The Right of Legation KLM Royal Dutch Airlines v CA Facts The Sps.

Mendoza approved a world tour itinerary, prepared by Reyes of the Philippine Travel Bureau (PTB), consisting of several legs to be carried out by different airlines. Reyes was an accredited agent of IATA, of which both KLM and Aer Lingus are members. In one of the trips leg, in Barcelona, the spouses were off-loaded on orders of Aer Lingus manager who harassed them physically and verbally. The Spouses filed a complaint against KLM as the principal of Aer Lingus for breach of contract of carriage and for the humiliation from ALs manager. The trial court awarded damages and attorneys fees. KLM appealed to be exonerated, while the Mendozas for an increase in the award of damages. The CA granted the increase in damages. Hence, KLM appealed before the SC. Issue Whether WC applies Ruling KLM invokes Art. 30 of the WC, to wit - (1) In the case of transportation to be performed by various successive carriers and failing within the definition set out in the third paragraph of Article I, each carrier who accepts passengers, baggage, or goods shall be subject to the rules set out in the convention, and shall be deemed to be one of the contracting parties to the contract of transportation insofar as the contract deals with that part of transportation which is performed under his supervision. (2) In the case of transportation of this nature, the passenger or his representative can take action only against the carrier who performed the transportation, during which the accident or the delay occurred, save in the case where, by express agreement, the first carrier has assumed liability for the whole journey. Such is not applicable because it presupposes the occurrence of either an accident or a delay, neither of which took place. ALs manager refuse to transport respondent to their destination.

Treaties Cuevas v Munoz Dec. 2000 Parties Petitioner Justice Serafin R. Cuevas substituted by Artemio G. Tuquero, as SOJ Respondent Juan Antonio Munoz Facts The Hong Kong Magistrates Court issued a warrant for the arrest of Munoz for accepting bribes in violation of a HK ordinance and for conspiring to defraud. Later, the Philippines DOJ was requested by the Mutual Legal Assistance Unit of the Hong Kong DOJ for the provisional arrest of Munoz pursuant to the RP-HK Extradition Agreement. The request was forwarded to the NBI. Subsequently, a warrant for the arrest of Munoz was issued by the RTC. Munoz filed with the CA a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or writ of habeas corpus assailing the validity of the Order of Arrest, which the CA granted on the ff. grounds: 1) that the request was unauthenticated and mere facsimile copies which are insufficient to form a basis for its issuance; 2) that the 20 day period under PD 1069 or the Philippine extradition law was not amended by the RP-HK extradition agreement which provides for a 45 day period for provisional arrest; 3) the judge issued it without having personally determined the existence of probable cause; and 4) the requirement of dual criminality under the Philippine extradition law has not been satisfied as the crimes complained of are not punishable by Philippine laws.

Cuevas, as Sec. of DOJ filed the instant petition. Munoz filed for release contending that since he has been detained beyond 20 days, the maximum for the provisional arrest, without a request for extradition being received by the DOJ, he should be released. Cuevas, on the other hand, avers that:

i)
ii) iii) iv) v) vi)

The Philippine DOJ had already received a formal request for extradition. There was urgency for the provisional arrest The municipal law does not subordinate an international agreement The supporting documents for the request need not be authenticated There was factual and legal bases in determining probable cause The offense of accepting an advantage as an agent is punishable under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

Issue Whether the provisional warrant of arrest issued by the RTC was void Ruling Sec. 20 of PD 1069 provides that the requesting state may, pursuant to the relevant treaty or convention and while the same remains in force, request for the provisional arrest of the accused, pending receipt of the request for extradition. In urgent cases, the person sought may, in accordance with the law of the requested Party, be provisionally arrested on the application of the requesting Party. There was urgency in the present case as there was a concern of Munoz being a flight risk if he will be informed of the pending request for extradition especially given the fact that if he will be found guilty of the charges against him, the penalties are of such gravity as to increase the probability of Munoz absconding if allowed provisional liberty. Sec. 20 (d) of PD 1069 provides that if within a period of 20 days after the provisional arrest the Secretary of Foreign Affairs has not received the request for extradition, the accused shall be released from custody. While the RP-HK Extradition Agreement provides for 45 days. Cuevas argument that the latter agreement amended PD 1069 has been rendered moot and academic by the fact that the Phil. DOJ had already received a request for extradition as early as 12 days after his provisional arrest. Contrary to Munozs contention, the request for extradition need not be filed in court, rather only need be received by the requested state. The request, as well as the accompanying documents, are valid despite lack of authentication. The pertinent extradition law does not provide for a requirement of authentication for the provisional arrest. Moreover, the authenticated copies of the decision or sentence imposed upon Munoz by HK and the warrant of arrest has already been received by the Phil. Furthermore, the extradition agreement only requires authentication for the request of extradition and not for the provisional arrest. Provisional arrest is a solution to the impending risk of flight as the process of preparing a formal request for extradition and its accompanying documents is time-consuming and leakage-prone. Thus, it is an accepted practice for the requesting state to rush its request in the form of a telex or diplomatic cable or facsimile. The temporary hold on private respondents privilege of notice and hearing is a soft restraint on his right to due process which will not deprive him of fundamental fairness should he decide to resist the request for his extradition to HK. There is no denial of due process as long as fundamental fairness is assured a party. As to Munoz contention that it should be the Foreign Diplomat who should send the request for provisional arrest, as required by PD 1069, the invoked provision only provides for the request for extradition and not the provisional arrest. There is sufficient compliance with the law if the request for provisional arrest is made by an official who is authorized by the government of the requesting state to make such a request and the authorization is communicated to the requested state.

There was sufficient factual and legal basis for the determination of probable cause as a requisite for the issuance of the Order of Arrest. Probable cause is the existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested. The judge sufficiently complied with the requirement of personal determination if he reviews the information and the documents attached thereto, and on the basis thereof forms a belief that the accused is probably guilty of the crime with which he is being charged. He need not examine personally the complainant and the witnesses.