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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE

WILLIAM SCHMIDT Vs CHARLES WASHINGTON Case No. 2:12-CV-01116

COMES NOW William Schmidt, as plaintiff and is appearing specially to challenge jurisdiction. Plaintiff is proceeding without assistance of counsel unschooled in law, pro se, requesting the court accept direction from Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), Boag v. MacDougall, 545 US 360 (1982), Puckett v. Cox 456 F2d 233 (1972 Sixth Circuit USCA), wherein the court has directed those who are unschooled in law making pleadings shall have the court look to the substance of the pleadings rather than the form. Pro se pleadings are to be considered without regard to technicality; pro se litigants' pleadings are not to be held to the same high standards of perfection as lawyers. Maty v. Grasselli Chemical Co., 303 U.S. 197 (1938), B. Platsky v. CIA, 953

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F.2d 25, 26 28 (2nd Cir. 1991), "Court errs if court dismisses pro se litigant without instruction of how pleadings are deficient and how to repair pleadings." BACKGROUND Plaintiff instituted a small claims tort suit in the King County district court against an employee of a third party debt collector, Charles Washington, for violation of plaintiffs Due Process Rights and Conversion on May 30, 2012. On July 2, 2012 plaintiff received a Notice of removal by trespassers, UNITED STATES and UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. ARGUMENT The trespassers improperly removed plaintiffs tort claim from the District Court of Washington state, which had jurisdiction of the subject matter and personal jurisdiction of all of the parties, to the USDC under two code sections that were not even alleged by the Defendant or counsel. Plaintiff states that Quinn P Harrington, Katheryn Keneally, Boris Kukso and Jenny A Durkan removed this case to Federal court in bad faith. This removal of plaintiffs tort claim by 28 USC 1441 (judicial Removal of Cases from State Courts) requires that the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction in order to accomplish removal from a state court to a court of the United States. No original jurisdiction has ever been identified and it is obvious that no original jurisdiction ever existed. Therefore, trespassers allegations are merely insinuations, as trespassers are operating ultra vires (CR 19) and without original jurisdiction Charles Washington, lacks any semblance of sovereign immunity.

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The trespassers, have relied on another code section for its removal of this tort suit from the District Court of Washington to the USDC, namely 28 USC 1442(a)(1). The USA states this in their answer brief, pursuant to 28 USC 1442(a)(1), which allows removal of actions against officers of the United States sued in an official or individual capacity for any act under color of such office. The trespassers, from the time of removal until now, have not alluded to, provided any affidavits or evidence of any kind, nor by any pleadings ever stated that Charles Washington was in fact an officer of the United States. Now there are two very important issues before this Court; 1st, where is the original jurisdiction proffered by the USA and 2 nd, is Charles Washington an officer of the United States? The immunities arising from statutes are, are founded upon the existence of particular facts and these facts must be stated to call into effect the protection of a particular statute. A mere averment will not be enough. A suit commenced in a state court must remain there until cause is shown under some act of Congress for its transfer. For the USDC to aquire a cause under its jurisdiction, a statement of facts, in a legal and logical form giving effect to the Constitution or law of the United States, must appear in the record. If these facts are not in the record, neither the District Court of the United States nor the USDC, can entertain the Removal, as the statutes must be strictly construed in Removal cases from a state court to a District Court of the United States, or even the USDC. These holdings are found in the adjudged decision of GoldWashing and Water Company v. Keyes, 96 U.S. 199, 202-205(1877). See also Carson

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v. Dunham, 121 U.S. 421, 426-429(1987); Chesapeake & O.R.Co. v. Cockrell, 232 U.S. 146, 152(1914); City of Memphis v. Cumberland Telephone & Telegraph Co., 218 U.S. 624, 629 (1910). Removing a case from the state courts to the federal courts by utilizing the jurisdiction of federal courts requires strict construction of the legislation and they both should scrupulously confine their own jurisdiction to the precise limits, which the statue has defined. See Shamrock Oil & Gas Corporation, 313 U.S. 100, 108 (1941). The Ninth Circuit has held that these same standards are derived entirely from the statutory authorization of Congress and that the removal statues are to be strictly construed against removal. See Libhart v. Santa Monica Dairy Co., 592 F.2d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 1979); Salveson v. Western States Bankcard Assoc., 739 F.2d 1423, 1426 (9th Cir. 1984); Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1195 (9 th Cir. 1988); Prize Friz, Inc., v. Matrix (U.S.) Inc., 167 F.3d 1261, 1266 (9th Cir. 1999). Where there is any doubt of the right to transfer a case to federal court, it must be rejected in the first instance. The party removing the suit has the burden of proof, or the suit must be remanded, and facts by competent proof must appear on the record if the removal is challenged. This is held in the adjudged decision of Matheson v.

Progressive Specialty Insurance Co., 375 F.3d 1089, 1090 (9 th Cir. 2003). See also United Computer Systems, Inc., 298 F.3d 756, 763 (9th Cir. 2002); Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566-567 (9th Circuit 1992). The USA did not identify the original facts for the removal. The USA did not claim, or even attempt to establish on the record that Charles Washington is an Officer of the United States.

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Not once has Charles Washington been claimed as, or referred to by the USA as an Officer of the United States. The USA has uses the term Internal Revenue

Service employee instead in their claim. Jenny Durkans certification does not certify that Charles Washington is an employee of the United States and there is no evidence that Charles Washington is an employee of the United States upon which the substitution, certification or removal is based. Jenny Durkan, in her certification states, that Charles Washington is an employee of the Internal Revenue Service and acting within the scope of his employment. She does not certify that Charles Washington is an employee of the United States as required under 28 USC 2679(b). So therefore the Certification by Jenny A Durkan is a nullity. Jenny Durkan is also testifying in a case she is acting as counsel for, and necessarily has a conflict of interest, as she cannot be a witness in the same case she is an advocate in without violating the Rules of Professional Conduct and the Witness-Advocate Rule. The U.S. Department of Justice and the U.S. Attorney, have perpetrated a fraud upon this court, as they well know, that the Internal Revenue Service is not an agency of the United States Government. See Diversified Metal Products, Inc, v. T-Bow Company Trust, Internal Revenue Service, Answer and Claim, item 4, in case No. 93405-E-EJL. Exhibit 1. The United States Notice of Substitution states that Charles Washington has a title of Revenue Officer with the Internal Revenue Service. The only place in the United States Code that such a title related to the IRS is found is defined at 27 CFR

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26.16 and is defined as follows: Revenue Agent. Any duly authorized Commonwealth Internal Revenue Agent of the Department of the Treasury of Puerto Rico. Not the United States Government.

Counsel knew, or should have known that the Internal Revenue Service is not a United States Government Agency and Charles Washington necessarily cannot be a United States Government employee. See exhibit 1. The state of Washington is defined under 28 U.S.C. 1603(a) as a foreign state and its laws are foreign to this court. "A canon of construction which teaches that of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States." [U.S. v. Spelar, 338 U.S. 217 at 222 (1949)]. The state of Washington is not within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States and venue and jurisdiction is hereby challenged. Under the holding of the Supreme Court of the United States in Buckley v. Valeo, supra, it was clearly held that officers of the United States do not include employees of the United States. See also see Auffmordt v. Hedden, 137 U.S. 310, 327(1890); United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508(1878). Therefore, with no employee being an officer of the United States, Charles Washington cannot be protected or shielded by sovereign immunity, as none exists, even if he was an employee of the United States. The removal is improper under Court Rule 11 and Plaintiff hereby objects to the removal of this small claims suit to Federal Court from the Washington state small claims court and objects to the substitution of parties.

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There is no evidence that the U.S. Attorney or the U.S. Department of Justice is authorized to represent a non-U.S. governmental employee. Plaintiff alleges that they are abusing their authority. Subject-matter jurisdiction is hereby challenged. Neither the United States government, its officers, its agencies nor its employees are being sued by plaintiff. There appears no evidence, that the state of Washington has ceded King County Washington to the United States or that King County Washington is within any Federal District upon which this removal is based. See: Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901), Colorado v. Toll, 268 U.S. 228, 45 S.Ct. 505 (1925), Penn Dairies v. Milk Control Comm. of Pennsylvania, 318 U.S. 261, 63 S.Ct. 617 (1943), Adams v. United States, 319 U.S. 312, 63 S.Ct. 1122 (1943). The assertions of the interlopers in this case are not applicable. Plaintiff demands that the case be remanded back to King County District Court. Dated: By:_________________________________________

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