Case number: 80 REYES VS. ALMANZOR GR 43839-46 April 26, 1991 196 SCRA 322 Paras, J.

: FACTS: Petitioners (J.B.L. Reyes and Edmundo Reyes) are owners of parcels of land leased to tenants. RA 6359 was enacted prohibiting for one year an increase in monthly rentals of dwelling units and said Act also disallowed ejectment of lessees upon the expiration of the usual period of lease. City assessor of Manila (one of the respondents) assessed the value of petitioners property based on the schedule of market values duly reviewed by the Secretary of Finance. The revision entailed an increase to the tax rates and petitioners averred that the reassessment imposed upon them greatly exceeded the annual income derived from their properties. ISSUE: Whether or not income approach is the method to be used in the tax assessment and not the comparable sales approach.

RULING: Petition Granted. By no stretch of the imagination can the market value of properties covered by PD 20 be equated with the market value of properties not so covered. In the case at bar, not even factors determinant of the assessed value of subject properties under the comparable sales approach were presented by respondent namely: 1. That the sale must represent a bonafide arms length transaction between a willing seller and a willing buyer 2. The property must be comparable property. As a general rule, there were no takers so that there can be no reasonable basis for the conclusion that these properties are comparable.Taxes are lifeblood of government, however, such collection should be made in accordance with the law and therefore necessary to reconcile conflicting interests of the authorities so that the real purpose of taxation, promotion of the welfare of common good can be achieved.

Case no. 93 Province of Abra vs. Hernando and Roman Catholic Bishop August 31, 1981

FACTS: The Province of Abra sought to tax the properties of the Roman Catholic Bishop, Inc. of Bangued. Judge Hernando dismissed the petition of Abra without hearing its side. Hernando ruled that there "is no question that the real properties sought to be taxed by the Province of Abra are properties of the respondent Roman Catholic Bishop of Bangued, Inc." Likewise, there is no dispute that the properties including their produce are actually, directly and exclusively used by the Roman Catholic Bishop of Bangued, Inc. for religious or charitable purposes." "The proper remedy of the petitioner is appeal and not this special civil action.

ISSUE: Whether or not the properties of the church (in this case) is exempt from taxes.

HELD: Petition granted. The Constitution provides that charitable institutions, mosques, and non-profit cemeteries" and required that for the exemption of "lands, buildings, and improvements," they should not only be "exclusively" but also "actually" and "directly" used for religious or charitable purposes. The exemption from taxation is not favored and is never presumed, so that if granted it must be strictly construed against the taxpayer. In this case, there is no showing that the said properties are actually and directly used for religious or charitable uses. Further, there is no merit in Abras contention that the validity of a tax assessment may be questioned before the Local Board of Assessment Appeals and not with a court.

Case Number: 94 COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. CA and YMCA G.R. No. 124043 October 14, 1998 Panganiban, J. Doctrine: - Rental income derived by a tax-exempt organization from the lease of its properties, real or personal, is not exempt from income taxation, even if such income is exclusively used for the accomplishment of its objectives. - A claim of statutory exemption from taxation should be manifest and unmistakable from the language of the law on which it is based. Thus, it must expressly be granted in a statute stated in a language too clear to be mistaken. Verba legis non est recedendum where the law does not distinguish, neither should we. - The bare allegation alone that one is a non-stock, non-profit educational institution is insufficient to justify its exemption from the payment of income tax. It must prove with substantial evidence that (1) it falls under the classification non-stock, non-profit educational institution; and (2) the income it seeks to be exempted from taxation is used actually, directly, and exclusively for educational purposes. - The Court cannot change the law or bend it to suit its sympathies and appreciations. Otherwise, it would be overspilling its role and invading the realm of legislation. The Court, given its limited constitutional authority, cannot rule on the wisdom or propriety of legislation. That prerogative belongs to the political departments of government. Facts: Private Respondent YMCA is a non-stock, non-profit institution, which conducts various programs and activities that are beneficial to the public, especially the young people, pursuant to its religious, educational and charitable objectives.

YMCA earned income from leasing out a portion of its premises to small shop owners, like restaurants and canteen operators, and from parking fees collected from non-members. Petitioner issued an assessment to private respondent for deficiency taxes. Private respondent formally protested the assessment. In reply, the CIR denied the claims of YMCA. Issue: Whether or not the income derived from rentals of real property owned by YMCA subject to income tax Held: Yes. Income of whatever kind and character of non-stock non-profit organizations from any of their properties, real or personal, or from any of their activities conducted for profit, regardless of the disposition made of such income, shall be subject to the tax imposed under the NIRC. Rental income derived by a tax-exempt organization from the lease of its properties, real or personal, is not exempt from income taxation, even if such income is exclusively used for the accomplishment of its objectives. Because taxes are the lifeblood of the nation, the Court has always applied the doctrine of strict in interpretation in construing tax exemptions (Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, 271 SCRA 605, 613, April 18, 1997). Furthermore, a claim of statutory exemption from taxation should be manifest and unmistakable from the language of the law on which it is based. Thus, the claimed exemption must expressly be granted in a statute stated in a language too clear to be mistaken (Davao Gulf Lumber Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue and Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117359, p. 15 July 23, 1998). Verba legis non est recedendum. The law does not make a distinction. The rental income is taxable regardless of whence such income is derived and how it is used or disposed of. Where the law does not distinguish, neither should we. Private respondent also invokes Article XIV, Section 4, par. 3 of the Constitution, claiming that it is a non-stock, non-profit educational institution whose revenues and assets are used actually, directly and exclusively for educational purposes so it is exempt from taxes on its properties and income. This is without merit since the exemption provided lies on the payment of property tax, and not on the income tax on the rentals of its property. The bare allegation alone that one is a non-stock, non-profit educational institution is insufficient to justify its exemption from the payment of income tax.

For the YMCA to be granted the exemption it claims under the above provision, it must prove with substantial evidence that (1) it falls under the classification non-stock, non-profit educational institution; and (2) the income it seeks to be exempted from taxation is used actually, directly, and exclusively for educational purposes. Unfortunately for respondent, the Court noted that not a scintilla of evidence was submitted to prove that it met the said requisites. The Court appreciates the nobility of respondents cause. However, the Courts power and function are limited merely to applying the law fairly and objectively. It cannot change the law or bend it to suit its sympathies and appreciations. Otherwise, it would be overspilling its role and invading the realm of legislation. The Court regrets that, given its limited constitutional authority, it cannot rule on the wisdom or propriety of legislation. That prerogative belongs to the political departments of government.

Case no. 106

Re: In the Matter of the Petition For Habeas Corpus FACTS: A directive was issued to all Major Service Commanders to take into custody the military personnel under their command who took part in the Oakwood incident. Petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus with SC. The SC issued a resolution, which required respondents to make a return of the writ and to appear and produce the persons of the detainees before the CA. CA dismissed the petition because the detainees are already charged of coup detat. Habeas corpus is unavailing in this case as the detainees confinement is under a valid indictment. ISSUE: What is the objective of the writ of habeas corpus? HELD: Petition denied. The duty to hear the petition for habeas corpus necessarily includes the determination of the propriety of the remedy. The remedy of habeas corpus has one objective: to inquire into the cause of detention of a person. The purpose of the writ is to determine whether a person is being illegally deprived of his liberty. If the inquiry reveals that the detention is illegal, the court orders the release of the person. If, however, the detention is proven lawful, then the habeas corpus proceedings terminate. The use of habeas corpus is thus very limited. It is not a writ of error. Neither can it substitute for an appeal.

Case no. 113 Pefianco (DECS Secretary) vs. Maria Luisa Moral

FACTS: Former DECS Secretary filed an administrative complaint against respondent for dishonesty. She was dismissed. Respondent filed a petition for mandamus to compel petitioner to furnish her a copy of the DECS Investigation Committee Report. It was denied.

ISSUE: whether or not the denial of the copy of the DECS investigation Committee Reports deprive the respondent of her right to due process.

HELD: A respondent in an administrative case is not entitled to be informed of the findings and recommendations of any investigating committee created to inquire into charges filed against him. He is entitled only to the administrative decision and a reasonable opportunity to meet the charges and the evidence presented during the hearings of the investigation committee. Respondent had been accorded these rights.

Case no. 120 VELASCO v. VILLEGAS

Facts: The petitioners filed a declaratory relief challenging the constitutionality based on Ordinance No.4964 of the City of Manila, the contention being that it amounts to a deprivation of property of their meansof livelihood without due process of law.The assailed ordinance is worded thus: "It shall be prohibited for any operator of any barber shopto conduct the business of massaging customers or other persons in any adjacent room or rooms of saidbarber shop, or in any room or rooms within the same building where the barber shop is located as longas the operator of the barber shop and the room where massaging is conducted is the same person."The lower court ruled in favor of the constitutionality of the assailed ordinance. Hence, the appeal. Issue: Whether or not Ordinance No. 4964 is unconstitutional Held: NO Ratio: It is a police power measure. The objectives behind its enactment are: "(1) To be able to imposepayment of the license fee for engaging in the business of massage clinic under Ordinance No. 3659 asamended by Ordinance 4767, an entirely different measure than the ordinance regulating the business of barbershops and, (2) in order to forestall possible immorality which might grow out of the construction of separate rooms for massage of customers."The Court has been most liberal in sustaining ordinances based on the general welfare clausebecause it "delegates in statutory form the police power to a municipality; this clause has been given wideapplication by municipal authorities and has in its relation to the particular circumstances of the case beenliberally construed by the courts. Such, it is well to really is the progressive view of Philippine jurisprudence."The judgment of the lower court is affirmed

CASE No. 128

INT'L. SCHOOL ALLIANCE VS. QUISUMBING [333 SCRA 13; G.R. NO. 128845; 1 JUN 2000]
Facts: Receiving salaries less than their counterparts hired abroad, the local-hires of private respondent School, mostly Filipinos, cry discrimination. We agree. That the local-hires are paid more than their colleagues in other schools is, of course, beside the point. The point is that employees should be given equal pay for work of equal value. Private respondent International School, Inc. (the School, for short), pursuant to Presidential Decree 732, is a domestic educational institution established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents. To enable the School to continue carrying out its educational program and improve its standard of instruction, Section 2(c) of the same decree authorizes the School to employ its own teaching and management personnel selected by it either locally or abroad, from Philippine or other nationalities, such personnel being exempt from otherwise applicable laws and regulations attending their employment, except laws that have been or will be enacted for the protection of employees. Accordingly, the School hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty, classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires. The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires. These include housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes, and home leave travel allowance. Foreign-hires are also paid a salary rate twenty-five percent (25%) more than local-hires. The School justifies the difference on two "significant economic disadvantages" foreign-hires have to endure, namely: (a) the "dislocation factor" and (b) limited tenure.

Issue: Whether or Not the grants provided by the school to foreign hires and not to local hires discriminative of their constitutional right to the equal protection clause. Held: The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of "equal pay for equal work." Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid similar salaries. This rule applies to the School, its "international character" notwithstanding. The School contends that petitioner has not adduced evidence that local-hires perform work

equal to that of foreign-hires. The Court finds this argument a little cavalier. If an employer accords employees the same position and rank, the presumption is that these employeesperform equal work. This presumption is borne by logic and human experience. If the employer pays one employee less than the rest, it is not for that employee to explain why he receives less or why the others receive more. That would be adding insult to injury. The employer has discriminated against that employee; it is for the employer to explain why the employee is treated unfairly. While we recognize the need of the School to attract foreign-hires,salaries should not be used as an enticement to the prejudice of local-hires. The local-hires perform the same services as foreign-hires and they ought to be paid the same salaries as the latter. For the same reason, the "dislocation factor" and the foreign-hires' limited tenure also cannot serve as valid bases for the distinction in salary rates. The Constitution enjoins the State to "protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare," "to afford labor full protection." The State, therefore, has the right and duty to regulate the relations between labor and capital. These relations are not merely contractual but are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts, collective bargaining agreements included, must yield to the common good. Should such contracts contain stipulations that are contrary to public policy, courts will not hesitate to strike down these stipulations. In this case, we find the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School to justify the distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification. There is no reasonable distinction between the services rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires. Wherefore, the petition is given due course. The petition is hereby granted in part. The orders of the secretary of labor and employment dated June 10, 1996 and march 19, 1997, are hereby reversed and set aside insofar as they uphold the practice of respondent school of according foreign-hires higher salaries than local-hires.

Case no. 136 Nunez vs. Sandiganbayan FACTS: Equal Protection Creation of the Sandiganbayan Nuez assails the validity of the PD 1486 creating the Sandiganbayan as amended by PD 1606. He was accused before the Sandoganbayan of estafa through falsification of public and commercial documents committed in connivance with his other co-accused, all public officials, in several cases. It is the claim of Nuez that PD1486, as amended, is violative of the due process, equal protection, and ex post facto clauses of the Constitution. He claims that the Sandiganbayan proceedings violates Nuezs right to equal protection, because appeal as a matter of right became minimized into a mere matter of discretion; appeal likewise was shrunk and limited only to questions of law, excluding a review of the facts and trial evidence; and there is only one chance to appeal conviction, by certiorari to the SC, instead of the traditional two chances; while all other estafa indictees are entitled to appeal as a matter of right covering both law and facts and to two appellate courts, i.e., first to the CA and thereafter to the SC. ISSUE: Whether or not the creation of Sandiganbayan violates equal protection insofar as appeals would be concerned. HELD: The SC ruled against Nuez. The 1973 Constitution had provided for the creation of a special court that shall have original jurisdiction over cases involving public officials charged with graft and corruption. The constitution specifically makes mention of the creation of a special court, the Sandiganbayan, precisely in response to a problem, the urgency of which cannot be denied, namely, dishonesty in the public service. It follows that those who may thereafter be tried by such court ought to have been aware as far back as January 17, 1973, when the present Constitution came into force, that a different procedure for the accused therein, whether a private citizen as petitioner is or a public official, is not necessarily offensive to the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Further, the classification therein set forth met the standard requiring that it must be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class. Further still,decisions in the Sandiganbayan are reached by a unanimous decision from 3 justices - a showing that decisions therein are more conceivably carefully reached than other trial courts.