Bandits, Spies, Mercenaries or Traitors?

The Counterguerrilla of Manuel Domnguez and the Mexican American War (1847-1848) Adriana Prez
Abstract In the midst of the war between the United States and Mexico (1846-1848) a group of Mexicans from the state of Puebla began to work for the American army as spies, couriers and fighters. The group operated under the leadership of Pueblas famous robber Manuel Domnguez, El Chato, and consisted of about 200 men most of whom were also former bandits. Given the collaborationist nature of Dominguezs counter-guerrilla it comes as no surprise that the band made it into Mexican historical memory simply as criminals and traitors, unnatural Mexicans who betrayed their homeland in its darkest hour. In spite of the fact that the counter-guerrilla was a bandits organization, their actions only minimally resemble Eric Hobsbawms classic social banditry. But Domnguezs group does not to fit neatly into the alternative model of individualistic, profit-driven brigands either. Regardless of their differences, these conceptualizations of banditry coincide in denying it a political role. I argue, however, that the decision of the individuals involved to participate in the war enrolling in Domnguezs band can be seen as a political act in the following ways: first, because it was anchored in a desire to exercise power to influence their lives and the lives of others; second, because it was an act of public vengeance; and third because it was an act of protest. Based on new archival research, this paper offers a fresh look at the fascinating and seldom told story of Domnguezs counter-guerrilla, one that challenges the traditional condemnatory view and brings forth its political dimension. Key Words: Banditry, contra-guerrilla, Mexican Spy Company, Domnguez, poblanos, violence, power, vengeance, protest. ***** 1. Background As a result of a border dispute1 Mexico and the United States were at war from May 1846, when the first hostilities were launched to February 1848, when the peace treaty was signed in vanquished Mexico.

2 Bandits, Spies, Mercenaries or Traitors? The Counter-guerrilla of Manuel Domnguez and the Mexican American War (1847-1848) ______________________________________________________________ By February 1847, the war had two fronts. While U.S. General Zachary Taylor and his troops advanced throughout the northern provinces of Mexico, U.S. General Winfield Scott commanding about 4,000 men began his march toward the capital of Mexico through the East taking over the most important cities and villages on that flank. On both fronts, American troops advanced undefeated until the occupation of Mexico City by Gen. Scotts army in September 1847. The incapability of Mexicos army to effectively defend the national territory has been the subject of great debate since the time of the war. Today, however, it is widely accepted that, on the one hand, despite its numeric superiority, the Mexican armys armament and training were no match for the well-equipped and disciplined American counterpart. On the other hand, it is agreed that Mexicos severe internal divisions proved decisive in hindering the organization of the defence against the invaders.2 In mid May 1847, Puebla, the second largest city of the country surrendered to US forces without firing a shot. The circumstances in which Puebla was occupied by Scotts army caused fury especially in Mexico City, which was then fatally close to the enemys reach.3 The socio-political and economic dynamics that the American occupation of Puebla generated are complex and fascinating enough to be the matter of an entire paper, in this one, however, I will focus on the event that Mexicans of the time (and of today) considered one of the most infamous occurrences of the war with the United States, namely, the formation of a Mexican Spy Company with former bandits at the service of the American army. Mexican war contemporaries baptized the notorious group as contra-guerrilla poblana (Pueblan counter-guerrilla, which started out with the hiring of Manuel Domnguez and a handful of his friends.4 2. The contra-guerrilla of Manuel Domnguez It all began soon after the Americans had taken over the city of Puebla when a local resident secretly pointed out Manuel Domnguez to General William J. Worth, who was in charge of the entrance to Puebla until Scott arrived. Nicknamed, El Chato, Domnguez was a perfectly known robber, who despite his crimes continued to stroll the streets of Puebla with impunity.5 Domnguez was a native of Puebla and had, in fact, a long career as a robber, especially in the highways connecting Puebla to the port of Veracruz and to Mexico City. In addition to the information that his nickname reveals, that is, that he was pug nosed, only few descriptions of this physical appearance survive. One of his victims described Domnguez as still young, dark-skinned (), sparse bearded, stout and mounting a bay horse.6 In his war diary Lieutenant Henry Moses Judah described the bandit as a very fine looking man with a with a good face and nothing indicating

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______________________________________________________________ cruelty in it.7 Contrastingly, a Mexican columnist said that Domnguezs personality combined the subtlety of the fox, the rapacity of a bloodthirsty bird of prey, the ferocity of a tiger and the animal-like stupidity of a beast. These considerations aside, Domnguez must have had the right attributes to, on the one hand, appeal as a leader and on the other to have systematically evaded Mexican justice.8 Be as it may have, it appears that after hearing about Domnguezs fame from the bandits detractors Gen. Worth realized the potential of having the famous highwayman working for the US army and ordered his arrest. Few days after Domnguezs detention, Gen. Worth let him know that he had been turned in by fellow poblanos; making the point that the robber had limited options Worth offered Domnguez a job assisting the American army, proposal that El Chato readily accepted. Without delay, Worth sent Domnguez to Ethan Allen Hitchcock, in charge of US intelligence at the time, to arrange the details of the robbers future services. Hitchcock seemed to like Domnguez right away but, needless to say, he did not trust the bandit immediately. To test both Domnguezs reputed dominion of the roads and his loyalty, Hitchcock commissioned the robber to deliver a letter to Col. Childs in the city of Jalapa. The successful delivery of the dispatch at a time when anyone travelling between occupied territories was likely to be stopped in the road by Mexican officers asking for safe-conducts or by the various guerrillas that cluttered the countryside made it obvious that Domnguez had all necessary credentials for a job as a spy and courier. By the time Domnguez carried out his first mission Hitchcock was already envisioning more a larger group under the orders of his new friend: Through this man () I am anxious to make an arrangement to this effect: that for a sum of money yet to be determined, the robbers shall let our people pass without molestation and that they shall, for extra compensation, furnish us with guides, couriers, and spies.9 Thus, in mid June 1847 Hitchcock finally asked Domnguez to bring the whole band of professional robbers to the service of the United States, an idea that according to the officers testimony seemed plausible to the bandit although he frankly spoke of the difficulty of giving security for [the robbers] good faith and honesty.10 The contra-guerrilla had a modest beginning with Domnguez and only five other men whom he recruited from his closest acquaintances. Starting on the evening of June 22, 1847, these men would make $2 per day for their services to the American army. The next increment to the membership of the contra-guerrilla came as a result of a shrewd plan devised by an individual named Ferra who was assisting the Americans stationed in

4 Bandits, Spies, Mercenaries or Traitors? The Counter-guerrilla of Manuel Domnguez and the Mexican American War (1847-1848) ______________________________________________________________ Puebla. Ferras plan consisted in getting himself in prison so that he could talk to the prisoners and offer them their liberty in exchange for their services to the Americans. Ferra left the prison the morning of June 25 with a list of 12 names of delinquents who had accepted the Americans proposition. The same day at 1 oclock in the afternoon, Gen. Scott ordered the liberation of the men in Ferras list. The next morning, Hitchcock took the twelve exprisoners to Domnguez. As it turned out, El Chato knew these men well. In late June, Hitchcock settled with the poblanos their monthly payment of $20 per head and explained that their responsibilities included the provision of their own horses, uniforms, food and everything else they needed to operate (i.e. weaponry). Although captained by Domnguez, the contra-guerrilla was to obey the orders of Gen. Scott. It is hard to estimate the actual size of the contra-guerrilla when it was in full swing. Because of its clandestine nature very scant and not necessarily accurate documents were kept about the band. At any rate, what the differences in the estimates that go from 200 to 2000 suggest is that the membership of the Spy Company fluctuated overtime, however, it must have had a steady core of about a couple hundred men and perhaps, at certain times, as many as 2000 temporary members. At the beginning of August 1847, when Scotts army was about to leave Puebla, Domnguez contra-guerrilleros were fully geared and prepared for their mission. For strategic purposes, their uniform was very similar to that of Mexican lancers, which included a bright green jacket, dark trousers and a red pennon in their spears. Only a bright red band tied around their hats told the contra-guerrilleros apart from the lancers. Unfortunately, the histories of the majority of the men that participated in the contra-guerrilla remain unknown. Even in those cases that a name has survived only rarely the records provide further information. It is quite adventurous trying to reach a conclusion in terms of the social background of the members of the contra-guerrilla by means of extrapolating what we know from the documented cases of four contra-guerrilleros. There is little common ground in those cases concerning socio-economic and geographical origins. Sources coincide that the members of the contraguerrilla were former criminals extracted from prisons of Puebla; beyond that there is only variation. Some came from an urban milieu, others from the countryside, some knew how to write some did not, some had a long and famous criminal history but others had none; we may assume that many were impoverished and were resentful about the lack of economic opportunities, but not every contra-guerrillero was in the same situation, as the case of Domnguez corroborates.11 The existing literature on the contra-guerrilla has overemphasized its role as provider of spies, guides and couriers, that the job of the poblanos

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______________________________________________________________ as combatants, especially as guerrilla fighters, has been ignored. I believe, however, that this is key because it reveals that the members of the contraguerrilla were up to something other than merely getting some money the easiest and safest way. I will later come back to this issue, which is directly linked to the argument about the politics behind the actions of the contraguerrilleros. 3. Running amok As one may expect, the bad reputation of the contra-guerrilleros (in their own time as well as historically) owed itself to a large extent, but not exclusively, to their collaborationism with the Americans. Domnguez and his men also gained for themselves the hatred of large sectors of the Mexican population because of their violence. In fact, the fame of the contraguerrilleros as merciless criminals was built during the time of their stay in the village of Tacubaya and finally in Mexico City, where they routinely made use of force against fellow Mexicans. Mexico and the United States agreed on an armistice that started on August 21, 1847 and ended sooner than planned on September 8. During this time, Domnguez and his contra-guerrilla quartered in Tacubaya accompanying the awaiting troops of Gen. Scott. Perhaps a mixture of boredom, the need to stock up their equipment, and/or the blatant inhospitality of the inhabitants of the village moved the contra-guerrilleros to some degree of hostility. According to the testimony of a witness of the occupation of Tacubaya, the contra-guerrilleros did nothing but steal from the villagers, including the poor, and, in general, displayed a reprehensible and scandalizing behaviour. A resident of Tacubaya once said that he considered the contra-guerrilleros hungry wolves. Another assured that the villagers feared Domnguez and his men more than the Americans.12 Unfortunately for the Tacubayans, the departure of the Americans once the armistice was over did not put an end to their suffering, quite the contrary, when the American troops left for Mexico City, the contraguerrilleros ran amok and brutally persecuted their detractors. A person that ill spoke of the poblanos, a witness said, did not live to tell the tale.13 Eventually, and to the relief of the Tacubayans, Domnguez and the band left for Mexico City to continue the rampage. The contra-guerrilleros robbed, attacked and insulted people on the streets often in broad day light. As per the recollections of many, even a glance at them was motive for a violent response on the part of the contra-guerrilleros. As though epitomizing their true boldness, one day, Rafael Rocha, one of Domnguezs close assistants, chased a gentleman sword in hand to the very municipal palace, where Rocha and associates tied their victim with a rope among other immoderations.14

6 Bandits, Spies, Mercenaries or Traitors? The Counter-guerrilla of Manuel Domnguez and the Mexican American War (1847-1848) ______________________________________________________________ Mexico Citys newspapers documented that the poblanos were accused o robbery and murder with relative frequency. However, from the lengthy reports on policing and public safety it is clear that the favourite pastime of the contra-guerrilleros was to pester or otherwise harm Mexican policemen and guards, especially the lighting stewards, who became their preferred prey. The time has come, a police officer complained, when the lighting guards cannot approach the contra-guerrilleros quarters without being injured, wounded, or killed with impunity.15 By May 1848, Mexico Citys Ayuntamiento (the citys governing council) was deeply concerned about the depraved behaviour of the contra-guerrilleros, which caused constant complains among the neighbours.16 Yet, what disquieted Mexican authorities the most was the rumoured nexus between the poblanos, the citys bandits, and other unruly groups. It is possible that the fears of the governing council were exaggerated, nevertheless, the ubiquity and profoundness of the accusations against the contra-guerrilleros in the sources, suggest that they, in fact, purposely stimulated mayhem in the already precarious Mexico City. Thus, it is easy to see that the attitude of the contra-guerrilleros says much less about their treacherous allegiance with the United States and lots more about their deeply rooted antagonism with Mexican power-holders, especially law enforcement authorities. Not only is it clear that the contraguerrilleros were remorseless about the defeat of Mexico in the war, it seemed as though they wanted to sink the country even further down. So, although palatably sensationalist, the story of the poblanos is much less interesting for their unpatriotic collaborationism with the United States, than for the fact that their implacable violence and seditiousness reveals a considerable degree of political inconformity with a decomposed state among disenfranchised Mexicans. Even though historians once ventured to say that Domnguez was a kind of Mexican Robin Hood, new light shed from the archives demonstrates that the contra-guerrilleros were no noble robbers.17 Yet, the designation that Mexican history has perpetuated for Domnguez and his men as mercenaries and ruthless delinquents is also far from providing us with the whole picture. The business that the poblanos embarked on was a highly risky one, it is thus worthwhile to inquire about their motives. 4. Banditry, violence and power Fifty years ago, Eric Hobsbawm coined the term social banditry to describe a type of protest which peasants from the late eighteenth century through the nineteenth century engaged in to remedy grievances caused by the intensification of capitalism and modernization. His main argument was that social banditry was a pre-political movement principally because it

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______________________________________________________________ was not intended to subvert social order, but rather to right individual wrongs and restore traditional power relations.18 Hobsbawm argued that what was social about this type of banditry was that it was tolerated and even supported by bandits social peers because its goal was collective relief. In 1972, Anton Blok challenged Hobsbawms thesis highlighting the fact that most bandits, including those analyzed by Hobsbawm, had become upwardly mobile as individuals, thus undermining the possibility of class solidarity among peasants and diverting the potential for organized class struggle.19 Having found little resemblance with the Robin Hood-like social bandit, in their own case studies a good number of Latin Americanists have closely followed Bloks argument. Paul Vanderwood, considers that self-interest, specifically immediate economic gain, was the chief motive behind Mexican bandits, whose loyalties depended on the opportunity for wealth. 20 Vanderwoods insight regarding the shifting nature of bandits loyalties are invaluable for the study of the contra-guerrilla because it points to the importance of the patron-client relationships involved in banditry, which was crucial for the constitution and operation of the contra-guerrilla. However, the case of Manuel Domnguez and the other contra-guerrilleros do not entirely fit Vanderwoods model of the self-serving, profit-driven brigand. Based on his study of Mexican banditry at the time of independence, historian Christon Archer coined the term guerrilla bandits, that Archer characterizes as personally ambitious activists who half-heartedly clung to the political precepts of the insurgents and used revolutionary discourse to rationalize and justify their use of violence.21 Despite the great advantage of trying to go beyond the dichotomist view of social versus individualistic banditry, Archers theory looses most of its appeal when he assures that the political claims of bandits were, for the most part, a pretext or justification to plunder.22 In the end, Archers bandits differ from the individualistic brigand only in their extended use of a political discourse they would readily abort in case it limited the opportunity to draw profits. Indeed, there are many aspects that no banditry model succeeds in accounting for when it comes the case of the contra-guerrilleros poblanos. The most salient is the question of their motive(s), for despite the undeniable fact that money constituted an important incentive; it does not sufficiently explain the contra-guerrilleros committed participation in the war. True, the poblanos robbed repeatedly; yet, looting was not their primordial objective. If all they wanted was to plunder, why to enlist in the contra-guerrilla? It is plainly evident that the generalized chaos Mexico was sunken in during the war with the United States was, by itself, propitiatory enough for undemanding opportunities to steal. The chances to get caught and punished were slim to none.23 In a similar way, we should not overlook the possibility that, interested in getting their hands on as much booty as possible, Domnguez and his men could have chosen to enlist in (or to form) a

8 Bandits, Spies, Mercenaries or Traitors? The Counter-guerrilla of Manuel Domnguez and the Mexican American War (1847-1848) ______________________________________________________________ Mexican guerrilla, which in fact became famous for their stealing excesses. Criminal antecedents would have not been an impediment to this necessarily, for in many cases during the war former prisoners obtained official pardon precisely by means of engaging in guerrillas to combat the United States army.24 Furthermore, getting involved in the contra-guerrilla poblana implied a rather significant risk not only because of the obvious perils of war, but essentially because the contra-guerrilleros were collaborating with the national enemy and thereby incurring in the grave crime of treason to the homeland, which Mexican law penalized with death sentence. Additionally, being part of the contra-guerrilla guarantied its members a profound abhorrence of Mexicans and Americans alike. The poblanos became a preferred target of the disgraces of war especially after the occupation of Mexico City, deemed despicable traitors the contra-guerrilleros were spoken about with resentment and repugnance as their common Mexican epithet perros (dogs) clearly reveals.25 This is not to say that the poblanos were highly regarded among American soldiers. For one thing, their criminal past was well known; therefore, Domnguez and his band were always seen with a degree of suspicion and revulsion. Besides, as helpful as it was, the assistance of the contra-guerrilleros appeared as a horrendous betrayal to the selfrighteous Americans. For example, in their memoirs of the Mexican War, two American officers confide that they cursed Domnguezs people and referred to them as jail birds, ragamuffins and The Forty Thieves.26 In view of the tremendous drawbacks of their temerity, why did Domnguez and the other contra-guerrilleros adopt the ensigns of the band and took up arms against their own country and in favour of the United States? My answer is that the men that formed the notorious gang decided to participate in it because of a deeply rooted desire to exercise power. To be clear, when I say that being a contra-guerrillero was a political act, what I am not claiming is that the contra-guerrilla had a political program, as would be the case of a political party, for instance.27 Rather I want to emphasize that power ambition was at the core of the contra-guerrilleros motives to take arms. This was in part an act of vengeance, in part a protest, in part a way to seek and promote personal interests, and partly too a way to obtain means of sustenance. There is really little to be said about the contra-guerrilla as economic enterprise since it is evident that, while employed, the United States generously remunerated Domnguez and the rest of the band. The monthly earnings of the poblanos surpassed the monthly salary of many enrolled in the American army and were appallingly superior to what Mexican soldiers could receive.28

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______________________________________________________________ While not every act of violence on the part of the contraguerrilleros was an act of vengeance, there were a couple crucial events that leave no doubt that Domnguez and his followers had taken the opportunity to avenge old quarrels with Mexican authorities. During the summer of 1847, the contra-guerrilleros visited several Pueblan villages explicitly looking after the judicial authorities.29 In San Juan de los Llanos, for example, the contra-guerrilleros went directly to the judge, rampaged his office setting it on fire and then proceeded to release all prisoners from the towns jail.30 Most of the early recruits of Domnguezs band came from Pueblas nearby villages and it is quite possible that the contra-guerrilleros seized the opportunity to pay a visit to persons with whom they had old feuds to settle. But nowhere is it clearer that the contra-guerrilleros used their newly acquired power to even the score vis vis Mexican authorities than in the hounding that Domnguezs squad made of Generals Anastasio Torrejn and Antonio Gaona. The first incident happened in October 1847, when the contra-guerrilla surprised Torrejons troops. Trapped in a corral, Domnguezs adversaries were in great disadvantage but that was no impediment for the contra-guerrilleros to lance a great many of the cornered Mexicans. Not content with the vicious attack, Domnguezs company burned the entire place where the incident had taken place.31 In January 1848, the contra-guerrilla had another famed encounter with Torrejn and Gaona, in which these and other officers were taken prisoners by Domnguezs band. American witnesses of the clash sustained that it was distinctively fierce on the part of the poblanos. Seemingly, not only Domnguez and his people had no interest in conforming to military codes of conductwhich scandalized the Americans- but in fact the contraguerrilleros made the most out of the opportunity to torment and humiliate the Mexican Generals, especially Gaona who had Domnguez publicly whipped in Pueblas plaza in the past. 32 The vengeful nature of the contraguerrillas attack upon Gaona and his troops is confirmed to a large extent by the interpretation that newspapers made of the incident, presenting it as a conquest of Domnguez and the other bandits, the eternal public enemies, and not as an American aggression.33 As I said before the existence of the contra-guerrilla can be regarded as a protest against states institutions, specifically the army and the judicial system and more broadly against a malfunctioning Mexican state. Evidence of the contra-guerrilleros hatred of the military apparatus comes from the documented judicial cases against four of them. Including Domnguez, the poblanos we know about served at least for a brief time in either the army or some police body but had deserted. 34 The principal causes for desertion seem to have been the draft, which forcefully withdrew thousands of men from their places of residence, and the absence of remuneration.

10Bandits, Spies, Mercenaries or Traitors? The Counter-guerrilla of Manuel Domnguez and the Mexican American War (1847-1848) ______________________________________________________________ Nicanor Martnez, a day labourer who had been levied to serve in the army was accused for being a contra-guerrillero. In his defence and attempting to dissuade the judge from imputing lack patriotism, Martnez said he deserted because the lack of a pay. 35 In fact, the army was quite negatively perceived among the majority of Mexicans as a terribly abusive and corrupt institution, there is no reason to believe that the contraguerrilleros had a different opinion, as the examination of Martnezs testimony seems to substantiate. With respect to the contra-guerrilla as sign of protest against the Mexican state, nothing evidenced it more than the refusal of Manuel Domnguez of an official pardon for him and his followers offered by Mexicos embodiment of political authority at the time, that is, General Santa Anna. If we can trust the recollections of officer Ethan Allen Hitchcock, Domnguez received a letter signed by the Mexican president with scorn and instead of keeping the indult offer for himself, the chief robber handed the letter to Hitchcock, an act that stated (at the very least symbolically) a complete disdain for Mexican authority, a disinterest in restoring his relation to legitimate power-holders.36 There is no certainty that every single contraguerrillero felt the same way Domnguez did, however, considering that Domnguez never lost his appeal as a leader and that the contra-guerrilla constantly increased its numbers we can presume that for many of the poblanos the participation in the band constituted a way to express thorough disbelieve and disrespect for the representatives of the Mexican state. Aside from this, the contra-guerrilleros continuous effort to ridicule and harass authority representativesas we saw in a previous sectionbrings further evidence that one of their purposes was to de-legitimize authority. Indeed, the discredit in which Mexico Citys governing council fell during the time that the poblanos occupied the city attests their success as protesters. Finally, an unmistakable sign that the contra-guerrilleros acts were acts of protest is the very fact that they were intentionally collaborating with Mexicos national enemy. Even if scholarship agrees that there was no real cohesive concept of nation in Mexico for at least the first fifty years of the nineteenth century, it is beyond doubt that Mexicans, including the individuals that became contra-guerrilleros poblanos knew that the United States army was an invading foreign force, they knewif for nothing else, just because the concept was in everybodys mouththat the Americans were the enemy. In light of this, the decision to side with the United States should be seen not as treason in the sense of a betrayal to the homeland, but as subversion.

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Notes

Tensions between Mexico and the United States had started with occasion of Texas secession from the Mexican republic in 1836, which was widely supported by the United States. The conflict between the two nations intensified in 1845 when Texas was formally annexed to the United States. 2 Broadly, since 1836 Mexicos government had shifted from federalism to centralismincluding a conservative attempt to establish a monarchy-, and back to federalism in 1845. These changes had prompted various provinces to threat with secession from the republic, which in the case of Texas materialized. In addition, when the war had already started, armed internal conflicts often took precedence over the war with the US. The most palpable example being the polkos rebellion, a civil war taking place in Mexico City between the supporters of Mexicos liberal vice-president and the supporters of the conservatives and the church while Gen. Scott disembarked in Veracruz. 3 The distance between Mexico City and Puebla is about 80 miles or 129 km. 4 I will subsequently refer to Domnguezs band as contra-guerrilla or contra-guerrilla poblana and to its members as contra-guerrilleros or as poblanos in the aim of using those terms that contemporary Mexicans coined and applied at the time. 5 Hitchcock, E. A., Fifty Years in Camp and Field: Diary of Major-General Ethan Allen Hitchcock. W.A. Crofutt (ed). Putnam Sons, New York, 1909, 263 and 336. An alternative version of how Worth knew Domnguez is the one referred by historian Irving Levinson, who says Domnguez was introduced to the American officer in Jalapa. See, Levinson, I. W., Wars Within Wars. Mexican Guerrillas, Domestic Elites, and the United States of America. 1846-1848. Printed in Canada, 2005, 32. 6 Causa criminal, formada en averiguacin del robo que con asalto y en camino pblico [expresaron] Dn. Patricio Arriaga, D. Lucio, Dn. Joaqun Jurez, Dn. Manuel Garca, Dn. Francisco Garca, Dn. Miguel Iriarte, y Dn. Manuel Durango; por el que est preso Manuel Domnguez, exp. 20650, Archivo Histrico Judicial de Puebla. 7 El Universal. Peridico Independiente, Mexico City, 30 December 1849, T. III, no. 410, 2-3. 8 From the diary of Lt. Henry Moses Judah, 4th Infantry, in Chronicles of the Gringos. The U.S. Army in the Mexican War, 1846-1848. Accounts of Eyewitnesses & Combatants. G. W. Smith and Ch. Judah (eds). The University of New Mexico Press, Albuquerque, 1968, 231. 9 Ibidem. It must be noted that aside from Hitchcock, the role of Mr. Spooner, another American, was crucial in the articulation of the contra-guerrilla. Although some sources state that Spooner became the leader of the band, the testimony of Hitchcock seems more reliable in this regard and according it Spooners role was that of interpreter. 10 Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 264. 11 Manuel Domnguez was no destitute, his family belonged to the middle sectors of Pueblas merchant class. 12 Case against Nicanor Martnez, Fondo Municipalidades, Seccin Tacubaya, Justicia y Juzgados, box 13, exp. 45, f. 8v, Archivo Histrico del Distrito Federal. 13 Case against Nicanor Martnez, Fondo Municipalidades, Seccin Tacubaya, Justicia y Juzgados, box 13, exp. 45, f. 3636v. 14 Eco del Comercio, Mexico City, 20 April 1848, II, no. 36, 4. 15 El Monitor Republicano, Mexico City, 3 March 1848, 2. 16 Fondo Ayuntamiento, vol. 2268, exp. s/n, f., 474-474v, Archivo Histrico del Distrito Federal. 17 Chronicles of the Gringos, 229. On the profile of the noble robber see, Hobsbawm, E. J., Primitive Rebels. Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movement in the 19th and 20th Centuries, Manchester University Press, 1959. 18 Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels; and Hobsbawm, E. J., Bandits, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln and London, 2000. 19 Anton B., The Peasant and the Brigand: Social Banditry Reconsidered, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 14, no. 4, 1972, pp. 492-503. 20 Vanderwood, P. J., Disorder and Progress. Bandits, Police, and Mexican Development, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, 1981; and Vanderwood, P. J., Nineteenth-Century Mexicos Profiteering Bandits, in Bandidos. The Varieties of Latin American Banditry, Richard Slatta (ed.) New York: Greenwood Press, 1987, 11-31. 21 Archer, C. I., Banditry and Revolution in New Spain, 1790-1821, in Bibliotheca Americana, 1, no. 2, 1982, pp. 59-89. 22 Archer, Banditry and Revolution, 60-61. 23 Public opinion across the country complained on a daily basis about the lack of sufficient and effective police. The issue can be followed in newspapers such as Monitor Republicano, Eco del Comercio, El Siglo XIX, etc. 24 This was not exclusive of the organization and recruitment of guerrilla members during the Mexican American war. The incorporation of former criminals into government-sanctioned armed forces was a trait not only during the wars of Independence but also later in the nineteenth century during the Reforma war (1857-1861) and in the twentieth century during the Mexican Revolution. See, Archer, Banditry and Revolution, and Vanderwood, Disorder and Progress. 25 Blzquez Domnguez, C., La presencia norteamericana en Veracruz durante el conflicto de 1847, in Mxico en guerra (1846-1848). Perspectivas regionales. L. Herrera Serna (coord). Museo Nacional de las Intervenciones-Consejo Nacional para la Cultura y las Artes, Mexico, 1997, 669.

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Brackett, A. G., General Lanes Brigade in Central Mexico by Albert G. Brackett, M.D., Late an officer in the U.S. Volunteer Service. H.W. Derby & Co., Publishers, Cincinnati and New York, 1854, 186-187; and Anderson, R., An Artillery Officer in The Mexican War 1846-7. Letters of Robert Anderson Captain 3rd Artillery, U.S.A. Preface by Eba Anderson Lawton. Book for Libraries Press, Freeport, New York, 1971, 266. 27 It must be said that the career of Manuel Domnguez seems to have come close to a political affiliation as such. A year after the war, Domnguez was directly involved in a secessionist movement. It is alleged that he co-authored the Independence plan of the Republic of the Sierra Madre. However, that was hardly the case of the other contraguerrilleros. See, El Siglo XIX, Mexico City, 11 July 1849, II, no. 192, 4; El Universal, Mexico City, 12 July 1849, II, no. 239, 1; and El Fnix, Campeche, Mexico, 1 September 1849, no. 61, 3. 28 Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 265; and Caruso, A. B., The Mexican Spy Company. United States Covert Operations in Mexico, 1845-1848. McFarland & Company, Jefferson, North Carolina and London, 1991, 152. As a matter of fact, a primary cause for desertion among Mexicos troops during the war was the lack of payment. 29 Flix Mara Aburto, Prefectura de Tepeaca to Secretary of Government in Atlixco, 19 July 1847, published in El Diario Oficial, Mexico City, 3 August 1847, 3; Andrs Martnez to Pueblas Governor, 18 July 1847, published in El Diario Oficial, Mexico City, 3 August 1847, 3. 30 Expediente instrudo por el Juez de letras de los Llanos participando la invasion de los norteamericanos en aquel lugar, y prdida de las causas criminales y algunos expedientes civiles, exp. 27059, Archivo Histrico Judicial de Puebla. 31 The American Star, 28 October 1847, vol. 1, no. 25, 3; and The American Star, 12 January 1848, vol. 1, no. 87, 1. 32 Bracket, Generals Lane, 223; and Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 341. 33 Eco del Comercio, Mexico City, 10 March 1848, II, no. 1, p. 4; and Eco del Comercio, Mexico City, 20 March 1848, II, no. 9, p 4. 39 Manuel Domnguez was for a time employed in a civil guard, Roque Miranda, who joined the contra-guerrilla in Mexico City, had been a member of the Escuadrn de Seguridad (Safety Police Squad); Nicanor Martnez served for some years in the Mexican army. It is possible that other members of the contra-guerrilla were deserters or had been employed in a civil guard corps. 40 Causa criminal contra Nicanor Martnez, Seccin, Tacubaya, Justicia y Juzgados, box 13, exp. 24, f. 9. Archivo Histrico del Distrito Federal. 41 Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 339-340. The practice of official indult was a long established political tradition in Mexico since colonial times. It was customary that former outlaws restored their relationship with legitimate power holders via official pardon. It meant a reincorporation into lawfulness and it served the purpose of the state well since it was a way to absorb dissenters.

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