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Chapter 10
Risk and Reliabilit y
AP Dr Azmi Mohd Shariff CAB2093 Process Safet y & Loss Prevent ion
Objectives
At t he end of t his chapt er, st udent s
should be able t o:
Underst and what risk is and how t o
access risk
Quant ify risk using various met hods
Underst and t he probabilit y ( and failure)
t heory
Prepare an event t ree or fault t ree
analysis
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AP Dr Azmi Mohd Shariff CAB2093 Process Safet y & Loss Prevent ion
Outline
Risk Assessment
Quant ificat ion of Risk
Accident Probabilit y
Event t ree analysis
Fault t ree analysis
AP Dr Azmi Mohd Shariff CAB2093 Process Safet y & Loss Prevent ion
Risk Assessment
Definit ions
Hazard: anyt hing t hat has t he pot ent ial t o produce an accident
Risk: t he probabilit y of a hazard result ing in an accident
Risk assessment : t he quant it at ive assessment of whet her t he
risks associat ed wit h any part icular hazard meet est ablished
crit eria of accept abilit y
Risk assessment includes incident ident ificat ion and
consequence analysis
I ncident ident ificat ion describes how an accident occurs. I t
frequent ly includes an analysis of t he probabilit ies.
Consequence analysis describes t he expect ed damage.
The risk assessment provides t he basis for improving t he
design and safe operat ion of chemical plant .
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AP Dr Azmi Mohd Shariff CAB2093 Process Safet y & Loss Prevent ion
Risk Assessment Process
Process Description
Hazard Identification
Scenario identification
Accident Probability Accident Consequences
Risk Assessment
Risk Acceptable ?
Build and/or Operate Process
Modify Design
yes
no
AP Dr Azmi Mohd Shariff CAB2093 Process Safet y & Loss Prevent ion
Accident Consequences
List of possible failure cases
eg. Pipe fract ure, vessel rupt ure et c.
Use source and released models t o det ermine out flows
Convert t he failure cases int o possible incident s
eg. Pool fire, BLEVE, explosion, t oxic gas dispersion
et c.
For each incident , calculat e damaging effect s as a
funct ion of dist ance from t he source
eg. Radiat ion flux, overpressure, t oxic concent rat ion
et c.
Use probit dat a t o est ablish t he probabilit y of deat h at
various dist ances
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AP Dr Azmi Mohd Shariff CAB2093 Process Safet y & Loss Prevent ion
Quantitative Risk Analysis
Risk is t he product of t he probabilit y of a
release, t he probabilit y of exposure and
t he consequences of exposure.
Risk can be described graphically as below:
Not acceptable
Acceptable
Consequences
Frequency
AP Dr Azmi Mohd Shariff CAB2093 Process Safet y & Loss Prevent ion
Quantitative Risk Analysis (cont.)
Act ual risk of a process or plant is usually det ermined
using quant it at ive risk analysis ( QRA) .
The frequency of t he release can be det ermined using a
combinat ion of event t rees and fault t rees
QRA is a met hod t hat ident ifies where operat ions,
engineering or management syst ems can be modified t o
reduce risk.
Complexit y of a QRA depends on t he obj ect ives of t he
st udy and t he available informat ion.
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AP Dr Azmi Mohd Shariff CAB2093 Process Safet y & Loss Prevent ion
Quantitative Risk Analysis (cont.)
Maxi mum benefi t s resul t when QRAs are used
at t he begi nni ng of a proj ect ( concept ual
revi ew and desi gn phase) and are mai nt ai ned
t hroughout t he faci l it ys l i fe cycl e
QRA met hod i s used t o :
provi de managers wi t h a t ool t o hel p t hem
eval uat e t he overal l ri sk of a process
eval uat e pot ent i al ri sks when qual i t at ive
met hods cannot provi de an adequat e
underst andi ng of t he ri sks.
Effect i ve for eval uat ing al t ernat i ve ri sk
reduct i on st rat egi es.
AP Dr Azmi Mohd Shariff CAB2093 Process Safet y & Loss Prevent ion
Quantitative Risk Analysis (cont.)
Maj or st eps of a QRA st udy include:
1. Defining t he pot ent ial event sequence and pot ent ial
incident s
2. Evaluat ing t he incident consequences ( t he t ypical
t ools: dispersion modeling and fire and explosion
modeling)
3. Est imat ing t he pot ent ial incident frequencies using
event t rees and fault t rees
4. Est imat ing t he incident impact s on people,
environment and propert y
5. Est imat ing t he risk by combining t he impact s and
frequencies and recording t he risk using a graph
similar t o Fig. 11- 15 as in L7.
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AP Dr Azmi Mohd Shariff CAB2093 Process Safet y & Loss Prevent ion
Quantification of Risk
For a gi ven di st ance from t he source:
( probabilit y of deat h) x ( accident probabilit y)
= ( risk of deat h)
For i nci dent s where t he consequences depend on
t he dri ft of a rel eased vapour cl oud, a ful l
Quant i fi ed Ri sk Assessment ( QRA) wi l l al so i ncl ude
wi nd speed and di rect i on probabi l i t i es deri ved
from met eorol ogi cal dat a.
AP Dr Azmi Mohd Shariff CAB2093 Process Safet y & Loss Prevent ion
Individual Risk Contours
i .e. l i nes j oi ni ng poi nt s of equal i ndi vidual ri sk
of deat h
Storage
Area
Process
Plant
10
-6
/year
10
-7
/year
10
-8
/year
Residential
Area
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AP Dr Azmi Mohd Shariff CAB2093 Process Safet y & Loss Prevent ion
Individual Risk Contours (cont.)
Off- si t e i mpact s can be i dent i fied
Cont rol room and offi ce si t t i ng can be
det ermi ned
Cont ours for Radi at i on Ri sk or Expl osi on Ri sk
can i ndi cat e pot ent i al domi no effect s bet ween
pl ant i t ems
I dent i fi cat ion of pl ant i t ems cont ri but i ng most
t o overal l ri sk al l ows rat i onal expendi t ure on
ri sk reduct i on
Mai n error i n ri sk cont ours st ems from
uncert ai nt y i n fai l ure probabi l i t i es
Overal l error coul d be up t o a fact or of 10 ( one
order of magni t ude)
AP Dr Azmi Mohd Shariff CAB2093 Process Safet y & Loss Prevent ion
Risk Criteria
Risk Dat a: FAR ( Fat al Accident Rat e)
Based on 1000 employees wor king for 50 year s
i. e. on 50 weeks x 40 hour s/ week x 50 year s x
1000 employees = 10
8
exposur e hour s
I ndust ry FAR
Chemical 4
Gener al Manufact ur ing 4
St eel 8
Agr icult ur e 10
Deep sea fishing 35
Coal Mining 40
Const r uct ion 67
Air Cr ew 250
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AP Dr Azmi Mohd Shariff CAB2093 Process Safet y & Loss Prevent ion
Fatality Statistics in Other Activities
I n any group of 1000 peopl e, on average, 20
wi l l di e from non- i ndust ri al acci dent s and 370
from di sease. The di sease t ot al i ncl udes 40
deat hs from smoki ng.
Act ivit y Fat alit y Rat e
( Deat hs/ person/ year)
Travelling by car 17x10
- 5
Rock Climbing 4x10
- 5
Smoking ( 20/ day) 500x10
- 5
St ruck by light ning ( UK) 1x10
- 7
Fire ( UK) 150x10
- 7
Run over by vehicle 600x10
- 7
Voluntary
activities
Involuntary
activities
AP Dr Azmi Mohd Shariff CAB2093 Process Safet y & Loss Prevent ion
Fatalities Statistics in Other Activities
(cont.)
A hi gher ri sk i s cl earl y accept abl e for vol unt ary
act i vi t ies
The equi val ent FAR ( deat hs/ 10
8
hours) for car
t ravel i s 57, t hi s common act i vi t y i f far more
dangerous t han worki ng i n a chemi cal pl ant ( FAR
= 4)
Publ i c concern about chemi cal pl ant safet y
focuses on t he pot ent i al for mul t i- fat alit y
acci dent s ( eg. Bhopal , Pi per- Al pha)
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AP Dr Azmi Mohd Shariff CAB2093 Process Safet y & Loss Prevent ion
Accident Probability
Probabi l i t y of hardware fai l ure
Probabi l i t y of operat or error
Event t rees
Faul t t rees
Basic failure
rate data
Techniques for scenario
identification and probability
calculation
AP Dr Azmi Mohd Shariff CAB2093 Process Safet y & Loss Prevent ion
Probability Theory
Equipment failures or fault s in a process occur as a
result of a complex int eract ion of t he individual
component s.
Dat a are collect ed on t he failure rat e of a part icular
hardware component .
Wit h adequat e dat a, it can be shown t hat t he
component fails aft er a cert ain period of t ime ( average
failure rat e, ( fault s/ t ime) ) .
Bathtub curve
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AP Dr Azmi Mohd Shariff CAB2093 Process Safet y & Loss Prevent ion
Failure Probability
Reliabilit y, R = e
- t
Unreliabilit y/ Failure Probabilit y, P = 1 -
R( t ) ,
P = 1 - e
- t
The t ime int erval bet ween 2 failures of
a component is called t he mean t ime
bet ween failures ( MTBF)
E( t ) = MTBF =
}

=
0
1
) (

dt t tf
AP Dr Azmi Mohd Shariff CAB2093 Process Safet y & Loss Prevent ion
Interaction Between Process Units
Accident s in chemical plant s are usually t he result of a
complicat ed int eract ion of a number of process component s.
I n some cases a process failure requires t he simult aneous failure
of a number of component s in parallel. The parallel st ruct ure is
represent ed by t he logical AND funct ion ( mult iplicat ion) .
Overall failure probability (11-6) Reliability (11-7)
For component s in series, failure of any single component will
result in in failure of t he process. The logical OR funct ion
represent s t his case and t he reliabilit y is found by mult iplying t he
reliabilit ies of t he individual component s.
Reliability (11-8) Probability (11-9)
[
=
=
n
i
i
P P
1
( )
[
=
=
n
i
i
R R
1
1 1
[
=
=
n
i
i
R R
1
( )
[
=
=
n
i
i
P P
1
1 1
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AP Dr Azmi Mohd Shariff CAB2093 Process Safet y & Loss Prevent ion
Interaction Between Process Units (cont.)
For a syst em composed of t wo component s A and B, eqn. ( 11- 9)
expanded t o
P( A or B) = P( A) + P( B) + P( A) P( B)
I f failure probabilit ies are small, t erm P( A) P( B) is negligible, and
t he above equat ion reduce t o
P( A or B) = P( A) + P( B)
For t his special case, eqn ( 11- 9) reduces t o
Failure dat a for a number of t ypical process component s are given
in Table 11- 1.
A summary of comput at ions for parallel and series process
component s is shown in Figure 11- 3.

=
=
n
i
i
P P
1
AP Dr Azmi Mohd Shariff CAB2093 Process Safet y & Loss Prevent ion
Table 11- 1
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AP Dr Azmi Mohd Shariff CAB2093 Process Safet y & Loss Prevent ion
AP Dr Azmi Mohd Shariff CAB2093 Process Safet y & Loss Prevent ion
Availability and Unavailability
Unrevealed Failure
Alarms, relief valves et c are only used in
emergencies.
I t is possible for t hem t o become fault y bet ween
inspect ions wit hout t he knowledge of t he operat or.
The AVAI LABI LI TY ( A) is t he probabilit y t hat t he
component is found funct ioning
The UNAVAI LABI LI TY ( U) is t he probabilit y t hat t he
component is found not funct ioning.
So A+ U = 1
rate failure
interval inspection where
2
=
=
=

U
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AP Dr Azmi Mohd Shariff CAB2093 Process Safet y & Loss Prevent ion
Event Tree Analysis
An Event Tree:
Begi ns wi t h an I ni t i at ing Event
Eval uat es t he i mpact of t he Safet y Funct i on
on t he acci dent process
Al l ows cal cul at ion of Fai l ure Probabi l i t y for
vari ous scenari os
Typi cal st eps i n an Event Tree Anal ysi s:
1. I dent i fy an i ni t iat ing event of i nt erest
2. I dent i fy t he safet y funct i on desi gned t o
deal wi t h t he i ni t iat ing event
3. Const ruct t he event t ree
4. Descri be t he resul t i ng acci dent event
sequences
AP Dr Azmi Mohd Shariff CAB2093 Process Safet y & Loss Prevent ion
Event Tree Example
Brake fails = 0.005+0.015+0.045+0.135+0.02+0.06+0.18 = 0.46
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AP Dr Azmi Mohd Shariff CAB2093 Process Safet y & Loss Prevent ion
Fault Tree Analysis
Descri bes how a hazardous event may occur in
t erms of combi nat i ons of i ndi vidual non-
hazardous component s or operat or fai l ures
Can eval uat e t he probabi l i t y of occurrence of a
hazardous event
The approach st art s wi t h a wel l - defined
acci dent ( t op event ) and works backward
t owards t he vari ous scenari os t hat can cause
t he acci dent .
AP Dr Azmi Mohd Shariff CAB2093 Process Safet y & Loss Prevent ion
Preliminary Steps Prior To
Fault Tree Construction
Define pr ecisely t he t op event .
liquid level t oo high
Define t he exist ing event .
What condit ions are present
Define t he un- allowed event s.
t ornadoes
Define t he physical bounds of t he pr ocess.
Component s t o be considered
Define t he equipment configur at ion.
Valves open or closed
Define t he level of r esolut ion.
Just a valve or also valve component s
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AP Dr Azmi Mohd Shariff CAB2093 Process Safet y & Loss Prevent ion
Fault Tree Construction
Put t he hazar dous event ( TOP EVENT) on t he left
hand side ( or t op) of t he page.
All immediat e possible causes of t he t op event ar e
ident ified and placed next t o it on t he t r ee.
I f any of t hese event s can cause t he t op event ,
t hey ar e j oined t o it by an OR gat e .
I f all ar e r equir ed befor e t he t op event occur s,
t hey ar e j oined t o it by an AND gat e.
I f a combinat ion of gat es appear s t o be necessar y
at any point , t hen pr ogr ess is t oo r apid and a
suit able int er mediat e st age should be sought .
Descr ibe t hese int er mediat e event s in t er ms of
ear lier event s, using eit her AND or OR logic.
Repeat t his for each br anch of t he t r ee unt il no
fur t her det ail is necessar y or possible.
AP Dr Azmi Mohd Shariff CAB2093 Process Safet y & Loss Prevent ion
Fault Tree Example
AND
OR
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AP Dr Azmi Mohd Shariff CAB2093 Process Safet y & Loss Prevent ion
Advantages Of Fault Trees
Advant ages:
Begins wit h a t op event t hat is select ed
by user t o be specific t o t he failure of
int erest .
Can be used t o det ermine minimal cut
set s, increases reliabilit y of t he syst em.
Can use soft ware t o graphically
const ruct , det ermine minimal cut set s
and calculat e failure probabilit ies.
AP Dr Azmi Mohd Shariff CAB2093 Process Safet y & Loss Prevent ion
Disadvantages of Fault Trees
Disadvant age:
for any reasonably complicat ed process,
fault t ree will be enormous, involving
t housands of gat es and int ermediat e
event s t hus requires more t ime
( measured in years) t o complet e.
user can never be cert ain t hat all failure
modes have been considered.
fault t ree only assumes hard failures.
Part ial failures are not considered.
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AP Dr Azmi Mohd Shariff CAB2093 Process Safet y & Loss Prevent ion
Relationship between Fault Trees
and Event Trees
Event t rees
begi n wi t h an i ni t iat ing event and work
t oward t he t op event ( i nduct i on) .
Faul t t rees
begi n wi t h a t op event and work backward
t oward t he i ni t iat ing event s ( deduct i on) .
Top event s for Faul t Trees are i ni t iat ing event s
for Event Trees.
Bot h are used t oget her t o produce a compl et e
pi ct ure of an i nci dent , from i t s i ni t iat ing
causes al l t he way t o i t s fi nal out come.
Probabi l i t ies and frequenci es are at t ached t o
t he di agrams.
AP Dr Azmi Mohd Shariff CAB2093 Process Safet y & Loss Prevent ion
Working Example 1
For a t ypical alarm syst em consist ing of a
pressure swit ch and an indicat or lamp, t he
failure rat e = 0. 18 fault s/ year. Wit h an
inspect ion int erval of 2 mont h, what is t he
availabilit y of t he syst em ?
Solut ion:
time the of 98.5% available is system alarm the i.e.
0.985 U - 1 A
so
015 . 0
2
0.166 x 0.18
U
= =
= =
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AP Dr Azmi Mohd Shariff CAB2093 Process Safet y & Loss Prevent ion
Working Example 2
Const ruct a faul t t ree for a t op event of FI RE
i n t he bel ow sect i on of pl ant .
Const ruct an event t ree for t he above pl ant
wi t h an i ni t iat ing event of FRACTURE OF LI NE
L. Use yes/ no l ogi c at t he branches.
Flame arrestor
T
1
(bulk storage tank)
T
2
(feed tank)
V
2
(float operated valve)
To process
Line L
V
1
pump P
Volatile
flammable
liquid
AP Dr Azmi Mohd Shariff CAB2093 Process Safet y & Loss Prevent ion
Working Example 2 (cont.)
Sol ut i on:
FAULT TREE
Fire
Solvent
vapour/air
mixture
AND AND
Ignition
Source
Vapour
from T2
OR OR
OR OR
OR OR
T2 leaks
V2 fails open
T1 leaks
T1 overflows
Valve V1 leaks
Pump P
leaks
Line L ruptured by
external impact
Line L fails due to
corrosion
Liquid
from T1
OR
Liquid
from T2
Liquid
from pipe
work
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AP Dr Azmi Mohd Shariff CAB2093 Process Safet y & Loss Prevent ion
Working Example 2 (cont.)
EVENT TREE
no
yes
yes
yes
no
no
no
No fire
Minor fire
Major fire
Major fire
Potential for
major fire
Line L
fractures
(initiating
event)
yes
Fire
detected
Fire services
available
Leak of solvent
noticed
immediately
Source
of
Ignition
SAFETY
FUCNTIONS
RESULTS