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Actuol ond Virtuol 8l ond Intensive, Spoce: Extensive

rities of water at forty-five degreesof temperature one does not get a body of u,ater at ninety degreesbut one at the original temperature. Deleuze 'indivisible', a definition which is simply clefinesintensive quantities as ilnother r,vayof erpressing the same point: a gallon of water at ninety can be divided in extension, yielding, say' two half gallons, but c'lcgrees nvo parts will not each have half the temperature.l rl.re \Xlhateverway one chooses to define the terms what really matters is r h e r e a s o n f o r t h e l a c k o f d i v i s i b i l i t y o f i n t e n s i v e q u a n t i t i e s :t h e y a r e p b j e c t i v e a v e r a g e s , n d t e n d t o p r e s e r v et h e s a m e a v e r a g ev a l u e u p o n a For nvo intensive quentities to produce a change,there must be rlilision. t difference,or gradient, in their degreeof intensity. And the change produced bv a gradienr of temperature (or pressure,density, speed)will not be a simple addition, but the emergenceof a spontaneous flow or movenrent u'hich rvill tend to cancel the difference in intensitn and restore cclrilibrir"rmand averagevalues. Yet, as Deleuze emphasises,despite the f.rct that it is the spontaneous cancellation of differences that explains indir.isibilin', the philosophical importance of intensive magnitudes can 'We can summarise what is onli' be grasped prior to this cancellation. relevant in this regard with the formula: iryye_nsitl1diffgr philosophically d c t t c e s r e p r o d L t c t i t , e . I n d e e d i,t m a y b e a r g u e d , w h e r e v e r o n e f i n d s a n i c r r c n s i v - el o r i i e i - t f o r e r a - p l e . t h e s k i n w h i c h d e f i n e s t h e e x t e n s i v e boundary of our bodies) there is always a processdriven by intensive difierenceswhich produced such a boundary (for erample, the embryological process which createsour bodies, driven by differencesin chemical . o r r e e n t r a t i o na m o n g o t h e r t h i n g s ) . . which yield This approach to intensive spaces,as the site of processes .ts products the great diversity of ertensive spaces,is key to Deleuze's ontolog).. In what is probably his most important book, Difference and Repetition, he writes: is Differenceis not diversitv. Diversitl-is given,bur difference that by r,vhich rhe given is given . . . Differenceis not phenomenonbut the nuomenon refersto an inequalityby closest the phenomenon . . Everl'phenomenon . to which and everything u'hich it is conditioned. . . Everi'thingu'hich happens of appears correlated rvith ordersof differences: differences level,temperis tlture, pressure, tension,potential, differenceof intensity.(Deleuze1994: 222) It is traditional since Kant to distinguish between the world as it is given in experience to us humans, that is, the world of phenomena or irppearances,and the world as it exists by itself, regardlessof whether there is a human observer to interact with it. This world 'in itself is the

Spoce:Extensive Actuol ond Intensive, ond Virtuol

MonuelDeLondo

There are :rt least two kinds of space relevant to our human identity. As b i o l o g i c a l o r g a n i s m sa n d a s s o c i a l a g e n t sw e l i v e o u r l i v e s r v i t h i n s p a c e s bounded by naturirl and artificial extensit,e bour.rdirries, that is, within zones that extend in space up to a limit marked by a frontier. Whether we are talking about the frontiers of a countrl', i.rcity', a neighbourhood or an ecosystern, inhabiting these extensive spacesis part of rvhat defines our social rrnd biological identities. There are, however, other welldefined spaceswhich we also inhabit but which are less familiar: these arezones of i!119!!y1, not only those zones of temperature that define dif( f e r e n t e c o s y s t e m s f r o m h o t j u n g l e st o c o l d t u n d r a s ) , b u t a l s o t h e z o n e s of high pressureerplored by deep-seadivers, or the zones of lorv gravity explored by astronauts. These other spacesare also bounded but in a different way, the limits of one zone marked by critical points of temperature, pressure, gravity, density, tension, connectir-it1i points defining abrupt transitions in the state of the creatures inhabiting those zones. Although the weather maps that have become common in relevision n e w s h a v e m a d e i n t e n s i v es p a c e sv e r y t a n g i b l e ( z o n e so f h i g h a n d l o w pressure,cold or warm fronts defining sharp temperature transitions) the fact remains that most philosophers have hardly thought about the questions raised.by the distinction between the ertensive and the intensive. t"An exception is the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze,where the distinction between intensive and extensivespacesis one of the tlvo key distincrions grounding his ontology (the other is that between actual and virtual space).The concepts come from thermodynamics lvhere they are defined not as a distinction between spacesbut between magnitudes or quantities ( w h i c h c a n t h e n b e u s e d r o d e f i n e s p a c e s ) . ' ! 7 h i l e x t e n s i v eq u a n t i t i e s e (such as volume, area, length, amount of energy or entropy) are additi_vqr_ intensive quantities are not. For example, if one adds two equal volumes of water one gets twice the amount of water. But if one adds two quan-

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I said above that the distinction between extensiveand intensive spaces is one of two distinctions which are fundamental in Deleuze's realist ontology. Far-from-equilibrium thermodynamics also throws light on the second distinction, that between actual and uirtudl space.Even in equilibrium thermodynamics scientistsmust face the fact that, given a system in rvhich an intensive difference exists, the final state of equilibrium to 'present prior to its actual1'hich the system tends is somehow already 'attractor' for the process and isation. That is, the final state acts as an erplains the tendency of the intensive difference to cancel itself. But what ontological status does that final state have prior to its coming into actual 'the possible' is the ontoeristence?One may think that the category of logical category one would need to describe this status, but this would be rvrong. Despite what some essentialistmodal logicians may argue, possibilities are not mind-independent entities, though they do possess psvchological reality (no-one can deny that human beings can in fact e n r e r t a i n v a r i o u s p o s s i b l e s c e n a r i o si n t h e i r h e a d s ) . S t a t e s a c t i n g a s '.lttractors', on the other hand, possessa certain ob;ective efficacy even towards a defn,hile not being fully actual, sincethey guide real processes inite outcome prior to the latter's actualisation. C)ne rval' of approaching the ontological status of attrac,to-rs would be to sav that while they are not possibilities they do att as the strwctwreof LtspLtce possibilities. Of all the possible outcomes only one, or a few, of become regularly actualised, a fact that suggeststhat the space of possible outcomes is greatly constrained, or in other words, that it has structr.rre. \7hile the possibilities making up this spaceare not real (other than in ir purely psychological way) the structure of the spacemay be considered fully real and mind-independent. But if this reality is not actual (by definition) what is it? Deleuze'sanswer would be that it is virtual, not in the senseof a virtual reality (as exemplified by computer simulations, or even cinema) but in the senseof a real uirtuality.In this regard, the contribution of the new thermodynamics is that only in the zone of intensit,v it explores do physical processes display the full repertoire of attractors. Vhile in linear systems near equilibrium only steady-state attractors exist, non-linear far-from-equilibrium systemsdisplay steadystate, periodic and chaotic attractors. Moreover, instead of the single global equilibrium of the classicaltheory we now have multiple equilibria, which means that history matters. While with a single possible outcome the different paths followed by systems on their way there can be ignored, with multiple possible outcomes the details of the history 'Why followed do matter (this is what physicists call 'path dependence'). is all this important? Because once this rich structure is revealed it

world of 'nuomena".While most philosophers do not believein nuomena Gilles De'1GF, i3-,h. quote above illuitrates, certainly does. In other words, Deleuze's ontology is a realist ontology. But while most realist philosophers espouseone or another form of essentialism,the belief that what gives the contents of this mind-independenr world their identity is for Deleuze the identity of any berng can the possessionof an essence, never be taken for granted and always needsexplanation in terms of the historical process which produced it.'lf we characterise the identity of material beings as defined by ertensities (not only by its spatial boundaries but also by the amounts of matter and energy contained within those boundaries) then the process that produces those beings will be defined by intensities. In this sense, human beings not only inhabit extensive spaces,they themselvesare extensivespaces.Generalising this to include mental phenomena would involve defining psychological intensities (not only grief, joy, love, hate, but also beliefs and desireswhich also come in different intensities)as well as the corresponding extensities.In this essay I will avoid this important issue and stick to our bodily identities which do form extensive spacesin a straightforward sense. Despite the fact that Deleuze takes the distinction between the extensive and the intensive from physics,in the page following the quote above he argues that nineteenth-century thermodynamics cannot provide the foundation he needs for his ontology. Why? Because that branch of physics became obsessedwith the final equilibrium state (defined by its amount of entropy, an extensive quantity) at the expense of the difference-driven intensive processwhich gives rise to that state. Fortunatelg this shortcoming of classicalthermodynamics has now been fixed in the 'far-from-equilibrigqg, latest version of this field, appropriately labelled thetmqdyna-mlcs', and the effect of this repair has been to make this discipline allthe more interesting philosophically. In a nutshell, while equilibrium thermodynamics focusseson what happens once the intensive differences have been cancelled, far-from-equilibrium thermodynamics studiessystmsthat are continuously traversed by a strong flow of energy or matter, a flow which does not allow the differences in intensity to be cancelled,that is, a flow that maintains these differencesand keeps them from cancelling themselvesout. In a sense,the new field studies systems in a zone of higher intensity, and it is only in this zone that differencedriven morphogenesis comes into its own, and that matter becomes an active agent, one which does not need form to come and impose itself from the outside, as is the case with essentialism.In shorf, only in this zone of intensity can we witness the birth of extensity and its identitydefining frontiers.

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rreed for such global embedding space is elin-rinated.This, Deleuze rlrgues, rrlso eliminates the extra dimension which relates to the space '[n l all cases b e i n g s t u d i e d a s a r r a n s c e n d e n t ad i m e n s i o n . A s h e p u t s i t , r l - r er l u l t i p l i c i t , v i s i n t r i n s i c a l l y d e f i n e d , w i t h o u t e x t e r n a l r e f e r e n c eo r r e c o u r s et o a u n i f o r m s p a c ei n w h i c h i t w o u l d b e s u b m e r g e d '( D e l e u z e 1994 7831.) s i E l i m i n a r i n g a g l o h r a l e m b e d d i n g p a c ea n d v i e w i n g : r l l s p a c e s n p u r e l y f o r D e l e u z eb e c a u s e o h i m t h i s i s n o t a f o r m a l i s s u e t l o c a lt e r m s i s c r u c i a l in the philosophl' of mathematics but an ontological issue bearing clircctll' on the status of the virtual. ,The virtual srrlrcture of possibility rrradeinto something transcerrdentbut always cons spilce must never l-re imntanenl to the rnaterial u,orld. A nrultiplicity, as Deleuze ceived as 'horvever m a n v d i m e n s i o n si t m a y h a v e . . n e v e r h a s a s u p p l e n'rites, t n r e n t a r yc l i m e n s i o n o t h a t w h i c h t r a n s p i r e su p o n i t . T h i s a l o r r em a k e s i t n . r t u r a lr r n d i m m a n e n t ' ( D e l e u z ea n d G u i r t t a r i 1 9 8 7 : 2 6 6 ) . 1B u t h o w , o n e mrrv ask, can such a geometric ob;ect have ontological significance?L.r \ \ ' h a t s e n s ec a n i t r c t a s t h e s t r u c t u r e o f a s p a c e o f p o s s i b i l i t i e s ? h e T i r l n s \ v e r s r h a t m u l t i p l i c i t i e so r n r a n i f o l d sc , l n b e u s e c t lo s t u d v a p h v s i c a l ' s \ ' s t e mi f e a c h o f t h e i r d i m e n s i o n s i s a s s i g n e dv a l u e s f r o r n o n e o f t h e 'clegrees o f f r e e d o m ' ( o r r e l e v a n t w a v s o f c h a n g i n g ) o f t h e s y s t e mi t s e l f . T h r r t i s , t h e m u l t i p l i c i t l ' o r m a n i f o l d b e c o r n e sh e s p a c eo f a l l r h e p o s s i b l e t s t a t e sn , h i c h a g i v e n s , v s t e m a n h a l . e . l T h i s s p a c e o f p o s s i b l e s r a t e si s c r c f e r r e dt o a s ' s t a t e s p a c e ' o r ' p h a s e s p a c e ' . ) a n d m o r e i u r p o r t a n t l y , A ri'hile tl-repoints in the manifold representall the possibilities for a given s v s t e m ,c e r t a i n t o p o l o g i c a i f e a t u r e so f t h i s s p a c er e p r e s e n tt h e i n v a r i a n t structrrreof that space.These topologicil inudriLTnts whar I referrecl are t o r t b o r - ea s ' a t t r a c f o r s ' . \ W h i l e s t a t e s p a c e st h e m s e l v e s r e n o t h i n S S u t a b r n a t h e m a t i c : l lr e p r e s e n t a t i o n s a n d t h e p o s s i b i l i t i e st h e y s y r n b o l i s ea r e ( r r o t m i n d - i n c l e p e n d e nrte a l i t i e s )r h e i r t o p o l o g i c i r li n v r t r i a n t s( t h e i r d i m e n s i o n s ,t h e i r s i n g u l a r i t i e s r a r r r a c t o r s ) a v i n d e e d b e i n t e r p r e t e da s b e i n g o m t L r l l vr e a l . Holl' one goes frorn a milthematical representarion (a manifold) to a I ' r . i t n o n - a c t u a l e n t i t y ( a r , i r t u a l m u l t i p l i c i r y ) i s a c o m p l e r i s s u ew h i c h l l citnnot tirckle here, but which I h:lve addressedin detail elservhere.s But cr'en if it r,vere clear just horv such an ontological move can be made that rvould take us only half \\'rr,vthrough an :rccount of virtual space, the sprrceformed bv all multiplicities (the plane of cor-rsistencl- plane of or i l r m a n e n c e ) . A f u l l a c c o u n t n e e d st o i n t r o d u c e y e t a n o t h e r u n f a m i l i a r t i r t u a l e n r i t y ( r e f e r r e dt o b y n a m e s s u c h a s ' a b s t r a c t m a c h i n e ' , ' l i n e o f f l i g [ r t ' , ' q u a s i - c a u s a lo p e r a t o r ' ) j o b i s c o n r i n u o r . r s l vo e x t r a c t t " hose ttrLrltiplicitiesfrom rhe systelrs inv which they are actualised and mesh

becomes harder for philosophers to ignore the ontological questrons raised by it. go To tackle rhis ontological issue,howeveq rve need t<-r beyond physics the status of virtual space. The matheirnd into mathematics to defir-re matical distinction that we need is that between metric and norr-metric 'length' fundamental and is that is, spacesin which the concept of spaces, a space is defined by :l set of spacesin which it is not. Mathernatically 'relirtionsof proximity' between points, in points and a definition of other words, of the relations which define ir given subset of the points as a neighbourhood. If proximity is defined via a minimurn length (for frclm a cetltre form a example, all points less than a given distance a'uvav r-reighbourhood) the space is said to be metric (u'hether flar, as in non-Euclidean versions) . If some Euclidean geometry, or curved, as in tl-re c r i t e r i o n i s u s e d t h e s p a c ei s s a i d t o b e t l o n - m e t r i c ( a s i n p r o i e c t i v e , other . d i f f e r e n t i a lo r t o p o l o g i c a i g e o m e t r i e s )\ V h a t o t h e r c r i t e r i o n o f p r o x i m ity could be used?In clifferentialgeometry, for erample, one takes advantirge of the fact that the calculus operates on equations expresslngrates g o f c h a n g ea n c lt h a t o n e o f i t s o p e r i l t o r s( d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n ) i v e sa s i t s o t l t p u t value for that rate of change. The points that form a itn instantaneous space can then be defined not by rigid lengths from a fixed coordinate system (as in the metric case)but by the instirntaneousrate at which czrc t , L t t u r e h a n g e sa t t h a t p o i n t . S o I n ep a r t s o f t h e s p a c er v i l l n o t b e c h a n g ing at all, other parts changir-rgslowly', and others changing fast. A differential space,in effect, becomesa field of rapidities and slorunesses, and via these infinitesimal relations one ciln specify neighbotirhoods rvithout hirving to use rigid lengths. Nlathematicrartsrefer to such a dif'manifold' or a 'rnultiplicit,v'. ferential sprrceas a ' m u l t i p l i c i t y ' h a s s e v e r a li m p o r t a n t f e a t u r e s . T o D e l e u z et h i s n o t i o n o f First of all, r,vhenGauss :rnd Riernrrnn introc'lucedthe notion in the first half of the nineteenth century, they revolutionised the very waf in r,vhich d w e c a n p o s es p a t i a lp r o b l e m s .( E i n s t e i na n d o t h e r sw o u l d s e v e r a l e c a d e s n e w p r o b l e m - p g s i n gr e s o u r c e st o , i n t u r n , r e v < t l L r t i o n i s e later use these O o u r i d e a s9 f p h y s i c a l s p a c e t i m e . ) n e f e a t u r e o f t h i s r e v o l t t t i o n w a s t o (say, a get rid of the idea that a space of a given rlumber of dirnensior-rs two-dimensional folded sheet) must be inscribed rvithin a space one l d i n r e n s i o nh i g h e r ( a t h r e e - d i m e n s i o n ab o x ) i n o r d e r f o r i t t o b e p r o p e r l y studied. The need for the extra dimension arises frorn the procedure of assigning Cartesian coordinates to every point of the sheet lvia rigid lengths expressingthe distance of each point to one of the three coordiBut if rhe sheet carnbe stLrdiedusing orrly local information (the n2rtes). rapidity or slowness at which curvature is changing ilt a given point) the

ond Spoce 86 Deleuze

them together without reducing their heterogeneity (thtrt is, give them consistencyas a space).6Again, iust how these two operations are supposed to be performed cannot be discussedhere but thel' are crucial if virtr-ralspaceis to be truly immanent and rlot trn eternal reservoir of fixed archetypes. In other words, philosophers cannot simpl,v use the label 'immanent' and assume this is going to eliminate transcendence,they must give concrete mechanisms of immanence.T Let's assurnefor a moment that one can give a full account of what virtual spaceis and how it is constantly being produced and reproduced. What materialist world view emergesfrom these ideas?"Ina nutshell, the containing all world would consist of il topological (non-metric) sperce biological and rhe constraints which organise the physical, chemical, social processeswhich produce the actual systems (planets, molecules, species, institutions) which inhabit our firmiliar Euclidean metric and e x t e n s i v es p a c e .N o n - m e t r i c a n d m e t r i c s p a c e sw o u l d b e c o n n e c t e dv i a intermediirte spaceswhich would be rnostly intensive.tlhus, the virtual, the intensive and the actuirl would constitute the three spheresof reality, with virtual multiplicities constraining and guiding intensive processes which in turn would yield specific actual entities. The opposite movement, from the actual to the intensive to the virtual, would also be constantly happening, guaranteeing the independence :rnd immanence of 'sfithin this material world human thinkers of different multiplicities. types would follow one or the other movement, scientiststracking the actualisation of the virtual (and focussing on actual beings, as well as and philosophers tracking the opposite motion, that intensiveprocesses), which reconstitutes virtual multiplicities (as ideal e\/ents)out of actual entities and gives them consistencyas a space. and philosophy take opposedpaths, because It could be said that science funcwhereasscientific have eventsfor consistency philosophical concepts phithrough concepts' havestates affairsor mixtures for reference: of tions 9f eventfrom the states affairs' . . losophycontinuallyextractsa consistent the continuallyactualizes eventin a state whereas through functions,science of affairs, thing, or body that can be referredto. (Deleuzeand Guattari 1994:726)

II

Spoce: Extensive Actuol ond Virtuol 87 ond Intensive,

G. trans. M. Lesterwith C. Stivale,New York: I)eleuze, (1990),'lhe Logic of Sense, Columbia UniversityPress. l)elcuze,G. (1994),I)ifferenceand Repetition,trans.P.Patton, New York: (,olumbia LlniversityPress. Delerrze,G. and Glrattari, F. (1987), A Thousand Plateitus.trans. B. lViassumi, \linneapolis: Llniversityof NlinnesotaPress. F. G. l)c'leuze, and GLrattari, (1994).\Yhat is Philosophy?,trans. H. Tornlinsonand (i. Burchell,Nerv York: Columbia Unir,ersitv Press.

Notes
'indivisible' I. Actuall,vDeleuzedefinesthe intensivenot as but as 'rvhat cannot be divided withor.rtchangingnarure'Ja definition rl'ratacknowledges the fact that critical points do subdividean inrensiveline of values but only by marking the onset of an abrupt changeof state.As he writes: \(hat is the significance theseindivisibledistances of that are ceaselesslv transformed and cirnnot be dir.idedor transformedwirhout their elements chanei n g i n n a t u r e e a c h t i m e J I s : t n o t t l r e i n t e n s i v ec h a r r r c r e o f t h i s t t p . o f r multiplicin"s elementsand the relations berrveen them? Exacrlv like a ipeed or a temperature, which is not composedof other speeds temperatures, or but rather rs envelopedin or envelopsothers, each of which marks a change in nature. The metrical principle of thesemultiplicities is not ro be found rn a homogeneous milieu but resideselsewhere, forces at work within them, rn in phvsicalphenomenainhabiting them . . . (Deleuzeand Guamari 1987: 3l\ 'distance' as if ir were a non-merric properry, _ This quote uses the term though in its usual meaning it certainly denotessomething metric. Deleuze takes this specialintensivemeaning of 'distance'from Bertrand Russell. Elservhere writes: he Unit,v alwavs operatesin an empty dimension supplementaryto that of the svstemconsidered(overcoding). . . [But a] multipliciry never allows irself to be overcoded.neverhas availablea supplementarv dimensionover and above its number of lines, that is, over and above the multiplicitv of numbers attachedto rhoselines. (Deleuzeand Guattari l9tl7: 8-9) This remark is made about the 'plane of consisrency' nor about multiplicities. But the former is nothing but the virtual spaceformed by the multiplicitiis themSCIVCS.

.)

References
and \/irtual Philosopbt'.London: Continuum Delanda, M. (2002), IntensiueScience Press. H' Deleuze,G. (1988), Bergsonism,trans. Tomlinson and B. Habberiam, New York: Zone Books.

vhen Deleuzedefineshis multiplicitieshe always seems be referringto manro ifolds rvhosedi.rensionsare used to represenr degrees freedom loiindepenof dent variabLes) some dynamic, and not to manifolds as mere geometric of objects.Thus, in his first introduction of the term he says: Riemann definedas 'multiplicities' those things that could be determinedby their dimensions their independent or variables. distinguished He betweendiscretemultipliciriesand conrinuousmultiplicities.The former conrainthe principle of rheir own merrics . The latter found a metrical principie in somethingelse,even if only i. phenomenaunfolding in them or h rhe forces a c t i n gi n t h e m . ( D e l e u z e 9 8 8 : 3 9 ) 1 And elsewhere he says, using the word 'Idea' to refer to concrete universals or virtual multiplicitiesas replacements essences: for

88

Deleuzeond Spoce
An Idea is an n-dimensional,continuous, defined multiplicin'. Colour - or rather,the Idt'a of colour - is a three-dimension;rl multiplicin'. Br. dimensions, we mean the v:triablesor co-ordinatesupon rvhich a phenomenon depends; by continuitv,we mean the sct of relationsbenveenchangesin thesevariablei . . . by definition,we mean the elemenrs reciprocally' deternrined theserelabv tions, elementswhich c:1nnot changeunlessthe multiplicitv changesits order and its metric. (Deleuze1994: 782\

C h o p t e5 r

'Genesis AfterPoulKleel Eternol':

5 . S e cD e L l n J r 2 0 0 1 : l 0 - 8 .
6 . That Deleuzeconceives imnranentvirtu.rl sprce in terms of both nrultiplicirics of

. r n d o f a n e d r l i r i t ' n . re n t i t . ri t l r i c h \ v e l v e \ t h e r r r o g e r l r e s i r l r , r t r lrr . m o g e n i s i n g l t r thenr is clear from the following quote: There was a lirst group of nr>tions: the Bodv u'ithout Organs or destratified Planeof Consistency; ihe Nl,rtter of the Plane,tliat rvhich occurs in the body or plane (singular,nonsegmented multiplicitiesconrposecl intensive of conrinuums, emissionsof particle-signs, conjuncrionsof florvs)l and the Abstract Machine, or Abstract Machines,in so far as the,v constructthat body'or draw the plane or 'diagram' ltlhat occurs (linesof flight, or absolutedeterritorial(DeleLrzc isaticrn). and Cuatrirri 1987:72) 'mecltrrnrsn.rs The term of irnr.nanence' does not. to mv knrtu'ledgeroccur ln Deleuze's r'r,ork, bnt he expresses himself in similar rvavs: Many rnoventents, tuith a iragile and delic,tte ntechanivn, inrersecr:that by means of which bodies, statesof affairs, and mixtures, consideredin their depth, succeed fail in the production of ideal surfaceslthe plane of consrsor tencyl; and con\:ersel)', tl-ratbr,means of which the eventsof the surfaceare actu.rlizedin the presenr of bodies (in accordanceu'ith conrplex rules) by imprisoning their singul;rriries rvithin the limirs of r.vorlds,individuals and p e r s o n s( D e l e u z e 9 9 0 : 1 6 7 ,m l ' e m p h a s i s ) . 1

ond Dewsbury NigelThrift Dovid John

Resonances'space' by ,\s geographerswe are often seenas delegatesand curators of . r h o s er v h o i n h a b i t t h e h u m a n i t i e sa n d s o c i a l s c i e n c e sW e a r e h e m m e d i n three dominant w:lys in which space is rendered: (1) Space as a [..,r'the Neu,tonian conceptualisationwhere it is seenas a category equal to time, thLrsallying geography to history. Spacehere is the solution to the question: the interaction and integration of phenomena is explained in terms of space.In other rvords, spaceis the container for action - Kant's filing svstem for observation - zrn abstract frame of reference independent of rratter; (2) Nlore simply, and more commonly, space is understood as a rL'lttiue, but active, rerm. Here space is a material reality dealing with as rplestions of scaie- spaceas a plane, as a clistance, something that acts rrs rr rveak actant and has effect; (3) I{ore open to possibility but often jLrst constrzriningin hon, it is conceptualised,spaceis turned into someas thing that is relatiue to the transcendent.Spaceis a product of society but rtlso:r factor in the production of the social becoming socially cons t n r c t e d ,i d e a l i s e da n d i d e o l o g i c a l( C r a n g a n d T h r i f t 2 0 0 0 ) . BLrt how' cloes space fare when we set out onto the open seas of l)eleuze'stranscendentalernpiricism - that wilder sort of empiricism that eInerses'in contrast to everythiirg that makes up the world of the subject r t n d t h e o b j e c t ' ( D e l e u z e 0 0 1 : 2 5 ) ? F o r u s , D e l e u z et u r n s s p a c ei n t o a 2 r t t o v i n gc o n c e p t :s o l e t ' s r e l e 2 l s e a n d o u r s e l v e s n t o t h e s t o r m . i it V'e rvanr to capture the movement of space in Deleuze'sthought by sec'ing space in terms of an immanent spatiality. Whilsr this chimes with the diagran-rof the iate thought of Deleuze, and, in particular, that of 'ltnmanence: A Life . . .' (seeAgamben 1.999:224), it hirunts all his rvork. I n d e e d t h i s s e n s eo f D e l e u z i a n s p a c ei s a k i n d o f h a u n t i n g , i r w o r l d o f phantoms, for, as we wanr to show, it speaksof spaceacting as a passage,