Information Briefing <<<Search google images “73 easting”

COVER SLIDE
“...My confidence in you is total. Our cause is just! Now you must be the thunder and lightning of
Desert Storm. May God be with you, your loved ones at home, and our Country." These were the
words of General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, USA Commander-in-Chief U.S. Central Command, in a
message to the command, 16 January 1991

Greeting. [Begin Slides] PURPOSE

“Good morning, [CADRE PRESENT] and Candidates. I’m Candidate Aipa, and today I will present an
unclassified information briefing with the purpose of educating you, OCS Class 002-09, on one of
the most decisive tank battles in recent U.S. military history, the Battle of 73 Easting.”

Summary
Key points I will address will be:
- the events leading up to the Battle
- How and why the US succeeded and the significance of the victory
- Lessons learned from research on this topic (overwhelming amount of information available form
official research and documentation, to general media accounts, to scholarly works. Reading and
assimilating the various accounts of this battle).

References
An incredibly helpful resource, the Combined Arms Research Library contains hundreds of
publications including the most recent FMs (downloadable in PDF), magazines, journals, historical
documents and treatises on subjects in military history, even obsolete manuals and much more all for
free.

Situation
In August of 1990, on the heels of Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait, 34 nations mustered under
the auspices of President George H.W. Bush's Operation Desert Shield. A total of 956,600 personnel
representing this Coalition stood ready as the deadline set by the United Nations Security Council for
Hussein to withdraw his forces from Kuwait (15 January 1991) came and went. On 17 January 1991,
Operation Desert Storm commenced with a massive air campaign.

In spite of the damage that 6 weeks of intensive Coalition air assaults had inflicted upon Iraqi forces,
Saddam Hussein still had not ordered his army out of Kuwait. On 24 February, the ground war
between Iraqi and Coalition forces officially began with a surprise attack by mainly US and British
forces along a 350 mile front extending from the north at Tawr al-Hammar south to the Iraq-Saudi
Arabian border. A “left-hook” attack was executed by the U.S. XVIII Airborne Corps, the 3rd Armored
Cavalry Regiment and the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized). Once these units had moved deep into
Iraqi territory, VII Corps launched a flank attack against the Republican Guard's Tawakalna Division,
which had been emplaced in order to cover the retreat of other Iraqi elements. This flanking maneuver
occurred in a sector of the Southeastern Iraqi desert known as 73 Easting. There are several other
interrelated battles on or around 26 February that also contributed to the complete destruction of the
Tawakalna Division such as the Battle of Phase Line Bullet, and the Battle of Al Busayyah. Also there
are also detailed accounts of the actions involving Iron, Ghost and Killer units of the 2nd ACR but for
the purposes of this briefing, I will focus on the actions of Eagle Troop and its Commanding captain,
now-Brigadier General HR McMaster.
Commander's Intent
The plan that came to be known as General Schwarzkopf's “Hail Mary” strategy relied heavily on the
elements of surprise and speed. Instead of making direct contact into the front lines of the Iraqi
defenses along Kuwait's southern border, an air strike would take out enemy command and control and
intelligence systems, masking the westward movement of Coalition forces as they moved in to outflank
the Iraqi army by sweeping in clockwise from south to north.
Integral to the complete destruction of the Tawakalna Division was the hasty attack ordered by the
commander of Eagle Troop of the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment and is a prime example of how an
officer at a lower echelon may deviate from specific strategic plans based on current combat
conditions, and still fulfill the intent of the higher echelon Commander.

The Commander
General HR McMaster is an interesting figure among today's Army leadership. He earned a Silver Star
for his service in the Gulf War, and since then has served in numerous field command and staff
positions, as well as developing a reputation as a “scholar-warrior” and a brilliant, innovative
counterinsurgency expert. Just a few of his achievements:

- He served as director of the Commander's Advisory Group for Lt. Gen. John Abizaid of the U.S.
Central Command from 2003 to 2004.
- In 2005, as Commander of the 3rd ACR, accomplished the stabilization of the city of Tal Afar, a
notoriously extremist Sunni stronghold
- Professor at West Point, published author of the controversial Dereliction of Duty, a critique of the
Army leadership during the Vietnam war
- He is currently a senior research associate at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London
and is slated to take over Directorship of Concepts and Experimentation of the Army Capabilities
Integration Center

His recent promotion to Brigadier General is one of several signs that the Army is turning to look at the
new face of combat, that of smaller-scale, counterinsurgency conflicts versus the older “big war”
doctrine that has shaped military decision making for the past hundred years. Gen. McMaster is known
for his unflinching honesty and attention to the civil and cultural considerations of conducting war.

He said in a 2005 interview with New Yorker magazine: “When we came to Iraq, we didn’t understand
the complexity—what it meant for a society to live under a brutal dictatorship, with ethnic and
sectarian divisions,” “When we first got here, we made a lot of mistakes. We were like a blind man,
trying to do the right thing but breaking a lot of things.” “You gotta come in with your ears open. You
can’t come in and start talking. You have to really listen to people.”

Friendly Forces
2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment, is mainly a reconnaissance element of VII Corps. It consists of three
ground squadrons (1st, 2nd and 3rd), an aviation squadron (4th) and a support squadron. Each ground
squadron has three cavalry troops, a tank company, a self-propelled howitzer battery, and a
headquarters troop. Each troop had 120 soldiers, 12 M3 Bradley fighting vehicles and nine M1 Abrams
main battle tanks. The US 3rd Armored Division (3rd AD) , 1st Infantry Division (1st ID), and the
British 1st Armoured Division (1 AD) were also a part of the Hail Mary strategy.

Armor and Weapons

The US held several technological advantages over the enemy: superior main battle tanks, and the use
of GPS to allow some preplanning of movement versus blind encounters.

Superiority of US tanks vs. Iraqi tanks

* M1A1 kill range = 2,500 m
- Iraqi tanks kill range = 2,000 m
* Chobham composite armor with depleted uranium upgrades and halon fire suppression system
reduced friendly casualties
*GPS
*Thermal, nightvision and laser rangefinder systems standard

Abrams
These pictures are from a training exercise conducted at Gowan Field in Boise, Idaho.

* Main battle tank produced in the United States since 1980; 1991 combat debut
* Heavily armored, highly mobile tank
* 105 mm rifled cannon
* 120 mm smooth bore cannon main gun - AT rounds (7 secs from command to kill)
* M240 coaxially mounted with main gun
* M240 at loader hatch
* .50 cal heavy machine gun with tank commander - can fire buttoned up or standing

Bradley
*Light armored personnel vehicle
*Tracked vehicle similar to a tank but with six dual-tired road wheels and three track-return rollers on
each side.
*Designed for speed (500 hp supercharged, eight-cylinder diesel engine) - can reach a top speed of 40
miles per hour
*25 mm M 242 Chain Gun, M240C coaxial medium machine gun, seven AT Missiles

Enemy Forces

Originally formed in 1980 as an elite fighting force tasked specifically to protect the Saddam Hussein
and his capital, by 1990 the Iraqi Republican Guard had been upgraded in personnel, training and
equipment until it was comprised of 5 infantry divisions and 3 armored-mechanized divisions: the 3rd
Tawakalna ala-Allah Mechanized Infantry Division, the Medina Armored Division, and the
Hammurabi Armored Division.

The Tawakalna Division was comprised of two mechanized brigades and one armored brigade, with
25000 to 3000 personnel per brigade. The RG was equipped with the most advanced equipment
available in the Iraqi Army, including 220 T-72 tanks and 278 infantry fighting vehicles - this meant
that the RG tanks would outnumber US tanks by 3 to 1. Tawakalna strong points consisted of dug in
vehicle and soldier fighting positions, wire, landmines and prepared fields of fire. The Republican
Guard had several tactical advantages over the Coalition forces: Obviously one of these is the
hometown advantage of fighting in familiar terrain and weather. However, as mentioned earlier, Iraqi
tanks were decidedly outclassed by the US and British armor, even if they did outnumber them.

The Disadvantages of RG Armor:

T-55:
- 100 mm main guns outclassed by larger caliber guns
- Can only sight and fire effectively when stationary
- Prone to more catastrophic secondary explosions if hit

T-72:
- No night vision or laser rangefinders on some older versions
- BOTH: using lower quality ammunition; inferior training for RG Soldiers

Strategic mistakes include relying on 1950s Soviet tank doctrine of “mass attack” and neglecting to
mitigate their armors' technological shortcomings by drawing the Coalition units into the urban combat
environment of Kuwait City, which would close the distance between the opposing sides, with the
advantage on the Iraqi side.

Terrain and Weather

"73 Easting" refers to a north-south line that indicates 7,300 meters east from the beginning of the
10,000 meter grid square. This designation was used as a phase line since the area of engagement was
open desert, with no distinguishable terrain features. The featurelessness of the desert can cause
problems with orientation and cause distortions in time and distance estimates.

Typical February weather proved to be a hindrance during the battle -- heavy fog in the morning gave
way to high winds (which generated sandstorms) and rain, reducing visibility sometimes to as little as
100 meters, necessitating the use of thermal sights.

The Essential Tasks

The VII Corps, spearheaded by the 2nd Cavalry Regiment, was tasked with two goals: cut off Iraqi
retreat from Kuwait, and destroy five Republican Guard divisions near the Iraq-Kuwait border that
were a potential threat to the Arab and Marine units moving into Kuwait.

Scheme of Maneuver
The 2nd ACR was to advance east, led by scouts in Bradleys to the front and tanks to covering them
from the rear, to LOA 70 Easting and locate the enemy at a distance, then allow the more lethal
mechanized units of the 1st ID to continue east to finish destroying the Republican Guard targets.

The Engagement
RG Commanders had learned late in the day on 25 Feb of the rapidly advancing VII Corps, and they
hastily ordered the Tawakalna Division to take up defense positions facing westward IOT screen the
fleeing Iraqi forces streaming out of Kuwait.

67 Easting
26 Feburary, 13:00: Ghost Troop of the 2nd ACR destroys several Iraqi armored personnel carriers, and
a few hours later, three enemy tanks.

16:10: Just south of Ghost Troop's position, Eagle Troop Scouts encounter Iraqi dismounted fire from a
dug-in emplacement and several small buildings while passing through a village. They engage and
destroy the opposition and continue to advance east.

73 Easting
16:22: 2nd Squadron destroys a line of eight RG T-72 tanks at LOA 70 Easting. Scouts confirm that
the enemy assembly area lay three kilometers ahead. Captain McMaster orders his troop to close with
the enemy in a hasty attack, instead of waiting for the 1st ID units as planned, so as not to lose the
surprise factor that was part of the intent of the higher echelon's order.

1600 on 26 Feb 3 US heavy divisions and the armored cav division attacked. Tawakalna lined up
abreast, with no depth of defense, dug in and bore the attack. Iraqi commanders didnt even attempt to
counterattack, it was a die-in-place strategy.

Post-War

The element of surprise and speed of attack and the quick decision making by the commanders on the
ground contributed to the success of this operation. Although the 2nd ACR was the only US ground
unit to find itself decisively outnumbered during the battle, it managed to destroy about 85 tanks, 40
personnel carriers and more than 30 wheeled vehicles, along with several anti-aircraft artillery systems
with minimal friendly damage and casualties. Eagle Troop alone destroyed more than 20 tanks and
other vehicles, a number of trucks and bunkers, and took a large number of prisoners.

Casualties
Only 12 US soldiers were killed in this battle, and an additional 57 were wounded. In comparison,
Iraqi casualties were estimated to be approximately 600 KIA or WIA (exact numbers were difficult to
obtain), and large numbers of Iraqi tanks were destroyed or captured. In looking at the total combat
casualties for Operation Desert Storm, the trend of US supremacy over Iraq's less-trained, poorly
equipped army is amplified: the US suffered 148 KIA, significantly less than pre-war projections for
Coalition losses of anywhere from 40,000 to as low as 6,000. Iraq's total combat casualties are
estimated to be between 20,000 to as many as 200,000.

Significance of the Victory

What makes this battle particularly worthy of note is the incredible speed at which the Coalition forces
advanced -- even the commanding generals were surprised -- 100 hours after the ground offensive
began, President Bush called for a cease-fire, as Iraqi forces began retreating back to Baghdad.

that at the time, the U.S. Army was not structured or trained for an operational offensive in open desert
terrain. Up until that time, the training and equipping of ground forces were the result of experiences in
Europe and Southeast Asia - obviously different terrain considerations. Another hurdle that the VII
Corps commanders successfully overcame was coordinating tactical and operational movement of large
units that had rarely, if ever, assembled in one place for training, let alone maneuvered tactically in
formation.

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From the S&S archives:
The Battle of the 73 Easting
By Vince Crawley, Middle East Bureau
From the Stars and Stripes 1991 Desert Storm commemorative edition
Vince Crawley, S&S
A communications officer from Iron Troop listens for word from another unit as he sits with his radio
gearinside the back of an M-113 armored personnel carrier. Purchase reprint
Vince Crawley, S&S
A soldier from Iron Troop, 2nd Armd Cav regt, peers across the desert battlefield deep inside Iraq.
Purchase reprint
Vince Crawley, S&S
An Iron Troop battle veteran of the combat at 73 Easting pauses for a moment atop his vehicle in the
Iraqi desert. Purchase reprint
Vince Crawley, S&S
The grim faces of soldiers from Iron Troop and Ghost Troop, 2nd Armd Cav Regt, show the strain after
the 73 Easting battle. Purchase reprint
Vince Crawley, S&S
Purchase reprint

Click here for a graphic (PDF format) detailing the Feb. 26, 1991 Battle of the 73 Easting. (Opens new
window)

Spec. Patrick Bledsoe heard an explosion echoing through the distance, and he was afraid.

This was two days after the cease-fire, four days after Ghost Troop's big battle, so probably there were
soldiers blowing up another dead Iraqi tank somewhere nearby.

Still, Bledsoe went off to sit in the desert by himself for awhile, and when he came back nobody asked
him why he'd gone. They didn't have to.

"There was not another person up on the hill it didn't happen to," said 1st Lt. Keith Garwick. "A certain
part of you just dies," he said. "Somebody trying to kill you so desperately for so many hours, and
coming so close. We just couldn't understand it. I still don't understand it.

"Those guys were insane. They wouldn't stop," Garwick said of the Iraqi army's Republican Guard,
which hurtled wave after wave of tanks at him. Ghost Troop's gunners would blow up the oncoming
vehicles, only to watch enemy soldiers jump out and start firing automatic rifles uselessly at the
American armored vehicles.

"They kept dying and dying and dying," said 25-yearold Garwick, a West Point graduate and cavalry
platoon leader from Fresno, Calif. "They never quit ... they never quit."

The Americans who fought there are calling it the Battle of the 73 Easting, a line on a map in a
nameless part of Iraq.
The 150-man troop comes from Bamberg, Germany, and is part of the 2nd Armd Cav Regt, whose job
was to sneak into southern Iraq and spearhead the VII Corps in its search-and-destroy mission against
the Republican Guard. Upon finding them, the cavalry regiment was supposed to pull aside and let the
heavy armored divisions roll in and annihilate the elite Iraqi forces.

And that's pretty much they way it happened. Except for the six hours that Ghost Troop spent fighting
the Guards' Tawakalna Div on the 73 Easting.

"If the rest of their army had fought as hard as the Tawakalna fought," Garwick said. "We would have
been in trouble."

Pfc. Jason E. Kick was driving a Bradley fighting vehicle on Tuesday morning, Feb. 26. The sky was
still dark from an overnight rainstorm.

Kick, 18, from Pembroke, Ga., had dropped out of high school and joined the Army not long after
turning 17. The "young buck" of the troop, he kept quiet and was making rank fast. He'd gotten a GED
diploma in basic training and was talking about going to college.

He carried a small tape recorder and was narrating his impressions of the war into it. He wanted to send
the tape home to his mom afterwards. He was also carrying his lucky cigarette lighter, the one he had
with him when the Bradley shot 1,000 in Grafenwohr last year.

Ghost Troop had crept into Iraq from Saudi Arabia more than 12 hours before the ground war officially
began. The cavalry soldiers drove due north for a couple of days, then began swinging to the right. By
that Tuesday, they were driving due east.

"We expect contact at anytime," Kick said on the tape for his mother, in a slow drawl. It was a little
after 8 a.m. "The units that were in Kuwait, that the Marines have driven out, are headed directly our
way. And reinforcements, instead of going back into Kuwait, are also headed our way. So, uh, we're
gonna hit a LOT of shooting."

At around 8:30 a.m., the sun broke out for a moment. Ghost Troop scouts spotted an Iraqi vehicle in the
distance.

There were 20 enemy soldiers packed into the personnel carrier. They all got out as if to surrender, but
three suddenly ran back to the vehicle and others fired rifles.

GIs said later there might have been some overkill when they blew apart the vehicle, but they wanted to
make sure the three Iraqis couldn't get a chance to send any radio messages to their officers. They
apparently didn't. There was a lot of blood.

"All I can say," Kick told his tape recorder, "is better them than me. That sounds cruel, but it's true."

It had been Ghost Troop's first kill of the war.

The debris turned out to be from the Tawakalna Div, and intelligence people said that the regiment
would probably meet up with the front line of the Iraqi division near the 73 grid line, about 13 miles to
the east.
By 1 p.m. the fog and clouds had gone. Instead, a ferocious wind raged in from the south, creating a
blizzard of sand. Iraqi vehicles and infantry were scattered here and there. Ghost killed several more
personnel carriers and, at around 3:30 p.m., three enemy tanks.

An hour later, they reached the 73 Easting. Off on the right hand side, Eagle, Iron and Killer Troops
already were fighting against dug-in Iraqi soldiers.

"I had a feeling," said Ghost Troop's commander, Capt. Joseph Sartiano, 29, from San Francisco.
"Everybody else was making contact. So I kicked all my scouts back and put my tanks up front."

A cavalry troop is half tanks and half Bradleys. Normally the Bradleys drive up front and the tanks
hang back a little, ready to defend them. Instead, Sartiano lined up the whole troop along the 73
Easting.

Garwick, the Bradley platoon leader, was in position at 4:42 p.m. Most of the troop, he said, was
behind a small hill and ridge, overlooking a wide, shallow valley that the Arabs call a wadi. Enemy
vehicles and infantrymen were all over the place, dug in on the other side of the wadi.

"We've pulled up on line right now," Kick said into his tape recorder. "We're engaged in a pretty decent
firefight right now ... we're shootin' again. I can see where we're shootin' at, but I can't see a victor."
Victor is an Army term for a vehicle, just as Ghost means G Troop.

"This is chaos here," Kick shouted. "This. is total chaos."

Battle commands flooded the radios, adding to the confusion.

"I see smoke on the horizon," Kick said into his tape recorder. "That means we killed somethin'. What
it is, I don't know ... White One, he's the platoon leader. You can hear it in his voice. He's all shook up.
Time, 4:54 ... this is the co-ax (machine gun) firing. Time is 5:10 p.m. We're still in contact ... there's a
few PC's (personnel carriers) here and there, mostly infantry. I just spotted the biggest damned
explosion at about 12 o'clock. I don't know what the hell it was. .."

Garwick's platoon alone had already killed nine personnel carriers. The enemy had started shooting
back at them at around 5 p.m. Artillery shells began falling around the Bradleys.

"A tremendous volume of small arms fire and shrapnel hit the berm to my front," peppering his Bradley
and another, Garwick said.

Iraqi infantrymen ran forward and were mowed down.

The enemy gunfire increased, and air-burst artillery rounds began exploding over their heads.

Two Bradleys in Garwick's platoon were positioned over his right shoulder. At 5:40 p.m. he saw three
tank rounds hit the ridge in front of him, each shot closer to the Bradleys on his right.

The last shot hit.

"One just got one of our guys," Kick shouted.

Bledsoe, 20, from Oxnard, Calif., was driving Bradley number G-16. All he saw was shooting.

"We were in a little wadi," he said, but the top of the vehicle looked out over the valley. "We were kind
of skylined," thus easily visible to the enemy.

The Bradley's gunner was 23-year-old Sgt. Nels A. Moller. The coaxial machine gun was jammed, and
the track commander, another sergeant, was trying to fix it when he looked up and saw Iraqi
infantrymen running toward them.

He asked Moller, "You got the troops to the front?"

Suddenly there was an explosion.

From his seat at the gunsights, down inside the Bradley turret, Moller couldn't see the area right outside
of the fighting vehicle.

"What was that?" Moller asked, hearing the explosion.

That, according to Bledsoe, was the last thing Moller said.

There was another explosion, showering sparks across the front of the Bradley.

"It was just like somebody hit us with a sledgehammer," Bledsoe said.

He jumped out and ran around behind the Bradley. Moller was dead. The other sergeant was slightly
wounded. Friendly tanks were shooting over Bledsoe's head and enemy fire was hitting the berm in
front of him. He jumped down just as there was yet another explosion.

Pfc. Jeff Pike, 21, of Binghamton, N.Y., was driving Sartiano's, the commander's, tank. It was never
confirmed, but he believes this last explosion was Sartiano's gunner shooting a Soviet-built T-55, the
tank that fired the shot killing Moller.

Bledsoe tried to get away.

"I low-crawled up to the other track," he said. "Knocked on the back door, but they didn't hear me. I
went up and knocked on the driver's hatch. The driver opened it. I said, `We got hit. We got hit. I think
Moller's dead."'

His own track, G-16, "was just smoking."

At 5:47, Kick spoke into his tape recorder. "It was one-six that got hit."

A few minutes later, he continued, his voice steadier. "The gunner of one-six, who was Sgt. Moller, is
dead. The TC (track commander) and observer are on onefive right now. Sgt. Moller, Sgt. Moller was
killed ... time about 5:49."

He paused a moment, then added, "Can't let this ... can't let this affect us or get us down at all. Or we're
gonna die. And he wouldn't want that. He don't want that. But I'm scared."
Garwick, the lieutenant, told his men to keep fighting. Artillery, tanks and machine guns were firing all
around them on the hill. More were destroyed. More fired.

"This is chaos," Kick reported at 6:04 p.m. "Total chaos ... got nine dead victors to our front. Enemy
victors. And got more coming."

The sandstorm had worsened. Garwick could see only about 50 yards. But the thermal sights cut
through some of the murk. With those, he could see more than half a mile.

Two more enemy tanks were coming.

Kick watched them get shot three minutes later. "Boom. Hit. Hit and kill. He hit it. That's revenge for
Sgt. Moller. You sonuvabitching Iraqis. God, I hate them. Sgt. Moller was a good guy. We killed them.
That's four Iraqi PC's killed for this track alone."

Garwick's scouts told him that 12 more tanks were coming. Possibly as many as 25. Iraqis down in the
valley would just leap from their personnel carriers and run at Garwick's platoon, firing rifles. Getting
killed.

All Kick could see was rounds going downrange.

It went on like this — total chaos — for nearly four more hours. At one point, Spec. Chris Harvey
looked out from the back of his personnel carrier.

"All I saw were things burning," said the 24-year-old artillery observer from Virginia Beach, Va. "For
360 degrees. Nothing but action."

Garwick called for the Air Force, but the planes were diverted to another mission two minutes before
they got to Ghost Troop. Instead, he held back the tanks by calling in artillery and rockets, pounding
each wave as it appeared on the far ridge. The Bamberg squadron's executive officer watched from a
vantage point a short distance away. It looked, he said, like Armageddon.

One of Garwick's biggest problems was that the radios were so frantically busy that he couldn't call
through. Several times, he had to jump out of his Bradley and crawl over to the artillery observers to
tell them in person where he needed them to shoot.

On one of these occasions, at about 8:30 p.m., he had crawled halfway to the artillery observer's vehicle
when a round of airburst went off just on the other side of a nearby Bradley.

He and the artilleryman, Sgt. Larry C. Fultz, sought cover under Garwick's Bradley.

Another wave of tanks was coming in.

"We just sat there crying, just shaken, until we could get back out from underneath the Bradley,"
Garwick said. "The air bursts were coming right on top, ricocheting around us. We were in a corner of
hell. I don't know how we made it out of there. I don't."

Days later, in a quiet tent in free Kuwait, an officer from the regiment tried to explain what had
happened to Ghost Troop.
The Republican Guards' Tawakalna Div had gotten tangled up with the 12th Iraqi Armd Div, and both
enemy units were trying to retreat through the same narrow piece of terrain, said Maj. Steven L.
Campbell, 35, the regiment's intelligence officer. The Iraqi path of retreat, a shallow valley between
two ridgelines, led straight into Ghost Troop.

Campbell theorized that the Republican Guard might have fought so fiercely because they were
desperately trying to escape.

"Those guys wanted to get out of there, and those guys are supposed to be the best fighters. In my
mind, they weren't trying to break the defenses (the line Ghost Troop was holding). The way the terrain
was, they had to go through here to get by."

The soldiers in Ghost weren't the only ones fighting that night. At least half of the regiment's troops and
tank companies were on line at one point or another. But most of them were fighting against dug-in
soldiers. None of them faced the wave-after-wave onslaught that was aimed at Ghost.

More than once, artillery saved Ghost Troop. Helicopters helped kill tanks. And, near the end, when the
troop was desperately short on ammunition, a tank company, Hawk, came in to relieve them.

In its 100 hours of combat, the regiment destroyed 100 tanks, about 50 personnel carriers and more
than 30 wheeled vehicles, plus some anti-aircraft artillery systems, Campbell said.

He estimated that 85 to 90 percent of those vehicles were killed in the battle at the 73 tasting, but no
one had yet counted the vehicles in Ghost's sector.

The equivalent of an Iraqi brigade was destroyed that night, the first ground defeat of the Republican
Guards, Campbell said. Within 36 hours, most of the others were gone.

The morning after the battle, someone made a wooden cross and stuck it in the sand, and a chaplain
came to say a few words about Moller. A colonel spoke, too.

Everyone from Ghost Troop was there, worn out men with sunken eyes, their faces covered with dirt
and gunpowder. It was the first time in two months that they had all been together in one place, instead
of spread out over the desert in training or combat formations. Several hugged each other, glad to see
their friends alive, then gathered in a semi-circle, took off their helmets and listened to the chaplain and
the colonel.

Then they were told to get ready for the next battle. It never came. Instead, a cease-fire was called, and
the cavalrymen had time to sit among themselves and try to understand what had happened.

They said that Moller died with his hand on the trigger of the Bradley gun, looking for more enemy to
shoot. His TOW missile launcher, the Bradley's main anti-tank defense, wasn't working, and Moller
knew it before he entered the battle. Reason enough to stay out, but he didn't.

"He died like a soldier," said one of Ghost's artillery officers, 2nd Lt. Joe Deskevich, 23, of Rockville,
Md. "He didn't run, and he didn't die for nothing."

He came from Paul, Idaho. Sartiano, the troop commander, decided he will take leave and visit the dead
sergeant's parents.

The morning after the battle, Kick and another soldier stood in front. of their shrapnel-scarred Bradley
and talked about Moller.

"He was about the only sergeant," Kick said, still with a bitterness in his voice, "who'd sit down and
listen to your problems and treat you like a human being instead of a private."

That night, before the cease-fire was called, the scouts took more prisoners and had to stay up guarding
them. Bledsoe, who'd been Moller's driver, said that he and the others had stayed awake by talking
about Moller.

"We talked about it for three hours," Bledsoe said.

"We decided that when he went up on that hill, he wasn't worried about it. He said, `If they get me,
that's just another bullet that was gonna hit somebody else.'

In Bamberg, the cavarlymen live in a place called Warner Barracks 2, and when they get back they
want to give it a new name, Moller Barracks — if the Army will let them.

No one, however, really knew what to call the battle they had just lived through. The officers were all
calling it the 73 Easting, because they were the ones looking at the maps. Staff Sgt. Waylan Lundquist,
a 29-year-old tanker prom Aurora, Mich., suggested the Battle of the Tawakalna. Another man thought
it should be Moller Ridge.

And none of them could judge how important it had been. They didn't know how hard anyone else had
fought in the 100-hour war. They still don't. It might take months or years before the people who write
history books will decide whether Ghost Troop is worth a page or not.

"At the time," said Garwick, the platoon leader, "none of us understood what was happening."

All they knew was that they'd had a tough night, one they found hard to describe in language that can
be printed in newspapers. It had snowballed into chaos before anyone really knew what was happening.

The chaos was relative, though, and all battles are chaotic to the men fighting them. "All I did,"
Sartiano said, "was manage the violence." At his level on the battlefield, one rung up from Garwick,
two up from most of the others, he had felt in control.

It had, after all, been a decisive victory. Captured prisoners confirmed that the Tawakalna had been
caught completely by surprise. And Sartiano, like the others, was proud of it.

One morning Garwick gathered his men around to talk to them and admitted that he still wasn't sure
what had happened.

"All I know is that a squadron's supposed to be able to take a brigade. A troop's supposed to be able to
take a battalion. A fire team, a company. Our fire team took out a brigade."

He paused a moment, and the words seemed to be sinking into him as much as the others. "That really
was above and beyond the call of duty."
Garwick, it seemed, had been changed the most. He'd been spoiling for a fight and got more than he
expected.

"That morning I was so excited to have killed a Republican Guard," said the 25-year-old lieutenant.
"And at the end of the battle, if I never saw another Republican Guard in my life, I'd be happy."

Or perhaps he's not so changed. He still wants to get married as soon as he gets back — his fiancee is
an old classmate from West Point, now a military intelligence officer at Fort Polk, La. And he jokes
about how his platoon will fail its next gunnery at Grafenwohr — the first target will pop up, and Ghost
Troop will instantly blast 40 rounds into it.

The night after the cease-fire, when his men rolled into free Kuwait, he stood beside his Bradley and
watched the eastern sky. Ghost Troop was camped in a quarry that had been turned into a Republican
Guard stronghold, a city-sized maze of 20-foot ridges transforming the flat desert into a miniature
mountain range.

Orange flames from the burning Kuwaiti oil fields glowed in the east — someone had counted 57 fires
— and a little to the south of that, a near full moon was rising.

"I couldn't wait to see combat. What a fool I was."

The killing, he said, became almost too easy, and that seemed also to make him uncomfortable. He
questioned his future, now that he's finished living what he thinks might be the most important night of
his life. But what bothered him most was another question that really doesn't have an answer — he
wanted to know why.

"Why did they fight?" he asked slowly, and repeated it. "Why did they fight?"

He looked again at the sky.

Sometimes, he said, he spins around the turret of his Bradley and aims it toward the moon. He switches
on the thermal sights and target magnifyers and gazes for a time at another desert on another world, a
quarter of a million miles away.
__________________________________
_________________
The Middle East Jounal, Volume 51, Number 4, Autumn 1997

CORRECTING MYTHS ABOUT THE PERSIAN GULF WAR: THE LAST STAND OF THE
TAWAKALNA

by Stephen A. Bourque

Stephen A. Bourque teaches at Moorpark College in Moorpark, California. This paper is based on the
forthcoming book Jayhawk: The VII Corps during the Persian Gulf War, scheduled for publication by
the US Army Center of Military History. A version of this paper was presented at the Twelfth Annual
Ohio Valley History Conference, 17-19 October 1996. Unless otherwise noted, primary documents and
unit after-action reports are located in the "VII Corps After Action Report" located at the Combined
Arms Center Historical Archives, Fort Leavenworth, KS.
Several myths about the Persian Gulf War still linger years after its conclusion. One is that the ground
war was a relatively simple, high-tech campaign; another is that the air campaign essentially destroyed
the Iraqi Army; and the third and most important is that the Iraqi Army did not fight, but simply
surrendered at the approach of the coalition's forces. This paper argues that the Iraqi Army, and
especially the Republican Guard, fought bravely but ineptly against the overwhelming combat power of
a better trained and equipped US Army.

This article attempts to dispel a number of myths about the way the Iraqi Republican Guard fought
during the Gulf War of 1991. TheDuring the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War, the regime opened the Guard to
college students from throughout Iraq. Most of these recruits, who had enjoyed college deferments, had
never been part of the grueling defensive warfare on the Iranian front. Trained only in offensive
warfare, their high motivation was obvious in the decisive victory over Iran on the Faw Peninsula. The
Iraqi High Command r

BACKGROUND TO THE US-REPUBLICAN GUARD BATTLE

Coalition air forces began the war against Iraq on 17 January 1991. Using every variety of aircraft,
from the French Mirage to the US B52, they subjected Iraqi military and civilian targets to one of the
most intense air operations since World War II. By 24 February, in spite of the damage that air power
inflicted on the Iraqi Army, Saddam Husayn had not ordered his army out of Kuwait. Air operations
then took on a new character. In addition to continuing their raids deep into Iraq, Coalition pilots began
to provide close air support to the Coalition's attacking ground troops. Using primarily A-10
Thunderbolt aircraft, these pilots joined with US Army attack helicopters and long-range field artillery
in attacking Iraqi Army units beyond the range of front-line ground troops.1

After six weeks of air bombardment, the ground war between the Iraqi and the Coalition forces began
on 24 February 1991 with an attack by the Coalition forces along a 350 mile front extending from the
north at Tawr al-Hammar south to the Iraq-Saudi Arabian border. During the ground offensive against
Iraq, the Allied Coalition was divided into two army-sized commands. In the east, in a sector that
extended from the western Kuwait border to Kuwait City, was the Joint Forces Command (JFC) under
HRH General Khalid bin-Sultan. This command consisted of three corps-sized commands: Joint Forces
Command-North, US Marine Corps-Central Command, and Joint Forces Command-East. In addition,
the JFC contained soldiers from Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and other Muslim forces from around the
world. The army command in the western portion of the sector was the US 3rd Army under Lieutenant
General John J. Yeosock. It consisted of two corps, the 7th and the 18th. The 7th Corps under
Lieutenant General Frederick M. Franks, Jr. was composed of the 1st British Armored Division, the 1st
US Armored Division, the 3rd Armored Division, the 1st Infantry Division, and the 2nd Armored
Cavalry Regiment. During this phase of the ground offensive, the 1st Cavalry Division was the theater
reserve force, working directly for General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, Central Command.

By the afternoon of 26 February, the Coalition forces had advanced across southern Kuwait and had
stopped on the outskirts of Kuwait City. Meanwhile, farther west in the desert between Al-Salman and
Al-Nasiriyya, the unopposed US 18th Corps was heading for the Euphrates Valley. In the center of the
Coalition's sector, Franks' 7th US Corps had penetrated the weakly held defenses of the Iraqi 7th Corps
and had turned from north to east in anticipation of a climatic battle with Iraq's Republican Guards
Forces Command (RGFC).2

On the US 7th Corps' right flank, the British 1st Armored Division continued to maul the Iraqi 7th
Corps.3 In the center, the 2nd US Armored Cavalry Regiment led the 3rd US Armored Division and 1st
Infantry Division towards the Iraqi Republican Guards. On the 7th Corps' left flank, the 1st Armored
Division captured the large Iraqi supply installation at Al-Busayya (that stored food, water, medicine,
fuel, repair parts, clothing, etc.) and then turned east, almost on line with the 3rd US Armored Division.

The Tawakalna Mechanized Division of the RGFC was positioned about 25 miles west of the Kuwait
border, located exactly in the center of the US 7th Corps' sector, The Tawakalna was probably the best
division in the Iraqi Army. It had fought with distinction during the war with Iran and was one of the
lead divisions in Saddam Husayn's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990.4 Its two mechanized brigades
and one armored brigade were equipped with the most advanced equipment available in the Iraqi Army,
including 220 T-72 tanks and 278 infantry fighting vehicles. On 25 February it had moved into a
blocking position west of the Iraq Petroleum Saudi Arabia (IPSA) pipeline about 80 miles from Kuwait
city. In spite of the air campaign, most of this division was in position and ready to fight when the US
7th Corps arrived on 26 February 1991.5

Neither the Iraqi nor the United States government has released the name of the Tawakalna division
commander.6 Most likely he died commanding his forces in the futile effort to stop an overwhelming
assault on his positions. Using US spot reports, situation reports, and analysis of destroyed Iraqi
equipment, this article will attempt to examine the various phases of that battle, which consisted of
several distinct, but integrated actions. Those included attacks on the security zone, the central zone,
each of the Tawakalna's flanks, and against its rear area. The surprising shock of this massive attack
from several directions ensured that the Tawakalna division had little opportunity to do anything but
either surrender or fight and die in place. They chose the latter course.

THE SECURITY ZONE BATTLE

The Tawakalna commander's first contact with the attacking force took place in his security zone, in
front of his operations zone. The Iraqi defense sector was organized into three zones. The main
defensive positions were located in the operations zone. Between the operations zone, and the enemy,
was the security zone. This zone, which was about ten kilometers (6.2 miles) wide, was designed to
provide early warning and to break-up and slow down enemy attacking formations. Behind the
operations zone was a rear area, where the division's logistics elements operated. It was in this sector
that the Republican Guard Commander had tried to deploy at least two brigades from the 12th Iraqi
Armored Division on the night of 24 February 1991, to act as a covering force. However, neither of
these two brigades got into position because they were mauled by the US 2nd Armored Cavalry
Regiment and the 3rd Armored Division.7

To find out what was going on, the Tawakalna commander sent his reconnaissance battalion towards
the approaching enemy.8 Initial reports, which the Iraqi commander received from various sources,
indicated that the approaching force was from the French 6th Light Armored Division.9 By the early
morning of 26 February, however, the Tawakalna commander had received enough information to
know that he was not facing the French. The Iraqi intelligence system had correctly located the French
6th Light Division in the western portion of the Coalition sector. Since that report was received,
however, the French division had moved another 75 kilometers west and was now securing the
Coalition's left flank. That night the Tawakalna commander moved a reinforced battalion into his
security zone. Organized into company and platoon strong-points, these units were to break up the US
attack, cause it to slow down, and inform the division commander on the nature of the enemy
advance.10 These forces, however, were unable to stop the US attack. Throughout the day the 3rd
Armored Division and the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment continued to destroy these forward
outposts.11 On the US side, the 3rd Armored Division had 316 tanks, 285 infantry fighting vehicles
(Bradleys) and over 17,000 soldiers. The 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment had approximately 39
infantry fighting vehicles and probably ten tanks. In addition, there was the remainder of the tank
battalion from the 12th Armored Division with perhaps 20 tanks remaining. The total number of Iraqi
soldiers involved in the engagement would have been around 2,000.

Behind his security zone, the Tawakalna commander deployed his three heavy brigades (the 18th, 29th
and 9th) forward of the IPSA pipeline road that served as one of the main supply routes in the Kuwait
theater of operations. On the left flank he positioned the 18th Mechanized Brigade. South of the 18th
Mechanized Brigade, and in front of a major supply depot located on the IPSA Pipeline Road twenty
kilometers north of the Saudi Arabian border, were the remnants of the Iraqi 37th Armored Brigade
from the 12th Armored Division. The 9th Armored Brigade, reinforced by survivors of the 50th
Armored Brigade, held the center of the Tawakalna line. The 50th Brigade had been mauled in the
security zone, as had some of the 37th. The remainder of these two brigades were located on the
Tawakalna's southern flank. The 29th Brigade defended the right flank of the division's sector. The 29th
Brigade had no other units protecting its right flank. Without such protection, American forces were
free to attack it from the north without fear of encountering Iraqi units prepared to conduct an effective
defense.

LEFT FLANK: THE BATTLE OF 73 EASTING (SOUTH)

The main battle began on the Tawakalna's (18th Mechanized Brigade's sector) left flank. At 3:30 pm on
26 February 1991, the US 2nd Squadron of the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment12 arrived at the edge
of the Tawakalna's operation zone and destroyed three T-72 tanks. A few moments later it ran right into
a battalion strong point of the 18th Iraqi Mechanized Brigade. Strong points consisted of dug in vehicle
and soldier fighting positions, wire, mines and prepared fields of fire. In most cases the Iraqi units were
in the right place, but had not developed their positions as well as they should have. In what was later
known as the Battle of 73 Easting,13 the 2nd Squadron attacked. It was a short, but violent battle. Iraqi
vehicles exploded as 120mm rounds found their marks. US scout platoons followed the M1 tanks
providing "scratching fires"14 to protect the US tanks from the Iraqi infantry. Just as the 2nd Squadron
arrived at the rear of the battalion strong point the Iraqis launched a counterattack. While brave, it was
ineffective. In 23 minutes one troop from the US squadron destroyed over half of the Iraqi battalion.15

The 3rd Squadron moved just to the south of the 2nd Squadron and attacked the southern portion of the
same Iraqi strong point at about 3:30 pm.16 At 4:45 pm, the Iraqis launched a counter-attack against
the US 3rd Squadron with a T-72 tank company. At 2,500 meters, they fired at the Bradley cavalry
fighting vehicles.17 The range was too great and their rounds struck the earth just short of their
intended targets. They were unable to get many more rounds off as M1 tanks bounded forward and, at
about 2,100 meters, destroyed most of the Iraqi T-72 tanks.18

The US attack must have surprised the Iraqi battalion. The Iraqi crews were out of their tanks and
infantry fighting vehicles because of the danger of air attacks, although the division commander must
have had an idea that he was about to be attacked by a large force because his forward security forces
and, one would hope, the Iraqi High Command or RGFC headquarters would have given him warning.
The word, however, did not find its way down to the front-line battalions and, especially, the individual
tank and fighting vehicle crews, since no one ordered the Tawakalna battalion to prepare for immediate
battle. At best, the Americans' attack speed was faster than the Tawakalna Division's orders process. At
worst, no one on the Iraqi staff thought of telling the front-line units to prepare. The US attacked so
violently that the Iraqis never had time to get back into their vehicles. The Iraqi battalion, also, did not
prepare its positions very well: obstacles were obviously not complete, and it had emplaced only a few
of its mines.19 Based on their experience in the Iran War, Iraqi defensive positions have lots of mines,
barbed wire and other obstacles to stop the attacker. They dig in their vehicles deep into the ground,
with just the turrets exposed so the guns can acquire targets. Unfortunately, the Tawakalna Division
was only able to develop partially its defenses. The reasons may be lack of time, the effect of coalition
jet aircraft flying overhead, and/or lack of materials (such as mines or wire).

Franks' orders to Colonel Don Holder, the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment commander, were to avoid a
decisive engagement. Holder's troops had successfully destroyed one Iraqi battalion strong point, but
there were still at least six or seven more battalions waiting for the US regiment, which did not have the
combat power to break through the Tawakalna's defenses. Holder, therefore ordered his squadrons to
hold at their current positions and prepare to pass the 1st Infantry Division, which had moved behind
the Regiment, forward.20

The fight in the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment's sector, however, was not yet over. Around 6 pm on
26 February, the character of the battle changed as dismounted Iraqi infantry, T-55 tanks and MT-
LBs21 began a series of attacks on 2nd Squadron's positions along the 73 Easting. Iraqi infantry,
believing that darkness and poor visibility would protect them, charged towards the US troopers firing
their AK assault rifles and RPG anti-tank rockets. The US 2nd Squadron's defensive firepower,
however, stopped the Iraqi attacks. US TOW anti-tank missiles destroyed several trucks loaded with
Iraqi soldiers. M1 tanks demolished T-55 and T-72 tanks long before they got within their own firing
range. The squadron's mortar sections began firing airbursts at the Iraqi infantry causing them either to
retreat or dig in. In several hours of combat, the US squadron knocked out at least two companies of
Iraqi tanks. Hundreds of Iraqi infantry and their lightly armored transporters lay scattered on the floor
of a small wadi, or dry stream bed, nearby.22

Shortly before 10:30 pm, it was suddenly quiet across the thirty kilometers in front of the Iraqi 18th
Mechanized and 37th Armored Brigades. The 2nd US Armored Cavalry Regiment held its fire as the
1st Infantry Division began its forward passage of lines. Passage lanes are clearly marked routes that
the moving unit uses to pass through the stationary unit. These routes may be marked by variouus
means, including pyrotechnics, reflective or white tape, and even simple road signs. In most cases, the
entry and exit of the lane is manned by members of both the moving and stationary unit to minimize
confusion. Because the attack had stopped, the Tawakalna commander probably thought he had stopped
the American advance on his left flank. Nothing, however could have been further from the truth. Just
as the soldiers of the 2nd Squadron were defending against the Iraqi counter-attacks, the 1st Infantry
Division began its final move towards the 73 Easting.23 American scouts on the forward line fired
green star clusters to mark the exact passage lanes. Then, past tired 2nd US Cavalry soldiers and
burning Iraqi T-72 tanks, the 1st US Infantry Division resumed the attack.24

Now, instead of three armored cavalry squadrons, the 18th and 37th Iraqi Armored Brigades faced six
heavy battalions of American tanks and infantry fighting vehicles and another six battalions of 155mm
field artillery.25 The Iraqis, however, did not run. Instead, they manned their vehicles and weapons
systems against the US forces. In the 1st US Brigade sector all of the battalions used a single passage
lane. Each unit had its own area of operations to keep it from becoming confused with other units and
to ensure that each unit achieved the command's common objective. Since these were only imaginary
lines on the ground, units often strayed into adjacent sectors. The first battalion (1-34 Armor) that
passed through the passage lane ran into a battalion from the Iraqi 18th Mechanized Brigade, and Iraqi
gunners were able to indentify two American vehicles and destroy them, killing one soldier and
wounding five others. The American commander pulled his scouts back and moved his tank companies
forward. The second American battalion (Task Force 2-34 Armor) that passed through the passage lane
became momentarily lost because it was dark and the combat equipment (in spite of rumors about super
technology) did not have a compass or directional aid built into the vehicle. And the third (Task Force
5-16 Infantry) was not yet through the passage lane.26

In the south, the 1st Infantry Division's 3rd Brigade moved through three separate passage lanes, where
each battalion almost immediately made contact with the Iraqi defenders and both sides started
shooting at each other. The primary fighting force in this sector were two battalions of the 37th Iraqi
Armored Brigade, defending the left flank of the Tawakalna. The assault of the 3rd US Brigade also
caught many Iraqi tank crews on the ground in their shelters, probably hiding from American air and
artillery attacks. Because they had not turned on their engines and were not, therefore, generating heat,
the tanks did not show up on the American's vehicle-mounted thermal sights.27 In many instances,
American vehicles simply drove past the Iraqi positions. For the next few hours, bypassed Iraqi RPG
equipped anti-tank teams and dismounted Iraqi infantry fired at passing American vehicles, only to be
destroyed by other US tanks and fighting vehicles following the initial forces.28

As Iraqi RPG teams and T-55 tanks maneuvered to shoot the Americans in their vulnerable rear, some
M1 and Bradley turrets swung back to engage their attackers. Responding to apparent enemy fire,
friendly crews returned fire. When the confusing mélée was over, the 1st Division tanks discovered that
they had destroyed five of their own M1 tanks and four Bradleys. Six brigade soldiers perished in these
attacks and thirty others were wounded.29 Rather than "press the attack" as those at Central Command
(General Norman Schwarzkopf's headquarters) were demanding,30 the brigade commander, Colonel
David Weisman, decided to pull the battalions back, consolidate, and use his artillery to destroy the
aggressive Iraqi infantry.31

The Iraqis had stopped the 1st Infantry Division's initial push into their sector; but not for long. By
12:30 am on 27 February, the two attacking brigades of the 1st Infantry Division were positioned along
the 75 Easting, 2,000 meters east of 73 Easting.32 For the next three hours they methodically crossed
the remaining ten kilometers of their objective, called Objective Norfolk. The area encompassed the
intersection of the IPSA Pipeline Road and several desert trails, as well as a large Iraqi supply depot. As
they slowly advanced, M1 tank commanders acquired the thermal images of the Iraqi tanks, or infantry
fighting vehicles, long before they were themselves spotted by the Iraqis. Platoon leaders, team
commanders, and even battalion commanders issued unit-wide fire commands, causing the entire
command to fire at Iraqi targets simultaneously.33 By dawn, the 1st US Infantry Division controlled
Objective Norfolk. The combined attack of the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment's three squadrons and
the Big Red One's two leading brigades had destroyed the two Iraqi brigades (18th Mechanized
Brigade and 37th Armored Brigade) on the Tawakalna's left flank. Simultaneously with the fighting in
the southern portion of its sector, the Tawakalna Division was under assault in the center of its line.

THE CENTER OF THE LINE

Soon after the Tawakalna Division Commander's 18th Mechanized Brigade was engaged, the US attack
spread to the center of his line. The Iraqi defense in this sector consisted of three mechanized battalions
from the Tawakalna 29th Mechanized Brigade, and three armored and one mechanized from the 9th
Armored Brigade. In addition, there was at least one battalion of the 46th Mechanized Brigade from the
12th Armored Division. There is also evidence that at least one T-62 tank battalion, most likely from
the 10th Armored Division, was also assigned to the Tawakalna in this sector.34 Approximately nine
Iraqi battalions, therefore, faced the attacking 3rd US Armored Division's ten heavy battalions. In a
space of only 270 square kilometers, Iraqi defenders massed over 160 tanks, 117 BMPs, and hundreds
of other combat vehicle, and fighting systems.35 Thousands of infantry men dismounted from their
combat carriers.36 Once on the ground, they constructed their dug in company strong points37 and
prepared to use their Saggers and RPGs to engage the attacking Americans. Finally, there were
approximately a dozen field artillery batteries arrayed along the rear of the Tawakalna's operations zone
in this sector. The Iraqi defenses were very thick and Major General Paul Funk, the 3rd Armored
Division commander, had no soft or exposed Iraqi flanks to exploit in his attack. He attacked with his
2nd Brigade in the north, his 1st Brigade in the south, and his 3rd Brigade in the rear trailing the 1st
Brigade.

The 1st US Brigade of the 3rd Armored Division moved in the south of the 3rd Armored Division's
sector on a relatively narrow zone.38 At 5:02 pm, 26 February, it ran into a battalion of the 9th Iraqi
Armored Brigade. 39 The lead American company team, from Task Force 3-5 Cavalry, established a
base of fire as two other company teams moved on line. Not inclined to assault hastily the center of this
complex, the entire 3-5 Cavalry moved into firing positions and began to locate and shoot at Iraqi
targets. Long-range tank and TOW fires, high explosive and DPICM rounds, and even COPPERHEAD
rounds ravaged the Iraqi 9th Armored Brigade's battalion strong points. 40 The Iraqi soldiers, however,
continued to fight, preventing this American battalion from advancing any farther for the next 12
hours.41

In the dark, around 7:20 pm, a scout platoon from the brigade's left-flank battalion Task Force 4-32
Armor, identified a T-72 tank covered with infantry heading towards them from the southeast. In a
short and confused fight, the scouts destroyed the tank and scattered its passenger infantry. Soon, a
platoon of Iraqi T-72s supported by dismounted infantry joined the fight. By 9:00 pm, Task-Force 4-32
Armor's fight in this sector came to an end. It had made little progress in its zone and had shot up one
of its own Bradley scout vehicles, killing two soldiers and wounding two more.42 The Iraqi line
continued to hold.

The US 4/7 Cavalry Squadron, a new unit working for the divison commander and acting
independently from the 1st Brigade, screened the division's southern flank. Around 6:00 pm it ran into
an Iraqi tank unit. Like other Iraqi defenders, the Iraqi unit, most likely a tank unit, was hastily dug in
and was waiting for a fight. The 4/7 Cavalry's Bradleys were out of their element in such an
engagement against Iraqi tanks. After more than an hour of fighting and making no progress, the 4/7
Cavalry began to pull back from the position where the Iraqis were dug in. In the confusion of the
withdrawal, a US tank from an approaching unit fired at one of the Cavalry's Bradleys, killing the
gunner. Another 4/7 Cavalry vehicle was engaged by the US 2nd Armored Cavalry in the south. In the
middle of this confusion, Iraqi fire hit and damaged nine of 13 M3 Cavalry fighting vehicles in addition
to the two hit by friendly fire. Two soldiers of the 4/7 Cavalry were killed and 12 were wounded in the
battle. When given the opportunity, the Iraqi Army could inflict serious losses on the attacking
American forces.43

The Iraqi 9th Armored Brigade had stopped the advance of the US 1st Brigade of the 3rd Armored
Division. In 12 hours and despite overwhelming fire power, this American brigade had moved forward
only four kilometers. That minor tactical success, however, had little effect on the battle's overall
outcome. Before 9:00 pm, Major General Funk determined that his main effort was in the northern
portion of his sector of operations, and prepared a deliberate attack to destroy the Iraqi units in the 2d
Brigade's zone of operations.

Funk's main effort was in the northern portion of his sector where the 2nd Brigade attacked. Waiting
less than ten kilometers behind the 2nd Brigade, was the 3rd Brigade. Its four battalions were eager to
get into the fight at the first opportunity.44 Until 5:20 pm the 2nd Brigade moved in a wedge
formation-with Task Force 4-8 Cavalry in the lead, Task Force 4-18 Infantry on the left and TF 3-8
Cavalry on the right-slowly through the Iraqi 29th Mechanized Brigade's security zone, constantly
fighting isolated Iraqi vehicles.45 Like its counterparts in the adjacent sector, this brigade of Iraqis
prepared its defenses according to doctrine. Bunkers, dug in vehicles, and pre-planned fires, backed by
determined soldiers, made a formidable defense.46

Funk now ordered his divisional artillery to pound the Iraqi positions with all the indirect fire he had
available.47 Almost five battalions of artillery fired at identified and suspected targets in a nine square
kilometer box. Then Funk ordered the launching of the 2-27 Attack Helicopter Battalion across the
forward line of US troops and into the depths of the Iraqi operations zone.48 At 10:00 pm the 2nd
brigade's three battalions and supporting artillery undertook a coordinated combined arms attack. For
the next four hours disciplined 2d Brigade tank and Bradley crews moved through the 29th Mechanized
Brigade's operations zone.

US tank companies bounded forward by platoons, using their thermal sights and stand-off range49 to
engage Iraqi vehicles on their own terms. Out-ranged and unable to locate the source of the accurate
fire they were receiving, the Republican Guard soldiers returned fire without any noticeable effect.
Attack helicopters and multiple rocket launchers destroyed Iraqi artillery almost as soon as they fired.
As the brigade line moved forward, Iraqi infantry forces emerged from their hiding places and tried to
engage US tanks and infantry fighting vehicles from close range. These Iraqi soldiers had little chance
of success as a line of infantry fighting vehicles, moving just behind the tanks, killed them with
machine-gun fire.50
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The Iraqi 29th Brigade commander continued to resist the American advance. He directed several
counter-attacks by armored and mechanized platoons and companies. Many of those were effectively
targeted against the 2nd Brigade's left flank, but concentrated tank, Bradley, and artillery fire stopped
these attacks before they could interfere with the 2nd Brigade's progress. It was a confusing mèlée,
with rounds flying in all directions.51 By 2:00 am, 27 February, the 2nd Brigade had fought through
the 29th Iraqi Brigade's first defensive echelon.52 The situation was now right for Funk to order the 3rd
Brigade forward. That morning it passed through the 2nd Brigade's front line and started the 3rd
Armored Division's attack at the rear of the Tawakalna Division, and beyond.53

The 3rd Armored Division's battle against the Tawakalna illustrates that good tactics are just as
important as good technology. Had Funk chosen to attack the Iraqi defenses without evaluating the
enemy, deciding on a main effort, massing his forces and using his tanks, infantry fighting vehicles,
attack helicopters and field artillery as they were designed, the outcome might have been different. At
the same time that American units were overwhelming the Tawakalna's left and center, another heavy
division assaulted its exposed right flank.

RIGHT FLANK (NORTH)

While most of the Tawakalna Division commander's attention was focused to his division's front, its
right flank was about to be attacked by a fourth American unit, the 1st Armored Division. Major
General Ron Griffith's primary military target had been the Medina Division about thirty kilometers
father east,54 but one battalion of the Tawakalna's 29th Mechanized Brigade occupied positions in
Griffith's 1st Armored Division's zone of operations.55 That Iraqi battalion lay directly in the path of
Colonel Dan Zanini's (one of Griffith's three maneuver brigades) 3rd Brigade, 1st Armored Division.56

Colonel Zanini synchronized the fight to maximize his fire power and minimize battlefield confusion.
Artillery, Apache attack helicopters and mechanized infantry fired their weapons at the Iraqi defenders
in order to prevent them from returning accurate fire as one of his tank battalions (Task Force 1-37
Armor) began moving in the dark towards the Iraqi defenses. This battalion's forty-five M1A1 tanks
moved abreast towards the Iraqis at less than ten kilometers per hour. About 1,000 meters behind the
tanks moved the battalion's infantry company mounted on its Bradleys, to help destroy any threat to
their rear. As the tanks moved forward, the overwatching infantry battalion began firing illumination
rounds from its mortar platoon. The brigade commander then turned the fight over to the battalion
commander, Lieutenant Colonel Ed Dyer.57

As was the case with the entire Tawakalna division, the Iraqi soldiers fought hard. Many Iraqi tanks
kept their engines off in order to defeat the American thermal sights. Those vehicles were often located
because of the strange white spots, the tank commander's head, seemingly suspended in thin air.58 The
Iraqi tanks that were not hit were able to turn their turrets and attack the M1s in their flanks and rear.
Iraqi infantry moved in three to five second rushes in order to get close to attacking vehicles. Burning
vehicles and explosions "washed out" the thermal sights and made it difficult for US forces to locate
Iraqi tanks. In that confusion, the 29th Iraqi Armored Brigade knocked out four M1 tanks, wounding
six US soldiers.59

The Iraqi brigade, however, never had a chance. It was attacked by Task Force 1/37 Armor, the tank
battalion with the best gunnery skills in the entire US Army.60 When TF 1/37 had completed its
assault, the Iraqi unit was in shambles. Because of luck, training, and the effectiveness of the Abrams'
enhanced armor, there were no American fatalities. In the sector swept by the 1st Brigade, two Iraqi
tank companies and one mechanized infantry company (approximately 24 T-72 tanks and 14 BMP
infantry fighting vehicles) had become burning hulks.61

THE DEEP BATTLE62

At the same time the American ground forces were demolishing the front line of the Tawakalna, US
attack helicopters, jet aircraft, and artillery were simultaneously attacking the Iraqi division throughout
the depth of its defensive zone. The primary targets included artillery batteries, command posts and
supply depots.

As soon as the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment made contact with the Tawakalna Division around 4:30
pm, 26 February, the battle began. Artillery from the Regiment's field artillery batteries and the 210
Field Artillery Brigade pounded the second line of Iraqi troops. Those missions destroyed troops and
supply installations and interfered with the Tawakalna's command and control.63 The 2/1 Attack
Helicopter Battalion, working for the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment, struck at artillery and support
areas to the rear of the Iraqi lines. It destroyed at least two artillery batteries and dozens of vehicles and
support installations along the IPSA Pipeline road.64

This assault continued until the 1st US Infantry Division passed through the 2nd Armored Cavalry
Regiment. The 1/1 Attack Helicopter Battalion then attacked the 18th Iraqi Mechanized and 9th Iraqi
Armored Brigade's second line of troops at 9:00 pm, on 26 February.65 The attack prevented the Iraqi
artillery from interfering with the 1st Infantry's passage of lines. From the time the 2nd Armored
Cavalry Regiment made contact, on the night of 26 February, until the following morning when the 1st
Infantry Division cleared Objective Norfolk, the Iraqi soldiers of the 18th and 37th Brigades received
no respite from constant ground, artillery, and air attack.

The situation was the same in the US 3rd Armored Division zone of operations. Its constant pounding
of Iraqi combat and combat service support units made Iraqi counterattacks, resupply or reinforcement
almost impossible. Those incessant attacks destroyed Iraqi artillery, broke up units assembling for
counter-attacks, and thoroughly disrupted Iraqi command and control. When the 3rd Brigade passed
through at dawn on 27 February, there were no more Iraqi strong points to slow the attack. The Iraqi
commander had no way of countering the effects of these deep attacks. He had no choice but to stand
and fight or surrender. Most of the soldiers in this proud division, like its commander, fought and
died.66

CONCLUSIONS

Soon after the 1st Armored Division's attack started at 8 PM on 26 February, the 3rd Armored Division
launched an attack just to the south of the 1st Division. One hour later, the 1st Infantry Division passed
through the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment and captured all of Objective Norfolk. Franks had wanted
to slam into the Republican Guards with a "three division fist."67 That is exactly what he did. Franks
defeated the Tawakalna Division by massing six brigades and an armored cavalry regiment against it,
and flanking it to the north and south with two more brigades. Attack helicopters and long range
artillery systems had bombed the Tawakalna beforehand.

The Tawakalna division commander, who probably perished in the battle, never had an opportunity to
maneuver, use reserves, or even use his artillery with any effect. His spirited defense, however,
confirmed Frank's concern that the Republican Guard did not enter the battle already defeated. They
did not run away, and fought with extreme bravery. American battle reports cite the bravery of the
determined Tawakalna defenders. This division had good equipment. Unfortunately, they did not know
how to use it fully. For example, they did not know how to employ their equipment to ensure that they
had local security, allowing the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment to gain contact with them without
discovery. The Tawakalna division was unable, regularly, to hit the targets at which they aimed with
their tanks and anti-tank guided missiles. Seldom did the Tawakalna division effectively use their
artillery or air defense artillery.68

More important than problems in using equipment, The Tawakalna division was simply, overwhelmed.
It was the application of the US Army's Airland Battle doctrine,69 executed by well-trained, equipped
and motivated soldiers, that defeated the Iraqi forces. By dawn on 27 February 1991, the Tawakalna
Mechanized Infantry Division had ceased to exist.
With the destruction of the Tawakalna Division, Franks was able to focus the combat power of the 7th
Corps towards the other heavy divisions of the Republican Guard Forces Command. Although part of
the Medina Division would stand and fight against the 1st US Armored Division, the Iraqi high
command ordered the Hammurabi Division to start moving north, across the Euphrates River and away
from the American attack in the west. The Tawakalna Division's defense gave the remainder of the Iraqi
Army in Kuwait the time it needed to evacuate most of its mechanized forces to Basra.

Notes:

1. Williamson Murry, Air War in the Persian Gulf(Baltimore, MD: The Nautical & Aviation Publishing
Company of America, 1995), pp. 281-303.

2. US Department of the Army, VII Corps Main Command Post (Plans), "OPLAN 1990-2, Operation
Desert Saber," 13 January 1991.

3. US Department of the Army, VII Corps G2, "The 100 Hour War: The Failed Iraqi Plan," (version
declassified 20 May 1994), pp. 106-108, 115-117. This is a limited history of the ground war rapidly
compiled shortly after the end of the conflict. It is based on interrogations of Iraqi prisoners of war,
captured documents and equipment, American logs and journals, and various intelligence collection
information. Since much of this report is based on information obtained from non-Republican Guard
soldiers, most insights about Iraqi performance center on the Iraqi regular Army.

4. Robert H. Scales, Certain Victory (Washington: Government Printing Office [GPO], 1993; reprint,
Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1994), pp. 44-45.

5. US Department of the Army, VII Corps G2, "The 100 Hour War," pp. 117-121; and Thomas A.
Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey Summary Report (Washington: GPO, 1993),
pp. 91, 106. Spot reports and after-the-war visits testify to the presence of more than 80 percent of the
Tawakalna Division's equipment.

6. Searches of material in the VII Corps After-Action Report and Freedom of Information Act requests
to the Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency and 3rd United States Army all failed
to produce this officer's name.

7. See Table 1. US Department of the Army, Headquarters, 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment, "2ACR
Operations Summary 23 Feb-1 Mar 91," n.p., n.d.; and US Department of the Army, 3rd Armored
Division Staff, "Chronology of 3rd Armored Division Operation Desert Spear," n.p., n.d. Both of these
documents were compiled by the regimental and division staffs from brigade and division operations
and intelligence duty logs. Also, US Department of the Army, VII Corps G2, "100 Hour War," pp. 98-
99. Divisional duty logs also reflect many individual engagements with Iraqi units attempting to reach
or prepare their security positions.

8. US Department of the Army, Headquarters, 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment, "2ACR Operations

Summary." A reconnaissance battalion consists of two companies of 18 reconnaissance vehicles, of
various types each. In addition, there was a maintenance and service-support company. Total battalion
strength was approximately 250 soldiers.

9. Scales, Certain Victory, p. 233.

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10. US Army, Battle Command Training Program, Iraq: How They Fight, 3rd ed.(Fort Leavenworth,
KS: Battle Command Training Program, 1993), pp. 30-31; and S2, 177th Armored Brigade, The Iraqi
Army: Organization and Structure (Fort Irwin, National Training Center: 1991), p. 96.

11. 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment, "2ACR Operations Summary 23 Feb-1 Mar 91," and Steve Vogel,
"A Swift Kick: The 2d ACR's Taming of the Guard," Army Times, 5 August 1991, p. 30.

12.

13. On US military maps, the ground is divided into 10,000 meter grid squares numbered from west to
east. "73 Easting" refers to the vertical line that indicates 7,300 meters east from the beginning of the
10,000 meter grid square. This term was used by American soldiers since there were no other important
terrain features in the area. See Scales, Certain Victory, p. 261;Vince Crawley, "Ghost Troop's Battle at
the 73 Easting," Armor 100 (May-June 1991), p. 8; and Michael D. Krause, "The Battle of 73 Easting,
26 February 1991: A Historical Introduction to a Simulation" (Washington, DC: Center of Military
History, 1991).

14. "Scratching fires" is a term used by soldiers to describe a friendly vehicle's machine gun fires aimed
at a friendly tank. The purpose of these fires is to kill or disperse enemy infantry who have climbed on
the back of the friendly vehicle. Machine gun rounds can not penetrate US tanks.

15. Krause, "The Battle of 73 Easting," pp. 11, 25. A cavalry troop has approximately 120 soldiers, 12
Bradleys (Cavalry fighting vehicles, which are infantry fighting vehicles with more space for
ammunition) and nine M1 tanks. The Iraqi battalion had 39 infantry fighting vehicles and eight anti-
tank guided missile carriers. There was at least one company (ten) of T-72 tanks cross-attached from
the brigade's tank battalion. In addition, there were 10-15 other tanks, most likely from the 12th
Armored Division, helping to defend the sector. Total Iraqi personnel were approximately 530.

16. Krause, "The Battle of 73 Easting," p. 20. Iraqi doctrine prescribed the launching of a counter-
attack to drive back an attacker. This tank company was positioned in the rear of the forward battalion
sector especially for this purpose. History, and Iraqi experience in the Iran War, shows that an attacker
is most vulnerable to defeat immediately after he has arrived at the objective. It was, however, a poorly
coordinated attack without supporting indirect fire support.
17. Both the US infantry fighting vehicle and the cavalry fighting vehicle were named "Bradley" in
honor of General Omar Bradley.

18. Krause, "The Battle of 73 Easting," p. 20; and Vogel, "A Swift Kick: The 2nd ACR's Taming of the
Guard," p. 30.

19. Krause, "The Battle of 73 Easting," p. 3.

20. Interview by author of Frederick M. Franks, Alexandria, VA, 8 September 1995.

21. Soviet-made, tracked, armored personnel carrier.

22. Crawley, "Ghost Troop's Battle at the 73 Easting," pp. 9-10.

23. US Department of the Army, HQ 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized), Tactical Command Post, "1st
Infantry Division Tactical Command Post Journal," 26 February 1991, entries 24, 29, 30; and Colonel
Lon E. Maggart, "A Leap of Faith," Armor 101, (January-February 1992), p. 24.

24. Major General Thomas G. Rhame, "Interview by COL Richard M. Swain," 26 July 1991, Swain
Papers, Combined Arms Center Historical Archives, Fort Leavenworth, KS; Steve Vogel, "Hell Night:
For the 2nd Armored Division (FWD) It Was No Clean War," Army Times, 7 October 1991, p. 15; and
Maggart, "A Leap of Faith," p. 27.

25. Ground battalions came from the 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division (Task Force 5-16 Infantry, Task
Force 3-34 Armor, and 1-34 Armor) and the 3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division (Task Force 1-41
Infantry, Task Force 3-66 Armor, and 2-66 Armor). Field Artillery Battalions came from the 1st
Infantry Division Artillery (1-5 Field Artillery, 4-3 Field Artillery, and 4-5 Field Artillery), the 210th
Field Artillery Brigade that had been supporting the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment (3-17 Field
Artillery and 6-41st Field Artillery) and the three artillery batteries belonging to the 2d Armored
Cavalry Regiment.

26. Maggart, "A Leap of Faith," pp. 27-28; and U.S. News and World Report, Triumph Without Victory
(Random House: Times Books, 1992), pp. 368-69.

27. Vogel, "Hell Night," p. 15. Thermal sights identify targets that generate heat. In general, they are
superior to any other night vision device. However, if there is no heat source, they are worthless.

28. Scales, Certain Victory, p. 284.

29. Vogel, "Hell Night," p. 16.

30. US Department of the Army, VII Corps Main Command Post (G3-Operations), "G3-Operations
Journal," 26 February 1991, entry # 28; and Tom Donnley, "The General's War," Army Times, 2 March
1992, p. 16. Apparently, General Schwarzkopf had little idea of the intensity of the unit fight in the 7th
Corps sector. Norman Schwarzkopf, It Doesn't take a Hero (New York: Bantam Books, 1992), p. 540.

31. Vogel, "Hell Night," p. 18.

32. US Department of the Army, VII Corps Main Command Post (G3-Operations), "G3-Operations
Journal," 27 February 1991, entry # 3.

33. Scales, Certain Victory, p. 291; and Colonel Gregory Fontenot, "Fright Night: Task Force 2/34
Armor," Military Review 73 (January 1993), p. 47.

34. Steve Vogel, "Tip of the Spear," Army Times, 13 January 1991, pp. 13, 16; and US Department of
the Army, VII Corps G2, "100 Hour War," p. 128; and, US Department of the Army, 7th Engineer
Brigade, "VII Corps Iraqi Material Denial Mission," Report to VII Corps Commander, 21 April 1991;
and Major General Paul Funk, Interview by Colonel Richard Swain, 4 April 1991, Swain Papers,
Combined Arms Center Historical Archives, Fort Leavenworth, KS. The "VII Corps Iraqi Material
Denial Mission," is a detailed listing of most Iraqi equipment encountered and destroyed by 7th Corps'
engineers prior to their departure from southern Iraq. Along with intelligence reports from units in
contact, this document is superb evidence as to the composition and disposition of Iraqi units in the 7th
Corps' area of operations.

35. These fighting systems included anti-tank guns, anti-tank missiles, air defense guns, air defense
missiles, field artillery batteries, rocket launchers, infantry squads, machine gun squads, reconnaissance
squads, and lightly armed armored personnel carriers.

36. Each Iraqi brigade had a strength of between 2,500 and 3,000 soldiers. On the one hand, the
Tawakalna had absorbed stragglers from the 12th Armored Division and other units. On the other, there
had been personnel losses from a variety of sources. A good guess is that the area occupied by these
two Iraqi brigades contained around 6,000 soldiers with over half being capable of fighting like
infantry. Because we do not have access to Iraqi records, we do not yet know these personnel statistics
with any precision.

37. Each battalion strong point was organized into smaller company strong points. Each of these battle
positions was supposed to be prepared for all-around defense, with individual soldiers and their
equipment dug in into defensive bunkers and trenches. In addition, they should have had these
positions reinforced by barbed wire, mines and other obstacles.

38. K. Weber and J. Aiello, "History of the Ready First Combat Team: First Brigade, Third Armored
Division, Nov 1990-22 March 1991," n.d., report prepared for Commander, 3rd Armored Division, p.
8. 1st Brigade consisted of Task Force 4-32 Armor, Task Force 4-34 Armor, and Task Force 3-5
Cavalry.

39. Ibid., pp. 8-9.

40. TOW stands for tube-launched, optically tracked, wire command-link, guided missile. It is fired
from an M2 or M3 Bradley fighting vehicle against tanks and other enemy vehicles. DPICM stands for
dual-purpose, improved convention munitions. These are canisters containing hundreds of small
bomblets that are used against soft targets such as trucks, trench lines and enemy personnel.
COPPERHEAD was the name given to an artillery round that was guided by lasers against enemy
tanks and bunkers.

41. Scales, Certain Victory, p. 273.

42. Ibid., pp. 273-274; US Department of the Army, 3rd Armored Division Staff, "Chronology of 3rd
Armored Division Operation Desert Spear, 24 -28 Feb 91" n.p., n.d.; Weber and Aiello, "History of the
Ready First Combat Team," pp. 8-9; and Vogel, "Tip of the Spear," pp. 14-16.

43. All vehicles were either driven away or ultimately recovered. The US soldiers were evacuated by
medical personnel or on marginally damaged vehicles. See U.S. News and World Report, Triumph
Without Victory, pp. 351-56; and Vogel, "Tip of the Spear," p. 13.

44. A close study of the 3rd Armored Divison's operational chronology reveals that the 3rd Brigade
maintained itself very close to the 1st Brigade and was obviously alert to what was going on in the
sectors of the lead two brigades, and, when the order was given, passed through with speed and vigor.
The commander, Colonel Rob Goff (who subsequently received promotions to brigadier and major
general) was an aggressive, hard-charging commander.

45. Scales, Certain Victory , pp. 276-79.

46. US Department of the Army, 2nd Brigade, 3rd Armored Division Staff, "2nd Bde 3AD History:
Operation Desert Shield," n.p., n.d.

47. Fires may be either direct or indirect. Tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, etc. all shoot direct fire, in
other words, they can see the target. All field artillery systems shoot indirect fire long-distance and they
cannot see the target.

48. Kevin Smith and Burton Wright, III, United States Army Aviation During Operations Desert Shield
& Desert Storm: Selected Readings (Fort Rucker, AL: United States Army Aviation Center, 1993), pp.
55-67; and, Scales, Certain Victory, p. 276.

49. US tanks had a greater killing range, especially at night, than the Iraqi tanks. The difference
between these two ranges is the "stand-off distance" which allowed the US tanks to destroy Iraqi armor
with little fear of being destroyed by the Iraqi tanks.

50. Swain's interview with Funk; US Department of the Army, 3rd Armored Division Staff,
"Chronology of 3rd Armored Division Operation Desert Spear, 24 -28 Feb 91," n.p., n.d; US
Department of the Army, 2nd Brigade, 3rd Armored Division Staff, "2nd Bde 3AD History: Operation
Desert Shield," n.p., n.d.; and, Scales, Certain Victory, p. 280.

51. US Department of the Army, 3rd Armored Division Staff, "Chronology of 3rd Armored Division
Operation Desert Spear, 24 -28 Feb 91," n.p., n.d.; US Department of the Army, 2nd Brigade, 3rd
Armored Division Staff, "2nd Bde 3AD History: Operation Desert Shield," n.p., n.d.; and US
Department of the Army, VII Corps G2, "100 Hour War," pp. 120-121.

52. This was a complex battle that took place over a very wide sector. The description of the battle first
looks at the southern portion with the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment and the 1st Infantry Division,
then at the central portion with the 3rd Armored Division. With each division, two brigades fought
simultaneously. Within each brigade, two to three battalions fought simultaneously.

53. Swain's interview with Funk; US Department of the Army, 3rd Armored Division Staff,
"Chronology of 3rd Armored Division Operation Desert Spear, 24 -28 Feb 91," n.p., n.d.; US
Department of the Army, VII Corps Main Command Post (G3-Operations), "G3-Operations Journal,"
27 February 1991, entries no. 2 and 15; and Smith and Wright, eds., United States Army Aviation, pp.
55-67.

54. This was east of their location and was the location of the right flank of the 29th Iraqi Mechanized
Brigade. US Department of the Army, VII Corps Main Command Post (G3-Operations), "VII Corps
SITREP (Situation Report) #40, 26 Feb 91,"; and, Richard M. Bohannon, "Dragon's Roar: 1-37 Armor
in the Battle of 73 Easting," Armor 101 (May-June, 1992), p. 11.

55. US Department of the Army, VII Corps G2, "100 Hour War," p. 120.

56. US Department of the Army, HQ, 1st Armored Division, G3 Operations, "The Fight," n.p., n.d. This
summary was prepared shortly after the end of hostilities.

57. Richard M. Bohannon, "Dragon's Roar: 1-37 Armor in the Battle of 73 Easting," pp. 12-13; Scales,
Certain Victory, p. 268.

58. Because the optical sights and vision blocks inside a tank give a very limited field of view, during
light combat, tank commanders usually keep the upper portion of their body outside of the tank
searching for enemy targets. Once the battle is joined, they "drop down" inside their turret and "button
up" their overhead hatch.

59. Bohannon, "Dragon's Roar," pp. 14-16.

60. D Company, 1-37 Armor was the Army's selection for the upcoming Canadian Army Trophy
Competition. This was a demanding, NATO-wide tank gunnery competition. It was also armed with the
latest M1A2 Abrams tank, with increased armor and improved fire control systems.

61. Bohannon, "Dragon's Roar," p. 17; and, US Department of the Army, VII Corps Tactical Command
Post, "Tactical Command Post Operations Journal," 27 February 1991, entry no. 19.

62. American doctrine emphasized that battle should be fought not only on the front lines, but carried to
the depths of the enemy positions. These operations, beyond the front line of troops, were conducted by
long-range artillery fires, attack helicopters, Air Force close air support aircraft, and electronic
communications jamming equipment. Targets for these weapons included command and control
facilities, reserve forces, field artillery and air defense batteries, and logistics facilities.

63. John Hillen, "2nd Armored Cavalry: The Campaign to Liberate Kuwait," Armor 101 (July-August
1991), p. 11.

64. There were about nine attack helicopter battalions subordinate to the 7th Corps. Krause, The Battle
of 73 Easting, p. 3.

65. US Department of the Army, HQ 1st Infantry Division, "1st Infantry Division Commander's
Report," daily report to Commander, VII Corps, 26 February 1991; and US Department of the Army,
HQ 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized), Tactical Command Post, "1st Infantry Division Tactical
Command Post Journal," 26 February 1991, entry no. 53.

66. US Department of the Army, 3rd Armored Division Staff, "Chronology of 3rd Armored Division
Operation Desert Spear, 24 -28 Feb 91," n.p., n.d.; US Department of the Army, 2nd Brigade, 3rd
Armored Division Staff, "2nd Bde 3AD History: Operation Desert Shield," n.p., n.d.; and US
Department of the Army, VII Corps G2, "100 Hour War," pp. 120-121.

67. Interview by Peter Kindsvatter with Frederick M. Franks, 11 April 1991, Office of the TRADOC
Historian, Fort Monroe, VA.

68. There are no comments in any of the divisional duty logs or chronologies that indicate the presence
of effective Tawakalna artillery fire. There are, also, no references to US attack helicopters or Air Force
close air support aircraft being destroyed by the Tawakalna's air defense weapons.

69. The details of how the US Army planned and fought the 1991 Persian Gulf War are contained in US
Department of the Army, Operations, Field Manual 100-5 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army,
1986). It is a comprehensive method of warfare, based on military history, that integrated and
synchronized all elements of the Army to achieve the nation's strategic objectives.

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