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Mark Fernandez

PHI 215 – Philosophical Issues

Philosophy of Religion: Topic 5

The Right to Believe

All of humanity’s diverse faculties serve a purpose. Hunger spurs eating, satiety

prevents over-consuming, and memory catalogues safe foods. Emotion and reason guide

and protect humanity, each serving a vital function. But William Clifford in “The Ethics

of Belief” imposes excess restrictions on the emotion of belief with the justifications that

are always given when rights are restricted: It is for your own protection and the benefit

of society. Belief will “weaken our powers of self-control, of doubting, [and] of judicially

and fairly weighing evidence” (Clifford 4) unless severely limited. The natural forces that

keep belief in check – reason, fear of being fooled, and loss of credibility – are

insufficient. We must indefinitely suspend all belief until sufficient evidence arrives.

Until then, doubt will replace belief in all instances. This is Clifford's ideal world.

But this is not reality. Every human is born with emotion as well as reason; both

are innate components of humanity. Therefore the faculty of belief is a natural right, for it

is intrinsically and uniquely human. To suppress this faculty is to oppress human rights.

In counter to Clifford, I interpret “The Will to Believe” as an epistemic argument derived

from the natural order of humanity, contrasting these facts of nature against the principles

espoused by Clifford. It is worth noting that Clifford was a mathematician and James a

psychologist. Clifford’s formulaic argument to virtually guarantee a “dispassionate

investigator” (Jaggar 226) collides with James’ acknowledgement and embracement of

the vital roles emotion must play in order to guide human life to its fulfillment.
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Dichotomies pervade our universe, with many of them either false or so

intellectually abstract that over-analysis can do more harm than good. Take the

dichotomy of reason and emotion. From day one the philosophy student is asked to

discern which camp to reside in. The fact that this philosophical proto-inquiry is still

intellectually open points to a deeper truth: We have falsely divorced reason and emotion.

An empiricist might exclaim “I feel, therefore I am” as proof of his existence. As

to why we have the faculty of belief, psychologist James says “we hardly know how or

why” (James 124), but certainly the same force that gave us reason imbued us with

emotion. Just as the fact that animals create and use tools – an overt display of reason –

has not negated Descartes' rationalism, the fact that animals experience emotions does not

damage James’ pragmatism. There is a visible gulf between homo sapiens and other

species; animals neither entertain abstract concepts nor cry. It is the abundance of the

faculties of reason and emotion that make us fully human. The lack of intellect incurs

labels such as mentally challenged; more severe deficiencies provide justification for

termination of life. Likewise, those with a lack of emotional abilities are “robots”, and

extreme cases prove dangerous. One who cannot feel empathy is a sociopath. To be fully

human one must manifest both reason and emotions.

Despite this axiom, we not only divorce reason and emotion; we subject one

under the other. An analogy can be made using the sexes. Male and female have

biological differences. Each is equally and fully human, yet humanity is not complete

without both. To denigrate one is to falsely elevate the other. Male and female cannot

exist in perpetual separation. For human life to exist, both aspects of humanity must

embrace each other. The same is true for reason and emotion.
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Questions in turn are either rational or emotional in nature, with degrees in

between. Pure mathematics involves solely rational inquiry, while love may be the

paradigm of emotion. Consequentially, each question necessitates a proportionally

rational or emotional response. One cannot correctly answer 2+2 with emotion, and who

to love cannot be divined from a calculator. This is what makes politics vexing. Social

problems are both rational and emotional in nature; the successful politician

acknowledging both components. The adage “fight fire with fire” proves apropos.

Likewise, religion is a fusion of science and morality (James 127). Like science, religion

declares what exists (heaven, God, etc.) and what is (morally) good.

It is this holistic philosophy that guides James' criticism against Clifford's rule

that “it is wrong in all cases to believe on insufficient evidence” (Clifford 13). Instead of

a line-item critique, James applies a logistical coup de grace, charging Clifford with using

the emotion of fear to influence action. “[Clifford] is actively playing his stake as much

as the believer is” (James 128). Clifford's reasoning is unknowingly tainted by “fear” (of

error), while the believer's reasoning is consciously guided by “hope” (James 128). This

dichotomy of belief existed at the genesis of philosophy. While conversing with Meno,

Socrates states “we shall be better, braver, and more active men if we believe it right to

look for what we don’t know than if we believe there is no point in looking because what

we don’t know we can never discover” (Jordan 2). James does not widen the gulf

between evidentialists and pragmatists. In both cases emotion is part of the process;

James intrinsically links the two.

The excess of “robustious pathos” (James 124) in “The Ethics of Belief” is not

specifically rejoined by James, but Clifford's apparent inconsistencies deserve analysis.

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Nowhere does Clifford quantifiably define sufficient. Reason proves ill-equipped to self-

impose limits, as “it [will] find a few arguments ... to recite in case our credulity is

criticized” (James 124). Taken to extremes, Clifford’s rule is unattainable. A rule that

condemns all with no access to appeal is an abomination of truth. In the end, the desire to

appease the emotion of fear through application of Clifford’s rule cannot be

accomplished. Entertaining an emotional desire that is impossible to fulfill can be

mentally and physically harmful (Kasser 9).

In his story of a negligent ship owner, Clifford states the guilt of the merchant

remains consistent whether the crew on the non-seaworthy ship survives or not. A judge,

however, sees things different, as the charge of murder is only applicable to the latter.

According to Clifford, the true, verifiable fact that hundreds of men died has no bearing

on a man's guilt.

Clifford next posits that “no man holding a strong belief ... can investigate it with

fairness” (Clifford 2). Here Clifford conflates judge and scientist (James 126). Ultimately,

life will fully verifies all hypotheses. Yes, a judge must be indifferent to people or ideas.

Yet for the initial truth-seeker, emotions are beneficial. Determination, patience, zeal, and

stubbornness sustain the scientist through the potentially grueling verification process.

These emotions stem from belief.

Belief precipitates action. I believe the highway is quicker, so I enter the on-ramp.

I believe I want to be a doctor, so I apply to medical school. Clifford, however, declares

the opposite, as we are to “act upon probabilities ... to justify future belief” (Clifford 5),

and through “verification [i.e. action] ... turn conjecture into belief” (6). Is this just a

semantic misunderstanding? Is James too flippant with the word belief? Is Clifford too
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restrictive? The fact that both employ belief in their titles denotes the level of scrutiny

each applies to the word. However, I do believe their respective connotations differ. For

James, belief is as wholesome as truth. The fact that he uses it more broadly may be due

to his more extensive study of the emotion as a psychologist. Clifford, however, strips

belief of much of its dictionary meaning, reserving it for situations where evidence has

already decided. After warning of the inherent risks of belief, he creates a rule to expunge

said risk, making belief perfunctory. It is interesting that American English says “I think

the party starts at 8:00”, while many romance languages use the phrase “I believe ...”

Perhaps this is linguistic evidence of a nationwide aversion to risk?

While Clifford provides one correct path, James offers (at least) two: “Believe

truth [or] shun error!” (James 125), summarizing James’ and Clifford’s arguments,

respectively. It is important to realize that James still keeps Clifford’s argument as a

viable option for those who gain most pleasure with the avoidance of mistakes (Kasser

6). However, Clifford’s path is neither beneficial nor practical for everyone.

A counter to James’ argument is the “multiple gods” problem (Jordan 5), though it

is more damaging to Pascal’s wager. While Pascal shows that belief in religion in general

is rational, the odds of picking the right God are low and choice is based on irrational

criteria, like the religion of one’s parents. An evidentialist might concede that humanity

has a right to believe, but concerning religion it truly is blind faith, which should be

avoided whenever possible.

The “multiple gods” problem, however, does not weaken the epistemic

foundations of James’ argument; it only jeopardizes religious belief. James’ “dependent

truths” (Jordan 7) do not directly answer the “multiple gods” problem, for it is absurd to
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assume gods will be formed ex nihilo, through faith alone. What is the minimum faith

quorum to generate a god? Instead, James says a religious person “gain[s], even now … a

certain vital good” (James 127) (emphasis added). These vital goods may follow from

liturgical precepts (do not smoke, drink, gamble, etc.), or they may be the aforementioned

dependent truths, including less stress, more self-confidence, and supernatural comfort.

“[W]e are better off even now if we believe” (James 127).

Clifford’s and James’ disagreements over religion stem from a difference in

prudential actions, which originate in conflicting epistemic world-views. Clifford’s

rational evidentialism is the antithesis of James’ empirical pragmatism. Their

epistemology in turn shapes what constitutes humanity’s innate rights. In the end, James’

comprehensive argument against Clifford’s narrow claim provides rational justification

for the innate faculty of belief that helps define humanity.

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Works Cited

Clifford, William K. “The Ethics of Belief.” Lectures and Essays. 1879. 19 Nov 2008

<http://www.infidels.org/library/historical/w_k_clifford/ethics_of_belief.html>.

James, William. “The Will to Believe.” The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular

Philosophy. 1896. Philosophical Questions: Classical and Contemporary

Readings. 1st ed. Ed. William Lawhead. NY: McGraw-Hill, 2003. 121-129.

Jaggar, Alison M. “Love and Knowledge: Emotion in Feminist Epistemology” Inquiry

32.2. Philosophical Questions: Classical and Contemporary Readings. 1st ed. Ed.

William Lawhead. NY: McGraw-Hill, 2003. 220-234.

Jordan, Jeff. "Pragmatic Arguments for Belief in God." The Stanford Encyclopedia of

Philosophy. Fall 2008 ed. Ed. Edward N. Zalta. 19 Nov 2008

<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/pragmatic-belief-god/>.

Kasser, Jeff, and Nishi Shah. “The Metaethics of Belief: An Expressivist Reading of ‘The

Will to Believe’.” Social Epistemology. 20.1 (2006): 1-17. 19 Nov 2008

<http://www3.amherst.edu/~npshah/Shah/papers/james.pdf>.