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Case Digest (Family Code of the Philippines) Jan Vincent Cailles Lo Bank of the Philippine Islands vs.

Juan Posadas Jr. Facts: The estate of Adolphe Oscar Schuetze is the sole beneficiary named in the lifeinsurance policy for $10,000, issued by the Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada. During the following five years the insured paid the premiums at the Manila branch of the company. The deceased Adolphe Oscar Schuetze married the plaintiff-appellant Rosario Gelano. The plaintiff-appellant, the Bank of the Philippine Islands, was appointed administrator of the late Adolphe Oscar Schuetze's testamentary estate by an order, entered by the Court of First Instance of Manila. The Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, whose main office is in Montreal, Canada, paid Rosario Gelano Vda de Schuetze upon her arrival at Manila, the sum of P20,150, which was the amount of the insurance policy on the life of said deceased, payable to the latter's estate. On the same date Rosario Gelano Vda de Schuetze delivered the money to said Bank of the Philippine Islands, as administrator of the deceased's estate, which entered it in the inventory of the testamentary estate, and then returned them o n e y t o s a i d w i d o w . T h e a p p e l l e e a l l e g e s t h a t i t i s a f u n d a m en t a l principle that a life-insurance policy belongs exclusively to the beneficiary upon the death of the person insured. Issue: Whether or not the life insurance policy belongs to the conjugal partnership. Ruling: SC holds that : (1) that the proceeds of a life-insurance policy payable to the insured's estate, on which the premiums were paid by the conjugal partnership, constitute community property, and belong one-half to the husband and the other half to the wife, exclusively; and (2) that if the premiums were paid partly with paraphernal and partly conjugal funds, the proceeds are likewise in like proportion paraphernal in part and conjugal inpart. T h a t t h e p r o c e e d s o f a l i f e - i n s u r a n c e p o l i c y p a y a b l e t o t h e i n s u r e d ' s e s t a t e a s t h e b e n e f i c i a r y , i f d e l i v e r e d t o t h e t e s t a m e n t a r y administrator of the former as part of the assets of said estate under probate administration, are subject to the

inheritance tax according to the law on the matter, if they belong to the assured exclusively, and it is immaterial that the insured was domiciled in these Islands or outside.

Philippine National Bank vs. Margarita Quintos E Yparraguirre and Angel A. Ansalso Facts: On June 20, 1918 PNB granted the defendants a credit to the amount of P31,284 to which defendants mortgaged stocks from BPI, Compaia Naviera, Davao Agriculture and Commercial Company etc. In the document, it did not clearly show that they were husband and wife, except in their civil statues On April 2, 1921/ July 22, 1921 a complaint was filed requiring Mr. Ansalso to pay his debt. SC First TRIAL: - Defendants claim that their debt is not of a solidary nature and should thus only bind one to the extent of their share in the obligation thus should not be charged to their conjugal partnership. However Art 1408 of NCC provides that all debts incurred by both husband and wife during the marriage are chargeable to the conjugal partnership thus Margarita, the wife, is part of the obligation as her husband as the legal manager of the conjugal partnership is liable for the debt. Supreme Court first decision held that conjugal partnership should be used to pay for the debt incurred as well as private property of each of them since they are both obligated. SC 2nd TRIAL (DECISION UPON MOTION FORRECONSIDERATION) - Reasserts that conjugal property is liable for the debt they incurred as husband and wife. Conjugal partnership begins existing at celebration of marriage Confined to properties stated in Art 1401 of CC (a) Those acquired by onerous (heavy obligations) title during the marriage at the expense of the common property whether the acquisition is made for the community or for only one of them; (b)those obtained by the industry, salary or labor of the spouses or any of them; (c) the fruits, rents or interest received or accruing during the marriage, from the common or the private property of each of the spouses. Conjugal partnership DOES NOT merge the properties they acquired before. The rest of the property that the spouse acquired before their marriage is separate from the conjugal partnership. Guaranteed by absolute separation of capitals. ISSUE:

Whether or not they are jointly liable for the debts incurred through conjugal partnership

HELD: Under New Civil Code 1698 it states that partners are not solidarily liable with respect to the debt of the partnership; New Civil Code 1137 that solidarity will exist only when it is expressly determined. Meaning, partner cannot be solidarity liable for the debts of the partnership, because there is no legal provision imposing such burden up on one. And it is now held that properties of the conjugal partnership of the defendants are liable for the debt to the plaintiff, and in default thereof, they are jointly liable for the payment thereof. It is being understood that the judgment appealed from is modified in the sense above stated and the motion of the appellants is denied.

Agapito Lorenzo vs. Florencio Nicolas Et Al. Facts: Prior to 1910, Magdalena Clemente was the surviving widow of the deceased Gregorio Nicolas, Manuel Lorenzo, former husband of the deceased Carlosa Santamaria, was also at that time a widower. On January 16, 1910, Magdalena Clemente and Manuel Lorenzo contracted marriage. Manuel Lorenzo died on January 7, 1929, while Magdalena died on January 31, 1934. During their coverture, the two had no children. In his first marriage, however, Manuel Lorenzo left, as heirs, the plaintiffs Agapito and Marcela Lorenzo and Policarpio Lorenzo, deceased, who had been succeeded by his children, the plaintiffs Faustina, Federico, Guillermo and Manuel all surnamed Lorenzo; while Magdalena Clemente, in her first marriage, left as heirs, the deceased Gerardo Nicholas, father of the defendants Florencio, Elena, Felix, Trinidad, Cecilia and Basilisa, all surnamed Nicolas. As to Parcel of land No. 6. This parcel of land which is lot No. 72 of the Friars Land Subdivision in Guiguinto, Bulacan, was purchased in her own name by Magdalena Clemente, for her own exclusive benefit on October 17, 1908, prior to her marriage with Manuel Lorenzo. She had paid the sum of P169.16 on account of the purchase price before her marriage with Lorenzo and, according to the terms of the contract of the sale, the balance of P833.32 was payable on installments, namely: P25.32 on June 1, 1909, and the balance in annual payment of P42.00 each, payable on the first day of June of each year, plus interest of 4% per annum. . The amount spent for the payments of installments due during the marriage, or obligations affecting the separate property of Magdalena Clemente, is certainly a useful expenditures because it preserves her right to the ownership of the land, and is, therefore, a credit which belongs to the conjugal partnership, and must be reimbursed to it by her. As to Parcel of land No. 5. This parcel was also purchased by Magdalena Clemente from the Bureau of Lands on October 17, 1908 for P967.16, of which amount P116.84 had previously been paid by her, before her marriage to Manuel Lorenzo. According to the terms of the sale, the balance of P850.32 was payable by installments: namely, P52.32 on June 1, 1909, and P42.00 annually on June 1, of each succeeding year. Payments on account of the installments were made by her, the receipts therefor were issued in her own name by the Bureau of Lands. On October 7, 1933 or 4 years after the death of Manuel Lorenzo, the final, certificate of sale was executed by the Director of Lands in her favor and in her name. By virtue thereof, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 13269 was issued in the sole name of Magdalena Clemente. The legal principles hereinabove discussed apply with equal force to this parcel of land No. 5.

Issue: Whether or not that parcels of land no. 5 and 6 held to be a paraphernal properties or exclusive property of Magdalena Clemente.

Held: In case of death of a holder of a certificate which is only an agreement to sell it is not the heirs but the widow who succeeds in the parcels of land to be sold by the Government. Only do the heirs succeed in the rights of the deceased holder of a certificate if no widow survives him. The petitioner, the heirs of the late Manuel Lorenzo, are not entitled to one-half of the two parcels of land. But the installments paid during coverture are deemed conjugal, there being no evidence that they were paid out of funds belonging exclusively to the late Magdalena Clemente. Upon these grounds and reasons the judgment of the Court of Appeals under review is affirmed, without cost.

Balbina Mendoza vs. Paciano Dizon Facts: It covers the file on the application filed on the request submitted originally before the Court by Balbina Mendoza, appellant,in which the Assembly requested that, under the faculty which confers on us the rule 45 of the Rules of the Courts. In 1932 Cuevas married Florence Cocadiz. This marriage was definitively dissolved on march 21, 1944 by virtue of a decree divorce issued by the Court of First Instance in Batangas on that date. There was no offspring. In December 7, 1945 the President of the Philippines of Commonwealth issued Administrative Order No. 27 in which under certain conditions is available to the bonuses or gratuities to officials and employees of the Government National who had been in active service in December 8, 1941, have been or not called to return to their jobs after the liberation. Later - 12 March 1946 - the Auditor General Delegate, making use of course powers conferred on it by article 262 of the Administrative Code, solved the substance of the instance of Balbina Mendoza, dictating the following judgment: As the gratuity of the late Juan M. Cuevas under Administrative Order No. 27, dated December 7, 1945, corresponds to his salary for the months of January and February, 1942, during which his marriage with Florencia Cocadiz in 1932 was not yet dissolved, the decree of their divorce having been issued by the Court of First Instance of Batangas only on March 21, 1944, the said gratuity should be deemed to be a part of their conjugal estate. Only one-half thereof may, therefore, be paid to his surviving mother, the herein claimant, who is hereby designated as his next of kin, the other half being payable to his divorced wife as her share. Issue: Whether such gratuity should be considered as goods belonging to the acquisitions of the deceased and his wife divorced Held: Bonuses or gratuities should governed the concerned that the law provides, that is, by Order No. 27 administrator had character and strength under the emergency powers granted by the Legislature to the President of the Philippines in the wake of war, according to the Constitution.

However, the said Order Management uses the word gratuity that has a meaning known, categorical and conclusive on the law and jurisprudence. Provide for a rapid authority of gratuity as an equivalent and not salary, wages or other remuneration. It means gift, award, present, something that is given and received by lucrative title. In this case the difference accentuate the two concepts when one considers that Congress, in its Joint Resolution No. 5 adopted on July 28, 1945, recommended the study of "ways and means to pay the back salaries, gratuities, bonuses or other emoluments of the loyal and deserving employees of the Commonwealth On merits of the above, amending appeal subject to the opinion and states that the appellant has receive the total amount of the gratuity belongs to the deceased John M. Cuevas, subject of course to any valid claim against the property of the deceased under the laws on good of the dead. No charge.

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