Aff Ethanol 49

WNDI 2008 1
Ethanol Aff
Ethanol Aff
1AC
Ethanol Aff..................................................................................................................................................................1
Ethanol Aff......................................................................................................................................1
1AC – Inherency (1/2)................................................................................................................................................4
1AC – Inherency (1/2)....................................................................................................................4
1AC – Inherency (2/2)................................................................................................................................................5
1AC – Inherency (2/2)....................................................................................................................5
1AC – Plan (1/1).........................................................................................................................................................6
1AC – Plan (1/1).............................................................................................................................6
1AC – Relations Advantage (1/4)...............................................................................................................................7
1AC – Relations Advantage (1/4)..................................................................................................7
1AC – Relations Advantage (2/4)...............................................................................................................................9
1AC – Relations Advantage (2/4)..................................................................................................9
1AC – Relations Advantage (3/4).............................................................................................................................10
1AC – Relations Advantage (3/4)................................................................................................10
1AC – Relations Advantage (4/4).............................................................................................................................11
1AC – Relations Advantage (4/4)................................................................................................11
1AC – Trade Advantage (1/3)...................................................................................................................................12
1AC – Trade Advantage (1/3)......................................................................................................12
1AC – Food Prices Advantage (1/3).........................................................................................................................15
1AC – Food Prices Advantage (1/3)............................................................................................15
China Advantage – Hegemony / Taiwan...................................................................................................................18
China Advantage – Hegemony / Taiwan....................................................................................18
China Advantage – Hegemony.................................................................................................................................19
China Advantage – Hegemony....................................................................................................19
China Advantage – Taiwan ......................................................................................................................................20
WNDI 2008 2
Ethanol Aff
China Advantage – Taiwan ........................................................................................................20

China Advantage – Solvency....................................................................................................................................21
China Advantage – Solvency.......................................................................................................21
Dollar Advantage – 2AC Add On............................................................................................................................22
Dollar Advantage – 2AC Add On..............................................................................................22
Dollar Advantage – 2AC Add On.............................................................................................................................23
Dollar Advantage – 2AC Add On...............................................................................................23
Food Prices Advantage – Solvency...........................................................................................................................24
Food Prices Advantage – Solvency.............................................................................................24
Leadership Advantage – 2AC Add-On.....................................................................................................................27
Leadership Advantage – 2AC Add-On......................................................................................27
Oil Advantage – 2AC Add-On..................................................................................................................................28
Oil Advantage – 2AC Add-On....................................................................................................28
Oil Advantage – 2AC Add-On..................................................................................................................................29
Oil Advantage – 2AC Add-On....................................................................................................29
Oil Advantage – Democracy.....................................................................................................................................30
Oil Advantage – Democracy........................................................................................................30
Oil Advantage – Middle East....................................................................................................................................31
Oil Advantage – Middle East......................................................................................................31
Relations Advantage – Solvency...............................................................................................................................32
Relations Advantage – Solvency.................................................................................................32
Relations Advantage – Amazon................................................................................................................................36
Relations Advantage – Amazon..................................................................................................36
Relations Advantage – Chavez.................................................................................................................................37
Relations Advantage – Chavez....................................................................................................37
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Relations Advantage – Economy..............................................................................................................................40
Relations Advantage – Economy................................................................................................40
Relations Advantage – FTAA...................................................................................................................................41
Relations Advantage – FTAA......................................................................................................41
Relations Advantage – Latin America......................................................................................................................42
Relations Advantage – Latin America........................................................................................42
Trade Advantage – Solvency.....................................................................................................................................43
Trade Advantage – Solvency.......................................................................................................43
Trade Advantage – doha Solvency............................................................................................................................44
Trade Advantage – doha Solvency..............................................................................................44
A2 Amazon DA.........................................................................................................................................................45
A2 Amazon DA.............................................................................................................................45
A2 Amazon DA.........................................................................................................................................................46
A2 Amazon DA.............................................................................................................................46
A2 Atlantic Rainforest DA........................................................................................................................................47
A2 Atlantic Rainforest DA..........................................................................................................47
A2 Brazil Environment Das......................................................................................................................................48
A2 Brazil Environment Das........................................................................................................48
A2 Food Prices DA...................................................................................................................................................49
A2 Food Prices DA.......................................................................................................................49
A2 Innovation DA.....................................................................................................................................................50
A2 Innovation DA........................................................................................................................50
A2 Slavery DA..........................................................................................................................................................51
A2 Slavery DA..............................................................................................................................51
A2 Incentives / in the United States..........................................................................................................................52
A2 Incentives / in the United States............................................................................................52
WNDI 2008 4
Ethanol Aff
1AC – Inherency (1/2)

Contention 1: Inherency
First, the U.S. maintains a 54¢/gallon tariff on ethanol imported from Brazil
Adam Lerrick, visiting scholar from the American Enterprise Institute at the Heritage Foundation, professor of
economics at Carnegie Mellon University, 7/8/2008, “Free Trade Fact of the Day,”
http://blog.heritage.org/2008/07/08/free-trade-fact-of-the-day-83/
High corn prices have displaced 12 million acres of soybeans and reduced U.S. soybean acreage to its lowest
level in a decade. At the same time, a 54¢ per gallon tariff on Brazilian sugar-based ethanol limits
imports that are grown on low-grade pastureland and that do not divert food capability to energy
production. The livestock industry claims that ethanol subsidies raise corn prices by 50 percent. The
International Monetary Fund calculates that one-fifth of the rise in food prices is due to the use of crops for
fuel.
And, the US is already cooperating with Brazil over ethanol but the tariff is preventing
improved relations
Clare Ribando Seelke, Analyst in Latin American Affairs at CRS, and Brent D. Yacobucci, Analyst in
Environmental and Energy Policy at CRS, 9/27/2007, “Ethanol and Other Biofuels: Potential for U.S.-Brazil Energy
Cooperation,” Congressional Research Service, www.wilsoncenter.org/news/docs/CRS%20Report%20on%20US-
Brazil%20potential%20cooperation%20on%20biofuels.pdf
On March 9, 2007, the United States and Brazil, which together produce almost 70% of the world’s ethanol,
signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to promote greater cooperation on ethanol and other
biofuels in the Western Hemisphere. The countries agreed to (1) advance research and development
bilaterally, (2) help build domestic biofuels industries in third countries, and (3) work multilaterally to
advance the global development of biofuels. Many analysts maintain that the United States would benefit
from having more energy producers in the region, while Brazil stands to further its goal of developing
ethanol into a globally traded commodity. In addition to these economic benefits, some analysts think that an
ethanol partnership with Brazil could help improve the U.S. image in Latin America and lessen the influence
of oil-rich Venezuela under Hugo Chávez. However, obstacles to increased U.S.-Brazil cooperation on
biofuels exist, including current U.S. tariffs on most Brazilian ethanol imports.
Furthermore, Brazilian ethanol production is inevitable – it’s only a question of whether it

reaches the American market
In 2006, Brazil produced roughly 16.5 billion liters (4.4 billion gallons). To promote the goals of the
Program, the Brazilian government has employed various policies through the years. These include
requiring Petrobras, the stateowned oil company, to purchase a set amount of ethanol; tying the pump
price of a liter of ethanol to a percentage of the price of gasoline (originally 59%, later increased to 80%);
and requiring Brazilian automakers to produce dedicated ethanol vehicles that could run only on 100%
ethanol.23 Currently, the Brazilian ethanol industry is thriving, and many of the requirements and policies
from Proalcool have been eliminated. However, one key policy remains: all gasoline sold in Brazil must
contain at least 20%-25% ethanol. Because of this mandate, as well as a large number of flexible fuel
vehicles (FFVs) that can run on any blend of ethanol and gasoline, ethanol represents 40% or more of
Brazilian gasoline demand.
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Ethanol Aff
1AC – Inherency (2/2)

And, the US already imports ethanol duty free from other countries via the CBI
Brent D. Yacobucci, Specialist in Energy and Environmental Policy at CRS, 3/18/2008, “Ethanol Imports and the
Caribbean Basin Initiative,” Congressional Research Services, www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/crs/RS21930.pdf
As Congress noted in the Customs and Trade Act of 1990, the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) was
established in 1983 to promote “a stable political and economic climate in the Caribbean region.”9 As
part of the initiative, duty-free status is granted to a large array of products from beneficiary countries,
including fuel ethanol under certain conditions. If produced from at least 50% local feedstocks (e.g.,
ethanol produced from sugarcane grown in the CBI beneficiary countries), ethanol may be imported duty-
free.10 If the local feedstock content is lower, limitations apply on the quantity of duty-free ethanol.
Nevertheless, up to 7% of the U.S. market may be supplied duty-free by CBI ethanol containing no local
feedstock.11 In this case, hydrous (“wet”) ethanol produced in other countries, historically Brazil or
European countries, can be shipped to a dehydration plant in a CBI country for reprocessing.12 After the
ethanol is dehydrated, it is imported duty-free into the United States. Currently, imports of dehydrated
ethanol under the CBI are far below the 7% cap (approximately 3% in 2006). For 2006, the cap was about
270 million gallons,13 whereas about 170 million gallons were imported under the CBI in that year.14
WNDI 2008 6
Ethanol Aff
1AC – Plan (1/1)

Plan text: The United States federal government should eliminate all tariffs on ethanol imports from Brazil.
WNDI 2008 7
Ethanol Aff
1AC – Relations Advantage (1/4)

Advantage 1: Relations
First, lifting ethanol tariffs is key to US/Brazilian relations

Richard G. Lugar, Senator, and Roberto Abdenur, Brazilian ambassador to the U.S., 5/15/2006, “America and
Brazil Intersect on Ethanol,” Renewable Energy World Online,
http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/story?id=44896
The United States and Brazil share many things: a hemisphere, a dedication to promoting democracy
and human rights and the vigor that comes from being multiethnic societies. Those of us who have long
wished that these two important countries of the Americas would establish a true partnership have seen
encouraging signs recently. Our two nations already have a strong economic relationship; the United States
is Brazil's biggest export market and the largest foreign direct investor in Brazil, while Brazil is, after
Mexico, by far the most important U.S. economic partner in Latin America. Last November, when President
Bush visited Brasilia, the two governments agreed to substantially increase by 2010 the volume of their
bilateral trade, from the current figure of $35 billion. Our two countries need to accelerate their
cooperation. The economic and political environment in the Americas is changing rapidly, creating new
challenges for each that we can meet better if we do so together. Brazil has special influence in the region
because of the size of its economy, population, land mass, natural resources and significant economic,
political and cultural ties with neighbors. Brazil and the United States should combine their strengths to
contribute to the region's economic, social and political development. Similarly, efforts at lowering
trade barriers in the Americas, so important in stimulating growth, are now on hold, in part because the
United States, Brazil and Mercosur (trading zone between Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay) have
differences over important issues. Resolving these differences would be a boon to both countries. We
both face challenges to our energy security from the sharply rising worldwide demand for energy. Higher
world energy prices, greater vulnerability to energy shocks and increased potential for conflict are
consequences that will affect all nations. But amid this new energy threat, we also have an opportunity to
fashion a win-win response that could benefit both our countries. The key is ethanol, which Brazil long
ago saw as an important element of its energy strategy and now provides 18 percent of the country's
automotive fuel, thanks to a booming sugar-cane-based ethanol industry. As a result, Brazil, which years ago
had to import a large share of the petroleum needed for domestic consumption, recently reached complete
self-sufficiency in oil. For its own energy security, the United States -- by far the world's largest oil importer
-- similarly needs to break oil's near-monopoly on the transport sector by turning to ethanol for a much larger
share of its auto fuel supply. Although the United States, using corn, produces nearly as much ethanol as
Brazil and is expanding its annual production by 25 percent, the four billion gallons produced is still a tiny
fraction of the 140 billion gallons of gasoline consumed. Using E-85 fuel, a blend of 15-percent gasoline and
85-percent ethanol, and easily available flexible-fuel technology so that cars can burn E-85, the United States
could dramatically lower its oil dependence. Gaining consumer acceptance will spur the expansion of ethanol
production and infrastructure. That means spreading the availability of E-85, now largely limited to the
Midwest, to markets from coast to coast. One solution might be for the United States to import more
Brazilian ethanol to blend on East Coast, where transportation costs significantly raise the price of Midwest
ethanol. That would, however, require the politically difficult step of ending the protective tariffs on
Brazilian ethanol that now shelters the U.S. industry. It makes strategic sense to import environmentally
friendly ethanol from a reliable friend like Brazil in our own hemisphere. After all, the United States doesn't
tax imported crude oil, which pollutes and often comes from unstable suppliers. Policymakers would need to
consider the impact on the U.S. ethanol industry, where breakthroughs in making ethanol out of cheap and
widely available biomass promise to lower costs and increase supplies. Currently, ethanol makers are highly
profitable and are literally overwhelmed by demand. They have little immediate prospect of marketing large
volumes of their product on the East Coast. Some analyses suggest that increasing foreign supplies to
accelerate the U.S. switch to E-85 will create a bigger ethanol pie for all. What is clear is that dropping the
tariff would remove a major source of friction between the two countries, as well as strengthen the
energy security of both. This bold gesture of friendship could launch productive bilateral negotiations
on trade and broader cooperation on other issues. Together, the two countries could undertake an
international joint action to globalize the production and utilization of ethanol, including by sharing
their technology with potential producers of ethanol throughout the world, particularly in developing
countries. We share common goals. We should start sharing common programs to achieve them.
WNDI 2008 8
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WNDI 2008 9
Ethanol Aff

And, relations prevent US/Brazilian nuclear war
Donald E. Schulz, Chairman of the Political Science Department at Cleveland State University, March 2000,
“The United States and Latin America: Shaping an Elusive Future,” Strategic Studies Institute,
www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/Pubs/display.cfm?pubID=31
Put simply, if changes in political leadership were instrumental in redirecting Brazil’s nuclear program towards peaceful purposes, future
political upheavals could still produce a reversion to previous orientations. Civilian supremacy is not so strong that it could not be swept
away by a coup, especially if the legitimacy of the current democratic experiment were to be undermined by economic crisis and
growing poverty/inequality. Nor are civilian leaders necessarily less militaristic or more committed to democracy than the military. The
example of Peru’s Fujimori comes immediately to mind. How serious a threat might Brazil potentially be? It has been
estimated that if the nuclear plant at Angra dos Reis (Angra I) were only producing at 30 percent capacity, it could produce
five 20-kiloton weapons a year. If production from other plants were included, Brazil would have a capability three
times greater than India or Pakistan. Furthermore, its defense industry already has a substantial
missile producing capability. On the other hand, the country has a very limited capacity to project its military power via air and
sealift or to sustain its forces over long distances. And though a 1983 law authorizes significant military manpower increases (which
could place Brazil at a numerical level slightly higher than France, Iran and Pakistan), such growth will be restricted by a lack of
economic resources. Indeed, the development of all these military potentials has been, and will continue to be, severely constrained by a
lack of money. (Which is one reason Brazil decided to engage in arms control with Argentina in the first place.) 56 In short, a
restoration of Brazilian militarism, imbued with nationalistic ambitions for great power status, is not unthinkable,
and such a regime could present some fairly serious problems. That government would probably need
foreign as well as domestic enemies to help justify its existence. One obvious candidate would be the United
States, which would presumably be critical of any return to dictatorial rule. Beyond this, moreover, the spectre of a predatory
international community, covetous of the riches of the Amazon, could help rally political support to the regime. For years, some
Brazilian military officers have been warning of “foreign intervention.” Indeed, as far back as 1991
General Antenor de Santa Cruz Abreu, then chief of the Military Command of the Amazon, threatened to transform the
region into a “new Vietnam” if developed countries tried to “internationalize” the Amazon. Subsequently, in 1993, U.S.-
Guyanese combined military exercises near the Brazilian border provoked an angry response from many high-ranking Brazilian officers.
57 Since then, of course, U.S.-Brazilian relations have improved considerably. Nevertheless, the basic U.S./ international concerns over
the Amazon—the threat to the region’s ecology through burning and deforestation, the presence of narcotrafficking activities, the Indian
question, etc.—have not disappeared, and some may very well intensify in the years ahead. At the same time, if the growing trend
towards subregional economic groupings—in particular, MERCOSUR—continues, it is likely to increase competition between Southern
Cone and NAFTA countries. Economic conflicts, in turn, may be expected to intensify political differences,
and could lead to heightened politico-military rivalry between different blocs or coalitions in the
hemisphere. Even so, there continue to be traditional rivalries and conflicts within MERCOSUR, especially between Brazil and its
neighbors, and these will certainly complicate the group’s evolution. Among other things, the past year witnessed a serious deterioration
of relations between Brazil and Argentina, the product partly of the former’s January 1999 currency devaluation, which severely strained
economic ties between the two countries. In part, too, these conflicts were aggravated by Argentina’s (unsuccessful) bid to join the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which Brazilians interpreted as an attempt to gain strategic advantage. The upshot was that
relations soured to the extent where questions have been raised as to the continued viability of MERCOSUR itself. In light of these
problems, one cannot but wonder what impact a resurgence of Brazilian authoritarianism, combined with a push for regional hegemonic
status, would have on Argentina, currently a “non-NATO ally” of the United States. Finally, closer to home, there is the difficult
problem of U.S. border defense. One suspects that the years ahead will witness growing pressure to use Department of
Defense personnel and resources to bolster law enforcement agencies patrolling U.S. frontiers to prevent illegal immigration and drug
smuggling. (Indeed, legislation has already been proposed authorizing the deployment of up to 10,000 more troops on the Southwest
Border. In late 1998, however, the bill was rejected by the Senate.) Since 1990, the military has been engaged in several thousand
operations along the frontier, running listening posts to assist the Border Patrol in tracking drugs and migrants, building fences and
barriers, repairing roads, and helping law enforcement agencies in counternarcotics operations. Yet, notwithstanding this aid, civilian
agencies continue to be stretched thin. The amount of drugs coming over the border has not been significantly reduced, and law
enforcement officials often find themselves outgunned and outmanned by their adversaries. Consequently, there is an increasing
temptation to look to the military for answers.
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Ethanol Aff

Furthermore, cooperation is key to Amazon preservation
US Department of State, 6/26/2003, “Environmental Cooperation Between the United States and Brazil,”
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2003/21986.htm
The United States and Brazil enjoy a long, rich history of environmental cooperation ranging from
management of parks to technical cooperation on forests, remote sensing, and fire science. We hope to make
that relationship even stronger in the coming years. We look forward to discussing our many bilateral
environmental interests during a high-level Common Agenda on the Environment meeting later this year in
Brasilia, and to further strengthening our already strong partnership to protect and manage important natural
resources. The U.S. and Brazil plan to encourage the use of renewable energy and energy efficiency through
workshops, information exchanges, technical assistance, and training. Our recent bilateral energy discussions
helped strengthen our joint commitment to clean energy efforts, while a new energy strategy developed by
the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) holds the potential for additional bilateral
collaboration with NGOs and the private sector. Working together, we have installed hybrid-renewable
village power systems in the Amazon, and we are beginning to build partnerships with universities to look at
biomass resources and develop markets for clean energy. Officials of the state of São Paulo are working with
the U.S. to promote technologies that can mitigate local air quality problems and reduce greenhouse gas
emissions. The U.S. and Brazil hope to collaborate closely to promote sustainable forest management,
particularly in the area of reduced impact logging. USAID partners look forward to working with
Brazil to develop forest management tracking technologies involving fire-detecting satellites operated
by the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Global Positioning Systems (GPS)
for forest management, modeling of logging damage in disturbed forests, and Landsat-based maps
reflecting compliance with Brazil's Forest Code. A consortium of Brazil-based institutions, together with
USAID and the U.S. Forest Service, have created a new "Natural Ecosystems Sustained" program for
forest management in Brazil that includes marketing of environmental goods and services and landscape-
level planning and policy. Brazil and the U.S. now coordinate closely on initiatives such as satellite
technology to detect forest fires. Conservation of migratory birds is another key issue for cooperation. The
U.S. looks forward to working with Brazil, and more broadly with the region, in a workshop this October to
begin developing a framework for a Western Hemisphere strategy to conserve migratory birds - a response to
the Summit of the Americas in 2001. Recognizing Brazil's critical role in regional environmental issues
across South America, the U.S. Department of State established one of the first of twelve regional
environmental "Hub" offices around the world at the U.S. Embassy in Brasilia in 1999.
And, environmental destruction causes extinction

Paul Warner, American University, Dept of International Politics and Foreign Policy, August, Politics and Life
Sciences, 1994, p 177
Massive extinction of species is dangerous, then, because one cannot predict which species are expendable to the system as a whole. As
Philip Hoose remarks, "Plants and animals cannot tell us what they mean to each other." One can never be sure which
species holds up fundamental biological relationships in the planetary ecosystem. And, because
removing species is an irreversible act, it may be too late to save the system after the extinction of key plants or
animals. According to the U.S. National Research Council, "The ramifications of an ecological change of this magnitude [vast
extinction of species] are so far reaching that no one on earth will escape them." Trifling with the "lives" of species is like
playing Russian roulette, with our collective future as the stakes.
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Ethanol Aff

Also, removing the tariff and strong relations are key to contain Chavez
Rueters, 3/6/2007, “Bush embarks on ethanol diplomacy to rebuff Chavez,”
http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSN05293598
"This is basically an effort to show that the U.S. remains relevant in the region," said Peter Hakim, president
of the Inter-American Dialogue, a think tank in Washington. "It's a trip to demonstrate that it retains good
relationships, particularly with Brazil and Mexico, that it's committed to Colombia, and that it's not worried
about left-wing governments." Bush will kick off his tour on Friday in Brazil. He will then travel to
Uruguay, Colombia, Guatemala and Mexico on the six-day trip, his longest ever to the region. Chavez, the
fiery Venezuelan president who is challenging U.S. influence in Latin America, plans to protest Bush's
presence in the region by leading a rally in Argentina on Friday when his nemesis will be in neighboring
Uruguay. It is no coincidence that Bush's tour starts in Brazil, a heavyweight with the clout to contain
Chavez. Though Bush and Lula come from opposing sides of the left-right divide, they are folksy leaders
with a good rapport. Other important stops will be Colombia and Mexico, two close U.S. allies. In Bogota,
Bush is expected to reaffirm his support for President Alvaro Uribe, who is fighting a decades-old insurgency
and is a partner in the war on drugs. The visit to Mexico will be Bush's first since President Felipe Calderon
took office in December. Analysts expect key bilateral issues like drugs and immigration to be high on the
agenda. ETHANOL DIPLOMACY In Sao Paulo, officials say Bush and Lula will launch a biofuels
initiative aimed at helping Brazil export its ethanol technology to the region. Washington hopes it will help
the United States reduce its dependence on Middle Eastern and Venezuelan oil. But some in Brazil
wonder if the initiative will bear fruit. They say that if Washington wants to promote biofuels, it should
scrap the 54-cents-a-gallon tariff it levies on Brazilian ethanol imports -- a politically sensitive issue that
Bush is unlikely to budge on. "If the United States wants to talk ethanol, let's talk import tariffs," said Pedro
Camargo Neto, a former official at the agriculture ministry. "The rest is just playing games." While the
United States is waking up to ethanol, Brazil is a biofuels pioneer. All gasoline here is blended with ethanol
made from sugar cane and over 80 percent of new cars are flex-fuel, which run on gasoline or ethanol.
And, unchecked Chavez destroys American hegemony and leads to terrorism

Ariel Cohen, Senior Research Fellow at the Heritage Foundation, Ph.D., 6/4/2008, “Big Money, Big Oil, Big
Risk,” http://www.heritage.org/Press/Commentary/ed060408b.cfm
If all this were not enough, Hugo Chavez, the socialist-fascist ruler of Venezuela, is spending billions in
dollar oil subsidies to assemble an empire of dependencies in Latin America. According to evidence on a
laptop taken from a dead guerilla leader in the neighboring Ecuador, Chavez supports the FARC narco-
guerillas who are attempting to overthrow the democratically-elected government of President Alvaro Uribe
of Colombia. Chavez, an ally of Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, provides cheap oil and loans to
Daniel Ortega and his wife, the Sandinista rulers of Nicaragua. Chavez also supports leftist leaders and
forces in Cuba, Ecuador, Bolivia and Paraguay. Their intent is to deny the US influence and allies in
South America, and ease the way for an Iranian-Hezbollah penetration of the Southern Cone.
Leadership is essential to prevent global nuclear exchange

Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND, The Washington Quarterly, Spring 1995
Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to
multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not
as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous
advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values --
democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing
cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional
hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the
rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold
or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would
therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.
WNDI 2008 12
Ethanol Aff
1AC – Trade Advantage (1/3)

Advantage 2: Trade
First, the ethanol tariff is allowing for a shift towards 19th century protectionism
Reuters, Reese Ewing, 1/17/2007, “Brazil’s Unica-protection stunts biofuel market,”
http://www.reuters.com/article/GlobalBiofuel07/idUSN1733381720070118
A leader in Brazil's ethanol industry said on Wednesday that the world's top producers of biofuels needed
to begin working together toward the common goal of replacing petroleum-based transport fuels. "Instead, it
never ceases to amaze me, we are still considering the shift from oil to renewables through a 19th
Century protectionist model," said Eduardo Pereira de Carvalho, president of Brazil's Cane Industry
Association (Unica). The United States currently imposes a 54 cent import tariff on Brazilian ethanol.
Participating in Reuters Global Biofuel Summit, Carvalho referred to the lack of cooperation between the
United States and Brazil "the world's two biggest producers of ethanol and we aren't working together.
"We all know the logistic problems the United States faces getting ethanol from its corn belt to its large
consumer market on the west coast. Why haven't U.S. officials visited Brazil to find out how we distribute
ethanol via pipeline across Brazil without any problem?" Carvalho said. He added that U.S. advancements in
distillation could benefit Brazil but there was little sharing of information between the two ethanol giants.
The world produces about 400 billion gallons of gasoline a year, while ethanol production is less than 10
billion gallons, mostly from the United States and Brazil, Carvalho said.
And, that leads to nuclear war

Michael Spicer, economist; member of the British Parliament, The Challenge from the East and the Rebirth of the
West, 1996, p. 121
The choice facing the West today is much the same as that which faced the Soviet bloc after World War II:
between meeting head-on the challenge of world trade with the adjustments and the benefits that it will bring,
or of attempting to shut out markets that are growing and where a dynamic new pace is being set for
innovative production. The problem about the second approach is not simply that it won't hold: satellite
technology alone will ensure that he consumers will begin to demand those goods that the East is able to
provide most cheaply. More fundamentally, it will guarantee the emergence of a fragmented world in which
natural fears will be fanned and inflamed. A world divided into rigid trade blocs will be a deeply troubled
and unstable place in which suspicion and ultimately envy will possibly erupt into a major war. I do not
say that the converse will necessarily be true, that in a free trading world there will be an absence of all strife.
Such a proposition would manifestly be absurd. But to trade is to become interdependent, and that is a
good step in the direction of world stability. With nuclear weapons at two a penny, stability will be at a
premium in the years ahead.
WNDI 2008 13
Ethanol Aff

Furthermore, removing the tariff would lead to doha success
IPS, Mario Osava, 3/10/2007, “Brazil-US: Ethanol Deal Represents Convergence of Multiple Interests,” IPS,
http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=36875
In terms of bilateral trade, the Brazilian government and business community are calling for the
elimination or reduction of U.S. tariff barriers to Brazilian ethanol, which is taxed at 54 cents per gallon,
plus a 2.5 percent tariff. But Bush said the tariff, which was extended to 2009 by the U.S. Congress, would
not immediately be removed. The association between the world's two largest ethanol producers, which
account for around 70 percent of all ethanol production, could have broad repercussions. An agreement
between Brazil and the United States, for instance, could help unblock the World Trade Organisation
(WTO) Doha Round of multilateral trade talks, said Lula. The new biofuels fever also modifies the
global outlook in agriculture, holding out possibilities of opening up solutions to the dismantling of
farm subsidies shelled out by the United States and the European Union, which are the biggest obstacle
in the Doha Round. To develop the biofuels market, the Brazilian government has already offered cheap
loans to companies interested in building plants. The public National Bank for Economic and Social
Development provided nearly one billion dollars in financing towards that end in 2006, and could raise that
amount by 25 percent this year. Over the next six years, Brazil will open one ethanol factory a month on
average, bringing the total number from the current 336 to 409 by 2013.
And, if the Doha isn’t brought back on track the WTO will collapse and the world will be
embroiled in protectionist trade wars
John Zarocostas. “Global trade negotiations at a crossroads, and at a standstill,” International Herald Tribune,
12/13, 2006
The international trade system is heading for turbulent times unless negotiators from developing and
industrial nations can reach an agreement in the coming year to liberalize global trade, top officials and business
executives warn. "I think it's probably a defining year for the round, and hence for the multilateral trading system,"
said Pascal Lamy, director general of the World Trade Organization, which is overseeing the so-called Doha round of negotiations. The
talks to improve trade in farm and industrial goods, which started in November 2001 in Doha, Qatar, collapsed in late July after
the United States, the European Union, Japan and India failed to reach an agreement on reductions in farm subsidies and tariffs, which is
critical to unlocking a wider agreement. Since then, some countries that had been waiting for the WTO to forge a
global agreement have said they would instead begin negotiating bilateral accords with key trading partners.
A new wave of bilateral agreements would threaten to undermine the WTO's authority. And the absence of a
global trade agreement poses other risks. It may escalate trade tensions that are already on the rise among large
economies, including China, the United States and the European Union. Trade experts also warn of a possible rise
in protectionism as both rich and emerging nations seek to pry open markets in the absence of a global
framework. That would also lead to an increase in litigation over market access. "This is one of the most dangerous
moments that I recall," said Peter Sutherland, chairman of BP and of Goldman Sachs International.
"At the moment, it is virtually impossible to be other than pessimistic about the round and therefore
about the WTO. There is a lack of leadership, as opposed to rhetoric." His pessimism is shared by many trade negotiators and
experts. At stake is five years of negotiations on a package to sweep away barriers to the international flow of goods and services valued
at more than $12 trillion a year. The complex areas of negotiations are all interrelated. As the WTO itself puts it, "Nothing is agreed until
everything is agreed." And they must be approved by all members — there will be 150 of them when Vietnam joins in January. About
two dozen trade ministers are scheduled to meet in late January on the sidelines of the World Economic Forum in
Davos, Switzerland. But Lamy played down expectations for the session.
WNDI 2008 14
Ethanol Aff

More, these trade wars will escalate into a US/China war
Henry C K Liu, chairman of a New York-based private investment group. “The Coming Trade War,” Asia Times
August 8/20, 2005 http://atimes.com/atimes/Global_Economy/GH20Dj01.html
The resultant global economic depression from a trade war between the world's two largest economies will in turn
heighten further mutual recriminations. An external curb from the US of Chinese export trade will accelerate a
redirection of Chinese growth momentum inward, increasing Chinese power, including military power,
while further encouraging anti-US sentiment in Chinese policy circles. This in turn will validate US
apprehension of a China threat, increasing the prospect for armed conflict. A war between the US and
China can have no winners, particularly on the political front. Even if the US were to prevail militarily through its
technological superiority, the political cost of military victory would be so severe that the US as it currently
exists would not be recognizable after the conflict and the original geopolitical aim behind the conflict would
remain elusive, as the Vietnam War and the Iraq war have demonstrated. By comparison, the Vietnam and Iraq
conflicts, destructive as they have been to the US social fabric, are mere minor scrimmages compared
with a war with China.
And, US-Sino conflict causes global nuclear war—text modified

Chalmers Johnson, author of Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire, 5/14/2001, The
Nation, Pg. 20
China is another matter. No sane figure in the Pentagon wants a war with China, and all serious US militarists know that China’s
minuscule nuclear capacity is not offensive but a deterrent against the overwhelming US power arrayed against it (twenty archaic
Chinese warheads versus more than 7,000 US warheads). Taiwan, whose status constitutes the still incomplete last act of the Chinese
civil war, remains the most dangerous place on earth. Much as the 1914 assassination of the Austrian crown prince
in Sarajevo led to a war that no wanted, a misstep in Taiwan by any side could bring the United States and
China into a conflict that neither wants. Such a war would bankrupt the United States, deeply divide Japan and
probably end in a Chinese victory, given that China is the world’s most populous country and would be
defending itself against a foreign aggressor. More seriously, it could easily escalate into a nuclear [war] holocaust.
However, given the nationalistic challenge to China’s sovereignty of any Taiwanese attempt to declare its independence formally,
forward-deployed US forces on China’s borders have virtually no deterrent effect.
Furthermore, these trade wars will collapse the global economy

David Crane, Economics Editor Toronto Star. “How Martin could defuse looming trade wars,” The Toronto Star
November 12, 2003
The world is closer to trade wars than it has been for many years. This is bad news because trade wars are
highly destructive to jobs and growth. Once launched, they inevitably escalate, generating a vicious
cycle of retaliation and response. This is what happened during the 1930s, making the Great
Depression much worse. It was why, after World War 2, that many nations, including Canada, worked to
create a new trade regime to lower trade barriers and establish a procedure for dealing with trade
disputes. This was the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, or GATT, which in 1994 became the World
Trade Organization (WTO).
Extinction
Lt. Col, Tom Bearden, PhD Nuclear Engineering, April 25, 2000,
http://www.cheniere.org/correspondence/042500%20-%20modified.htm
Just prior to the terrible collapse of the World economy, with the crumbling well underway and rising, it is inevitable
that some of the [wmd] weapons of mass destruction will be used by one or more nations on others. An interesting result then---
as all the old strategic studies used to show---is that everyone will fire everything as fast as possible against their perceived enemies. The
reason is simple: When the mass destruction weapons are unleashed at all, the only chance a nation has to
survive is to desperately try to destroy its perceived enemies before they destroy it. So there will erupt
a spasmodic unleashing of the long range missiles, nuclear arsenals, and biological warfare arsenals of the
nations as they feel the economic collapse, poverty, death, misery, etc. a bit earlier. The ensuing holocaust is
certain to immediately draw in the major nations also, and literally a hell on earth will result. In short, we
will get the great Armageddon we have been fearing since the advent of the nuclear genie. Right now, my personal estimate is
that we have about a 99% chance of that scenario or some modified version of it, resulting.
WNDI 2008 15
Ethanol Aff
1AC – Food Prices Advantage (1/3)

Advantage 3: Food Prices
First, Removing Brazilian ethanol tariffs would decrease food prices

Brett D. Schaefer, Jay Kingham Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs at the Heritage Foundation, Ben
Lieberman, Senior Policy Analyst at the Heritage Foundation, and Brian M. Riedl, 6/26/2008, “Addressing
the Global Food Crisis,” The Heritage Foundation,
http://www.heritage.org/Research/TradeandForeignAid/bg2151.cfm
Eliminate ethanol and other biofuel mandates and remove tariffs on ethanol and other biofuel imports.
Ethanol and other biofuel mandates adopted in the U.S. and many European countries have artificially
increased demand for food crops and contributed to the current food crisis. Eliminating these
mandates would immediately expand the amount of food available for consumption. Eliminating
import tariffs on ethanol would also reduce the amount of food used to manufacture ethanol and other
biofuels. For example, the U.S. levies a tariff of 2.5 percent plus 54 cents on each gallon of imported ethanol.
This tariff protects domestic production of corn ethanol by preventing imports of less expensive ethanol,
largely sugar ethanol from Brazil. As World Bank President Zoellick has noted, "Cutting tariffs on
ethanol imported into the US and European Union markets would encourage the output of more efficient
sugarcane biofuels that do not compete directly with food production and expand opportunities for
poorer countries, including in Africa."[16]
And, hikes in food prices kill billions

Tampa Tribune, 1-20-96
On a global scale, food supplies - measured by stockpiles of grain - are not abundant. In 1995, world
production failed to meet demand for the third consecutive year, said Per Pinstrup-Andersen, director of the
International Food Policy Research Institute in Washington, D.C. As a result, grain stockpiles fell from an
average of 17 percent of annual consumption in 1994-1995 to 13 percent at the end of the 1995-1996 season,
he said. That's troubling, Pinstrup-Andersen noted, since 13 percent is well below the 17 percent the United
Nations considers essential to provide a margin of safety in world food security. During the food crisis of the
early 1970s, world grain stocks were at 15 percent. "Even if they are merely blips, higher international
prices can hurt poor countries that import a significant portion of their food," he said. "Rising prices
can also quickly put food out of reach of the 1.1 billion people in the developing world who live on a
dollar a day or less." He also said many people in low-income countries already spend more than half of
their income on food.
WNDI 2008 16
Ethanol Aff

Furthermore, rising food prices are leading to failed states and terrorism
Voice of America, Carolyn Presutti, 4/25/2008, “World Food Crisis Worsening,”
http://www.voanews.com/english/2008-04-25-voa33.cfm
Increasing food prices have sparked protests in five African nations and several more countries
worldwide. United Nations officials are warning that food prices are likely to keep rising. Humanitarians
worry about the effect on lives, while some terrorism experts caution about an increase in violence and a
situation ripe for terrorism recruitment. VOA's Carolyn Presutti explains the connection. One sees the
faces of the hungry in many areas of the world, where food costs too much to afford. The United Nation's
World Food Program says at least 850 million people worldwide are hungry. Executive Director Josette
Sheeran says, “The world's misery index is rising to a silent tsunami that respects no borders - most don't
know what hit them." In Somalia, the price of the food staple sorghum has doubled since February. Peter
Smerdon of the World Food Program predicts the rising prices will push poor people into destitution or
even death. "We may have to cut rations or cut the number of people that we feed in Somalia because of
these increased costs," he said. The World Bank says wheat prices have increased 120 percent over the past
year. The Peruvian defense minister says his country copes by making potato bread. "Wheat isn't produced
here; it's imported and every day it costs more," explains Peruvian Defense Minister Antero Flores-Araoz.
"With the potato mixed into the bread, we try to avoid, to control as much as possible, the cost of the bread."
Poor people in Yemen are now spending more than a quarter of their incomes just on bread before they pay
for other essential foods for their children, let alone basic healthcare or shelter," Robert Zoellick, with the
World Bank said. In Asia, the military guards are precious cargo. The price of rice, the staple for Asian
countries, has tripled since January. Prices in Thailand surged to a record high on Thursday, 24 April. The
hungry are driven to desperate acts, as desperation becomes the substitute for food. In Haiti, there has
been violence. In Egypt, the same. Professor Vanda Felbab-Brown of Georgetown University says world
hunger threatens global security. "Anti-American groups such as al-Qaida will be able to mobilize
marginalized, frustrated populations that are especially affected by the food crisis," noted Brown.
Some terrorism experts say al-Qaida will blame Western countries for the lack of food, then use
modern technology for recruitment. Jan Lane is with the Homeland Security Policy Institute at George
Washington University. “People aren't pushed into radical ideology," she says. "They are pulled into rebellion
through those social networks."
WNDI 2008 17
Ethanol Aff

Unchecked terrorism will result in extinction
Yonah Alexander, professor and director of the Inter-University for Terrorism Studies in Israel and the United
States. “Terrorism myths and realities,” The Washington Times, August 28, 2003
Last week's brutal suicide bombings in Baghdad and Jerusalem have once again illustrated dramatically
that the international community failed, thus far at least, to understand the magnitude and implications
of the terrorist threats to the very survival of civilization itself. Even the United States and Israel have for decades
tended to regard terrorism as a mere tactical nuisance or irritant rather than a critical strategic challenge to their national security
concerns. It is not surprising, therefore, that on September 11, 2001, Americans were stunned by the unprecedented tragedy of 19 al
Qaeda terrorists striking a devastating blow at the center of the nation's commercial and military powers. Likewise, Israel and its
citizens, despite the collapse of the Oslo Agreements of 1993 and numerous acts of terrorism triggered by the second intifada that began
almost three years ago, are still "shocked" by each suicide attack at a time of intensive diplomatic efforts to revive the moribund peace
process through the now revoked cease-fire arrangements [hudna]. Why are the United States and Israel, as well as scores of other
countries affected by the universal nightmare of modern terrorism surprised by new terrorist "surprises"? There are many reasons,
including misunderstanding of the manifold specific factors that contribute to terrorism's expansion, such as lack of a universal
definition of terrorism, the religionization of politics, double standards of morality, weak punishment of terrorists, and the exploitation of
the media by terrorist propaganda and psychological warfare. Unlike their historical counterparts, contemporary
terrorists have introduced a new scale of violence in terms of conventional and unconventional threats
and impact. The internationalization and brutalization of current and future terrorism make it clear
we have entered an Age of Super Terrorism [e.g. biological, chemical, radiological, nuclear and cyber]
with its serious implications concerning national, regional and global security concerns. Two myths in particular must be debunked
immediately if an effective counterterrorism "best practices" strategy can be developed [e.g., strengthening international cooperation]. The first illusion is
that terrorism can be greatly reduced, if not eliminated completely, provided the root causes of conflicts - political, social and economic - are addressed.
The conventional illusion is that terrorism must be justified by oppressed people seeking to achieve their goals and consequently the argument advanced by
"freedom fighters" anywhere, "give me liberty and I will give you death," should be tolerated if not glorified. This traditional rationalization of "sacred"
violence often conceals that the real purpose of terrorist groups is to gain political power through the barrel of the gun, in violation of fundamental human
rights of the noncombatant segment of societies. For instance, Palestinians religious movements [e.g., Hamas, Islamic Jihad] and secular entities [such as
Fatah's Tanzim and Aqsa Martyr Brigades]] wish not only to resolve national grievances [such as Jewish settlements, right of return, Jerusalem] but
primarily to destroy the Jewish state. Similarly, Osama bin Laden's international network not only opposes the presence of American military in the Arabian
Peninsula and Iraq, but its stated objective is to "unite all Muslims and establish a government that follows the rule of the Caliphs." The second myth is that
strong action against terrorist infrastructure [leaders, recruitment, funding, propaganda, training, weapons, operational command and control] will only
increase terrorism. The argument here is that law-enforcement efforts and military retaliation inevitably will fuel more brutal acts of violent revenge.
Clearly, if this perception continues to prevail, particularly in democratic societies, there is the danger it will paralyze governments and thereby encourage
further terrorist attacks. In sum, past experience provides useful lessons for a realistic future strategy. The prudent application of force has been
demonstrated to be an effective tool for short- and long-term deterrence of terrorism. For example, Israel's targeted killing of Mohammed Sider, the Hebron
commander of the Islamic Jihad, defused a "ticking bomb." The assassination of Ismail Abu Shanab - a top Hamas leader in the Gaza Strip who was directly
responsible for several suicide bombings including the latest bus attack in Jerusalem - disrupted potential terrorist operations. Similarly, the U.S. military
operation in Iraq eliminated Saddam Hussein's regime as a state sponsor of terror. Thus, it behooves those countries victimized by terrorism to understand a
cardinal message communicated by Winston Churchill to the House of Commons on May 13, 1940: "Victory at all costs, victory in spite of terror, victory
however long and hard the road may be: For without victory, there is no survival."
WNDI 2008 18
Ethanol Aff
China Advantage – Hegemony / Taiwan

China’s rising influence in the region is paving the way for attacks on Taiwan and
American hegemony
Peter Hakim, President of the Inter-American Dialogue, Febrauary 2006, “Is Washington Losing Latin America?”
Foreign Affairs, http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20060101faessay85105/peter-hakim/is-washington-losing-latin-
america.html
Washington also worries about China's growing presence in Latin America, a concern that has already
been the subject of congressional hearings. In fact, some members of Congress view China as the most
serious challenge to U.S. interests in the region since the collapse of the Soviet Union. They cite the huge
financial resources China is promising to bring to Latin America, its growing military-to-military
relations in the region, and its clear political ambitions there all as potential threats to the long-
standing pillar of U.S. policy in the hemisphere, the Monroe Doctrine. China's interest in Latin America is
significant and expanding. The region has become a vital source of raw materials and foodstuffs for China. In
the past six years, Chinese imports from Latin America have grown more than sixfold, or by nearly 60
percent a year. Beijing also faces a major political challenge in the region: of the 26 countries that
recognize Taiwan, 12 are in Latin America or the Caribbean. China is intent on reducing that number
through aggressive diplomacy and increased trade, aid, and investment. Bush administration officials
have watched China's growing commercial and political engagement in the region closely. Chinese
President Hu Jintao traveled to Latin America twice in the past two years, spending a total of 16 days
there. The White House could not have missed the warm welcome he received in the five Latin American
countries he visited, the concessions the host governments offered him (such as the quick granting of
"market-economy status" to China), and the enormous expectations his presence created of major Chinese
investments in roads, ports, and other infrastructure. Hu's trips have been reciprocated by a long series of
visits to China by Latin American heads of state, economic officials, and corporate leaders. Many people in
Latin America look to China as an economic and political alternative to U.S. hegemony. Although
officials in some of these countries are concerned that China, with its lower manufacturing costs, will cut into
their sales, profits, and investment, others (mainly South America's food- and mineral-producing nations)
largely see China as a major potential partner for new trade and investment. Brazilian leaders, including
President Lula, have said they want to establish a strategic relationship with Beijing that might involve
trade in high-tech products, mutual support in international organizations, and scientific and cultural
collaboration. Interestingly, the recent advances of China (and India as well) have prompted some Latin
Americans to examine their own economic and political development, producing a new wave of self-
criticism about the region's stumbling performance in recent years and intense discussion about what can be
learned from the success of some Asian countries.
WNDI 2008 19
Ethanol Aff
China Advantage – Hegemony

China’s rising influence in Latin America is part of a global challenge to American
hegemony
Stephen Johnson, former Senior Policy Analyst for Latin America at the Heritage Foundation, 10/24/2005,
“Balancing China’s Growing Influence in Latin America,” the Heritage Foundation,
http://www.heritage.org/research/latinamerica/bg1888.cfm#_ftn3
China’s neighbors are competing for many of the same world markets, as are Europe and the United
States. Latin America is a particularly promising prospect. It is relatively unindustrialized and has an
abundance of raw materials. Moreover, authoritarian leaders and/or corrupt oligarchies control a number of
governments. Signing purchase agreements with them is much easier than dealing with the panoply of private
corporations found in more democratic countries. Challenging the United States. China’s main rival for
global preeminence is the United States. China sees the United States as preventing Taiwan’s
reunification with the mainland and thwarting Beijing’s rise as a power. Previously, China was isolated,
but now plays key roles in Asian geopolitics and aspires to do so elsewhere. Besides status as a nuclear
nation, it is a member of the U.N. Security Council, the World Trade Organization, the Group of 77
developing nations, and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation group. It also holds observer status in the
Organization of American States. While China has become the second-largest U.S. trade partner after
Canada, it challenges U.S. influence wherever it can. In fact, it will soon have more attack submarines than
the United States, with the addition of four Russian Kilo-class subs and new diesel–electric vessels equipped
with technology that will allow them to run quieter than nuclear submarines.[1] According to former U.S.
Ambassador to Beijing James Lilly, “[T]he facts are that [the Chinese] run massive intelligence operations
against us, they make open statements against us, their high-level documents show that they are not friendly
to us.” Chinese military white papers promote power projection and describe U.S. policies as “hegemonism
and power politics.”[2] In the Western Hemisphere, the Chinese are taking advantage of failures of
half-hearted market reforms and Washington’s unwillingness to pursue neighborhood relations with
much enthusiasm. National Defense University professor Cynthia A. Watson notes, “[T]he 1990s turned
into a period of severe disappointment as free markets led to rampant corruption and unfulfilled
expectations in Latin America while Washington became the world’s superpower rather than a partner
for the region.”[3]
WNDI 2008 20
Ethanol Aff
China Advantage – Taiwan

Chinese influence in the region is paving way for a cross-strait war
Daniel P. Erikson, Senior Associate at the Inter-American Dialogue, 6/11/2008, “The New Challenge: China and
the Western Hemisphere,” Congressional Testimony,
http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=1386&s=Brazil
Latin America is half a world away from the decades-long conflict simmering in the Taiwan Strait, but
the diplomatic tussle between Taiwan and China remains a red-hot issue in the Caribbean and Central
America. Beijing rigorously promotes its “One China” policy, which means that non-recognition of the
Taiwanese government is a prerequisite for conducting formal diplomatic relations with the People’s
Republic of China—in effect forcing other governments to choose between Beijing and Taipei. Although
Latin American countries involved in this geopolitical chess match have little individual clout, together
they make up the most significant group of states caught in the cross-strait tug-of-war, representing 12
of the 23 countries that recognize Taiwan. Today, Taiwan preserves relations with Guatemala, Belize, El
Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama, as well as the Dominican Republic, Haiti, St. Kitts and Nevis,
St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Paraguay—the lone holdout in South America. After nearly a
decade of fairly stable alliances, the battle between China and Taiwan in Latin America began to heat up in
2004, when Dominica defected to China. Grenada followed suit in 2005, but Taiwan struck back in 2007 by
wooing the newly-elected government of St. Lucia. Beijing notched a major victory later that year by
winning over Costa Rica, which was the first Central American country to recognize China. For China, Costa
Rica's benign image in Washington presented a huge advantage by minimizing U.S. concern about this
decision. Its president, Oscar Arias, is a Nobel Prize-winner who supports free trade and has tangled publicly
with Cuba's Fidel Castro. The defection of Costa Rica may mark the beginning of a domino effect that will
lead all of Central America to forge ties with Beijing over the next decade. Given the change in government
in Taipei, coupled with the conciliatory rhetoric of the new president Ma Ying-jeou, China hopes to seize
the moment to peel off other Latin American nations—especially Guatemala, the most populous country
to recognize Taiwan, and Panama, which is already a key trading partner. In addition, the recent election of
left-leaning Fernando Lugo will likely put Paraguay in play and raises the risk that Taiwan will lose its last
remaining ally in South America.
WNDI 2008 21
Ethanol Aff
China Advantage – Solvency

Relations are zero sum – plan would decrease Chinese influence
Stephen Johnson, former Senior Policy Analyst for Latin America at the Heritage Foundation, 10/24/2005,
“Balancing China’s Growing Influence in Latin America,” the Heritage Foundation,
http://www.heritage.org/research/latinamerica/bg1888.cfm#_ftn3
The United States and China have competing interests in Latin America. Washington would like to see its
hemispheric neighbors develop into stable, democratic, prosperous trade partners that embrace the rule of
law. Beijing sees the region as a source of raw materials, a market for manufactured goods, and a platform
for power projection. U.S. interests probably coincide more with Latin American needs. In contrast, China
represents an opportunity to temper American dominance with broader alliances. Regrettably, Chinese
aid and commodity imports may buy time for state industries, powerful presidents, and influential oligarchs.
Most of all, such commerce could delay needed reforms and industrialization that might lift Latin America’s
near majority underclass out of poverty. America’s strength is competition, and it should influence the rules
of the game in that direction. As a good neighbor and in its own and Latin America’s interests, the United
States should: * Accelerate free trade agreements. Free trade agreements have been the hallmark of
U.S. policies toward the region since the 1990s. As an inducement, America should drop its agricultural
and steel subsidies that dissuade potential partners and cost taxpayers money. Improved U.S. trade
relations with Andean neighbors (and eventually Southern Cone countries) will open market access for
both U.S. and Latin American enterprises and provide an outlet for industrial growth.
WNDI 2008 22
Ethanol Aff
Dollar Advantage – 2AC Add On

Removing tariffs prevent dollar tailspin
Ariel Cohen, Ph.D. and Senior Research Fellow at the Heritage Foundation, 6/4/2008, “Big Money, Big Oil, Birg
Risk,” the Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/Press/Commentary/ed060408b.cfm
Finally, Iran, Russia, Venezuela, and even US friend Kuwait are dumping the greenback in favor of the Euro
in energy transactions. This is likely to decrease demand and increase the supply of dollars, sending the US currency
into a tailspin. Weaker dollars and higher inflation may add insult to injury in the prolonged process of
America's economic deterioration. To stave it off and to combat its oil-rich adversaries, the US needs, in the short
term, to expand its domestic energy sector. Increasing oil and gas production in the West, along the Pacific and Atlantic continental shelf,
and in Alaska will help, and so will a coal and nuclear power build-up. US should emphasize ties with friendly oil suppliers, such as
Azerbaijan, Angola, Canada, Nigeria, Norway, Equatorial Guniea, etc. The US Congress should also abolish corn ethanol subsidy and
lift tariffs on the really competitive ethanol made from sugar cane. Brazil and Africa can produce more
ethanol than Iowa and Nebraska. However, in the long term, more advanced technological solutions are vital to stem the
global wealth redistribution to OPEC potentates and other America-haters. World powers have risen and fallen over major economic
factors. This should never be the case of the US. The oil potentates should know that the US will not be intimidated - or bankrupted out
of existence. And US allies, from the Caspian to the Middle East, from the Pacific to Atlantic, should know that US is a true and trusted
friend.
Weak dollar means Euroswitch which undermines the US economy

The Observer Sunday February 23, 2003
At various points in time since the early 1970s, oil producers have discussed this, especially in periods
when the dollar has been weak. Opinions have tended to be wide-ranging, depending on the strategic and
trade alliances certain members have with particular trade blocs,' said Yarjani. That was an elliptical
reference to the overwhelming influence of Saudi Arabia, whose government is the staunchest ally of
the US within Opec. 'The Saudis are holding the line on oil prices in Opec and should they, for
example, go along with the rest of the Opec people in demanding that oil be priced in euros, that would
deal a very heavy blow to the American economy,' Youssef Ibrahim, of the influential US Council on
Foreign Relations, told CNN. Last year the former US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia told a committee of the
US Congress: 'One of the major things the Saudis have historically done, in part out of friendship with the
United States, is to insist that oil continues to be priced in dollars. Therefore, the US Treasury can print
money and buy oil, which is an advantage no other country has. With the emergence of other currencies
and with strains in the relationship, I wonder whether there will not again be, as there have been in the
past, people in Saudi Arabia who raise the question of why they should be so kind to the United States.'
The US is key to global economy

Walter Russell Mead, Kissinger Senior Fellow at the Council of Foreign Relations, Foreign Policy. 3/1/04
Similarly, in the last 60 years, as foreigners have acquired a greater value in the United States--government
and private bonds, direct and portfolio private investments--more and more of them have acquired an interest
in maintaining the strength of the U.S.-led system. A collapse of the U.S. economy and the ruin of the
dollar would do more than dent the prosperity of the United States. Without their best customer,
countries including China and Japan would fall into depressions. The financial strength of every
country would be severely shaken should the United States collapse. Under those circumstances, debt
becomes a strength, not a weakness, and other countries fear to break with the United States because they
need its market and own its securities. Of course, pressed too far, a large national debt can turn from a source
of strength to a crippling liability, and the United States must continue to justify other countries' faith by
maintaining its long-term record of meeting its financial obligations. But, like Samson in the temple of the
Philistines, a collapsing U.S. economy would inflict enormous, unacceptable damage on the rest of the
world. That is sticky power with a vengeance.
WNDI 2008 23
Ethanol Aff
Dollar Advantage – 2AC Add On

Extinction
WNDI 2008 24
Ethanol Aff
Food Prices Advantage – Solvency

Removing Brazilian ethanol tariffs would decrease food prices
Brett D. Schaefer, Jay Kingham Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs at the Heritage Foundation, Ben
Lieberman, Senior Policy Analyst at the Heritage Foundation, and Brian M. Riedl, 6/26/2008, “Addressing
the Global Food Crisis,” The Heritage Foundation,
http://www.heritage.org/Research/TradeandForeignAid/bg2151.cfm
Eliminate ethanol and other biofuel mandates and remove tariffs on ethanol and other biofuel imports.
Ethanol and other biofuel mandates adopted in the U.S. and many European countries have artificially
increased demand for food crops and contributed to the current food crisis. Eliminating these
mandates would immediately expand the amount of food available for consumption. Eliminating
import tariffs on ethanol would also reduce the amount of food used to manufacture ethanol and other
biofuels. For example, the U.S. levies a tariff of 2.5 percent plus 54 cents on each gallon of imported ethanol.
This tariff protects domestic production of corn ethanol by preventing imports of less expensive ethanol,
largely sugar ethanol from Brazil. As World Bank President Zoellick has noted, "Cutting tariffs on
ethanol imported into the US and European Union markets would encourage the output of more efficient
sugarcane biofuels that do not compete directly with food production and expand opportunities for
poorer countries, including in Africa."[16]
World bank and leading economists agree lifting tariff would relieve food prices
Des Moines Register, Philip Brasher, 7/3/2008, “U.S. urged to import, not make, ethanol,” Truth about Trade
& Technology, http://www.truthabouttrade.org/content/view/12014/54/
The skyrocketing price of grain is bringing new pressure on American and European leaders to ease
biofuel incentives, including the U.S. tariff on imported ethanol. The World Bank on Wednesday called
for the United States and the European Union to roll back biofuel mandates, subsidies and tariffs as part of
a 10-point plan to deal with soaring food costs in poor countries. The plan, which also proposes doubling
agricultural aid, was prepared for the Group of Eight economic summit meeting next week in Japan. "We're
starting to see a breakdown in international agricultural and food markets," the bank's president,
Robert Zoellick, said in an appearance at a Washington think tank. Meanwhile, a coalition of livestock
producers and food companies called on President Bush to lift the 54-cent-a-gallon tariff on imported
ethanol. The new farm bill extended the tariff through 2010. The organizations said that increasing
imports of ethanol would hold down the price of grain for animal feed and food ingredients. The groups
include the National Pork Producers Council, the American Bakers Association, dairy giant Dean Foods Co.,
meatpacker Tyson Foods, Coca-Cola Co. and PepsiCo Inc. The Iowa Turkey Federation also is among the 35
groups that endorsed the proposal. Removing the tariff on ethanol imports "will alleviate a portion of
the unnecessary feed and food price inflationary pressures that are adversely affecting our economic
well-being and American consumers," the groups wrote. The Brazilian ethanol industry is launching a small
advertising campaign this weekend in Florida and California to generate public interest in repealing the tariff.
Brazilian ethanol, which is distilled from sugar, cost about 90 cents a gallon to produce in 2007, compared
with $1.70 for corn-based ethanol, according to the World Bank. Phasing out biofuel subsidies and reducing
tariffs "would allow biofuels to be produced from the most efficient feedstock by the lowest-cost
producers, removing pressure from food prices," the bank said. A spokesman for Bush, Scott Stanzel,
said the White House is "always reviewing policies to best address the needs of the country."
WNDI 2008 25
Ethanol Aff

Removing the tariff would reduce corn prices
The Hill, Jim Snyder, 7/7/2008, “Food, livestock groups push policies to reduce corn prices,” The Hill,
http://thehill.com/business--lobby/food-livestock-groups-push-policies-to-reduce-corn-prices-2008-07-07.html
Federal spending watchdogs have also signed on to a letter urging suspension of the tariff. But
livestock producers that rely on corn as a feed grain, soft drink makers that use corn as a sweetener and
food manufacturers that blame corn-based ethanol for raising the price of one of their main ingredients
are the main backers of the lobbying campaign. “Feed prices and supply are press5ing dairy, livestock
and poultry producers to endure one of the greatest adverse economic situations in decades, which is
ultimately adding unnecessary economic pressure to all Americans,” 36 groups wrote President Bush last
week. The American Meat Institute , Coca-Cola , the National Chicken Council and the Grocery
Manufacturers Association were among the groups and businesses that signed the letter. The letter urged
the president to suspend the ethanol tariff to “foster downward pressure for ethanol and its feedstock.”
Dave Warner, a spokesman for the National Pork Producers Council , said farmers have lost on average $30 a
pig between October 2007 and April 2008. While rising energy costs have contributed to the tough
economic times, the rising price of corn is more to blame, Warner said. He noted feed prices account for
70 percent of the costs to raise a pig to market. The pork producers brought agriculture economists and
farm lenders to a meeting with United States Department of Agriculture officials two weeks ago to talk about
how high corn prices have hurt the livestock industry and could make it harder for producers to get operating
loans in the future.
Lifting the tariff would decrease food prices

Anne Korin, editor of Energy Security, 6/30/2008, “Thinking Outside the Barrel About OPEC and the Oil
Weapon,” The Cutting Edge, http://www.thecuttingedgenews.com/index.php?article=601
In Brazil, where ethanol is widely used, the share of flex fuel vehicles in new car sales is estimated to be 90
percent this year. These cars are manufactured by the same automakers that sell to the U.S. market and entail
no size, power, or safety compromise by consumers. The proliferation of flex fuel vehicles in Brazil has
driven fuel competition at the pump such that the Brazilian oil industry has been forced to keep gasoline
prices sufficiently low to compete with ethanol in order not to lose more market share. Expanding U.S. fuel
choices to include biofuels imported from developing countries can actually help ameliorate world
poverty and hunger. Sugar, from which ethanol can be cheaply and efficiently produced, is now grown
in 100 countries—many of which are poor and on the receiving end of U.S. development aid. Encouraging
these countries to increase their output and become fuel suppliers (and by removing our protectionist 54
cent-per-gallon Brazilian sugar ethanol tariff) could have far-reaching implications for their economic
development. By creating economic interdependence with countries in Africa, Asia, and the southern
hemisphere, the United States can strengthen ties with the developing world, help reduce poverty, and
wean itself from oil. The International Energy Agency has noted that biofuels are key to keeping the lid on
an overheated transportation fuel market. According to Merrill Lynch, without the increase in biofuels
production, oil prices would have been 15 percent higher, which at current oil prices translates into a savings
of over $80 billion a year to the U.S. economy. Critics continue to hammer America's $4 billion biofuels
program as expensive. However, if it generated $80 billion in fuel savings, the program yielded a $76 billion
return. Moreover, it sent $4 billion to America's farmers instead of to petro-dictators in the Middle East.
WNDI 2008 26
Ethanol Aff

US ethanol tariffs increase sugar and corn prices
Adam Dean, B.A. M.Sc. in International Political Economy from the London School of Economics, 4/4/2007,
“Unethical Ethanol Tariff,” Policy Innovations, http://www.policyinnovations.org/ideas/briefings/data/ethanol
At the heart of the issue is U.S. ethanol policy. Despite the Bush Administration's explicit support for increased U.S. ethanol
consumption, the United States maintains a tariff of 54 cents per gallon for imported ethanol. This tariff limits
U.S. ethanol imports and creates a higher domestic price than would otherwise result from a more open market. By
limiting market access for Brazilian ethanol producers, who would benefit from increased exports, the U.S. tariff also
limits the subsequent benefits that would accrue to Brazilian sugar producers. Furthermore, since ethanol
production in the United States is based on corn, the tariff also leads to a higher price of corn in the United States.
This artificially inflated price is then passed on to Mexican consumers in the form of higher food
prices. In these ways, it is the U.S. tariff on ethanol imports that may have caused higher tortilla prices in Mexico and slowed the
growth of Brazilian ethanol production. If the United States were to eliminate its ethanol tariff, we would likely
witness market changes that would greatly benefit everyone involved. The ramifications of the U.S. ethanol tariff
display the ethical consequences of American trade policy. Although free trade agreements such as NAFTA hold the potential to benefit
Mexican consumers through access to cheaper goods, these benefits can be eliminated by later market distortions, such as the ethanol
tariff. In order for Mexican consumers to benefit from open markets, the United States must be committed to a free trade policy that does
not distort the price of basic commodities such as corn. Likewise, in order for Brazilian ethanol and sugar producers to benefit from
global trade, they must be granted tariff-free market access to the United States. If the United States is to share the benefits of
globalization with developing countries, it must maintain a commitment to open markets for foreign imports and carefully consider the
global impact of its trade policy.
Removing the tariff would encourage production and reduce prices

The Hill, Jim Snyder, 7/7/2008, “Food, livestock groups push policies to reduce corn prices,” The Hill,
http://thehill.com/business--lobby/food-livestock-groups-push-policies-to-reduce-corn-prices-2008-07-07.html
But removing the tariff would send a signal to Brazilian cane farmers to plant more, which could
eventually help bring down the price of corn and ethanol. “The fuel prices could be significantly lower
if you had real competition, not just in oil but on the ethanol side as well,” Velasco said. Unica and
Velasco have recently registered to lobby to make that point on Capitol Hill.
WNDI 2008 27
Ethanol Aff
Leadership Advantage – 2AC Add-On

Reducing tariffs is key to leadership
Ariel Cohen, Ph.D. and Senior Policy Analyst at the Heritage Foundation, 5/31/2008, “The Real World: Oil &
Shifting Geopolitics,” the Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/Press/Commentary/ed053108a.cfm
To stave off geopolitical and economic decline and to combat its oil-rich adversaries, the U.S. needs to
recognize the damage high oil prices are doing, and to design a strategy to change the geo-economic
equation. In the short term, the U.S. needs to expand its domestic energy sector. Increasing oil and gas production in the West, along
the Pacific and Atlantic continental shelf, and in Alaska, will help. More production from unconventional oil sources, such as oil sands
and oil shale, is also crucial. A coal and nuclear power build-up are necessary as well. The U.S. Congress should also abolish
the corn ethanol subsidy and lift tariffs on the really competitive ethanol made from sugar cane. Brazil and
Africa can produce more ethanol than Iowa and Nebraska. However, in the long term, more advanced technological
solutions are vital to stem the global wealth redistribution to OPEC potentates and other America-haters. A budgetary discipline by the
Congress, coupled with a steady repayment of our domestic and foreign national debt will go a long way to restore the U.S. global
economic clout. World powers have risen and fallen over major economic factors, such as deficit spending, the loss of industrial base,
and stifling innovation and entrepreneurship. This does not have to be the case with the United States. The U.S. should not be
intimidated - or bankrupted - out of existence.
Leadership is essential to prevent global nuclear exchange

Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND, The Washington Quarterly, Spring 1995
Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to
multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not
as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous
advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values --
democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing
cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional
hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the
rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold
or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would
therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.
WNDI 2008 28
Ethanol Aff
Oil Advantage – 2AC Add-On

Removing trade barriers to Brazilian ethanol solves oil dependence
Richard G. Lugar, Senator, and Roberto Abdenur, Brazilian ambassador to the U.S., 5/15/2006, “America and
Brazil Intersect on Ethanol,” Renewable Energy World Online,
http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/story?id=44896
The key is ethanol, which Brazil long ago saw as an important element of its energy strategy and now
provides 18 percent of the country's automotive fuel, thanks to a booming sugar-cane-based ethanol industry.
As a result, Brazil, which years ago had to import a large share of the petroleum needed for domestic
consumption, recently reached complete self-sufficiency in oil. For its own energy security, the United States
-- by far the world's largest oil importer -- similarly needs to break oil's near-monopoly on the transport
sector by turning to ethanol for a much larger share of its auto fuel supply. Although the United States,
using corn, produces nearly as much ethanol as Brazil and is expanding its annual production by 25 percent,
the four billion gallons produced is still a tiny fraction of the 140 billion gallons of gasoline consumed.
Using E-85 fuel, a blend of 15-percent gasoline and 85-percent ethanol, and easily available flexible-fuel
technology so that cars can burn E-85, the United States could dramatically lower its oil dependence. Gaining
consumer acceptance will spur the expansion of ethanol production and infrastructure. That means spreading
the availability of E-85, now largely limited to the Midwest, to markets from coast to coast. One solution
might be for the United States to import more Brazilian ethanol to blend on East Coast, where
transportation costs significantly raise the price of Midwest ethanol. That would, however, require the
politically difficult step of ending the protective tariffs on Brazilian ethanol that now shelters the U.S.
industry. It makes strategic sense to import environmentally friendly ethanol from a reliable friend like
Brazil in our own hemisphere. After all, the United States doesn't tax imported crude oil, which pollutes
and often comes from unstable suppliers. Policymakers would need to consider the impact on the U.S.
ethanol industry, where breakthroughs in making ethanol out of cheap and widely available biomass promise
to lower costs and increase supplies. Currently, ethanol makers are highly profitable and are literally
overwhelmed by demand. They have little immediate prospect of marketing large volumes of their product
on the East Coast. Some analyses suggest that increasing foreign supplies to accelerate the U.S. switch to E-
85 will create a bigger ethanol pie for all. What is clear is that dropping the tariff would remove a major
source of friction between the two countries, as well as strengthen the energy security of both. This bold
gesture of friendship could launch productive bilateral negotiations on trade and broader cooperation on other
issues. Together, the two countries could undertake an international joint action to globalize the
production and utilization of ethanol, including by sharing their technology with potential producers of
ethanol throughout the world, particularly in developing countries. We share common goals. We should start
sharing common programs to achieve them.
Even if markets can solve scarcity, perceived need for control of energy to meet demand
causes resource wars and conflict with China
New Statesman, 9/8/2003
In the 1990s, the faith of Spencer and Marx was repackaged and sold to governments. Given a spurious
rigour by economists, it became the intellectual basis for the global free market. Yet its influence over policy
has never extended to defence planning. Bien-pensants economists can babble on as much as they like
about the pacifying effects of free markets, but military strategists continue to assume that secure
access to energy sources is a strategic imperative. Advanced industrial societies would collapse if they
were cut off from them for more than a few months. No new technology can prevent such a disaster. Talk
of new sources of energy replacing oil in the long run is all very well, but history is one short run after
another. The first Gulf war was waged to protect western oil supplies, and for no other reason. Iraq's vast oil
reserves are not the only reason that country was invaded, but they are a vitally important factor. If - as some
strategists believe is likely - military conflict breaks out between China and the United States over the
next few decades, it will be partly because they are the chief competitors for the world's shrinking
reserves of cheap oil. The rising demand for energy has become a cause of war. Contrary to the theories
of progress bequeathed to us from the 19th century, worldwide industrialisation is not banishing scarcity in
the necessities of existence and ushering in a new era of peace. It is creating new scarcities and triggering
new conflicts. Without oil, the energy-intensive agriculture on which we rely so heavily could not exist. A
steady supply of oil is as important in our lives as good weather was in the agrarian societies of the past.
WNDI 2008 29
Ethanol Aff
Oil Advantage – 2AC Add-On

US-Sino conflict causes global nuclear war—text modified
Chalmers Johnson, author of Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire, 5/14/2001, The
Nation, Pg. 20
China is another matter. No sane figure in the Pentagon wants a war with China, and all serious US militarists
know that China’s minuscule nuclear capacity is not offensive but a deterrent against the overwhelming US
power arrayed against it (twenty archaic Chinese warheads versus more than 7,000 US warheads). Taiwan,
whose status constitutes the still incomplete last act of the Chinese civil war, remains the most dangerous
place on earth. Much as the 1914 assassination of the Austrian crown prince in Sarajevo led to a war that no
wanted, a misstep in Taiwan by any side could bring the United States and China into a conflict that
neither wants. Such a war would bankrupt the United States, deeply divide Japan and probably end in a
Chinese victory, given that China is the world’s most populous country and would be defending itself against
a foreign aggressor. More seriously, it could easily escalate into a nuclear [war] holocaust. However, given
the nationalistic challenge to China’s sovereignty of any Taiwanese attempt to declare its independence
formally, forward-deployed US forces on China’s borders have virtually no deterrent effect.
WNDI 2008 30
Ethanol Aff
Oil Advantage – Democracy

Dependency allows countries to rely on oil wealth, preventing democracy or a diversified
economy from emerging
David Ivanovich, staff writer, May 18, 2003, Houston Chronicle
WASHINGTON - Call it the curse of crude. The 11 countries that comprise the OPEC cartel pocketed
nearly $ 180 billion in oil revenues last year. None is a thriving democracy. Coincidence? Oil wealth
hinders development of a tax-paying middle class, the very segment of society most likely to agitate for
a voice in government, political economists say. Bountiful crude reserves also discourage the kind of
diversification needed for a successful capitalistic economy.
Global democratic consolidation is essential to prevent many scenarios for war and
extinction.
Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, October 1995, “Promoting Democracy in
the 1990’s,” http://www.carnegie.org//sub/pubs/deadly/dia95_01.html, accessed on 12/11/99
OTHER THREATS This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming
years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could
easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime
syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the
institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate.
The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new
and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of
democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness. LESSONS
OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that
govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not aggress
against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not
ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency.
Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to
use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading
partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more
environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the
destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal
obligations and because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely
because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of
law, democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new world order of international security and
prosperity can be built.
WNDI 2008 31
Ethanol Aff
Oil Advantage – Middle East

The politics of oil shapes US Mideast policy toward war
Steve Kretzmann, PetroPolitics co-organizer, 1/5/2004, washingtonpost.com
Steve Kretzmann: No conflict can ever be understood by looking at just one factor - but understanding the
politics of oil sheds important light on facts that are often obscured in the fog of war. The peace movement's
rallying cry of "No blood for oil" has resonance and power because it holds more than a grain of truth when
talking about any proposed military action in Iraq. How much is the Bush administration's push for war with
Iraq motivated by its desire to gain control of Iraq's oil fields? As one Bush adviser who chose to remain
anonymous put it: "If you were trying to talk about Iraq and if you were not encumbered by the fear that your
actions would be linked to ExxonMobil or the oil industry, you'd be talking about oil issues". Or as an oil
industry consultant put it recently when asked if oil was part of the equation: "Of course it is. No doubt." Oil
clearly has a role, and quite arguably a central one, in motivating and explaining not only the actions of
the Bush administration, but also allies like France and Russia, the Iraqi opposition, and even Saddam
Hussein. 1) Oil is unquestionably the long-term "vital interest" of the United States, Europe, and Japan in the
Persian Gulf. Factors other than oil (e.g. supposed links to terrorism and possible weapons of mass
destruction) clearly contribute to the rationale for war - but the dominant economic interest in the region
and Iraq has been, is, and will continue to be oil. There is virtually no foreign investment in the region
outside of the oil industry. Fully two-thirds of the world's proven oil supplies are in the Persian Gulf.
As long as we are dependent on oil, we are dependent on this region. According to General Anthony
Zinni, the US "must have free access to the region's resources"
Mideast war escalates and goes nuclear

John Steinbach, Hiroshima/Nagasaki Peace Committee, March 2002,
http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/02.03/0331steinbachisraeli.htm
Meanwhile, the existence of an arsenal of mass destruction in such an unstable region in turn has serious
implications for future arms control and disarmament negotiations, and even the threat of nuclear war.
Seymour Hersh warns, "Should war break out in the Middle East again,... or should any Arab nation fire
missiles against Israel, as the Iraqis did, a nuclear escalation, once unthinkable except as a last resort, would
now be a strong probability."(41) and Ezar Weissman, Israel's current President said "The nuclear issue is
gaining momentum (and the) next war will not be conventional."(42) Russia and before it the Soviet Union has long
been a major (if not the major) target of Israeli nukes. It is widely reported that the principal purpose of Jonathan Pollard's spying for
Israel was to furnish satellite images of Soviet targets and other super sensitive data relating to U.S. nuclear targeting strategy. (43)
(Since launching its own satellite in 1988, Israel no longer needs U.S. spy secrets.) Israeli nukes aimed at the Russian heartland seriously
complicate disarmament and arms control negotiations and, at the very least, the unilateral possession of nuclear weapons by Israel is
enormously destabilizing, and dramatically lowers the threshold for their actual use, if not for all out nuclear war. In the words of Mark
Gaffney, "... if the familar pattern(Israel refining its weapons of mass destruction with U.S. complicity) is not reversed soon - for
whatever reason - the deepening Middle East conflict could trigger a world conflagration." (44).
WNDI 2008 32
Ethanol Aff
Relations Advantage – Solvency

Lifting the tariff is key to Brazilian relations
Ray Walser, Senior Policy Analyst for Latin America at the Heritage Foundation, 5/6/2008, “Meeting Energy
Challenges in the Western Hemisphere,” the Heritage Foundation,
http://www.heritage.org/Research/LatinAmerica/hl1079.cfm
In 1997, Brazil opened the way for energy competition. The national oil company, Petróleo Brasileiro, SA (Petrobras), engages in energy
partnerships with foreign investors and is developing into a global energy powerhouse. Petrobras' current investment plan calls for
spending $112.4 billion between 2008 and 2012, including approximately $5 billion for exploration, production, and refining in the
United States. Off Brazil's coast, recent discoveries—the Tupi field and the Jupiter gas field— have substantially raised the hope that
Brazil may actually equal or surpass the reserves of Venezuela and become a net exporter of oil. Petrobras could become one of the five
biggest integrated energy companies in the world by 2020. The 2007 memorandum of understanding between
Brazil and the U.S. was an important symbolic step forward for sugarcane-based ethanol and draws
together the two nations responsible for 70 percent of global ethanol production. As noted previously, there is
good reason to be concerned about the negative consequences of subsidized corn-based ethanol production in the U.S. While Brazil's
ethanol producers are apparently working at full capacity, eventually removing the 54-cent per gallon tariff on Brazilian
ethanol would help promote free trade in biofuels and could have a catalytic effect on U.S.–Brazil relations. I will
note that this proposition was most recently endorsed by Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke. This positive move could also
encourage Brazilians and others to invest in more research in promising second-generation biofuels such as cellulosic ethanol. Also,
working with Brazil to revitalize the Doha Round of global free trade talks will strengthen our hand
and forge a stronger U.S.–Brazil partnership.
The tariff is preventing improved relations

Increasing biofuels cooperation with Brazil and other countries in Latin America may prompt challenges to
existing U.S. trade, energy, and agriculture policies. For example, U.S. tariffs on foreign ethanol imports
may prove to be an obstacle to U.S.- Brazil energy cooperation. In the 109th Congress, legislation was
introduced that would have eliminated current tariffs on foreign ethanol. While some Members support
ending the ethanol tariffs, other Members of Congress support further extensions of the ethanol import tariffs.
Some have also proposed using tariff duties collected on foreign ethanol imports to fund advanced ethanol
research and production within the United States. This report examines the opportunities and barriers
related to increasing U.S. cooperation with other countries in the hemisphere on biofuels development,
focusing on the U.S.-Brazil agreement. It provides background information on Western hemisphere energy
challenges, the ethanol industries in Brazil and the United States, and the biofuels potential in the region. It
then raises a number of policy issues that Congress may choose to consider related to bolstering the
development of ethanol and other biofuels in Latin America.
WNDI 2008 33
Ethanol Aff

Removing tariffs key to cooperation
In the next few months, results from U.S.-Brazil feasibility studies for Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and El
Salvador are expected to be completed. The St. Kitts study has already determined that although producing
biofuels for transport would not be feasible there, bio-electricity could be generated for domestic use. The
results of the other feasibility studies and the willingness of the governments of each of those countries to
embrace biofuels development are likely to affect the selection of a second round of countries to receive
U.S.-Brazil technical assistance. While U.S. officials are eager to expand third-country initiatives into South
America, Brazilian officials have reportedly been reluctant to give the United States a foothold into its
sphere of influence. While some Members of Congress have been supportive of energy cooperation efforts
like the U.S.-Brazil MOU, others might not support any initiatives that they feel will adversely affect U.S.
corn-based ethanol producers. Indeed, the U.S.-Brazil MOU does not address two key issues that many
Brazilians feel are significant obstacles to expanding bilateral and regional biofuels cooperation, namely the
current subsidies and tariffs that protect U.S. corn-based ethanol producers. Since many Members strongly
favor extending the current subsidy programs for corn producers and tariffs on foreign ethanol, these issues
may be obstacles to maintaining expanded U.S.-Brazil biofuels cooperation. In addition, Members who
feel that Brazil’s positions on agricultural trade during the failed Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA)
and in the World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations have adversely affected U.S. interests may also be
opposed to the MOU on biofuels. On the other hand, some may see energy cooperation as an issue on
which a positive U.S.-Brazil agenda can be based, presenting a unique opportunity to overcome past
trade disputes.
WNDI 2008 34
Ethanol Aff

If the ethanol MOU is not followed up by lifting the tariff relations could collapse
Paulo Sotero, director of the Brazil Institute, 9/19/2007, Testimony before congress,
http://www.internationalrelations.house.gov/110/sot091907.htm
The warm reception President Lula gave President Bush in his official weekend residence in Brasília, in
November 2005, after both participated in an embarrassingly acrimonious and unproductive Summit of the
Americas hosted by Argentina put the bilateral dialogue back in high gear. The initiative the two
presidents announced last March to promote cooperation on biofuels is emblematic of the positive moment
we see today in the bilateral relationship. Mr. Chairman, I could not agree more with the statement that you
and Congressman Dan Burton recently made about the significance of the Brazil-US Memorandum of
Understanding announced in São Paulo by Presidents Bush and Lula. It indeed marks a point of strategic
confluence of interests between Brazil and the US. This initiative has created an important new space
for the two nations–world leaders in biofuels–to collaborate in the advancement of the technology of
ethanol and biodiesel production. The objective is to spread this technology, make it ecologically sustainable
in various latitudes in the Americas, and open new markets for a renewable source of fuel that can and should
be part of the solution to the enormous challenge of climate change. The presidents’ initiative needs
to be followed-up with concrete actions on different fronts. Brazil and the United States are actively
working with other countries to create an international standard for ethanol, which will allow its
commercialization in the international markets. The expiration in January 2009 of the current incentives
and protection the U.S. Congress has adopted to promote production of corn-based ethanol offers an
opportunity for changes that, without threatening the U.S. industry, would allow imported ethanol to
function as a stabilizer of supplies and prices in the American market as the United States transitions to
cellulose-based ethanol. A bill introduced earlier this year by Senator Richard Lugar of Indiana contains the
main elements of a new approach that would both preserve U.S. industry and broaden Brazil-U.S. and
hemispheric cooperation to expand production of ethanol either as a supplement to fossil fuels in large
economies or as an alternative in smaller ones. Allowing greater access of imported ethanol to the US is
not an option, but a necessity if the country is to fulfill the federal mandate to increase five-fold the use of
ethanol to 35 billion gallons in ten years in order to replace 20 percent of gasoline consumption. The broader
question that will test constantly the credibility of any US policy that intends to reduce dependence on fossil
fuels as a way to address climate change is whether Washington will continue to rely on the free trade of
fuels that cause global warming while restricting the international trade of more environmentally benign
forms of fuel. It is important to understand, however, that the promising opportunity for
collaboration created by Presidents Lula and Bush’s initiative could be lost if policymakers in both
countries fail to negotiate the differences that separate Brazil and United States on the crucial issue of
agricultural global trade. This is a theme important in itself and will eventually be linked to the production
and commerce of plant-based fuels.
WNDI 2008 35
Ethanol Aff

Reduction in agriculture tariffs prevent an adversarial shift in relations
america.html
Still, there are some U.S. policy initiatives that could improve hemispheric relations. What Latin American
governments consistently press hardest for are changes in U.S. farm policy that would lower barriers
to the region's food and fiber exports. In particular, they want cuts in U.S. subsidies to agricultural
producers and reductions of tariffs and quotas on key commodities. These changes would not only
increase Latin American exports and create jobs, but they would also revive negotiations toward the
proposed FTAA and open the way to more secure access to U.S. trade, investment, and technology --
precisely what the region desires from its relationship with the United States. Such reforms would also
end many bitter disputes with Brazil and Argentina, the region's largest agricultural exporters. The Bush
administration basically supports this agenda and has taken the lead in the Doha Round of multilateral trade
talks to push for an accord that would require Europe, Japan, and other governments, as well as the United
States, to lower subsidies and other barriers. But powerful U.S. agricultural producers and their
representatives in Congress make it impossible for the United States to reshape its farm policy on its own. On
this front, Washington has refused to make even the smallest unilateral concession to Latin America.
Lifting the tariff key to relations

The Washington Times, 3/29/2007, “Whatever Lula wants…”
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2007/mar/29/20070329-084331-3397r/
A U.S.-Brazil deal on biofuels is also the means to a larger end -- it would help our nation restore a more
balanced relationship with the rest of Latin America. President Lula could become an important interlocutor
with Venezuela's Hugo Chavez and could potentially serve as a mediator in other regional energy disputes
such as that in Bolivia. Within the Western Hemisphere, Brazil is heading the only U.N. peace operation in
Haiti in part because the United States, blindsided by Iraq, has been too preoccupied to manage the crisis
south of the Florida Keys. While other Latin American countries remain at odds with the U.S. "war on terror"
and the counter-narcotics agenda, our relationship with Brazil is secure. It would be regrettable if President
Bush, who needs regional friends and allies more than ever, squanders this opportunity to consolidate
our U.S.-Brazil partnership by taking discussion of the ethanol tariff off the table. Lula wants
something to deliver in this deal, and failure to bring home some promise on tariff relief would
compromise an important regional relationship. The Bush administration could rehabilitate its image
in the Americas by taking bold action now to remove the tariff. If our government really wants to fulfill
the promise the president made to the American people about energy independence, it must move now to
match rhetoric with action. Short of this, any alternative energy strategy will merely be viewed as symbolic.
A lame duck president, George W. Bush need not worry about taking a position against the farm-state
interests, whose sacred subsidies will stall growth of a global ethanol market. U.S. farmers need not fear
exclusion from the marketplace in a world where the search for energy is insatiable. Fighting for their corn
subsidies and blocking tariff relief only delays the inevitable, threatens long-term economic growth, and
endangers a powerful new energy alliance our nation must embrace.
WNDI 2008 36
Ethanol Aff
Relations Advantage – Amazon

US/Brazil cooperation is key to the Amazon and human survival
Council on Hemispheric Affairs, Hampden Macbeth, Philip Morrow, and Joseph Taves, 5/25/2005,
“Amazon Rainforest, Barbados and Haiti and the Bolton Nomination,” http://www.coha.org/2005/05/amazon-
rainforest-barbados-and-haiti-and-the-bolton-nomination/
News reports on May 19 announced that more than 10,000 square miles of the Amazon rainforest had
been deforested over the last year – an area the size of Massachusetts. Not only is the Amazon rainforest
an area of breathtaking beauty and unparalleled biodiversity, through the process of photosynthesis it also
ensures the survival of the human race, with its billions of trees producing much of the world’s supply
of oxygen. While ultimately Brazil’s progressive president, Luiz Inácio “Lula”da Silva, bears the brunt of
this fiasco, the U.S. and European nations also generously share in the responsibility for the destruction of
vast swaths of the country’s rainforest. They have promoted the neo-liberal economic polices that
persuaded Brazil to rely on the strength of its constantly expanding agricultural sector to pay down its
suffocating international debt. As a result, loggers have felled hundreds of thousands of hectares of trees and
farmers have cleared vast tracks of the rainforest to grow crops. Just as was the case under former President
Henrique Cardosa, the negative repercussions which result from this arboreal homicide, were relatively mild
because – despite presidential declarations to the contrary – Brazil’s environmental polices under Lula have
been much more bark than bite. Brasilia, under the “people’s president” has failed to fulfill its commitment to
prevent further destruction of the Amazon rainforest as promised last year when Lula announced a $140
million campaign to preserve and ensure better policing of the fragile habitat. However, external economic
factors also have certainly played a role in persuading the government to turn a blind eye to the desecration
of its own rainforest. It is critical to our common planet’s survival that the U.S. and the EU develop a
comprehensive plan with teeth, in cooperation with Brazil, in order to provide the financial incentives
necessary to preserve the rainforest, while also strengthening Brazil’s competitiveness in the global
economy. The U.S. and the EU would be wise to accept this responsibility in order to temper the dangerous
extremes involved in their push for globalization and the maximization of free trade that threatens the very
integrity of the environment, if not the very survival of the human race.
WNDI 2008 37
Ethanol Aff
Relations Advantage – Chavez

Relations cause Brazilian pressure on Chavez
William Waack, 9/21/2007, “Ties with U.S. Sour Brazil’s Relations with Hugo Chavez,” O Globo,
http://watchingamerica.com/oglobo000046.shtml
And as ironic as it may seem, the question of relations with Washington is one of the main sources of
bitterness between Brazil and Venezuela. Last Wednesday, (Sept. 19) the Western Hemisphere
subcommittee of the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee held a hearing on relations between Brazil and
the United States (the first time an event like this in regard to Brazil ever occurred in the Committee's hearing
room, which was full). One of those to testify was Paulo Sotero, director of the Brazilian Institute of the
Woodrow Wilson Center, an institution with an excellent reputation that isn't part of a government agency.
The emergence of populist regimes amongst its neighbors “has forced Brazil to refocus its policies and
reaffirm its interests in the stability of the region,” Sotero told the American Congress. “The distancing of
Brazil from the populist regime in Caracas is even more eloquent when the international scene in
which it occurred is taken into account,” Sotero continued. And the recent meeting of the heads of state
of Washington and Brasília showed that neither, “would allow the points of view of opposition politicians
get in the way of the positive dialogue begun by their predecessors,” he concluded. In other words, for
Lula's purposes it's obvious that partnering with Bush is better than partnering with Chávez. It's not
necessary to say this with a tone of disdain or any type of sarcasm. To continue in the words of Paulo Sotero's
speech, an enormous part of relations between Brazil and the United States depend on “daily transactions
carried out by Brazilians and Americans in the fields of business and culture” - and I would add, the
thousands of Brazilians that have sought to live in the U.S., send back money from there and share a different
(likely drastically different) point of view as government officials. It's quite clear that relations between
Brazil and the United States are much deeper, broader and more important that the particular leaders in each
capital. As for Chávez, he has proven (like several other tyrants of his low stature) to be a good tactician and
a poor strategist, for bringing misfortune to future generations of Venezuelans. And I prefer, looking at the
images from the meeting in Manaus, a government regime where the leader's advisers can dress as they wish.
Costumes are only for Carnival.
WNDI 2008 38
Ethanol Aff

Relations key to check Chavez influence
Peter Hakim, President of Inter America Dialogue, 12/30/2007, “Latin America: the next U.S. President’s
agenda,” Inter America Dialogue, http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/Peter%20Hakim%20-
%20Great%20Decisions%202008.pdf
Brazil is a crucial partner for the U.S. on other issues as well. Indeed, inter- American relations today
largely pivot on Brazil and the U.S. When these two countries find grounds for cooperation, almost
everyone else will join in. When they cannot, the hemisphere usually remains divided. Good relations with
Brazil are vital to Washington’s credibility in the region and to expand opportunities for both countries
to pursue their interests. As a welcome side effect, they help to offset the influence of President Chávez.
WNDI 2008 39
Ethanol Aff

Chavez is challenging American hegemony and Latin American democarcy
america.html
More serious than Latin America's distaste for U.S. policies, however, is the emergence of Venezuelan
President Hugo Chávez as a vexing and potentially dangerous adversary. Under Chávez, Venezuela has
developed close ties to Cuba and is now generously subsidizing the island's economy. Some in Washington
think this support could complicate Cuba's post-Castro transition by helping a repressive regime hold on to
power. And there are more immediate concerns. Although the nature of Chávez's involvement remains
murky, administration officials are convinced that he is provoking instability in some of the most volatile
states in the hemisphere, including Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua. His alleged links to Colombia's leftist
guerrillas and the sanctuary they enjoy in Venezuela also worry U.S. officials. Furthermore, Chávez's
ambitions are not limited to stirring up trouble in a few neighboring countries. He has made clear his intent
to forge a wide anti-U.S. coalition in order to replace Washington's agenda for the hemisphere with his
own -- one that rejects representative democracy and market economics. So far he is a long way from
succeeding: no other government has followed his economic or political lead. Indeed, nearly every Latin
American country still sees its future as being linked to the United States and wants to strengthen its relations
with Washington. Nonetheless, the United States is alarmed by the prospects that Ortega could take power in
Nicaragua and that a radical government could come to power in Bolivia if the left-wing indigenous leader
Evo Morales wins the presidential elections in December 2005. Chávez has close ties to both leaders and is
assisting them financially. Despite his failure to export his "Bolivarian Revolution" thus far, Chávez,
buoyed by enormous oil revenues and virtually unchecked power at home, is working to increase his
influence in the region. On his watch, Venezuela has launched Petrocaribe, an energy alliance designed to
deliver subsidized oil from Venezuela to the small states of the Caribbean, and begun financing Telesur, a
regional news network intended to compete with the BBC's and CNN's Spanish-language programs.
Venezuela is nearing full partnership in Mercosur, South America's most important free-trade zone, which
also includes Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay (Bolivia, Chile, and Peru are associate members).
And Chávez has proposed the creation of Petrosur, which would be a confederation of the region's state-
owned petroleum companies; he has also suggested forming a nuclear energy consortium with Brazil and
Argentina and establishing a South American development bank. Venezuela and the United States have
clashed repeatedly at the Organization of American States (OAS) and other regional institutions. Last
November, when President Bush and the hemisphere's 33 other elected presidents and prime ministers
traveled to Mar del Plata, Argentina, for the fourth Summit of the Americas, violent anti-American
demonstrators filled the streets. Chávez was the only head of state to join the protests (although his ally and
Bolivian presidential candidate Morales joined him). His raging polemics fired up the crowds and revealed
once again his political reach and popularity in the region. Although the other national leaders largely ignored
him, the world press gave ample coverage to his antics. Washington is galled that no government in Latin
America has yet been willing to help it challenge Chávez. Even governments closely associated with
Washington have some sympathy for the Venezuelan leader's anti-Bush, anti-American polemics. Although
from time to time Brazil has helped restrain Chávez, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, a staunch democrat,
said in the fall of 2005 that Venezuela suffered from an excess, not a lack, of democracy. At last year's
meeting of the OAS General Assembly, Latin American diplomats rebuffed a U.S. proposal to establish a
committee to monitor democracy in Latin America, which was seen as a U.S. effort to put a spotlight on
Chávez's democratic failings. Many regional governments are unhappy with Chávez and his policies, but
they are unwilling to risk their commercial and financial relationships with Venezuela or pay the domestic
political costs of opposing him.
WNDI 2008 40
Ethanol Aff
Relations Advantage – Economy

Relations are key the Brazilian economy
Peter Hakim, President- Inter-American Dialogue, Jan/Feb 2004, Foreign Affairs,
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20040101faessay83111/peter-hakim/the-reluctant-partner.html
Washington needs Brasilia's cooperation to make progress on critical regional issues, such as the Free
Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), Venezuela's worsening political confrontation, and Colombia's
criminal violence and guerrilla warfare. Brazil's voice also carries weight on broader international
issues such as global trade negotiations and the struggle against AIDS. Just as surely, Brazil needs U.S.
cooperation to advance its domestic and international agendas, particularly the central challenge of
economic growth, which requires dependable access to U.S. markets, capital, and technology. Brazil
needs the United States to have any chance of energizing its long-stagnant economy, expanding job
opportunities, and accelerating social development. An adversarial relationship would be extremely
damaging to U.S. policy and interests in Latin America, more so than ever given the region's unsettled
politics and uneasy relations with the United States.
Brazilian economic collapse would destroy the US economy

By any quantitative measure, what happens elsewhere in Latin America is less important to the U.S. The rest
of the region is not central to U.S. security; it is neither a source of nor a target for international terrorism.
Economic relations with South and Central America are expanding, but they are modest compared to Mexico.
All of South America’s trade with the U.S., including the oil from Venezu- ela, amounts only to about 40% of
U.S. commerce with Mexico alone. Trade with Brazil, the second-largest U.S. partner in Latin America,
accounts for little more than 1% of U.S. trade worldwide. Still, an economic crisis in Brazil, the eighth-
largest economy in the world, would have destructive spillover effects across the region, which could
importantly damage the U.S. economy. And Brazil is a country that could become much more eco-
nomically consequential to the U.S.— if it sustains a healthy rate of growth and continues to open its
economy.
Extinction
WNDI 2008 41
Ethanol Aff
Relations Advantage – FTAA

Relations key to FTAA
Washington will have to systematically engage Brazil in the search for greater hemispheric economic
cooperation. More than anything else, it was the failure of Brazil and the U.S. to reach an agreement that
paralyzed the FTAA negotiations. No new hemisphere-wide trade or economic proposals can prosper
without the support of both nations.
Relations key to US interests in the region, such as FTAA. This card is in the economy impact
scenario.
Peter Hakim, President- Inter-American Dialogue, Jan/Feb 2004, Foreign Affairs,
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20040101faessay83111/peter-hakim/the-reluctant-partner.html
Washington needs Brasilia's cooperation to make progress on critical regional issues, such as the Free
Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), Venezuela's worsening political confrontation, and Colombia's
criminal violence and guerrilla warfare. Brazil's voice also carries weight on broader international
issues such as global trade negotiations and the struggle against AIDS. Just as surely, Brazil needs U.S.
cooperation to advance its domestic and international agendas, particularly the central challenge of
economic growth, which requires dependable access to U.S. markets, capital, and technology. Brazil
needs the United States to have any chance of energizing its long-stagnant economy, expanding job
opportunities, and accelerating social development. An adversarial relationship would be extremely
damaging to U.S. policy and interests in Latin America, more so than ever given the region's unsettled
politics and uneasy relations with the United States.
WNDI 2008 42
Ethanol Aff
Relations Advantage – Latin America

Relations are key to American interest in Latin America
Peter Hakim, President of Inter-American Dialogue, 4/13/2008, “Advice for the Next US President,” Inter-
American Dialogue, http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=1295&s=Brazil
The Bush Administration has built a constructive relationship with the Lula government in Brazil. The
two countries are not active partners on most issues (even the heralded ethanol agreement signed by Lula and
Bush has not produced much), but they share many basic interests and values. When they cooperate almost
every other country in the region joins in. When they do not, the hemisphere usually remains divided.
To sustain this fundamental relationship, the next administration in Washington needs to follow Bush’s lead
in acknowledging Brazil’s expanding regional and global influence, respecting its independent foreign policy,
and accommodating its disagreements with the US.
Relations key to broader Latin American relations

Brazil is a crucial partner for the U.S. on other issues as well. Indeed, inter- American relations today
largely pivot on Brazil and the U.S. When these two countries find grounds for cooperation, almost
everyone else will join in. When they cannot, the hemisphere usually remains divided. Good relations with
Brazil are vital to Washington’s credibility in the region and to expand opportunities for both countries to
pursue their interests. As a welcome side effect, they help to offset the influence of President Chávez.
WNDI 2008 43
Ethanol Aff
Trade Advantage – Solvency

Lifting the tariff is key to free trade
Russell Hasan, Researcher at Altenews.com, 6/8/2006, “A Research Report on Ethanol Investment: Golden
Opportunity or Fool’s Gold?” Altenews.com, http://www.altenews.com/Ethanol%20Research%20Report.pdf
South American Imports: Brazil, a major player in ethanol, now accounts for more than 50% of the 20,000
barrels/day of U.S. ethanol imports. Brazilian production costs have been 40-50% lower than the U.S.,
according to a Congressional Research Service Report for Congress of 2005. It may be as low as 20% now.
Even with the supposedly prohibitive tariff, which violates WTO rules, Brazilian sugarcane ethanol is
competitive with domestic corn ethanol. Brazilian exports to the U.S. are limited only by its capacity
constraints. Japan plans to invest $1.29 billion in Brazil towards the production of sugarcane ethanol and
biodiesel, which will increase Brazilian ethanol capacity significantly before the end of the decade.
Caribbean and CAFTA countries, because of the duty free access provided by the Caribbean Basin Initiative
and CAFTA, have been long time exporters of ethanol to the U.S. CBI and CAFTA allow Caribbean and
Central American countries to purchase ethanol from other countries such as Brazil, reprocess it, and export
to the U.S. without paying the import tariff. It is questionable whether America can champion
globalization and keep the ethanol import tariff indefinitely. It is also a matter of time before Brazilian
ethanol finds its way to the U.S. via the Caribbean. Brazilian sugarcane ethanol is more energy efficient than
American corn ethanol and cheaper than gasoline. By 2010, Brazil will export 2.5 billion gallons of ethanol,
which is likely to put enormous pressure on domestic ethanol. Thus, competition from Brazil and the
Caribbean may lower the price of ethanol in America in five years.
WNDI 2008 44
Ethanol Aff
Trade Advantage – doha Solvency

Furthermore, removing the tariff would allow for doha success
AP, Alan Clendenning, 3/5/2007, “U.S. ethanol tariff irks Brazil,” Nation’s leader to meet with Bush this week,”
Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, http://www.jsonline.com/story/index.aspx?id=573261
Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva said Monday that a U.S. tariff on Brazilian ethanol does not
make sense and that he will complain about it to President George W. Bush when the American leader visits
Brazil later this week. On Friday, Bush and Silva are expected to forge an "ethanol alliance" aimed at
creating quality standards for the alternative fuel, while joining forces to promote production of ethanol in
nations between Brazil and the United States. But the United States' 54 cent-per-gallon tariff on Brazilian
ethanol makes the sugar cane-based fuel more expensive in America, and means that American corn that
could be used for animal feed is being diverted to produce ethanol, Silva said. The United States and Brazil
are the world's biggest ethanol producers, and Brazil is the largest exporter. National Security Adviser
Stephen Hadley said Monday that the tariff is "not under negotiation" adding, "we have no intention to
propose altering the tariff." Silva, however, compared the tariff that subsidizes American farmers to other
agricultural trade barriers the United States and Europe have imposed, key sticking points in
negotiations by the World Trade Organization for a deal that would liberalize trade across the world
and boost the international economy. "They talk a lot about free trade, but they like to protect their
own products," Silva said on his biweekly radio program. Silva said he will also talk with Bush about
efforts to salvage the WTO talks that collapsed in discord last summer over farm subsidies and reluctance
by developing nations to open their markets to rich countries. He made the comments as negotiators from
the United States, the European Union, Brazil and India were holding meetings in Geneva in an attempt
to get the "Doha round" of trade talks back on track. "I think we're close to a deal in the Doha
round," Silva said, adding that he thinks an accord will most benefit nations such as Brazil that have
complained about difficulties shipping agricultural products to American and European markets.
Tariff reduction key to doha talks

Biofuels Digest, 6/9/2008, “US Senate bill to reduce ethanol tariff is doomed,”
http://www.biofuelsdigest.com/blog2/2008/06/09/us-senate-bill-to-reduce-ethanol-tariff-is-doomed/
Last month, Cosan called on the Brazilian government to intervene with the US government more forcefully
on ethanol tariff, and observers said that Brazil may take the US to the World Trade Organization over
the tariff, now that the US Farm Bill becamke law and extended it. The WTO has commenced an
investigation into US farm subsidies following protests from Canada and Brazil. The Canadians and
Brazilians allege that the US has exceeded its $19.1 billion cap on farm subsidies in six of the past eight
years, including subsidies for biofuel feedstocks such as corn and soya. It will be the first time the World
Trade Organization has ruled on energy subsidies. The convergence of energy and agriculture in the
biofuels industry is expected to pose thorny questions for the WTO. While neither sector has enjoyed free
trade conditions, the subsidy mechanism which has supported national agriculture interests has attracted
negative attention far more than the cartel approach employed in the oil industry. The issue is a key point of
contention imperiling the Doha round of global trade talks. The United States and European Union have
blocked a Brazilian proposal to include biofuels among “environmental goods” scheduled for tariff reduction
or elimination in the next world trade treaty. The US and European position is that the environmental
designation rules are for industrial products, not agriculture.
WNDI 2008 45
Ethanol Aff
A2 Amazon DA
Brazilian ethanol does not lead to reduction of the Amazon
The Economist, Ribeirao Preto, 6/26/2008, “Lean, green and not mean,” The Economist,
http://www.economist.com/world/la/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11632886
Take this last point first. Demand for ethanol is growing fast in Brazil because 90% of new cars have flex-fuel engines that can run on
any mixture of petrol and ethanol. Even so, ethanol remains cheap. This is because producers have invested in expanding capacity (see
chart), partly because they hope for export markets, but mainly because they reckon they must sell at a 30% discount to petrol to keep
the custom of Brazilians. The price of petrol has not risen for three years because the government has opted to hold it down. This year
Brazil hopes to export up to 3 billion litres of ethanol to the United States. But this market depends on the corn price being so high as to
make it profitable to pay the import tariff. That was not the case last year and it may not be the case next year. Brazil could expand
output much more, but will do so only when export markets are less unpredictable. That is because supplying them requires investment
in pipelines and port equipment. For those worried about climate change, Brazilian ethanol is worth buying only if it is as green as
it claims to be. It is certainly much greener than its corn-based rival in America: it packs 8.2 times as much energy as is
used in its production, compared with just 1.5 times for corn ethanol, according to the Woodrow Wilson Centre, a Washington think-
tank. Some greens say that the spread of sugar is deforesting the Amazon. That is not true. The vast
majority of the sugar crop is grown thousands of miles away from the forest, in São Paulo state or the north-
east. Some 65% of new planting of sugar cane has been on land that was previously pasture; the rest
was previously used for other crops, according to Conab, a government agency.
Economic factors and regulation prevent Amazon deforestation

Reuters, Raymond Colitt, 7/11/2007, “U.S. officials: Brazil ethanol doesn’t harm Amazon,” Reuters,
http://www.reuters.com/article/environmentNews/idUSHO18246220070711?pageNumber=1&virtualBrandChannel
=0
Brazil's ethanol production is not devastating the Amazon rain forest or hiking food prices, U.S. energy
officials said on Wednesday. "There is a huge misconception internationally that in Brazil, we're cutting
down the rain forest to (make) fuels, which is not true," said Dan Arvizu, director of the U.S. Department
of Energy's National Renewable Energy Laboratory. "Done responsibly (ethanol production) does not have
to (compete) with food or impact the environment," Arvizu told reporters in the capital Brasilia. President
Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva had said on Monday that European competitors were trying to undermine Brazil's
biofuels production by raising environmental concerns. Environmentalists fear increased sugar cane
production for ethanol could push other crops, such as soybeans, deeper into the Amazon rain forest. Oil and
natural gas producers such as Venezuela and Bolivia along with Cuba have also openly criticized U.S. and
Brazilian ethanol production, saying they would increase food prices and world hunger. The United States is
the world's largest producer of ethanol, which it derives from corn. Brazil is the world's largest exporter of
ethanol. It launched a program to fuel cars with ethanol derived from sugar cane 30 years ago. Both
countries signed an accord in March to jointly forge a global ethanol market and promote its production in
Latin America and the Caribbean. In Europe and the United States biofuel production costs far more than in
Brazil and is highly subsidized. Cultivating sugar cane in the rain forest's tropical climate makes no
business sense, said Gregory Manuel, International Energy Coordinator at the U.S. State Department.
"Economics don't drive ethanol production in the rain forest. Yield rates in very wet environments are
roughly half that in temperate environments," he said. Both officials spoke on the sidelines of a U.S.-
Brazilian business summit in Brasilia. Production growth must be monitored carefully to avoid unwanted
consequences, said Arvizu. But he added that the current global market for ethanol was still far from
what could be produced sustainably.
WNDI 2008 46
Ethanol Aff
A2 Amazon DA
Recent laws and economic pressures mean Amazon won’t be deforested
Environmental protection is another area of legitimate concern, particularly in regard to the preservation of
the Amazon and its biodiversity. The debate in Brazilian society over environmental issues has evolved
considerably since the times when the military governments dismissed it as a foreign-inspired conspiracy
against the country’s economic development. The current minister and deputy-minister of the Environment
come from the trenches of the environmental movement. The complicated challenges of sustainability are
confronted daily in state capitals and in Brasília. Research produced by Brazilian scientists in
recent years has changed the terms of the national debate by showing that the preservation of the rain
forest is essential to maintain the rain patterns that make Brazilian agriculture the world’s most
productive, and to replenish the reservoirs of the hydropower plants in South-Central Brazil that
supply 85 percent of the electricity to the country. Stopping and reversing deforestation is no longer a
cause for the so-called “tree huggers”. It is an economic imperative for Brazil, and the issue occupies a
growing space in the domestic agenda. It has also entered the country’s foreign policy. The preservation
of the Amazon can no longer be treated in isolation, because it is crucially connected and dependent of the
climate change strategies adopted by the countries that produce most of the greenhouse gases derived from
the burning of fossil fuels. Brazilian efforts to preserve the rainforest would be fatally undermined by a
continuing rise of the Earth’s atmospheric temperatures.
WNDI 2008 47
Ethanol Aff
A2 Atlantic Rainforest DA
Brazil enforces forest reserve regulations
IHT, 7/1/2008, “Brazil fines 24 local ethanol producers for environmental crimes,” International Herald Tribune,
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/07/01/business/LA-Brazil-Ethanol-Fines.php
Brazil has slapped multimillion-dollar fines on 24 ethanol producers accused of environmental crimes
in the country's dwindling Atlantic rain forest, Environment Minister Carlos Minc said Tuesday. The
companies together face 120 million reals (US$75 million) in fines for operating without licenses and
planting sugarcane in illegally deforested parts of one of Brazil's most threatened ecosystems, Minc
said. They will also be required to restore 143,300 acres (58,000 hectares) of degraded rain forest. "We
will not let companies that destroy the Atlantic rain forest have any peace," Minc told reporters. "If these
environmental crimes continue, they will provide ammunition for those who want to slap trade barriers on the
export of Brazilian ethanol." International criticism of Brazil's massive sugarcane-based ethanol industry is
mounting, with opponents saying it encourages environmental destruction and inflates world food prices.
Brazilian officials deny those claims and note that ethanol producers are required to preserve much of
their land. The companies fined this week — mostly small Brazilian producers — violated rules requiring
them to leave 20 percent of their forest lands untouched, Minc said.
WNDI 2008 48
Ethanol Aff
A2 Brazil Environment Das

Brazilian sugar ethanol production will expand regardless of plan
TSC staff writers, 2/1/2008, “Ethanol: Behind the Buzz,” Main Street, http://www.mainstreet.com/ethanol-behind-
buzz
Sugar ethanol is produced from sugar cane and beets, mainly in Brazil. Because sugar can be fermented
directly into ethanol, production is efficient and yields a healthy 8.3:1 "energy balance" -- the ratio of energy
produced by a fuel to the energy needed to manufacture it -- according to the International Energy Agency.
Indeed, among varieties of ethanol, only sugar-based ethanol can compete with gasoline, unaided by
tariff or direct subsidy. It also leaves a clean carbon footprint, emitting 80% less net greenhouse gases than
gasoline. The growth potential for sugar ethanol is significant. In Brazil alone, investors are planning to
put some $14.6 billion into expanding production capacity, and by 2012, expect to be producing 9.5
billion gallons of ethanol annually. A study commissioned by Brazil's Ministry of Science and Technology
concludes that Brazil could increase exports to more than 50 billion gallons, one-tenth of current world
gasoline production, by 2025. Other South American and Caribbean nations are also expanding sugar ethanol
production, and Africa offers additional potential growers.
WNDI 2008 49
Ethanol Aff
A2 Food Prices DA
Location of the sugar crop and technological advances mean Brazilian ethanol doesn’t
trade off with food
The Economist, Ribeirao Preto, 6/26/2008, “Lean, green and not mean,” The Economist,
http://www.economist.com/world/la/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11632886
But might ethanol be indirectly responsible for lifting food prices and for pushing cattle ranchers into the Amazon?
Such concerns look premature. Sugar cane occupies only 7m hectares (17m acres) of Brazil’s farmland
(and only about half of the crop is distilled into ethanol). This compares with some 200m hectares
devoted to cattle ranching, much of which is extensive (a Brazilian cow enjoys, on average, a lordly hectare of grazing).
Sugar could expand on degraded pasture with little or no effect on beef prices. Besides, the ethanol
industry may be poised for a leap in productivity. “The sugar-cane plant is now where corn was at the beginning of the
20th century,” reckons Fernando Reinach, a biologist turned venture-capitalist at Votorantim, a conglomerate. His fund has backed two
start-ups in Campinas in São Paulo state. One of them, CanaVialis, breeds better varieties. The other, Alellyx, alters the genes in the
plant to give them new properties (one strain being tested gives about 80% more sucrose; another can go for 45 days without water). It is
run by Paulo Arruda, a Brazilian who led a team of 200 people in sequencing the DNA for sugar cane. Across the road is Amyris, a
Californian company which has developed enzymes that in laboratory experiments have turned sugar into substitutes for motor and jet
fuel.
N/U – oil prices increase food prices

The Wall Street Journal, Kenneth Rapoza, 7/8/2008, “Pique Oil: Big Ethanol, Sick of Criticism, Lashes Out at Big
Oil,” The Wall Street Journal, http://blogs.wsj.com/environmentalcapital/2008/07/08/pique-oil-big-ethanol-sick-of-
criticism-lashes-out-at-big-oil/
As the Group of Eight presidential leaders finish their meeting today in Japan, where food and fuel crises
took center stage, the world’s leading ethanol trade groups joined forces to argue it’s not their fault food
prices are so high. Their message: Blame oil. The U.S. and Canadian Renewable Fuels Association,
European Bioethanol Fuel Association and the Brazilian Sugarcane Industry Association all said in a
letter to G8 presidents dated Monday that: “…the sudden and rapid increase in food prices around the
world has multiple causes, not the least of which is oil already priced at $140 per barrel. Much of the
world’s agriculture and food transportation are reliant on oil, and drastically higher oil prices increase
prices all along the food chain.” Put another way: Stop picking on us for high food prices already. Oil
prices have risen by 40% on the New York Mercantile Exchange since January. The International Monetary
Fund calculates that world food prices are up 43% and ethanol is often to blame. “In the last 200 years that
the world has been using fossil fuels, no one has ever…placed such high levels of expectations on them that
today are being imposed upon biofuel producers,” said Marcos Jank, president of Brazil’s ethanol
association. The ethanol lobby says the oil lobby is selling the food-versus-fuel debate. Every drop of
ethanol mixed with gasoline, Big Ethanol argues, is one less drop of gasoline refiners can sell. The
presidents of the four ethanol trade associations fear policies will move away from ethanol. That would hurt
countless ethanol producers and banks that have sunk millions into ethanol’s future from California to
Sweden to Sao Paulo.
WNDI 2008 50
Ethanol Aff
A2 Innovation DA
Removing tariffs would spur US ethanol innovation through competition
W. K. Aiken, Indystar contributor, 6/28/2008, “Ease up on Brazilian ethanol to help U.S. consumers,”
http://www.indystar.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080628/OPINION01/806280395/1002/OPINION
Last week, politics trumped common sense as Congress overrode the president's veto of HR 6124 for the second time. The farm bill
heavily subsidizes domestic corn-based ethanol in a period of record farm income and places penalizing tariffs on imported sugar
cane-based ethanol from countries like Brazil when demand for alternative fuels is at never-before-seen levels. Democratic
candidate Barack Obama has been quoted as favoring this status quo: "It does not serve our national and economic security to replace
imported oil with Brazilian ethanol," he argues. Advertisement Demand for ethanol is high enough that the 2 to 3 billion gallons per
year we might import from Brazil, if brought in without tariff, could help ease the burden at the pump for
consumers and go far toward reducing carbon emissions from petroleum. Developing our own renewable
energy sources would not be impacted by these imports; if anything, the good, healthy competition would
spur Americans to get some real innovation going.
WNDI 2008 51
Ethanol Aff
A2 Slavery DA
Civil society and government policies check slavery
Personally, I have problems when some of my fellow Brazilians reject the discussion of both issues as a
matter of principle, arguing they do not belong in conversations about trade. The recent flooding of our own
markets with cheap and sometimes unsafe products from Asian countries where labor is not allowed a free
and independent voice forces us to reconsider this issue. Besides, Brazil has its own challenges in this area. I
am aware that some members of the U.S. Congress have raised concerns about the issue of forced labor in
my country. It is important to underline that abuses of workers’ rights are not denied or ignored in Brazil.
The Brazilian media has done its part to keep the issue in the public eye. It is a subject of great concern
to Brazilian society and government. And it would be irresponsible not to recognize that President Lula, a
leader who came from the labor movement, has kept his commitment to defend workers’ rights in the last
four and a half years. Don’t take my word for it. A study of this very topic produced by the International
Labor Organization was presented just yesterday at a conference we hosted at the Wilson Center. The
report, entitled “Rights at Work,” presents a comprehensive assessment of the implementation by four
countries of commitments they made to combat all forms of abuse against workers rights as signatories
of the 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. Brazil is one of the
countries studied by the ILO. The report concludes with a recognition that “Brazil has shown a strong
commitment towards guaranteeing the rights and principles of the Declaration for all Brazilians,”
introducing various programs, legal reforms, policies and institutions “in an effort to initiate change
across a spectrum of human rights issues, and to move the country toward compliance with the
fundamental labor standards of the Declaration.” The document highlights the positive involvement of no
less than sixty companies in corporate responsibility initiatives to eradicate slave labor and the contributions
made by the United States Department of Labor in some of the programs Brazil has implemented with ILO’s
assistance. Much remain to be done. This type of collaborative effort is producing results and should
continue. It would be tragically counterproductive and completely unacceptable, however, if Brazil’s
recognition of the abuses against workers it confronts and the country’s efforts to address the problem were
be used as pretext for the adoption of protectionist measures in the United States and elsewhere.
WNDI 2008 52
Ethanol Aff
A2 Incentives / in the United States

Lifting the tariff would be a domestic incentive for both producers and consumers
Lauren Etter and Joel Millman, 3/9/2007, “Ethanol Tariff Loophole Sparks a Boom in Caribbean,” Alternative
Energy, http://hughbartling.blogspot.com/2007/03/ethanol-tariff-loophole-sparks-boom-in.html
Encouraging more imports of foreign ethanol would drive down prices and likely boost the American
market further. While the 54-cent tariff early on encouraged the U.S. domestic industry, now it has
become counterproductive, contends Robert Howse, a trade expert at the International Food &
Agriculture Trade Policy Council, an advocacy group sponsored largely by agricultural companies. "If we
wanted to achieve the energy goals in the U.S. we would disassemble a lot of the protectionist policies,"
he says.
The tariff isn’t an incentive for US ethanol production

Cindy Zimmerman, 7/12/2008, “Organizations Support Ethanol Tariff,”
http://domesticfuel.com/2008/07/12/organizations-support-ethanol-tariff/
The 54 cent per gallon secondary tariff was enacted by Congress in 1980 to offset any incentive for
imported ethanol to benefit from the 54 cent per gallon tax credit for ethanol blended into motor fuel.
The tax credit is taken by refiners who blend ethanol into motor fuel and the purpose of the secondary tariff
is to protect American taxpayers from subsidizing imports.
Even if they win 100% of their violation evidence removing the tariff would still be a
$.03/gallon incentive for ethanol
ICIS, 5/15/2008, “US Congress extends ethanol subsidy and tariff,” ICIS News,
http://www.icis.com/Articles/2008/05/15/9124273/us-congress-extends-ethanol-subsidy-and-tariff.html
The farm bill’s extension of the ethanol import tariff means that volumes of sugarcane-based ethanol
directly from Brazil will remain priced out of the US fuels market. As investment bank Friedman,
Billings & Ramsey (FBR) noted, by lowering the tax credit to 45 cents/gal while maintaining the tariff at
54 cents/gal, Congress has effectively raised the barrier to ethanol imports from 3 cents/gal to 9
cents/gal.

Aff Ethanol 49

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WNDI 2008 1

China Advantage – Taiwan ........................................................................................................20

Relations Advantage – Chavez....................................................................................................38

1AC – Inherency (1/2)

Furthermore, Brazilian ethanol production is inevitable – it’s only a question of whether it

1AC – Inherency (2/2)

1AC – Plan (1/1)

1AC – Relations Advantage (1/4)

First, lifting ethanol tariffs is key to US/Brazilian relations

1AC – Relations Advantage (2/4)

1AC – Relations Advantage (3/4)

And, environmental destruction causes extinction

1AC – Relations Advantage (4/4)

And, unchecked Chavez destroys American hegemony and leads to terrorism

Leadership is essential to prevent global nuclear exchange

1AC – Trade Advantage (1/3)

And, that leads to nuclear war

1AC – Trade Advantage (2/3)

1AC – Trade Advantage (3/3)

And, US-Sino conflict causes global nuclear war—text modified

Furthermore, these trade wars will collapse the global economy

1AC – Food Prices Advantage (1/3)

First, Removing Brazilian ethanol tariffs would decrease food prices

And, hikes in food prices kill billions

1AC – Food Prices Advantage (2/3)

1AC – Food Prices Advantage (3/3)

China Advantage – Hegemony / Taiwan

China Advantage – Hegemony

China Advantage – Taiwan

China Advantage – Solvency

Dollar Advantage – 2AC Add On

Weak dollar means Euroswitch which undermines the US economy

The US is key to global economy

Dollar Advantage – 2AC Add On

Food Prices Advantage – Solvency

Food Prices Advantage – Solvency

Lifting the tariff would decrease food prices

Food Prices Advantage – Solvency

Removing the tariff would encourage production and reduce prices

Leadership Advantage – 2AC Add-On

Leadership is essential to prevent global nuclear exchange

Oil Advantage – 2AC Add-On

Oil Advantage – 2AC Add-On

Oil Advantage – Democracy

Oil Advantage – Middle East

Mideast war escalates and goes nuclear

Relations Advantage – Solvency

The tariff is preventing improved relations

Relations Advantage – Solvency

Relations Advantage – Solvency

Relations Advantage – Solvency

Lifting the tariff key to relations

Relations Advantage – Amazon

Relations Advantage – Chavez

Relations Advantage – Chavez

Relations Advantage – Chavez

Relations Advantage – Economy

Brazilian economic collapse would destroy the US economy

Relations Advantage – FTAA

Relations Advantage – Latin America

Relations key to broader Latin American relations

Trade Advantage – Solvency

Trade Advantage – doha Solvency

Tariff reduction key to doha talks