Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION G.R. No.

189122 March 17, 2010

JOSE ANTONIO LEVISTE, Petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents. DECISION CORONA, J.: Bail, the security given by an accused who is in the custody of the law for his release to guarantee his appearance before any court as may be required,1 is the answer of the criminal justice system to a vexing question: what is to be done with the accused, whose guilt has not yet been proven, in the "dubious interval," often years long, between arrest and final adjudication? 2 Bail acts as a reconciling mechanism to accommodate both the accuseds interest in pretrial liberty and societys interest in assuring the accuseds presence at trial.3 Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the accused who has been sentenced to prison must typically begin serving time immediately unless, on application, he is admitted to bail.4 An accused not released on bail is incarcerated before an appellate court confirms that his conviction is legal and proper. An erroneously convicted accused who is denied bail loses his liberty to pay a debt to society he has never owed.5 Even if the conviction is subsequently affirmed, however, the accuseds interest in bail pending appeal includes freedom pending judicial review, opportunity to efficiently prepare his case and avoidance of potential hardships of prison.6 On the other hand, society has a compelling interest in protecting itself by swiftly incarcerating an individual who is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a crime serious enough to warrant prison time.7 Other recognized societal interests in the denial of bail pending appeal include the prevention of the accuseds flight from court custody, the protection of the community from potential danger and the avoidance of delay in punishment.8 Under what circumstances an accused may obtain bail pending appeal, then, is a delicate balance between the interests of society and those of the accused.9 Our rules authorize the proper courts to exercise discretion in the grant of bail pending appeal to those convicted by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. In the exercise of that discretion, the proper courts are to be guided by the fundamental principle that the allowance of bail pending appeal should be exercised not with laxity but with grave caution and only for strong reasons, considering that the accused has been in fact convicted by the trial court.10 The Facts Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City for the lesser crime of homicide and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum.11 He appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals.12 Pending appeal, he filed an urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal, citing his advanced age and health condition, and claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his part. The Court of Appeals denied petitioners application for bail.13 It invoked the bedrock principle in the matter of bail pending appeal, that the discretion to extend bail during the course of appeal should be exercised "with grave caution and only for strong reasons." Citing well-established jurisprudence, it ruled that bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or aged detainee or a prisoner needing medical care outside the prison facility. It found that petitioner failed to show that he suffers from ailment of such gravity that his continued confinement during trial will permanently impair his health or put his life in danger. x x x Notably, the physical condition of [petitioner] does not prevent him from seeking medical attention while confined in prison, though he clearly preferred to be attended by his personal physician.14 For purposes of determining whether petitioners application for bail could be allowed pending appeal, the Court of Appeals also considered the fact of petitioners conviction. It made a preliminary evaluation of petitioners case and made a prima facie determination that there was no reason substantial enough to overturn the evidence of petitioners guilt. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied.15 Petitioner now questions as grave abuse of discretion the denial of his application for bail, considering that none of the conditions justifying denial of bail under the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was present. Petitioners theory is that, where the penalty imposed by the trial court is more than six years but not more than 20 years and the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5 are absent, bail must be granted to an appellant pending appeal. The Issue The question presented to the Court is this: in an application for bail pending appeal by an appellant sentenced by the trial court to a penalty of imprisonment for more than six years, does the discretionary nature of the grant of bail pending appeal mean that bail should automatically be granted absent any of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court? Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides: Sec. 5. Bail, when discretionary. Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. The application for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has not transmitted the original record to the appellate court. However, if the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed with and resolved by the appellate court.

Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to continue on provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject to the consent of the bondsman. If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other similar circumstances: (a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration; (b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without a valid justification; (c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon; (d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or (e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal. The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review the resolution of the Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in either case. (emphasis supplied) Petitioner claims that, in the absence of any of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, an application for bail by an appellant sentenced by the Regional Trial Court to a penalty of more than six years imprisonment should automatically be granted. Petitioners stance is contrary to fundamental considerations of procedural and substantive rules. Basic Procedural Concerns Forbid Grant of Petition Petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to assail the denial by the Court of Appeals of his urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal. While the said remedy may be resorted to challenge an interlocutory order, such remedy is proper only where the interlocutory order was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.16 Other than the sweeping averment that "[t]he Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners application for bail pending appeal despite the fact that none of the conditions to justify the denial thereof under Rule 114, Section 5 [is] present, much less proven by the prosecution," 17 however, petitioner actually failed to establish that the Court of Appeals indeed acted with grave abuse of discretion. He simply relies on his claim that the Court of Appeals should have granted bail in view of the absence of any of the circumstances enumerated in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. Furthermore, petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals committed a grave error and prejudged the appeal by denying his application for bail on the ground that the evidence that he committed a capital offense was strong. We disagree. It cannot be said that the Court of Appeals issued the assailed resolution without or in excess of its jurisdiction. One, pending appeal of a conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is expressly declared to be discretionary. Two, the discretion to allow or disallow bail pending appeal in a case such as this where the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable is exclusively lodged by the rules with the appellate court. Thus, the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to hear and resolve petitioners urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal. Neither can it be correctly claimed that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioners application for bail pending appeal. Grave abuse of discretion is not simply an error in judgmentbut it is such a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment which is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. 18Ordinary abuse of discretion is insufficient. The abuse of discretion must be grave, that is, the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility.19 It must be so patent and gross as to amount to evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of the law. In other words, for a petition for certiorari to prosper, there must be a clear showing of caprice and arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion.20 Petitioner never alleged that, in denying his application for bail pending appeal, the Court of Appeals exercised its judgment capriciously and whimsically. No capriciousness or arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion was ever imputed to the appellate court. Nor could any such implication or imputation be inferred. As observed earlier, the Court of Appeals exercised grave caution in the exercise of its discretion. The denial of petitioners application for bail pending appeal was not unreasonable but was the result of a thorough assessment of petitioners claim of ill health. By making a preliminary appraisal of the merits of the case for the purpose of granting bail, the court also determined whether the appeal was frivolous or not, or whether it raised a substantial question. The appellate court did not exercise its discretion in a careless manner but followed doctrinal rulings of this Court. At best, petitioner only points out the Court of Appeals erroneous application and interpretation of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. However, the extraordinary writ of certiorari will not be issued to cure errors in proceedings or erroneous conclusions of law or fact.21 In this connection, Lee v. People22 is apropos: Certiorari may not be availed of where it is not shown that the respondent court lacked or exceeded its jurisdiction over the case, even if its findings are not correct. Its questioned acts would at most constitute errors of law and not abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari. In other words, certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction and not to correct errors of procedure or mistakes in the courts findings and conclusions. An interlocutory order may be assailed by certiorari or prohibition only when it is shown that the court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. However, this Court generally frowns upon this remedial measure as regards interlocutory orders. To tolerate the practice of allowing interlocutory orders to be the subject of review by certiorari will not only delay the administration of justice but will also unduly burden the courts.23 (emphasis supplied)

Wording of Third Paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 Contradicts Petitioners Interpretation The third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 applies to two scenarios where the penalty imposed on the appellant applying for bail is imprisonment exceeding six years. The first scenario deals with the circumstances enumerated in the said paragraph (namely, recidivism, quasi-recidivism, habitual delinquency or commission of the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration; previous escape from legal confinement, evasion of sentence or violation of the conditions of his bail without a valid justification; commission of the offense while under probation, parole or conditional pardon; circumstances indicating the probability of flight if released on bail; undue risk of committing another crime during the pendency of the appeal; or other similar circumstances) not present. The second scenario contemplates the existence of at least one of the said circumstances. The implications of this distinction are discussed with erudition and clarity in the commentary of retired Supreme Court Justice Florenz D. Regalado, an authority in remedial law: Under the present revised Rule 114, the availability of bail to an accused may be summarized in the following rules: xxx xxx xxx

e. After conviction by the Regional Trial Court wherein a penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6 years but not more than 20 years is imposed, and not one of the circumstances stated in Sec. 5 or any other similar circumstance is present and proved, bail is a matter of discretion (Sec. 5); f. After conviction by the Regional Trial Court imposing a penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6 years but not more than 20 years, and any of the circumstances stated in Sec. 5 or any other similar circumstance is present and proved, no bail shall be granted by said court (Sec. 5); x x x24 (emphasis supplied) Retired Court of Appeals Justice Oscar M. Herrera, another authority in remedial law, is of the same thinking: Bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense charged is not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. On the other hand, upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, bail becomes a matter of discretion. Similarly, if the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) years then bail is a matter of discretion, except when any of the enumerated circumstances under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present then bail shall be denied.25 (emphasis supplied) In the first situation, bail is a matter of sound judicial discretion. This means that, if none of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, the appellate court has the discretion to grant or deny bail. An application for bail pending appeal may be denied even if the bail-negating26 circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 are absent. In other words, the appellate courts denial of bail pending appeal where none of the said circumstances exists does not, by and of itself, constitute abuse of discretion. On the other hand, in the second situation, the appellate court exercises a more stringent discretion, that is, to carefully ascertain whether any of the enumerated circumstances in fact exists. If it so determines, it has no other option except to deny or revoke bail pending appeal. Conversely, if the appellate court grants bail pending appeal, grave abuse of discretion will thereby be committed. Given these two distinct scenarios, therefore, any application for bail pending appeal should be viewed from the perspective of two stages: (1) the determination of discretion stage, where the appellate court must determine whether any of the circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present; this will establish whether or not the appellate court will exercise sound discretion or stringent discretion in resolving the application for bail pending appeal and (2) the exercise of discretion stage where, assuming the appellants case falls within the first scenario allowing the exercise of sound discretion, the appellate court may consider all relevant circumstances, other than those mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114, including the demands of equity and justice;27 on the basis thereof, it may either allow or disallow bail. On the other hand, if the appellants case falls within the second scenario, the appellate courts stringent discretion requires that the exercise thereof be primarily focused on the determination of the proof of the presence of any of the circumstances that are prejudicial to the allowance of bail. This is so because the existence of any of those circumstances is by itself sufficient to deny or revoke bail. Nonetheless, a finding that none of the said circumstances is present will not automatically result in the grant of bail. Such finding will simply authorize the court to use the less stringent sound discretion approach. Petitioner disregards the fine yet substantial distinction between the two different situations that are governed by the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114. Instead, petitioner insists on a simplistic treatment that unduly dilutes the import of the said provision and trivializes the established policy governing the grant of bail pending appeal. In particular, a careful reading of petitioners arguments reveals that it interprets the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 to cover all situations where the penalty imposed by the trial court on the appellant is imprisonment exceeding six years. For petitioner, in such a situation, the grant of bail pending appeal is always subject to limited discretion, that is, one restricted to the determination of whether any of the five bail-negating circumstances exists. The implication of this position is that, if any such circumstance is present, then bail will be denied. Otherwise, bail will be granted pending appeal. Petitioners theory therefore reduces the appellate court into a mere fact-finding body whose authority is limited to determining whether any of the five circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 exists. This unduly constricts its "discretion" into merely filling out the checklist of circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 in all instances where the penalty imposed by the Regional Trial Court on the appellant is imprisonment exceeding six years. In short, petitioners interpretation severely curbs the discretion of the appellate court by requiring it to determine a singular factual issue whether any of the five bail-negating circumstances is present. However, judicial discretion has been defined as "choice."28 Choice occurs where, between "two alternatives or among a possibly infinite number (of options)," there is "more than one possible outcome, with the selection of the outcome left to the decision maker."29 On the other hand, the establishment of a clearly defined rule of action is the end of discretion. 30 Thus, by severely clipping the appellate courts discretion and relegating that tribunal to a mere fact-finding body in applications for bail pending appeal in all instances where the penalty imposed by the trial court on the appellant is imprisonment exceeding six years, petitioners theory effectively renders nugatory the provision that "upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary."

The judicial discretion granted to the proper court (the Court of Appeals in this case) to rule on applications for bail pending appeal must necessarily involve the exercise of judgment on the part of the court. The court must be allowed reasonable latitude to express its own view of the case, its appreciation of the facts and its understanding of the applicable law on the matter.31 In view of the grave caution required of it, the court should consider whether or not, under all circumstances, the accused will be present to abide by his punishment if his conviction is affirmed.32 It should also give due regard to any other pertinent matters beyond the record of the particular case, such as the record, character and reputation of the applicant,33 among other things. More importantly, the discretion to determine allowance or disallowance of bail pending appeal necessarily includes, at the very least, an initial determination that the appeal is not frivolous but raises a substantial question of law or fact which must be determined by the appellate court. 34 In other words, a threshold requirement for the grant of bail is a showing that the appeal is not pro forma and merely intended for delay but presents a fairly debatable issue.35 This must be so; otherwise, the appellate courts will be deluged with frivolous and time-wasting appeals made for the purpose of taking advantage of a lenient attitude on bail pending appeal. Even more significantly, this comports with the very strong presumption on appeal that the lower courts exercise of discretionary power was sound,36 specially since the rules on criminal procedure require that no judgment shall be reversed or modified by the Court of Appeals except for substantial error.37 Moreover, to limit the bail-negating circumstances to the five situations mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is wrong. By restricting the bail-negating circumstances to those expressly mentioned, petitioner applies the expressio unius est exclusio alterius38 rule in statutory construction. However, the very language of the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 contradicts the idea that the enumeration of the five situations therein was meant to be exclusive. The provision categorically refers to "the following or other similar circumstances." Hence, under the rules, similarly relevant situations other than those listed in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 may be considered in the allowance, denial or revocation of bail pending appeal. Finally, laws and rules should not be interpreted in such a way that leads to unreasonable or senseless consequences. An absurd situation will result from adopting petitioners interpretation that, where the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six years, bail ought to be granted if none of the listed bail-negating circumstances exists. Allowance of bail pending appeal in cases where the penalty imposed is more than six years of imprisonment will be more lenient than in cases where the penalty imposed does not exceed six years. While denial or revocation of bail in cases where the penalty imposed is more than six years imprisonment must be made only if any of the five bail-negating conditions is present, bail pending appeal in cases where the penalty imposed does not exceed six years imprisonment may be denied even without those conditions. Is it reasonable and in conformity with the dictates of justice that bail pending appeal be more accessible to those convicted of serious offenses, compared to those convicted of less serious crimes? Petitioners Theory Deviates from History And Evolution of Rule on Bail Pending Appeal Petitioners interpretation deviates from, even radically alters, the history and evolution of the provisions on bail pending appeal. The relevant original provisions on bail were provided under Sections 3 to 6, Rule 110 of the 1940 Rules of Criminal Procedure: Sec. 3. Offenses less than capital before conviction by the Court of First Instance. After judgment by a municipal judge and before conviction by the Court of First Instance, the defendant shall be admitted to bail as of right. Sec. 4. Non-capital offenses after conviction by the Court of First Instance. After conviction by the Court of First Instance, defendant may, upon application, be bailed at the discretion of the court. Sec. 5. Capital offense defined. A capital offense, as the term is used in this rule, is an offense which, under the law existing at the time of its commission, and at the time of the application to be admitted to bail, may be punished by death. Sec. 6. Capital offense not bailable. No person in custody for the commission of a capital offense shall be admitted to bail if the evidence of his guilt is strong. The aforementioned provisions were reproduced as Sections 3 to 6, Rule 114 of the 1964 Rules of Criminal Procedure and then of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. They were modified in 1988 to read as follows: Sec. 3. Bail, a matter of right; exception. All persons in custody, shall before final conviction be entitled to bail as a matter of right, except those charged with a capital offense or an offense which, under the law at the time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail, is punishable by reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong. Sec. 4. Capital offense, defined. A capital offense, as the term is used in this Rules, is an offense which, under the law existing at the time of its commission, and at the time of the application to be admitted to bail, may be punished by death. (emphasis supplied) The significance of the above changes was clarified in Administrative Circular No. 2-92 dated January 20, 1992 as follows: The basic governing principle on the right of the accused to bail is laid down in Section 3 of Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, which provides: Sec. 3. Bail, a matter of right; exception. All persons in custody, shall before final conviction, be entitled to bail as a matter of right, except those charged with a capital offense or an offense which, under the law at the time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail, is punishable by reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong. Pursuant to the aforecited provision, an accused who is charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, shall no longer be entitled to bail as a matter of right even if he appeals the case to this Court since his conviction clearly imports that the evidence of his guilt of the offense charged is strong. Hence, for the guidelines of the bench and bar with respect to future as well as pending cases before the trial courts, this Court en banc lays down the following policies concerning the effectivity of the bail of the accused, to wit: 1) When an accused is charged with an offense which under the law existing at the time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail is punishable by a penalty lower than reclusion perpetua and is out on bail, and after trial is convicted by the trial court of the offense charged or of a lesser offense than that charged in the complaint or information, he may be allowed to remain free on his original bail pending the resolution of his appeal, unless the proper court directs otherwise pursuant to Rule 114, Sec. 2 (a) of the Rules of Court, as amended;

2) When an accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense which under the law at the time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail is punishable by reclusion perpetua and is out on bail, and after trial is convicted by the trial court of a lesser offense than that charged in the complaint or information, the same rule set forth in the preceding paragraph shall be applied; 3) When an accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense which under the law at the time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail is punishable by reclusion perpetua and is out on bail and after trial is convicted by the trial court of the offense charged, his bond shall be cancelled and the accused shall be placed in confinement pending resolution of his appeal. As to criminal cases covered under the third rule abovecited, which are now pending appeal before his Court where the accused is still on provisional liberty, the following rules are laid down: 1) This Court shall order the bondsman to surrender the accused within ten (10) days from notice to the court of origin. The bondsman thereupon, shall inform this Court of the fact of surrender, after which, the cancellation of the bond shall be ordered by this Court; 2) The RTC shall order the transmittal of the accused to the National Bureau of Prisons thru the Philippine National Police as the accused shall remain under confinement pending resolution of his appeal; 3) If the accused-appellant is not surrendered within the aforesaid period of ten (10) days, his bond shall be forfeited and an order of arrest shall be issued by this Court. The appeal taken by the accused shall also be dismissed under Section 8, Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Court as he shall be deemed to have jumped his bail. (emphasis supplied) Amendments were further introduced in Administrative Circular No. 12-94 dated August 16, 1994 which brought about important changes in the said rules as follows: SECTION 4. Bail, a matter of right. All persons in custody shall: (a) before or after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and (b) before conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as prescribed by law of this Rule. (3a) SECTION 5. Bail, when discretionary. Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the court, on application, may admit the accused to bail. The court, in its discretion, may allow the accused to continue on provisional liberty under the same bail bond during the period of appeal subject to the consent of the bondsman. If the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) years but not more than twenty (20) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail previously granted shall be cancelled, upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other similar circumstances: (a) That the accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration; (b) That the accused is found to have previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence or has violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification; (c) That the accused committed the offense while on probation, parole, under conditional pardon; (d) That the circumstances of the accused or his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or (e) That there is undue risk that during the pendency of the appeal, the accused may commit another crime. The appellate court may review the resolution of the Regional Trial Court, on motion and with notice to the adverse party. (n) SECTION 6. Capital offense, defined. A capital offense, as the term is used in these Rules, is an offense which, under the law existing at the time of its commission and at the time of the application to be admitted to bail, maybe punished with death. (4) SECTION 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable. No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution. (emphasis supplied) The above amendments of Administrative Circular No. 12-94 to Rule 114 were thereafter amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC to read as they do now. The development over time of these rules reveals an orientation towards a more restrictive approach to bail pending appeal. It indicates a faithful adherence to the bedrock principle, that is, bail pending appeal should be allowed not with leniency but with grave caution and only for strong reasons. The earliest rules on the matter made all grants of bail after conviction for a non-capital offense by the Court of First Instance (predecessor of the Regional Trial Court) discretionary. The 1988 amendments made applications for bail pending appeal favorable to the appellant-applicant. Bail before final conviction in trial courts for non-capital offenses or offenses not punishable by reclusion perpetua was a matter of right, meaning, admission to bail was a matter of right at any stage of the action where the charge was not for a capital offense or was not punished by reclusion perpetua.39 The amendments introduced by Administrative Circular No. 12-94 made bail pending appeal (of a conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment) discretionary. Thus, Administrative Circular No. 12-94 laid down more stringent rules on the matter of post-conviction grant of bail.

A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC modified Administrative Circular No. 12-94 by clearly identifying which court has authority to act on applications for bail pending appeal under certain conditions and in particular situations. More importantly, it reiterated the "tough on bail pending appeal" configuration of Administrative Circular No. 12-94. In particular, it amended Section 3 of the 1988 Rules on Criminal Procedure which entitled the accused to bail as a matter of right before final conviction.40 Under the present rule, bail is a matter of discretion upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Indeed, pursuant to the "tough on bail pending appeal" policy, the presence of bail-negating conditions mandates the denial or revocation of bail pending appeal such that those circumstances are deemed to be as grave as conviction by the trial court for an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment where bail is prohibited. Now, what is more in consonance with a stringent standards approach to bail pending appeal? What is more in conformity with an ex abundante cautelam view of bail pending appeal? Is it a rule which favors the automatic grant of bail in the absence of any of the circumstances under the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114? Or is it a rule that authorizes the denial of bail after due consideration of all relevant circumstances, even if none of the circumstances under the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present? The present inclination of the rules on criminal procedure to frown on bail pending appeal parallels the approach adopted in the United States where our original constitutional and procedural provisions on bail emanated. 41While this is of course not to be followed blindly, it nonetheless shows that our treatment of bail pending appeal is no different from that in other democratic societies. In our jurisdiction, the trend towards a strict attitude towards the allowance of bail pending appeal is anchored judicial discretion particularly with respect to extending bail should be exercised not with laxity but with strong reasons.42 In fact, it has even been pointed out that "grave caution that must attend the exercise of granting bail to a convicted accused is best illustrated and exemplified in Administrative Circular No. 12-94 Section 5."43 Furthermore, this Court has been guided by the following: The importance attached to conviction is due to the underlying principle that bail should be granted only where it is uncertain whether the accused is guilty or innocent, and therefore, where that uncertainty is removed by conviction it would, generally speaking, be absurd to admit to bail. After a person has been tried and convicted the presumption of innocence which may be relied upon in prior applications is rebutted, and the burden is upon the accused to show error in the conviction. From another point of view it may be properly argued that the probability of ultimate punishment is so enhanced by the conviction that the accused is much more likely to attempt to escape if liberated on bail than before conviction.44 (emphasis supplied) As a matter of fact, endorsing the reasoning quoted above and relying thereon, the Court declared in Yap v. Court of Appeals45 (promulgated in 2001 when the present rules were already effective), that denial of bail pending appeal is "a matter of wise discretion." A Final Word Section 13, Article II of the Constitution provides: SEC. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. x x x (emphasis supplied)1avvphi1 After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence terminates and, accordingly, the constitutional right to bail ends.46 From then on, the grant of bail is subject to judicial discretion. At the risk of being repetitious, such discretion must be exercised with grave caution and only for strong reasons. Considering that the accused was in fact convicted by the trial court, allowance of bail pending appeal should be guided by a stringent-standards approach. This judicial disposition finds strong support in the history and evolution of the rules on bail and the language of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. It is likewise consistent with the trial courts initial determination that the accused should be in prison. Furthermore, letting the accused out on bail despite his conviction may destroy the deterrent effect of our criminal laws. This is especially germane to bail pending appeal because long delays often separate sentencing in the trial court and appellate review. In addition, at the post-conviction stage, the accused faces a certain prison sentence and thus may be more likely to flee regardless of bail bonds or other release conditions. Finally, permitting bail too freely in spite of conviction invites frivolous and time-wasting appeals which will make a mockery of our criminal justice system and court processes. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The Court of Appeals is hereby directed to resolve and decide, on the merits, the appeal of petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 32159, with dispatch. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED. RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice on the principle that caution and only for judicial discretion in amending Rule 114,

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Baguio City THIRD DIVISION G.R. NO. 184537 April 23, 2010

QUINTIN B. SALUDAGA and SPO2 FIEL E. GENIO, Petitioners, vs. The HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, 4th DIVISION and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents. DECISION MENDOZA, J.: This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order assailing the July 14, 2008 Resolution1 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. SB-08 CRM 0263, denying the Motion for Preliminary Investigation filed by the petitioners who were charged with a violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, and the denial of their Motion for Reconsideration done in open court on August 13, 2008. An Information2 dated September 13, 2000 charging both petitioners with having violated Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, by causing undue injury to the government, reads: The undersigned Graft Investigation Officer of the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas, accuses QUINTIN B. SALUDAGA and SPO2 FIEL E. GENIO, for VIOLATION OF SECTION 3(e) OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019, AS AMENDED (THE ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT), committed as follows: That in or about the months of November and December, 1997, at the Municipality of Lavezares, Province of Northern Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused, public officials, being the Municipal Mayor and PNP Member of Lavezares, Northern Samar in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to office, conniving, confederating and mutually helping with one another, and with the late Limpio Legua, a private individual, with deliberate intent, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter into a Pakyaw Contract for the Construction of Barangay Day Care Centers for Barangays Mac-arthur and Urdaneta, Lavezares, Northern Samar, each in the amount of FORTYEIGHT THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P48,500.00), Philippine Currency, or a total amount of NINETY-SEVEN THOUSAND PESOS (P97,000.00), Philippine Currency, without conducting a competitive public bidding, thus depriving the government the chance to obtain the best, if not, the most reasonable price, and thereby awarding said contracts to Olimpio Legua, a non-license contractor and non-accredited NGO, in violation of Sec. 356 of Republic Act No. 7160 (The Local Government Code) and COA Circular No. 91-368, to the damage and prejudice of the government. CONTRARY TO LAW. This case was initially raffled to the Third Division of Sandiganbayan and was docketed as Criminal Case No. 26319. In a Resolution3 promulgated on June 14, 2002, the Third Division granted petitioners Motion to Quash and dismissed the information "for failure of the prosecution to allege and prove the amount of actual damages caused the government, an essential element of the crime charged."

In a Memorandum4 dated July 1, 2003, the Ombudsman directed the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) to study the possibility of having the information amended and re-filed with the Sandiganbayan. Thus, the OSP re-filed the Information5 dated August 17, 2007, this time, docketed as Criminal Case No. SB-08 CRM 0263, with the Fourth Division of the Sandiganbayan, charging the petitioners for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, by giving unwarranted benefit to a private person, to the prejudice of the government. The information, subject of the petition, now reads: The undersigned Prosecutor of the Office of the Special Prosecutor/Office of the Ombudsman, hereby accuses, MAYOR QUINTIN B. SALUDAGA and SPO2 FIEL E. GENIO, for the violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act, committed as follows: That in or about the months of November and December, 1997 at the Municipality of Lavezares, Province of Northern Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused QUINTIN B. SALUDAGA, a high ranking public official being then the Mayor of Lavezares, Northern Samar, and committing the crime herein charged while in the discharge of his official administrative function, conspiring and conniving with accused SPO2 FIEL B. GENIO, a member of Lavezares Police Force (PNP) and with the late OLIMPIO LEGUA, a private individual, with deliberate intent, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally give unwarranted benefit or advantage to the late Olimpio Legua, a non-license contractor and nonaccredited NGO, through evident bad faith and manifest partiality by then and there entering into a Pakyaw Contract with the latter for the Construction of Barangay Day Care Centers for barangays Mac-Arthur and Urdaneta, Lavezares, Northern Samar, in the amount of FORTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P48,500.00) each or a total of NINETY SEVEN THOUSAND PESOS (P97,000.00) Philippine Currency, without the benefit of a competitive public bidding to the prejudice of the Government and public interest. CONTRARY TO LAW. Petitioners filed a Motion for Preliminary Investigation6 dated June 4, 2008 which was strongly opposed by the prosecution in its Opposition7 dated June 18, 2008. Petitioners contend that the failure of the prosecution to conduct a new preliminary investigation before the filing of the second Information constituted a violation of the law because the latter charged a different offensethat is, violation of Section 3(e) by giving unwarranted benefit to private parties. Hence, there was a substitution of the first Information. They argue that assuming that no substitution took place, at the very least, there was a substantial amendment in the new information and that its submission should have been preceded by a new preliminary investigation. Further, they claim that newly discovered evidence mandates reexamination of the finding of a prima facie cause to file the case. On July 14, 2008, the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division issued the assailed Resolution denying the petitioners motion for preliminary investigation. The graft court found that there is no substituted information or substantial amendment that would warrant the conduct of a new preliminary investigation. It gave the following ratiocination: The re-filed information did not change the nature of the offense charged, but merely modified the mode by which accused committed the offense. The substance of such modification is not such as to necessitate the conduct of another preliminary investigation. Moreover, no new allegations were made, nor was the criminal liability of the accused upgraded in the re-filed information. Thus, new preliminary investigation is not in order. The dispositive portion of the Resolution states: Finding the arguments of accused-movants indefensible, the sufficiency of the information must be sustained. WHEREFORE, having established the sufficiency of the Information, the motion under consideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the arraignment of both accused shall proceed as scheduled.8 Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration9 dated August 6, 2008, submitting that the two Informations substantially charged different offenses, such that the present information constituted a substitution that should have been preceded by a new preliminary investigation. On August 13, 2008, in a hearing for the arraignment of petitioners, the Sandiganbayan denied the Motion10 in open court. Hence, petitioners interpose the present petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court anchored on the following grounds: I The Honorable Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it refused to order the preliminary investigation of the case a quo, when the second Information in the instant case constituted substituted Information whose submission required the conduct of preliminary investigation. II The Honorable Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it refused to order the conduct of a preliminary investigation of the case a quo, since the second Information therein contained substantial amendments whose submission required the conduct of preliminary investigation. III

The Honorable Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it refused to order the preliminary investigation of the case a quo, although the newly discovered evidence mandates due re-examination of the finding that prima facie cause existed to file the case a quo.11 From the arguments raised by petitioners, the core issue is whether or not the two (2) ways of violating section 3(e) of Republic Act 3019, namely: (a) by causing undue injury to any party, including the Government; or (b) by giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference constitute two distinct and separate offenses that would warrant a new or another preliminary investigation. In its Comment12 dated January 12, 2009, respondent People of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Special Prosecutor, counters that there is no substituted information in contemplation of law and jurisprudence that would require the conduct of another preliminary investigation. There is no newly-discovered evidence that would lead to a different determination should there be another preliminary investigation conducted. In their Reply,13 dated April 24, 2009, petitioners insist that the offenses charged in the first and second Information are not the same, and what transpired was a substitution of Information that required prior conduct of preliminary investigation. Even assuming there was no substitution, substantial amendments were made in the second Information, and that its submission should have been preceded by a new preliminary investigation. We find no merit in this petition. Petitioners were charged with a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act which reads: Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers.- In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be 0unlawful: xxx (e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions. The essential elements of the offense are as follows: 1. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions; 2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence; and 3. That his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.14 In a string of decisions, the Court has consistently ruled: R.A. 3019, Section 3, paragraph (e), as amended, provides as one of its elements that the public officer should have acted by causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or by giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions. The use of the disjunctive term "or" connotes that either act qualifies as a violation of Section 3 paragraph (e), or as aptly held in Santiago, as two (2) different modes of committing the offense. This does not however indicate that each mode constitutes a distinct offense, but rather, that an accused may be charged under either mode or under both.15 The afore-stated ruling is consistent with the well-entrenched principle of statutory construction that "The word or is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation and independence of one thing from the other things enumerated; it should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies, as a disjunctive word."16 Contrary to the argument of petitioners, there is no substituted information. The Information dated August 17, 2007 filed in Criminal Case No. SB-08 CRM 0263 charged the same offense, that is, violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. Only the mode of commission was modified. While jurisprudence, the most recent being Talaga, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,17 provides that there are two (2) acts or modes of committing the offense, thus: a) by causing any undue injury to any party, including the government; or b) by giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference, it does not mean that each act or mode constitutes a distinct offense. An accused may be charged under either mode18 or under both should both modes concur.19 Petitioners reliance on the Teehankee v. Madayag,20 ruling that, "in substitution of information another preliminary investigation is entailed and that the accused has to plead anew to the new information" is not applicable to the present case because, as already stated, there is no substitution of information there being no change in the nature of the offense charged. Consequently, petitioners cannot invoke the principle enunciated in Villaflor v. Vivar,21 that failure to conduct a new preliminary investigation is tantamount to a violation of their rights. While it is true that preliminary investigation is a statutory and substantive right accorded to the accused before trial, the denial of petitioners claim for a new investigation, however, did not deprive them of their right to due process. An examination of the records of the case discloses that there was a full-blown preliminary investigation wherein both petitioners actively participated. Anent the contention of petitioners that the information contained substantial amendments warranting a new preliminary investigation, the same must likewise fail.1avvphi1 Petitioners erroneously concluded that giving undue injury, as alleged in the first Information, and conferring unwarranted benefits, alleged in the second Information, are two distinct violations of, or two distinct ways of violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, and that such shift from giving undue injury to conferring unwarranted benefit constituted, at the very least, a substantial amendment. It should be noted that the Information is founded on the same transaction as the first Information, that of entering into a Pakyaw Contract for the construction of barangay day care centers for barangays Mac-Arthur and Urdaneta, Lavezares, Northern Samar. Thus, the evidentiary requirements for the prosecution and defense remain the same.

To bolster their claim for a reinvestigation of the offense, petitioners cited the case of Matalam v. Sandiganbayan.22 The same is inapplicable to petitioners case. In Matalam, there was indeed a substantial amendment which entitled the accused to another preliminary investigation. The recital of facts constituting the offense charged therein was definitely altered. In the original information, the prohibited act allegedly committed by the petitioner was the illegal and unjustifiable refusal to pay the monetary claims of the private complainants, whereas in the amended information, it is the illegal dismissal from the service of the private complainants. In the case at bar, there is no substantial amendment to speak of. As discussed previously, the Information in Criminal Case No. 26319 was already dismissed by the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan in view of the petitioners Motion to Quash. As such, there is nothing more to be amended. The Court is not unaware of the case of People v. Lacson,23 where it was written: The case may be revived by the State within the time-bar either by the refiling of the Information or by the filing of a new Information for the same offense or an offense necessarily included therein. There would be no need of a new preliminary investigation. However, in a case wherein after the provisional dismissal of a criminal case, the original witnesses of the prosecution or some of them may have recanted their testimonies or may have died or may no longer be available and new witnesses for the State have emerged, a new preliminary investigation must be conducted before an Information is refiled or a new Information is filed. A new preliminary investigation is also required if aside from the original accused, other persons are charged under a new criminal complaint for the same offense or necessarily included therein; or if under a new criminal complaint, the original charge has been upgraded; or if under a new criminal complaint, the criminal liability of the accused is upgraded from that as an accessory to that as a principal. The accused must be accorded the right to submit counter-affidavits and evidence. No such circumstance is obtaining in this case, because there was no modification in the nature of the charged offense.1avvphi1 Consequently, a new preliminary investigation is unnecessary and cannot be demanded by the petitioners. Finally, the third assigned error, that newly discovered evidence mandates due re-examination of the finding of prima facie cause to file the case, deserves scant consideration. For petitioners, it is necessary that a new investigation be conducted to consider newly discovered evidence, in particular, the Affidavit of COA Auditor Carlos G. Pornelos, author of the audit report. We are not convinced. Under Section 2, Rule 121 of the Rules of Court, the requisites for newly discovered evidence are: (a) the evidence was discovered after trial (in this case, after investigation); (b) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial with reasonable diligence; and (c) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching, and is of such weight that, if admitted, will probably change the judgment.24 The Pornelos affidavit, which petitioners claim as newly-discovered, was executed by affiant way back in November 29, 2000, as correctly found by the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, it cannot be considered as newly found evidence because it was already in existence prior to the re-filing of the case. In fact, such sworn affidavit was among the documents considered during the preliminary investigation. It was the sole annexed document to petitioners Supplement to Motion for Reinvestigation,25 offered to dispute the charge that no public bidding was conducted prior to the execution of the subject project. More important is the prosecutions statement in its Memorandum that, "after a careful re-evaluation of the documentary evidence available to the prosecution at the time of the filing of the initial Information, and at the time of the re-filing of the Information, the prosecution insists on the finding of probable cause, an exercise within the exclusive province of the Office of the Ombudsman."26 Worthy of note is the case of Soriano v. Marcelo,27 viz: Case law has it that the determination of probable cause against those in public office during a preliminary investigation is a function that belongs to the Office of the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman has the discretion to determine whether a criminal case, given its attendant facts and circumstances, should be filed or not. It is basically his call. Without good and compelling reasons, the Court cannot interfere in the exercise by the Office of the Ombudsman of its investigatory and prosecutory powers.28 The only ground upon which it may entertain a review of the Office of the Ombudsmans action is grave abuse of discretion.29 Grave abuse of discretion is an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act in contemplation of law as when the judgment rendered is not based on law and evidence but on caprice, whim and despotism.30 The special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is intended to correct errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The writ of certiorari is directed against a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function that acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion means such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. To justify the issuance of the writ of certiorari, the abuse of discretion must be grave, as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all, in contemplation of law, as to be equivalent to having acted without jurisdiction.31 The case at bench discloses no evident indication that respondent Sandiganbayan acted with arbitrariness, whim or caprice. It committed no error in refusing to order the conduct of another preliminary investigation. As sufficiently explained by the prosecution, a new preliminary investigation is not necessary as there was neither a modification of the nature of the offense charged nor a new allegation. Such conduct of preliminary investigation anew will only delay the resolution of the case and would be an exercise in futility in as much as there was a complete preliminary investigation actively participated by both petitioners. In view of the foregoing, we hold that the public respondent committed no grave abuse of discretion in issuing its Resolution of July 14, 2008, denying petitioners motion for preliminary investigation in Criminal Case No. SB-08 CRM 0263. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. SO ORDERED. JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA Associate Justice Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 182651 August 25, 2010

HEIRS OF JANE HONRALES, Petitioners, vs. JONATHAN HONRALES, Respondent. x-----------------------x G.R. No. 182657 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HEIRS OF JANE HONRALES, Petitioners, vs. JONATHAN HONRALES, Respondent. DECISION VILLARAMA, JR., J.: Before this Court are petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing the October 1, 2007 Decision1 and April 3, 2008 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 92755. The antecedents are as follows:

On August 19, 2002, Jane Honrales was fatally shot by her husband, respondent Jonathan Honrales. Thus, in a Resolution 3 dated October 28, 2002, Bernardino R. Camba, Assistant City Prosecutor of Manila, recommended the filing of an information for parricide against respondent. On November 18, 2002, the following Information4 was filed against respondent with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila: That on or about August 19, 2002, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and use personal violence upon one JANE HONRALES y ILAGAN, his legal wife, by then and there shooting her with a 45 cal. pistol, thereby inflicting upon the latter a gunshot wound of the head and neck which was the direct and immediate cause of her death thereafter. Contrary to law. On November 21, 2002, Judge Teresa P. Soriaso of the RTC of Manila, Branch 27, ordered respondents arrest.5 On November 22, 2002, respondent moved to reconsider6 the October 28, 2002 Resolution of Assistant City Prosecutor Camba which recommended the filing of parricide charges. Respondent later also filed a supplement to his motion. In view of respondents motion for reconsideration, 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Alfredo E. Ednave moved that the RTC defer proceedings.7 Respondent in turn filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Recall Warrant of Arrest,8which the public prosecutor opposed.9 On December 12, 2002, the RTC issued an Order10 deferring proceedings in view of the pendency of respondents motion for reconsideration. It, however, denied the motion to recall the arrest warrant since deferment of proceedings does not impair the validity of the information or otherwise render the same defective. Neither does it affect the jurisdiction of the court over the offense as would constitute a ground for quashing the information. The trial court further held that considering the evidence submitted, it finds probable cause for the issuance of the arrest warrant. On May 21, 2003, 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Laura D. Biglang-Awa filed a Motion for Leave to Conduct Reinvestigation11 with the RTC in light of the affidavit of one (1) Michelle C. Luna, which respondent, in his motion/supplemental motion for reconsideration, argues "will belie the statement of witness for the complainant, John James Honrales that the shooting of the victim . . . was intentional." On May 30, 2003, the RTC issued an Order12 granting leave to conduct the reinvestigation and authorizing 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Biglang-Awa to reinvestigate the case. On September 9, 2003, the heirs of the victim (petitioner heirs) moved before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila for the inhibition13 of 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Biglang-Awa from conducting the reinvestigation and praying that the case be remanded to the court for trial.14 On September 25, 2003, City Prosecutor Ramon R. Garcia issued Office Order No. 164015 reassigning the case to Assistant City Prosecutor Antonio R. Rebagay. Hearings were scheduled on October 15 and 22, 2003. On October 15, 2003, both parties appeared but petitioner heirs manifested that they earlier moved to reconsider Office Order No. 1640. Respondent moved that he be given up to October 22, 2003 to file an opposition. On October 22, 2003, respondent filed his opposition. Counsel for petitioner heirs then manifested that they be given until November 5, 2003 to submit a reply thereto. On November 17, 2003, Assistant City Prosecutor Rebagay issued an Order16 denying petitioners motion to reconsider Office Order No. 1640 and set the continuation of the hearings on December 3 and 10, 2003. On December 3, 2003, both parties appeared. Petitioner heirs moved that the hearing be suspended on the ground that they have filed a petition for review before the Department of Justice (DOJ) to assail the Order of November 17, 2003. Respondents counsel objected in view of the presence of their witness Michelle Luna. Thus, the hearing proceeded. After the hearing, petitioner heirs moved for the cancellation of the December 10, 2003 hearing and filed a formal motion to that effect. On December 15, 2003, respondent filed a Motion and Manifestation praying that the case be submitted for resolution or, in the alternative, that it be set for final clarificatory hearing on December 22, 2003. The following day or on December 16, 2003, Assistant City Prosecutor Rebagay issued an Order denying the prayers for suspension and submission of the case for resolution and instead set the hearing on December 22, 2003. On December 19, 2003, however, Assistant City Prosecutor Rebagay issued a Resolution17 setting aside the October 28, 2002 Resolution and recommending the withdrawal of the information for parricide and the filing of an information for reckless imprudence resulting in parricide in its stead. City Prosecutor Garcia approved the Resolution. On January 16, 2004, Assistant City Prosecutor Rebagay filed with the RTC a motion to withdraw the information for parricide.18 On January 28, 2004, while the Motion to Withdraw Information was still pending, an Information19 for Reckless Imprudence resulting in Parricide was filed against respondent before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila. The Information reads, That on or about August 19, 2002, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being then in possession of a 45 cal. pistol, did then and there unlawfully and feloniously, after removing the bullets of the gun in a careless, reckless, negligent and imprudent manner playfully poked the gun to his maid, son and to his wife, by then and there accidentally shooting upon one JANE HONRALES, his legal wife, inflicting upon the latter a gun shot wound of the head and the neck which was the direct and immediate cause of her death thereafter. CONTRARY TO LAW. Determined to have respondent prosecuted for parricide, petitioner heirs filed a petition for review20 with the DOJ questioning the downgrading of the offense. They likewise filed an Opposition to Motion to Withdraw Information21with the RTC arguing that there was no final resolution yet downgrading the charge against respondent that would justify withdrawal of the Information for parricide.

On February 17, 2004, petitioner heirs filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Defer Proceedings22 with the RTC to give time to the DOJ Secretary to resolve their petition for review. On March 17, 2004, the DOJ, through Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuo, dismissed the petitions for review assailing (1) the Order dated November 17, 2003 of Assistant City Prosecutor Rebagay denying the urgent motion to reconsider Office Order No. 1640 and (2) the Resolution dated December 19, 2003 finding probable cause against respondent for reckless imprudence resulting in parricide, instead of intentional parricide as charged.23 Petitioner heirs moved to reconsider24 the Resolution, and the RTC of Manila issued an Order25 on April 14, 2004, holding in abeyance the resolution of the pending incidents in the parricide case in view of the said motion for reconsideration. On May 14, 2004, the DOJ, through Chief State Prosecutor Zuo, denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.26Thus, Judge Soriaso of the RTC of Manila issued an Order27 on May 28, 2004 considering the motion to withdraw the Information submitted for resolution. Undaunted by the denial of their motion for reconsideration, however, petitioners again filed a petition for review28with the DOJ on June 14, 2004, assailing said denial. Said petition, however, was dismissed with finality by the DOJ in a Resolution29 dated July 14, 2004. Contending that the petition for review before the DOJ questioning the downgrading of the offense was no longer an impediment to the resolution of the pending Motion to Withdraw Information, respondent promptly filed with the RTC a Manifestation with Reiteration to Resolve the Motion to Withdraw Information.30 On August 5, 2004, petitioner heirs appealed31 the dismissal of their petitions to the Office of the President (OP). Thus, on August 6, 2004, Judge Soriaso reiterated her previous ruling to hold in abeyance the resolution of the motion to withdraw in deference to the appeal taking its course before the OP.32 In the meantime, on October 11, 2004, respondent was arraigned before the MeTC and pleaded guilty to the charge of reckless imprudence resulting in parricide. He was accordingly sentenced to suffer the penalty of one (1) year, seven (7) months and eleven (11) days to two (2) years, ten (10) months and twenty (20) days of prision correccional.33 On October 27, 2004, respondent filed with the RTC a motion34 seeking to dismiss the parricide charges against him. He cited his arraignment and conviction by the MeTC as grounds for the dismissal of the case against him. On October 28, 2004, petitioner heirs filed with the MeTC a motion 35 to nullify the proceedings held on October 11, 2004. They claimed that they were denied procedural due process since October 11, 2004 was not the agreed date for respondents arraignment but October 18, 2004. They also argued that the Information before the MeTC was invalid. On December 6, 2004, the OP dismissed petitioner heirs appeal of the DOJ Resolution. 36 Petitioner heirs promptly moved to reconsider the OPs dismissal of their appeal, but their motion was denied by Resolution37dated April 20, 2005. On May 5, 2005, respondent moved for Judge Soriasos inhibition38 alleging bias in favor of the prosecution as shown by her continued inaction on his motion to withdraw Information. On June 6, 2005, petitioner heirs filed before the CA an appeal by certiorari 39 under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing the denial by the OP of their motion for reconsideration. On June 30, 2005, Judge Soriaso inhibited herself from the case.40 The case was eventually re-raffled off to Branch 54 presided over by Judge Manuel M. Barrios. Shortly thereafter, Judge Barrios issued an Order41 on September 26, 2005 granting the withdrawal of the Information for parricide and recalling the warrant of arrest issued against respondent. Judge Barrios ruled that the Information for parricide found itself without a supporting resolution and thus its withdrawal was appropriate. On October 14, 2005, petitioner heirs filed a motion for reconsideration 42 of the September 26, 2005 Order but their motion was noted without action on November 3, 2005, as it was made without the approval or intervention of the Public Prosecutor.43 On January 9, 2006, petitioner heirs filed a petition for certiorari 44 with the CA assailing the September 26, 2005 and November 3, 2005 Orders issued by the RTC through Judge Barrios. Petitioner heirs argued that Judge Barrios granted the motion to withdraw the Information for parricide on grounds other than his personal and independent findings. They likewise contended that Judge Barrios should not have granted the withdrawal of the Information and recall of the arrest warrant since he knew that their appeal with the CA disputing the downgrading of the offense was still pending. Petitioner heirs further argued that the adoption of a contrary stand by the prosecutor after the filing of the Information for parricide should not bar them from prosecuting the case actively sans supervision and intervention of the prosecutor. On August 16, 2006, petitioner heirs filed a Motion to Implead the People of the Philippines as party respondent.45On August 31, 2006, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a similar motion46 and further prayed that it be furnished a copy of the petition and be given time to file its comment. On October 10, 2006, the CA granted the motions.47 On October 1, 2007, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari. Though it found that Judge Barrios failed to make an independent assessment of the merits of the case and thus abdicated his judicial power and acted as a mere surrogate of the Secretary of Justice, it ruled that the remand of the case to the RTC would serve no useful purpose since it may result in the reopening of the parricide case which would violate respondents constitutional right against double jeopardy. Petitioner heirs and the OSG moved to reconsider the CA decision, but their motions were denied on April 3, 2008. Hence, they filed the present consolidated petitions raising the sole issue of whether the remand of the parricide case to the trial court will violate respondents constitutional right against double jeopardy. Petitioner heirs argue that the MeTC did not validly acquire jurisdiction over the case for parricide through reckless imprudence and that jurisdiction remained with the RTC where the Information for parricide was filed. They also assail the filing with the MeTC of the Information for the downgraded offense after a supposedly dubious reinvestigation and question the hasty arraignment of accused which was done allegedly without notice to petitioner heirs and without them being furnished with the result of the reinvestigation. They even claim that they were not furnished with a copy of the motion for leave to conduct reinvestigation as it was sent to the

wrong address. Petitioner heirs further argue that when respondent immediately pleaded guilty to the charge for reckless imprudence without notice to them, such a plea cannot be legally invoked in respondents defense of double jeopardy. Also, the Information for parricide was still pending with the RTC when accused was hastily arraigned for the downgraded offense. Thus, not all requisites of double jeopardy are present. The OSG, for its part, argues that the MeTC could not have validly acquired jurisdiction over the case for the same offense of parricide or any offense necessarily included therein because the prosecutions motion to withdraw the Information for parricide before the RTC remained unacted upon by the said court. Respondent, on the other hand, maintains that if the petition is granted, it would violate his right against double jeopardy. The first jeopardy has already attached because there was a valid indictment, arraignment and plea and the proceedings were already terminated as he is already serving sentence and has applied for probation. He also contends that proceeding with reinvestigation was justified since the principal action can continue if there is no order from the appellate court to stop the proceedings. He further argues that petitioner heirs have no right to file this appeal especially since the appeal was filed by petitioner heirs without the public prosecutors conformity. Respondent likewise contends that it is already too late for petitioner heirs to question the validity of the MeTC proceedings since its decision has become final and executory, no appeal having been taken from the decision. Also, petitioner heirs failed to present evidence to prove that there was fraud in the reinvestigation and subsequent plea to a lesser offense. We grant the petitions. It is beyond cavil that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting the withdrawal of the Information for parricide and recalling the warrant of arrest without making an independent assessment of the merits of the case and the evidence on record.48 By relying solely on the manifestation of the public prosecutor that it is abiding by the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice, the trial court abdicated its judicial power and refused to perform a positive duty enjoined by law. What remains for our resolution is whether the case may be remanded to the RTC without violating respondents right against double jeopardy. On this question, we find the answer to be in the affirmative. Section 7, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended provides: SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information. xxxx Thus, double jeopardy exists when the following requisites are present: (1) a first jeopardy attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first. A first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused has been acquitted or convicted, or the case dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.49 In this case, the MeTC took cognizance of the Information for reckless imprudence resulting in parricide while the criminal case for parricide was still pending before the RTC. In Dioquino v. Cruz, Jr.,50 we held that once jurisdiction is acquired by the court in which the Information is filed, it is there retained. Therefore, as the offense of reckless imprudence resulting in parricide was included in the charge for intentional parricide51 pending before the RTC, the MeTC clearly had no jurisdiction over the criminal case filed before it, the RTC having retained jurisdiction over the offense to the exclusion of all other courts. The requisite that the judgment be rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is therefore absent. A decision rendered without jurisdiction is not a decision in contemplation of law and can never become executory.52 WHEREFORE, the present petitions are GRANTED. The Decision dated October 1, 2007 and Resolution dated April 3, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 92755 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Consequently, the September 26, 2005 and November 3, 2005 Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 54 are hereby NULLIFIED and said trial court is hereby DIRECTED to REINSTATE Criminal Case No. 02-207976 for parricide for appropriate criminal proceedings. No costs. SO ORDERED. MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. Nos. 172476-99 September 15, 2010

BRIG. GEN. (Ret.) JOSE RAMISCAL, JR., Petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents. DECISION CARPIO, J.:

The Case This is a special civil action for certiorari1 seeking to annul the 5 April 2006 Resolution2 of the SandiganbayanFourth Division in Criminal Case Nos. 25122-45. The assailed Resolution denied petitioners motion to set aside his arraignment on 26 February 2006 pending resolution of his motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsmans finding of probable cause against him. The Facts Petitioner Jose S. Ramiscal, Jr. was a retired officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), with the rank of Brigadier General, when he served as President of the AFP-Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS) from 5 April 1994 to 27 July 1998.3 During petitioners term as president of AFP-RSBS, the Board of Trustees of AFP-RSBS approved the acquisition of 15,020 square meters of land situated in General Santos City for development as housing projects.4 On 1 August 1997, AFP-RSBS, represented by petitioner, and Atty. Nilo J. Flaviano, as attorney-in-fact of the 12 individual vendors,5 executed and signed bilateral deeds of sale over the subject property, at the agreed price ofP10,500.00 per square meter. Petitioner forthwith caused the payment to the individual vendors of the purchase price of P10,500.00 per square meter of the property. Subsequently, Flaviano executed and signed unilateral deeds of sale over the same property. The unilateral deeds of sale reflected a purchase price of only P3,000.00 per square meter instead of the actual purchase price of P10,500.00 per square meter. On 24 September 1997, Flaviano presented the unilateral deeds of sale for registration. The unilateral deeds of sale became the basis of the transfer certificates of title issued by the Register of Deeds of General Santos City to AFP-RSBS.6 On 18 December 1997, Luwalhati R. Antonino, the Congresswoman representing the first district of South Cotabato, which includes General Santos City, filed in the Ombudsman a complaint-affidavit7 against petitioner, along with 27 other respondents, for (1) violation of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; and (2) malversation of public funds or property through falsification of public documents. The case was docketed as Case No. OMB-3-98-0020. After preliminary investigation, the Ombudsman, in its 20 January 1999 Resolution,8 found petitioner probably guilty of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 and falsification of public documents, thus: WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Office finds and so holds that the following crimes were committed and that respondents, whose names appear below, are probably guilty thereof: xxxx 4. JOSE RAMISCAL, JR., WILFREDO PABALAN, NILO FLAVIANO, conspirators for twelve (12) counts of falsification of public documents relative to the twelve (12) unilateral Deeds of Sale; xxxx 6. JOSE RAMISCAL, JR. WILFREDO PABALAN, and NILO FLAVIANO twelve (12) counts of violation of section 3(e) of RA 3019 for shortchanging the government in the correct amount of taxes due for the sale of Lot X to AFP-RSBS;9 On 28 January 1999, the Ombudsman filed in the Sandiganbayan 12 informations 10 for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 and 12 informations11 for falsification of public documents against petitioner and several other co-accused. Petitioner filed his first motion for reconsideration dated 12 February 1999,12 with a supplemental motion dated 28 May 1999,13 of the Ombudsmans finding of probable cause against him. In its 11 June 1999 Order,14 the Sandiganbayan disposed of petitioners first motion for reconsideration, thus: WHEREFORE, the prosecution is given 60 days from today within which to evaluate its evidence and to do whatever is appropriate on the Motion for Reconsideration dated February 12, 1999 and supplemental motion thereof dated May 28, 1999 of accused Jose Ramiscal and to inform this Court within the said period as to its findings and recommendations together with the action thereon of the Ombudsman. In a memorandum dated 22 November 2001, the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OMB-OSP) recommended that petitioner be excluded from the informations. On review, the Office of Legal Affairs (OMB-OLA), in a memorandum dated 18 December 2001, recommended the contrary, stressing that petitioner participated in and affixed his signature on the contracts to sell, bilateral deeds of sale, and various agreements, vouchers, and checks for the purchase of the subject property.15 The memoranda of OMB-OSP and OMB-OLA were forwarded for comment to the Office of the Ombudsman for Military (OMB-Military). In a memorandum dated 21 August 2002, the OMB-Military adopted the memorandum of OMB-OSP recommending the dropping of petitioners name from the informations. Acting Ombudsman Margarito Gervacio approved the recommendation of the OMB-Military. However, the recommendation of the OMB-Military was not manifested before the Sandiganbayan as a final disposition of petitioners first motion for reconsideration. A panel of prosecutors16 was tasked to review the records of the case. After thorough review, the panel of prosecutors found that petitioner indeed participated in and affixed his signature on the contracts to sell, bilateral deeds of sale, and various agreements, vouchers, and checks for the purchase of the property at the price ofP10,500.00 per square meter. The panel of prosecutors posited that petitioner could not feign ignorance of the execution of the unilateral deeds of sale, which indicated the false purchase price of P3,000.00 per square meter. The panel of prosecutors concluded that probable cause existed for petitioners continued prosecution. In its 19 December 2005 memorandum,17 the panel of prosecutors recommended the following: WHEREFORE, premises considered, undersigned prosecutors recommend the following: 1. The August 2002 approved Recommendation of the Ombudsman-Military be set aside and the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Ramiscal (petitioner) be DENIED;

2. Another information for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 be filed against Ramiscal and all the other accused for causing damage to the government when it caused the payment of the amount of Php 10,500.00 per square meter for the subject lots when the actual amount should only be Php 3,000.00 per square meter.18 (Emphasis supplied) Ombudsman Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez approved the recommendation of the panel of prosecutors. Upon receipt of the final findings of the Ombudsman, the Sandiganbayan scheduled the arraignment of petitioner. Meanwhile, on 26 January 2006, petitioner filed his second motion for reconsideration19 of the Ombudsmans finding of probable cause against him. On 26 February 2006, petitioner was arraigned. For his refusal to enter a plea, the Sandiganbayan entered in his favor a plea of not guilty. On 9 March 2006, petitioner filed a motion to set aside his arraignment 20 pending resolution of his second motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsmans finding of probable cause against him. The Ruling of the Sandiganbayan The Sandiganbayan pointed out that petitioners second motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsmans finding of probable cause against him was a prohibited pleading. The Sandiganbayan explained that whatever defense or evidence petitioner may have should be ventilated in the trial of the case. In its assailed 5 April 2006 Resolution, the Sandiganbayan denied for lack of merit petitioners motion to set aside his arraignment, thus: WHEREFORE, the Motion to Set Aside Arraignment is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.21 The Issue Did the Sandiganbayan commit grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioners motion to set aside his arraignment pending resolution of his second motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsmans finding of probable cause against him? The Courts Ruling The petition has no merit. Petitioner contends that the Ombudsman should have excluded him from the informations. He claims lack of probable cause to indict him considering the prior findings of the Ombudsman recommending the dropping of the cases against him. Petitioner claims that heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates and that there should be grounds other than the mere signature appearing on a questioned document to sustain a conspiracy charge. Respondent Sandiganbayan counters that it correctly denied petitioners motion to set aside his arraignment. Respondent court argues that petitioners motion for reconsideration, filed on 26 January 2006 and pending with the Ombudsman at the time of his arraignment, violated Section 7, Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended. Respondent court maintains that the memorandum of the panel of prosecutors finding probable cause against petitioner was the final decision of the Ombudsman. The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended by Administrative Order No. 15, Series of 2001,22 sanction the immediate filing of an information in the proper court upon a finding of probable cause, even during the pendency of a motion for reconsideration. Section 7, Rule II of the Rules, as amended, provides: Section 7. Motion for Reconsideration. a) Only one motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation of an approved order or resolution shall be allowed, the same to be filed within five (5) days from notice thereof with the Office of the Ombudsman, or the proper Deputy Ombudsman as the case may be, with corresponding leave of court in cases where the information has already been filed in court; b) The filing of a motion for reconsideration/reinvestigation shall not bar the filing of the corresponding information in Court on the basis of the finding of probable cause in the resolution subject of the motion.(Emphasis supplied) If the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the resolution finding probable cause cannot bar the filing of the corresponding information, then neither can it bar the arraignment of the accused, which in the normal course of criminal procedure logically follows the filing of the information. An arraignment is that stage where, in the mode and manner required by the Rules, an accused, for the first time, is granted the opportunity to know the precise charge that confronts him. The accused is formally informed of the charges against him, to which he enters a plea of guilty or not guilty.23 Under Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8493, 24 otherwise known as the Speedy Trial Act of 1998, the court must proceed with the arraignment of an accused within 30 days from the filing of the information or from the date the accused has appeared before the court in which the charge is pending, whichever is later, thus: Section 7. Time Limit Between Filing of Information and Arraignment and Between Arraignment and Trial. - The arraignment of an accused shall be held within thirty (30) days from the filing of the information, or from the date the accused has appeared before the justice, judge or court in which the charge is pending, whichever date last occurs. x x x (Emphasis supplied) Section 1(g), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, which implements Section 7 of RA 8493, provides: Section 1. Arraignment and plea; how made.

(g) Unless a shorter period is provided by special law or Supreme Court circular, the arraignment shall be held within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused. xxx (Emphasis supplied) Section 1(g), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court and the last clause of Section 7 of RA 8493 mean the same thing, that the 30-day period shall be counted from the time the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused, which is when the accused appears before the court. The grounds for suspension of arraignment are provided under Section 11, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, which applies suppletorily in matters not provided under the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman or the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan, thus: Sec. 11. Suspension of arraignment. Upon motion by the proper party, the arraignment shall be suspended in the following cases: (a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which effectively renders him unable to fully understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto. In such case, the court shall order his mental examination and, if necessary, his confinement for such purpose. (b) There exists a prejudicial question; and (c) A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at either the Department of Justice, or the Office of the President; provided, that the period of suspension shall not exceed sixty (60) days counted from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office.25 Petitioner failed to show that any of the instances constituting a valid ground for suspension of arraignment obtained in this case. Thus, the Sandiganbayan committed no error when it proceeded with petitioners arraignment, as mandated by Section 7 of RA 8493. Further, as correctly pointed out by the Sandiganbayan in its assailed Resolution, petitioners motion for reconsideration filed on 26 January 2006 was already his second motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsmans finding of probable cause against him. The Ombudsman, in its 19 December 2005 memorandum, has already denied petitioners first motion for reconsideration,26 impugning for the first time the Ombudsmans finding of probable cause against him. Under Section 7, Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, petitioner can no longer file another motion for reconsideration questioning yet again the same finding of the Ombudsman. Otherwise, there will be no end to litigation. We agree with the Sandiganbayan that petitioners defenses are evidentiary in nature and are best threshed out in the trial of the case on the merits. Petitioners claim that the Ombudsman made conflicting conclusions on the existence of probable cause against him is baseless. The memorandum of the OMB-Military, recommending the dropping of the cases against petitioner, has been effectively overruled by the memorandum of the panel of prosecutors, thus: WHEREFORE, premises considered, undersigned prosecutors recommend the following: 1. The August 2002 approved Recommendation of the Ombudsman-Military be set aside and the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Ramiscal be DENIED;27 (Emphasis supplied) As the final word on the matter, the decision of the panel of prosecutors finding probable cause against petitioner prevails. This Court does not ordinarily interfere with the Ombudsmans finding of probable cause.28 The Ombudsman is endowed with a wide latitude of investigatory and prosecutory prerogatives in the exercise of its power to pass upon criminal complaints. 29 As this Court succinctly stated in Alba v. Hon. Nitorreda:30 Moreover, this Court has consistently refrained from interfering with the exercise by the Ombudsman of his constitutionally mandated investigatory and prosecutory powers. Otherwise stated, it is beyond the ambit of this Court to review the exercise of discretion of the Ombudsman in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint filed before it. Such initiative and independence are inherent in the Ombudsman who, beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people and preserver of the integrity of the public service.31 In Ocampo, IV v. Ombudsman,32 the Court explained the rationale behind this policy, thus: The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in much the same way that the courts would be extremely swamped if they could be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.33 Significantly, while it is the Ombudsman who has the full discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in the Sandiganbayan, once the case has been filed with said court, it is the Sandiganbayan, and no longer the Ombudsman, which has full control of the case.341avvphi1 In this case, petitioner failed to establish that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied petitioners motion to set aside his arraignment. There is grave abuse of discretion when power is exercised in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility so patent and gross as to amount to evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law.35 Absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion, this Court will not interfere with the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction and control over a case properly filed before it. The Sandiganbayan is empowered to proceed with the trial of the case in the manner it determines best conducive to orderly proceedings and speedy termination of the case.36There being no showing of grave abuse of discretion on its part, the Sandiganbayan should continue its proceedings with all deliberate dispatch. We remind respondent to abide by this Courts ruling in Republic v. Sandiganbayan,37 where we stated that the mere filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court does not by itself merit a suspension of the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan, unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against the Sandiganbayan. Section 7, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court so provides:

Section 7. Expediting proceedings; injunctive relief. The court in which the petition [for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus] is filed may issue orders expediting the proceedings, and it may also grant a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings.The petition shall not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against the public respondent from further proceeding in the case. (Emphasis supplied) WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the assailed 5 April 2006 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 25122-45, which denied petitioners motion to set aside his arraignment. This Decision is immediately executory. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED. ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 162336 February 1, 2010

HILARIO P. SORIANO, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS (BSP), PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION (PDIC), PUBLIC PROSECUTOR ANTONIO C.BUAN, and STATE PROSECUTOR ALBERTO R. FONACIER, Respondents. DECISION DEL CASTILLO, J.: A bank officer violates the DOSRI2 law when he acquires bank funds for his personal benefit, even if such acquisition was facilitated by a fraudulent loan application. Directors, officers, stockholders, and their related interests cannot be allowed to interpose the fraudulent nature of the loan as a defense to escape culpability for their circumvention of Section 83 of Republic Act (RA) No. 337.3 Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari4 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the September 26, 2003 Decision 5 and the February 5, 2004 Resolution6 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 67657. The challenged Decision disposed as follows: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby DENIED.7 Factual Antecedents Sometime in 2000, the Office of Special Investigation (OSI) of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), through its officers,8 transmitted a letter9 dated March 27, 2000 to Jovencito Zuo, Chief State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice (DOJ). The letter attached as annexes five affidavits,10 which would allegedly serve as bases for filing criminal charges for Estafa thru Falsification of Commercial Documents, in relation to Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1689,11 and for Violation of Section 83 of RA 337, as amended by PD 1795,12 against, inter alia, petitioner herein Hilario P. Soriano. These five affidavits, along with other documents, stated that spouses Enrico and Amalia Carlos appeared to have an outstanding loan of P8 million with the Rural Bank of San Miguel (Bulacan), Inc. (RBSM), but had never applied for nor received such loan; that it was petitioner, who was then president of RBSM, who had ordered, facilitated, and received the proceeds of the loan; and that the P8 million loan had never been authorized by RBSM's Board of Directors and no report thereof had ever been submitted to the Department of Rural Banks, Supervision and Examination Sector of the BSP. The letter of the OSI, which was not subscribed under oath, ended with a request that a preliminary investigation be conducted and the corresponding criminal charges be filed against petitioner at his last known address. Acting on the letter-request and its annexes, State Prosecutor Albert R. Fonacier proceeded with the preliminary investigation. He issued a subpoena with the witnesses affidavits and supporting documents attached, and required petitioner to file his counteraffidavit. In due course, the investigating officer issued a Resolution finding probable cause and correspondingly filed two separate informations against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan.13 The first Information,14 dated November 14, 2000 and docketed as Criminal Case No. 237-M-2001, was for estafa through falsification of commercial documents, under Article 315, paragraph 1(b), of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), in relation to Article 172 of the RPC and PD 1689. It basically alleged that petitioner and his co-accused, in abuse of the confidence reposed in them as RBSM officers, caused the falsification of a number of loan documents, making it appear that one Enrico Carlos filled up the same, and thereby succeeded in securing a loan and converting the loan proceeds for their personal gain and benefit.15 The information reads: That in or about the month of April, 1997, and thereafter, in San Miguel, Bulacan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused HILARIO P. SORIANO and ROSALINDA ILAGAN, as principals by direct participation, with unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence and taking advantage of their position as President of the Rural Bank of San Miguel (Bulacan), Inc. and Branch Manager of the Rural Bank of San Miguel San Miguel Branch [sic], a duly organized banking institution under Philippine Laws, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there, willfully and feloniously falsify loan documents consisting of undated loan application/information sheet, credit proposal dated April 14, 1997, credit proposal dated April 22, 1997, credit investigation report dated April 15, 1997, promissory note dated April 23, 1997, disclosure statement on loan/credit transaction dated April 23, 1997, and other related documents, by making it appear that one Enrico Carlos filled up the application/information sheet and filed the aforementioned loan documents when in truth and in fact Enrico Carlos did not participate in the execution of said loan documents and that by virtue of said falsification and with deceit and intent to cause damage, the accused succeeded in securing a loan in the amount of eight million pesos (PhP8,000,000.00) from the Rural Bank of San Miguel San Ildefonso branch in the name of Enrico Carlos which amount of PhP8 million representing the loan proceeds the accused thereafter converted the same amount to their own personal gain and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the Rural Bank of San Miguel San Ildefonso branch, its creditors, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, and the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation. CONTRARY TO LAW.16 The other Information17 dated November 10, 2000 and docketed as Criminal Case No. 238-M-2001, was for violation of Section 83 of RA 337, as amended by PD 1795. The said provision refers to the prohibition against the so-called DOSRI loans. The information alleged that, in his capacity as President of RBSM, petitioner indirectly secured an P8 million loan with RBSM, for his personal use and benefit, without the written consent and approval of the bank's Board of Directors, without entering the said transaction in the bank's records, and without transmitting a copy of the transaction to the supervising department of the bank. His ruse was facilitated by placing the loan in the name of an unsuspecting RBSM depositor, one Enrico Carlos.18 The information reads: That in or about the month of April, 1997, and thereafter, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, in his capacity as President of the Rural Bank of San Miguel (Bulacan), Inc., did then and there, willfully and feloniously indirectly borrow or secure a loan with the Rural Bank of San Miguel San Ildefonso branch, a domestic rural banking institution created, organized and existing under Philippine laws, amounting to eight million pesos (PhP8,000,000.00), knowing fully well that the same has been done by him without the written consent and approval of the majority of the board of directors of the said bank, and which consent and approval the said accused deliberately failed to obtain and enter the same upon the records of said banking institution and to transmit a copy thereof to the supervising department of the said bank, as required by the General Banking Act, by using the name of

one depositor Enrico Carlos of San Miguel, Bulacan, the latter having no knowledge of the said loan, and one in possession of the said amount of eight million pesos (PhP8,000,000.00), accused converted the same to his own personal use and benefit, in flagrant violation of the said law. CONTRARY TO LAW.19 Both cases were raffled to Branch 79 of the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan.20 On June 8, 2001, petitioner moved to quash21 these informations on two grounds: that the court had no jurisdiction over the offense charged, and that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. On the first ground, petitioner argued that the letter transmitted by the BSP to the DOJ constituted the complaint and hence was defective for failure to comply with the mandatory requirements of Section 3(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, such as the statement of address of petitioner and oath and subscription.22 Moreover, petitioner argued that the officers of OSI, who were the signatories to the "letter-complaint," were not authorized by the BSP Governor, much less by the Monetary Board, to file the complaint. According to petitioner, this alleged fatal oversight violated Section 18, pars. (c) and (d) of the New Central Bank Act (RA 7653). On the second ground, petitioner contended that the commission of estafa under paragraph 1(b) of Article 315 of the RPC is inherently incompatible with the violation of DOSRI law (as set out in Section 83 23 of RA 337, as amended by PD 1795), 24 hence a person cannot be charged for both offenses. He argued that a violation of DOSRI law requires the offender to obtain a loan from his bank, without complying with procedural, reportorial, or ceiling requirements. On the other hand, estafa under par. 1(b), Article 315 of the RPC requires the offender to misappropriate or convert something that he holds in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to return the same.25 Essentially, the petitioner theorized that the characterization of possession is different in the two offenses. If petitioner acquired the loan as DOSRI, he owned the loaned money and therefore, cannot misappropriate or convert it as contemplated in the offense of estafa. Conversely, if petitioner committed estafa, then he merely held the money in trust for someone else and therefore, did not acquire a loan in violation of DOSRI rules. Ruling of the Regional Trial Court In an Order26 dated August 8, 2001, the trial court denied petitioner's Motion to Quash for lack of merit. The lower court agreed with the prosecution that the assailed OSI letter was not the complaint-affidavit itself; thus, it need not comply with the requirements under the Rules of Court. The trial court held that the affidavits, which were attached to the OSI letter, comprised the complaintaffidavit in the case. Since these affidavits were duly subscribed and sworn to before a notary public, there was adequate compliance with the Rules. The trial court further held that the two offenses were separate and distinct violations, hence the prosecution of one did not pose a bar to the other.27 Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied in an Order dated September 5, 2001.28 Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari29 with the CA, reiterating his arguments before the trial court. Ruling of the Court of Appeals The CA denied the petition on both issues presented by petitioner. On the first issue, the CA determined that the BSP letter, which petitioner characterized to be a fatally infirm complaint, was not actually a complaint, but a transmittal or cover letter only. This transmittal letter merely contained a summary of the affidavits which were attached to it. It did not contain any averment of personal knowledge of the events and transactions that constitute the elements of the offenses charged. Being a mere transmittal letter, it need not comply with the requirements of Section 3(a) of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.30 The CA further determined that the five affidavits attached to the transmittal letter should be considered as the complaint-affidavits that charged petitioner with violation of Section 83 of RA 337 and for Estafa thru Falsification of Commercial Documents. These complaint-affidavits complied with the mandatory requirements set out in the Rules of Court they were subscribed and sworn to before a notary public and subsequently certified by State Prosecutor Fonacier, who personally examined the affiants and was convinced that the affiants fully understood their sworn statements.31 Anent the second ground, the CA found no merit in petitioner's argument that the violation of the DOSRI law and the commission of estafa thru falsification of commercial documents are inherently inconsistent with each other. It explained that the test in considering a motion to quash on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, is whether the facts alleged, when hypothetically admitted, constitute the elements of the offense charged. The appellate court held that this test was sufficiently met because the allegations in the assailed informations, when hypothetically admitted, clearly constitute the elements of Estafa thru Falsification of Commercial Documents and Violation of DOSRI law.32 Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration33 was likewise denied for lack of merit. Hence, this petition. Issues Restated, petitioner raises the following issues34 for our consideration: I Whether the complaint complied with the mandatory requirements provided under Section 3(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court and Section 18, paragraphs (c) and (d) of RA 7653. II

Whether a loan transaction within the ambit of the DOSRI law (violation of Section 83 of RA 337, as amended) could also be the subject of Estafa under Article 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code. III Is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 the proper remedy against an Order denying a Motion to Quash? IV Whether petitioner is entitled to a writ of injunction. Our Ruling The petition lacks merit. First Issue: Whether the complaint complied with the mandatory requirements provided under Section 3(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court and Section 18, paragraphs (c) and (d) of Republic Act No. 7653 Petitioner moved to withdraw the first issue from the instant petition On March 5, 2007, the Court noted35 petitioner's Manifestation and Motion for Partial Withdrawal of the Petition36dated February 7, 2007. In the said motion, petitioner informed the Court of the promulgation of a Decision entitledSoriano v. Hon. Casanova,37 which also involved petitioner and similar BSP letters to the DOJ. According to petitioner, the said Decision allegedly ruled squarely on the nature of the BSP letters and the validity of the sworn affidavits attached thereto. For this reason, petitioner moved for the partial withdrawal of the instant petition insofar as it involved the issue of "whether or not a court can legally acquire jurisdiction over a complaint which failed to comply with the mandatory requirements provided under Section 3(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court and Section 18, paragraphs (c) and (d) of RA 7653".38 Given that the case had already been submitted for resolution of the Court when petitioner filed his latest motion, and that all respondents had presented their positions and arguments on the first issue, the Court deems it proper to rule on the same. In Soriano v. Hon. Casanova, the Court held that the affidavits attached to the BSP transmittal letter complied with the mandatory requirements under the Rules of Court. To be sure, the BSP letters involved in Soriano v. Hon. Casanova39 are not the same as the BSP letter involved in the instant case. However, the BSP letters in Soriano v. Hon. Casanova and the BSP letter subject of this case are similar in the sense that they are all signed by the OSI officers of the BSP, they were not sworn to by the said officers, they all contained summaries of their attached affidavits, and they all requested the conduct of a preliminary investigation and the filing of corresponding criminal charges against petitioner Soriano. Thus, the principle of stare decisis dictates that the ruling in Soriano v. Hon. Casanova be applied in the instant case once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument.40 We held in Soriano v. Hon. Casanova, after a close scrutiny of the letters transmitted by the BSP to the DOJ, that these were not intended to be the complaint, as envisioned under the Rules. They did not contain averments of personal knowledge of the events and transactions constitutive of any offense. The letters merely transmitted for preliminary investigation the affidavits of people who had personal knowledge of the acts of petitioner. We ruled that these affidavits, not the letters transmitting them, initiated the preliminary investigation. Since these affidavits were subscribed under oath by the witnesses who executed them before a notary public, then there was substantial compliance with Section 3(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. Anent the contention that there was no authority from the BSP Governor or the Monetary Board to file a criminal case against Soriano, we held that the requirements of Section 18, paragraphs (c) and (d) of RA 7653 did not apply because the BSP did not institute the complaint but merely transmitted the affidavits of the complainants to the DOJ. We further held that since the offenses for which Soriano was charged were public crimes, authority holds that it can be initiated by "any competent person" with personal knowledge of the acts committed by the offender. Thus, the witnesses who executed the affidavits clearly fell within the purview of "any competent person" who may institute the complaint for a public crime. The ruling in Soriano v. Hon. Casanova has been adopted and elaborated upon in the recent case of Santos-Concio v. Department of Justice.41 Instead of a transmittal letter from the BSP, the Court in Santos-Concio was faced with an NBI-NCR Report, likewise with affidavits of witnesses as attachments. Ruling on the validity of the witnesses sworn affidavits as bases for a preliminary investigation, we held: The Court is not unaware of the practice of incorporating all allegations in one document denominated as "complaint-affidavit." It does not pronounce strict adherence to only one approach, however, for there are cases where the extent of ones personal knowledge may not cover the entire gamut of details material to the alleged offense. The private offended party or relative of the deceased may not even have witnessed the fatality, in which case the peace officer or law enforcer has to rely chiefly on affidavits of witnesses. The Rules do not in fact preclude the attachment of a referral or transmittal letter similar to that of the NBI-NCR. Thus, in Soriano v. Casanova, the Court held: A close scrutiny of the letters transmitted by the BSP and PDIC to the DOJ shows that these were not intended to be the complaint envisioned under the Rules. It may be clearly inferred from the tenor of the letters that the officers merely intended to transmit the affidavits of the bank employees to the DOJ. Nowhere in the transmittal letters is there any averment on the part of the BSP and PDIC officers of personal knowledge of the events and transactions constitutive of the criminal violations alleged to have been made by the accused. In fact, the letters clearly stated that what the OSI of the BSP and the LIS of the PDIC did was to respectfully transmit to the DOJ for preliminary investigation the affidavits and personal knowledge of the acts of the petitioner. These affidavits were subscribed under oath by the witnesses who executed them before a notary public. Since the affidavits, not the letters transmitting them, were intended to initiate the preliminary investigation, we hold that Section 3(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court was substantially complied with.

Citing the ruling of this Court in Ebarle v. Sucaldito, the Court of Appeals correctly held that a complaint for purposes of preliminary investigation by the fiscal need not be filed by the offended party. The rule has been that,unless the offense subject thereof is one that cannot be prosecuted de oficio, the same may be filed, for preliminary investigation purposes, by any competent person. The crime of estafa is a public crime which can be initiated by "any competent person." The witnesses who executed the affidavits based on their personal knowledge of the acts committed by the petitioner fall within the purview of "any competent person" who may institute the complaint for a public crime. x x x (Emphasis and italics supplied) A preliminary investigation can thus validly proceed on the basis of an affidavit of any competent person, without the referral document, like the NBI-NCR Report, having been sworn to by the law enforcer as the nominal complainant. To require otherwise is a needless exercise. The cited case of Oporto, Jr. v. Judge Monserate does not appear to dent this proposition. After all, what is required is to reduce the evidence into affidavits, for while reports and even raw information may justify the initiation of an investigation, the preliminary investigation stage can be held only after sufficient evidence has been gathered and evaluated which may warrant the eventual prosecution of the case in court.42 Following the foregoing rulings in Soriano v. Hon. Casanova and Santos-Concio v. Department of Justice, we hold that the BSP letter, taken together with the affidavits attached thereto, comply with the requirements provided under Section 3(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court and Section 18, paragraphs (c) and (d) of RA 7653. Second Issue: Whether a loan transaction within the ambit of the DOSRI law (violation of Section 83 of RA 337, as amended) could be the subject of Estafa under Article 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code The second issue was raised by petitioner in the context of his Motion to Quash Information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense.43 It is settled that in considering a motion to quash on such ground, the test is "whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the offense charged as defined by law. The trial court may not consider a situation contrary to that set forth in the criminal complaint or information. Facts that constitute the defense of the petitioner[s] against the charge under the information must be proved by [him] during trial. Such facts or circumstances do not constitute proper grounds for a motion to quash the information on the ground that the material averments do not constitute the offense". 44 We have examined the two informations against petitioner and we find that they contain allegations which, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the crime of DOSRI violation and estafa thru falsification of commercial documents. In Criminal Case No. 238-M-2001 for violation of DOSRI rules, the information alleged that petitioner Soriano was the president of RBSM; that he was able to indirectly obtain a loan from RBSM by putting the loan in the name of depositor Enrico Carlos; and that he did this without complying with the requisite board approval, reportorial, and ceiling requirements. In Criminal Case No. 237-M-2001 for estafa thru falsification of commercial documents, the information alleged that petitioner, by taking advantage of his position as president of RBSM, falsified various loan documents to make it appear that an Enrico Carlos secured a loan of P8 million from RBSM; that petitioner succeeded in obtaining the loan proceeds; that he later converted the loan proceeds to his own personal gain and benefit; and that his action caused damage and prejudice to RBSM, its creditors, the BSP, and the PDIC. Significantly, this is not the first occasion that we adjudge the sufficiency of similarly worded informations. In Soriano v. People,45 involving the same petitioner in this case (but different transactions), we also reviewed the sufficiency of informations for DOSRI violation and estafa thru falsification of commercial documents, which were almost identical, mutatis mutandis, with the subject informations herein. We held in Soriano v. People that there is no basis for the quashal of the informations as "they contain material allegations charging Soriano with violation of DOSRI rules and estafa thru falsification of commercial documents". Petitioner raises the theory that he could not possibly be held liable for estafa in concurrence with the charge for DOSRI violation. According to him, the DOSRI charge presupposes that he acquired a loan, which would make the loan proceeds his own money and which he could neither possibly misappropriate nor convert to the prejudice of another, as required by the statutory definition of estafa.46 On the other hand, if petitioner did not acquire any loan, there can be no DOSRI violation to speak of. Thus, petitioner posits that the two offenses cannot co-exist. This theory does not persuade us. Petitioners theory is based on the false premises that the loan was extended to him by the bank in his own name, and that he became the owner of the loan proceeds. Both premises are wrong. The bank money (amounting to P8 million) which came to the possession of petitioner was money held in trust or administration by him for the bank, in his fiduciary capacity as the President of said bank.47 It is not accurate to say that petitioner became the owner of theP8 million because it was the proceeds of a loan. That would have been correct if the bank knowingly extended the loan to petitioner himself. But that is not the case here. According to the information for estafa, the loan was supposed to be for another person, a certain "Enrico Carlos"; petitioner, through falsification, made it appear that said "Enrico Carlos" applied for the loan when in fact he ("Enrico Carlos") did not. Through such fraudulent device, petitioner obtained the loan proceeds and converted the same. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that petitioner became the legal owner of the P8 million. Thus, petitioner remained the banks fiduciary with respect to that money, which makes it capable of misappropriation or conversion in his hands. The next question is whether there can also be, at the same time, a charge for DOSRI violation in such a situation wherein the accused bank officer did not secure a loan in his own name, but was alleged to have used the name of another person in order to indirectly secure a loan from the bank. We answer this in the affirmative. Section 83 of RA 337 reads: Section 83. No director or officer of any banking institution shall, either directly or indirectly, for himself or as the representative or agent of others, borrow any of the deposits of funds of such bank, nor shall he become a guarantor, indorser, or surety for loans from such bank to others, or in any manner be an obligor for moneys borrowed from the bank or loaned by it, except with the written approval of the majority of the directors of the bank, excluding the director concerned. Any such approval shall be entered upon the records of the corporation and a copy of such entry shall be transmitted forthwith to the Superintendent of Banks. The office of any director or officer of a bank who violates the provisions of this section shall immediately become vacant and the director or officer

shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than one year nor more than ten years and by a fine of not less than one thousand nor more than ten thousand pesos. x x x The prohibition in Section 83 is broad enough to cover various modes of borrowing.[48] It covers loans by a bank director or officer (like herein petitioner) which are made either: (1) directly, (2) indirectly, (3) for himself, (4) or as the representative or agent of others. It applies even if the director or officer is a mere guarantor, indorser or surety for someone else's loan or is in any manner an obligor for money borrowed from the bank or loaned by it. The covered transactions are prohibited unless the approval, reportorial and ceiling requirements under Section 83 are complied with. The prohibition is intended to protect the public, especially the depositors,[49] from the overborrowing of bank funds by bank officers, directors, stockholders and related interests, as such overborrowing may lead to bank failures.[50] It has been said that "banking institutions are not created for the benefit of the directors [or officers]. While directors have great powers as directors, they have no special privileges as individuals. They cannot use the assets of the bank for their own benefit except as permitted by law. Stringent restrictions are placed about them so that when acting both for the bank and for one of themselves at the same time, they must keep within certain prescribed lines regarded by the legislature as essential to safety in the banking business".51 A direct borrowing is obviously one that is made in the name of the DOSRI himself or where the DOSRI is a named party, while an indirect borrowing includes one that is made by a third party, but the DOSRI has a stake in the transaction.52 The latter type indirect borrowing applies here. The information in Criminal Case 238-M-2001 alleges that petitioner "in his capacity as President of Rural Bank of San Miguel San Ildefonso branch x x x indirectly borrow[ed] or secure[d] a loan with [RBSM] x x x knowing fully well that the same has been done by him without the written consent and approval of the majority of the board of directors x x x, and which consent and approval the said accused deliberately failed to obtain and enter the same upon the records of said banking institution and to transmit a copy thereof to the supervising department of the said bank x x x by using the name of one depositor Enrico Carlos x x x, the latter having no knowledge of the said loan, and once in possession of the said amount of eight million pesos (P8 million), [petitioner] converted the same to his own personal use and benefit".53 The foregoing information describes the manner of securing the loan as indirect; names petitioner as the benefactor of the indirect loan; and states that the requirements of the law were not complied with. It contains all the required elements54 for a violation of Section 83, even if petitioner did not secure the loan in his own name. The broad interpretation of the prohibition in Section 83 is justified by the fact that it even expressly covers loans to third parties where the third parties are aware of the transaction (such as principals represented by the DOSRI), and where the DOSRIs interest does not appear to be beneficial but even burdensome (such as in cases when the DOSRI acts as a mere guarantor or surety). If the law finds it necessary to protect the bank and the banking system in such situations, it will surely be illogical for it to exclude a case like this where the DOSRI acted for his own benefit, using the name of an unsuspecting person. A contrary interpretation will effectively allow a DOSRI to use dummies to circumvent the requirements of the law. In sum, the informations filed against petitioner do not negate each other. Third Issue: Is a Rule 65 petition for certiorari the proper remedy against an Order denying a Motion to Quash? This issue may be speedily resolved by adopting our ruling in Soriano v. People,55 where we held: In fine, the Court has consistently held that a special civil action for certiorari is not the proper remedy to assail the denial of a motion to quash an information. The proper procedure in such a case is for the accused to enter a plea, go to trial without prejudice on his part to present the special defenses he had invoked in his motion to quash and if after trial on the merits, an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law. Thus, petitioners should not have forthwith filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA and instead, they should have gone to trial and reiterated the special defenses contained in their motion to quash. There are no special or exceptional circumstances in the present case that would justify immediate resort to a filing of a petition for certiorari. Clearly, the CA did not commit any reversible error, much less, grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition.56 Fourth Issue: Whether petitioner is entitled to a writ of injunction The requisites to justify an injunctive relief are: (1) the right of the complainant is clear and unmistakable; (2) the invasion of the right sought to be protected is material and substantial; and (3) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. A clear legal right means one clearly founded in or granted by law or is "enforceable as a matter of law." Absent any clear and unquestioned legal right, the issuance of an injunctive writ would constitute grave abuse of discretion. 57 Caution and prudence must, at all times, attend the issuance of an injunctive writ because it effectively disposes of the main case without trial and/or due process.58 InOlalia v. Hizon,59 the Court held as follows: It has been consistently held that there is no power the exercise of which is more delicate, which requires greater caution, deliberation and sound discretion, or more dangerous in a doubtful case, than the issuance of an injunction. It is the strong arm of equity that should never be extended unless to cases of great injury, where courts of law cannot afford an adequate or commensurate remedy in damages. Every court should remember that an injunction is a limitation upon the freedom of action of the [complainant] and should not be granted lightly or precipitately. It should be granted only when the court is fully satisfied that the law permits it and the emergency demands it. Given this Court's findings in the earlier issues of the instant case, we find no compelling reason to grant the injunctive relief sought by petitioner. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed September 26, 2003 Decision as well as the February 5, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67657 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED. MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO Associate Justice

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 170979 February 9, 2011

JUDITH YU, Petitioner, vs. HON. ROSA SAMSON-TATAD, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 105, and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents. DECISION BRION, J.: We resolve the petition for prohibition filed by petitioner Judith Yu to enjoin respondent Judge Rosa Samson-Tatad of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 105, Quezon City, from taking further proceedings in Criminal Case No. Q-01-105698, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Judith Yu, et al."1 The Factual Antecedents The facts of the case, gathered from the parties pleadings, are briefly summarized below. Based on the complaint of Spouses Sergio and Cristina Casaclang, an information for estafa against the petitioner was filed with the RTC. In a May 26, 2005 decision, the RTC convicted the petitioner as charged. It imposed on her a penalty of three (3) months of imprisonment (arresto mayor), a fine of P3,800,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment, and the payment of an indemnity to the Spouses Casaclang in the same amount as the fine.2 Fourteen (14) days later, or on June 9, 2005, the petitioner filed a motion for new trial with the RTC, alleging that she discovered new and material evidence that would exculpate her of the crime for which she was convicted.3 In an October 17, 2005 order, respondent Judge denied the petitioners motion for new trial for lack of merit.4 On November 16, 2005, the petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the RTC, alleging that pursuant to our ruling in Neypes v. Court of Appeals,5 she had a "fresh period" of 15 days from November 3, 2005, the receipt of the denial of her motion for new trial, or up to November 18, 2005, within which to file a notice of appeal.6 On November 24, 2005, the respondent Judge ordered the petitioner to submit a copy of Neypes for his guidance.7 On December 8, 2005, the prosecution filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for being filed 10 days late, arguing that Neypes is inapplicable to appeals in criminal cases.8 On January 4, 2006, the prosecution filed a motion for execution of the decision.9

On January 20, 2006, the RTC considered the twin motions submitted for resolution. On January 26, 2006, the petitioner filed the present petition for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the RTC from acting on the prosecutions motions to dismiss the appeal and for the execution of the decision.10 The Petition The petitioner argues that the RTC lost jurisdiction to act on the prosecutions motions when she filed her notice of appeal within the 15-day reglementary period provided by the Rules of Court, applying the "fresh period rule" enunciated in Neypes. The Case for the Respondents The respondent People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a manifestation in lieu of comment, stating that Neypes applies to criminal actions since the evident intention of the "fresh period rule" was to set a uniform appeal period provided in the Rules.11 In view of the OSGs manifestation, we required the Spouses Casaclang to comment on the petition.12 In their comment, the Spouses Casaclang aver that the petitioner cannot seek refuge in Neypes to extend the "fresh period rule" to criminal cases because Neypes involved a civil case, and the pronouncement of "standardization of the appeal periods in the Rules" referred to the interpretation of the appeal periods in civil cases, i.e., Rules 40, 41, 42 and 45, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure among others; nowhere in Neypes was the period to appeal in criminal cases, Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, mentioned.13 Issue The core issue boils down to whether the "fresh period rule" enunciated in Neypes applies to appeals in criminal cases. The Courts Ruling We find merit in the petition. The right to appeal is not a constitutional, natural or inherent right it is a statutory privilege and of statutory origin and, therefore, available only if granted or as provided by statutes. It may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by the provisions of the law.14 The period to appeal is specifically governed by Section 39 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (BP 129),15 as amended, Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Section 39 of BP 129, as amended, provides: SEC. 39. Appeals. The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from: Provided, however, That in habeas corpus cases, the period for appeal shall be forty-eight (48) hours from the notice of the judgment appealed from. Section 3, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states: SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order. The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed. Section 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure reads: SEC. 6. When appeal to be taken. An appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of the judgment or from notice of the final order appealed from. This period for perfecting an appeal shall be suspended from the time a motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed until notice of the order overruling the motion has been served upon the accused or his counsel at which time the balance of the period begins to run. In Neypes, the Court modified the rule in civil cases on the counting of the 15-day period within which to appeal. The Court categorically set a fresh period of 15 days from a denial of a motion for reconsideration within which to appeal, thus: The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all courts. It has the sole prerogative to amend, repeal or even establish new rules for a more simplified and inexpensive process, and the speedy disposition of cases. In the rules governing appeals to it and to the Court of Appeals, particularly Rules 42, 43 and 45, the Court allows extensions of time, based on justifiable and compelling reasons, for parties to file their appeals. These extensions may consist of 15 days or more. To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.16

The Court also reiterated its ruling that it is the denial of the motion for reconsideration that constituted the final order which finally disposed of the issues involved in the case. The raison dtre for the "fresh period rule" is to standardize the appeal period provided in the Rules and do away with the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be counted. Thus, the 15-day period to appeal is no longer interrupted by the filing of a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration; litigants today need not concern themselves with counting the balance of the 15day period to appeal since the 15-day period is now counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration or any final order or resolution. While Neypes involved the period to appeal in civil cases, the Courts pronouncement of a "fresh period" to appeal should equally apply to the period for appeal in criminal cases under Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, for the following reasons: First, BP 129, as amended, the substantive law on which the Rules of Court is based, makes no distinction between the periods to appeal in a civil case and in a criminal case. Section 39 of BP 129 categorically states that "[t]he period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all casesshall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from." Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. When the law makes no distinction, we (this Court) also ought not to recognize any distinction.17 Second, the provisions of Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, though differently worded, mean exactly the same. There is no substantial difference between the two provisions insofar as legal results are concerned the appeal period stops running upon the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration and starts to run again upon receipt of the order denying said motion for new trial or reconsideration. It was this situation that Neypes addressed in civil cases. No reason exists why this situation in criminal cases cannot be similarly addressed. Third, while the Court did not consider in Neypes the ordinary appeal period in criminal cases under Section 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure since it involved a purely civil case, it did include Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on petitions for review from the RTCs to the Court of Appeals (CA), and Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure governing appeals by certiorari to this Court, both of which also apply to appeals in criminal cases, as provided by Section 3 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, thus: SEC. 3. How appeal taken. x x x x (b) The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review under Rule 42. xxxx Except as provided in the last paragraph of section 13, Rule 124, all other appeals to the Supreme Court shall be by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Clearly, if the modes of appeal to the CA (in cases where the RTC exercised its appellate jurisdiction) and to this Court in civil and criminal cases are the same, no cogent reason exists why the periods to appeal from the RTC (in the exercise of its original jurisdiction) to the CA in civil and criminal cases under Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should be treated differently. Were we to strictly interpret the "fresh period rule" in Neypes and make it applicable only to the period to appeal in civil cases, we shall effectively foster and encourage an absurd situation where a litigant in a civil case will have a better right to appeal than an accused in a criminal case a situation that gives undue favor to civil litigants and unjustly discriminates against the accusedappellants. It suggests a double standard of treatment when we favor a situation where property interests are at stake, as against a situation where liberty stands to be prejudiced. We must emphatically reject this double and unequal standard for being contrary to reason. Over time, courts have recognized with almost pedantic adherence that what is contrary to reason is not allowed in law Quod est inconveniens, aut contra rationem non permissum est in lege.18 Thus, we agree with the OSGs view that if a delay in the filing of an appeal may be excused on grounds of substantial justice in civil actions, with more reason should the same treatment be accorded to the accused in seeking the review on appeal of a criminal case where no less than the liberty of the accused is at stake. The concern and the protection we must extend to matters of liberty cannot be overstated.1avvphi1 In light of these legal realities, we hold that the petitioner seasonably filed her notice of appeal on November 16, 2005, within the fresh period of 15 days, counted from November 3, 2005, the date of receipt of notice denying her motion for new trial. WHEREFORE, the petition for prohibition is hereby GRANTED. Respondent Judge Rosa Samson-Tatad isDIRECTED to CEASE and DESIST from further exercising jurisdiction over the prosecutions motions to dismiss appeal and for execution of the decision. The respondent Judge is also DIRECTED to give due course to the petitioners appeal in Criminal Case No. Q-01-105698, and to elevate the records of the case to the Court of Appeals for review of the appealed decision on the merits. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 184769 October 5, 2010

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, ALEXANDER S. DEYTO and RUBEN A. SAPITULA, Petitioners, vs. ROSARIO GOPEZ LIM, Respondent. DECISION CARPIO MORALES, J.: The Court is once again confronted with an opportunity to define the evolving metes and bounds of the writ of habeas data. May an employee invoke the remedies available under such writ where an employer decides to transfer her workplace on the basis of copies of an anonymous letter posted therein imputing to her disloyalty to the company and calling for her to leave, which imputation it investigated but fails to inform her of the details thereof? Rosario G. Lim (respondent), also known as Cherry Lim, is an administrative clerk at the Manila Electric Company (MERALCO). On June 4, 2008, an anonymous letter was posted at the door of the Metering Office of the Administration building of MERALCO Plaridel, Bulacan Sector, at which respondent is assigned, denouncing respondent. The letter reads: Cherry Lim: MATAPOS MONG LAMUNIN LAHAT NG BIYAYA NG MERALCO, NGAYON NAMAN AY GUSTO MONG PALAMON ANG BUONG KUMPANYA SA MGA BUWAYA NG GOBYERNO. KAPAL NG MUKHA MO, LUMAYAS KA RITO, WALANG UTANG NA LOOB.1 Copies of the letter were also inserted in the lockers of MERALCO linesmen. Informed about it, respondent reported the matter on June 5, 2008 to the Plaridel Station of the Philippine National Police.2 By Memorandum3 dated July 4, 2008, petitioner Alexander Deyto, Head of MERALCOs Human Resource Staffing, directed the transfer of respondent to MERALCOs Alabang Sector in Muntinlupa as "A/F OTMS Clerk," effective July 18, 2008 in light of the receipt of "

reports that there were accusations and threats directed against [her] from unknown individuals and which could possibly compromise [her] safety and security." Respondent, by letter of July 10, 2008 addressed to petitioner Ruben A. Sapitula, Vice-President and Head of MERALCOs Human Resource Administration, appealed her transfer and requested for a dialogue so she could voice her concerns and misgivings on the matter, claiming that the "punitive" nature of the transfer amounted to a denial of due process. Citing the grueling travel from her residence in Pampanga to Alabang and back entails, and violation of the provisions on job security of their Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), respondent expressed her thoughts on the alleged threats to her security in this wise: xxxx I feel that it would have been better . . . if you could have intimated to me the nature of the alleged accusations and threats so that at least I could have found out if these are credible or even serious. But as you stated, these came from unknown individuals and the way they were handled, it appears that the veracity of these accusations and threats to be [sic] highly suspicious, doubtful or are just mere jokes if they existed at all. Assuming for the sake of argument only, that the alleged threats exist as the management apparently believe, then my transfer to an unfamiliar place and environment which will make me a "sitting duck" so to speak, seems to betray the real intent of management which is contrary to its expressed concern on my security and safety . . . Thus, it made me think twice on the rationale for managements initiated transfer. Reflecting further, it appears to me that instead of the management supposedly extending favor to me, the net result and effect of management action would be a punitive one.4 (emphasis and underscoring supplied) Respondent thus requested for the deferment of the implementation of her transfer pending resolution of the issues she raised. No response to her request having been received, respondent filed a petition5 for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan, docketed as SP. Proc. No. 213-M-2008. By respondents allegation, petitioners unlawful act and omission consisting of their continued failure and refusalto provide her with details or information about the alleged report which MERALCO purportedly receivedconcerning threats to her safety and security amount to a violation of her right to privacy in life, liberty and security, correctible by habeas data. Respondent thus prayed for the issuance of a writ commanding petitioners to file a written return containing the following: a) a full disclosure of the data or information about respondent in relation to the report purportedly received by petitioners on the alleged threat to her safety and security; the nature of such data and the purpose for its collection; b) the measures taken by petitioners to ensure the confidentiality of such data or information; and c) the currency and accuracy of such data or information obtained. Additionally, respondent prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining petitioners from effecting her transfer to the MERALCO Alabang Sector. By Order6 of August 29, 2008, Branch 7 of the Bulacan RTC directed petitioners to file their verified written return. And by Order of September 5, 2008, the trial court granted respondents application for a TRO. Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the petition and recall of the TRO on the grounds that, inter alia, resort to a petition for writ of habeas data was not in order; and the RTC lacked jurisdiction over the case which properly belongs to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).7 By Decision8 of September 22, 2008, the trial court granted the prayers of respondent including the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction directing petitioners to desist from implementing respondents transfer until such time that petitioners comply with the disclosures required. The trial court justified its ruling by declaring that, inter alia, recourse to a writ of habeas data should extend not only to victims of extra-legal killings and political activists but also to ordinary citizens, like respondent whose rights to life and security are jeopardized by petitioners refusal to provide her with information or data on the reported threats to her person. Hence, the present petition for review under Rule 45 of 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data9 contending that 1) the RTC lacked jurisdiction over the case and cannot restrain MERALCOs prerogative as employer to transfer the place of work of its employees, and 2) the issuance of the writ is outside the parameters expressly set forth in the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data.101avvphi1 Maintaining that the RTC has no jurisdiction over what they contend is clearly a labor dispute, petitioners argue that "although ingeniously crafted as a petition for habeas data, respondent is essentially questioning the transfer of her place of work by her employer"11 and the terms and conditions of her employment which arise from an employer-employee relationship over which the NLRC and the Labor Arbiters under Article 217 of the Labor Code have jurisdiction. Petitioners thus maintain that the RTC had no authority to restrain the implementation of the Memorandum transferring respondents place of work which is purely a management prerogative, and that OCA-Circular No. 79-200312 expressly prohibits the issuance of TROs or injunctive writs in labor-related cases. Petitioners go on to point out that the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data directs the issuance of the writ only against public officials or employees, or private individuals or entities engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding an aggrieved partys person, family or home; and that MERALCO (or its officers) is clearly not engaged in such activities. The petition is impressed with merit. Respondents plea that she be spared from complying with MERALCOs Memorandum directing her reassignment to the Alabang Sector, under the guise of a quest for information or data allegedly in possession of petitioners, does not fall within the province of a writ of habeas data.

Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides: Section 1. Habeas Data. The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. (emphasis and underscoring supplied) The habeas data rule, in general, is designed to protect by means of judicial complaint the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual. It is meant to provide a forum to enforce ones right to the truth and to informational privacy, thus safeguarding the constitutional guarantees of a persons right to life, liberty and security against abuse in this age of information technology. It bears reiteration that like the writ of amparo, habeas data was conceived as a response, given the lack of effective and available remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances. Its intent is to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security as a remedy independently from those provided under prevailing Rules.13 Castillo v. Cruz14 underscores the emphasis laid down in Tapuz v. del Rosario15 that the writs of amparo and habeas data will NOT issue to protect purely property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague or doubtful.16 Employment constitutes a property right under the context of the due process clause of the Constitution.17 It is evident that respondents reservations on the real reasons for her transfer - a legitimate concern respecting the terms and conditions of ones employment - are what prompted her to adopt the extraordinary remedy of habeas data. Jurisdiction over such concerns is inarguably lodged by law with the NLRC and the Labor Arbiters. In another vein, there is no showing from the facts presented that petitioners committed any unjustifiable or unlawful violation of respondents right to privacy vis-a-vis the right to life, liberty or security. To argue that petitioners refusal to disclose the contents of reports allegedly received on the threats to respondents safety amounts to a violation of her right to privacy is at best speculative. Respondent in fact trivializes these threats and accusations from unknown individuals in her earlier-quoted portion of her July 10, 2008 letter as "highly suspicious, doubtful or are just mere jokes if they existed at all."18 And she even suspects that her transfer to another place of work "betray[s] the real intent of management]" and could be a "punitive move." Her posture unwittingly concedes that the issue is labor-related. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed September 22, 2008 Decision of the Bulacan RTC, Branch 7 in SP. Proc. No. 213M-2008 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. SP. Proc. No. 213-M-2008 is, accordingly, DISMISSED. No costs. SO ORDERED. CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SPECIAL THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 174570 December 15, 2010

ROMER SY TAN, Petitioner, vs. SY TIONG GUE, FELICIDAD CHAN SY, SY CHIM, SY TIONG SAN, SY YU BUN, SY YU SHIONG, SY YU SAN, and BRYAN SY LIM, Respondents. RESOLUTION PERALTA, J.: On February 17, 2010, this Court rendered a Decision 1 in G.R. No. 174570 entitled Romer Sy Tan v. Sy Tiong Gue, et al., the decretal portion of which reads, as follows: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution dated December 29, 2005 and August 18, 2006, respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 81389 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders of the RTC dated September 1, 2003 and October 28, 2003 are REINSTATED. The validity of Search Warrant Nos. 03-3611 and 03-3612 is SUSTAINED. On March 22, 2010, respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration 2 wherein respondents informed this Court, albeit belatedly, that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted their motion for the withdrawal of the Information filed in Criminal Case No. 06-241375. As

such, respondents prayed that the decision be reconsidered and set aside and that the quashal of the subject search warrants be rendered moot and academic on the basis of the dismissal of the criminal case. In his Comment3 dated July 7, 2010, petitioner maintains that the motion is a mere reiteration of what respondents have previously alleged in their Comment and which have been passed upon by this Court in the subject decision. Petitioner alleges that he also filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila a Complaint for Qualified Theft against the respondents based on the same incidents and that should the Information for Qualified Theft be filed with the proper court, the items seized by virtue of the subject search warrants will be used as evidence therein. On August 6, 2010, respondents filed their Reply. On September 8, 2010, this Court issued a Resolution4 wherein respondents were required to submit a certified true copy of the Order of the RTC dated November 14, 2008, which granted their motion to withdraw the information. On October 22, 2010, respondents complied with the Courts directive and submitted a certified true copy of the Order.5 In granting the motion to withdraw the Information, the RTC took into consideration the Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 90368 dated August 29, 2006, which affirmed the findings of the City Prosecutor of Manila and the Secretary of Justice that the elements of Robbery, i.e., unlawful taking with intent to gain, with force and intimidation, were absent. Thus, there was lack of probable cause, warranting the withdrawal of the Information.6 The RTC also considered that the said pronouncements of the CA were affirmed by no less than this Court in G.R. No. 177829 in the Resolution7 dated November 12, 2007. Accordingly, the RTC granted respondents motion to withdraw the information without prejudice, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, the motion to withdraw information is hereby GRANTED and the case is DISMISSED without prejudice. SO ORDERED. Consequently, in view of the withdrawal of the Information for Robbery, the quashal of the subject search warrants and the determination of the issue of whether or not there was probable cause warranting the issuance by the RTC of the said search warrants for respondents alleged acts of robbery has been rendered moot and academic. Verily, there is no more reason to further delve into the propriety of the quashal of the search warrants as it has no more practical legal effect.8 Furthermore, even if an Information for Qualified Theft be later filed on the basis of the same incident subject matter of the dismissed case of robbery, petitioner cannot include the seized items as part of the evidence therein. Contrary to petitioners contention, he cannot use the items seized as evidence in any other offense except in that in which the subject search warrants were issued. Section 4, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: Section 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.1avvphi1 Thus, a search warrant may be issued only if there is probable cause in connection with only one specific offense alleged in an application on the basis of the applicants personal knowledge and his or her witnesses. Petitioner cannot, therefore, utilize the evidence seized by virtue of the search warrants issued in connection with the case of Robbery in a separate case of Qualified Theft, even if both cases emanated from the same incident. Moreover, considering that the withdrawal of the Information was based on the findings of the CA, as affirmed by this Court, that there was no probable cause to indict respondents for the crime of Robbery absent the essential element of unlawful taking, which is likewise an essential element for the crime of Qualified Theft, all offenses which are necessarily included in the crime of Robbery can no longer be filed, much more, prosper. Based on the foregoing, the Court resolves to Grant the motion. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the respondents is GRANTED. The Decision of this Court dated February 17, 2010 is RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. The petition filed by Romer Sy Tan is DENIED for being MOOT and ACADEMIC. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 186459 September 1, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. NITA EUGENIO Y PEJER, Appellant. DECISION CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Nita Eugenio y Pejer (appellant) was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City 1 for violation ofSection 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (R.A. No. 9165) or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, allegedly committed as follows:2 On or about May 13, 2003 in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, not being lawfully authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and give away to PO1 Aldrin Mariano, a police poseurbuyer, one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing three (3) centigrams (0.03 gram) of white crystalline substance, which was found positive to the test for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, in violation of the said law. Contrary to law. (underscoring supplied) From the evidence for the prosecution, the following version is culled: On the night of May 13, 2003, at around 7:30 p.m., a confidential informant reported to PO1 Aldrin Mariano (PO1 Mariano), officer-onduty at the Pasig City Hall Detachment, that one alias "Aruba" was selling shabu at Vicper Compound, Malinao, Pasig City. P/Sr. Insp. Chief Rodrigo Villaruel at once formed a buy-bust team to conduct an operation composed of, among others, PO3 Amilassan Salisa as team leader, and PO1 Mariano as poseur-buyer. PO1 Mariano, who was given two one hundred peso bills bearing Serial Numbers BT219634 and XN547078 to be used as buy-bust money, wrote his initials "ARM" thereon at the lower left portion. The operation was recorded in the police blotter and coordinated with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) which gave it control number NOC-1305-03-10.3 At around 8:00 in the evening, the team, together with the confidential informant, proceeded to the residence of appellant who was standing in front of her house. The informant at once introduced PO1 Mariano as buyer. As appellant inquired how much, PO1 Mariano handed her the two marked bills upon which appellant drew out one substance-filled sachet from the "outside wall" of her house. At that instant, PO1 Mariano removed his cap, the pre-arranged signal for the team members to, as they did, close in. PO1 Mariano then held appellants arm, identified himself as a police officer, and apprised her of her constitutional rights as he retrieved from her the buy-bust money. He thereafter marked "EXH-A arm/05/13/03" on the substance-filled sachet "sold" to him by appellant. The buy-bust team brought appellant to the Rizal Medical Center for physical check-up and later to the police detachment office where P/Sr. Insp. Chief Villaruel prepared the following memorandum of May 13, 20034addressed to the Chief of the Eastern Police District Crime Laboratory Office, requesting the conduct of laboratory examination on the seized substance-filled sachet to determine the presence of dangerous drugs and their weight: 1. Respectfully forwarded to your good office herewith/attached (sic) submitted specimen for laboratory examination to wit: NATURE OF OFFENSE NAME OF SUSPECT VIOLATION OF RA 9165 NITA EUGENIO Y PEJER, 57 years old, widow, Res. At Vicper Compound, Malinao, Pasig City On or about 8:30 PM 13 May 2003 at Vicper Compound, Malinao, Pasig City Elements of Mayors Special Action Team/ City Hall Detachment, Pasig City Police Station represented by PO1 Aldrin Mariano One (1) heat sealed transparent plastic sachet containing undetermined amount of suspected "shabu" Marked EXH A ARM 05/13/03

D.T.P.O.

ARRESTING OFFICER

SPECIMEN SUBMITTED

2. Request acknowledge (sic) receipt.5 (emphasis and underscoring supplied) Acting on the above-quoted memorandum, P/Sr. Insp. Annalee R. Forro, Forensic Chemical Officer of the Eastern Police District Crime Laboratory Office, who received the sachet, conducted on the same night of May 13, 2003, at around 8:33 P.M, a laboratory examination of the contents of the sachet, the result of which she recorded in Chemistry Report No. D-889-03E6 wherein she concluded that the substance inside the sachet weighed 0.03 gram and was positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. Hence, the filing of the Information against appellant. Denying the charge against her, appellant gave the following version: On May 11, 2003, while fetching water from a nearby well, she was, in the presence of family and neighbors, accosted by police officers who brought her to the police station. At the station, she was questioned whether she knew one "Baylene Ramba," to which she replied in the negative. She was later surprised to learn that an Information for violation of R.A. 9165 had been filed against her. Finding for the prosecution, the trial court, by Decision of May 31, 2005, convicted appellant, disposing as follows: WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused NITA EUGENIO y Pejer @ Aruba GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of R.A. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 and imposes upon her the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine of Php500,000.00 SO ORDERED.7 (underscoring supplied) By Decision of September 16, 2008,8 the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision.

In affirming the trial courts rejection of appellants defense, the appellate court held: . . . As correctly observed by the trial court, the claim that accused-appellant was arrested without reason is not supported by evidence. Not one of the alleged witnesses to the unlawful arrest, including accused-appellants own daughter, was presented to corroborate the claim. Hence, the court a quo is correct in considering the defense incredible for being self-serving and uncorroborated.9 (underscoring supplied) In her present appeal, appellant claims, in the main, that there was failure to follow the requirements of Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165, hence, it compromised the integrity and evidentiary value of the allegedly seized item. Sec. 21 of R.A. No 9165 provides: Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources or dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner: (1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the persons/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; x x x (emphasis and underscoring supplied) Appellant specifically claims that no physical inventory and photographing of the specimen took place. Respecting the required conduct of an inventory, since only one sachet was seized, failure to comply therewith may understandably have been rendered unnecessary. As for the required photograph of the seized item, a reading of the testimony of PO1 Mariano confirms the prosecutions failure to follow such requirement: Atty. Ronatay: Q: Are you aware that it is required under the dangerous drugs law that in case of the buy-bust operation,the subject specimen their (sic) must be a picture taken on the subject specimen? A: What I said is that impossible, we have a buy-bust to verify. Atty. Ronatay: Your Honor, I think the answer is not responsive to the question. We moved (sic) to strike that out and the witness to answer the question. Court: Answer the question. Witness: A: Not yet maam. Atty. Ronatay: Q: How many times have you been engaged in buy-bust operation? A: More or less ten maam. Q: And in those ten cases, was there ever an occasion that the subject specimen, there was a picture taken on that subject specimen? A: None, maam. Q: Are you also aware Mr. witness that under the dangerous drugs law, it is standard operating procedure that in cases of operation specifically in a buy-bust operation, there has also be (sic) a presence of the media? A: I do not know, maam. Q: In this case was there a media present at the time of the operation? A: None maam. Q: Are you also aware that under the dangerous drugs law, it is required that there has to be coordination with the Local Brgy.? A: None maam.10 (emphasis and underscoring supplied) Failing to comply with the provision of Section 2 of R.A. No. 9165 does not necessarily doom the case for the prosecution, however. People v. Pringas enlightens:

Non-compliance by the apprehending/buy-bust team with Section 21 is not fatal as long as there is justifiable ground therefor, and as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the confiscated/seized items, are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team. Its non-compliance will not render an accused's arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.11 (citation omitted, emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied) The Courts pronouncement in Pringas is based on the provision of Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations 12 of R.A. No. 9165 reading: x x x Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items; (emphasis and underscoring supplied) Clearly, it was necessary for the prosecution to prove that the integrity and evidentiary value of the shabu was preserved. As reflected in the above-quoted Memorandum of P/Sr. Insp. Chief Villaruel, the time of operation was "on or about8:30 P.M., 13 May 2003." If the allegedly seized substance-filled sachet was confiscated at 8:30 p.m., it is highly improbable that it was received at the Crime Laboratory at 8:33 P.M or a mere three minutes after the seizure, given that appellant was after his arrest first brought to a hospital for physical check-up. Doubt is thus engendered on whether the object evidence subjected to laboratory examination and presented in court is the same as that allegedly "sold" by appellant. In fine, the prosecution failed to prove the integrity and evidentiary value of the 0.03 gram specimen. Parenthetically, unlike in Pringas, the defense in the present case questioned early on, during the cross examination of PO1 Mariano, the failure of the apprehending officers to comply with the inventory and photographing requirements of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165. And the defense raised it again during the offer of evidence by the prosecution, thus: Atty. Ronatay: xxxx Exh. C - we object to its admission as well as the purpose for which they are being offered for being planted evidence, your honor. 13 (underscoring supplied) The prosecution having failed to discharge the burden of establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the burden of the evidence did not shift to the defense to thus leave it unnecessary to pass upon the defense evidence even if it were considered weak. Appellants acquittal based on reasonable doubt is then in order. WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant, Nita Eugenio y Pejer, is ACQUITED for failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director of the Bureau of Corrections for Women, Mandaluyong City who is directed to cause the immediate release of appellant, unless she is being lawfully held for another cause, and to inform this Court of action taken within ten (10) days from notice. SO ORDERED. CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. 184800 May 5, 2010

WONINA M. BONIFACIO, JOCELYN UPANO, VICENTE ORTUOSTE AND JOVENCIO PERECHE, SR.,Petitioners, vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI, BRANCH 149, and JESSIE JOHN P. GIMENEZ, Respondents.

DECISION CARPIO MORALES, J.: Via a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, petitioners Wonina M. Bonifacio, et al. assail the issuances of Branch 149 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati (public respondent) Order1 of April 22, 2008 which denied their motion to quash the Amended Information indicting them for libel, and Joint Resolution2 of August 12, 2008 denying reconsideration of the first issuance. Private respondent Jessie John P. Gimenez3 (Gimenez) filed on October 18, 2005, on behalf of the Yuchengco Family ("in particular," former Ambassador Alfonso Yuchengco and Helen Y. Dee (Helen) and of the Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. (Malayan), 4 a criminal complaint,5 before the Makati City Prosecutors Office, for thirteen (13) counts of libel under Article 355 in relation to Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) against Philip Piccio, Mia Gatmaytan and Ma. Anabella Relova Santos, who are officers of Parents Enabling Parents Coalition, Inc. (PEPCI), John Joseph Gutierrez, Jeselyn Upano, Jose Dizon, Rolanda Pareja, Wonina Bonifacio, Elvira Cruz, Cornelio Zafra, Vicente Ortueste, Victoria Gomez Jacinto, Jurencio Pereche, Ricardo Loyares and Peter Suchianco, who are trustees of PEPCI, Trennie Monsod, a member of PEPCI (collectively, the accused), and a certain John Doe, the administrator of the website www.pepcoalition.com. PEPCI appears to have been formed by a large group of disgruntled planholders of Pacific Plans, Inc. (PPI) - a wholly owned subsidiary of Great Pacific Life Assurance Corporation, also owned by the Yuchengco Group of Companies (YGC) - who had previously purchased traditional pre-need educational plans but were unable to collect thereon or avail of the benefits thereunder after PPI, due to liquidity concerns, filed for corporate rehabilitation with prayer for suspension of payments before the Makati RTC. Decrying PPIs refusal/inability to honor its obligations under the educational pre-need plans, PEPCI sought to provide a forum by which the planholders could seek redress for their pecuniary loss under their policies by maintaining a website on the internet under the address of www.pepcoalition.com. Gimenez alleged that PEPCI also owned, controlled and moderated on the internet a blogspot6 under the website address www.pacificnoplan.blogspot.com, as well as a yahoo e-group7 at no2pep2010@yahoogroups.com. These websites are easily accessible to the public or by anyone logged on to the internet. Gimenez further alleged that upon accessing the above-stated websites in Makati on various dates from August 25 to October 2, 2005, he "was appalled to read numerous articles [numbering 13], maliciously and recklessly caused to be published by [the accused] containing highly derogatory statements and false accusations, relentlessly attacking the Yuchengco Family, YGC, and particularly, Malayan."8 He cited an article which was posted/published on www.pepcoalition.com on August 25, 2005 which stated: Talagang naisahan na naman tayo ng mga Yuchengcos. Nangyari na ang mga kinatatakutan kong pagbagsak ng negotiation because it was done prematurely since we had not file any criminal aspect of our case. What is worse is that Yuchengcos benefited much from the nego. x x x . That is the fact na talagang hindi dapat pagtiwalaan ang mga Yuchengcos. LETS MOVE TO THE BATTLEFIELD. FILE THE CRIMINAL CASES IN COURT, BSP AND AMLC AND WHEREVER. Pumunta tayong muli sa senado, congreso, RCBC Plaza, and other venues to air our grievances and call for boycott ng YGC. Let us start within ourselves. Alisin natin ang mga investments and deposits natin sa lahat ng YGC and I mean lahat and again convince friends to do the same. Yung mga nanonood lang noon ay dapat makisali na talaga ngayon specially those who joined only after knowing that there was a negotiation for amicable settlements. FOR SURE MAY TACTICS PA SILANG NAKABASTA SA ATIN. LET US BE READY FOR IT BECAUSE THEY HAD SUCCESSFULLY LULL US AND THE NEXT TIME THEY WILL TRY TO KILL US NA. x x x 9(emphasis in the original) By Resolution of May 5, 2006,10 the Makati City Prosecutors Office, finding probable cause to indict the accused, filed thirteen (13) separate Informations11 charging them with libel. The accusatory portion of one Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-876, which was raffled off to public respondent reads: That on or about the 25th day of August 2005 in Makati City, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the trustees of Parents Enabling Parents Coalition and as such trustees they hold the legal title to the website www.pepcoalition.com which is of general circulation, and publication to the public conspiring, confederating and mutually helping with one another together with John Does, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and publicly and maliciously with intention of attacking the honesty, virtue, honor and integrity, character and reputation of complainant Malayan Insurance Co. Inc., Yuchengco Family particularly Ambassador Alfonso Yuchengco and Helen Dee and for further purpose exposing the complainant to public hatred and contempt published an article imputing a vice or defect to the complainant and caused to be composed, posted and published in the said website www.pepcoalition.com and injurious and defamatory article as follows: Talagang naisahan na naman tayo ng mga Yuchengcos. Nangyari na ang mga kinatatakutan kong pagbagsak ng negotiation. x x x x xxxxx For sure may tactics pa silang nakabasta sa atin. Let us be ready for it because they had successfully lull us and the next time they will try to kill us na. x x x A copy of the full text of the foregoing article as published/posted in www.pepcoalition.com is attached as Annex "F" of the complaint. That the keyword and password to be used in order to post and publish the above defamatory article are known to the accused as trustees holding legal title to the above-cited website and that the accused are the ones responsible for the posting and publication of the defamatory articles that the article in question was posted and published with the object of the discrediting and ridiculing the complainant before the public. CONTRARY TO LAW.12 Several of the accused appealed the Makati City Prosecutors Resolution by a petition for review to the Secretary of Justice who, by Resolution of June 20, 2007,13 reversed the finding of probable cause and accordingly directed the withdrawal of the Informations for libel filed in court. The Justice Secretary opined that the crime of "internet libel" was non-existent, hence, the accused could not be charged with libel under Article 353 of the RPC.14 Petitioners, as co-accused,15 thereupon filed on June 6, 2006, before the public respondent, a Motion to Quash16the Information in Criminal Case No. 06-876 on the grounds that it failed to vest jurisdiction on the Makati RTC; the acts complained of in the

Information are not punishable by law since internet libel is not covered by Article 353 of the RPC; and the Information is fatally defective for failure to designate the offense charged and the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense of libel. Citing Macasaet v. People,17 petitioners maintained that the Information failed to allege a particular place within the trial courts jurisdiction where the subject article was printed and first published or that the offended parties resided in Makati at the time the alleged defamatory material was printed and first published. By Order of October 3, 2006,18 the public respondent, albeit finding that probable cause existed, quashed the Information, citing Agustin v. Pamintuan.19 It found that the Information lacked any allegations that the offended parties were actually residing in Makati at the time of the commission of the offense as in fact they listed their address in the complaint-affidavit at Yuchengco Tower in Binondo, Manila; or that the alleged libelous article was printed and first published in Makati. The prosecution moved to reconsider the quashal of the Information, 20 insisting that the Information sufficiently conferred jurisdiction on the public respondent. It cited Banal III v. Panganiban21 which held that the Information need not allege verbatim that the libelous publication was "printed and first published" in the appropriate venue. And it pointed out that Malayan has an office in Makati of which Helen is a resident. Moreover, the prosecution alleged that even assuming that the Information was deficient, it merely needed a formal amendment. Petitioners opposed the prosecutions motion for reconsideration, contending, inter alia, that since venue is jurisdictional in criminal cases, any defect in an information for libel pertaining to jurisdiction is not a mere matter of form that may be cured by amendment.22 By Order of March 8, 2007,23 the public respondent granted the prosecutions motion for reconsideration and accordingly ordered the public prosecutor to "amend the Information to cure the defect of want of venue." The prosecution thereupon moved to admit the Amended Information dated March 20, 2007,24 the accusatory portion of which reads: That on or about the 25th day of August 2005 in Makati City, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the trustees of Parents Enabling Parents Coalition and as such trustees they hold the legal title to the website www.pepcoalition.com which is of general circulation, and publication to the public conspiring, confederating together with John Does, whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and all of them mutually helping and aiding one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and publicly and maliciously with intention of attacking the honesty, virtue, honor and integrity, character and reputation of complainant Malayan Insurance Co. Inc., Yuchengco Family particularly Ambassador Alfonso Yuchengco and Helen Dee and for further purpose exposing the complainant to public hatred and contempt published an article imputing a vice or defect to the complainant and caused to be composed, posted and published in the said website www.pepcoalition.com, a website accessible in Makati City, an injurious and defamatory article, which was first published and accessed by the private complainant in Makati City, as follows: x x x x (emphasis and underscoring in the original; italics supplied) Petitioners moved to quash the Amended Information 25 which, they alleged, still failed to vest jurisdiction upon the public respondent because it failed to allege that the libelous articles were "printed and first published" by the accused in Makati; and the prosecution erroneously laid the venue of the case in the place where the offended party accessed the internet-published article. By the assailed Order of April 22, 2008, the public respondent, applying Banal III, found the Amended Information to be sufficient in form. Petitioners motion for reconsideration26 having been denied by the public respondent by Joint Resolution of August 12, 2008, they filed the present petition for Certiorari and Prohibition faulting the public respondent for: 1. NOT FINDING THAT THE ACTS ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION ARE NOT PUNISHABLE BY LAW; 2. ADMITTING AN AMENDED INFORMATION WHOSE JURISDICTIONAL ALLEGATIONS CONTINUES TO BE DEFICIENT; and 3. NOT RULING THAT AN AMENDMENT IN THE INFORMATION FOR THE PURPOSE OF CURING JURISDICTIONAL DEFECTS IS ILLEGAL.27 With the filing of Gimenezs Comment 28 to the petition, the issues are: (1) whether petitioners violated the rule on hierarchy of courts to thus render the petition dismissible; and (2) whether grave abuse of discretion attended the public respondents admission of the Amended Information. The established policy of strict observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts,29 as a rule, requires that recourse must first be made to the lower-ranked court exercising concurrent jurisdiction with a higher court.30 A regard for judicial hierarchy clearly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level courts should be filed in the RTC and those against the latter should be filed in the Court of Appeals.31 The rule is not iron-clad, however, as it admits of certain exceptions. Thus, a strict application of the rule is unnecessary when cases brought before the appellate courts do not involve factual but purely legal questions.32 In the present case, the substantive issue calls for the Courts exercise of its discretionary authority, by way of exception, in order to abbreviate the review process as petitioners raise a pure question of law involving jurisdiction in criminal complaints for libel under Article 360 of the RPC whether the Amended Information is sufficient to sustain a charge for written defamation in light of the requirements under Article 360 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 4363, reading: Art. 360. Persons responsible.Any person who shall publish, exhibit or cause the publication or exhibition of any defamation in writing or by similar means, shall be responsible for the same. The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or business manager of a daily newspaper, magazine or serial publication, shall be responsible for the defamations contained therein to the same extent as if he were the author thereof. The criminal action and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations, as provided for in this chapter shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and

first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense: Provided, however, That where one of the offended parties is a public officer whose office is in the City of Manila at the time of the commission of the offense, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila or of the city or province where the libelous article is printed and first published, and in case such public officer does not hold office in the City of Manila, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous article is printed and first published and in case one of the offended parties is a private individual, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous matter is printed and first published x x x. (emphasis and underscoring supplied) Venue is jurisdictional in criminal actions such that the place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action but constitutes an essential element of jurisdiction.33 This principle acquires even greater import in libel cases, given that Article 360, as amended, specifically provides for the possible venues for the institution of the criminal and civil aspects of such cases. In Macasaet,34 the Court reiterated its earlier pronouncements in Agbayani v. Sayo35 which laid out the rules on venue in libel cases, viz: For the guidance, therefore, of both the bench and the bar, this Court finds it appropriate to reiterate our earlier pronouncement in the case of Agbayani, to wit: In order to obviate controversies as to the venue of the criminal action for written defamation, the complaint or information should contain allegations as to whether, at the time the offense was committed, the offended party was a public officer or a private individual and where he was actually residing at that time. Whenever possible, the place where the written defamation was printed and first published should likewise be alleged. That allegation would be a sine qua non if the circumstance as to where the libel was printed and first published is used as the basis of the venue of the action. (emphasis and underscoring supplied) It becomes clear that the venue of libel cases where the complainant is a private individual is limited to only either of two places, namely: 1) where the complainant actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense; or 2) where the alleged defamatory article was printed and first published. The Amended Information in the present case opted to lay the venue by availing of the second. Thus, it stated that the offending article "was first published and accessed by the private complainant in Makati City." In other words, it considered the phrase to be equivalent to the requisite allegation of printing and first publication. The insufficiency of the allegations in the Amended Information to vest jurisdiction in Makati becomes pronounced upon an examination of the rationale for the amendment to Article 360 by RA No. 4363. Chavez v. Court of Appeals 36 explained the nature of these changes: Agbayani supplies a comprehensive restatement of the rules of venue in actions for criminal libel, following the amendment by Rep. Act No. 4363 of the Revised Penal Code: "Article 360 in its original form provided that the venue of the criminal and civil actions for written defamations is the province wherein the libel was published, displayed or exhibited, regardless of the place where the same was written, printed or composed. Article 360 originally did not specify the public officers and the courts that may conduct the preliminary investigation of complaints for libel. Before article 360 was amended, the rule was that a criminal action for libel may be instituted in any jurisdiction where the libelous article was published or circulated, irrespective of where it was written or printed (People v. Borja, 43 Phil. 618). Under that rule, the criminal action is transitory and the injured party has a choice of venue. Experience had shown that under that old rule the offended party could harass the accused in a libel case by laying the venue of the criminal action in a remote or distant place. Thus, in connection with an article published in the Daily Mirror and the Philippine Free Press, Pio Pedrosa, Manuel V. Villareal and Joaquin Roces were charged with libel in the justice of the peace court of San Fabian, Pangasinan (Amansec v. De Guzman, 93 Phil. 933). To forestall such harassment, Republic Act No. 4363 was enacted. It lays down specific rules as to the venue of the criminal action so as to prevent the offended party in written defamation cases from inconveniencing the accused by means of out-of-town libel suits, meaning complaints filed in remote municipal courts (Explanatory Note for the bill which became Republic Act No. 4363, Congressional Record of May 20, 1965, pp. 424-5; Time, Inc. v. Reyes, L-28882, May 31, 1971, 39 SCRA 303, 311). x x x x (emphasis and underscoring supplied) Clearly, the evil sought to be prevented by the amendment to Article 360 was the indiscriminate or arbitrary laying of the venue in libel cases in distant, isolated or far-flung areas, meant to accomplish nothing more than harass or intimidate an accused. The disparity or unevenness of the situation becomes even more acute where the offended party is a person of sufficient means or possesses influence, and is motivated by spite or the need for revenge. If the circumstances as to where the libel was printed and first published are used by the offended party as basis for the venue in the criminal action, the Information must allege with particularity where the defamatory article was printed and first published, as evidenced or supported by, for instance, the address of their editorial or business offices in the case of newspapers, magazines or serial publications. This pre-condition becomes necessary in order to forestall any inclination to harass. The same measure cannot be reasonably expected when it pertains to defamatory material appearing on a website on the internet as there would be no way of determining the situs of its printing and first publication. To credit Gimenezs premise of equating his first access to the defamatory article on petitioners website in Makati with "printing and first publication" would spawn the very ills that the amendment to Article 360 of the RPC sought to discourage and prevent. It hardly requires much imagination to see the chaos that would ensue in situations where the websites author or writer, a blogger or anyone who posts messages therein could be sued for libel anywhere in the Philippines that the private complainant may have allegedly accessed the offending website. For the Court to hold that the Amended Information sufficiently vested jurisdiction in the courts of Makati simply because the defamatory article was accessed therein would open the floodgates to the libel suit being filed in all other locations where the pepcoalition website is likewise accessed or capable of being accessed.1avvphi1

Respecting the contention that the venue requirements imposed by Article 360, as amended, are unduly oppressive, the Courts pronouncements in Chavez37 are instructive: For us to grant the present petition, it would be necessary to abandon the Agbayani rule providing that a private person must file the complaint for libel either in the place of printing and first publication, or at the complainants place of residence. We would also have to abandon the subsequent cases that reiterate this rule in Agbayani, such as Soriano, Agustin, and Macasaet. There is no convincing reason to resort to such a radical action. These limitations imposed on libel actions filed by private persons are hardly onerous, especially as they still allow such persons to file the civil or criminal complaint in their respective places of residence, in which situation there is no need to embark on a quest to determine with precision where the libelous matter was printed and first published. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.) IN FINE, the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners motion to quash the Amended Information. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of April 22, 2008 and the Joint Resolution of August 12, 2008 are hereby SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Br. 149 is hereby DIRECTED TO QUASH the Amended Information in Criminal Case No. 06-876 and DISMISS the case. SO ORDERED. CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice