Justus-Liebig-University Giessen Institute of Sociology And Cultural Studies Winter Semester 2011/2012 Seminar: The End of HistoryAgain?

1990s Social Thought and the Arab Spring Lecturer: Floris Biskamp

The Youth in Iraq A Glimpse of Democracy

Toms da Costa e Silva Vasconcelos Economics 7th Semester Unterhof 59 Zimmer 517 35392 Gieen tomas.c.s.vasconcelos@gmail.com

Table of Contents
1. 2. Introduction ............................................................................................................. 3 Historical Backdrop ................................................................................................ 3
2.1 2.2 The Invasion .................................................................................................................. 5 Iraqs Unchecked Government...................................................................................... 5

3.
4.

Democracy?.............................................................................................................. 6
The Down to Earth Elections .............................................................................................. 9

5.

Literature List ....................................................................................................... 11

1. Introduction The background of Iraq is unique. Iraq is a sect divided country, where democracy was imposed by foreign actors after the deposition of Saddam Hussein in 2003. The country is also haunted by violent fighting between sects, terrorism and the constant presence of American troops on national territory. In 2012, American occupation has officially ended. Whenever troops are to occupy the country again, it will be in Iraqian terms, in the exercise of its full sovereignty. But the situation deteriorated. Bombings took dozens of lives in Bagdhad, tensions with the Kurdish population are increasing as they shelter terrorist suspects, and sectarian conflicts get in front of public interest. The government works its way to get rid of the opposition movements that brought down past governments and corruption runs loose with inappropriate institutions. In the region, liberal parties1 overall lost the elections following the Arab Spring. At first sight it looks like a fully fledged Clash of Civilizations as envisioned by Huntington (1993). But a closer look might hold different perspectives for the future of Iraq. This case study intends to focus itself on Iraqs recent history, especially after the United States invasion and on the paper Not Your Parents Political Party: Young Sunnis and the New Iraqi Democracy from Katherine Blue Carroll and its account of the creation of the Iraqi National Tribal Grouping (INTG). Also the partys involvement in the Provincial elections of 2009 and parliamentary elections of March 2010 to give a closer look on the countrys situation. 2. Historical Backdrop Iraq emerged as a modern parliamentary monarchist state in 1921 backed up by the United Kingdom after the fall of the Ottoman Empire in the I World War. The arbitrariness of its borders, uniting three very distinct provinces mostly explains the lack of national cohesion and of government legitimacy seen throughout the countrys history.

The overall perceived majority of the Freedom and Justice party in Egypt (Jack Shenker-Egypt election results put Muslim Brotherhood ahead, 30.11.2011, The Guardian) and the overall victory of the Ennahda in Tunisia (http://www.tunisia-live.net/2011/10/24/tunisian-election-results-tables/ accessed in 22.01);

Following the fall of the monarchy in 1958 the secular Baath Party2 struggled to find its way to power amidst competing factions that pursued nationalism and social change. As of Saddam Hussein, he was from a modest peasant background joining the party in 1957 and becoming quintessential activist and party man (International Crisis Group [ICG], October 2002, p.5). He was from the Sunni Tikriti tribe. In 1968, dissident army officers deposed Abdel-Rahman Arif3, with support from the Baath and its then powerful militia. The new regime consequently began a systematic campaign to root out potential opposition in the army and set about to transform all national institutions, with the primary purpose of achieving undisputed power. Leaving no option but exile for most of the other parties. [The Baath partys leadership] had no faith in the existing police and intelligence and Saddam Hussein received the task of controlling an independent security apparatus. (ICG, October 2002, p.5) Saddam Hussein became head of state in 1979. His rise to power was accompanied by various ruthless moves aimed at destroying competing claims of leadership from within the Tikriti tribe. The development of a state-controlled economy helped him to create a broad base of support for the regime through the wealth generated from oil. Other major efforts went into housing, education, literacy and health, primarily for the urban population in central Iraq and around Baghdad. Both the Kurdish north and the Shiite South suffered in comparison, despite a general increase in the standard of living across the country (ICG, October 2002, p.6). The war with Iran4 (1980-1988) was a watershed in the regime. The focus changed from pan-Arabism to nationalism and a more religious character was imprinted in Sadams public figure. Key political positions gave way to nepotism and he consolidated

alliances with powerful Sunni tribes to assure the regimes (and his personal) stability. By now, the Baath Party was merely a shadow of Saddams rule. The strains from the war, oil disputes and a certain vanity (ICG, October 2002, p.7) led Iraq in 1990 to invade Kuwait and be defeated in 1991 by international forces. The
2

The Baath Party, which was equally active in Syria, sought to revive the glory of the Arab past and called for Arab unity on the basis not of Islam but of the twin secular principles of socialism and nationalism. (ICG, October 2002, p.4) 3 An authoritarian non-Baathist officer who had been in power since a military coup in 1963. 4 The Iraqi regime felt it was no longer bound by the agreement over the right to access the Shatt al-Arab, a waterway that provides vital access for Iraq to the Gulf and on 22 September 1980, Iraqi forces crossed into Iran in an apparent attempt to take advantage of the revolutionary chaos in Tehran to take full control over the waterway. (ICG October 2002, p.6)

defeats resulted in a rigorous sanction regime that fell harder on the population than the government leaders. That spurred large scaled uprisings regarding political marginalization and relative socio-economic deprivation (ICG, October 2002, p.8) in the formerly neglected Kurdish North and Shiite South, both lacking international support and violently contained by central power. 2.1 The Invasion On March 20th, 2003, a military coalition led by the United States and the United Kingdom invaded Iraq with the intention of overthrowing the Baath regime of Saddam Hussein, even if operating outside the legal parameters of the UN charter. (Sultan Barakat, 2005, p. 2) From the beginning the international agents failed to involve the national stakeholders in the countrys post-war reconstruction and neglected the importance of working for national cohesion. Huge contracts were awarded to major US companies to complete showcase infrastructure projects (Sultan Barakat, 2011, p.516) marginalizing Iraqs human capacity and wealth. The dragging process of moving towards elections and a permanent government was constantly delayed by the lack of cohesion and recurrent insurgent (mostly Sunni) movements. In January 2005 the Transitional National Assembly was elected, with very low participation of women and Sunni population, to draft the Constitution. A national referendum in October approved it with 79% in favor. Elections for the first Council of representatives were held under the new constitution on 15 December 2005. Parties and voting were highly sectarian; most parties were mainly Shiite, Sunnis participated mainly as voters (Carroll, 2011, p.103). This election used a proportional system, with approximately 25% of the seats required to be filled by women. After the election, a coalition government was formed under the leadership of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, with Jalal Talabani as president. 2.2 Iraqs Unchecked Government In February 2006 the bombing of the Al Askari Mosque, a symbol for the Shiite population, exploded into two of the bloodiest years in Iraq sectarian conflict history. State apparatus became very unstable because as an insurgency took shape, state

institutions were more systematically targeted. During some periods, work ground to a halt, as government staff were unable to reach their offices. Thousands of skilled professionals were forced into exile (ICG, September 2011, p.4) and thousands died. The majority of the fighting was over by September 2007, although US forces would maintain a stability and advisory role for over two more years. Today, none of the institutions required to monitor government operations has been able to assert itself in the face of government interference, intransigence and manipulation, a deficient legal framework and ongoing threats of violence (ICG, September 2011, p. i). Prime Minister Nouri al-Malikis broad coalition government has exacerbated the problem by interfering in anti-corruption cases, manipulating investigations for political advantage and intimidating critics to prevent a replication of the type of popular movements that already have brought down three regimes in the region (ICG, September 2011, p. i). At first sight this hectic backdrop falls in the description of a Clash of Civilizations in Huntingtons (1993) broadly debated paper. It is a sectarian conflict and it was worsened by western interference. But our historical analysis indicates its resulted from a confluence of distorted interests, international interference and violence and its not simply the case of West against Islam or Sunnis against Shiites (or Kurds). Iraq is actually a very secular state, wealthy from oil and with an educated population, hence one of the Arab countries with most favorable conditions towards democratic development. So what is there to be done? 3. Democracy? As Carroll (2011, p.104) mentioned: There is a general consensus among scholars of Arab politics that political parties in the Arab world, especially outside the Islamist trend, have failed to contribute to democratization. Specifically, secular Arab parties have failed to develop routinized, effective structures and procedures linking citizens to the state, and they have failed to develop policy preferences and identities independent of those of their leaders. Politics has indeed always been very sectarian, which is something deep-rooted in Iraq, worsened by Saddams neglect of the Kurdish north and the Shiite south and further

worsened by the international actors who failed to involve the Sunnis in the constitutional process. But there are exceptions. When considering the reasons why young Sunnis from the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP), a non secular party following the model of the Muslim Brotherhood (the Freedom and Justice party in Egypt)5, decided to form the Iraqi National Tribal Grouping (INTG) Carroll (2011, p. 102) mentions: First, in that they were not steeped in the Baathist tradition of a party as personal vehicle, their youth led them to appreciate more institutionalized forms of party organization. Second, the INTGs leaders were comfortable soliciting western advice in constructing their party and developing their political strategy (). The INTG was formed in February 2008 and is somewhat secular and non sectarian. In developing their political strategy, the INTG decided nationalism would be appealing in a country in crisis and () tribalism was increasingly viewed by Iraqis as a nonsectarian but authentically Iraqi ideology (most Iraqi tribes, especially the Jibouri, are of mixed sect). The party also ()set up a network of regional councils with members elected by local supports.() also organized itself across three types of supporters it sought to mobilize women, tribes and youth()also sought to provide what social services it could to potential supporters(Carroll, 2011, p.112) . The INTG was not arbitrarily used as an example. This party impersonates how Iraqis should approach democracy, as their tool to act upon. First, instead of a democratic effort with Western interest like Iraqis have come to know in 2003, national interest is its main objective. Second, it is working itself along the lines that unite the Iraqian population to search for national cohesion through tribal connections. Their inexperience with democracy is answered by their connections with the IIP and active openness to western advice. Third, it recognizes the importance of setting up regional councils, led by regional leaders to foster public political participation, especially recognizing women and young people as voters. National cohesion is a still a long run objective, but the lesson from Saddams rule is that a highly centralized power is unable to comprehend and attend to the needs of all sects of the population with legitimacy.

Stands in the grey area between Islamic values and democratic values but is still strongly religious based;

And fourth, being Sunni originated, means people are turning to politics instead of violence, and that the political atmosphere is finally reaching a point where most people can finally run for candidacy and form parties without spending most of their energy trying not to be captured or killed. Stanley Kurtz (2002, p.1) argues: Huntington (1993) insists that promoting democracy and modernization abroad means more war, not less. Electoral competition in nonWestern countries() heightens appeals to nationalism and brings belligerent fundamentalists to power, thus increasing international conflict.()But Huntingtons deepest assault on liberalism may be his insistence on treating our belief in democracys global appeals as a characteristic() of the Western culture rather than a universal truth. But democracy was implemented founded on the concept of military victory. Leading to the removal of Saddam Hussein and his loyalists, creating a blank space in which to install a Western style democracy, favorable to US political and economic interests in the Middle East. Reconstruction strategies have neither sought to enlist Iraqs wealth of human capacity, nor to solve its short-term debt crisis in order to put its economic resources at the disposal of national development rather than international corporate profit. The contracting out of reconstruction, and the rapid privatization of key industries that followed, marginalizes Iraqi business, middle class professionals and the general public (Sultan Barakat, 2005, p. 576). The problem is not democracy itself. As of now, in Iraqs and other Arab Spring countries case, theres nothing more important than international willingness to support the Arab youth in its democratic efforts. Like Hilterman (05 December 2011) argues: () regardless of any formal unity, the polity [in Iraq] remains profoundly divided. () This mirrors the situation before the 2010 parliamentary elections and thus suggests a deep pathology in the body politic. The only thing that could break through this political stalemate is the gradual but inevitable rise of a new class of leaders in opposition to the established parties, most of which are led by former exiles. This new class will be young and inexperienced and international actors cannot let that be the reason why democratic efforts failed. We must act as knowledge and support source.

4. .The Elections In 2009 the INTG participated in the provincial elections as part of the Tawafuq coalition with the IIP. The party still depended of IIP funding, lobbying and decided joining a senior party might help them not be completely shadowed in their first elections. Prime Minister Malikis State of Law coalition secured 28 [of 57] seats in Baghdad and Tawafuq was the next largest winner with seven seats with four belonging to the INTG (Carroll, 2011, p.116). In March 2010 the parliamentary elections revealed the electorates preference for the old guard and Tawafuq secured only 6 seats of the 325-member Parliament, none of which belonging to the INTG. Iraqis were attracted to a strong-state message. The country was in crisis, and this was not the time to risk putting untested young people in control. The INTG also suffered from a widespread frustration with the IIP (Carroll, 2011, p. 117). Even so, theres still a lot to be learned from the party. Firstly, the role of the international actors today in Iraq, in parallel the other Arab Spring countries, is of coaching. It is necessary to educate the politicians, parties and activists in how to institutionalize their parties, how to draft an organized political program and how to foster dialogue between local leaders and central government. Moreover, the population needs to understand their role as voters. Leaving, therefore, open ways for the new political actors to reach out for experience and guidance, to protect the newly emancipated youth from being easy prey for experienced politicians, whether they are pro-regime or opposition (Carroll, 2011, p. 101). Tribalism is an interesting counterbalance to sectarianism, but it still vulnerable to fragmentation for structural reasons associated with the maintenance of tribal leadership by sheikhs (Carroll 2011, p. 105). Decentralized organization is an alternative answer to centralizing power, in order to diminish the sectarian conflicts. Inclusiveness will help people feel represented, they wont need violence; political dialogue is cheaper and more effective and regionalism will help them connect with their leaders. The INTG and its 4 elected chairs in the Provincial Council in their first electoral run are evidence that iraqians are starting to question old political traditions and to act upon criticism. As Fukuyama states (1992, p. 42): Two hundred years after they first animated the French and American revolutions, the principles of liberty and equality

have proven not durable but resurgent. The Iraqis might have majorly chosen a more strong-state message in the last elections but the Iraqian democratic effort has only just begun.

5. Literature List Barakat, S. (2005). Post-Saddam Iraq: Deconstructing a regime, reconstructing a nation. Third World Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 45, pp. 571 591. doi:

10.1080/01436590500127800 Carroll, Katherine B. (2011). Not your parents political party: Young Sunnis and the new Iraqi democracy. Middle East Policy, Vol. XVIII, No. 3 (Fall), pp. 101 121. Fukuyama, Francis 1992: The End of history and the Last Man. New York; Hiltermann, Joost. (05.12.2011). US withdrawal from Iraq. Article post to: http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/iraq-iran-gulf/iraq/opeds/us-troop-withdrawal-from-iraq.aspx visited on 06.01.2012 Huntington, Samuel P. 1993: The Clash of Civilizations? In: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72 (Summer), pp. 22-49. International Crisis Group. (2011). Failing Oversight: Iraqs Unchecked Government Middle East Report N113. Retrieved from:

http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/iraq-iran-gulf/iraq/113failing-oversight-iraqs-unchecked-government.aspx International Crisis Group. (2002). Iraq Backgrounder: What Lies Beneath ICG Middle East Report N6. Retrieved from: http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-eastnorth-africa/iraq-iran-gulf/iraq/006-iraq-backgrounder-what-lies-beneath.aspx International Crisis Group. (2012). CrisisWatch N101. Retrieved from:

http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/crisiswatch/crisiswatchdatabase.aspx?CountryIDs={18CB966A-0073-4264-B3F5-ED0472ED975C}#results accessed on Januray 27th 2012 Kurtz, Stanley. (June - July, 2002). The future of History: Francis Fukuyama and Samuel P. Huntington, post-September 11. Policy Review, No. 113.