People v. Tampus GR No.

181084, June 16, 2009 FACTS : The offended party, ABC, is the daughter of appellant Ida, and was 13 years old at the time of the incident. Ida worked as a waitress in a beer house. At the time of the commission of the crime, Ida and ABC was renting a room in a house owned by Tampus who was a barangay tanod. On April 1, 1995 ABC testified that she was in the house with Ida and Tampus who were both drinking beer. They forced her to drink beer and after consuming three and one-half glasses of beer, she became intoxicated and very sleepy. While ABC was lying on the floor of their room, she overheard Tampus requesting her mother, Ida, that he be allowed to have sexual intercourse with her. Appellant Ida agreed and instructed Tampus to leave as soon as he finished having sexual intercourse with ABC. Ida then went to work, leaving Tampus alone with ABC. ABC fell asleep and when she woke up, she noticed that the garter of her panties was loose and rolled down to her knees. She suffered pain all over her body and her private parts and noticed that her panties and short pants were stained with blood which was coming from her private part. When her mother arrived home from work the following morning, she kept on crying but appellant Ida ignored her. ABC testified that on April 4, 1995, she was left alone in the room since her mother was at work at the beer house. Tampus went inside their room and threatened to kill her if she would report the previous sexual assault to anyone. He then forcibly removed her panties. ABC shouted but Tampus covered her mouth and again threatened to kill her if she shouted. He undressed himself and consummated the sexual act then he left the house. When ABC told appellant Ida about the incident, the latter again ignored her. Both defendants denied the allegation Tampus claiming that he went to the public market on April 1 and that he was at the Barangay Outpost to perform his duties as barangay tanod on April 4. Ida alleged that she always brings her daughter with her when she works. (Dr. Costas), the Head of the Department of Psychiatry of the Vicente Sotto Memorial Medical Center, issued a Medical Certification which showed that appellant Ida was treated as an outpatient at the Vicente Sotto Memorial Medical Center Psychiatry Department from November 11, 1994 to January 12, 1995 and was provisionally diagnosed with Schizophrenia, paranoid type. The trial court convicter Tampus of two counts of rape and found Ida guilty as an accomplice in the first rape case. The mitigating circumstance of illness which would diminish the exercise of will power without depriving her of the consciousness of her acts was appreciated in favor of Ida. Both were ordered jointly, and severally to indemnify ABC the sum of Php 50,000.00 Pending resolution of the appeal before the Court of Appeals, accused Tampus died and his appeal was dismissed. The appeal dealt only with that of appellant Ida. The appellate court gave credence to the testimony of ABC and affirmed the trial courts decision with modification. It appreciated the mitigating circumstance of illness in favor of Ida, but found that Ida failed to prove that she was completely deprived of intelligence on On the basis of
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the medical report and the testimony of the attending physician, Idas schizophrenia was determined by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals to have diminished the exercise of her will-power though it did not deprive her of the consciousness of her acts. The appeal was dismissed, the appellate court affirmed the trial courts decision but modified the award of damages ordering Ida to pay moral damages in the amount of fifty Php 50,000.00 and exemplary damages in the amount of Php 25,000.00 ISSUES: Whether the mitigating circumstance must be appreciated in favor of Ida Whether or not Ida can be considered as an accomplice. Whether or not the trial court and appellate court was correct in their Imposition of the indemnities that Ida has to pay RULING: 1. The conviction of Ida as accomplice in the crime Accomplices are persons who, not being included in Article 17 of the Revised Penal Code, cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts.47 The following requisites must be proved in order that a person can be considered an accomplice: (a) community of design, i.e., knowing that criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose; (b) he cooperates in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts; and, (c) there must be a relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person charged as accomplice.48 The testimony of ABC establishes that Ida cooperated in the execution of the rape by Tampus when prior to the act of rape by Tampus, she forced ABC to drink beer and she agreed to Tampus request for him to have sexual intercourse with ABC. Idas acts show that she had knowledge of and even gave her permission to the plan of Tampus to have sexual intercourse with her daughter.1avvphi1 All the requisites concur in order to find Ida guilty as an accomplice to Tampus in the rape of ABC. The testimony of ABC shows that there was community of design between Ida and Tampus to commit the rape of ABC. Ida had knowledge of and assented to Tampus intention to have sexual intercourse with her daughter. She forced ABC to drink beer, and when ABC was already drunk, she left ABC alone with Tampus, with the knowledge and even with her express consent to Tampus plan to have sexual intercourse with her daughter. It is settled jurisprudence that the previous acts of cooperation by the accomplice should not be indispensable to the commission of the crime; otherwise, she would be liable as a principal by indispensable cooperation. The evidence shows that the acts of cooperation by Ida are not indispensable to the commission of rape by Tampus. First, because it was both Ida and Tampus who forced ABC to drink beer, and second because
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Tampus already had the intention to have sexual intercourse with ABC and he could have consummated the act even without Idas consent. The acts of Ida are closely related to the eventual commission of rape by Tampus. Circumstances affecting the liability of ida Schizophrenia may be considered as a mitigating circumstance if it diminishes the exercise of the willpower of the accused. The testimony shows that even though Ida was diagnosed with schizophrenia, she was not totally deprived of intelligence but her judgment was affected. Thus, on the basis of the Medical Certification that Ida suffered from and was treated for schizophrenia a few months prior to the incident, and on the testimony of Dr. Costas, Idas schizophrenia could be considered to have diminished the exercise of her willpower although it did not deprive her of the consciousness of her acts. The undisputed fact that Ida is the mother of ABCwho was 13 years old at the time of the incidentcould have been considered as a special qualifying circumstance which would have increased the imposable penalty to death. However, although the victim's minority was alleged and established, her relationship with the accused as the latter's daughter was not properly alleged in the Information, and even though this was proven during trial and not refuted by the accused, it cannot be considered as a special qualifying circumstance that would serve to increase the penalty of the offender. Under the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which should be given retroactive effect following the rule that statutes governing court proceedings will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, every Information must state the qualifying and the aggravating circumstances attending the commission of the crime for them to be considered in the imposition of the penalty. Since in the case at bar, the did not state that Ida is the mother of ABC, this circumstance could not be appreciated as a special qualifying circumstance. Ida may only be convicted as an accomplice in the crime of simple rape, which is punishable by reclusion perpetua. Civil indemnity imposed against the appellant It is necessary and proper to award ABC civil indemnity of P50,000.00. Civil indemnity ex delicto is mandatory upon finding of the fact of rape. This is distinct from moral damages awarded upon such finding without need of further proof, because it is assumed that a rape victim has actually suffered moral injuries entitling the victim to such award. The victim in simple rape cases is entitled to an award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto and another P50,000.00 as moral damages. However, Tampus civil indemnity ex delicto has been extinguished by reason of his death before the final judgment, in accordance with Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code. It becomes relevant to determine the particular amount for which each accused is liable when they have different degrees of responsibility in the commission of the crime and, consequently, differing degrees of liability. When a crime is committed by many, each one has a distinct part in the commission of the crime and though all the persons who took part in the
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commission of the crime are liable, the liability is not equally shared among them. Hence, an accused may be liable either as principal, accomplice or accessory. The particular liability that each accused is responsible for depends on the nature and degree of his participation in the commission of the crime. The penalty prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for a particular crime is imposed upon the principal in a consummated felony. he accomplice is only given the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by the law for the crime committed and an accessory is given the penalty lower by two degrees. However, a felon is not only criminally liable, he is likewise civilly liable. Apart from the penalty of imprisonment imposed on him, he is also ordered to indemnify the victim and to make whole the damage caused by his act or omission through the payment of civil indemnity and damages. Civil liability arising from the crime is shared by all the accused. Although, unlike criminal liabilityin which the Revised Penal Code specifically states the corresponding penalty imposed on the principal, accomplice and accessorythe share of each accused in the civil liability is not specified in the Revised Penal Code. The courts have the discretion to determine the apportionment of the civil indemnity which the principal, accomplice and accessory are respectively liable for, without guidelines with respect to the basis of the allotment. Article 109 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "[i]f there are two or more persons civilly liable for a felony, the courts shall determine the amount for which each must respond." Notwithstanding the determination of the respective liability of the principals, accomplices and accessories within their respective class, they shall also be subsidiarily liable for the amount of civil liability adjudged in the other classes. Article 110 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "[t]he principals, accomplices, and accessories, each within their respective class, shall be liable severally (in solidum) among themselves for their quotas, and subsidiarily for those of the other persons liable." If for instance, there are four principals and only one accomplice and the total of the civil indemnity and damages is P6,000.00, the court cannot assign two-thirds (2/3) of the indemnity and damages to the principals and one-third (1/3) to the accomplice. Even though the principals, as a class, have a greater share in the liability as against the accomplice-- since onethird (1/3) of P6,000.00 is P2,000.00, while two-thirds (2/3) of P6,000.00 is P4,000.00-- when the civil liability of every person is computed, the share of the accomplice ends up to be greater than that of each principal. This is so because the two-thirds (2/3) share of the principalsor P4,000.00is still divided among all the four principals, and thus every principal is liable for only P1,000.00. In the case at bar, the trial court ruled that the accomplice is solidarily liable with the principal for the entire amount of the civil indemnity of P50,000.00. This is an erroneous apportionment of the civil indemnity. First, because it does not take into account the difference in the nature and degree of participation between the principal, Tampus, versus the accomplice, Ida. Idas previous acts of cooperation include her acts of forcing ABC to drink beer and permitting Tampus to have sexual intercourse with her daughter. But even without these acts, Tampus could have still
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raped ABC. It was Tampus, the principal by direct participation, who should have the greater liability, not only in terms of criminal liability, but also with respect to civil liability. Second, Article 110 of the Revised Penal Code states that the apportionment should provide for a quota amount for every class for which members of such class are solidarily liable within their respective class, and they are only subsidiarily liable for the share of the other classes. The Revised Penal Code does not provide for solidary liability among the different classes, as was held by the trial court in the case at bar.lTaking into consideration the difference in participation of the principal and accomplice, the principal, Tampus, should be liable for two-thirds (2/3) of the total amount of the civil indemnity and moral damages and appellant Ida should be ordered to pay one-third (1/3) of the amount. Civil indemnity for simple rape was correctly set at P50,000.00 and moral damages at P50,000.00. The total amount of damages to be divided between Tampus and Ida is P100,000.00, where Tampus is liable for P66,666.67 (which is two-thirds [2/3] of P100,000.00) and Ida is liable for P33,333.33 (which is one-third [1/3] of P100,000.00). This is broken down into civil indemnity of P16,666.67 and moral damages of P16,666.67. However, since the principal, Tampus, died while the case was pending in the Court of Appeals, his liability for civil indemnity ex delicto is extinguished by reason of his death before the final judgment. His share in the civil indemnity and damages cannot be passed over to the accomplice, Ida, because Tampus share of the civil liability has been extinguished. However, since Tampus civil liability ex delicto is extinguished, Idas subsidiary liability with respect to this amount is also eliminated, following the principle that the accessory follows the principal. Exemplary damages were incorrectly awarded by the Court of Appeals. In criminal cases, exemplary damages are imposed on the offender as part of the civil liability when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Also known as "punitive" or "vindictive" damages, exemplary or corrective damages are intended to serve as a deterrent to serious wrongdoings, and as a vindication of undue sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of an injured or a punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct. Exemplary damages may be awarded only when one or more aggravating circumstances are alleged in the information and proved during the trial. In the case at bar, no qualifying or aggravating circumstance was appreciated against Ida. Although, the minority of the victim coupled with the fact that the offender is the parent of the victim could have served to qualify the crime of rape, the presence of these concurring circumstances cannot justify the award of exemplary damages since the relationship of the offender, Ida, to the victim, ABC, was not alleged in the Information. The minority of the rape victim and her relationship with the offender must both be alleged in the information and proved during the trial in order to be appreciated as an aggravating/qualifying circumstance. While the information in the instant case alleged that ABC was a minor during the incident, there was no allegation that Ida was her parent. Since the relationship between ABC and appellant was not duly established, the award of exemplary damages is not warranted.
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Appellant Ida Montesclaros guilty beyond reasonable doubt as accomplice in the crime of rape and sentencing her to suffer the indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. She is ordered to pay civil indemnity in the amount of sixteen thousand, six hundred sixty-six pesos and sixty-seven centavos (P16,666.67), and moral damages in the amount of sixteen thousand, six hundred sixty-six pesos and sixty-seven centavos (P16,666.67). The award of exemplary damages is deleted.

People v. Satonero GR No. 186233, October 2, 2009 FACTS: At around five oclock in the afternoon of December 25, 1997, Leticia and her nephew, Ramon Amigable were in Brgy. La Esperanza, Tulunan waiting for a tricycle ride to a place called Mlang. Leticia had just received a gift from her sister. Accused-appellant who was also her nephew happened to be nearby. Accused-appellant, upon seeing the gift Leticia was holding, inquired where it came from. When told of the source, accusedappellant mocked the gift-giver for giving more to those who have more in life. Accused-appellant then asked Leticia if she knew who he was, followed by a remark that he would throw her into the irrigation ditch At that moment, Leticia told Ramon not to mind accused-appellant because he was drunk. When Ramon was about to board the tricycle, accused-appellant followed him, shot him three times with a short-barreled gun, then stabbed him several times. All told, Ramon sustained nine stab wounds on different parts of his body. Despite the presence of other persons at the scene of the crime, nobody attempted to approach the protagonists as accused-appellant threatened to harm anyone who dared come near them. Afterwards, accused-appellant went to the house of Barangay Kagawad Nestor Porras ostensibly to notify, via radio, the police about the incident. But no policeman came. Instead, Pastor Peafiel, the Citizens Crime Watch coordinator, arrived and accompanied accusedappellant to the police station in Tulunan, Cotabato. Accused-appellant denies the allegation saying that he acted in selfdefense and that it was Ramon who attacked him and that the bullet hit Ramon was from a second warning shot that he fired. He also asserted that when he went near Ramon to check on him while he was already lying down, the latter tried to stab him and a scuffle ensued for the possession of the knife. He also claimed that he warned those nearby not to come close because he wanted to keep them away from possible harm. Accused-appellant was convicted of the crime of murder and was sentenced to serve the penalty of reclusion Perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the victim Php 75,000.00 for loss of life and Php 50,000.00 for moral damages. ISSUE: Whether or not self-defense can be appreciated in favor of accusedappellant Whether or not treachery existed during the commission of the crime. RULING: Existence of self-defense One who admits killing another in the name of self-defense bears the onus of proving the justifiability of the killing. The accused, therefore, must
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convincingly prove the following elements of the justifying circumstance of self-defense: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person claiming selfdefense. While all three elements must concur to support a claim of complete self-defenese, self-defense relies first and foremost on a showing of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. Absent clear proof of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, self-defense may not be successfully pleaded. Accused-appellant failed to discharge his burden of proving unlawful aggression. For unlawful aggression to be present, there must be a real danger to life or personal safety. There must be an actual, sudden, and unexpected attack or imminent danger, and not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude. As the element of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is absent, or at least not convincingly proved, accusedappellants claim of self-defense cannot be appreciated. But assuming arguendo that there was unlawful aggression on Ramons part, the Court distinctly notes that the means accused-appellant employed to prevent or repel the supposed unlawful aggression were far from reasonably necessary. The number and nature of the wounds sustained by Ramon certainly belie a claim of self-defense. It is worth stressing that accused-appellant inflicted nine stab wounds on Ramon after he pumped a bullet on the latters lower left chest. Said gunshot wound, as medical report later showed, was by itself already fatal. Significantly, after Ramon fell as a result of his bullet wound, accused-appellant still proceeded to stab him. As aptly observed by the trial court, Ramon could not have walked far after he was hit by the bullet. Accused-appellants pretense, therefore, that he had no intention to harm Ramon after the shooting and that he only approached the fallen Ramon to bring him to the doctor, stretches credulity to the absurd and must be rejected. Certainly, the nature and number of the injuries inflicted by accused-appellant on the victim should be significant indicia in determining Appreciation of treachery as qualifying circumstance It may be, as postulated, that the suddenness of the attack would not, by itself, suffice to support a finding of treachery. Where, however, proof obtains that the victim was completely deprived of a real chance to defend himself against the attack, as in the instant case, thereby ensuring its commission without risk to the aggressor, and without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim, the qualifying circumstance of treachery ought to and should be appreciated. Verily, what is decisive is that the attack was executed in a manner that the victim was rendered defenseless and unable to retaliate. As shown by the prosecutions evidence thus adduced and as determined by the trial court, Ramon was without a weapon and had no opportunity to defend himself against accused-appellants unexpected assault. In fact, Ramon was about to board a tricyclean indicium of the suddenness of the attackwhen accused-appellant shot him three times, with at least one bullet finding its mark. The assault with the knife came
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immediately after Ramon fell to the ground. It was physically impossible for Ramon to safely distance himself due to the swiftness of the assault. Any suggestion, therefore, that the killing of Ramon was not attended by treachery cannot be accepted. The trial court correctly awarded the amount of P75,000 to the heirs of Ramon by way of civil indemnity ex delicto. Its award of P50,000.00 as moral damages is, however, increased to P75,000.00 to conform to existing jurisprudence. Moral damages may be awarded without need of pleading or proof. The Court, however, deems it proper to award exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00 in accordance with Article 2230 of the Civil Code considering that the killing was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery. The appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATION: (1) The award of moral damages is increased to PhP 75,000; and (2) Accused-appellant is also ordered to pay the heirs of Ramon Amigable exemplary damages in the amount of PhP 30,000.

People v. Obligado GR No. 171735, April 16, 2009 FACTS: Eye-witness Roberto Bagaporo testified that he and the victim along with several others were having a drinking spree in front of his residence in the evening of March 12, 2000. They were later joined by appellant. As Bagaporo prepared the videoke machine, he heard the victim call out, "Pinsan!" (Cousin!) He then turned around and saw appellant standing behind the victim. Appellant grabbed the victim's hair with his left hand and, with his right, pulled out a bolo from underneath his shirt and slashed the victim's neck. He then pushed the victim (who fell face down on the pavement) and walked away. The victim's widow, Gloria Oliveros testified that her husband earned at least P5,000 per month as a driver. She also presented a receipt from the funeral parlor amounting to P15,000 and an itemized list of expenses incurred during the wake amounting to P12,000. For his defense, appellant asserted that he accidentally killed the victim. While they were drinking, the victim approached and confided to him that he had a problem but did not say what his problem was. Appellant gave the victim a drink. To his surprise, the victim allegedly pulled out his bolo from its scabbard. Afraid of what could happen, appellant tried to wrest the bolo but the victim resisted. It was while grappling for possession of the bolo that the victim was fatally slashed in the neck. The defense also presented SPO4 David Sarto, police community officer of the PNP Buhi station. According to SPO4 Sarto, he and his fellow police officers were ordered to arrest appellant on March 13, 2000. They met appellant while traversing the lone footpath leading to his residence. Appellant surrendered his person and the bolo. RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered him to pay indemnity on the amount of P50,000; actual damages of P27,000; moral and exemplary damages of P50,000 and to pay the cost of suit. On intermediate appellate review, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the guilt of the appellant but modified the civil liabilities imposed by the RTC. Because SPO4 Sarto testified that appellant intimated a desire to surrender, the appellate court appreciated the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. Thus, it deleted the award of exemplary damages and instead ordered appellant to pay moral damages in the amount of P50,000. ISSUSE: Whether or not the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender be appreciated in the case at bar RULING: Mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender
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The evidence of the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant intended to kill (and in fact killed) the victim and that he consciously adopted a design which deprived the victim of any opportunity to defend himself, or to retaliate. However, the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should not have been considered. For the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender to be appreciated, the defense must prove that: (a) the offender had not been actually arrested; (b) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority; (c) the surrender was spontaneous and voluntary.7 SPO4 Sarto testified that appellant's residence could be accessed only through a footpath where they met appellant. Inasmuch as he was intercepted by the arresting officers there, appellant had no means of evading arrest. His surrender therefore was neither voluntary nor spontaneous. On the contrary, the aforementioned circumstances revealed that he had no option but to yield to the authorities. Award of damages With respect to the award of damages, to conform with recent jurisprudence, the appellant is ordered to pay P75,000 as civil indemnity ex delicto. Both the RTC and CA did not award indemnity for loss of earning capacity despite the testimony of the victim's widow that he earned P5,000 per month as a driver. Such indemnity is not awarded in the absence of documentary evidence except where the victim was either self-employed or was a daily wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws. Since it was neither alleged nor proved that the victim was either self-employed or was a daily wage worker, indemnity for loss of earning cannot be awarded to the heirs of the victim. Settled is the rule that only receipted expenses can be the basis of actual damages arising from funeral expenditures. All the prosecution presented was a receipt from the funeral parlor amounting to P15,000. Since the receipted expenses of the victim's family was less than P25,000, temperate damages in the said amount can be awarded in lieu of actual damages. Accordingly, the heirs of the victim are not entitled to actual damages but to temperate damages in the amount of P25,000. Inasmuch as moral damages are mandatory in cases of murder (without need to allege and prove such damages), appellant is likewise ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victimP50,000. Lastly, since the killing of the victim was attended by treachery, his heirs are entitled to exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000. . Appellant Alejo Obligado yMagdaraog is found guilty of murder as defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is further ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim Felix Oliveros y Raada P75,000 as civil indemnity ex delicto, P25,000 as temperate damages, P50,000 as moral damages and P25,000 as exemplary damages.

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People v. Angeles GR No. 177134; August 14, 2009

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FACTS: While prosecution witness Aguilar was driving his tricycle along Batanes St., Sampaloc, Manilabehind another tricycle driven by Michael Colligado (the victim) bearing appellant and an unidentified companion, the victims tricycle stopped at the corner of Tomas Pinpin and Batanes Streets. After Aguilars tricycle passed by the victims tricycle, he (Aguilar) made a U-turn upon which he heard the victim and appellant arguing about the fare. While appellant was standing on the left side of the victim and his companion was holding the victims hands, appellant stabbed the victim near his armpit causing him to fall down. Appellant and his companion immediately fled, passing by Carpio, also a tricycle driver. Aguilar, with the help of people in the vicinity, immediately brought the victim to the United Doctors Medical Center where he died at the Emergency Room On the other hand, appellant, interposing alibi, claimed that at around 9:15 p.m. to 9:35 p.m. on September 1, 1998, he was sitting in front of his house, after which he went inside and watched television until around 10:30 p.m. when he fell asleep at the sofa located at the ground floor of their house. The trial court convicted appellant of murder and sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay the legal heirs of the victim moral and nominal damages in the respective sums of P200,000.00 and P70,000.00, plus compensation for the loss of the life of the victim in the sum of P50,000.00 with interest thereon at the legal rate of 6% per annum from this date until fully paid The appellate court affirmed with modification however it deleted the award of nominal damages in the amount of P70,000.00, ordering the accused-appellant to pay the heirs of Michael Coligado the amount of P25,000.00 as temperate damages, and reducing the award of moral damages from P200,000.00 to P50,000.00. the appellate court held that nominal damages are awarded only when no actual damages resulted or none were shown. In the present case, the appellate court noted that the family of the victim made a downpayment of P10,000 to the Davao Funeral Home as part of the funeral expenses, and while an Agreement between the mother of the victim and the funeral home for funeral expenses and interment in the amount of P38,000 was presented, it was not established that the total amount of P38,000 was actually paid Hence, the appellate courts award of temperate damages instead of nominal damages. ISSUE: Whether or not there was treachery in the case Whether indemnities were properly awarded by the court Whether the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender be appreciated The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by the aggressor on an unsuspecting victim, depriving him of any real chance to defend himself Even when the victim was forewarned of the danger to his person, treachery may still be appreciated since what is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate. In the present case, even assuming that the victim was forewarned of the danger because he was, immediately before the
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stabbing, engaged in an argument with appellant, he was not in a position to defend himself as his hands were held by appellants companion. As for appellants claim of voluntary surrender to mitigate the penalty imposed on him, the same fails. The records do not indicate that appellant intended to assume responsibility for the death of the victim. As the Office of the Solicitor General observes, he was merely forced by circumstances. Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code, when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot be proved with certainty, temperate damages may be recovered. Consistent with prevailing jurisprudence, the appellate court correctly awarded the amount ofP25,000. Further, under Article 2230 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages may be awarded in criminal cases when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances, in this case, treachery. This is intended to serve as deterrent to serious wrongdoings and as vindication of undue sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of an injured, or as a punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct. The imposition of exemplary damages is also justified under Article 2229 of the Civil Code in order to set an example for the public good. The amount for the purpose is P25,000 following precedents

Ronquillo v. People GR No. 181430; March 9, 2010 FACTS: While appellants Felipe Ronquillo and Gilber Torres, together with Alejandro Rivera, were drinking near the store of Henry Ugale, the victim Edgar Ronquillo who is a first cousin of appellant Ronquillo passed by as he repaired to the store to buy cigarettes. As appellant Ronquillo followed the victim at the store, a heated argument ensued between and the two were engaged in a fistfight. Appellant Ronquillo kicked the victim twice who drew out his knife which hit appellant Ronquillo at his left thigh. Torres joined the fray and struck the victim on the nape with a shovel. As the victim lay unconscious on the ground, appellant Ronquillo repeatedly hit him with a bamboo pole on the head and on different parts of his body. The victim died the following day. Ronquillo and Torres interposed self-defense alleging that a heated argument arose when the victim called Ronquillos father a wicked witch. Subsequently the victim chased Ronquillo with a knife, around the store premises. The victim turned to Torres to attack him. Torres repaired to a parked truck got a shovel and struck the victim on the nape. However the blow did not affect the victim who ran again after Ronquillo. The victim
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stabbed the left thigh of Ronquillo. The latter retaliated by striking the victim with a bamboo pole The trial court convicted both appellants of homicide and they were sentenced to suffer a penalty of eight years and four months to fourteen years and eight months and to pay the heirs of the victim solidarily the amount of Php 50,000.00 as civil indemnity, Php 50,000.00 as moral damages and another Php 50,000.00 as actual damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts decision but modified the award of damages by deleting the actual damages and replacing it with Php 25,000.00 as temperate damages. ISSUE: Whether or not the defense of self-defense be appreciated by virtue of the unlawful aggression that emanated from the victim. RULING: Self-defense cannot be appreciated in this case. The petitioners failed to discharge the burden of proving that the aggression emanated from the victim. The presence of unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non for self-defense to be warranted Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual and imminent peril. The victims mere possession of a knife would not suffice to impute unlawful aggression on him as petitioners have not even established that their lives had been actually threatened on account thereof. The victim in fact drew out his knife after he was twice kicked by Ronquillo. That the injury Ronquillo sustained was not serious or severe dovetails with the narration of prosecution witness that the victim used his knife to parry the second kick of Ronquillo. In stark contrast, the victim sustained severe head injuries that resulted in hernia and hemorrhage, and a fracture on his humerus or upper arm. The gravity, location, and number of injuries he sustained undoubtedly negate self-defense on petitioners part. Even assuming arguendo that unlawful aggression initially came from the victim, the aggression ceased when the victim already lay prostate on the ground at which time there was no longer any need to further inflict injuries on him. For there was no longer any imminent risk to petitioners lives or personal safety. Considering that petitioners already admitted the killing of Edgar Ronquillo, the issue of conspiracy is irrelevant simply because the participation of the petitioners in the killing has already been established. For even if conspiracy was not proven, the fact that the two accused each inflicted a serious wound which contributed to the death of the victim makes them co-principals.

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