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Payal Malik
Tuesday, 18 March 2008 00:00
If one were to compile two lists, one of the areas of economic management
that directly impinge on the day-to-day quality of life of all citizens, and
another of the areas in which misguided policies have resulted in outcomes
far short of potential outcomes, then it is reasonable to conjecture that the
electricity and water sectors would have pride of place in both lists. In both
cases, not only were policies followed that were contrary to good sense as
dictated by the science of economics, but more perversely, they undermined
the very political and economic interests whose furtherance was proclaimed
by socialist rhetoric to be the raison-de-etre for these policies. Indian economic
policy failures are often charitably excused by the plea that policy-makers
were soft-hearted, but presumably hard-headed. However, an ex ante
appraisal of the economics underlying these policies leads one to believe that
they were soft-headed, while the ex post impact on the populace points to
hardness of heart. While the continuance of these policies in the short run
may be attributed to naivete and an ideologically blinkered world-view, or an
inability to recognize and repair the unintended consequences of well-
meaning efforts, their longevity points elsewhere. It is evident that the
political and economic elites coalesced into a nexus that supped at the high
table on the rents created by the misguided policies while placating the
electoral vote-banks with a steady diet of socialist rhetoric and some populist
crumbs from the table.
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What did the dirigeste view of the electricity and water sectors amount to?
First, water and electricity are often viewed as ``public goods'', although they
do not have the properties required of public goods. Applying standard
definitions, water and electricity are private goods. This seemingly innocuous
error has been used to dictate inappropriate institutional design, and distort
investment and pricing decisions. However, this error does not stem merely
from intellectual lethargy. As in many other policy problems where the
commodity in question is inappropriately labelled a ``public good'', the
reason for this inappropriate categorization is not difficult to see. The inherent
nature of a true public good does not allow straightforward commercial or
economic cost-benefit analysis. As such analysis is invariably vitiated by
considerations of externalities and some of the concerned goods being ``merit
goods'', the planner or policy-maker has wide latitude and discretion in
skewing decisions in a chosen predestined direction. Thus, by the sleight-of-
hand of simply labelling private goods as public goods, headroom is created
for policy intervention and distortion.
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natural spring, but wholly inappropriate for large urban areas with treated
and piped water. Water treatment and transport are costly activities and
represent value addition to the raw water. The problem of designing
institutions for the allocation of these costs is no different from that faced in a
host of other commodity markets in which transport depends on a fixed
common network.
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It is telling that in the popular imagination water tariffs are often referred to
as ``taxes'' rather than as ``prices''. This confusion neatly encapsulates a basic
flaw in the status quo and indicates a direction for policy reform. Taxes as an
economic category describe an impost by the state for the purpose of
providing public goods or for redistribution of resources by fiat. Being
artificial impositions by the state, they carry information about the state's
moral stance, but little useful information regarding economic values,
preferences, technology, etc. On the other hand, as was stressed by von
Hayek, prices are the life-blood of the economic system as they incorporate
and disseminate vital economic information with an efficiency that a tax
cannot hope to match. So, changing tariffs from whimsically imposed ``taxes''
to economically-justified ``prices'' is a major part of the reform agenda.
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What is to be done?
The solutions of the problems afflicting the water and electricity sectors
require concerted policy responses in a number of directions. As the details of
the required policies have been studied above, it suffices here to place these
policies in a broader intellectual and political context.
First, it needs to be recognized intellectually that both water and electricity are
private goods. A practical corollary is that the consumption of these goods
needs to be accurately metered for each consumer. Treating these goods as
``public'' goods that are jointly consumed by a community implies a moral
hazard problem leading to a tragedy of the commons. The broad principles
governing the design of institutions for the welfare maximizing provision of
private goods are well-understood, indeed staple, parts of the economics
literature. These insights are being sharpened at the level of market micro-
structure in sophisticated economies; see Wilson (2002). However, in India,
the debate is still at a relatively rudimentary stage as we are still grappling
with first-order problems of institutional design such as the role of the private
sector in these markets, whether these goods should be allocated via the price
mechanism, what should be the nature of regulatory design and the nature of
contracts governing relationships among the players in these markets. In
sophisticated economies, most of these elementary issues have been dealt
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with over the past two decades or so and the debate has moved on to second-
order technical issues, e.g., the design of market micro-structure for spot,
futures and option trading in these goods. However, as a latecomer to the
party, India does have the great advantage of being able to learn from the
experiences of other countries and being able to take into account the possible
market micro-structure issues even while resolving the first-order problems.
Electricity is traded at two levels: bulk/wholesale and retail. In the market for
bulk electricity, the generators are the ultimate source of supply and the
distributors are the ultimate source of demand. As in any other market, there
can be pure traders who neither generate electricity nor distribute it to the
ultimate consumers. In India, the bulk electricity market has been strangled
by vertically integrating the generation and distribution businesses in the
form of SEBs, with almost no economic room left for genuine trading activity.
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is the only part of the value addition chain that is a natural monopoly.
Exclusive control of the transportation infrastructure by a distributor is a
source of market power and a means for preventing entry into the
distribution business. Even when a distributor owns the wire network, it is
necessary that the regulator enforce a fire-wall between the two businesses by
requiring open access to the network by all electricity traders in exchange for
a regulated access charge. Apart from providing efficient transportation to
traders, the other task of the electricity carrier is to expand and maintain the
network by making the necessary investments. For this, it is necessary to
provide this entity with a budgetary transfer. There is an extremely rich
literature (use Laffont and Tirole (1993) as a starting point) analyzing the
relationship between the regulator and the firm and we refer the reader to it
for details.
Electricity Act goes some way towards providing a legal framework for
bringing about the market structure described above. For instance, the de-
licensing of electricity generation, the legal requirement of open access to
retail markets and the creation of independent regulators to oversee consumer
interests are very sensible provisions.
However, mere market design is not enough as the efficient operation of any
market requires it to be embedded in a nurturing system of laws and their
effective enforcement. For instance, laws related to property rights and
contract execution need to take into account not merely broad philosophical
aspects of fairness, ``rights'' and ``social justice'', but they should marry these
principles sensibly with anticipated incentive and informational constraints
under which any law-enforcement executive operates. Failure to harness
together the law with sound economics has yielded laws in India that make
most contracts not worth the paper on which they are written. It is a matter of
everyday experience for every Indian citizen that contracts are flouted with
impunity and any attempt for redress is drowned in ceaseless litigation. The
most obvious instances of these problems are the very high incidence of
electricity theft by consumers, and more disturbingly, the theft of electricity
by many SEBs that callously exploit their state-owned and legally sanctioned
monopsony status to simply not pay for the electricity or coal that they ``buy''.
Therefore, a fourth essential and practical ingredient for the effective operation
of electricity and water markets is the enactment of appropriate laws and their
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As we have argued above, Electricity Act provides a legal matrix in which the
structure of electricity markets is brought in line with sound economic
principles. Even more fundamentally, for the first time there is an attempt to
fix and protect property rights by making electricity theft and manipulation of
meters a penal offence. It is remarkable indeed that purloining electricity has
not been ``theft'' for so long!
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One may wonder how this Mad Hatter's tea party, with ``Jam yesterday and
jam tomorrow but never jam today'', is sustained. This has been done by the
sleight-of-hand of confusing ends and means: instead of a clear objective of
providing well-defined amounts of water and electricity to the poor, with
subsidized prices as just one of the possible means, the politicians have
managed to shift the goalposts and framed low prices as an end in itself! In
both cases, the state has attempted to address distributional concerns via a
high degree of de jure price discrimination and cross-subsidy. Of course, the
pattern of de facto price discrimination is not congruent with the de jure
pattern. By imposing wedges between marginal cost and de facto prices, the
system imposes significant deadweight welfare losses on society.
Furthermore, de jure price discrimination motivated by politics defeats any
attempt at sensible ex ante economic calculus, e.g., what is the right amount to
produce, by what means, by whom, who should consume the output.
However, the ex post effects are easily discerned. As the prices do not convey
appropriate economic signals, there is a mismatch between demand and
supply across all the various artificially created segments of the markets. In
every segment, there is excess demand, indicating that the price is below the
equilibrium level. The effective price received by the supplier is the realized
revenue per unit of output. The persistent supply deficit points to this
incentive being inadequate to induce investment and augment supply to meet
the demand.
One reason for the parallax between de jure and de facto prices is the rampant
corruption that enables many consumers to undermine the attempted market
segmentation. For instance, a well-entrenched system of bribes allows
households and industries with high electricity loads to masquerade as those
with low loads and to manipulate their meters.
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have simply seceded from the decrepit public system by setting up a parallel
private system. This islanding strategy not only undermines the price
discrimination attempted by the state, but more seriously, it reduces the stake
of the affluent segment of the market in sustaining and improving the public
system. By impeding the expansion of the public system, the islanding
strategy also sustains and reinforces the socio-economic wedge between those
``inside the system'' and those ``outside looking in''. Thus, the policy
undermines and defeats the very objectives it is purportedly designed to
serve.
So, the fifth policy reform required is to replace the opaque system of price
discrimination with a transparent system of direct budgetary transfers to
well-targeted groups of consumers, e.g., a voucher-based system of transfers.
Our discussion so far has touched upon some aspects of the regulator's job,
e.g., price and quality regulation, ensuring open access to the market,
inducing investment, etc. Given the Indian policy-makers’ new-found faith in
``regulators’’ as a panacea for all problems, it is important to delineate the
regulator's role and the limits on his ability to bring about desired outcomes.
With respect to the scope of useful regulatory activity, one needs to state the
obvious: a regulator has no legitimate economic role in a market where competition
can ensure first-best outcomes by means of conventional commercial contracts. The
demand for regulators in such markets is silly at best or an attempt to re-
introduce state interference at worst. All that such markets require are well-
functioning judicial and executive institutions for contract enforcement,
prevention of market collusion and anti-trust activities, etc. However, the
regulator is of crucial importance in a non-competitive market where a firm
has the power to exact rents. Here, a regulator is charged to act as society's
fiduciary to provide incentives to the firm to act in the social interest,
howsoever this social mandate is defined. The regulator’s interaction with the
firms is governed by the contracts between these entities and the regulator’s
fiduciary responsibility to pursue the social mandate. Once they frame the
regulator’s mandate, the state actors lose their ability to interfere with this
interaction on a day-to-day basis.
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It is sometimes argued that the regulator can be dispensed with and the
relationship between the state and the firm can be governed directly by a
contract. This is possible if one can draw up a complete contract, i.e., provide
for every possible eventuality that might arise. That being practically
impossible, a regulator is required for the quasi-judicial task of interpreting
the social mandate and providing direction in states of the world not foreseen
by the contract. In the absence of a regulator, even trivial conflicts caused by
contract incompleteness would end up in the court's lap.
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Secondly, it has been argued that regulation is a means for disciplining and
improving the performance of state-run utilities. This seems true in principle
as one might expect state-owned firms to respond to incentives in the same
way as private firms. Indian political reality, however, destroys this apparent
parity. The regulator's ability to bring about desired outcomes depends on the
regulated entity's sensitivity to financial incentives in the form of tariffs,
transfers, penalties, etc. Historically, Indian state-owned entities have been
motivated by myriad considerations, many of the non-commercial and non-
financial kind. These considerations have been used as an alibi for poor
commercial and financial performance by the managers of these entities and
the political class that oversees and exploits these entities. The alibis of the
``social responsibility'' variety are routinely seized upon by the political class
to open the public purse to provide open-ended non-performance-related
subsidies to the state-owned entities. Consequently, these entities face very
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The only way to have good regulatory outcomes when state-owned utilities
are involved is to transform them into “private” firms, either via sale of equity
and loss of direct state control, or by maintaining control but stripping away
their government department character: have similar employment policies,
have similar managerial and labor incentives, credibly deny them open-ended
budgetary hand-outs and empower management to make commercially
sensible decisions. Although the Indian state has failed to credibly implement
the second route time and again, commitment to this route is piously intoned
by elements of the Indian polity every time straightforward privatization is
proposed, the political class is clearly loath to part with the milch cow
fattened over decades. For instance, a red herring regularly tossed into this
debate is that instead of privatizing state-owned utilities, it is sufficient to
“corporatize” them. While the change of legal status from government
department to corporation is a necessary first step for reform, it will not by
itself necessarily subject the organizations to external market discipline or
force them to create internal systems of accountability. The setting-up of good
internal and external incentive structures is of paramount importance for a
well-functioning utility and the Indian state is yet to demonstrate its ability to
set up such institutions. In the absence of credible state initiatives in this
respect, privatization of a number of activities is the only realistic solution of
the problem.
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