Additionally, HMS Sheffields HF radio was unmanned and its UHF failed to pick up HMS Glasgows entire warning message. Because its satellite communications terminal (SCOT) was still being used, information from the ships Electronic Support Measure (ESM) equipment was unavailable, and by the time the operations team came to enhanced alert, the SCOT was turned off, and the anti-air-warfare team returned to their stations, there was insufficient time to prevent missile impact. 97 Moro, 152-3; Freedman, 306. 98 Moro, 153. 99 Freedman, 307-313 and Moro, 153. 100 Woodward notes that blockading the Falklands was a non-starter because: a) we were not big enough to seal the Falklands off; and b) we could not stay out at sea long enough to enforce a starve-them-out programme, even if such a scheme could be made to avoid, somehow, starving out the islanders at the same time. Woodward, 185. 101 Ibid., 191-94. 102 Middlebrook, The Fight for the Malvinas, 127-31 and Woodward, 194-98. 103 While the second set of attacking Skyhawks did survive the attacks against HMS Glasgow, on their return flight one of the Skyhawks flew too close to Goose Greena prohibited area for Argentine aircraftand was shot down by its own Argentine 35-mm Oerlikon air defense artillery killing the pilot. Ibid., 135. 104 Hastings and Jenkins, 157-59; Middlebrook, The Fight for the Malvinas, 132-35; and Woodward, 20421. 105 Middlebrook, The Fight for the Malvinas, 135-36. 106 Freedman, 431-37 and Woodward, 225-33. 107 Freedman, 437-39 and Middlebrook, Task Force, 192-93. While the 3-man Sea King aircrew was later captured and repatriated to the UK by Chile, no mention of what happened to the SAS team is made in Freedmans official accountan obvious omission; however, Martin Middlebrook speculates on a story, which he suggest is plausiblethe team partially accomplished its mission (installing mini-video cameras that transmitted airfield takeoffs) and was engaged by Argentine security forces who killed at least one and wounded another before capturing the rest. The incident was nevertheless kept quiet because the team may have been secretly exchanged for LCDR Astiz, the naval officer captured at South Georgia. 108 Freedman, 445, 463; Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, 335. 109 Freedman, 445-46. The ring of air defenses around Stanley consisted of 61 anti-aircraft gun and 7 missile launch batteries. Middlebrook, The Fight for the Malvinas, 141-42. Despite robust air defenses around Stanley, SAS reconnaissance observers assessed the mainly conscript ground forces as well-armed but poorly trained: General Menendezs army lacked the training and discipline in washing, changing clothes, keeping dry, looking after each other, which was second nature to the British. . . . the enemy were unhappy and inadequately fed, unsure of why they were on the Malvinas, poorly equipped to remain there. Hastings and Jenkins, 177. 110 Middlebrook, The Fight for the Malvinas, 142; Freedman, 446-47; and Freedman and GambaStonehouse, 326-27. 111 Freedman, 449-50. 112 Ibid. 113 Thompson, The Lifeblood of War, 269. 114 Freedman, 467-69.

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115

Ibid., 469-71. The initial greetings between the native Falkland islanders and their liberators were exceptionally low key and would remain so throughout the operation. As Captain Roger Williams of 40 Commando observed upon arriving in San Carlos: Our chaps surrounded the managers house and Andy Pillar knocked on the door to ask if there were any Args about. There was some delay and then Mr Short appeared and said something like, Oh, youve come thena common reaction throughout the settlement. There were no garlands of flowers or kisses on both cheeks. Middlebrook, Task Force, 210. 116 Woodward, 241-49; Freedman, 471-73; Moro, 211-29; and Middlebrook, Task Force, 206-16. 117 Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, 337. 118 Middlebrook, The Fight for the Malvinas, 166; quote from Oscar Cardoso, et al., Falklands: The Secret Plot (London: Preston Editions, 1983), 285; quoted in Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, 357. 119 Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, 357-59. For his part, Menndez was also hoping that the Argentine Air Force would have some success against the British carriers, which would help solve some of his defensive challenges. Freedman, 480. 120 Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, 474-77. The Rapier high-altitude surface-to-air defense system did not have radar, and so target acquisition was entirely dependent upon optical tracking. Additionally, missile equipment had been poorly loaded and hadnt made the long journey south without damage. Once ashore, Rapier units werent placed to deal adequately with aircraft attacks against shipping. 121 Freedman, 479. 122 Ibid. 123 Middlebrook, Task Force, 216 and Freedman, 480-81. 124 Woodward, 269-302 and Freedman, 483-90. 125 Freedman, 491. 126 Moro, 237-55. In addition to the Argentine Air Force, Argentine Navy aircraftspecifically, the tendard squadron and an A-4 squadron from the Veinticinco de Mayo, operating ashorehad participated in these attacks. 127 Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, 362-63. 128 Middlebrook, The Fight for the Malvinas, 176; Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, 364-65. 129 Hastings and Jenkins, 229-32. In addition to lacking air superiority, each man would be carrying 120 lbs. of equipment on his back, and the journey would be made without what little comfort the lost Atlantic Conveyers cargo of tenting could have provided. 130 Freedman, 450, 554-56. Though ostensibly a joint headquarters, the staff at Northwood had always been a fleet headquarters and [was] never truly joint 556. MG Moore departed Northwood by air and joined up with the QEII at Ascension. Though the QEII had Satellite Communications terminal, technical difficulties precluded reliable contact with Thompson and Fieldhouse, so Moore was unable to guide the interchange of information or to protect Thompson from theater-strategic-level meddling. In fact, at one point Fieldhouse told Woodward to go ashore and shout at Thompson until he moved out of the beachhead (562). Woodward refused, and so Fieldhouse called Thompson directly and ordered him to attack Goose Green in a subsequent signal: you should do all you can to bring the Darwin/Goose Green operation to a successful conclusion with Union Jack seen to be flying in Darwin. This . . . will allow us to claim with justification that we now control large areas of East Falklands. To complete the package you will understand how important it is to cover ground as quickly as possible to box him in Stanley (563). See also Julian Thompson, No Picnic: 3 Commando Brigade in the South Atlantic: 1982 (New York: Hippocrene, 1985), 73-74. 131 Julian Thompson, Ready for Anything: A History of the Parachute Regiment (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1989), 332. 132 Freedman, 570-71. In fact, the local commander, Lt Col Piaggi, did hear the BBC report, but assumed it was a planned bluff and, as a result, took no action to rearrange his defenses. Middlebrook, The Fight for the Malvinas, 180. 133 Freedman, 566-67; Middlebrook, Task Force, 254-55; and Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, 372-73. 134 Moro, 257; Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, 372; Freedman, 564-65; and Middlebrook, Task Force, 253. In fact, the senior ranking officer at Darwin was Vicecommodoro Wilson D. Pedroza, who, along with BG Menndez at Stanley, occasionally interfered with Piaggis decisions despite having less information upon which to make decisions (Freedman, 564). 135 Freedman, 578-80; Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, 372-76; and Middlebrook, Task Force, 261-73. 136 Freedman, 567-68, 582.

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137 138

Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, 377-78. Ibid., 378-79. Admiral Lombardo believed there were already sufficient provisions in place in the Malvinas, and so withheld the two ships from sailing, though they remained loaded and ready to sail when signaled. 139 Middlebrook, The Fight for the Malvinas, 205-207. Argentina, to this day, claims that the Invincible was indeed hit and damaged, proven by its three months late return from the war, which, Argentina argues, occurred while it was secretly repaired because the British wanted to conceal the damage from its public. Moro offers one such alternative account, 273-79. 140 Middlebrook, The Fight for the Malvinas, 200-201, 208-209. CDR Guillermo Repetto, Argentine Navy, disputes this portion of the text as having never occurred; however, an article by George Russell, Arthur White, and Marsh Clark, Falklands Islands: Girding for the Big One, Time, June 21, 1982, reports essentially the same events. 141 Freedman, 598. Although MG Moore arrived in the theater on 27 April, he actually became Task Group Commander (CTG 317.1) on 20 May, with both 3 Commando Bde and 5 Infantry Bde under his command. 142 Freedman, 33, 586-87. One of the issues with which MG Moore had to deal was Admiral Fieldhouses lack of confidence in Moores two subordinate brigadiers. Poor performance by 5 Brigade during preembarkation exercises had raised concerns about Brigadier Wilsons competence, and Thompsons reluctance to breakout from the beachhead at San Carlos had caused some to be suspect of his intestinal fortitudeimpressions that MG Moore first learned about after he was aboard the QEII en route to the Falklands (586). 143 Ibid., 587-89. 144 Freedman, 598-600; Middlebrook, Task Force, 296-98; and Hastings and Jenkins, 272-74. Part of the problem was that because there was no on-scene overall commander, decisions were being made and coordinated (or not) among different decision makers at five separate locationsFieldhouse at Northwood, Moore and Clapp aboard HMS Fearless at San Carlos, Woodward on HMS Hermes, Wilson and 5 Infantry Bde at Darwin/Goose Green, and 2 Para, with part of the 5 Bde HQ at Fitzroy/Bluff Cove. Moreover, when Moore found out about Wilsons opportunistic move to Fitzroy, he didnt immediately share that information with neither his then-current shipmate, Commodore Clapp, nor RADM Woodward, whose vessels would be needed to support this southern approach. Freedman, 604. 145 Hastings and Jenkins, 274-75 and Middlebrook, Task Force, 298-99. 146 Middlebrook, Task Force, 304-5. 147 Ibid., 304-9. 148 Middlebrook, The Fight for the Malvinas, 216-17; Middlebrook, Task Force, 315-16; and Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, 395. Of Menndez 9,000 troops, only ~5,000 were actually combat forcesmost were infantry and most were conscriptsand all were hungry, cold, and wet. Conversely, British forces, despite being 8,000 miles from home (as opposed to 400 miles for the Argentineans), never faced serious shortages of essential needs, though they were fearfully close at conflict termination. Much of Britains ultimate success was due in large measure to the tremendous operational logistics support its forces were provided by Northwood. Middlebrook, Task Force, 324-25. 149 Middlebrook, Task Force, 325-327; Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, 395-96; and Freedman, 613. 150 Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, 395-97; Middlebrook, Task Force, 329-50. 151 Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, 397-99 and Freedman, 653. Hastings uncontested walk into Stanley suggests that Argentine defenses there had already dissolved. Nevertheless, MG Moore later noted that Hastings presence in Stanley could have brought Great Britain significant embarrassment had he been captured while negotiations were ongoing. Freedman, 653-4. 152 Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, 400-405. Galtieris remarks about the military code refer to a section under the then-Argentine military code under which a commander would not be expected to surrender until he had lost half his men and three-quarters of his ammunition. . . . (405). Surrender under conditions less grim than these would warrant a court-martial offense. Galtieri is already trying to place the blame for Argentinas military failure on the shoulders of BG Menndez. 153 Freedman, 657-59. In the final surrender document, the word unconditional was deleted; however, the Argentine surrender was total and complete with regard to personnel and equipment on East and West Falkland and all the outlying islands. Freedman, 659. 154 Middlebrook, The Fight for the Malvinas, 277-86; Hastings and Jenkins, 314-24; Moro, 88-92; and Freedman, 662-72.

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Middlebrook, The Fight for the Malvinas, 287; Pardon of Argentine Officers Angers Critics of the Military, New York Times, October 8, 1989, http://www.nytimes.com/1989/10/09/world/ pardon-ofargentine-officers-angers-critics-of-the-military.html. Accessed: 27 April 2010; Profile: Leopoldo Galtieri, Telegraph, 13 March 2007, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1545385/ProfileLeopoldo-Galtieri.html. Accessed: 27 April 2010; Colin Harding, Obituary: Rear-Admiral Jorge Anaya: Argentine Naval Commander, The Independent, 16 January 2008; Silvana Boschi, La Corte, contra un pedido de Graffigna y Lami Dozo Clarn, 13 April 2006, http://www.clarin.com/diario/2006/04 /13/elpais/p-01101.htm. Accessed: 27 April 2010.
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1982 FALKLANDS WAR TIMELINE A Chronology of Events during the Falklands Conflict of 1982 9 January British Ambassador to Argentina lodges formal protest against Argentine scrap-metal merchant Constantino Davidoff for unauthorized landing on South Georgia on 20 December 1981 12 January Argentine Joint Armed Forces committee begins planning military invasion of Malvinas Islands 2 February Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher makes clear that she regards the Royal Marine presence in Stanley as sufficient to prevent an Argentine invasion 3 February Britain renews its formal protest at Davidoff's unauthorized landing 9 February Thatcher confirms retirement of HMS Endurance 1 March British and Argentine deputy foreign ministers issue a joint communiqu praising the cordial and positive spirit of sovereignty discussions held in New York 2 March Argentine foreign minister rejects the communiqu and says that Argentina reserves the right to employ other means if Britain continues to refuse to cede sovereignty 5 March Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington refuses to send a submarine to patrol off the Islands and South Georgia 6 March Hercules aircraft operated by Argentine military airline LADE, supposedly on a mail run to an Antarctic base, lands at Stanley Airport, falsely claiming a fuel leak, and carrying several senior Argentine officers whom the local LADE commandant takes on a tour of Stanley and its environs 8 March Thatcher asks the Foreign Office and Ministry of Defence for contingency plans in case of an Argentine blockade or invasion of the Islands 19 March Davidoff sends 40 workmen on naval vessel Bahia Buen Suceso to dismantle Leith whaling station on South Georgia; the workmen fail to ask permission to land from the British Antarctic Survey base at Grytviken and upon arrival hoist the Argentine flag; Britain lodges a formal protest 20 March Thatcher sends HMS Endurance and 24 Royal Marines from Stanley to South Georgia 23 March Bahia Buen Suceso and 30 workmen sail from Leith 24 March HMS Endurance arrives at Grytviken but earlier instructions to remove Argentine workmen are rescinded; Argentine naval vessel Bahia Paraiso puts a large quantity of stores ashore at Leith together with a marine detachment under the command of Captain Alfredo Astiz 26 March Argentine government says it will provide all necessary protection to the workmen on South Georgia; British intelligence source in Buenos Aires warns that an Argentine invasion of the Islands is imminent, but British government dismisses the warning; Argentine navy sets out on scheduled 57

maneuvers with the Uruguayan fleet; Argentine junta brings forward its invasion plans for Operation ROSARIO because of the South Georgia crisis and the worsening economic turmoil and civil unrest; British Ministry of Defence advises the government against a military response 27 March Argentine missile boats Drummond and Granville sail south to join Bahia Paraiso 28 March Argentina restates its claim to the Falkland Islands and Dependencies, tells Britain there will be no negotiations on South Georgia, cancels leave for military and diplomatic personnel, sends stores and equipment to the naval bases of Puerto Belgrano and Comodoro Rivadavia, and begins over flights of Stanley; 5 Argentine warships are sighted near South Georgia; Britain begins contingency planning for the sending of a task force to the Islands; Lord Carrington asks U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig to intercede with the junta in an attempt to avoid military action 29 March UK Joint Intelligence Committee reports an invasion seems imminent and Thatcher orders 3 nuclear submarines south to the Islands; British submarine HMS Spartan sails south to the Islands from Gibraltar; Royal Fleet Auxiliary Fort Austin sails south to provide support for Endurance; New Royal Marine detachment arrives in Stanley aboard research ship John Biscoe 30 March Daily Telegraph reports that a nuclear submarine is sailing south; Former Prime Minister James Callaghan informs Parliament that in 1977 in response to Argentine pressure Britain secretly sent a nuclear submarine and two warships to the South Atlantic; Lord Carrington states that a diplomatic solution is being pursued 31 March Argentine Military Junta takes final decision to invade the Islands on 2 April; Violent anti-government riots occur across Argentina; British intelligence warns that the Argentine fleet is at sea heading toward Falklands; Chief of Navy Staff Admiral Sir Henry Leach advises a crisis meeting headed by Thatcher that Britain could and should send a task force if the islands are invaded; Governor Rex Hunt is informed Britain believes Argentina is planning a submarine landing on the Islands as a means of increasing pressure over South Georgia; Royal Marines commander Brigadier Julian Thompson is alerted to the crisis 1 April British submarine Splendid sails from Faslane; UN Security Council meets at Britains request and calls for restraint and avoidance of force; U.S. President Reagan warns Argentine military junta leader General Galtieri not to take military action; Governor Hunt is informed at 3:30 pm FI time that Britain now believes a full invasion is planned and summons an immediate meeting of government heads of department; at 7:15 pm FI time Governor Hunt in a radio broadcast warns Islanders of impending invasion and mobilizes the Royal Marines and Falkland Islands Defence Force; 58

Admiral Leach orders ships on exercise in the Mediterranean to prepare to sail south 2 April Argentina launches Operation ROSARIO, bringing ships into position off the Islands; Governor Hunt advises Islanders that Galtieri has rejected Reagans intervention, and declares a State of Emergency at 3:25 am; Argentine special forces land at Mullet Creek ~ 4:30am, more troops land at York Bay at 5:30 am, and Governor Hunt orders the surrender at 9:15 amby now the whole town other than Government House is under Argentine control; Galtieri hails the recovery of the Malvinas, saying Argentina had been left no option other than military action; Governor Hunt and other Foreign Office officials and the captured Royal Marines are forcibly evacuated by the Argentines to Montevideo; Brigadier General Mario Menndez is appointed governor of Islas Malvinas and Dependencies; Stanley renamed Puerto Argentino; Royal Marines on South Georgia attack the Argentine forces at 12:30 pm, but after inflicting heavy damage surrender to a far-superior force at 2:30 pm; Britain orders Argentine diplomats out of the country; Bank of England freezes Argentine assets in Britain; Emergency cabinet meeting approves the sending of the task force to liberate the Islands; 9 Royal Navy ships on exercise in the Mediterranean sail south; 3 April UN Security Council passes Resolution 502 by 10 votes to 1 (with 4 abstentions) demanding immediate Argentine withdrawal from the Islands; Argentina refuses to comply; Emergency session of House of Commons endorses the decision to send the task force but attacks the British Government for not foreseeing the Argentine attack; first RAF elements of the task force deploy to Ascension Island; Argentina reinforces its troops on South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands; 4 April British submarine HMS Conqueror sails from Faslane; Argentines occupy Goose Green and Darwin; 5 April Aircraft carriers HMS Hermes and Invincible sail from Portsmouth with other ships; Lord Carrington resigns and is replaced as Foreign Secretary by Francis Pym; 7 April British Government announces it will impose a 200-mile exclusion zone around the Islands on 26 April; Liner SS Canberra is requisitioned at Southampton upon her return from a world cruise; Britain freezes $1.4 billion in Argentine assets held in British banks 9 April 3 Commando Brigade sails from Southampton aboard SS Canberra; European Economic Community approves economic sanctions against Argentina (Ireland and Italy veto) 10 April EEC sanctions against Argentina come into effect (against wishes of Italy and Ireland) 12 April 200 mile maritime exclusion zone around the Islands declared by Britain to prevent Argentine reinforcements/supplies reaching the Islands from the 59

mainland; British submarine HMS Spartan arrives on station off Stanley; 14 April Argentine fleet leaves Puerto Belgrano; Squadron of ships carrying Royal Marines and special forces sent to retake South Georgia rendezvous with HMS Endurance; 15 April British destroyer group takes up holding position in mid-Atlantic; 17 April Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse chairs conference at Ascension Island with Admiral Sandy Woodward and 3 Commando Brigade, which sets out detailed plans for the retaking of the Islands by force; main task force sails south from Ascension Island; 18 April Argentine aircraft carrier Veinticinco de Mayo returns to port with engine trouble 20 April British War Cabinet orders repossession of Islands; SS Canberra arrives at Ascension Island 21 April South Georgia operation begins with failed landing by SAS on Fortuna Glacier 22 April Britain warns all British nationals to leave Argentina; British task force arrives in Falklands waters; Galtieri visits Islands; Argentine navy commandeers trawler Narwhal for intelligence purposes 23 April Britain warns Argentina that any military or civilian ship or aircraft representing a threat to the task force will be destroyed 24 April RADM Woodwards task group rendezvous with mid-Atlantic destroyers 25 April South Georgia recaptured by Royal Marines; Thatcher tells Britain to rejoice; Argentine submarine Santa Fe is beached on South Georgia after British attack 26 April Defence area declared around British fleet; Thatcher declares time for diplomacy is running out; Argentines occupy Port Howard 27 April UK Chiefs of staff present San Carlos landing proposals (Operation SUTTON) to War cabinet 28 April Organization of American States supports Argentinas sovereignty claim but calls for peaceful negotiations 29 April Task force arrives at exclusion zone; Vulcan bombers arrive at Ascension Island; 30 April Maritime Exclusion Zone (MEZ) is declared a Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ), applicable to all ships and aircraft supporting the Argentine occupation of the Islands; MG Sir Jeremy Moore flies to Ascension for conference with Brigadier Thompson; Reagan terminates Haigs peace mission, declares U.S. support for Britain, imposes economic sanctions on Argentina, and offers Britain materiel and other aid 1 May Initial SAS and SBS landings on the Islands; first Vulcan bomber raid on Stanley airport; Sea harrier aircraft attack Stanley airport and Goose 60

Green; 3 Argentine aircraft are shot down; naval bombardment of Stanley begins; 114 inhabitants of Goose Green are imprisoned in the settlements Recreation Club for the next 4 weeks; 14 Stanley residents previously sent to Fox Bay East are placed under house arrest; 2 May General Belgrano sunk 30 miles outside exclusion zone by submarine HMS Conqueror on orders of War Cabinet who claim self-defence368 Argentines die 3 May British forces sink one Argentine patrol boat and seriously damage another; Argentine navy vessels are recalled to shallow waters off Argentine coastline out of reach of submarines; Galtieri rejects Peruvian peace plan, citing General Belgrano 4 May British destroyer HMS Sheffield hit by an Exocet missile, and subsequently sinks20 die; British forces begin bombarding Argentine positions around Stanley 6 May Two British sea harriers crash in fog; convoy including SS Canberra heads south from Ascension Island 7 May Britain extends TEZ to 12 miles off Argentine coast; UN Sec Gen de Cuellar discusses peace proposals in NYC with British and Argentine delegations 8 May War cabinet dispatches landing force south from Ascension Island; 9 May Final plans drawn up for San Carlos landing site; Argentine trawler Narwhal bombed by sea harriers, and subsequently sinks; Argentine positions face heavy bombardment from sea and air, especially around Stanley 10 May Task Force briefed about San Carlos landing plans; Argentine supply ship Islas de los Estados sunk by HMS Alacrity in Falkland Sound; Argentina declares the entire South Atlantic a war zone 12 May QEII leaves Southampton with 5 Infantry Brigade comprising Scots Guards, Welsh Guards and Gurkhas; Argentine military junta concedes sovereignty of the Islands isnt a precondition to the UN peace plan 14 May Britains ambassadors to U.S. and UN summoned back to London; Thatcher warns Britain that a peaceful settlement may not be possible; SAS attack the Argentine base on Pebble Island and destroy supplies and 11 Pucar aircraft; 3 Argentine Skyhawk are shot down by Sea Harriers 17 May Helicopter from HMS Invincible lands SAS team in Argentina, but they fail to destroy Argentine military aircraft at the Rio Grande base 18 May Landing force rendezvous with RADM Woodwards task group; San Carlos landing plan put to full cabinet; Argentine junta rejects British 61

peace proposals 19 May War cabinet gives RADM Woodward the go ahead for landing plan; British sea king helicopter crashes with the loss of its crew and 19 Special Forces personnel 20 May Thatcher accuses Argentina of obduracy and delay, deception and bad faith, tells Commons of collapse of peace process, and orders task force into battle; RMS St. Helena requisitioned by the Task Force 21 May San Carlos landings begin, codenamed Operation SUTTON; British frigate Ardent sunk in San Carlos Water by air attack22 die; HMS Argonaut and Antrim hit by Argentine bombs, which fail to explode2 die; 2 British helicopters and 15 Argentine aircraft are shot down; 23 May British frigate HMS Antelope hit by Argentine bomb which fails to explode 1 crewman dies; 10 Argentine aircraft are shot down 24 May HMS Antelope explodes and sinks when a bomb disposal officer attempts to defuse the bomb; landing craft Sir Galahad and Sir Lancelot hit by Argentine bombs, which fail to explode while Sir Bedivere is damaged by a bomb exploding in water nearby; 7 Argentine aircraft are shot down 25 May British destroyer HMS Coventry sunk by air attack20 die; British container ship Atlantic Conveyor is abandoned with 3 vital Chinook helicopters aboard after an Exocet missile hit sets the ship ablaze12 die; 8 Argentine aircraft are shot down; SAS unit reconnoiters Mount Kent 26 May War cabinet questions lack of movement out of bridgehead at San Carlos; London makes the retaking of Goose Green a priority; 2 Para sets out for Goose Green; UN Security Council Resolution 505 instructs de Cuellar to seek negotiated settlement 27 May 45 Commando and 3 Para set out for Douglas and Teal Inlet; SAS land in strength on Mount Kent; Sea Harriers attack Goose Greenone plane is shot down; British forces furious when BBC World Service report 2 Para are advancing on Darwin; however, Argentine commander believes this is deliberate misinformation 28 May 2 Para launch attack early in the morning, and by evening surround Goose Green17 British and 250 Argentines die; 5 Infantry Brigade transship from QEII to Norland and Canberra at South Georgia; British shelling by air and sea of Stanley recommences and continues for the next 16 days 29 May Argentines surrender Goose Green, British take 1,400 prisoners, and the Islanders imprisoned at Goose Green by the Argentines are released; Organization of American States condemns Britains military action and calls on U.S. to stop helping Britainonly the U.S., Chile, Columbia and Trinidad & Tobago abstain 30 May 45 Commando takes Douglas and 3 Para takes Teal Inlet; 42 Commando advances on Mount Kent and Mount Challenger; General Moore arrives at San Carlos; 62

31 May 42 Commando takes Mount Kent and Mount Challenger; 19 men from the Royal Marines Mountain and Arctic Warfare Cadre capture Top Malo House after a firefight; Reagan asks Thatcher not to inflict too serious a defeat on the Argentines 1 June 5 Infantry Brigade begins disembarkation at San Carlos; War Cabinet debates further peace proposals; Britain repeats its ceasefire terms; 2 June 2 Para reaches Bluff Cove; Argentine military envoys arrive in New York offering to surrender to the UN 3 June Versailles summit opens; Reagans 5-point plan given to Britain 4 June Britain and U.S. veto Panamanian-Spanish immediate ceasefire resolution in UN Security Council; Spain criticizes Britains military action, becoming the only NATO country not to support Britain; 2 Para occupies the undefended Bluff Cove and Fitzroy 5 June Scots Guards depart San Carlos at night on board HMS Intrepid heading for Fitzroy 6 June Scots Guards land at Fitzroy in early morning; Versailles summit supports British position on the conflict; Welsh Guards depart San Carlos at night on board HMS Fearless heading for Fitzroy 7 June A shortage of landing craft means half the Welsh Guards land at Fitzroy in early morning but the rest return to San Carlos, which they leave again at night on board landing craft Sir Galahad and Sir Tristram; 8 June Plymouth in Falkland Sound is hit by 4 Argentine bombs but none explode; Sir Galahad and Sir Tristram are bombed at Fitzroy while the Welsh Guards are waiting to disembark51 die including 38 Welsh Guards and 55 are seriously wounded; War cabinet asked not to reveal Fitzroy casualties; Landing craft Foxtrot-4 sunk with British vehicles aboard; 3 Argentine Skyhawks are shot down by Sea Harriers; MG Moore finalizes battle plan for Stanley 10 June Falklands Appeal launched under patronage of Lord Shackleton; Peru sends 10 mirage jets to Argentina to replenish losses 11 June Battle for Stanley begins on Mount Longdon, Mount Harriet and Two Sisters23 paras and 50 Argentines die; 12 June 3 Para takes Mount Longdonanother 6 paras and 50 Argentines die; 42 Commando takes Mount Harriet and 45 Commando takes Two Sisters; British destroyer HMS Glamorgan badly damaged by land-launched Exocet missile13 die; 5 Infantry Brigade moves into position 13 June Battle for Tumbledown, Wireless Ridge and Mount William15 Britons and 40 Argentines die 14 June By daylight Argentine troops are fleeing in disarray, by mid-morning white flags flying in Stanley, and by noon British have marched to the 63

outskirts of Stanley; Thatcher informs the House of Commons at 10:15 pm UK time that the Argentines have surrendered; BG Mario Menndez surrenders to MG Jeremy Moore at 9 pm FI time; 9,800 Argentines surrender 15 June British officers are flown by helicopter to the outlying settlements to accept the surrender of local Argentine commanders; Stanleys historic Globe Store is destroyed by an Argentine arsonist; SS Canberra embarks 1,200 Argentine POWs at San Carlos 16 June SS Canberra embarks a further 1,850 Argentine POWs in Port William outside Stanley; UK Defence Minister of State announces that the official count of British military and civilian war dead is 255, with approximately 300 wounded 17 June Galtieri resigns 18 June SS Canberra sails from Port William with 3,046 Argentine POWs aboard once Argentina guarantees her safe passage 19 June SS Canberra offloads the POWs at Puerto Madryn, Argentina; Britain announces that 11,845 Argentines were captured 20 June British forces land on Southern Thule (South Sandwich Islands) Argentines surrender without a fight; Britain formally declares an end to hostilities; 200 mile exclusion zone established around the Islands during the war is replaced by a Falkland Islands Protection Zone of 150 miles; 22 June Retired Army General Reynaldo Bignone replaces Galtieri as President of Argentina; Argentine army assumes full power, the Navy and Air Force withdrawing from the Junta 25 June Governor Rex Hunt returns to Stanley as Civil Commissioner; SS Canberra departs Falklands waters with 40, 42 and 45 Commando on board 2 July Argentine war toll set at 645 dead and missing; RADM Woodward replaced by RADM Derek Roy Reffell as Commander of the British naval task force, and MG Jeremy Moore replaced by MG David Thorne as Commander of the British ground forces 6 July Thatcher appoints an official commission headed by Lord Franks to examine the causes of Britains failure to prevent Argentine capture of the Islands 8 July Argentina releases its only acknowledged British prisoner of war, an airman shot down near Stanley in May; Thatcher announces British government will repatriate bodies of dead British servicemen buried in the Falklands for reburial in Britain if requested by next-of-kin 11 July SS Canberra arrives home at Southampton with 40, 42 and 45 Commando; Britain drops its condition that Argentina formally acknowledge the end of hostilities before repatriating the remaining prisoners of war 64

12 July USA ends trade sanctions against Argentina 14 July Final 593 Argentine prisoners of war (mostly officers and technicians) repatriated 17 July Britain admits to falsifying press releases during the war to mislead Argentina 22 July Britain lifts the Exclusion Zone around the Islands 26 July BG Menndez dismissed from Argentine army 12 October Victory Parade in London 4 November UN General Assembly passes a resolution calling for a peaceful solution to the sovereignty dispute1

Hastings and Jenkins, 341-43 and Conflicto Malvinas, Tomo II, Anexo 66.

65

Order of Battle: British Units in the Falklands War Naval and Maritime Forces Royal Navy Ships Type Ship Carriers Hermes Invincible Guided Missile Destroyers (County Class) Antrim Glamorgan (Type 82) Bristol (Type 42) Cardiff Coventry Exeter Glasgow Sheffield Frigates (Type 12) Plymouth Yarmouth (Batch II) Argonaut (Leander) Minerva Penelope (Batch III) Active Alacrity Ambuscade Antelope Ardent Arrow Avenger (Type 22) Brilliant Broadsword Patrol Submarine Onyx Fleet Submarines 66

(Valiant) Conqueror Courageous Valiant (Swiftsure) Spartan Splendid Amphibious Assault Ships Fearless Intrepid Offshore Patrol Vessels Dumbarton Castle Leeds Castle Survey (Ambulance) Vessels Heccla Herald Hydra Antarctic Patrol Vessel Endurance Deep Armed Team Sweep Trawlers Cordella Farnella Junella Northella Pict Fleet Air Arm Squadrons Deployed Squadron 737 800 801 809 815 820 824 825 826 829 845 846 847 848 899 Aircraft 2 Wessex III helos 12 Sea Harriers 8 Sea Harriers 8 Sea Harriers 24 Lynx Helicopters 9 Sea King Mk II ASW 7 Sea King Mk II ASW 10 Sea King Mk II ASW 9 Sea King Mk V ASW 12 Wasp Helicopters 21 Wessex V Helos 13 Sea King Mk IV CDO 24 Wessex V Helos 12 Wessex V Helos 5 Sea Harriers Deployed Antrim/Glamorgan Hermes Invincible Hermes/Invincible various Invincible O class tankers San Carlos Hermes various various various various various Yeovilton

67

Fleet Clearance Diving Teams 1 and 3 Royal Fleet Auxiliaries Type Name Fleet Oilers O Olmeda Olna Tide Tidepool Tidespring Rover Blue Rover Support Oilers (Chartered) Pearleaf Plumleaf Appleleaf Bayleaf Brambleleaf Fleet Replenishment Ships Regent Resource Stromness Fort Fort Austin Fort Grange Helicopter Support Ship Engadine Landing Ships (Logistic) Sir Bedivere Sir Galahad Sir Geraint Sir Lancelot Sir Percivale Sir Tristram Royal Maritime Auxillary Service Tug Typhoon Mooring Vessel Goosander

68

Ships Taken Up From Trade (STUFT) Auxiliary Fleet Support Hospital Ship Uganda Minesweeper Support St Helena Mooring Vessel Wimpey Seahorse Repair Ship Stena Inspector Stena Seaspread Salvage Tug Irishman Yorkshireman Salvageman Logistic Support Support Oiler Anco Charger Balder London British Avon British Dart British Esk British Tamar British Tay British Test British Wye Eburna GA Walker Base Storage Tanker (Ascension) Alvega Base Storage Tanker (S Georgia) Scottish Eagle Fresh Water Tanker Fort Toronto Stores Ships Refrigerated Stores Avelona Star Geestport Military Supplies Laertes Ammunition 69

Lycaon Naval Stores Saxonia Transports A/C Transports Astronomer RO/RO Atlantic Causeway Atlantic Conveyor Contendor Bezant Dispatch Vessels British Enterprise III CS Iris Personnel and Vehicle Transports RO/RO Baltic Ferry Europic Ferry Nordic Ferry Norland St Edmund Tor Caledonia Liner Canberra Queen Elizabeth II Falklands Islands Merchant Vessels Forrest Monsunen British Land Combat Forces (Major Units) HQ 3 Commando Brigade 29 Commando Regiment Royal Artillery 40 Commando, RM 42 Commando, RM 45 Commando, RM 2nd Battalion Parachute Regiment+ 3rd Battalion Parachute Regiment+ HQ 5 Infantry Brigade 2nd Battalion Scots Guards 1st Battalion Welsh Guards 1/7th Duke of Edinburgh Own Gurka Rifles Royal Air Force Aircraft Units Squadron 44/50/101 Aircraft 6 Vulcan 70 Deployed Ascension

1 (F) 18 55/57 42 (TB) 120/201/206 47 24/30/70 10 202

10 GR3 Harriers 7 Chinook (3 sunk before arrival) 23 Victor tankers 5 Nimrod MR1 7 Nimrod MR2 Hercules C-130 Hercules C-130 13 VC-10 1 Sea King

Hermes San Carlos Ascension Mainly Ascension Mainly Ascension Ascension RAF Lyneham RAF Lyneham/ Ascension Ascension2

Order of Battle: Argentine Units Argentine Navy (Armada Argentina) Patrol Vessel Alfrez Sobral Comodoro Somellara Francisco de Gurruchaga Polar Vessel Almirante Irizar Baha Paraso Fleet Transport Baha Buen Suceso Amphibious Landing Ship Cabo San Antonio Destroyers Comodoro Py Segui (Type 42) Hrcules Santsima Trinidad (Exocet-equipped) Hiplito Bouchard Piedra Buena Frigates Drummond Grnville Guerrico (corvette) Cruiser General Belgrano Naval Transport
2

Freedman, 771-80.

71

Isla de los Estados Fleet Tanker Punta Medanos Submarine San Luis Santa F Aircraft Carrier Veinticinco de Mayo Coast Guard (Prefectura Naval Argentina) Patrol Vessels Islas Malvinas Ro Iguaz Merchant and Other Civil Ships ELMA Cargo Ships Formosa Lago Argentino Ro Cincel Ro Carcaraa Ro de la Plata Stern Fishing Trawler Narwal Commercial Tanker Puerto Rosales Oil-rig Tender Yehuin Small Coasters (Owned by Falklands Island Company; taken over by Argentines for inter-island work) Forrest Monsumen Marines 2nd Marine Infantry Battalion (Batalln de Infantera de Marina 2) Amphibious Commando Company (Compaia de Comandos Anfibios) Tactical Divers (Buzos Tcticos) Marine Field Artillery Amphibious Vehicles Battalion (Batalln de Vehculos Anfibios) 5th Marine Infantry Battalion (Batalln de Infantera de Marina 5) Marine Machine0Gun Company (Compaia de Ametralladoras) Marine Anti-Aircraft Unit Marine Amphibious Engineer Company (Compaia de Ingenieros Anfibios de Marina)

72

Argentine Army (Ejrcito Argentino) III Brigade X Brigade 3rd Regiment (Regimiento de Infantera Mecanizado 3) 4th Regiment (Regimiento de Infantera 4) 5th Regiment (Regimiento de Infantera 5) 6th Regiment (Regimiento de Infantera Compaa de Ingenieros 6) 7th Regiment (Regimiento de Infantera Mecanizado 7) 8th Regiment (Regimiento de Infantera 8) 12th Regiment (Regimiento de Infantera 12) 25th Regiment (Regimiento de Infantera 25) 3rd Artillery Regiment (Grupo de Artillera 3) 4th Air Mobile Artillery Regiment (Grupo de Artillera Aerotransportado) 601st Anti-Aircraft Regiment (Grupo de Artillera Defensa Aerea 601) B Battery, 101st Anti-Aircraft Regiment 601st Combat Aviation Battalion (Batalln de Aviacin de Combate 601) 9th Engineer Company (Compaa de Ingenieros de Combate 9) 10th Engineer Company Compaa de Ingenieros Mecanizado 10) 601st Engineer Company (Compaa de Ingenieros de Combate 601) 601st Commando Company (Compaia de Comandos 601) 602nd Commando Company (Compaia de Comandos 602) 601st National Guard Special Forces Company (Compaia de Fuerzas Especiales 601 de Gendarmera Nacional) 10th Armored Car Squadron (Escuadrn de Exploracin de Caballera Blindada 10) 181st Military Police Company (Compaa de Polica Militar 181) Argentine Air Force (Fuerza Aerea Argentina) 1st Air Transport Group (Grupo 1 Transporte Aro) (7 C-130, 2 KC-130, 3 707) 1st Aerial Photographic Group (Grupo 1 de Aerofotogrfico) (4 Learjets) 2nd Bomber Group (Grupo 2 de Bombardeo) (7 Canberra B-6 [Ex-RAF]) 3rd Attack Group (Grupo 3 de Ataque) (24 Pucar) 4th Fighter Group (Grupo 4 de Caza) (12-15 Skyhawk A-4C [Ex-USN]) 5th Fighter Group (Grupo 5 de Caza) (12 Skyhawk A-4B) 6th Fighter Group (Grupo 6 de Caza) (12 Daggers [Ex-Israeli-built Mirage V]) 8th Fighter Group (Grupo 8 de Caza) (11 Mirage IIIEA) Helicopters (2 Chinook, 2 Bell 212) Air Transport (civil aircraft of Aerolneas Argentinas, Austral Airlines, and LADE semimilitary air service) Phoenix Squadron (Escuadrn Fnix) (35 civil aircraft) Naval Air Units 1st Attack Squadron (1 Escuadrilla de Ataque) (6 Aeromachi 339A) 2nd Fighter and Attack Squadron (2 Escuadrilla de Caza y Ataque) (4 Super tendard) 73

3rd Fighter and Attack Squadron (3 Escuadrilla de Caza y Ataque) (10 Skyhawk A-4B) 4th Attack Squadron (4 Escuadrilla de Ataque) (4 Turbo-Mentor T-34C) Anti-Submarine Squadron ( Escuadrilla Antisubmarina) (unknown number of S-2Es) Reconnaissance Squadron (Escuadrilla de Exploracin) (4 Neptune SP-2H) 1st and 2nd Transport Squadrons (1 and 2 Escuadrillas de Sostn Logstico Mvil) (3 F-28 Fellowships and 3 Electras) 1st and 2nd Helicopter Squadrons (1 and 2 Escuadrillas de Helicpteros) (Lynx, Alouette, and Sea King helicopters)3

Martin Middlebrook, The Fight for the Malvinas, 292-309.

74

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