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ANCHOR REPORT

China economy
GLOBAL ECONOMICS AND STRATEGY November 2011

China risks
Research analysts

November 2011

We attach a one-in-three probability to China experiencing a hard economic landing commencing before the end of 2014. We define hard landing as an abrupt slowdown in real GDP growth to an average of 5% y-o-y or less over four consecutive quarters. We discuss six key reasons why the risk of a China hard landing happening in the next three years appears to have increased. We launch Nomuras China Stress Index (CSI), which uses 18 indicators to summarize the macro risks in a single measure. Our global strategy teams conduct a what if exercise, discussing trading recommendations and stock ideas for this non-trivial risk scenario.

Economist Rob Subbaraman rob.subbaraman@nomura.com +852 2536 7435

Strategist Kevin Gaynor kevin.gaynor@nomura.com +44 (0) 20 710 27800

Any portion of this report that has been prepared by a trading desk analyst is not a product of the Fixed Income Research Department and is not covered by the Research Analyst certification provided in Appendix A-1. For additional information concerning the role of Trading Desk Analysts, please see the important conflicts disclosures beginning at page 101 of this report.

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November 2011

Foreword........................................................................................................... 3 Executive summary ......................................................................................... 4 Introduction Six reasons to worry .............................................................. 5 Defining a hard economic landing ................................................................. 8 Defining a hard landing ................................................................................ 8 Triggers and timing ........................................................................................ 8 Policy responses ............................................................................................ 8 Perceived likelihood ..................................................................................... 10 Nomuras China Stress Index (CSI) ............................................................. 11 1. Overinvestment and excessive credit ..................................................... 13 Box 1: Fuzzy numbers .............................................................................. 14 Box 2: Chinas challenging GDP arithmetic .............................................. 17 Box 3: Lessons from Japan on the return and cost of capital .................. 19 2. Rudimentary monetary architecture ........................................................ 22 Box 4: Shadow banking in the US and China compared ......................... 26 3. The privileged state-owned enterprises .................................................. 28 Box 5: Investment is high, but savings are even higher ........................... 30 Box 6: The Akerlof market for lemons problem applied to China ............. 31 4. Unintended consequences of financial liberalization ............................ 33 Box 7: A chronology of Chinas capital account liberalization .................. 34 Box 8: Risks associated with financial liberalization: lessons from Japan38 5. The Lewis turning point ............................................................................ 39 6. The setting in of growing pains ............................................................... 43 Demographic challenges .............................................................................. 43 Box 9: Chinas hukou household registration system .............................. 46 Rising inequality and an aspiring middle class ............................................ 46 Resource and environmental strains ........................................................... 51 Pricing a China hard landing Strategy perspectives .............................. 56 Global macro perspectives ........................................................................... 59 Global equity perspective ............................................................................. 64 Asia-ex Japan FX perspective ..................................................................... 67 Implications for Asia regional equities69 China equities the risk.......73 Chinese credits already reflecting the risks of a China hard landing ........ 91 References...................................................................................................... 94 Appendix: The Construction of Nomuras China Stress Index ....................... 97

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November 2011

Foreword
We are pleased to present Nomuras Anchor report on China, in which our economists, strategists, equity and political analysts assess the medium-term risk of a hard landing a critical issue for todays global economy. At Nomura, we pride ourselves in producing research of the highest standard. Historically, we have had a strong presence across Asia, and in recent years we have increased our footprint in Europe and the United States to become Asias leading global investment bank. Our roots in Asia allow us to see firsthand the breakneck speed at which the regions economies are emerging and contributing over half of global GDP growth. China leads the world in the growth stakes, but the risks in our view have risen and should no longer be ignored. Our base case is that China's economy will average growth of about 8.5% in 2012-14, but we judge that the risks of a temporary interruption that pushes growth far below potential are rising. We define a so-called hard landing as an abrupt slowdown in real GDP growth to average 5% or less for at least one year. This report discusses six key factors that lead us to attach a one-in-three likelihood that Chinas economy commences a hard landing before the end of 2014. How would this non-trivial risk of a hard landing in China impact global financial markets? Our global and Asian equity, FX, rates and credit strategy teams assess the macro implications and present trading recommendations and specific stock ideas to this risk scenario. How can investors calibrate the risk of this hard landing scenario? In this report we launch Nomuras China Stress Index (CSI) which we will update quarterly. The exact probability of a hard landing is necessarily a matter for investor judgment, but the CSI will give investors an important indication of risk. Nomuras Anchor series of reports underscore our dedication to produce thematic, long-term studies, involving cross-region and cross-division collaboration among our global markets research teams. We welcome your feedback as we continue our tradition of collaborative work to deliver unique investment insight and ideas to our clients.

Hideyuki Takahashi Head of Global Research

Paul Norris Head of Global Markets Research

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November 2011

Executive summary1
This study takes Chinas still enormous economic development potential as a given and focuses on the risks and challenges that lie ahead for the economys meteoric rise has been associated with a build-up of fundamental imbalances. We define a hard economic landing in China as an abrupt slowdown in real GDP growth to an average of 5% y-o-y or less over four consecutive quarters. While our base case is that China's economy will average growth of about 8.5% in 2012-14, we discuss six compelling reasons why the risk of a hard landing has increased. We attach a one-in-three likelihood that a hard landing commences before the end of 2014. Overinvestment and excessive credit. China's investment is almost half of GDP, while domestic credit is nearly 1.5x GDP, or 1.8x if the shadow banking sector is included. Empirical literature shows that investment booms are more likely to trigger a crisis if they are associated with credit booms. China ticks both of these boxes. A rudimentary monetary architecture, centered on controlling the exchange rate is not very effective in managing an economy that is rapidly becoming more open and sophisticated, and has resulted in a cost of capital that is too low and a financial sector that is repressed. The privileged state-owned enterprises receive preferential government subsidies and bank financing, yet they are capital intensive, inefficient and crowd out smaller private enterprises. Unintended consequences of financial liberalization. Internationalization of the renminbi is adding pressure for China to accelerate financial liberalization, but this is not without risks, such as falling credit standards as banks overly compete with one another. The Lewis turning point, associated with a dwindling supply of surplus labour from the countryside, is likely upon China, which could trigger a serious outbreak of inflation. The setting in of growing pains from worsening demographics and increasing strains on natural resources and the environment. These growing pains will almost certainly cause the economy's growth potential to slow over this decade, making it more challenging to implement structural reforms and address high income inequality. China's economy is now so big and complex that many of its structural problems are becoming more interrelated. Also, many of its critical reforms are becoming unavoidably connected, making it more difficult to continue undertaking individual reforms gradually and in isolation. The government would no doubt do all in its power to respond, but the question is how large, quick and effective a policy stimulus would be. On all three counts, we judge that it would be less than in 2008. We are well aware that picking the exact timing of a hard landing is devilishly difficult. The key will be whether the risk of a hard landing rises or falls in the future. Enter Nomura's new proprietary tool, our China Stress Index, which uses 18 indicators to summarize the macro risks in a single measure. Please refer to the summary pages 56-58 for strategy perspectives, trading recommendations and stock ideas should the non-trivial risk of a China hard landing impact global financial markets.

The authors of particular parts are accredited in their respective sections, but specific mention should be made of Zhiwei Zhang, Chi Sun, Alastair Newton, Simon Flint, Pradeep Mohinani, Michael Kurtz, Ian Scott, Chien-hua Chen and Qilong Zhang. We are grateful to Candy Cheung and Wendy Chen for data analysis; David Vincent and Kenneth Persing for editing; and Jay Chandrasekharan for coordinating the equity analysts. We are also indebted to Zhiwei Zhang, Paul Sheard and Paul Norris for providing helpful comments on early drafts.

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November 2011

Introduction Six reasons to worry


China has made remarkable achievements in development, but it remains the largest developing country in the world. Population, resources and the environment have put great pressure on our economic and social development, and there is lack of adequate balance, coordination or sustainability in our development. President Hu Jinato, Boao Forum for Asia, Hainan, China, 15 April 2011. Chinas economy has averaged 10% real growth since it launched its reforms and began to open up in 1978. In 2010 it surpassed Japan to become the 2 worlds second-largest economy (Figure 1). Yet China is still a poor country: its nominal GDP per capita of USD4,400 in 2010 is similar to that of Japan in 1975, suggesting that there is still lots of room to urbanize, industrialize and 3 move up the value-added ladder (Figure 2). However, as Chinas leaders readily admit, the economys meteoric rise has been associated with a build-up of fundamental problems: the export- and investment-led growth model is reaching its limits; macro and industrial policies need a major overhaul; the once seemingly endless supply of cheap rural labour migrating to the cities is diminishing; and there are the growing challenges of worsening demographics, high income inequality, resource shortages and environmental degradation.

China's economy still has lots of room to develop, but fundamental problems have built up

Fig. 1: Chinas long-run real GDP growth


% y-o-y 30 20
10

Fig. 2: Nominal GDP per capita: China vs Japan


USD 45,000
40,000

35,000 30,000
25,000 20,000

China

Japan

0 -10
-20

15,000 10,000
5,000 0

-30 1950

1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

2010

1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

Source: CEIC and Nomura Global Economics.

Source: CEIC and Nomura Global Economics.

This study takes Chinas still enormous economic development potential as a given and focuses on the macro risks and challenges that lie ahead. Our base case is that China's economy will average growth of about 8.5% in 2012-14, but we judge that the risks of a temporary interruption that pushes growth far below potential are rising. We define a so-called economic hard landing as an abrupt slowdown in real GDP growth to an average of 5% y-o-y or less over four consecutive quarters. Six factors lead us to attach a one-inthree likelihood that a China hard landing commences before the end of 2014. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. Overinvestment and excessive credit Rudimentary monetary architecture The privileged state-owned enterprises (SOEs) Unintended consequences of financial liberalization The Lewis turning point The setting in of growing pains
Six factors lead us to attach a one-in-three likelihood that a China hard landing commences before the end of 2014

2 3

To compare the sizes of economies we convert nominal GDP into USD at market exchange rates. GDP per capita in constant prices is a more appropriate yardstick to compare real purchasing power, but such data on a consistent basis are only available back to 1960. World Bank data show that in 1960, Japan's real GDP per capita (USD7,241) was still higher than China's real GDP per capita (USD2,423) in 2010, suggesting that China's current real average standard of living is more on par with Japan's before the 1960s.

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November 2011

While there may be many tell-tale warning signs that a hard landing is coming, the trickiest part is getting the timing right. The conventional wisdom seems to be that, because of political incentives, a hard landing, should there be one, would not occur until after the transition to Chinas fifth generation of leaders in 4 early 2013. The analysis of Eichengreen, Park and Shin (2011) adds some support to this view. They analyse a sample of 41 fast-growing economies over the period 1957 to 2007 and find that on average these economies slow significantly when GDP per capita on a purchasing power parity basis hits 5 USD16,740 which China is unlikely to reach until 2015, at the earliest. However, they also show that a low consumption-to-GDP ratio, higher and more volatile inflation, a rising old-age dependency ratio and an undervalued exchange rate are important features that typically increase the chances of a sharp slowdown and China has all of these. While we are well aware that picking the exact timing of a hard landing is devilishly difficult, we find some compelling reasons why the risk of it happening in the next three years should no longer be ignored. The empirical literature on the causes of financial crises offers some pertinent lessons to China. The first is that an extended period of high GDP growth can mask the build-up of underlying financial problems, in part because the most robust leading indicator of financial crises the debt-to-GDP ratio is flattered. Lesson number two is that investment booms are more likely to trigger a crisis if they are associated with credit booms. China ticks both of these boxes: investment (public and private) comprises nearly half of GDP and domestic credit is almost 1.5x GDP, or 1.8x if the shadow banking sector is included. The second reason relates to China's stage of economic development the economy has become so big and complex that many of its structural problems are becoming more interrelated. For example, a rudimentary monetary architecture, centering on controlling the exchange rate, has resulted in a cost of capital that is too low and a financial sector that is severely repressed. The too-low cost of capital has fueled overinvestment, while the financial repression has given rise to a flourishing shadow banking sector. Another example is the generous government and bank support given to the less efficient and capital-intensive state-owned enterprise (SOE) sector, which leads to wasteful investment of scarce resources, environmental degradation and credit rationing to private small to medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Rather than any one of these factors alone, we believe it is the combination of various imbalances and interactions among them that increases the likelihood of a major setback. Third, increasing strains on natural resources and the environment, together with demographic changes rapidly turning unfavorable, are causing growing pains to set in that will almost certainly cause the economy's potential growth to slow over the course of this decade and inflation to be structurally higher. In an environment of slowing trend growth and higher structural inflation, structural problems festering below the surface can bubble up to the surface, and implementing reforms can be more challenging. For instance, removing the generous government subsidies to SOEs, can become politically more divisive as power and economic privilege needs to be wrested from local governments, the SOEs and the banks. Fourth, historically the government has implemented reforms incrementally. However, China has reached a stage of development at which many of its critical reforms are unavoidably connected, making it more difficult to undertake individual reforms gradually and in isolation. For example, internationalizing the renminbi and moving to a more flexible exchange rate
4

The empirical literature on the causes of financial crises offers some pertinent lessons to China

Chinas economy has become so big and complex that many of its structural problems are becoming more interrelated

Increasing strains on natural resources, the environment, and demographics are causing growing pains to set in

It is becoming more difficult to undertake individual reforms gradually and in isolation

For example, according to a Bloomberg global survey on 29 September 2011, 1,031 of its subscribers were asked about the chances of Chinas economy slowing below 5% growth: 12% of respondents believed it will happen within the next year, 47% within the next 2-5 years and the remainder thought longer than 5 years, or that it would never happen. 5 Specifically, the authors identify 43 cases where rapidly growing economies slow significantly that is, real GDP growth shifts down by at least 2 percentage points and calculate that, on average, the tipping point is when GDP per capita (on a purchasing power parity basis) is USD16,740.

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November 2011

regime are adding pressure on China to press ahead with capital account liberalization and interest rate deregulation. But without adequate safeguards, financial deregulation can pressure banks to engage in overly aggressive competition, lowering overall credit standards. Another example is Chinas shrinking supply of young, rural surplus labour which is starting to accelerate wage growth. One proposed reform is to relax the rigid hukou household registration system, giving city migrants the same rights as locals so as to encourage greater labour mobility and faster urbanization. But without other reforms this could exacerbate other problems, such as environmental degradation and social tensions. We see the pressure building to make more broad-based wholesale reforms, but given growing inter-linkages of various reforms, big changes will carry greater risks. Politically, it is hard to envisage substantial change before the next generation of leaders takes the helm in March 2013.

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November 2011

Defining a hard economic landing


The term China hard landing is too often a throw-away line that means different things to different people. We provide a precise definition of what we regard as a hard economic landing in China. In addition and with a large dose of humility we present our views on the likelihood, timing and description of a hard economic landing, were it to occur.

Defining a hard landing


We define a hard economic landing in China as an abrupt slowdown in real GDP growth to an average of 5% y-o-y or less over four consecutive quarters. In economists parlance we would regard this as a deep recession. On our estimate of Chinas potential GDP growth being around 8%, our hard landing definition means GDP growth being at least 3 percentage points (pp) below potential, which we would regard as equivalent to a contraction in real GDP in the US, on average, over four consecutive quarters. Note that under our definition, Chinas real GDP growth could average 4.9% y-o-y for four quarters in a row, or it could plunge to negative year-on-year growth in one quarter (a low probability event, but one that we do not rule out) before rebounding to over 5% y-o-y in subsequent quarters but for the four quarters, averaging below 5%. The last time China experienced a hard economic landing by this definition was when real GDP growth slowed from 11.3% y-o-y in 1988 to 4.1% in 1989 and 3.8% in 1990, before rebounding to 9.2% in 1991. From Q4 1999, China started publishing quarterly real GDP data, and since then the lowest average growth on a four-quarter rolling basis was 7.5% y-o-y in Q4 2001.
Our definition is an abrupt slowdown in real GDP growth to an average of 5% y-o-y or less over four consecutive quarters

Triggers and timing


Although the advanced economies falling back into recession would hurt Chinas exports, the economy is too domestic driven, in our view, for external shocks to directly cause a hard landing. The more likely cause would be a major pullback in investment from its current very high share of almost half of GDP. Within gross capital formation, investments in property (24% of total) and infrastructure (28% of total) appear the most vulnerable components. Examples of potential triggers of an investment-led downturn include: 1) a correction in what appears to be an overheated property market; 2) policy mistakes, for instance the Peoples Bank of China (PBC) underestimating inflation and having to play catch-up via aggressive tightening; 3) unforeseen shocks, such as social unrest or a deadly pandemic; and 4) simply investment fatigue setting in. Whatever the trigger, a major pullback in investment would be likely to cause a steep rise in non-performing loans (NPLs) given that Chinas domestic credit-to-GDP ratio is also at an extraordinarily high 1.5x, or 1.8x once the shadow banking sector is taken into account. Through losses of wealth, confidence and jobs there would likely be large indirect knock-on effects to household consumption. It terms of timing, there is an argument that, because of political incentives, a hard landing would not be allowed to happen until after the leadership transition in March 2013. However, we would not rule out it happening earlier, given: 1) the ratios of investment to GDP and credit to GDP are so high; 2) support from exports is likely to be less than before; 3) the economy has become so large and complex that many of the structural problems are becoming more interrelated; and 4) policy responses are likely less effective than before.
The most likely cause would be a major pullback in investment, but there are many potential triggers

Policy responses
In response to the global financial crisis China implemented a RMB4trn (13% of 2008 GDP) fiscal stimulus; put the steady appreciation of the CNY/USD exchange rate, that has been in train since July 2005, on hold; cut the bank

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November 2011

reserve requirement ratio (RRR) by 250bp; and cut the benchmark 1yr lending rate by 216bp. We have no doubt that the government would again do all in its power to respond to signs of a hard landing, but the question is how large, quick and effective a policy stimulus would be. On all three counts, we judge that it would be less than in 2008. On monetary policy, we would expect aggressive cuts in the bank RRR and CNY/USD appreciation to once again be halted (if there were to be large net capital outflows rather than allowing CNY/USD depreciation, we would expect the PBC to drawdown its USD3.2trn of FX reserves to keep CNY/USD stable). On the other hand, we see a higher hurdle than in 2008 for the PBC to cut the benchmark 1yr lending rate aggressively. One reason is because of greater inflation pressures today, with CPI inflation currently much higher (6.1% y-o-y in September 2011) than the 2.5% in 4Q 2008. Moreover, core CPI inflation, which excludes food and energy items, has also risen steadily over the past two years to 2.4% y-o-y in Q3 2011, the highest since the government began publishing the data in 2005, suggesting that a structural inflation problem is emerging (see Asia Special Report, China: The case for structurally higher inflation. 21 September 2011). Another reason is what we believe is growing recognition among Chinas policymakers that interest rates were set fundamentally too low in the past, and that this cheap cost of capital contributed to overinvestment. As such, we would expect to see greater official resistance to rate cuts than in the past. On fiscal policy, we would expect another stimulus package and, to avoid the economy becoming more unbalanced, there would likely be more focus on consumption-boosting measures. However, fiscal stimulus aimed at consumption tends to be less effective than public investment, because any increase in household income can be saved rather than spent. Therefore, we would expect a fiscal stimulus package to again be dominated by public investment, but again believe it would be less effective than that seen in 2008-09, for three reasons. First, while China certainly has room for fiscal stimulus, it has less room than it did before. Central government debt is still low at around 20% of GDP, but the build-up of local government debt in recent years has lifted general government debt (central plus local) to around 50% of GDP. On top of this are the governments contingent future liabilities, including future losses related to NPLs and unfunded pension liabilities which, if all were to be recognized in 2011, would lift the general government debt to 85% of GDP, according to the IMF (2011a, p.47). Second, the speed of implementation would likely be slower than in 2008-09. Before the global financial crisis, the economy was overheating, forcing the National Development Reform Commission (NDRC) to turn down a large number of new investment projects by SOEs and local governments. So when the global financial crisis hit, China had many large off-the-shelf investment projects ready to go and so could boost investment quickly. This is no longer 6 the case. Third, given that government-influenced investment comprises about one-third of total investment, to avoid a fall in total investment public investment must grow by twice as much as any decline in private investment growth. The government doubling up with another public-led investment boom could heighten concerns over misallocated, wasteful investment, increasing fears of an even bigger hard landing further out the private response could be to pull back investment even more.
China still has room for fiscal stimulus, but less than in 2008 We see a higher hurdle than in 2008 for the PBC to cut the benchmark 1yr lending rate aggressively

The speed of implementation would likely be slower than in 2008-09

Another public-led investment boom could heighten concerns over misallocated, wasteful investment

The growth of newly started fixed-asset investment projects was 28.7% y-o-y in 2007, but the NDRCs rejection of new projects caused the growth rate to plunge to -2.9% y-o-y in Jan-July 2008; the NDRC reversed course after the global financial crisis hit, and the pent-up demand caused the growth rate to rebound to over 80% y-o-y in Jan-Oct 2009. The growth of newly started fixed-asset investment projects was 23.1% y-o-y in Jan-Aug 2011, and there is now much less pent-up demand.

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November 2011

Perceived likelihood
Drawing together the strands of the analysis we have done on the six main macro risks in China, our overall assessment is that the chance of a hard economic landing has increased in recent years. We attach a one-in-three probability of real GDP growth falling to an average of 5% y-o-y or less over four consecutive quarters sometime between now and the end of 2014. While our baseline modal (i.e., most likely outcome) forecast to which we attach the residual two-third probability is for Chinas real GDP to grow by an average of 8.5% in 2012-14. We are aware of the non-trivial tail risk of a much worse outcome which, as we explain in the final chapter, would have severe repercussions for the global economy and financial markets. Interestingly, this year there has been a significant sell-off in Chinas equity and credit markets, yet most China economists have not significantly downgraded their GDP forecasts. For example, the latest 10 October survey of 18 market economists by Consensus Economics Inc. shows that the consensus forecast of Chinas real GDP growth is 8.5% in 2012 and 8.4% in 2013, while the IMFs latest forecast (released in September) is 9.0% in 2012. The way we would reconcile this gap is that economists forecast the modal, or most likely, outcome, whereas the financial market tends to take a weightedaverage probability of different possible outcomes. If we apply our baseline and hard-landing probabilities to the market method {(8.5*0.66)+(5.0*0.33)}, it gives a weighted-average GDP growth forecast of at most 7.3% in 2012-14. In other words, like-for-like, our forecasts are probably not that dissimilar to what the market is pricing in the key will be whether the risk of a hard landing rises or falls going forward, which brings us to Nomuras new proprietary tool our China Stress Index (CSI).
We attach a one-in-three probability to our definition of a hard landing commencing sometime between now and the end of 2014

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November 2011

Nomuras China Stress Index (CSI)


To more closely monitor the risks of a hard landing in Chinas economy, we have constructed a macro China Stress Index, or CSI for short. The CSI is made up of 18 indicators that quantify the macro risks in China into one summary measure. We selected the 18 indicators by using two main criteria: Importance: Each indicator signals an important risk factor that we believe is not fully captured by other indicators in the CSI. We try to capture, among others, the risks associated with over- and mal-investment, particularly in the property market; excessive credit and the problems created by the rudimentary monetary architecture; structural inflation risks associated with the Lewis turning point; and the increasing challenges arising from high income inequality and environmental degradation. Availability: A challenge not only in China, but in all developing economies is the paucity of the data. We chose indicators that are sourced from official statistics and that have a time series of over a decade, so that the CSI has a reasonably long history for statistical inference (the CSI begins in January 2000). For the indicators that are available only on an annual or quarterly basis, monthly series were interpolated from the longer-frequency data. To construct the CSI, the 18 indicators are first standardized and then weighted. The weights, to some extent, are subjective, but they are grounded in our analysis in the following chapter and international experience of the common causes of emerging market crises. Most variables have weights of 35%, while two have 8% weights (property loans/total loans and residential property price index/long-run trend) and three have 10% weights (gross capital formation/GDP, domestic credit/GDP and new shadow banking funding/ new total social financing). The CSI is indexed to 100 in January 2000. For more technical details on the methodology in constructing the CSI, please see the Appendix: The construction of Nomuras China Stress Index. The CSI indicates that risks in Chinas macro economy have been on a broad uptrend, and more noticeably since the global financial crisis. In Q2 2011, the CSI rose to its highest level since it was first compiled, but in Q3 it eased slightly, mainly because of a decline in the flow of new shadow banking funding (Figure 3). One limitation of the CSI is that it does not give a probability of a hard economic landing. To do so would require a reference variable measuring past episodes of hard economic landings in China, the obvious one being real GDP. Yet in the past 20 years Chinas GDP growth has not fallen below 5% and before then the causes of hard landings in GDP were influenced heavily by social and political unrest. We could have used panel data on GDP from other countries showing hard economic landing experiences internationally, but in our view Chinas economy is too special for this exercise to give credible results. So what the CSI tells us is: 1) the direction of overall macro risk; and 2) how fast the risk has changed compared to history.
The CSI indicates that risks in Chinas economy have been on a broad uptrend, more noticeably since the global financial crisis The CSI is made up of 18 indicators that quantify the macro risks in China into one summary measure

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Fig. 3: Nomuras China Stress Index


Jan 2000=100 102.0 101.5

101.0 100.5
100.0

99.5 Jan-01

Jan-03

Jan-05

Jan-07

Jan-09

Jan-11

Note: The last data point is September 2011. Source: PBC; National Bureau of Statistics and Nomura Global Economics. For details of construction, see the Appendix: The construction of Nomuras China Stress Index

A closer look at the components reveals that rapid increases in residential housing starts relative to sales, residential property prices, gross capital formation, property loans and domestic credit have been the main recent drivers (Figure 4). We are under no illusions that the CSI has its limitations and needs to be treated with caution. The results of the CSI, which we will update on a quarterly basis, should always be open to interpretation, and used as a tool among many others for analysis of China macro risks.

Housing starts relative to sales, property prices, gross capital formation, property loans and domestic credit have been the main recent drivers

Fig. 4: The five biggest drivers of the CSI over Jan 2007-Sep 2011 (contribution to the increase in the CSI index over this period)
0
Residential housing starts less sales Residential property price deviation from long-run linear trend

0.05

0.1

0.15

0.2

Gross capital formation/GDP Property loans/total loans


Domestic credit/GDP

Note: Unit is percentage point. Source: PBC; National Bureau of Statistics and Nomura Global Economics. For details of CSI construction, see Appendix: The construction of Nomuras China Stress Index.

Fig. 1

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November 2011

1. Overinvestment and excessive credit


Since the early 1960s the share of total investment (public and private gross capital formation) in Chinas GDP has trended upwards, a normal course of economic development as poor countries start with a small capital stock ensuring a high return on capital and hence a high rate of investment. Former leader Deng Xiaoping endorsed this trend during his famous South China tour in 1992, by espousing the benefits of an open economy, setting China firmly on the path of export- and investment-led growth. Chinas share of investment in GDP rose from 35.3% in 2000 to a relatively high 43.9% in 2008, before surging to 47.5% in 2009 and to 48.6% in 2010 (Figure 5). By the end of 2010, we estimate that more than half of Chinas total gross capital formation was related to property (23.8%) and infrastructure (27.7%). This year, property investment has continued to surge, to 13% of GDP in Q3 2011 (Figure 6).
The share of investment in Chinas GDP has risen to almost half

Fig. 5: Investment and consumption shares of nominal GDP


% GDP

Fig. 6: Property investment share of nominal GDP


% of GDP 15

70 60
50

Investment

Household consumption 12
9

40 30 20
10 1954

6
3 Sep-97 Sep-99 Sep-01 Sep-03 Sep-05 Sep-07 Sep-09 Sep-11

1962

1970

1978

1986

1994

2002

2010

Source: CEIC and Nomura Global Economics.

Source: China's NBS and Nomura Global Economics.

In international and historic terms, China is now an outlier: no other large economy has had such a high investment-to-GDP ratio for so long. The highest investment ratio in the US since 1929 was 26.2% in 1941. Surveying Japan, Korea, Singapore and Thailand, four Asian countries that have experienced rapid economic take-offs, their highest investment ratios typically lasted seven to eight years and none ever reached the levels seen in China (Figure 7). 2011 will be the ninth consecutive year that Chinas investment ratio has been over 40%. Undoubtedly there are questions marks over the quality of Chinese data some claim that Chinas official investment ratio is overstated because the services sector and hence consumption are likely underestimated; on the other hand, aggregating the investment data for Chinas 31 provinces suggests that the official national investment-to-GDP ratio could be 7pp too low (see Box 1: Fuzzy numbers).

China is now an outlier: no other large economy has had such a high investment-to-GDP ratio for so long

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November 2011

Fig. 7: Asian investment-to-GDP ratios during economic take-off periods


% of GDP 50 45 40 35 30
25 20

China, 2002 -11e Japan, 1966 -75 Korea, 1988 -98 Singapore, 1978 -88 Thailand, 1989 -98 t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6 t+7 t+8 t+9 t+10

Note: t=numbers of years from the starting year, eg. For China, the starting year is 2002. The data are in nominal terms and investment is the sum of public and private gross capital formation. Source: China Statistical Yearbook; CEIC and Nomura Global Economics.

Fig. 2

Box 1: Fuzzy numbers


The quality of Chinas statistics is improving, but large gaps remain. Following the completion of its first Financial Stability Assessment Program (FSAP) of China in July 2011, the IMF noted that a full assessment of these various risks is, however, hampered by serious data gaps, weakness in the infrastructure and constraints on the FSAP teams access to confidential data, IMF (2011a, p.11). Some of the glaring examples include the official urban unemployment rate hovering within such a tight range of 4.0-4.3% for the past nine years, and how in 2010 real GDP growth in 29 of the 31 provinces was above the national GDP growth of 10.3%. There have also been several sizable upward revisions to Chinas GDP, mainly due to under-reporting of the size of the services sector and hence consumption. The biggest revision was in 2005 after the first national economic census, when 2004 nominal GDP was revised up by 16.8% in one fell swoop, with the share of services in GDP revised up from 31.9% to 40.7%. It is possible that the services sector and consumption will be revised up again, and the investment-to-GDP ratio revised down, but then again it is also possible that the starting position is a higher investment-to-GDP ratio than officially reported. GDP data are available by province and aggregating the gross capital formation and the GDP data for the 31 provinces, we arrive at an investment-to-GDP ratio of 55.7% in 2010, a full 7pp higher than the national investment-GDP ratio (see Figure 8).

Fig. 8: An alternative measure of the investment-to-GDP ratio

% GDP
60 50
40

30 20
10 0 1954 Sum of provinces National

1962

1970

1978

1986

1994

2002

2010

Source: CEIC and Nomura Global Economics.

Fig. 3

The recent jump in China's investment ratio to almost half of GDP was driven by a conscious policy response to the global financial crisis, but the fundamental reason why the investment ratio has been so high for so long has more to do with serious factor cost distortions. The high priority on internal rebalancing of the economy that is, lowering the investment ratio and raising the consumption ratio is not a new initiative; in fact it was a key goal of the 11th Five-Year Plan (2006-10) unveiled in early 14

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2006. However, the global financial crisis of 2008 was a huge unexpected shock, causing Chinas export performance to swing from 23% y-o-y growth in Q3 2008 to a 24% y-o-y contraction in Q2 2009. Fearing major knock-on effects to the domestic economy from firms cutting jobs and capex, the authorities gave the go-ahead to a credit-financed investment boom. China's real estate developers, SOEs and local governments took heed, ramping up investment in property and infrastructure, putting rebalancing efforts in China firmly on the back burner. However, the more fundamental reason for China's persistently high investment-to-GDP ratio is the large difference between the return on, and cost of, capital. The bank lending rate has historically been artificially controlled far below the return on capital needed to support an industry-led, export-orientated growth model. A simple approximation of the return on capital is nominal GDP growth, which averaged 18.5% in the 1990s and 14.6% in the 2000s, compared with the benchmark 1yr bank lending rate of 9.4% in the 1990s and 5.8% in the 2000s. This large gap gave producers a big incentive to invest. To more formally estimate China's return on capital, we follow a similar methodology to the Bank of Japan (2011) and Bai et al (2006). Qualitatively, the results are similar to that of using nominal GDP growth, indicating the large wedge between the return on, and cost of, capital of over 10pp over the past three decades (Figure 9). Even five years ago, Aziz (2006) found that Chinas low cost of capital was quantitatively an important factor in explaining why the investment-to-GDP ratio was high, and back in 2006 the 7 ratio was only 42%.
The fundamental reason for the high investment-to-GDP ratio is the large difference between the return on, and cost of, capital

Fig. 9: The difference between the return on, and cost of, capital
% 30 25
20 15 Difference (percentage points) Return on capital Cost of capital

10 5 0

Note: The aggregate return on capital is measured using approximated data on the share of capital in total income, the capital stock-to-output ratio and the depreciation rate of capital. The cost of capital is estimated using the 1yr bank lending rate. Source: CEIC; China Statistical Yearbook; Development and Research Center under the State Council; and Nomura Global Economics.

The big question is not if, but when, Chinas investment and consumption ratios re-balance and will it happen in a gradual, policy-controlled way, or will the process involve one or more episodes that are abrupt and beyond the control of policymakers, causing major disruptions to the economy and markets? International experience shows that rebalancing is never easy, as it usually means redistributing income and power from vested interests that have benefited from the old model in China, notably large SOEs and local governments (see chapter: The privileged state-owned enterprises). Of all the main components in GDP, investment is typically the largest swing factor and in most Asian countries it usually contracts at least one year each decade. Yet
7

At almost half of GDP, Chinas investment is now so large that were it to stop growing it would cut real GDP growth in half

The flipside of China's high investment-to-GDP ratio is a low consumption-to-GDP ratio, which is partly because Chinese households have a high motive for precautionary saving, but also the share of wages in national income is low relative to profits. SOEs historically provided generous social welfare benefits to their workers, so the downsizing of SOEs in the late 1990s meant that workers needed to save more of their income to pay for their own healthcare, education and pensions. Also, while urbanization has boosted incomes of rural migrant workers, the stringent hukou household registration system has provided them with scant social welfare benefits in the cities where they live, increasing their precautionary savings. The very low or negative real interest rate on bank saving deposits has also forced households to save more than they otherwise might have.

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China's investment has not fallen since 1990 in volume terms and not since 1976 in value terms (Figure 10). At almost half of GDP, Chinas investment is now so large that were it to stop growing, let alone turn negative, it would cut real GDP growth in half (see Box 2: Chinas challenging GDP arithmetic). The timing of rebalancing is also now less favourable for China, as besides investment and consumption, the third engine of growth exports is unlikely to be firing on a full cylinder given the crisis-scarred economies of the US and Europe.

Fig. 10: Identifying the years when real gross capital formation contracted
China Nominal Real* Hong Kong Real 1940s n.a. n.a. n.a. 1950s 1955: -2% 1955:-2% n.a. 1960s 1967:-25% 1960-62:-95% 1967-68: -27% 1960-62:-109% 1966-68: -38% 1970s 1976:-7% 1972:-3% 1976: -9% 1972: -2% 1980s 1990s 2000s

1981: -2% 1989: -5% 1985: -5% 1982-83: -7%

1990: -1% 1998-99: -32% 1996: -3% 1996: -1% 1991: -16% 1998-99: -62% 1998-99: -16% 1992-94: -10% 1997-98: -32% 1992: -1% 1998-99: -47% 2008: -1% 2005: -1% 2001: -5% 2008: -6% 2000-01: -6% 2002: -4% 2008-09: -23% 2001-03: -13% 2009: -13% 2008-09: -17% 2005: -2% 2003: -2% 2001: -9% 2009: -9% 2006: -15% 2004: -2% 2009: -19% 2001-03: -57% 2007-09: -30% 2001: -24% 1997-98: -73% 2009: -25% 2006: -4%

India Indonesia Japan Korea Malaysia

Real Real Real Real Real

n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.

1957-59: -8% 1952: -26% n.a.

1967-68: -9% 1961: -2% n.a.

1979: -10% 1974: -10% 1974-75: -12%

1981: -4% 1988: -5% 1983: -3% 1980: -1% 1980: -17% 1985-87: -32%

n.a. n.a.

n.a. n.a.

1975: -4% 1972: -10% n.a.

Philippines

Real

1956: -1% 1952: -3% 1949-50: -30% n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1955: -15% n.a.

1962: -1% 1960: -11% 1964: -3%

1970: -4%

1984-85: -69% 1980: -4% 1988: -3% 1985-86: -18% 1985: -8% 1982: -5% 1985-86: -8% 1982: -7%

1998-99: -29% 1991: -17% 1998: -24%

Singapore Taiwan Thailand

Real Real Real

1977: -4% 1975: -5% 1975: -7%

n.a.

n.a.

Source: CEIC and Nomura Global Economics. Note: The shaded areas are decades when real gross capital formation falls. For China, official data on real gross capital formation are not available and so Nomuras proxy is nominal gross capital formation deflated by the fixed-asset investment deflator back to 1990 and before that, deflated by the GDP deflator.

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Box 2: Chinas challenging GDP arithmetic8


With investment making up almost half of GDP, Chinas economy is vulnerable to an investment slump for whatever reason: a banking crisis; the central bank hiking aggressively having fallen behind the curve in fighting inflation; unforeseen shocks, such as social unrest or a deadly pandemic; or simply because investment fatigue sets in. To illustrate Chinas challenging GDP arithmetic consider the numbers. We expect real investment to grow by 11.3% in 2011, contributing 5.5pp to GDP growth of 9.2%. However, if real investment were to grow by only 5% it would contribute 2.4pp and, assuming (conservatively) unchanged contributions from net exports and consumption, GDP growth would be just 6.1%. If real investment growth were to slow to 0%, it would make no contribution to GDP and so GDP growth would more than halve to 3.7%. However, carefully calibrating a rebalancing of GDP growth toward consumption is no easy feat. To illustrate, for the share of household consumption in GDP to rise, consumption growth must outpace GDP growth. Yet we estimate that real household consumption has grown at a double-digit rate in only three of the past 14 years and over the past decade has averaged about 9% growth, whereas real GDP has averaged 10.3% growth. To raise the household consumption-to-GDP ratio from 34% in 2010 to 40% by 2020, and assuming real GDP grows 8% pa this decade, then real household consumption would need to grow consistently by 10% pa over 2010-20. To turn consumption into an engine of growth, China needs to do more than simply beef up social welfare spending to reduce precautionary household savings. It needs to transfer a massive amount of income from the still heavily state-subsidized corporate sector to households (see chapter: The privileged state-owned enterprises) and end financial repression, which has given rise to negative real deposit rates (see chapter: Rudimentary monetary architecture). As Japan's experience shows, the large positive gap between the return on, and the cost of, capital does not last forever (see Box 3: Lessons from Japan on the return and cost of capital). Chinas large gap could soon start to narrow, possibly quite sharply, because of a simultaneous fall in the return on capital and a rise in the cost of capital. The return on capital could start falling simply because the enormity of investment is causing the capital stock to accumulate at such a rate that capital is rapidly becoming less scarce. Total nominal investment (i.e. gross capital formation) is set to total some USD3.5trn in 2011, 3x larger than in 2006 and 7x larger than in 2001. Another reason to expect the return on capital to soon start to fall is the strong international evidence that investment booms are often associated with a misallocation of capital, especially in emerging markets. This seems a particular risk in China given: 1) the banking sector does not have much experience in gauging credit risk; 2) a massive shadow banking sector has emerged, which is difficult to measure, let alone regulate; and 3) the fact that much of the investment in recent years has been government-led, which tends to be less productive than private investment, and in big infrastructure projects, which can take many years to 9 break even. A third reason is that China's heavy investment can also run into diminishing returns from a social perspective, as capital intensive industries pollute the environment and create fewer job opportunities. Meanwhile, China's cost of capital has been increasing and we expect it to rise further. The benchmark 1yr bank lending rate has risen from 5.31% in October 2010 to 6.56%, and this likely understates the effective cost of capital as banks are charging a record 61.2% of their new loans above the benchmark lending rate; in the shadow banking sector borrowing costs can be several times higher. While the central bank has paused its rate hiking cycle, we expect it to resume hiking in 2012. China needs higher interest rates to contain what we see as structural inflation problems caused by accelerating labour costs (see chapter: The Lewis turning point); the urgent need for the government to
8

As Japan's experience shows, the large positive gap between the return on, and the cost of, capital does not last forever

The phrase Chinas challenging GDP arithmetic was coined by Paul Sheard, Nomuras global chief economist, back in 2009 (see the Global Letter, Chinas challenging GDP arithmetic in the Global Economic Weekly Monitor, 25 September 2009). 9 A good micro example is China building in just three years the worlds longest and fastest high-speed rail network, which according to data from the International Union of Railways extends to 6,300km, an achievement that had produced considerable national pride. The collision of two new high-speed trains outside the city of Wenzhou on 23 July, which killed 40 and injured 191, stoked public anger and a media frenzy that the breakneck development of high-speed rail had cut corners indeed, Chinas Railways Ministry is the manufacturer, operator and regulator of the network. As a result, Beijing has suspended approvals of new high-speed lines and its original ambitious program of having a further 4,339km of high-speed rail under construction by 2012 more under construction over this period than that of the rest of the world put together is now unlikely to be achieved.

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unwind generous subsidies to SOEs and to stop underpricing factor inputs such as land, water and energy; and a likely continued multi-year surge in food prices (see our Special Report, The coming surge in food prices, 8 September 2010). Higher interest rates would also be a natural result of accelerating the evolution of China's monetary policy framework, from administrative measures to more market-price-based instruments (see chapter: Rudimentary monetary architecture). A key risk is policy errors, for example falling behind the curve in fighting inflation and needing to catch up via aggressive rate hikes, leading to a sharp rise in the cost of capital at a time when the return on capital could be 10 falling.

10

Firms should adjust their capital stock so that its marginal productivity equals its user cost. As interest rates increase, firms scale back investment for which the expected return is insufficient to cover the higher financing costs. Using micro data on listed Chinese firms over 2002-07, Conway, Herd and Chalaux (2010) found empirically that capital spending is negatively influenced by higher interest rates.

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Box 3: Lessons from Japan on the return and cost of capital


Similar to China in the last two decades, Japan achieved high GDP growth over the period 1955 to 1970, averaging 9.7% and, like China today, Japans economy became increasingly unbalanced, with a rising investment-to-GDP ratio and falling consumption-to-GDP ratio, reaching 35.5% and 59.7% respectively in 1970 (Figure 11). Domestic rebalancing in Japan began after 1970. According to a recent study by researchers Fukumoto and Muto (2011) at the Bank of Japan, the main trigger of rebalancing was a decline in the return on capital and a rise in the cost of capital. In the 1950s, Japan had a small capital stock and so the return on capital was higher than 20%, but the rapid accumulation of capital drove down the marginal productivity of capital. An undeveloped financial sector led to some misallocation during the investment boom, while the development catch up to advanced foreign technology was virtually complete in the early 1970s. All these factors contributed to a decline in the return on capital in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Meanwhile, the bank lending rate was highly regulated in the 1950-60s and was kept very low to support an industry-led growth model. However, in the early 1970s Japan experienced an outbreak of inflation, in part driven by the 1973-74 oil crisis, but also the flow of surplus rural labour moving to the cities started to diminish in the 1960s, leading to increased worker bargaining power and a surge in real wages, the so-called Lewis turning point (Minami, 1973). All this led to monetary policy tightening and a rise in bank lending rates and the cost of capital. So in the early 1970s, Japan faced a marked narrowing in the difference between the return and cost of capital, significantly reducing firms incentives to maintain high rates of investment (Figure 12).

Fig. 11: Japan's investment and consumption shares of GDP


% of nominal GDP 70 60 50
40 30 20 10 Gross fixed capital formation

Consumption

Source: Bank of Japan (2011).

Fig. 12: Japans difference between the return and cost of capital
% 35
30 Difference (percentage points)

Return on capital Bank lending rate

25
20

15
10

5
0

Source: Bank of Japan (2011).

What accentuates the macro risks of China's investment boom is the credit boom associated with it. One of the relatively few robust findings to emerge from the empirical literature on leading indicators of banking crises is that rapid domestic credit growth increases the likelihood of a problem (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999). In a survey of credit booms in 28 emerging market economies during 1970-2002, the IMF (2004) estimates that about 75% of the credit booms were associated with a banking crisis. More pertinent to China, Borio

What accentuates the macro risks of China's investment boom is the credit boom associated with it

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and Lowe (2002) use annual data since 1960 for 34 countries to show empirically that an investment boom by itself may pose little threat to the stability of the financial system. Rather, it is the combination of various imbalances, in particular the simultaneous interactions of rapid credit growth, rapid increases in asset prices and an investment boom rather than any one of these alone that increases the likelihood of problems. Analysis of China's recent credit boom has tended to focus on local government borrowing, where the data are opaque. Local governments are not allowed to directly incur debt, and so finance infrastructure projects by borrowing from banks. To do so, they set up over 6,500 Local Government Financing Vehicles (LGFVs). The latest official estimate of local government debt outstanding was RMB10.7trn, or 27% of 2010 GDP, as at June 2011 by 11 the State Audit Office, although some private estimates are much higher. Whatever the true figure of local government debt is, a broader analysis can be gleaned from IMF data which show that total domestic credit (private and government) surged from 121% of GDP in Q4 2008 to 147% in Q2 2011, a level that is not far from the peak in 2003 (Figure 13). Moreover, China's credit-to-GDP ratio stands as an outlier compared with other countries of a similar income level (Figure 14).
China's credit-to-GDP ratio stands as an outlier compared with other countries of a similar income level

Fig. 13: Domestic credit-to-GDP ratio


% of GDP 160 150 140 130 120 110 100 90 80 70 60 50 Jun-81 Jun-86

Fig. 14: Credit-to-GDP ratio versus GDP per Capita


Credit to GDP, end-2010 (%)
350

300 250 200 150 100


50 0 China

Cyprus

0 Jun-91 Jun-96 Jun-01 Jun-06 Jun-11

10 20 30 40 50 60 70 GDP per capita, 2009 (PPP, thousands of US$)

Source: IMF; CEIC and Nomura Global Economics.

Source: IMF Global Financial Stability Report, September 2011.

Fig. 4

Fig. 5

China's credit boom over 1998-2003 led to a banking crisis. As far as we know, the earliest official data on the NPL ratio of the major commercial banks was 23.6% in 2002, but this excludes a large volume of bad loans, of over 15% of GDP, that were carved out and transferred to newly created asset 12 management companies a few years earlier. Since 2002, the official NPL ratio has steadily declined and by June 2011 stood at just 1.0% for all commercial banks. However, given that China's credit-to-GDP ratio has surged to just shy of the record high in 2003, there is little doubt that the NPL ratio will rise again the question is by how much. Reflecting the paucity of data and the uncertainties involved, estimating how high NPLs may rise and the potential fiscal cost of recapitalizing the banks can 13 vary widely. To be sure, compared to a decade ago Chinas banks today are better capitalized, have higher loan-loss provisioning and face more stringent

There is little doubt that the NPL ratio will rise again the question is by how much

Chinas banks today are better capitalized, have higher loanloss provisioning, but

11

In July 2010, the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) first estimated total local government debt outstanding at RMB7.7trn but raised its estimate in November 2010 to RMB9.1trn. The latest estimate in June 2011 by the State Audit office was even higher, at RMB10.7trn, or 27% of 2010 GDP albeit still far short of the RMB20trn projected by Professor Victor Shih at Northwestern University. 12 Before the establishment of asset management companies, unofficial estimates put the peak NPL ratio in 1999-2000 at about 40%, or higher. The OECD estimates that the total cost to the government of recapitalizing the banking sector in the early 2000s was some 30% of GDP (OECD 2005). 13 The State Audit Office sent a warning in June 2011, when after a lengthy audit of the five major banks it found that RMB58bn, or 17% of total loans outstanding, violated regulations, such as new loans granted for unapproved projects or used to repay existing debt. Rating agency Moodys expects Chinas NPL ratio to rise to 8-12% in coming years. In July 2011, the official auditor of Liaoning province reported in a speech that 85% of LGFVs in Liaoning had insufficient income in 2010 to cover debt-servicing payments.

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regulations and supervision. But on the other hand, we see two important reasons for concern: 1) a big and largely unregulated shadow banking sector has emerged in recent years, estimated to be almost as large as the official banking sector (see chapter: Rudimentary monetary architecture); and 2) this time, both local governments and property developers are heavily indebted, which raises the risk of a vicious spiral if there is a major correction in property prices given that 30-40% of local government revenue is made up of proceeds 15 from land sales and other property-related activities. According to official data, nationwide property prices have risen 60% since the end of 2006 (IMF 2011c). This has fueled speculative property investment and an ominous sign is the large gap that has opened up between the combined floor space of residential, office and commercial property that builders have started work on, 16 compared to the floor space sold (Figure 15). In a back-of-the-envelope exercise simply to illustrate how much estimates can vary, if we assume that China's NPL ratio rises from 1% to 10% and that 70% of these loans could be recovered, then the cost to the banking sector or failing that, the government would be RMB1.6trn, or 3.6% of 2011 GDP (Figure 16). However, under more drastic scenarios of higher NPLs and lower recovery rates, it is possible that the total cost could be over 30% of 2011 GDP.

a big and largely unregulated shadow banking sector has emerged in recent years

Fig. 15: Difference between floor space started and floor space sold:
Millions of Sq. meters, 12m rolling sum 2,500

Fig. 16: Assessing the cost of potential financial sector problems, % of GDP
Loan recovery rate, % 30 40 7.1 14.2 21.3 28.4 35.5 50 5.9 11.8 17.8 23.7 29.6 60 4.7 9.5 14.2 18.9 23.7 70 3.6 7.1 10.7 14.2 17.8

2,000 1,500

Floor space started


Floor space sold
NPL 10 20 30 40 50 8.3 16.6 24.9 33.1 41.4

1,000
ratio,

500 0 Dec-96

Dec-99

Dec-02

Dec-05

Dec-08

Dec-11

Source: CEIC and Nomura Global Economics.

Note: % of estimated 2011 GDP. Source: CEIC and Nomura Global Economics.

14

In May 2011, the CBRC ordered systemically important banks to have bad-loan provisions that are no less than 2.5% of total outstanding credit by the end of 2013 and 150% of non-performing debt. 15 This year, tighter credit conditions have led property developers to seek other, more expensive, forms of financing in the shadow banking sector, notably new entrusted loans. Lucy Fung, Nomuras China Bank analyst, estimates that of the RMB702.8bn of new entrusted loans in Jan-Jun 2011, 46% were granted to property developers at an average interest rate of 15.8% and at an average duration of 11.3 months. Stress tests by ratings agency Standard & Poors (2011) estimate that the property developers could absorb a 10% decline in property sales in 2012. But if property sales fell by 30% in 2012, more than half of the 30 developers rated by S&P would have weak liquidity, which according to S&Ps definition means overarching credit risk and an issuer credit rating at the B level or lower. 16 The increasing use of desperate sales gimmicks by property developers is one micro-level sign that property supply has moved ahead of demand. For example, at this year's Shanghai Autumn Property Exhibition, to exploit the law which prohibits the purchase of more than two residential apartments, so-called Soho apartments offices equipped with private bathroom and kitchens have been marketed as they are not classed as homes (South China Morning Post, 6 October 2011).

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2. Rudimentary monetary architecture


Chinas monetary policy, by evolving too slowly toward market price-based instruments, is losing its effectiveness in managing an economy that is rapidly becoming more open and sophisticated. In the words of the OECD, after three decades of liberalization, product markets have become increasingly competitive and market forces are now generally the main determinant of price formation and market behaviour, OECD (2005, p.102). The PBC needs to place less emphasis on quantity-based instruments such as the bank reserve requirement ratio (RRR), central bank bill issuance, credit quotas and bank window guidance, and instead adopt the interest rate as the primary policy tool. A precondition for this is a more flexible exchange rate. Market-based instruments are less distortionary and can have powerful indirect economywide effects by enhancing competition, efficiency and risk management. At the root of the problem is Chinas inflexible exchange rate, which significantly hinders the PBCs ability to tailor monetary policy to domestic objectives. The essential problem stems from Professor Robert Mundells Impossible Trinity: that a country can simultaneously choose two, but not all three, of a managed exchange rate, an open capital account and monetary policy autonomy. With capital flowing more freely, China risks losing more control over its monetary policy if it continues to heavily manage the exchange rate. A rigid exchange rate reduces the central banks ability to use market instruments such as interest rates to manage aggregate credit growth and instead perpetuates a reliance on administrative measures such as credit quotas, hindering efforts to make the banking system more commercially orientated. Chinas inflexible exchange rate regime requires the PBC to conduct substantial open market operations to sterilize, or mop up excess domestic liquidity arising from FX intervention, which has increased FX reserves to an 17 extraordinary USD3.2trn as at September 2011. The sterilization measures include aggressively issuing low-yielding central bank bills and raising the RRR of large banks 12 times since January 2010, from 15.5% to 21.5%, an 18 all-time high. Meanwhile, the benchmark 1yr bank lending interest rate has been increased only five times, from 5.31% to 6.56% (Figure 17). While the PBC is successfully sterilizing its FX intervention, it is repressing the freefunctioning intermediation role of the banking sector.
Fig. 17: Bank reserve requirement ratio and the benchmark bank lending rate
% 25

Chinas monetary policy is losing its effectiveness in managing an economy that is rapidly becoming more open and sophisticated

At the root of the problem is Chinas inflexible exchange rate

While the PBC is successfully sterilizing its FX intervention, it is repressing the freefunctioning intermediation role of the banking sector

20 15
10

Benchmark 1yr bank lending rate


Bank reserve requirement ratio

5 0 Oct-91

Oct-95

Oct-99

Oct-03

Oct-07

Oct-11

Source: CEIC and Nomura Global Economics.

17

The massive accumulation of FX reserves to USD3.2trn is not necessarily costless. The larger the stock of FX reserves the greater the potential quasi-fiscal cost if the return earned on the foreign assets is less than the interest paid on the PBCs sterilization bills. The PBC could also incur substantial capital losses on its balance sheet if USD was to crash, leaving it with negative capital. The PBC could try and recapitalize itself by earning profits from increased seigniorage, i.e. printing more currency; or it could be recapitalized by the government but at the cost of losing some of its monetary policy independence and heightening the risk of a major inflation problem. 18 Combining these two sterilization measures, we estimate that the PBC has effectively "locked up" nearly onequarter of total bank deposits that otherwise could have been used for more profitable commercial business, such as lending.

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Fig. PBCs sterilization operations impose considerable cost on the banking The 6

sector. China maintains an interest rate ceiling on bank deposits, which currently ranges from 3.50% for 1yr savings deposits to 5.50% for 5yr deposits. So, the requirement that 21.5% of deposits for large banks be reserved at the PBC earning only 1.62% interest is akin to an implicit tax on the banking sector, restricting banks from allocating a larger portion of their portfolios to higheryielding loans and investments. One way to help ease this financial repression is to allow a wide margin between the benchmark bank lending and deposit rates, which traditionally is what China has done. In the last decade, the spread between the 1yr bank lending and saving deposit rates averaged 3.4% substantially higher than the 1.4% average in the 1990s. However, fat margins simply shift the cost of financial repression from the banks to depositors, which means most households given a lack of alternative investment opportunities. This has been particularly onerous on depositors in the past year because of the sharp rise in inflation. For a third time in the past eight years (after 2004 and 2008) the real rate of return on 1yr bank saving deposits has sunk deep into negative territory, averaging -2.5% in Jan-Sep 2011 (Figure 18). The IMF (2011a, p.34) finds that a 1pp increase in the real rate of return on bank deposits lowers the urban household saving rate by 0.6pp.
One way to help ease this financial repression is to allow a wide interest rate margin, but this shifts the repression from the banks to depositors

Fig. 18: 1yr inflation-adjusted real deposit rate


% p.a. 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3 -4 -5 Sep-97 Sep-99 Sep-01 Sep-03 Sep-05 Sep-07 Sep-09 Sep-11

Source: CEIC and Nomura Global Economics.

Fig. 7

It should come as no surprise then, that despite waves of macro-prudential tightening measures, it has proved difficult to cool speculation in the property market. Moreover, with negative inflation-adjusted returns, banks have been finding it more difficult to attract deposits and so are turning to wealthmanagement products, which typically are loans repackaged as short-term investment vehicles and are held off-balance sheet. These products are typically short term, maturing within one month, and can offer annualized returns of about 8%, more than double that on 1yr bank deposits. According to Xinhua news agency, by mid-2011 China had RMB7trn in outstanding wealth management products, triple the amount at the end of 2010. With bank assets mainly tied to longer-term loans, there is a growing problem of duration mismatch between bank assets and liabilities. Perhaps in response, in this latest tightening cycle the PBC has hiked interest rates on longer-term bank deposits by a larger magnitude, which has shifted some of the costs of financial repression back to the banks. For example, since September 2010 the 1yr bank deposit rate been increased by 125bp, and the 5yr rate by 190bp, while the benchmark 5yr or longer lending rate has been increased by only 114bp. Interestingly, this seems to be forcing banks to price credit risk more actively by charging borrowing rates that are higher than official benchmark rates on more of their loans: in June 2011, a record-high 61.2% of loans were priced above benchmark rates, versus 44.3% in

Negative real bank deposit rates have contributed to property market speculation and the explosion of wealthmanagement products

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September 2010 (Figure 19). Yet with an obligation to lend to large SOEs, banks are increasingly rationing credit to private companies, forcing them to borrow in the shadow banking sector at punitively higher interest rates (see chapter: The privileged state-owned enterprises).

Fig. 19: Proportion of new bank loans charged above the benchmark lending rate
% share 65

60 55 50
45

40 35
30 Jun-05

Jun-06

Jun-07

Jun-08

Jun-09

Jun-10

Jun-11

Source: CEIC and Nomura Global Economics.

Fig. 8

Financial repression is also encouraging off-balance sheet bank activities, disintermediation and other less-regulated activities outside the official banking system. In an attempt to monitor informal financing activities, the PBC introduced a new statistic in February 2011 called total social financing, which in addition to net new bank loans includes net new trust loans, bank acceptance bills, corporate bonds, non-financial corporate equity and funding from insurers (see Box 4: Shadow banking in the US and China compared). The total social financing statistic likely still does not capture all informal financing activities, but even so, the results are revealing. Outside net new bank loans, the sum of other forms of financing more than tripled from RMB1.9trn in 2008 to RMB6.3trn in 2010 although the annualized rate in Jan-Sep 2011 had eased to RMB5.5trn. Add on net new bank loans, which totaled an annualized RMB7.6trn in Jan-Sep 2011 and total social financing was RMB13.1trn, with the shadow banking sector comprising a stunning 42% of the total. A sign of the costs of financial repression, movements in the bank RRR are closely correlated with the aggregate data on net new non-bank financing activities (Figure 20).

Financial repression is also encouraging off-balance sheet bank activities and other lessregulated activities outside the official banking system

Fig. 20: Bank RRR and net new bank loans and other forms of financing
RMBbn 18 15
12

Net new bank loans, lhs

% 25 20 15 10 5
0

Net new other forms of financing, lhs


Bank reserve requirement ratio, rhs

9
6

3
0

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010 Jan-Sep 2011

Note: Jan-Sep 2011 is an annualized figure. Source: CEIC and Nomura Global Economics.

19

On 1 January 2004, the PBC deregulated commercial bank lending rates, allowing banks to charge 0.9-2.0x the benchmark 1yr lending rate. On 29 October 2004 the ceiling on commercial bank lending rates was scrapped altogether (except for credit cooperatives).

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Utilizing the new social financing statistics, which is a net flow of funds concept (new issuance less redemptions and write-offs), we have attempted to tally the stock of total funds outstanding in Chinas economy; that is the official banking and shadow banking sectors combined. Data are available on outstanding RMB bank loans, which nearly doubled from RMB26.2trn at the end of 2007 to RMB52.9trn by September 2011, and outstanding corporate bonds, which increased more than five-fold from RMB0.8trn at the end of 2007 to RMB4.5trn by September 2011. To gauge total funds outstanding in the shadow banking sector, we simply accumulate the other components of the social financing statistics, of which the data first began in 2002, and assume that the outstanding amount before 2002 was zero for each component. The result is a more than four-fold rise in total funds outstanding in the shadow banking sector, from RMB4.5trn at the end of 2007 to RMB18.2trn by September 2011. Summing up outstanding bank loans, corporate bonds and funds in the shadow banking sector gives a grand total of RMB75.6trn, or 177% of GDP, as at September 2011 a 57% of GDP increase since the global financial crisis in 2008, revealing just how explosive the growth in 20 economy-wide financing has been (Figure 21).
We estimate that total banking and shadow banking funds outstanding totaled 177% of GDP as at September 2011

Fig. 21: Our estimate of total banking and shadow banking funds outstanding
RMBtrn 80 70 60 50 40
30 20 10 0 % of GDP 180

Shadow banking, lhs Corporate bonds, lhs RMB loans, lhs Total as a % of GDP, rhs

170 160 150 140


130 120 110

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

Sep-11

100

Source: CEIC and Nomura Global Economics.

Fig. 9

20

FitchRatings (2011) arrives at a similar number, estimating that total economy-wide financing would increase to 185% of GDP by the end of 2011. These estimates are also more in line with the broad money supply, which in September 2011 equaled 175% of GDP.

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Box 4: Shadow banking in the US and China compared


To the best of our knowledge, McCulley (2007) coined the term shadow banking system. To quote Pozar, Adian, Ashcraft and Boesky (2010, pp,13-14) the shadow banking system decomposes the simple process of depositfunded, hold-to-maturity lending conducted by banks into a more complex, wholesale-funded securitization-based lending process that is performed by a variety of non-bank financial intermediaries, or shadow banks. Shadow banking transforms risky, long-term loans into seemingly credit-free, short-term, money-like instruments through a granular set of steps (Figure 22), which in the US includes loan origination, loan warehousing, ABS issuance, ABS warehousing, ABS CDO issuance, ABS intermediation and wholesale funding. On the eve of the global financial crisis, the volume of credit intermediated in the US by the shadow banking system was nearly USD20trn, nearly twice as large as the USD11trn of credit intermediated by the traditional banking system. Even today, the US shadow banking system is about the same size as the traditional banking system. In China, non-bank financial intermediation occurs through credit-related trust products, wealth managementrelated trust products, lease financing and credit guarantees. But the biggest form of shadow banking is in entrusted loans, in which a bank acts as an agent on a third-party loan between a depositor and a borrower, and books a fee.

Figure. 22: Illustrative examples in the US of the steps, entities and funding techniques involved in shadow credit intermediation
Function Step (1) Loan origination Step (2) Loan warehousing Step (3) ABS issuance Step (4) ABS warehousing Step (5) ABS CDO issuance Step (6) ABS intermediation Step (7) Wholesale funding Shadow banks Finance companies Single and multi-seller conduits SPVs, structured by broker-dealers Hybrid, TRS/repo conduits, brokerdealers' trading books SPVs, structured by broker-dealers LPFCs, SIVs, securities arbitrage conduits, credit hedge funds 2(a)-7 MMMFs, enhanced cash funds, securities lenders, etc. Shadow banks' funding* CP, MTNs, bonds ABCP ABS ABCP, repo ABS CDOs, CDO-squareds ABCP, MTN, repo $1 NAV shares (shadow bank "deposits")

Source: Shadow banking, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Report No. 458, July 2010.

Fig. 10

The growth of shadow banking presents new challenges for Chinas policymakers. One is that the bank RRR, loan quotas and other quantitativebased monetary policy instruments aimed at the official banking sector are becoming less effective as they target what is a shrinking share of the overall financial system. Another is that, almost by definition, the different types of offbank balance sheet or non-bank financial activities are less regulated, heightening the risk of too much credit being generated and of credit being misallocated. Adding to these challenges is the opaqueness of the data, suggesting that Chinas shadow banking sector could be a lot larger than the official social financing statistic suggests. FitchRatings argues that the official social financing statistic fails to fully capture some RMB3.5trn of shadow banking activity, including letters of credit from domestic trust companies, lending by domestic non-bank financial institutions and financial claims on mainland 21 entities by Hong Kong-based banks. The latter has mushroomed in recent years as Chinese companies and banks seek cheaper funding overseas. We estimate that Mainland China-related exposure of Hong Kong financial institutions has nearly tripled from HKD1.1trn in 1Q 2009 to HKD3.7trn in Q2 2011, equivalent to 27.2% of the total assets of Hong Kong banks (Figure 22 23).

The growth of shadow banking presents new challenges for Chinas policymakers

Adding to these challenges is the opaqueness of the data

21

A micro example of the flourishing "underground market" for loanable funds can be gleaned from the advertisements on the back pages of city newspapers, often listing only a single mobile phone number next to names such as "Easy Heaven Investments" and "Treasure Beautiful Gold Credit", Financial Times, 10 October 2011. 22 To put this surge in Hong Kong bank mainland-related claims into perspective, from 1Q 2009 to 2Q 2011, domestic property-related lending by Hong Kong banks rose by HKD410bn to HKD1.7trn, or 13% of the total assets of Hong Kong banks.

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Fig. 23: Hong Kong financial institutions exposure to the mainland


HK$bn 4,000 3,500 3,000
2,500 HK financial institutions' external claims on banks in the mainland (LHS) Hong Kong financial institutions' mainland-related nonbank exposure (LHS) Hong Kong financial institutions' mainland-related exposure as a % of total assets (RHS) % 30

25
20

2,000 1,500 1,000


500 Mar-07 Sep-07 Mar-08 Sep-08 Mar-09 Sep-09 Mar-10 Sep-10 Mar-11

15 10
5 0

Source: HKMA and Nomura Global Economics.

Fig. 11

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3. The privileged state-owned enterprises


At their peak in 1978, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) produced 78% of total industrial output and employed 60% of the non-farm workforce. While the authorities closed thousands of SOEs in the late 1990s, thousands remain, including many of Chinas largest companies with oligopoly power in many important sectors. By 2009, despite accounting for only 4.7% of the total number of firms, SOEs employed 21% of the total non-farm workforce, produced 27% of gross output in the industrial sector and controlled an eyepopping 44% of the stock of fixed assets, highlighting their capital intensity (Figure 24). The massive fiscal stimulus following the global financial crisis seems to have benefited SOEs more than non-SOEs, given that most large construction and transportation companies and the steel and cement companies supplying them are SOEs.
The massive fiscal stimulus following the global financial crisis seems to have benefited SOEs more than non-SOEs

Fig. 24: The SOE share of total urban employment and stock of fixed assets
% share 90 80
70 60 50

40 30 20 10
0 1950

Share of total urban employment

Share of total stock of assets of industrial enterprises 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010

Source: CEIC and Nomura Global Economics.

Fig. 12

The performance of Chinas SOEs is puzzling in two respects. One is that labour productivity, or output per worker, in the SOE sector has been much stronger than in the private sector, whereas in most other countries it is the opposite. In 1999 to 2007, labour productivity averaged 5.6% per year in the SOE sector, versus 3.6% per year in the private sector (OECD, 2005, p.110). However, the SOE sectors high labour productivity is misleading, as it is driven by: 1) large declines in employment and 2) massive capital accumulation (Figure 25). By contrast, growth in total factor productivity (TFP) measuring output gains over and above increases in inputs of labour and capital has been relatively weak in Chinas SOE sector, at less than two-thirds of that in the private sector (OECD, 2005, p.111). TFP is driven by innovation by new technologies and managerial skill and is a better gauge than labour productivity of real efficiency gains.

The SOE sectors high labour productivity is misleading, as it is driven by: 1) large declines in employment and 2) massive capital accumulation

The SOE sectors growth in total factor productivity has been relatively weak

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Fig. 25: Industrial structure of SOEs and private firms a comparison


1998 Employment Public sector Non-state sector Capacity intensity Public sector Non-state sector Inventory Public sector Non-state sector Long-term liabilities Public sector Non-state sector Exports Public sector Non-state sector Subsidies Public sector Non-state sector Average number of employees 662.1 250.0 000 yuan per employee 82.2 51.6 % of annual sales 27.2 19.7 % of total assets 22.2 11.3 % of total exports by sector 25.7 74.3 % of value added 2.1 0.6 1.5 0.9 0.8 0.7 13.7 86.3 9.8 90.2 19.1 8.0 17.1 6.9 16.2 13.5 12.6 11.0 193.5 68.1 364.0 97.7 716.8 229.0 887.9 200.0 2003 2007

Source: Product Market Regulation and Competition in China - OECD Economics Department Working Papers No. 823, 2010

Fig. 13

A related puzzle is that, despite relatively low TFP, the SOE sector as a whole has remained profitable, with high retained earnings to plough back into new investments. This is because after almost 30 years of economic reforms, while nearly all product markets have been liberalized, the factor markets remain heavily distorted through a raft of generous government subsidies to SOEs (see Box 5: Investment is high, but savings are even higher). Subsidies include low effective tax rates; under-pricing key inputs, such as energy, water, 23 land, and capital; keeping the RMB undervalued; allowing low or no dividend payouts; charging little or no royalties on resource extraction; barriers to entry in some industries; and only lightly enforcing environmental protection, 24 workers rights and work place safety (e.g., coal mines). One study estimates that these factor market distortions could be costing the economy almost 10% of GDP in terms of lost efficiency (Huang 2010). Another study of a sample of over 3,000 firms shows empirically that private firms, where managers have complete de facto autonomy in corporate decisions from the state, do indeed have better operating efficiency under various metrics (Gan et al, 2008). In contrast, despite preferential treatment, many of the smaller SOEs still make losses or barely break even in 2007, one in five SOEs earned a negative return (Conway, Herd, Chaalaux, 2010, p.19). Government support for the massive yet inefficient use of capital by SOEs is likely contributing to wasteful investment of scarce resources and environmental degradation, and goes completely against efforts to rebalance GDP growth from investment to consumption (see chapter: The setting in of growing pains).

Despite relatively low total factor productivity, SOEs as a whole have remained profitable due to a raft of generous government subsidies

Government support for the capital-intensive goes completely against efforts to rebalance GDP growth from investment to consumption

23

The latest estimates of the IMFs Consultative Group on Exchange Rates indicate that the RMB is undervalued by 3-23%, IMF (2011a, p.18). 24 In China, all land belongs to the state and local governments who have the discretion to sell industrial land use rights to companies for up to 50 years. In many cases the industrial land is provided cheaply or even free to companies in order to attract investment. The price of water in China is about one-third of the global average, while the cost of electricity is also relatively low (IMF 2011a, p. 20).

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Box 5: Investment is high, but savings are even higher


Chinas gross domestic investment rose from an already high 35.3% of GDP in 2000 to 48.6% in 2010, but gross 25 domestic savings rose even more, from 37% of GDP to 53.9% over the same period. Chinas saving rate is the highest in the world, and on IMF estimates, gross savings can be roughly decomposed into three sectors: that done by households (23% of GDP), by corporates (21%) and by government (10%). Household savings have been high for decades, the causes of which are relatively well known: a high precautionary motive to save because of inadequate social welfare, including healthcare, pensions, unemployment benefits and education; a low return on bank deposits and the lack of diversification opportunities for financial assets. On the other hand, saving in the corporate sector, which reflects retained earnings and hence corporate profitability, has increased markedly in the past decade, to almost the same level as household savings. The rise in corporate saving reflects oligopoly or monopoly power in some industries and government intervention to artificially repress the prices of labour, land, capital, resources and environmental protection. A low dividend policy also explains a high level of retained earnings. Government saving has also been rising and is high by global standards, reflecting robust fiscal revenues and land sales. Given that the current account surplus is, by a GDP accounting identity, the excess of gross domestic saving over investment, from the above analysis it follows that China needs to reduce corporate and household savings to narrow its current account surplus (5.2% of GDP in 2010). RMB appreciation is just one of many reforms available to achieve this. Chinas potential output growth looks set to slow this decade, because of a shrinking labour force and limited room to increase an already very high contribution of capital (see chapter: The setting in of growing pains). To ensure that the slowdown in potential growth is gradual, China needs to focus more on TFP improvements by reducing SOE subsidies and creating a more competitive business landscape, particularly given that the low-hanging fruit of productivity gains from surplus rural labour migrating to the cities is set to diminish (see chapter: The Lewis turning point). However, after the 2008 global financial crisis, the authorities did the reverse, resorting to even greater interventionist policies to quickly revive the economy by instigating a massive credit-fueled investment boom. These interventionist policies were to the advantage of the less efficient, capital intensive, SOE-related sectors, and so have exacerbated Chinas structural industry problems. A more enduring challenge to reforming Chinas industry structure relates to an asymmetric information problem in the banking sector, which is being exacerbated by the recent tightening of monetary policy. Unlike past monetary policy tightening cycles, this one differs for Chinas banks in two respects: 1) the bank RRR is at a record high 21.5% and the interest rate margin squeeze is more severe, indicating a larger-than-usual impact on the banks; but 2) commercial bank lending rates, which started being gradually deregulated in 26 2004, are no longer subject to a ceiling. The second point is important because it provides a valve to ease the financial repression facing banks by allowing them to price credit risk more actively, charging higher lending rates for riskier customers. And for the first time they are starting to do so: in June 2011, a record-high 61.2% of new loans were priced above benchmark lending rates. However, the problem is that Chinas banks are pricing credit in an increasingly distortionary way, creating a loan market that is segmented between SOEs and non-SOEs. Chinas four largest banks, which are still majority state-owned, maintain a strong bias to lend to SOEs, largely irrespective of credit risk (Yeung 2009, Podpiera 2006). Rightly or wrongly, the SOEs are still perceived by the banks to have implicit government backing. So, it has been the mostly private SMEs that have borne the brunt of the credit tightening and even more so than in
25

Chinas potential output growth looks set to slow this decade, increasing the urgency to boost total factor productivity

A more enduring challenge to reforming Chinas industry structure relates to an asymmetric information problem in the banking sector

Chinas four largest banks, which are still majority stateowned, maintain a strong bias to lend to SOEs, largely irrespective of credit risk

From the accounting identity, gross domestic savings is equal to gross domestic investment plus the current account balance. Hence Chinas savings are higher than investment because of a current account surplus of 5.2% of GDP in 2010. 26 Until 2004, interest rates set by commercial banks were not permitted to be more than 10% above the benchmark lending rate, but the band has been progressively widened and commercial bank lending rates are now only subject only to a floor, while deposit rates are subject to a ceiling.

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the past as banks are more actively starting to price credit risk. Yet at the grassroots level, Chinas bank loan officers still lack the skill and experience to properly assess credit risk a task compounded by opaque company 27 reporting data. This is creating a serious asymmetric information problem for Chinas lenders who are under increasing pressure not to make bad loans. As a result, creditworthy SMEs are being charged too high borrowing rates in relation to what they perceive to be their credit risk, thereby encouraging them to opt out of the loanable funds market and hence lowering the overall credit standard of the non-SOE loan market. This can have a snowballing effect. Nobel Prize laureate George Akerlofs famous market for lemons effect is starting to appear in Chinas non-SOE loans market (see Box 6: The Akerlof market for lemons problem applied to China).

Box 6: The Akerlof market for lemons problem applied to China


George Akerlof won the Nobel Prize in economics in 2001 for his work showing how markets can break down in the presence of asymmetric (or unequal) information. The example Akerlof used was of the used car market, where sellers have better knowledge of whether their car is a good or a bad one (a lemon). This kind of asymmetric information also exists in Chinas bank loan market. Many of Chinas bank loan officers do not have the expertise or information to properly price risk. The best guess of the car buyer (the China bank) is that the car (the loan) is of average quality, and so he/she will only be willing to pay the price (charge an interest rate) of a car (loan) of average quality. This means, however, that owners of good cars (borrowers of high credit standard) will not place their cars (seek loans) in the used car market (in the banking sector). But that in turn lowers the average quality of cars (loans) in the market (banking sector), causing buyers (China banks) to revise downward their expectations of quality. Now even owners of moderately good cars (borrowers of good credit standard) are unable to sell (borrow) at a fair price, causing, in the worst case, the market to seize up. Meanwhile, a growing number of SMEs with very low credit standards have been denied bank credit altogether, and not being able to access the debt or equity markets, this leaves them no choice than to turn to the less regulated shadow banking sector, where the asymmetric information problem is even more lopsided. A growing number of SMEs have to rely on non-formal financing sources, such pawn loans, micro credit companies and even loan sharks, which bear much higher funding costs. According to the PBC, the average informal lending rate in the city of Wenzhou the country's SME hub rose to 25.4% pa in September 2011 from 13.0% pa in December 2009 (Figure 26), while local media report that the uncollateralized black market 28 lending rate is as high as 10% per month, up from 5% per month last year.

A growing number of SMEs have been denied bank credit altogether and have to turn to the less regulated shadow banking sector

27

Perhaps the most publicized Chinese company accounting fraud case this year was Sino-Forest, which listed on the Toronto stock exchange in 1994, overstating its forestry holdings in Yunnan province by some USD900m. But this is one example of more than two dozen listed Chinese companies that have shown accounting discrepancies or seen their auditors resign so far this year, according to an article by David Pilling in the Financial Times, 1 September 2011. 28 According to the PBC's Wenzhou branch office, underground banking in the city is estimated to have reached RMB110bn by June 2011, equivalent to 18% of formal bank loans outstanding, see http://zj.people.com.cn/GB/15228039.html.

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Fig. 26: Informal lending rate in Wenzhou vs. official benchmark lending rate
% p.a. 30
Wenzhou informal lending rate

25
20

Benchmark official bank lending rate

15 10 5
0 Sep-07

Sep-08

Sep-09

Sep-10

Sep-11

Source: CEIC; www.wenzhou.gov.cn; Nomura Global Economics estimates.

Fig. 14

The segmentation of Chinas credit market, through priority lending to large SOEs at the expense of SMEs, poses serious risks to the economy. For not only are the SMEs, on average, more productive than SOEs, they are also in many ways the life and blood of the economy: in 2009, Chinas 431,000 SMEs generated two-thirds of total industrial output, paid two-thirds of tax revenues and employed over three-quarters of the workforce (Figure 27). In recent months, the government has urged banks to relax credit standards to SMEs 29 but the quid pro quo could be higher bank NPLs.

The segmentation of Chinas credit market, through priority lending to large SOEs at the expense of SMEs, poses serious risks to the economy

Fig. 27: Gauging the importance of SMEs to the economy, 2009


Number of Enterprises Total Large enterprises Medium enterprises Small enterprises SME % of total: SME unit 43,4364 3,259 38,036 393,074 431,110 99 Gross industrial output value current prices 54,831 17,581 15,937 21,313 37,250 68 Total Assets RMB bn 49,369 19,312 15,796 14,261 30,057 61 Revenue RMB bn 54,252 18,070 15,505 20,677 36,182 67 Total profits RMB bn 3,454 1,090 1,137 1,228 2,365 69 Employment 00 persons 8,831 2,044 2,788 4,000 6,788 77

*Note: SMEs are classified on the official definition which is based on employment, revenue and total capital size, which varies by industry. For example, SMEs by employment size are defined as <2,000 persons for industry, <3,000 for construction, < 200 for wholesale, <500 for retail sales, <3,000 for transportation, <1,000 for postal service and <800 for accommodation and catering. Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2010.

Fig. 15

29

In late September 2011, the city government of Wenzhou set a ceiling on the interest rate of loans made by non-bank financial institutions at 4x the benchmark lending rate (6.56%), while for banks the ceiling for the interest rate on loans to SMEs was set at 1.3x the benchmark lending rate. More significantly, the State Council on 12 October 2011 ruled that nationwide bank loan growth to small enterprises should not be lower than overall loan growth; bank loans of RMB5m or less to small enterprises can be treated as retail loans in determining credit risk weights and can be excluded from the banks aggregate loan-to-deposit calculation.

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4. Unintended consequences of financial liberalization


Based on international experience, the conventional view (see Johnson, 1998) is that financial liberalization serves to enhance competition, increase the efficiency of capital allocation and support long-term growth, but the sequencing and initial conditions are important: if it happens too fast and without a strong banking system and efficient accounting, regulatory, supervisory and corporate governance frameworks, it can cause financial and economic crises. China will go through a series of financial sector reforms in the next five years. One advantage is that China can learn from the experiences of financial crises in other emerging markets and, indeed, this has likely contributed to its gradualist approach to financial liberalization so far. On the other hand, pressures are building for China to accelerate financial liberalization, as it is linked with other reforms, despite structural problems and challenges in the domestic economy. China's 12th Five-Year Plan, unveiled in March 2011, listed capital account liberalization, renminbi internationalization and interest rate deregulation as policy priorities. While these reforms are interrelated and indeed necessary for China to make its financial system more efficient and its monetary policy more effective, they do entail macro risks given the unbalanced domestic economy, with excessive investment and credit, including the flourishing shadow banking sector. In recent years, China has made progress on capital account liberalization, particularly in relation to the internationalization of the renminbi. This, in some ways, is a natural development given the sheer size of Chinas economy and the exponential rise in its international trade (Chinas combined exports and imports totaled USD3.3trn in 2010, 6x larger than in 2000). Indeed, with a more open and rapidly growing economy, together with the, albeit gradual, move to a more flexible exchange rate, it has become a challenge to restrict 30 non-FDI, or so-called hot money capital inflows. In 2009-10, simply by subtracting the current account surplus and net FDI inflows from the balance of payments surplus, we estimate that other forms of net capital inflows totaled USD108bn. These loopholes are not easy to control as the desirable flows are mingled with the undesirable flows, and it may be difficult to distinguish the two. Meanwhile, perhaps motivated by recently becoming the world's second-largest economy, or perhaps over concerns of its exposure to foreign financial assets (Chinas FX reserves totaled USD3.2trn in September 2011), China seems to have made a clear policy shift to accelerate the use of the renminbi in international trade and finance (see Box 7: A chronology of Chinas capital account liberalization). Zhiwei Zhang +852 2536 7433
zhiwei.zhang@nomura.com

Chi Sun +852 2536 7705


chi.sun@nomura.com

Pressures are building for China to accelerate financial liberalization

China seems to have made a clear policy shift to accelerate the use of the renminbi in international trade and finance

30

For instance, firms can move capital to China by overstating export receipts and/or understating import expenses. Expectations of CNY/USD appreciation can also fuel speculative hot-money capital inflows.

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Box 7: A chronology of Chinas capital account liberalization


Date announced 1980 1996 1999 2001 2002 2004 2004 2005 2006 2007 2007 2008 2009 2009 Liberalization measure Liberalized FDI in four Special Economic Zones Current account transactions were liberalized FDI liberalization extended to all provinces, but subject to limits varying by sector Under WTO commitment, the services sector is opened up to FDI, including the financial sector Opening the domestic capital market for selected Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFII) The approval requirement for firms' overseas investment was repealed Allowing Hong Kong residents to open RMB deposit accounts at Hong Kong banks RMB de-pegged from USD; daily trading range of CNY/USD is set at 0.3% Opening investment abroad for selected Qualified Domestic Institutional Investors (QDII) CNY/USD daily trading range expanded to 0.5% Domestic financial institutions allowed to issue RMB-denominated bonds in Hong Kong subject to approval Domestic commercial banks allowed to provide loans to firms for use in cross-border M&A Local firms allowed to register the source of their foreign exchange financing after their investment overseas rather than requiring approval in advance Introduced RMB as a cross-border trade settlement currency, but restricted to trade between five Chinese cities (Shanghai, Shenzhen, Guangzhou, Dongguan and Zhuhai) and Hong Kong, Macau and ASEAN countries (open to all Chinese importers but only a small number of exporting firms) RMB as cross-border trade settlement currency program was expanded to include trade transactions between Chinese firms in 20 provinces and cities and the rest of the world. The number of Chinese exporting firms who may participate in the program was also expanded Foreign companies were authorized to issue RMB-denominated bonds in Hong Kong Renminbi transactions in Hong Kong were further relaxed to allow: 1) renminbi lending for any purpose; 2) renminbi remittance to mainland by companies subject to approval by China's government Hong Kong banks involved in renminbi cross-border trade settlement allowed to access the on-shore interbank bond market Allowed export companies to keep their export revenues overseas (introduced to export companies in Beijing, Guangdong, Shenzhen, Shandong, Jiangsu first in October 2010 and expanded nationwide on 1 January 2011) US companies and residents can trade renminbi in US branches of Bank of China. Individual accounts can convert US$4000 a day into renminbi (annual quota is US$10,000) Introduced pilot scheme on allowing qualified foreign institutions to make private equity investment in China To launch Renminbi QFII, which would allow foreign investors to invest in mainland securities with an initial quota size of RMB20bn To expand the renminbi trade settlement scheme nationwide To allow Hong Kong firms to invest directly into mainland China using renminbi To expand Treasury bond sales in Hong Kong To launch an ETF linked to Hong Kong stocks in mainland China 2011 Allowed Hong Kong listed companies to raise renminbi through share placements or rights issues. Investment banks are also allowed to issue RMB-denominated derivative warrants based on renminbi shares

2010

2010 2010 2010 2010

2011 2011 2011*

Note: * These planned measures were announced by Vice Premier Li Keqiang during a special visit to Hong Kong on 17 August 2011, but have yet to be fully implemented. Source: Nomura Global Economics.

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Over the past year, the offshore use of the renminbi has grown tremendously. Renminbi trade settlement has surged from almost zero in 2009 to 10% of Chinas total trade in June 2011 (Figure 28), while trade settled in renminbi through banks in Hong Kong has increased 35x from RMB27bn (USD4bn) in H1 2010 to RMB953bn (USD146bn) in H1 2011, comprising one-third of total trade between Hong Kong and China (including offshore trade). At the same time, renminbi deposits in Hong Kong have grown exponentially from RMB103.7bn (USD15bn) in July 2010 to RMB609bn (USD95bn) in August 2011, equivalent to 6.8% of total deposits in Hong Kong (Figure 29).

Renminbi deposits in Hong Kong have grown exponentially from USD15bn in July 2010 to USD95bn in August 2011

Fig. 28: RMB usage for trade settlement


% of China's total trade 12 10 8 6 4 2
0 Mar-10

Fig. 29: RMB deposits in Hong Kong


% 7 6 5 Total amount of RMB deposits in Hong Kong, rhs

RMB bn 800
600

RMB deposits as a % share of total Hong Kong deposits, lhs

4 3 2
1 0

400 200
0

Jun-10

Sep-10

Dec-10

Mar-11

Jun-11

Aug-04 Aug-05 Aug-06 Aug-07 Aug-08 Aug-09 Aug-10 Aug-11

Source: CEIC and Nomura Global Economics.

Source: CEIC and Nomura Global Economics.

Fig. 16

Fig. 17

However, the range and accessibility of renminbi financial instruments outside China is still small relative to the volume of renminbi that is building up offshore, leaving much of the renminbi being deposited at the Hong Kong clearing bank earning a low return. As a result, internationalization of the renminbi is adding pressure for China to accelerate capital account liberalization. Chinas government has allowed about RMB50bn (USD7bn) in Hong Kong to be invested in Chinas interbank bond markets, a similar amount to return as inward FDI and plans are underway to launch an RMB-based QFII (Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors) scheme of RMB20bn (USD3bn) to invest in Chinas capital markets (IMF, 2011a, p.14). However, if the renminbi is to become truly an international currency, Chinas capital controls will have to be eliminated so that foreign investors can freely invest in RMBdenominated assets and easily repatriate their capital and income. Yet even following the best practice of carefully sequencing capital account 31 liberalization , the lessons from other emerging markets, including those in Asia in the late 1990s, is that foreign capital can come pouring in, whether it be foreign portfolio investment or China's banks and companies stepping up borrowing from overseas. Without a strong regulatory infrastructure and appropriate safeguards, capital can be misallocated, fueling rapid credit growth, asset price bubbles and an overheated economy. The economic boom can then turn to bust, through diminished competitiveness, a worsening current account, rising NPLs and a loss of investor confidence triggering capital flight. With a war chest of FX reserves and a large current account surplus, China is not, in our opinion, vulnerable to a balance of payments crisis, but that does not rule out the possibility of large net capital outflows and a drawdown in FX reserves particularly given that China's M2 money supply has swelled to 175% of GDP as of September 2011. Indeed, a freer capital account amid severe financial repression can increase the incentive for China's savers to flee negative real bank deposit rates in favour of higher returns abroad.

Internationalization of the renminbi is adding pressure for China to accelerate capital account liberalization

Based on international experience, if capital account liberalization happens too fast, without appropriate safeguards, it can cause financial crises

31

Although certain rules about sequencing capital account liberalization for example, countries should liberalize long-term flows before short-term flows, and foreign direct investment before portfolio investment have the appeal of simplicity, the fungibility of capital makes their practical application difficult.

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Faster capital account liberalization can also speed up domestic financial deregulation. With freer capital movement it will become more difficult for the PBC to both manage the exchange rate and have autonomy over monetary policy. With the exceptions of small and very open economies, like Singapore and Hong Kong, the conventional macro policy approach under a freer capital account is to gradually relinquish control over the exchange rate and focus instead on setting domestic interest rates. Indeed, quantitative-based monetary policy instruments, such as credit quotas, are easier to circumvent under a freer capital account (for example, by companies increasing borrowing from overseas), undermining their effectiveness. However, if the primary instrument of monetary policy is to be the policy interest rate, to be effective in influencing the price of money and credit it 32 becomes necessary to deregulate bank deposit and lending rates. China still imposes a floor on bank commercial lending rates (0.9x the benchmark 1yr lending rate) and a ceiling on bank deposit rates. While deregulating these interest rates should increase the efficacy of monetary policy, it is not without risks. Without strong regulatory and supervisory frameworks, interest rate deregulation can pressure banks to engage in overly aggressive competition to 33 attract customers and maintain market share. By raising deposit rates and cutting lending rates it can shrink the profit margins of banks; worse still, it could also encourage them to start taking on riskier loans to compensate for the drop in profits. The overall loan quality in the banking system would decline, heightening the risk of a financial crisis. Another risk related to financial liberalization can stem from developing the local private debt markets. Until 2004, Chinas private debt market was small and heavily regulated, but since then regulations have been relaxed and debt issuance by non-finance firms more than tripled to RMB1.5trn (USD226bn) in 2010 (Figure 30). There are a number of advantages in deepening the debt market in tandem with capital account liberalization and interest rate deregulation. Deeper debt markets can: 1) help absorb larger capital inflows; 2) develop a yield curve and increase the potency of monetary policy; and 3) diversify credit risks away from the banks. However, developing the private bond market can increase competition between banks, as large companies choose to increase borrowing directly from investors by issuing debt. Without adequate supervision, losing market share of high-grade corporate customers to the bond market could pressure banks to lower their credit standards to attract new customers. This happened in Japan in the 1980s and contributed to its unprecedented asset price bubble (see Box 8: Risks associated with financial liberalization: lessons from Japan).

Faster capital account liberalization can also speed up domestic financial deregulation

Interest rate deregulation can pressure banks to engage in aggressive competition, leading to a drop in credit standards

Another risk related to financial liberalization can stem from developing the local private debt markets

Losing market share to the bond market could pressure banks to take on riskier loans to attract new customers

32

In China's current credit tightening cycle there has been a surge in mainland institutions borrowing from Hong Kong banks and debt issuance in Hong Kong's bond market. 33 Rather than interest rate deregulation, the risk could stem from other forms of financial deregulation, such as relaxing controls on the issuance of new lending products which can be counterproductive when complimentary factors such as commercially orientated loan officers and consumer familiarity with the risks of new financial products are lacking. For example, domestic financial liberalization in Korea resulted in a crisis in 2003 when credit card debt as a share of GDP more than tripled between 1999 and 2002, and the average number of credit cards for every adult in the country rose from one to three.

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Fig. 30: Bond issuance by Chinese firms


RMB bn

1,800 1,600

Middle-term notes Commercial paper

Asset-backed securities Corporate bonds

1,400
1,200 1,000 800 600 400 200

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

Jan-Sep 2011

Note: Commercial paper issuance was allowed from May 2005 for maturities of 1yr and below. Issuance of so-called medium-term notes was allowed from April 2008. Source: China Government Securities Depository Trust & Clearing Co. Ltd.

Fig. 18

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Box 8: Risks associated with financial liberalization: lessons from Japan


This box summarizes research by Tomo Kinoshita. See What Japans 1980s experience means for China, Nomura Asia Special Report, 19 October 2009. Japans financial liberalization experience was gradual in the 1970s but accelerated in the 1980s under US pressure. Japans bubble in the 1980s and its lost decade once the bubble burst in the early 1990s is usually attributed to the Plaza Accord in September 1985 a coordinated effort by the G5 to depreciate the USD which led to significant JPY appreciation, hurting Japans exporters and caused the Bank of Japan to aggressively ease monetary policy. However, bond market liberalization and interest rate deregulation were also important underlying reasons for Japans asset bubble in the 1980s. Bond market liberalization The Ministry of Finance deregulated the bond market aggressively in the early 1980s. Due to high minimum standards, only two companies in the domestic market were allowed to issue convertible bonds (CBs) before deregulation. This increased to 25 in 1983 and further to 175 companies in 1985. Furthermore, in 1985 unsecured straight bonds were issued for the first time since the Second World War. The combination of rapid deregulation of the bond market and rapidly rising stock prices meant that issuance of equity-linked bonds (e.g., CBs and warrants) soared in 1989, resulting in a massive expansion of the primary market for corporate bonds. The annual average amount of corporate bonds issued tripled from JPY2trn in 1975-80 to JPY6trn in 1985, peaking in 1989 at a yet-tobe surpassed JPY19.6trn (Figure 31). The liberalization of the bond market enabled big companies to raise funds more cheaply and to repay their earlier bank loans. Banks were forced to complete aggressively against each other in seeking out a new client base, targeting SMEs, individuals and property developers. The proportion of total city bank loans (excluding trust accounts) made to SMEs and individuals rose to around 70% in 1990 from 47% in 1980. In the fierce competition for new clients that ensued, lending standards often deteriorated. Financial institutions often lacked information on the credit histories of their new clients. For borrowers, the relaxation of the banks lending stance created an opportunity to tap easy funds to speculate in property and stocks.
Fig. 31: Bond issuance by Japanese firms

Yen trn
20 Bond with Warrants (overseas) Convertible Bonds (overseas)

18
16 14 12

Straight Bonds (overseas)


Bond with Warrants (domestic) Convertible Bonds (domestic) Straight Bonds (domestic)

10
8 6 4 2 0 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

Source: Japan Ministry of Finance and Nomura Global Economics.

Interest rate deregulation Deregulation of interest rates made for another source of aggressive bank lending behaviour. Bank deposit rates had long been set at low levels by the authorities to provide banks with sufficient interest rate margins. The interest rate deregulation schedule started by removing the interest rate ceiling for large deposits of JPY1bn or more in October 1985; for deposits of JPY500m or more in April 1986; for deposits of JPY50m or more in April 1988; and for deposits of JPY10m or more in October 1989. Interest rates for certificates of deposit were also rapidly deregulated in the 1980s. Abolishing the interest rate restrictions sparked fierce competition among banks to raise deposit rates to attract new customers. To reduce interest rate margin pressure, financial institutions started to seek out riskier customers that were willing to pay higher borrowing rates.

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5. The Lewis turning point


Over the past decade, Chinas urban population has increased by about 20m per year while its rural population has fallen by 13m per year, largely through migration. The seemingly endless supply of cheap rural labour migrating to the cities has helped contain average wages. However, Nobel Prize-winning economist Arthur Lewis (1915-91) observed that in developing economies a point is reached when the supply of surplus rural labour starts to diminish, strengthening the wage bargaining power of industrial workers. This has become known as the Lewis turning point (LTP) and in a stylized chart can be thought of as a kink in the labour supply curve when wages can take-off (Figure 32). In the early stage of economic development, the manufacturing labour supply curve can be elastic, that is flat increased labour demand does not affect the wage level but as the economy develops there will be a point when the manufacturing labour supply curve will kink because of a diminishing supply of surplus rural labour.
The Lewis turning point is when the supply of surplus rural labour starts to diminish, raising the wage bargaining power of industrial workers

Fig. 32: A stylized diagram of the Lewis turning point


Wages Lewis Point

Labour supply

D2
D1

Labour pool

Source: Nomura and inspired by Stephen Jen at SLJ Macro Partners

Fig. 19

Surveying the recent literature, empirical studies have reached no firm 34 conclusions on whether China is at the LTP. Taking a different approach, we find an interesting pattern in countries that have already passed the LTP. In Japan it was in 1965 when employment in the secondary sector (manufacturing and construction) overtook that in the primary sector (mostly agriculture) that real manufacturing wages started to surge (Figure 33). A strikingly similar phenomenon happened in Korea in 1987. In China, employment is still largest in the primary sector, but on current trends it will be overtaken by employment in the secondary sector in 2015.

Empirical studies have reached no firm conclusions on whether or not China is at the LTP

34

Knight, Deng and Li (2011), Zhang, Yang and Wang (2010) and Cai and Wang (2008) conclude that China is at, or near, the LTP. On the other hand, work by Minami and Ma (2010), Du and Wang (2010), Wang (2010) and Garnaut (2010) conclude that the LTP has yet to be reached.

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Fig. 33: Primary, secondary and tertiary employment and real wage growth Japan
Employment, Mn 60 50 40

South Korea
% y-o-y 20
15 10

China
% y-o-y 25 20 15 10 5 0 -5 -10 -15 -20 2010
Employment, Mn

30
20 10

5
0 -5

ent, Mn

0 1954

1968

1982

1996

-10 2010

Employment, Mn 20 18 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 1978 1986 1994


Primary, lhs

% y-o-y
F

450
400 350

25
20 15

300 250 200


150 100

10 5 0
-5 -10

50 0 1953 1969 1985 2001

-15 -20 2017

2002

Real wage growth, rhs

Secondary, lhs

Tertiary, lhs

Source: Japans Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications and Ministry of Health and Labour; CEIC and Nomura Global Economics.

Fig. 20

At first glance it would appear that China is near, but not yet at, the LTP, and it is true that lower-end manufacturing is moving inland to areas where labour is more plentiful and cheaper. However, we believe that most of the recent empirical studies have ignored three critical factors that, taken together, suggest to us that the LTP is upon China. The first is demographics (see chapter: The setting in of growing pains). Based on projections by the United Nations, Chinas 15-24 year-old age cohort1986 will 1962 1970 1978 fall from 16.8% of the total population in 2010 to 14.6% in 2015 and 12.8% in 2020, resulting in there being fewer young, productive workers willing to leave the countryside to work in factories. In contrast, the 15-24 age cohort was 20.3% in Japan in 1965 and 21.1% in Korea in 1985. Second, the focus should be on total labour benefits, not just wages. Chinas wages are growing strongly: in 2010, the average wage grew by 13.3% and the average minimum wage jumped 22.9% and by a similar magnitude in 2011, but other components of labour compensation have surged even more. As in Japan in the early 1970s, there are signs that Chinas workers are becoming increasing aware of their fair share of entitlements from social welfare benefits to better working conditions as evidenced by the surge in the 35 number of labour disputes. It is intriguing that there was a structural break in Chinas labour disputes in 2008, and the same pattern happened in Japan in 36 the early 1970s, coinciding with the wage surge there (Figure 34).

We believe that most studies have ignored three factors that, taken together, suggest to us that the LTP is upon China

The1994 is demographics first

2002

The second is to focus on total labour benefits, not just wages

35

According to research by Huang (2010), if companies strictly follow policies on social welfare contributions, commonly the payrolls of migrant workers would have to rise by at least 35-40%, including contributions to pensions (20% of payroll), medical insurance (6%), employment benefit (2%), work injury insurance (1%), maternity benefit (0.8%) and housing entitlements (5-10%). 36 In the early 1970s Japan experienced an outbreak of inflation, in part driven by the 1973-74 oil crisis, but also the flow of surplus rural labour moving to the cities started to diminish in the 1960s, leading to increased worker bargaining power, as evidenced by the surge in labour disputes, not only for higher wages but also better working conditions the so-called Lewis turning point (Minami, 1973).

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Fig. 34: Number of labour disputes Japan versus China


Number 12
10

No. of labour disputes in Japan in thousands, lhs No. of labour disputes in China in 100 thousands, lhs Japan's real wage growth, rhs

% y-o-y 12
9

8 6 4 2 0 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000

6 3 0 -3 -6 2010

Source: Bank of Japan; Chinas Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security and Nomura Global Economics.

Fig. 21

This may have been triggered in part by Chinas new labour laws in 2008 and the exponential increase in user-penetration of the internet and mobile phones. The new labour laws have empowered low-paid workers by making it mandatory to have written labour contracts, enforcing the payment of overtime, paying salaries on time, and being enrolled in a social security program. It is also now easier for workers to file complaints against employers in the arbitration tribunals or courts. If we aggregate data measuring compensation of labour in Chinas 31 provinces, which is based on the income measure of GDP, it shows that this broader measure of firms labour costs grew much faster than average national wages in 2008-09, although both series returned to a similar rate of still-fast growth of around 16-17% last year (Figure 35).

This may have been triggered in part by Chinas new labour laws in 2008

Fig. 35: Growth in wages versus total labour compensation


% y-o-y 35 30
25 20

Wages Total labour compensation

15 10
5 0 1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

Source: CEIC and Nomura Global Economics.

Fig. 22

The third reason is the rising opportunity costs of migrating from the agricultural sector, if food prices keep rising, lifting incomes in the countryside. Food prices have soared in recent years and we expect them to continue to climb, underpinned by burgeoning demand from the worlds rapidly developing and most populated economies. In these economies, diets are changing towards a higher calorie intake, while agricultural supply faces many constraints and uncertainties, such as greater use of biofuels, global warming and increasing water scarcity (see Special Report, The coming surge in food prices, Nomura Global Economics, 8 September 2010). The rigid hukou household registration system, by making it extremely difficult for rural migrants to obtain a permanent urban resident permit and thereby gain the same access to the deepening social welfare systems as locals, could also become a growing constraint on urbanization, as costs in the cities rise.

The third reason is the rising opportunity costs of migrating from the agricultural sector

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A surge in wages is no doubt positive for household consumption and helps facilitate internal rebalancing, but if it happens too fast, particularly if productivity growth fades, then it can eat into profit margins, erode export competitiveness and, if passed on to consumers, trigger a serious outbreak of inflation. Indeed, because of the LTP, but also due to the need to deregulate the government's underpricing of key natural resources and a likely multi-year surge in food prices, our base case is that CPI inflation will average around 5% from 2011 to 2015, compared to 2% over the past decade, see Asia Special Report, China: The case for structurally higher inflation. 21 September 2011.

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6. The setting in of growing pains


China is starting to face growing pains from worsening demographics and increasing strains on natural resources and the environment. This will almost certainly cause the economy's potential growth to slow over the course of this decade, and inflation to be structurally higher. The combination of slower trend growth but higher structural inflation creates a more challenging environment to implement much-needed reforms. For example, it will likely become politically more difficult to remove the myriad government subsidies to the relatively less efficient, capital intensive SOE-related sectors. Yet failing to reform the SOE sector will make it tougher to increase the efficient usage of natural resources, reduce environmental degradation and rebalance GDP growth away from investment towards consumption. This combination can also make it more challenging to address China's high income inequality, while the experience of other emerging economies is that slower trend growth can cause problems festering below the surface such as hidden bad debts to bubble up to the surface. Alastair Newton +44 20 710 23940
alastair.newton@nomura.com

China is facing growing pains from worsening demographics and increasing strains on natural resources and the environment

Demographic challenges
China is in the midst of a huge demographic shift. A rapidly ageing population, a shrinking labour force and a sex ratio heavily skewed toward males are 37 creating new challenges (Figure 36). The one-child family policy was introduced in 1978 and has brought the fertility rate down to about 1.6. Because of low fertility and rising life expectancy, the UN projects the share of people aged over 60 in the total population to rise from 12.3% in 2010 to 15.1% in 2015 and to 17.4% in 2020, increasing the number of 60+ year-olds over this period by 76m. Meanwhile, the share of 15-24 year-olds in the total population is projected to fall from 16.8% in 2010 to 14.6% in 2015 and to 12.8% in 2020, decreasing the number of 15-24 year-olds over this period by 47m. Chinas age pyramid is projected by the UN to change shape dramatically in the next two decades (Figures 37 and 38), while the World Bank (2011a) expects total employment to start to shrink from around 2015.
China faces a rapidly ageing population, a shrinking labour force and a sex ratio heavily skewed toward males

Fig. 36: Key demographics indicators and projections for China, by the United Nations
Population, millions Working age population, millions Median age, years Young population aged 15-24, % total Elderly population aged 60+, % total Old age dependency ratio - aged 65+, % 15-64 Child dependency ratio - aged 0-14, % 15-64 Total dependency ratio - aged 0-14 and 65+, % 15-65 Fertility rate, child births per woman Net reproduction rate, No. of daughters per woman Population sex ratio, males per 100 females Sex ratio at birth, No. of male births per one female 2000 1269 857 29.7 15.5 10.2 10.4 37.7 48.1 1.80 0.78 107.5 1.18 2005 1308 923 32.2 17.0 10.9 10.7 31.0 41.7 1.70 0.73 107.8 1.21 2010 1341 971 34.5 16.8 12.3 11.3 26.9 38.2 1.64 0.71 108.0 1.20 2015 1370 996 36.2 14.6 15.1 13.0 24.5 37.5 1.56 0.69 108.0 1.18 2020 1388 989 38.1 12.8 17.4 16.8 23.5 40.3 1.51 0.68 107.8 1.16 2025 1395 981 40.1 11.7 20.2 19.9 22.3 42.2 1.53 0.69 107.5 1.15 2030 1393 960 42.5 11.4 24.4 23.9 21.2 45.1 1.58 0.72 107.1 1.14

Source: United Nations and Nomura Global Economics.

Fig. 23

37

Chinas one-child policy officially restricts married, urban couples to having only one child, although it allows exemptions in several cases, including for rural couples, ethnic minorities and parents without any siblings themselves.

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Fig. 37: Age pyramid, 2010


100+ 90-94 80-84 70-74 60-64 50-54 40-44 30-34 20-24 10-14 0-4

Fig. 38: Age pyramid, 2030


100+ 90-94 80-84 70-74 60-64 50-54 40-44 30-34 20-24 10-14 0-4

Female

Male

Female

Male

70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 Millions

70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 Millions

Source: United Nations and Nomura Global Economics

Source: United Nations and Nomura Global Economics 7, 2011

Fig. 24

Fig. 25

Chinas rapidly ageing population will increase the strain on the countrys relatively undeveloped health and pension systems, and could increase tensions in society (see section in this chapter: Rising inequality and an aspiring middle class). Young urban couples, many of them without siblings, will find themselves with four parents to look after and will themselves have only one child (known in China as the 4-2-1 phenomenon). Perhaps the more alarming concern for population sustainability is the large imbalance between baby girls and boys. Women are bearing only 0.71 girls over their lifetime, well below the replacement figure of just over unity. In 2010, there were 51m more men than woman in the country. The sex ratio among newborns is 120 boys for every 100 girls, the highest in the world (Figure 39). At this rate, there will not be enough brides for as many as one-fifth of todays baby boys when they get to marrying age, heightening the risk of social tensions.

The rapidly ageing population will increase the strain on the relatively undeveloped health and pension systems, and could increase tensions in society

Fig. 39: Country rankings of sex ratio at birth


Number of male births per 100 female births 120 117 114 111 108 105 102

Source: United Nations and Nomura Global Economics.

Fig. 26

As a result of Chinas ageing population, potential output growth looks set to slow, possibly quite sharply in the next 5-10 years. The contribution of labour to Chinas potential output growth is estimated by the World Bank to have declined from an average of 3.3pp in 1978-94 to 1.0pp in 1995-2009, and is projected to decline further to -0.5pp in 2016-20 (Figure 40). In the past two decades, the decreasing contribution of labour to Chinas potential output growth was not a major concern as it was offset by capital deepening, with capital accumulation adding a hefty 5.8pp to potential growth in 1995-2009. But capital deepening has lifted the investment-to-GDP ratio to an extraordinarily high level of almost 50%, limiting the scope for further increases in the contribution of capital to potential output growth. The implication is that Chinas potential output growth, which has been remarkably stable in the last three decades, could slow abruptly this decade unless total factor productivity (TFP) can be boosted, i.e. unless China uses its labour and capital more 44

China Korea India Hong Kong Greece Ireland Singapore Australia Czech Denmark Germany Italy Japan Malaysia Netherlands New Zealand Philippines Poland Portugal Russia Spain Sweden Thailand Brazil Canada Colombia Egypt Finland France Iceland Indonesia Mexico Norway Pakistan Switzerland Turkey UK US Vietnam Argentina Sri Lanka Saudi Arabia South Africa

The prospect of a shrinking workforce means that Chinas potential output growth is likely to slow, possibly quite sharply in the next 5-10 years

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November 2011

efficiently. The World Bank is not optimistic, projecting Chinas potential output growth to slow from an average of 9.6% in 1995-2009 to 8.4% in 2010-15 and to 7.0% in 2016-20. If potential growth slows too sharply, excess demand 38 could fuel runaway inflation and/or swing the current account into deficit.
Fig. 40: Estimates of potential output growth past and future
% y-o-y Potential output growth Employment growth Labour productivity growth - From total factor productivity (TFP) growth - From capital deepening 1978-94 9.9 3.3 6.4 3.0 3.4 1995-2009 9.6 1.0 8.6 2.7 5.8 2010-15 8.4 0.2 8.2 2.3 5.9 2016-20 7.0 -0.5 7.5 2.3 5.2

Source: Kuijs, L., China Through 2020: A Macroeconomic Scenario, World Bank, China Research Working Paper No. 9, June 2009.

To try to avoid a shrinking workforce, new policies could be implemented. For example, Chinas hukou household registration system, which discriminates against the social rights of migrant workers, could be relaxed (see Box 9: Chinas hukou household registration system). Relaxing the hukou system, which links most health and education benefits to the area where the person is registered rather than living, should help ease the wide income inequalities and encourage more labour mobility and faster urbanization. In turn, this could boost TFP given that productivity in agriculture is about 6x less than in the rest of the economy. Urbanization also creates larger cities, which generate economies of scale due to specialization, information spillovers and clustering. In the countryside, it would also facilitate the much-needed consolidation of farmland holdings, providing economies of scale and greater scope for modernization, hence boosting agriculture productivity. However, the challenge is that these reforms, while helping to encourage urbanization and labour mobility, risk generating other negative externalities. Already, with half of the 1.3bn population living in urban areas, the strain on the bigger cities is intensifying in terms of resource constraints, environmental concerns and social tensions. A good example is Beijing, the capital city, where the population has soared from 15.4mn in 2005 to 19.6mn in 2010, a cumulative increase of 27.5%, dwarfing the 2.5% increase in the nationwide population over this five-year period (Figure 41). No surprise the authorities in Beijing are introducing stringent measures to limit motor vehicle ownership, and in August 2011 shut down 23 schools for migrants across the capital.

China could relax the hukou household registration system to encourage urbanization, but at the risk of generating other negative externalities

38

As economies develop it is common for the initial high rates of TFP growth to slow, as productivity catch up and the flow of surplus labour from the less productive agricultural sector to the more productive manufacturing and services sectors starts to ease. More specifically for China, the recent investment boom has been led by public infrastructure projects, of which the return on capital tends to be relatively lower than private investments and can take longer to be realized. One hope to lifting Chinas TFP is from a boost in human capital. The number of university graduates rose more than 6x between 2000 and 2010 to 384mn, although a large share are struggling to find jobs.

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Fig. 41: Cumulative population growth, 2005-10


Cumulative growth, % 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 -5 -10
Shanghai Tianjin Guangdong Beijing

National

Jiangxi

Heilongjiang

Shandong

Zhejiang

Jiangsu

Mongolia

Chongqing

Ningxia

Gansu

Liaoning

Source: CEIC and Nomura Global Economics.

Fig. 27

Box 9: Chinas hukou household registration system


Chinas household registration system, or hukou, was introduced in the 1950s to keep as many people as possible in farming, in order to maximize food production. It was also an element of the governments social control structure, in part to control the pace of urbanization. Starting in the late 1990s, restrictions were eased to allow migrants to register as temporary urban residents and the right of police to expel unofficial migrants was abolished in 2003. However, the main problem remains: migrants do not have the same social rights as locals with permanent resident permits. Many migrants are not entitled to pensions or medical care; their children cannot attend local public schools. They cannot enjoy a housing subsidy. Overall the hukou system is still very much in force, acting as a major constraint on migration and hence on urbanization, attributing to income inequality. Another reform could involve relaxing the 1978 one-child policy, but it would take decades to have an impact on employment and risks exacerbating Chinas social, resource and environmental problems. Allowing greater immigration or increasing the official retirement age which is currently 60 for men and 50 for women, and has not been changed since 1951 would likely have a more immediate impact on employment. However, the former would also strain Chinas resources and environment, while the latter would not be a politically popular move ahead of the transition to the fifth generation of leaders in early 2013.

Rising inequality and an aspiring middle class


Events in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) at the start of this year triggered a good deal of thought over other countries which could be vulnerable to similar outbreaks of civil unrest. At the forefront of the protests in Tunisia and Egypt in particular were middle-class, relatively well educated and often un- or under-employed urban youth. However, despite comparisons between Tahrir Square in 2011 and Tiananmen Square in 1989, we see major differences between the MENA and contemporary China and little, if any, risk of contagion. In essence, rising incomes and living standards have so far satisfied the aspirations of Chinas growing middle class without the need for political reform. However, if the gap between rich and poor and between cities and countryside continues to widen, the government could find itself under increasing pressure from the less well-off to distribute wealth more evenly, particularly as social media has become a powerful tool for the underclass to mobilise and to share its grievances. Rising inequality could threaten social stability Bo Xilai, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) chief in the municipality of Chongqing, was described by British newspaper The Independent in 2010 as
There is little if any risk of contagion to China from the Arab Spring

Rising living standards have so far satisfied the aspirations of Chinas growing middle class

However, rising inequalities within China could spur increasing civil unrest

46

Guizhou

Xinjiang

Shaanxi

Qinghai

Shanxi

Jilin

Sichuan

Yunnan

Fujian

Guangxi

Hunan

Hainan

Henan

Hubei

Hebei

Anhui

Tibet

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39

Chinas most charismatic politician. Certainly, he has proved himself to be adept at striking a chord with ordinary Chinese through a combination of his crackdown on corruption in Chongqing since he assumed his current post in 2007 and his media-savvy skills. So, it is in our view safe to assume that with his July 2011 public statement in support of greater social equality dividing the cake up well in addition to making the cake bigger he was again striking a chord with many Chinese which, while arguably populist, nevertheless has a firm foundation in contemporary China. Indeed, President Hu Jintao seemingly made a similar point during his joint press conference in Washington with President Barack Obama in January 2011. Asked about human rights in China, he placed great emphasis on economic rights, highlighting the fact that China still has over 250mn citizens living close to the poverty line despite the tremendous strides it has made in poverty alleviation over the past three decades or so. The data support these concerns. Notably, in a study published in 2002 not long before the handover of power to the current (fourth generation) leadership, Newton and Subbaraman (2002) noted that Chinas Gini coefficient a common measure of income inequality rose from 28.8 in 1981 to 38.8 in 1995, and has risen further to 39.0 in 1999, close to internationally recognised danger levels. According to the United Nations 2010 Human Development Report, as we look forward to the handover of power to the fifth generation leadership a year or so from now, Chinas Gini coefficient has risen 40 still further to 41.5 in 2005 (latest data available). By a widely recognised yardstick, inequality is therefore now at a level where it may pose a significant risk to social stability. On simpler but more timely yardsticks of income inequality, Chinas average household income in urban areas has increased to more than three times that in rural areas; and within urban areas, average income of households in the top 20% income decile have risen to more than eight times that of households in the bottom 20% income decile (Figures 42 and 43).
and standard measures support the view that there may be some risk to social stability

Fig. 42: Urban-rural household income ratio

Fig. 43: A gauge of urban household income inequality: the ratio of highest and lowest income deciles
Ratio 10

Ratio 3.5

3.0

Urban income ratio: top 10%/bottom 10%


8 Urban income ratio: top 20%/bottom 20%

2.5

2.0

1.5 1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010

2 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

Source: CEIC and Nomura Global Economics.

Source: CEIC and Nomura Global Economics.

Fig. 28

Fig. 29
Calls for more redistributive policies in response do not enjoy universal support

One way of addressing this issue would be through the adoption of more redistributive policies which some commentators (e.g. the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) in an article published on 30 September 2011) have suggested Bo Xilai (who is experimenting with a property tax in Chongqing) was advocating as part of what has become known as the Chongqing model, marrying leftist rhetoric/policies with a strong anti-corruption drive. This approach is widely seen as an alternative to the so-called Guangdong model promoted by, among others, Wang Yang, head of the CCP in Guangdong
39

Bo Xilai, China's most charismatic politician, makes a bid for power by Clifford Coonan, The Independent, 8 March 2010. 40 The Gini coefficient ranges theoretically from 0, when everyone has exactly the same income, to 100 when a single individual receives all the income of a society.

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province and Bo Xilais predecessor in Chongqing, which adopts a more liberal approach both politically and economically but one which, in our view, has the potential to generate greater public dissatisfaction. In effect, with both Bo Xilai and Wang Yang widely seen as potential candidates for promotion to the Politburo Standing Committee next year, these contrasting approaches can be viewed as a de facto election issue. Furthermore, with others, including Premier Wen Jiabao and his predecessor Zhu Rongji (calling, respectively, for bolder political reform and faster economic reform) recently weighing in, this appears to be an ideological struggle which may be a key determinant in the make-up of the fifth generation leadership and the policies it pursues. But how extensive is social unrest in reality? Gauging the true extent of social unrest in China is far from straightforward. The international press frequently cites numbers from 80,000 upwards per year for mass incidents the majority historically revolving around environmental issues (where the Green movement has emerged over the past decade as the most notably organised manifestation of civil society in China). However, the definition of mass incident is not clear-cut and official reporting may not be entirely reliable; furthermore, the Ministry of Public Security has not published data since it cited 87,000 incidents of public order disturbances (a broader category than mass incident) in 2005. However, as Will Freeman of GaveKal Dragonomics noted in an article published last year: Anecdotal evidence over the last five years suggests a rise in angerventing mass incidents large-scale, often violent, riots that erupt from seemingly minor incidents and reflect general discontent rather 41 than specific rights violations. Although we agree that there is no reason to believe that even the upper estimates of social unrest pose an immediate threat to the CCPs grip on power, we also accept that no government can be sure of its longevity in the face of increasing unrest and a failure to address the underlying causes. Stress in the city According to Chinas 2010 census, around 670mn people now live in towns and cities almost exactly half the total population. History (including recent events in the MENA) teaches us that it is urban, rather than rural, unrest to which regimes are especially vulnerable. However, the continued existence of the hukou household registration system (see Box 9: Chinas hukou household registration system) means that in todays China there is a significant overlap between rural and urban citizenship. The hukou system officially restricts labour mobility thereby effectively discriminating against farmers moving to work in the city. According to the OECD (2011, pp.163-165), Chinas 2005 census estimated the total number of rural-to-urban migrants without a local hukou at 74mn and unofficial migrants in urban areas at 39% of the urban labour force in 2005 (Figure 44). Total labour compensation of migrant workers without a hukou is sometimes only half of that of urban residents, even if they perform the same job functions, according to research by Huang Yiping (2010).
We believe that the hukou system helps perpetuate inequality in the cities but we see no reason to believe that the CCPs grip on power is currently under threat Gauging the true extent of social unrest remains difficult

41

The accuracy of Chinas mass incidents, Will Freeman, Financial Times, 2 March 2010.

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Fig. 44: Origin and destination of unofficial migrants


Absolute number (millions) Population Living in urban areas Living in rural areas Total Employment Living in urban areas Living in rural areas Total Population Living in urban areas Living in rural areas Total Employment Living in urban areas Living in rural areas Total Coming from urban areas 52.6 5.2 57.9 Coming from rural areas 73.6 18.1 91.8 Total 126.3 23.4 149.6

45.2 61.7 106.9 4.9 15.0 19.9 50.1 76.7 126.8 As % of population or employment living in an area 13.1 2.4 7.0 16.5 1.0 6.6 22.5 3.1 11.4 22.6 3.1 10.1 9.4 0.7 4.4 39.1 4.1 16.7

Source: "China" - OECD Economic Surveys, Volume 2010/6, February 2010.

Fig. 30

If the status quo persists, the tensions to which these inequalities inevitably give rise look set to deepen. According to a report published early in 2011 by Chinas National Population and Family Planning Commission, the next decade will see a further 100mn Chinese migrate from rural to urban areas. Indeed, another recent report this one by the Hong Kong-based China Labour Bulletin claimed that the so-called new generation workforce, i.e. workers born since 1980 who account for nearly half of the total number of internal migrants, is the driving force behind increasing labour unrest and strikes in an at least a partly successful quest for better pay and conditions. In response, as the EIU notes in its May 2011 Risk Briefing on China, the authorities have adopted a range of policies which are broadly supportive of workers, at least in part to try to address discontent arising from socioeconomic inequality. These include: raising the minimum wage, improving labour regulation and permitting local unionisation and a degree of collective bargaining. There is some recent evidence that, despite the authorities efforts to prevent a mass labour movement from developing, modern communications are facilitating wider cooperation (e.g. the recent case of industrial action by cab drivers which spread to a number of cities). However, the EIU continues to place only a moderate probability on a labour movement emerging in the foreseeable future which could pose a significant challenge to the government. No taxation without representation? On the other hand, reform of the status quo whatever its direction stands to run into headwinds from constituencies which benefit from, and therefore favour, the current system. Notable among these is Chinas burgeoning middle class, whose aspirations to date have been satisfied without political reform. Indeed, it has long been our view that the implicit understanding between Chinas leaders and its citizens is that political reform would be a nettle to be grasped by the fifth generation leadership, but not until the second half of its expected period of office, i.e. from 2017 onwards provided, that is, that the latters expectation of continuing economic betterment is fulfilled. That said, as The Economist pointed out in its June 2011 special report on China, the introduction of new and higher taxes on the middle classes e.g. as part of an overall more redistributive shift may stir demands for a say in how their money is spent.

and that persisting with it risks increased labour and wider unrest

despite recent measures which are supportive of workers

Any reform of the status quo is likely to run into headwinds from vested interests

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Stepping stones prevail for now For the time being at least, just as is the case with labour policy, we believe that Deng Xiaopings famous analogy of crossing the river one stepping stone at a time is likely to prevail. In particular, as The Economist put it in its June 2011 special report on China: For now the party would rather deal with angry underdogs than with an embittered bourgeoisie. This may in part at least account for the recent boost in spending on internal security which, according to the 2011 annual budget unveiled on 5 March 2011, is now higher and growing faster than defence spending. Another reason behind this could be Chinas demographics, discussed in the previous section. A recent book by science journalist Mara Hvistendahl (2011) examining the implications of the gender imbalance in China (and in India) pointed to a possible link with the expansion over the past several years of the paramilitary Peoples Armed Police, military service being a safety valve historically for the pressures which surplus male populations can create. Ms Hvistendahl goes on to suggest that such imbalances can be as destabilising as climate change, potentially sparking crime, cross-border trafficking and even wider conflict. Indeed, she finds statistical evidence that crime, including violent crime, is 42 rising already in cities in China where the gender skew is greatest. As the EIUs May 2011 Risk Briefing reflects, local protests over a whole range of issues notably inflation, pay, factory closures, environmental issues and corruption are set to continue. Especially with no official channels such as elections through which citizens can register their opinions, these can and do act as a valuable safety valve. Furthermore, as with labour disputes, modern communications (which already facilitate the organisation of social unrest at the local level) bring with them a greater risk of copycat action and even the emergence of a regional or national protest movement of some sort. Nevertheless, as the EIU concludes rapid economic growth and the lack of a figurehead make a national uprising unlikely for the time being. Less haste, more speed All that being said, an accident (attributed by the head of the official inquiry to an as yet unspecified design flaw) near the eastern city of Wenzhou on 23 July 2011 involving two high-speed trains, in which 40 people were reportedly killed, may have significant consequences on the aspirations of the middle classes in particular (as well as being something of a set-back to Chinas highspeed rail (HSR) programme). HSR is a high prestige project which has enjoyed the full backing of the top leadership and which is supposed to showcase Chinas ability to absorb and improve imported technologies. Compounded by what is widely perceived as the authorities clumsy handling of the aftermath of the crash, both the press (including the state-controlled media), despite official warnings to desist from negative reporting, and Chinas weibo networks (i.e. the domestic equivalent of twitter) have repeatedly and strongly challenged official statements and even openly criticised the government. Some commentators have suggested that the slow official response may reflect high-level disagreement over how to handle the matter; and even that this could, in turn, spill over into the selection process for the fifth generation 43 leadership. If that is correct, it may, in turn, bear on the speed with which the fifth generation feels able or obliged to initiate some sort of political reform process. Quite how China will evolve politically is far from clear. But what is clear is that, compounded by growing inequalities, the status quo looks increasingly unsustainable in the medium-term and that evolution there will have to be if something more wrenching is to be avoided.
42

so reform is likely to remain incremental

Chinas gender imbalance could also pose a threat to stability

Overall, however, a national uprising remains unlikely, for the time being at least

Nevertheless, political reform may come more quickly than previously expected

Unnatural Selection: Choosing boys over girls, and the consequences of a world full of men, Mara Hvistendahl (Oxford University Press, 2011). 43 See, for example, Curiouser, The Economist, 6 August 2011.

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That is not to contradict our earlier suggestion that the Arab Spring was unlikely to spread to China: indeed, far from it. But the chatter on the weibo networks does appear to have been of a very different nature to the established patterns of social unrest. It is, therefore, not impossible that the 23 July train disaster will be looked back upon in due course as a benchmark moment in accelerating Chinas socio-political evolution.

Resource and environmental strains


Writing during the run-up to the handover of power to the 4 generation leadership, Newton and Subbaraman (2002) noted that energy security would be a top foreign policy priority for China in the following decade. Underpinning this was the recognition that Chinas quest for comprehensive national power (i.e. economic, political, military, technological, scientific and cultural) demands continued high economic growth which, in turn, requires commodity security in general and energy security in particular. As the fifth generation prepares to take power, commodity security will, in our view, remain a very high foreign and domestic policy priority for the foreseeable future. Critically, there is also the added dimension of food and therefore water security, very much to the fore. Furthermore, both energy and food/water security bear strongly on yet another dimension that of environmental security. Food security to the fore Guaranteeing food security for all its citizens confronts China with two overarching challenges. First, even though it is one of the few countries on track to meet its Millennium Development Goal target of halving hunger by 2015, the most recent food insecurity report of the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), for the period 2005-07, noted that around 10% of Chinas population was affected by undernourishment. Second, in contrast to the early 1980s when food production was rooted in the subsistence level, rising incomes over the past two decades in particular have stimulated increasing demand initially in urban areas, but now increasingly in the countryside too for non-staple foods. Furthermore, food price inflation the original cause of the protests in Tiananmen Square in 1989 remains a politically sensitive issue which, in our view, stands to influence a raft of policy areas including agriculture, environment, exchange rate and even defence. Reflecting at least some of these challenges and speaking at a forum on urbanisation in March 2011, the Secretary-General of Chinas National Development and Reform Commission, Yang Weimin, commented that: We should not excessively turn farmland into urban areas. Grain security should be given priority. Official estimates put the minimum average requirement of grain per person per year to meet not only subsistence but also animal feed and processing requirements at 400kg. Coupled with its target of 95% self-sufficiency, this suggests that China will need to produce at least 580mn tons of grain pa by 2020 (from 546mn tons in 2010). However, with 8.3mn hectares of arable land lost to urbanisation since 1999 (i.e. around 6.5% of the countrys total), as Yang Weimin was suggesting, achieving this goal is being jeopardised by urbanisation. Furthermore, loss of land to urbanisation is only part of the story. Almost 30% of Chinas total land area is desert and, despite major efforts over many years to counter land degradation, the rate of desertification nationwide is currently running at (an admittedly significantly slower rate than was the case a decade ago) a 250,000 hectares pa, largely due to human activities, 44 notably over-grazing.
th

Commodity security, including food and water, remains a top priority

Undernourishment and dietary shifts both contribute to increasing food demand

and food price inflation remains a politically sensitive issue

China risks falling short of its target of 95% food selfsufficiency

44

Furthermore and directly related to the issue of food security analysis of the composition of cereal production reveals that since the 1980s growth of output of corn (at 3.5% pa) the key crop for the biofuel industry (as well as animal feed) has been significantly faster than is the case for wheat (2.5%) and rice (1.2%). However, this growth in corn production has been achieved not simply through improved productivity but also through the reallocation of land out of rice and wheat into corn. Based on the experience of Japan, experts such as Robert Ash (2011) believe that China could be approaching a plateau in rice productivity and that switching

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Land reform A boost to productivity but politically challenging


In its report on monetary policy in the first quarter of 2011, the Peoples Bank of China opined that: The agricultural sector is still a weak link in the national economy facing a lot of problems and challenges agricultural infrastructure is relatively backward, and the land-output ratio, resource utilization ratio and labour productivity are still low It is becoming increasingly difficult to guarantee national food security and to supply the major agricultural products. When in October 2008, the CCPs Central Committee promised a new upsurge in rural reform, some hoped that the party had come to see land ownership as the key to modernizing and collectivizing agriculture. Currently, although all land is state-/collectively-owned, there is a vibrant market in (relatively long lease) urban land which contrasts starkly with the tepid market in rural land, where leases are restricted to a maximum of 30 years, mortgages are not permitted and selling land usage rights is very difficult. As The Economist put it in an article published shortly after the Central Committees announcement: Chinese academics have long argued that a freer and better-regulated rural property market is essential if peasants are to enjoy more of the fruits of growth. They say it would encourage the consolidation of tiny, inefficient plots of land leased to farmers by collectives and allow peasants to cash in on their lands market value, enabling them to use the capital to go into business in the cities. Academics also think that a proper land market would protect farmers from indiscriminate land grabs by local officials who often take collective ownership to mean 45 control by themselves. However, as The Economist reports in an article on urbanisation published in mid-2011: Thorough going land reform, of the sort that would encourage larger-scale farming remains stuck. One obstacle is ideological 46 many in the party still regard collectivism as a sacred principle. Furthermore, as The Economist concedes, restricting the ability of farmers to detach themselves from their land also protects a valuable social safety net. When an estimated 20mn workers were laid off in early 2009 as a result of the global financial crisis, many were able to return to their family farms maintained by their relatives, thereby significantly reducing the risk of unrest on the city streets. Thus, despite the potential boon it would offer to agricultural productivity, we see little prospect of real progress on land reform unless, or until, an alternative social safety net is in place. Nature will play its part Even so, especially given the impressive record of the Ministry of Agriculture in both policy formulation and R&D, China could conceivably boost production consistent with achieving 95% self-sufficiency for some years to come. However, underlined by this years severe drought in Hebei, Henan, Jiangsu and Shandong (four provinces which accounted for almost two-thirds of total wheat output in 2009), natural disasters continue to threaten steady progress. Such periodic droughts compound the underlying problems caused by uneven distribution of water supply nationwide in very simple terms, too much in the
land from rice to corn may therefore prove to be increasingly difficult unless China is prepared to import an increasing proportion of its rice. 45 Promises, promises: A breakthrough in land reform? Or a damp squib? The Economist, 16 October 2008. 46 Where do you live?, The Economist, 23 June 2011.

Land reform could boost productivity but remains politically challenging

and could threaten social stability

Natural disasters, especially drought, pose a continuing threat to productivity

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south (which is prone to flooding, although the incidence of drought is also increasing in some parts) and too little in the North China Plain in particular, a major cotton and wheat producing area where both surface and ground water is being depleted to dangerous levels. The practical implications of this can be illustrated by the fact that China went from being a net exporter of 1.9mn tons of wheat in 2003 to a net importer of 6.5mn tons in 2004 due to drought (Figure 45).

Fig. 45: Chinas net imports of certain commodities in volume terms


Tons 25 20 15 10 5
0 -5 -10

Crude petroleum, 10m tons Soybean, 10m tons Cereals, m tons Copper, m tons Coal, 10m tons

-15 -20 Aug-99 Aug-01 Aug-03 Aug-05 Aug-07 Aug-09 Aug-11

Source: CEIC and Nomura Global Economics

Balancing priorities In 2008, China consumed 43% of the worlds coal (meeting 70% of its energy demands) and 10% of its oil; it remains on target to overtake the US as the worlds largest consumer of energy within the next few years and is already the worlds largest emitter of carbon (in volume terms, but if measured per head of population, it is far from being the largest). Sustaining economic growth without compromising the environment requires leapfrogging to a low-carbon urbanisation model which focuses on clean energy supply, compact city design, enhanced public transport, green buildings and clean vehicles. Since anecdotal evidence consistently points to environmental issues (which include air quality, water pollution and food standards) as the biggest single cause of civil unrest throughout the past decade, this also matters in terms of social stability. In response, China needs to continue to increase energy efficiency and lift the share of low-carbon technologies. China already has the worlds largest installed wind energy capacity, yet how successful China is in meeting these challenges is of tremendous importance both domestically and globally, a fact which is fully recognised by the leadership notably, as long ago as 2006 President Hu Jintao proposed a new energy security concept at the G8+5 summit in St Petersburg noting the need for sustainable development of human society. Evidence from China itself over the past five years underlines that this is not merely rhetoric. Good progress has been made toward a more resourceefficient and environmentally friendly economy, and most targets are on track. The efficiency of water use has increased; forest cover is expanding and the long-standing uptrend of both SO2 and CO2 emissions has finally started to reverse. However, with rapid economic growth, immense environmental challenges remain. According to the World Bank, China accounts for 13 of the worlds 20 most polluted cities (admittedly down from 19 out of 23 in 2001). Energy efficiency (the amount of energy per unit of output) has been improving, but not by enough to achieve the targeted 20% reduction over 2006-10. According to a study by the World Bank (2008), if Chinas economy grows by 7.2% pa and the average energy intensity remains around current levels for the next 25 years, as experienced by other large economies during their early

Balancing growth and environmental security poses major challenges

as Chinas leaders have been quick to recognize in concrete policy measures

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stage of industrialisation, Chinas energy consumption would reach around 12,750 million tonnes of coal equivalent by 2030 about 87% of the worlds 47 energy demand today. Entering international markets Chinas impact on hard commodity markets over the past decade, especially energy, is well documented. If the 95% self-sufficiency target does indeed prove increasingly unattainable, a similarly dramatic impact on international trade in food and global food prices over the course of the next decade 48 cannot, in our view, be ruled out. In an essay published earlier this year, Robert F. Ash concluded: The Chinese government will find it increasingly difficult to continue to fulfil its long-held target of maintaining 95% self-sufficiency in the provision of basic foodstuffs. As this target is abandoned, China's engagement in international grain markets will increase. This will prove to be a watershed for China, which has previously never wavered in its pursuit of basic food self-sufficiency. It may also prove to be a watershed for international food security through the impact on world cereal prices and supplies of China's emergence as a significant player in world cereal markets However, the cereal whose imports are likely to rise most sharply is corn. It is true that since 1996 China has, remarkably, been a net exporter of corn. But it is striking that the scale of such exports has contracted dramatically (from 16.4 million tons to a mere 0.05 million between 2003 and 2009). Accelerating demand for corn for both feed and biofuel is almost certain to outstrip domestic output growth in the coming years, thereby forcing China to resort to purchases from overseas especially from Latin America and the United States as a permanent feature of its agricultural trade.

A decline in self-sufficiency could have a dramatic impact on global food prices

Resource security and conflict Throughout history, resource security has been a major source of conflict and it is one to which we are certainly not immune today. Peter Gleick (2008) st identified over 50 occasions since the start of the 21 century where water had been an issue in some form of, often violent, conflict ranging from Afghanistan to Yemen. Without wishing to dismiss the importance of the conflict in the Darfur region of Sudan, which has been described by UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon as the first climate change war of the 21st century, the impact of climate change on already stressed and/or disputed water resources may pose even bigger challenges for the international community as a whole in the foreseeable future. Notably, in his recent book Water: Asias New Battleground, Brahma Chellaney (2011) notes that China and India between them account for 37% of the worlds population but command only 10.8% of its water resources. Furthermore, much of Indias water comes from the (China-controlled) Tibetan plateau (which is, in fact, a key source for all the countries in an arc from Afghanistan to Vietnam). Combined with the gender imbalance common to India and China, one has to be concerned about the possibility that, exacerbated by climate change, water could indeed be the cause of a literal battleground between Asias two emerging superpowers in the not too distant future.

Historically, both climate change and resource security have caused violent conflict

47

The World Bank (2011a) estimates that if business as usual continues with respect to Chinas economic growth and energy efficiency, then by 2030 China is expected to import 75% of its oil and half of its gas. 48 A second and related trend is Chinas purchasing and leasing of large tracts of farmland in, in particular, subSaharan Africa. Accurate data on the scale of such investments are hard to come by, but a 2009 study prepared on behalf of the FAO and the UN estimated that nearly 2.5mn hectares of farmland had been allocated to foreign-owned entities in the five-year period since 2004 in just five African countries which the study considered. See Land grab or development opportunity? Agricultural investment and international land deals in Africa, by Lorenzo Cotula, Sonja Vermeulen, Rebeca Leonard and James Keeley (IIED/FAO/IFAD, 2009).

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Not that the definition of conflict should be restricted to acts of violence and/or war. Ronald Findlay and Kevin ORourke (2008) in their book Power and Plenty note a close correlation historically between the end of hegemon and rising protectionist pressures. While the economic justification including any possible link to competition for resources to rising protectionist pressures in the US is, at best, tenuous in our view, the recent passage through the US Senate of the Brown-Schumer bill seeking to punish China for its alleged currency manipulation clearly highlights the risk that history will 49 repeat itself.

as well as rising protectionist pressures

49

US presidential and congressional elections on 6 November 2012, which could encourage the House of Representatives to follow through on the Senates recent action to pursue punishment of China over its alleged currency manipulation and especially if US unemployment remains sticky.

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Pricing a China hard landing Strategy perspectives


We discuss market implications of the economic scenario laid out above from the perspectives of: Global macro strategy Global equity strategy Regional FX strategy Regional equity strategy Regional equity sector by sector and country by country implications, and Regional credit strategy

The key conclusions for strategy from the economic discussion are: The size of the growth decline a true growth recession. The nature of the growth slowdown capex-led and balance-sheet constrained. The ineffectiveness of policy no rapid recovery. The persistence of some of the causes true change may be required on a number of fronts.

Global macro perspectives


Growth expectations: Naturally, the initial impact in terms of market pricing will be a rapid reassessment of the growth outlook for those economies and global sectors most linked to China's investment cycle. Sectors ranging from aerospace through elevators via shipping would be in the front line. Countries like Germany, Sweden and Japan, which have at the aggregate growth level benefited the most from China's capital spending cycle, are most at risk of a substantial fall in growth expectations. Countries like Hong Kong, Singapore and the Netherlands would be marked down from the impact of lower global trade volumes. Australia, Canada, the Gulf, LatAm, parts of sub-Sahara Africa, Russia, Mongolia and others would be liable to terms-of-trade and volume shocks as commodity markets re-think the demand/supply picture and re-price accordingly. Inflation expectations: While measures of economic slack would increase as Chinese demand slows, leading to markets pricing in medium-term disinflationary pressures, a faster impact will be felt through lower consumer commodity prices i.e., oil, and by extension food prices, and the potential for inventory dumping into the EU and US. Policy response limited ammunition, but expect more central bank balance sheet expansion. Current account and government deficits deteriorate implications for the EU bailout. Risk and uncertainty premia increase not just business-cycle risk, but business-model risk as investors question the post-crisis policy and supply chain environment. Nave modelling suggests the following hierarchy for returns: EM equities (in USD terms) and commodities underperform the most. G7 stocks are half as bad, US high yield and EMBIG bond returns are similar to each other, but are both outperformed by IG. The USD index does well (and our C10 index correspondingly badly), and implied vol as proxied by the VIX rises. Rates markets offer a safe haven.

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Global equity market perspectives


Chinese stocks have already underperformed and de-rated markedly. Despite this, global equity markets would be at risk and we highlight consumer goods and commodity producing sectors (in particular, mining). While Japanese stocks are not highly correlated to developments in China, European markets are the most sensitive of the developed regions.

Asia ex-Japan FX perspectives


In a hard landing scenario, USD/CNY change is likely to be put on hold as Chinese policymakers seek to avoid a tightening of monetary conditions. However, depreciation is unlikely for a number of reasons: domestic capital flight, being perceived as exporting their domestic economic strife (China draws great credit from the fact that CNY was stable during both Asian and global financial crises), undermining their efforts to internationalize CNY, and of being provocative towards the US. If a hard landing is taken as a globally important systemic event, the most vulnerable currencies are unlikely to be those with the greatest fundamental linkages with China (e.g. TWD), but those with inferior balance sheets, the worst balance of payments profiles, and the least central bank market power, of which Singapore ranks least vulnerable and India most vulnerable on our analysis.

Asia ex-Japan equity perspectives


The hard landing scenario would undercut earnings expectations and dramatically up-end investor confidence across the entire Asia region. For earnings vulnerability, operational gearing is our guide, with India, China itself, Malaysia and Australia at the higher end and Thailand, Philippines and Vietnam at the lower. In terms of valuations it is worth noting that the equity risk premium for Asia ex-Japan stocks and a high China CDS spread suggests investors are already discounting an extraordinary degree or risk. Nevertheless, particular markets would still be quite vulnerable. Korea, Indonesia, Hong Kong and Australia display a high beta to China equity risk, whereas Japan would offer a relative regional safe haven. Sector correlations with China are higher than country correlations, with energy, materials and industrials sectors having the most linkage. Classically defensive sectors such as utilities, staples and telcos show the weakest betas. Given the particular capital spending nature of the China scenario, one would naturally also consider capital equipment names, construction companies, banks and property companies. We also run through each key regional equity market and sector risks on separate pages.

Asia ex-Japan credit perspectives


From a credit perspective, we believe the four key areas of focus would be the impact on the sovereign and its ratings, the banks and the availability of credit with implications for the HY property sector and industrials, and lastly the Chinese SOE space. We would expect a significant underperformance of the highly levered SOEs, whose investment grade ratings have been underpinned by government support.

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Chinese HY industrials would likely underperform the large cap HY property credits, impacted by significantly weaker earnings and credit profiles. Expect significantly more scrutiny over the default risk of the smaller cap property credits. The Hong Kong banks that have extended their balance sheets to Chinese banks and SOEs would likely be dragged to wider spread levels once again, though we believe some of these issues could be unfairly penalized.

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Global macro perspectives


It might be argued that the economic and policy scenario set out above has to some extent already been priced into markets related to Chinese growth and balance sheet health. Naturally, some downside skew has been attached to China-linked assets since the risks we highlight are not, individually, new. However, we would argue that our scenario is substantially more challenging than the one generally set out to explain recent market moves and that market participants have not fully thought through the implications of a persistent hard landing for non-Asian assets. Moreover, disentangling the effects of the euro areas crisis from market performance is non-trivial, and in some ways Europes impasse may be masking and diverting market concerns about China. Given the inherent uncertainty around the timing and extent of our scenario, specific trade recommendations are not sensible at this stage. Instead we believe it appropriate to the tackle the issue from a largely top-down perspective, following up with specific trade ideas on a regional and assetclass basis as the nature, timing and extent of the risk evolves. But there is much to think about even at a high level. The key conclusions for strategy from the economic discussion are: The size of the growth decline a true growth recession. The nature of the growth slowdown capex-led and balance-sheet constrained. The ineffectiveness of policy no rapid recovery. The persistence of some of the causes true change may be required on a number of fronts. From this perspective we can bunch the issues under four different exposure headings: 1. Growth Naturally, the initial impact in terms of market pricing will be a rapid reassessment of the growth outlook for those economies and global sectors most linked to China's investment cycle. Global growth estimates would be reduced, but we would argue the timing of this increased hard landing risk comes at a particularly difficult time for global activity weaker than "normal" post-crisis domestic demand growth in the West makes for a higher-thannormal sensitivity to global manufacturing demand. Sectors ranging from aerospace through elevators via shipping would be in the front line. Countries like Germany, Sweden and Japan, which have at the aggregate growth level benefited the most from China's capital spending cycle, are most at risk of a substantial fall in growth expectations. Countries like Hong Kong, Singapore and the Netherlands would be marked down from the impact of lower global trade volumes. Australia, Canada, the Gulf, LatAm, parts of sub-Sahara Africa, Russia, Mongolia and others would be liable to terms-of-trade and volume shocks as commodity markets re-think the demand/supply picture and re-price accordingly. Countries with relatively small manufacturing sectors as a ratio of GDP and employment would be affected at the aggregate headline level commensurately less, but even they for example the US have seen important improvements in growth from global infrastructure growth, in particular from China. After the initial impact on these countries and sectors, markets would look immediately to the policy response globally and from China. The scenario laid out here suggests that while there would indeed be a policy response in China it is unlikely to have a rapid or large positive impact on growth. A more serious impact on risk assets would occur as medium-term growth expectations are marked down. Moreover, it is not clear what conventional demand management policy actions major Western economies could take, since fiscal policy would appear to be unavailable and monetary policy is now almost

Kevin Gaynor +44 (0) 20 710 27800


kevin.gaynor@nomura.com

Martin Whetton +61 (2) 8062 8611


martin.whetton@nomura.com

Naka Matsuzawa +81 3 6703 3864


naka.matsuzawa@nomura.com

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wholly reliant on the vague benefits of QE-style balance sheet expansion. Thus, the multiplier effects of a China hard landing could be bigger than one may initially think for short- and medium-term Western growth forecasts. 2. Supply chains and inflation A demand shock for China is also a supply shock for the countries it supplies. While measures of economic slack would increase as Chinese demand slows, leading to markets pricing in medium-term disinflationary pressures, a faster impact would be felt through lower consumer commodity prices i.e., oil, and by extension food prices, and the potential for inventory dumping into the EU and US. This happened during the Asian currency crisis and led to quite rapid durable goods price declines. While this softens the growth blow for Western consumers it is only temporary and it squeezes some corporate margins. We would expect headline CPI inflation expectations, in any event, to fall across developed markets initially from the fall in global traded goods and commodity prices.
Fig. 46: OECD measures of economic slack
10

8 6
4

2 0
-2

-4
-6 1Q90 1Q93 1Q96

Unemployment Rate (%) Output Gap (%)


1Q99 1Q02 1Q05 1Q08 1Q11

Source: Nomura, OECD.

What is more difficult to gauge is the medium-term impact on supply chains from a China shock of this scale and duration. Investors would naturally fear inventory dumping turning into competitive devaluations across the region in an effort to take a larger share of a slower growing global demand pie. This would no doubt increase investor concern about protectionist measures and tariff increases. It would be natural to expect investors to predict an initial increase in Chinas trade surplus in this scenario, adding to global imbalances rather than helping to close them. At the same time, we should probably expect capital outflows from China by both domestic and foreign investors. To keep the currency peg intact, as our scenario suggests, would require a slower pace of reserve accumulation, although perhaps by not as much as might be priced in if the trade balance improves. Nevertheless, reserve accumulation globally would be expected to slow, which could prove crucial to funding of Western government deficits in capital account deficit economies. 3. Balance sheets Which brings us on to balance sheet considerations. Slower growth in the OECD would naturally imply higher unemployment, slower profit growth and lower income and consumption tax revenues The result would be forecasts of larger government deficits at the same time as smaller trade surpluses, or larger trade deficits. If this is a 2012 story, the timing really could not be much worse. Countries that have already undertaken substantial fiscal tightening would see headline deficit improvement stall or even reverse. And those taking on responsibility for joint fiscal support in the euro area for example would see their own fiscal accounts deteriorate, thus undermining market confidence in their ability to support further periphery or bank sector needs.

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Of course, this increase in government bond supply expectations would apply equally well to the US, UK, Canada, Sweden and Australia. However, the starting points for debt are substantially different for example, compare and contrast Australian and Canadian government debt. One could imagine the political complications of a widening US federal deficit during an election year, especially if another debt ceiling increase had to be passed. Combine this backdrop with slower reserve accumulation and one has a perfect set of conditions to drive term risk premia higher on weaker fiscal countries. By extension, one also sees markets price in a higher cost of capital for weaker corporate and financial balance sheet entities. Without doubt, more central bank activism would be priced in, leading to the belly of curves flattening along with weaker BEIs from lower commodity prices. Wider credit spreads in investment grade and high yield would seem probable. Financials would remain a source of pressure in this environment. Chinas official data for external USD borrowing has increased quite substantially since the 2008 crisis and most of the increase is short-term debt. Part of this is in the form of trade credits, but by no means all. Naturally, markets would consider which entities are most exposed to China credit risk from these loans and would price accordingly.
Fig. 47: China external debt (USDbn)
500 External Debt - Short term 450 External Debt - Long and medium term 400 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0 1Q03 1Q04 1Q05 1Q06 1Q07 1Q08 1Q09 1Q10 1Q11

Source: Datastream, Nomura.

4. Risk and uncertainty premia While the growth and inflationary implications of a China hard landing are reasonably clear, the bigger uncertainties will be around future policy regime changes and therefore supply chain risks. One might call this a distinction between business-cycle risk and business-model risk. Clearly the global imbalances that have grown over the past 15 years are contributing and have contributed to domestic imbalances in the US, China and the euro area. A China hard landing would raise legitimate questions about what sort of global architecture for trade and currencies will hold after the event. This, we would argue, will only add to heightened levels of macroeconomic uncertainty already in place, with the result that high risk premia and uncertainty premia should be attached to risky cash flows. A hard landing would only increase those risks.

Strategic conclusions
Modeling can only get one so far in terms of predicting returns. But in circumstances such as this it can at least give some guidance on what to focus on. A very simple VAR (vector auto regression) model of changes in Chinas PMI index, total returns for US Treasuries, US IG, US HY, a commodity index, G7 and EM equities, the EMBIG index and changes in the VIX index, produces results that fit with ones priors as to how changes in Chinese growth might influence and feed back on those asset classes. The cumulative six-month

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change in annual returns (or changes in terms of the VIX index) is shown in Figure 48.
Fig. 48: Six-month cumulative response to a 1sd negative shock to Chinese growth
15 10 5 0 -5 -10 -15 -20 -25 -30 -35

VIX

USD Index

UST Index

US IG Index

EMBIG

US HY MSCI G7 MSCI EM GSCI Index Index

Source: Datastream, Nomura.

Now, one should not place too much emphasis on the numerical outcomes of this it is an extremely nave and simple model. However, the hierarchy seems fairly sensible: EM equities (in USD terms) and commodities underperform the most. G7 stocks are half as bad, US high yield and EMBIG bond returns are similar to each other, but are both outperformed by IG. The USD index does well, or put another way, our Nomura C10 index would be a sell, and implied vol as proxied by the VIX rises by 10 points or so. Interestingly, the UST index does not do very much, a result that we do not put too much emphasis on. In any event, this provides a starting point to think about positioning for a China hard landing, that we believe is not too controversial. More specifically, our global fixed income strategists provide the following colour: Government bond curves would flatten as forward monetary policy rate expectations are reduced and BEI expectations fall. Weaker government markets, however, may see higher embedded risk premia leading to underperformance relative to the peer group. Principal safe havens are JGBs, AUD, SEK and NOK bonds. Certainly USTs also benefit despite open issues around future funding costs as reserve growth slows, or flow of funds change (perhaps offset by QE3?). Bunds naturally receive a safe-haven bid, but again open issues would be raised about fiscal union and support of peripheral bonds. European credit markets would experience broad-based weakness within a more macro risk-off environment, but decent balance sheet health and low refinancing risks generally should help credit to outperform equities in such a scenario. That said, the effect on equity valuations could still particularly weigh on the more levered issuers and levered products, which would see high yield/leveraged loans underperform Investment Grade corporates and Financials. On a more micro level, the greatest impact in terms of sectors will, we believe, be felt in the spreads of the more cyclical corporates, especially those directly affected such as Mining and Oil, which in turn would also impact Shipping (a sector already under pressure). Indirect impacts would be felt by sectors and issuers which have been offsetting the weak recovery in Europe thus far with growth in Emerging Markets, such as Luxury Goods companies or some of the Chemical companies for example, but the effect on spreads could differ markedly depending on a wide range of balance sheet health profiles luxury goods companies, for example, tend to have relatively strong balance sheets which would help absorb some of these pressures from a credit perspective, whereas the credit metrics of chemical companies, say, could be more vulnerable. 62

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The impact on Japan would be felt mostly through the economic channel (a weaker economic outlook and further monetary easing) than the financial channel. Chinese buying of JGBs has been increasing but is still too small to affect the JGB market directly and Japanese bank lending exposure to China is relatively small in their balance sheets. As such, we believe any negative effects should be felt more by the equity market. As a result, banks capacity to buy the long- and super-long end of the curve would be hampered by valuation losses on their equity holdings, so we would expect the yield curve to bull steepen, kinked around the 7yr sector (=JGB futures). Australia offers a particularly popular angle to address this risk. We would expect AUD to take the first hit and is the most obvious trade, in our opinion. After that, confirmation of a slowdown and the follow on effects of this should cause the curve to steepen. More generally, USD, JPY and CHF all outperform in the initial phase of a hard landing scenario, with the Nomura C10 index suffering commensurately.

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Global equity perspective


Before examining a what if scenario for global equities in the case of a hard landing in the Chinese economy, it is important to first recognise that the market is already attaching a heavy discount to Chinese stocks. As Figure 49 demonstrates, Chinese stocks have underperformed the global index by 18% since mid-April 2011, and one has to go back to 2007 to see a period of trend outperformance.
Fig. 49: Chinese equity market relative performance*
31 Jul 00 = 100 Chinese stocks have underperformed
800

Ian Scott +44 (0) 20 710 22959


ian.scott@nomura.com

Robertas Stancikas +44 (0) 20 710 23127


robertas.stancikas@nomura.com

700
600

500
400

Chinese stocks have underperformed the world index

300
200

100 0 Oct-01
Oct-03 Oct-05 Oct-07 Oct-09 Oct-11

*Versus FTSE World Developed (US$). Source: FTSE, Nomura Strategy research

Fig. 31 This underperformance has not been matched by a similarly poor earnings trend so that the market has been heavily de-rated to the point where the discount now being applied to the Chinese market is the largest since late 2005.

Fig. 50: Chinese market multiple relative to global developed market multiple*
Ratio 1.9
1.7 1.5 1.3 1.1 0.9 0.7 0.5

The market trades on a 32% discount to the global market multiple

0.3 Oct-01

Oct-03

Oct-05

Oct-07

Oct-09

Oct-11

*12 month forward PE. Source: IBES, FTSE, Nomura Strategy research

Fig. 32 Compared with other emerging markets, the Chinese market is also trading on a sizeable 28% discount, as Figure 51 demonstrates.

Fig. 51: Chinese market multiple relative to global EMs*


Ratio 1.9 1.7 1.5 1.3 1.1 0.9 0.7 Oct-01

and an 18% discount compared with global emerging markets

Oct-03

Oct-05

Oct-07

Oct-09

Oct-11

*12 month forward PE. Source: IBES, FTSE, Nomura Strategy research

Fig. 33 64

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That said, there is little doubt that a hard landing in China would have far reaching consequences for global equities. Firstly, there are the stocks and sectors with direct exposure. Here we would highlight Consumer Goods, where stocks have been re-rated relative to their historic valuation norms partly as a result of their exposure to China and other fast growing EM economies.
Fig. 52: Global Consumer Goods sector 12M forward PE relative to market

The global consumer Ratio


1.8
1.6

The global consumer goods sector has been re-rated relative to historic norms, partly as a result of exposure to Chinese growth

1.4 1.2
1

0.8 0.6 Oct-90

Oct-93

Oct-96

Oct-99

Oct-02

Oct-05

Oct-08

Oct-11

Source: IBES, FTSE, Nomura Strategy research

Fig. 34 Elsewhere, commodity producing sectors have been the beneficiaries of strong Chinese demand. Although the valuations attached to these commodity producers are not as demanding as the global sectors exposed to the consumer, there is little doubt that a hard landing in the Chinese economy would have a detrimental impact on them.
Fig. 53: Relative performance of global oil and mining sectors
31 Dec 99 = 100 280 240
200

Of the commodity producers, mining companies have shown the highest sensitivity to developments in China

160 120
80 Oct-01

Oct-03 Oct-05 Oil & Gas relative performance

Oct-07 Oct-09 Oct-11 Basic Materials relative performance

Source: FTSE, Nomura Strategy research

Fig. 35 Mining stocks have the most to lose, in our opinion. Mining companies have invested heavily in recent years to expand capacity and if demand from China is not forthcoming, those investments are unlikely to prove profitable. That said, recent demand trends in China remain intact (Figure 54).

Fig. 54: Chinese copper import volumes and copper price


Tons 80 70
60 50

$/Ton 12000
10000

Copper demand remains relatively strong

8000 6000
4000

40 30 20
10 0 Oct-93

2000 Oct-96 Oct-99 Net imports in tons*(LHS) Oct-02 Oct-05 Oct-08 Copper price per ton (RHS)
0 Oct-11

*Imports of copper ore and concentrate. Source: Datastream, Nomura Strategy research.

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In the Oil sector, demand from China remains relative inelastic to movements in the world price, so a hard landing would likely have much less impact on the Oil sector than the miners. Lastly, from a regional perspective, the Japanese market has the lowest historic correlation to Chinese equities, typically acting as something of a safe haven. US equities are the next least likely to be impacted, with European stocks the most highly correlated of the developed markets outside Asia to movements in Chinese stock prices. Figure 56 shows the relative performance of a group of European companies heavily exposed to Chinese demand. Until recently, the poor performance of Chinese stocks had little impact on the relative performance of these China-linked companies. However, in recent weeks they have become more closely correlated to the news flow from China.
Fig. 56: Relative performance of European stocks exposed to Chinese demand and the relative performance of Chinese equities
Index, Oct 2007 = 100 150 130 110
90

While Japanese stocks are lowly correlated with developments in China, European stocks show the highest sensitivity of any developed market outside Asia

70
50 Oct-07 Oct-08 Oct-09 Asia Exposed European Stocks performance relative to Asia

Oct-10

Oct-11

Source: FTSE, Datastream, Nomura Strategy research

Fig. 36 their recent underperformance, the stocks described in Figure 56 also Despite trade on a substantial 24% premium to the wider European market. There is little doubt that a hard landing in China would have far reaching consequences for stocks well beyond the country itself.
Fig. 57: PE relative for Europes Chinese exposed stocks*
Ratio 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.1 1 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 Sep-95

European companies with strong links to China would be especially vulnerable since they trade on a significant premium to the European market

Sep-99

Sep-03

Sep-07

Sep-11

* PE for selected European stocks with high exposure to China relative to the European market Source: IBES, FTSE, Nomura Strategy research

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Asia-ex Japan FX perspective


Our baseline forecast is for the rate of CNY appreciation to slow to nearly 3% p.a. in 2012 from about 6% in 2011. Economics aside, Chinas own political calendar is likely to induce conservatism during 2012. As the 18th Party Congress in Q4 approaches (the last before the leadership handover), Chinese leadership will likely become more sensitive to internal criticism and growth concerns, and thus more inured to external pressure. More importantly, the poor economic performance of its trade partners as well as its domestic challenges will likely act as an inhibitor to change in 2012. In the more extreme scenario of a hard-landing, change in USD-CNY would likely be put on hold. China will likely not wish to see any form of tightening in monetary conditions, and will probably seek to minimize economic uncertainty. This has certainly been past experience 2008 most obviously, but also the slower-than-expected move in early 2011, can be attributed to economic uncertainty. In the hard-landing scenario, CNY depreciation is also unlikely. China would be wary of a number of risks: domestic capital flight, being perceived as exporting their domestic economic strife (China draws great credit from the fact that CNY was stable during both the Asian and global financial crises), undermining efforts to internationalize the CNY, and of being seen as provocative toward the US. Indeed, the final point creates the greatest risk, both to our call for a hold on CNY appreciation in the event of slowdown, and of a trade conflict which could affect broader markets. First, there is an argument in Chinese policy circles (albeit we believe a minority one) that a) the USD-CNY FX is macroeconomically unimportant, and b) the wisest thing to do is placate the US in 2012 so that China can give its full attention to domestic challenges rather than international conflicts. Second, if this view does not prevail, then the probability of China and the US entering a trade conflict clearly increases, especially given that the US is entering a tight Presidential race. A Chinese hard landing would likely be of systemic global importance. Thus, the most vulnerable currencies are not likely to be those with the greatest fundamental linkages to China (e.g., TWD), but rather, those from countries with inferior balance sheets, the worst balance of payment profiles, and the 50 least central bank market power , which is illustrated by our ranking in Figure 58.
Fig. 58: Asian FX vulnerability rankings (least vulnerable at top) 51
Short term external debt USD bn Singapore Hong Kong Taiwan Malaysia Thailand Philippines Korea Indonesia India 731 701 91 29 51 7 150 36 63 % GDP 328.1% 312.3% 21.0% 12.1% 16.1% 3.8% 15.8% 5.2% 3.6% FX reserves and forwards USD bn 234 280 389 131 180 75 303 115 277 % GDP 97.1% 122.2% 83.5% 50.4% 53.0% 35.5% 27.9% 15.0% 15.1% Basic balance USD bn 80 14 25 26 13 10 4 16 -35 % GDP 32.3% 6.1% 5.5% 10.0% 3.8% 4.9% 0.4% 2.1% -1.9%

Simon Flint +65 6433 6504


simon.flint@nomura.com

Craig Chan +65 6433 6106


craig.chan@nomura.com

Prateek Gupta +65 6433 6197


prateek.gupta@nomura.com

Note: As per the latest data available. Source: CEIC, Bloomberg, Nomura.

That said, it is worth having a sense of the relative Sino-Asian linkages, in the unlikely event that the shock is non-systemic and/or a Chinese hard-landing occurs while G3 prospects are improving. The schema gives very different
50 51

As gauged by FX reserves owned as a percent of countrys GDP. The ranking is based on the average of the basic balance and FX reserves as a percent of GDP. The order is from least vulnerable to the most vulnerable economy.

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results, indicating that INR (for example) would be least effected, whilst TWD would be most vulnerable (see Figure 59, which shows Chinese exports/GDP for each Asian country).
Fig. 59: Asia rolling 12m exports to China / GDP
20%
Latest 15% 2004

10%

5%

0% TW KR MY SG TH PH ID HK IN

Note: As per the latest data available. Source: CEIC, Nomura.

Given a weaker-than-expected recovery and potential downside risk in developed countries, external demand as a driver of Chinas growth now has less of a boosting effect. Meanwhile, there are more domestic risks growing as well, from local government debt issues to funding of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) and the property market. China IRS curves (deposit IRS, SHIBOR IRS and repo IRS) have all started to invert and price in the potential for rate cuts for example, the 5yr IRS indexed to the 1yr deposit rate implies an average 1yr deposit rate in five years is 3.27%.

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Implications for Asia regional equities


Given Chinas key role as a demand driver for Asian goods and underwriter of regional current account surpluses and particularly given investor hopes that Chinese private consumption will ramp-up structurally to help supplant the US consumption growth lost due to household balance sheet repair we would expect a Chinese hard landing scenario to undercut earnings expectations and dramatically upend investor confidence across the entire Asia-Pacific region.
In assessing earnings vulnerability, Operating Leverage (OL) would be a key

Research analysts:

Michael Kurtz
+852 2252 2182 michael.kurtz@nomura.com

Mixo Das
+852 2252 1424 mixo.das@nomura.com

Yiran Zhong
+852 2252 1413 yiran.zhong@nomura.com

determinant in projecting the degree to which a collapse in top-line revenues would transmit through to bottom-line profits. In the Figure below we rank the Asia-Pacific markets in terms of aggregate OL:
Fig. 1: Asia-Pacific operating leverage and gearing
Asia Pacific India China Malaysia Australia HK Japan Singapore Korea Taiwan Indonesia Thailand Philippines Vietnam Operating Leverage* 3.9 7.1 5.7 4.6 3.8 3.4 3.3 3.1 2.7 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.3 Net Debt / Equity (%) 39.1 34.0 24.6 28.4 27.0 18.7 54.4 25.5 43.9 12.0 28.0 48.6 34.9 34.7

* Note: Operating leverage calculated as (Revenue - COGS) / (Revenue COGS - SG&A). Aggregated for all members of the respective MSCI index ex banks/insurance/diversified financials. Source: Bloomberg, Nomura Strategy research

1 In assessing the scope for damage to valuations, it is useful to keep in mind Fig. 1 ex-Japan Asian stocks are already discounting an extraordinary degree of that

risk, as illustrated by the equity risk premium (i.e. the differential between the consensus 12-month forward earnings yield and the available risk-free cost of / opportunity return on capital in the 10-year US Treasury market).
At currently 8.0%, this compensation for equity risk-bearing is fully 2.5

standard deviations above its long-term mean of 4.3%. While this by no means would alone insulate regional stocks from further volatility, it does suggest the degree to which Chinese structural concerns have already embedded themselves into asset values.
Fig. 2: MSCI Asia ex-Japan: Equity Risk Premium
10% 9% 8% 7% 6% 5% 4% 3% 2% 1% 0%
May-01

Equity Risk Prem (%) +1 Std Dev.

LT Avg. -1 Std Dev.

Oct-01

Oct-06

Nov-03

Dec-05

Nov-08

Dec-10

Aug-02

Sep-04

Aug-07

Sep-09

Feb-05 Jul-05

Jun-08

Jan-03

Jun-03

Jan-08

Feb-10 Jul-10

Source: DataStream, Nomura Strategy research

2 Fig. 2

69

May-11

May-06

Mar-02

Mar-07

Oct-11

Apr-04

Apr-09

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Similarly, Chinas sovereign credit default swap (CDS) spread, at currently 137bp, stands fully 62bp above its 75bp January 2010-July 2011 average suggesting China investor perceptions have already grown substantially more cautious.
Fig. 3: China Credit Default Spread
(bps)

210 190
170 150

130 110
90 70

50 Jan-10

Apr-10

Jul-10

Oct-10

Jan-11

Apr-11

Jul-11

Oct-11

Source: Bloomberg, Nomura Strategy research

3 Still, comparing current Asian equity index multiples to trough levels of the Fig. 3 decade does suggests particular markets would still be quite vulnerable past

(Figure below). Because earnings themselves become less reliable in times of greater demand uncertainty, the results below are ranked according to the more tangible Price-to-Book Value measure:
Fig. 4: Asia ex Japan market valuations versus historical trough
PER (since 2001) Current % to Trough 9.9 -21% 11.8 13.4 9.3 12.6 12.1 8.4 13.1 11.5 7.7 12.2 -69% -38% -40% -24% -32% -29% -28% -29% -14% -26% Trough 7.8 3.7 8.4 5.6 9.5 8.2 6.0 9.5 8.2 6.6 9.0 Date of Trough Oct-08 Apr-01 Oct-08 Oct-08 Aug-04 Oct-08 Mar-03 Oct-08 Oct-08 Oct-08 Oct-08 PBV (since 2001) Current % to Trough 1.6 -25% 3.9 2.6 2.0 1.7 2.5 1.3 2.1 1.5 1.5 1.2 -79% -67% -50% -37% -36% -35% -34% -28% -21% -21% Trough 1.2 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.6 0.8 1.4 1.1 1.2 0.9 Date of Trough Sep-01 May-01 Jan-03 Nov-08 Jan-09 Sep-01 Dec-01 Jun-01 Feb-09 May-03 Feb-09

MSCI Asia ex-Japan Indonesia Philippines Thailand Taiwan India Korea Malaysia Singapore China HK

Source: DataStream, Nomura Strategy research

4 Fig. 4

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Fig. 5: Asia ex Japan sector valuations versus historical trough


PER (since 2001) Current % to Trough 9.9 -20% 16.9 13.7 21.5 8.8 16.9 12.0 25.2 17.5 9.4 7.7 13.6 12.8 14.4 7.9 12.3 10.8 8.7 15.3 8.9 13.5 11.5 7.5 11.8 11.9 -82% -25% -64% -43% -37% -28% -52% -40% -39% -34% -45% -28% -40% -37% -50% -26% -25% -34% -13% -33% -40% -8% -26% -17% Trough 7.8 3.0 10.2 7.8 5.0 10.6 8.6 12.0 10.4 5.7 5.1 7.5 9.3 8.6 5.0 6.2 8.0 6.5 10.0 7.7 9.1 7.0 6.9 8.7 9.8 Date of Trough Oct-08 Feb-01 Oct-02 Jan-02 Mar-03 Nov-08 Oct-02 Apr-03 May-03 Oct-01 Oct-08 Oct-08 Oct-08 Mar-03 Oct-08 Oct-08 Jul-08 Oct-08 Oct-08 Oct-08 Mar-03 Jun-04 Oct-11 Mar-03 Mar-03 PBV (since 2001) Current % to Trough 1.6 -24% 2.9 3.0 3.3 2.3 6.8 1.7 8.9 3.4 1.3 1.4 2.5 2.7 2.4 1.7 1.2 1.5 1.3 3.3 0.8 1.4 1.8 1.4 2.0 1.8 -88% -77% -76% -67% -63% -61% -53% -51% -50% -46% -46% -46% -42% -37% -37% -35% -35% -35% -31% -29% -29% -23% -12% -3% Trough 1.2 0.4 0.7 0.8 0.8 2.5 0.7 4.2 1.7 0.6 0.8 1.3 1.5 1.4 1.1 0.7 1.0 0.8 2.2 0.5 1.0 1.3 1.0 1.8 1.7 Date of Trough Sep-01 Aug-01 Sep-01 Mar-01 Jan-01 May-03 Sep-01 Jun-04 Jun-02 Sep-01 Sep-01 Jan-01 Aug-01 Apr-03 Jan-01 Sep-01 Jan-09 Oct-02 Apr-09 May-03 Nov-01 Jan-09 Feb-09 Feb-09 Aug-01

Asia ex-Japan Fd/Staples Rtl Cons Svs Health Care Equip & Serv Auto & Compo Software & Services Div Fin Household & Pers Prod Pharmaceuticals Cons Dur/App Materials Retailing Commerical Serv & Supp Fd/Bev/Tob Energy Transpt Tech Hardware & Equip Cap Goods Media Real Estate Utilities Semiconductors Banks Telecom Insurance

Source: DataStream, Nomura Strategy research

A look at recent years statistical correlation between Asia-Pac indexes and Fig. 5 H-shares also offers insight into where the risk of equity market contagion China may be greatest. In most cases these correlations also comport with our fundamental sense as to how the real and financial effects of a China rollover would propagate through the rest of the Asia-Pac region.
Based on US$-denominated weekly returns since 2007, Korea and Indonesia

exhibit the Asia-Pac regions two highest-beta relationships with China Hshares. This is interesting given the substantial disparity between these two economies and markets: the former largely a high-value-added manufacturer of capital goods and consumer durables, vs the latter predominantly a provider to China of primary goods such as coal, natural gas, and ore. Yet in both cases, the risks appear justified by Chinas rapidly increasing role in recent years as a key export growth market. Indonesias broader sensitivity to any presumptive downdraft in global energy and commodity prices also places it squarely atop the endangered list.
Fig. 6: Asia-Pacific Country Index Correlations w/ China H-shares
vs. HSCEI R^2 0.56 0.52 0.48 0.53 0.74 0.65 0.45 0.50 0.38 0.37 0.46 0.36 Slope 0.80 0.74 0.66 0.63 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.54 0.48 0.42 0.37 0.34

MSCI Korea MSCI Indonesia MSCI India MSCI Australia MSCI Hong Kong MSCI Singapore MSCI Thailand MSCI Taiwan MSCI Philippines MSCI New Zealand MSCI Malaysia MSCI Japan
Source: DataStream, Bloomberg, Nomura Strategy research

6 Fig. 6

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Although India offers the third-highest beta relationship with China over the

2007-11 period, this strikes us more as coincidental (based on generalized BRICs risk tolerance/aversion) than fundamentally driven. Indeed, we would be inclined to see India as comparatively more resilient in the Asian-regional context to a China rollover, given still-modest trade linkages between the two economies, and given prospective relief both on Indias chronic current account deficit / terms of trade, as well as on its recently problematic inflation front if commodity prices were to recede.
Also noteworthy as a potential comparative safe haven is Japan. Not only do

Japanese stocks exhibit the lowest-beta relationship with China H-shares among the Asia-Pac markets, but Japans domestic consumption-heavy GDP composition may help insulate it from a Chinese demand slowdown. Additionally albeit tragically the impact of 2011s Miyagi earthquake forced markets already to substantially downgrade expectations for Japan.
Among the riskiest markets in terms of historical return correlations are also

Australia and Hong Kong (i.e. the pure Hong Kong ex-China H-shares as found in MSCI HK). Unlike in Indias case, these seem explainable in terms of direct real-economic (and in Hong Kongs case, also financial) linkages between those geographies and China. Of note, Asian equity China correlations are generally stronger at the sector level than the country level (Figure below). Given Chinas predominant role as a driver of global marginal demand for energy and commodities (as discussed above in the Global context), within Asia-Pac it is the Energy, Materials and Industrials sectors (at the GICS-1 level) that exhibit the strongest correlations with H-shares.
By contrast, lower-beta relationships (i.e. vs. H-share returns) are generally

found among the classically defensive sectors (e.g. Utilities, Staples, Telcos). In other words, positive China-share performance should tend to be associated with outperformance in riskier assets (as seems intuitively logical); but a China-driven rollover could best be sidestepped within the Asian-regional equity space through exposure in low-cyclical names (Staples, Health Care), steady high dividend yielders (primarily among Asias Telcos), and Utilities where softer energy costs would offer the prospect of margin relief.
Fig. 7: Asia-Pacific Sector Correlations w/ China H-shares
vs. HSCEI R^2 0.79 0.71 0.75 0.82 0.81 0.63 0.48 0.70 0.62 0.59 Slope 0.83 0.80 0.79 0.72 0.66 0.59 0.54 0.51 0.48 0.38

Energy Material Industrial Financials MSCI Asia ex Japan Consumer Disc IT Telco Consumer Staples Utilities
Source: Bloomberg, Nomura Strategy research

7 Fig. 7

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China equities the risk


Within China specifically, given the predominance of the investment component of GDP, a "China slowdown" scenario would have to equate with a Chinese investment slowdown.
With this, the sectors most immediately adversely impacted would be those

Research analysts:

Michael Kurtz
+852 2252 2182 michael.kurtz@nomura.com

Mixo Das
+852 2252 1424 mixo.das@nomura.com

tied to China's investment cycle: Commodities and Basic Materials (e.g. Metals & Mining incl. Steel, Cement, etc.) as well as the Capital Equipment names and, possibly, the Construction Companies, depending on whether policymakers saw room to expand infrastructure project spending as a counter-cyclical tool as they did in 2008-10 (which we see as less feasible a second time, as discussed elsewhere).
A dramatic slowdown in Chinas aggregate growth alongside the credit

Yiran Zhong
+852 2252 1413 yiran.zhong@nomura.com And the China Research Team

constraints and rising real cost of capital discussed elsewhere would also undermine the quality of assets in the domestic financial system. This would hurt asset-rich balance sheets, not least in China's large, state-owned Banks; and as such, composition of individual institutions loan books and breakdown of their lending activity would be a key differentiator. By similar token, many Chinese property developers would find themselves under substantial financial stress from a combination of falling property prices and slumping sales volumes.
The simultaneous cashflow constraints from a weaker Chinese economy along

with higher real cost of capital would make corporate balance sheets a key differentiator generally. We would expect the market to favor lower-geared (or net-cash) companies within any given sector, whereas higher gearing would be discounted. Similarly, companies with imminent capital needs such as near-term debt rollovers or refinancings would be discounted relative to those whose funding were mostly long-term secured.
Given that one tipping-point for a Chinese growth slowdown would presumably

be ongoing/deepening weakness in the external sector (i.e. global double-dip risks), we would not expect export-driven China names (e.g. Shipping, Ports, Tech, Contract Manufacturing & Logistics) to be particularly defensive. Rather, "traditionally" defensive domestic names in Utilities (including Gas), Telecoms, Health Care/Pharma, and Fertilizer would likely be the outperformers among HK-listed China names.
One area where Chinese policymakers may find some room to exercise

stimulus different than the largely infrastructure project-driven approach of 2009-10, would be domestic private consumption (for example through targeted credit growth, taxation, wage policy, etc). As such, we are inclined to regard domestic Consumer-sector stocks (both Discretionary and Staple) as comparatively defensive although already high valuations diminish these attractions somewhat.
One key litmus test as to the leadership's willingness to empower the domestic

private consumer may be the path of the RMB in any sustained slowdown scenario: Were Chinese policymakers to (unexpectedly) avoid the temptation to fall back on a stable (or weaker) RMB but rather allow appreciation to continue, we believe it would signal a commitment to press ahead with restructuring toward a more domestic/consumption-driven growth mix. Taking the above considerations into effect, we present in the following two Figures a short list of key Chinese names that we would expect to prove respectively more vulnerable and more resilient:

IMPORTANT: The sensitivity table below does not assess just the impact of a China hard landing on the mentioned stocks, rather it takes a look at an extreme scenario including recessions in the US and Europe. None of this is in our macro or industry or company forecasts. Detailed assumptions are footnoted. See table in appendix for our current ratings.

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Fig. 8: MORE VULNERABLE: Chinese companies in most-impacted sectors with high gearing*
TICKER 3323 HK 753 HK 1055 HK 2777 HK 2600 HK 2883 HK 3333 HK 267 HK 2318 HK 2007 HK 1109 HK 2866 HK 939 HK Com pany CHINA NATIONAL BUILDING MA-H AIR CHINA LTD-H CHINA SOUTHERN AIRLINES CO-H GUANGZHOU R&F ALUMINUM CORP OF CHINA LTD-H CHINA OILFIELD SERVICES-H CITIC PACIFIC LTD PING AN INSURANCE GROUP CO-H COUNTRY GARDEN HOLDINGS CO CHINA RESOURCES LAND LTD CHINA SHIPPING CONTAINER-H CHINA CONSTRUCTION BANK Industry Group Building Materials Airlines Airlines Real Estate Mining Oil&Gas Services Iron/Steel Insurance Real Estate Real Estate Transportation Banks HK Market Cap ($m n) 3,237 3,610 1,611 909 2,055 2,476 5,824 6,310 21,721 6,144 7,750 700 167,939 Sales ($m n) Net Debt / Equity 9,837 13,376 12,676 3,641 19,196 2,562 8,677 10,892 34,947 4,480 2,701 5,143 66,470 199 174 150 111 109 92 88 80 77 59 52 11 -

EVERGRANDE REAL ESTATE GROUP Real Estate

*Excludes Level I sectors: Consumer Disc. Staples, Healthcare, Utilities, Telcos; Net D/E > 50% (in most cases) Source: Bloomberg, Nomura Strategy research

8
Fig. 9: MOST RESILIENT: Chinese companies in least-impacted sectors with positive net cash*

Fig. 8

TICKER 1688 HK 700 HK 168 HK 2238 HK 2319 HK 489 HK 941 HK 1880 HK 151 HK

Com pany ALIBABA.COM LTD TENCENT HOLDINGS LTD TSINGTAO BREWERY CO LTD-H CHINA MENGNIU DAIRY CO DONGFENG MOTOR GRP CO LTD-H CHINA MOBILE LTD BELLE INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS

Industry Group Internet Internet Beverages Food Auto Manufacturers Telecommunications Retail

HK Market Cap ($m n) 6,057 41,823 3,683 2,227 5,692 4,717 197,004 15,733 12,058

Sales ($m n) Net Debt / Equity 925 3,596 3,183 8,843 5,193 18,753 76,294 3,991 2,521 -169 -77 -62 -61 -58 -55 -45 -30 -24

GUANGZHOU AUTOMOBILE GROUP-HAuto Manufacturers

WANT WANT CHINA HOLDINGS LTD Food

*Excludes Level I sectors: Financials, Energy, Industrial, Materials, level II sector: Tech; Net D/E < -20% Source: Bloomberg, Nomura Strategy research

9
IMPORTANT: Our sensitivity analysis does not assess just the impact of a China hard landing on the mentioned stocks, rather it takes Fig. 9 at an extreme scenario including recessions in the US and Europe. None of this is in our macro or industry or company a look forecasts. The extreme case assumes (1) US real GDP falls 3% and euro area GDP falls 5%; (2) Chinas GDP growth falls to 5%; (3) Substantial commodity price declines by end 2012. Base case and extreme case real GDP growth % assumptions: Australia (4.3, 0.5); China (8.6, 5.0); Hong Kong (4.5, -6.0); India (7.9, 3.0); Indonesia (7.0, 2.5); Malaysia (5.1, -5.8); New Zealand (3.5, 0.8); Philippines (5.7, 0.5); Singapore (5.3, -5.2); South Korea (5.0, -3.0); Taiwan (5.0, -5.0); Thailand (4.7, -3.0).

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China risk: Australia


Risks to our current overall view
The sensitivity of the Australian equity market to a hard landing in China (GDP growth of 5% which means US GDP of -3% and Eurozone of -5%) and a substantial fall in commodity prices would be dramatic, notwithstanding the fall in the equity market we have already seen this year. Such a scenario, should it eventuate, could see Australian GDP growth drop back to around 0.5%, assuming a vigorous policy response and a coincident weakening in the A$, which there would inevitably be.

Research analysts:

Richard Johnson
+612 8062 8412 richard.j.johnson@nomura.com And the Australia Research Team

Key areas of impact if China has a hard landing


One of the hardest hit would be the metals and mining sector, which would be heavily affected by the drop in US$ commodity prices, only partly mitigated by the likelihood of a much weaker A$. The effect of this would also inevitably flow onto volumes as well as demand would dry up, which would see capex programs scaled back or stopped, which would then have a major knock effect on the mining services sector. Sector earnings of the majors would enjoy some relative support from their low positions on the cost curve but all the same sector growth would decline in our view at least as much as commodity prices, with the junior and intermediate sectors in particular very hard hit. Many could disappear. The share prices of the major miners more than halved in the 2008 global financial crisis. Also caught in this web would also be the mining services sector, which would hit the likes of DOW and UGL. BLY would not escape as junior mining activity would slow and exploration spend generally would be scaled back materially. ORI and IPL are resource volume rather than price linked but an extended economic downturn would flow onto volume ultimately in our view and sentiment would inevitably also take a knock. The other key sector in the Australian market is Banks. Given its homogenous nature, our worst case stress scenario sees the major banks with broadly similar downside risks to FY12 earnings (22% - 28%) and share prices (29% - 35%). We assume a significant increase in BDDs (175bps to NHL, consistent with the global financial crisis experience) and no margin benefit (unlike the GFC) given a significant slowdown in China will reduce banks ability to re-price margins. In a relative sense, however, we do not expect the banks to materially underperform the broader market under the extreme case scenario, given their strong capital positions, robust balance sheets and strong underlying franchises and market positions. Relative beneficiaries of this scenario may be parts of the Consumer sector, Healthcare, and Telstra has historically been a relative safe haven. Consumer Staples could benefit on a relative basis from an Armageddon scenario impacting global growth, although we note the absolute benefit is likely to be subdued. A lower AUD particularly against USD could result in higher costs of goods sold which might be difficult to pass on to consumers suffering the effects of lower GDP. On a relative basis we believe Coca-Cola Amatil and Woolworths are likely to outperform. Treasury Wine Estates could benefit from better transaction and translation rates, however, the absolute benefit would likely be mitigated by lower sales. Consumer Discretionary could be adversely impacted by slowing sales at the same time as COGS increase.

IMPORTANT: The sensitivity table below does not assess just the impact of a China hard landing on the mentioned stocks, rather it takes a look at an extreme scenario including recessions in the US and Europe. None of this is in our macro or industry or company forecasts. Detailed assumptions are footnoted. See table in appendix for our current ratings.

Fig. 10: Potentially most vulnerable and most resilient companies in coverage in the extreme case*
Most vulnerable companies Boart Longyear Bluescope Steel Onesteel Orica Rio Tinto BHP Billiton Ticker BLY AU BSL AU OST AU ORI AU RIO AU BHP AU Industry Drilling equipment and services Steel solutions Steel long products Diversified chemicals Resources Resources Most resilient companies Amcor AGL Energy Coca-Cola Amatil Tabcorp Holdings Telstra Woolworths Ticker AMC AU AGK AU CCL AU TAH AU TLS AU WOW AU Industry Packaging Power and gas Food & beverages Gaming Telecoms Retail

Note: Base case represents our current forecasts and TP * Extreme case assumes (1) US real GDP falls 3% and euro area GDP falls 5%; (2) Chinas GDP growth falls to 5%; (3) Substantial commodity price declines by end 2012. Base case and extreme case real GDP growth % assumptions: Australia (4.3, 0.5); China (8.6, 5.0); Hong Kong (4.5, -6.0); India (7.9, 3.0); Indonesia (7.0, 2.5); Malaysia (5.1, -5.8); New Zealand (3.5, 0.8); Philippines (5.7, 0.5); Singapore (5.3, -5.2); South Korea (5.0, -3.0); Taiwan (5.0, -5.0); Thailand (4.7, -3.0) Source: Nomura estimates

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November 2011

China risk: India


Risks to our current overall view
We have a constructive view on Indian equities, underpinned by our expectation of nearterm peaking of inflation and an ensuing turnaround in the rates cycle. A hard landing in China, combined with a global growth collapse, would accelerate the fall in inflation and rates, and alleviate concerns on the twin deficits, but equity prices would have to adjust to a lower growth equilibrium, despite Indias high growth and rate differentials.

Research analysts:

Prabhat Awasthi
+91 22 4037 4180 prabhat.awasthi@nomura.com

Nipun Prem
+91 22 4037 5030 nipun.prem@nomura.com And the India Research Team

Key areas of impact if China has a hard landing


A hard landing in China, combined with a collapse of growth in the US and euro area, would likely also be accompanied by substantial risk aversion globally. We do not expect a high-beta market such as Indias to outperform in this scenario, especially when domestic growth could potentially fall more than 4 percentage points to about 3% under the extreme case, a depressed growth outcome we have not seen in India in the two decades post liberalization. The market would have to contend with significant downside risk to earnings; we estimate downside risk to the extent of 20% under the extreme case. Sector-wise, defensives like FMCG, pharma, utilities and telecoms would be defensive plays. Meanwhile, high beta, growth-oriented and global cyclical sectors such as real estate, metals, capital goods and autos would likely underperform, in our view.

Where is potential for upside surprise?


A collapse in the commodities complex would be considerably positive for Indias perpetual twin-deficit problem which, along with elevated inflation, has loomed large as a key overhang for market performance. An improvement in the current account on the back of lower commodity prices, especially oil (oil imports are more than 30% of total imports), and a normalization of the fiscal deficit on the back of lower government subsidies would be key upsides. Indias WPI basket is largely commodity-driven and we estimate the fall in global commodities would eliminate inflation, despite a weaker rupee. Another overhang on the market has been Indias high interest rate regime underpinned by high inflation and a high fiscal deficit. A turnaround in inflation and mitigation of fiscal risk would be a major improvement in the macro backdrop for equities.

IMPORTANT: The sensitivity table below does not assess just the impact of a China hard landing on the mentioned stocks, rather it takes a look at an extreme scenario including recessions in the US and Europe. None of this is in our macro or industry or company forecasts. Detailed assumptions are footnoted. See table in appendix for our current ratings.

Fig. 11: Earnings and target price sensitivity for most affected and least affected companies in coverage in the extreme case*
China sales share 2011% 16 Base case EPS 2012 29.4 % y-y 7.1 Target price 200.0 Extreme case* EPS 2012 (11.6) % y-y NA Target price Comments 31 Domestic CV and JLR volumes could come under pressure, causing sharp declines in EBITDA margins and profitability. Multiples would also come down. 215 Assumed 65% utilization at European operations, steel prices falling by 40% and raw material prices by 60%. No direct China exposure but would be affected by global commodity fall. 100 Lower demand as well as intense competition from Chinese players in the power systems segment. 1,911 Although exposure to US is high, pharma is a nondiscretionary expense and growth for generics will be fuelled by the patent cliff. 137 We assume cigarette volume growth going to 0% (vs. 6% base case) price impact 4% vs. base case of 12%. Multiple for cig business down from 23x to 15x. 1,750 We assume flat US$ revenue growth in FY13F (led by a pricing cut of 5%), a US$/INR of 48 and no salary hike in FY13F. P/E multiples down to 12x from 18x.

(INR) Most affected Tata Motors

Ticker TTMT IN

TATA Steel

TATA IN

NA

82.5

28.9

653

(11.8) (118.4)

Crompton Greaves Least affected Dr. Reddys

CRG IN

NA

12.21

(15.5)

240

8.02

(45)

DRRD IN

90.76

24

1,911

81.4

24

ITC

ITC IN

8.7

16.2

229

6.7

(10.1)

Infosys

INFO IN

159.1

14.3

3,100

148.1

6.5

Note: Base case represents our current forecasts and TP *Extreme case assumes (1) US real GDP falls 3% and euro area GDP falls 5%; (2) Chinas GDP growth falls to 5%; (3) Substantial commodity price declines by end 2012. Base case and extreme case real GDP growth % assumptions: Australia (4.3, 0.5); China (8.6, 5.0); Hong Kong (4.5, -6.0); India (7.9, 3.0); Indonesia (7.0, 2.5); Malaysia (5.1, 5.8); New Zealand (3.5, 0.8); Philippines (5.7, 0.5); Singapore (5.3, -5.2); South Korea (5.0, -3.0); Taiwan (5.0, -5.0); Thailand (4.7, -3.0) Source: Nomura estimates

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China risk: Indonesia


Risks to our current overall view
Despite the relatively closed economy and no sign of consumption slowdown to date, a sharp fall in commodity prices would reduce disposable incomes in rural areas. This in turn would hurt demand for discretionary items and lead to slower growth in manufacturing. Under the extreme bearish scenario we would look toward staple consumer plays such as Telkom Indonesia, Indosat, Gudang Garam, Jasa Marga, and PGAS.

Research analysts:

Wilianto Ie
+62 21 2991 3341 wilianto.ie@nomura.com And the Indonesia Research Team

Key areas of impact if China has a hard landing


Domestic demand, especially for discretionary items such as cars, motorcycles and clothing, would be hurt. There is also a risk of China products flooding the Indonesian market at cheaper prices due to oversupply in China and the FTA with Indonesia. A sharp fall in commodity prices could hit coal and plantation earnings hard. Any disruption in funding due to a global liquidity crunch would be short term in nature. Indonesian companies are low in leverage. The banking sector LDR is around 83%, public debt to GDP is at 25% and banking system loans to GDP are less than 30%. Policy response is likely to be easing through lowering interest rates (currently 6.5% benchmark vs inflation of 4.6%), lowering reserve requirements (currently 8% and was as low as 3% during the 2008 crisis), managed intervention in currency and bond markets. Government can boost infrastructure spending given low fiscal deficit of 1.7%. Expansion would slow and FDI would likely fall or be put on hold, as in 2008. Capital formation accounts for about one-third of GDP. Credit underwriting would be tightened and this would hurt consumption of large ticket items such as cars and motorcycles.

Where is potential for upside surprise?


Telecom sector could surprise on the upside as people travel less and communicate more through phone or internet. Consumer companies with pricing power and high commodity proportion in COGS would also benefit from easing cost pressure.

IMPORTANT: The sensitivity table below does not assess just the impact of a China hard landing on the mentioned stocks, rather it takes a look at an extreme scenario including recessions in the US and Europe. None of this is in our macro or industry or company forecasts. Detailed assumptions are footnoted. See table in appendix for our current ratings.

Fig. 12: Earnings and target price sensitivity for most affected and least affected companies in coverage in the extreme case*
China sales share 2011% 30 Base case EPS 2012 0.04 (USD) 275 924 2,013 4,821 % y-y 154 Target price Extreme case* EPS Target 2012 % y-y price Comments N.A 750 High operating leverage to coal price plus geared balance sheet (280% net gearing) at high cost of funds. 1,500 High operating leverage to coal price plus 43% net gearing. 5,000 High operating leverage to coal price. Net cash. 9,000 High operating leverage to palm oil price. Net cash.

(IDR) Most affected Bumi

Ticker BUMI IJ

4,750 Net loss

Adaro Energy Harum Energy Astra Agro Astra International Least affected Gudang Garam Telkom Indonesia Jasa Marga

ADRO IJ HRUM IJ AALI IJ ASII IJ

19 26 0 0

114

2,850

50 350 425 2,500

(61) (60) (69)

61 11,000 2 28,400 16 72,000

(40) 35,000 Automotive sales could drop 30% or more if GDP growth slows to 2.5% and commodity prices collapse. (2) 50,000 Demand proven to be relatively inelastic during crisis. (1) 15 6,000 Demand proven to be relatively inelastic during crisis. 3,500 Demand proven to be relatively inelastic during crisis. Tariff increase is certain as it is regulated by law.

GGRM IJ TLKM IJ JSMR IJ

0 0 0

3,189 629 376

22 65,000 4 21 8,700 4,950

2,550 598 357

Note: Base case represents our current forecasts and TP *Extreme case assumes (1) US real GDP falls 3% and euro area GDP falls 5%; (2) Chinas GDP growth falls to 5%; (3) Substantial commodity price declines by end 2012. Base case and extreme case real GDP growth % assumptions: Australia (4.3, 0.5); China (8.6, 5.0); Hong Kong (4.5, -6.0); India (7.9, 3.0); Indonesia (7.0, 2.5); Malaysia (5.1, 5.8); New Zealand (3.5, 0.8); Philippines (5.7, 0.5); Singapore (5.3, -5.2); South Korea (5.0, -3.0); Taiwan (5.0, -5.0); Thailand (4.7, -3.0) Source: Nomura estimates

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China risk: South Korea


Risks to our current overall view
Although we currently remain positive on Korean equities fundamentals and attractive valuations, any sharp slowdown in the Chinese economy would likely affect the cyclical Korean economy substantially, and in turn, the earnings growth of most Korean companies. If a China hard landing scenario materializes a substantial drop in Korean exports would not be avoidable, as 25% of Korean exports go to China and, at the same time, the domestic industry would be hit too as 22% of tourists come from China. Under the extreme case scenario, assuming a China hard landing and recession in the US and Europe, our Korean economists 2012F GDP forecast is expected to be cut from +5% to -3%. Historically, when the Korean economy was in or close to recession, the Korean equity market got hit hard, plunging 42% in 1997 and 41% in 2008. We cannot rule out the same magnitude of impact under the extreme case scenario as a substantial economic downturn tends to come along with capital flight, weighing sharply on the Korean equity market.

Research analysts:

James Kim
+ 852 2252 6203 james.kim@nomura.com And the Korea Research Team

Key areas of impact if China has a hard landing


Our current sector recommendation focuses on earnings visibility as we believe developed economies will grow slowly but not fall into a deep recession; also we dont take account of a China hard landing in our base case scenario. However, under the extreme case, we expect Korean telcos would be largely insulated from the economic slowdown and domestic-consumption companies such as KT&G would be less vulnerable to the downturn. At the same time, Korean financials would likely face lower asset quality, low loan growth and high provisions, and hence would likely be affected most.

IMPORTANT: The sensitivity table below does not assess just the impact of a China hard landing on the mentioned stocks, rather it takes a look at an extreme scenario including recessions in the US and Europe. None of this is in our macro or industry or company forecasts. Detailed assumptions are footnoted. See table in appendix for our current ratings.

Fig. 13: Earnings and target price sensitivity for most affected and least affected companies in coverage in the extreme case*
China sales share Ticker 2011% 053000 KS 105560 KS 024110 KS 086790 KS 0 0 0 0 Base case Extreme case* Target price Comments 4,900 Due to inferior asset quality (high NPL and low coverage ratio), severe recession should result in greater provisioning. 23,400 Pressure from macro slowdown, increased loan loss provisions, interest rate cuts. 5,500 With SME concentrated loan portfolio, greater impact on asset quality than peers in the case of recession. 19,400 Pressure from macro slowdown, increased loan loss provisions, interest rate cuts. NIM should be more vulnerable due to weak deposit franchise. 15,000 Export-oriented Koreas power demand is highly sensitive to China and global economic slowdown. 65,010 Tobacco demand is relatively inelastic in response to economic cycle. # Recent currency moves would imply 6,677. 70,000 Less sensitive to interest rate cycle and their main product, medical insurance, is stable in nature.

(KRW) Most affected Woori FG KB FG IBK Hana FG

EPS Target EPS 2012 % y-y price 2012 % y-y 2,828 6.561 2,492 4,745 12 18,000 617 (70) (61) (76) (52)

13.4 62,000 2,623 (15) 16,000 702

(9) 54,000 2,194

KEPCO

015760 KS

52

na 35,000 -1,330

na

Least affected KT&G Dongbu Insurance SKT KT LGU 033780 KS 005830 KS 017670 KS 030200 KS 032640 KS 3 6,380# 0 6,464 10 66,000 6,577 26 71,000 3,031 (1) 178,00 22,47 0 0 15 53,000 6,070 (6) 6,000 793 10 25

0 22,496 0 0 6,101 793

(1) 178,000 Korean telcos are largely insulated from the economic slowdown. 15 (6) 53,000 Korean telcos are largely insulated from the economic slowdown. 6,000 Korean telcos are largely insulated from the economic slowdown.

Note: Base case represents our current forecasts and TP *Extreme case assumes (1) US real GDP falls 3% and euro area GDP falls 5%; (2) Chinas GDP growth falls to 5%; (3) Substantial commodity price declines by end 2012. Base case and extreme case real GDP growth % assumptions: Australia (4.3, 0.5); China (8.6, 5.0); Hong Kong (4.5, -6.0); India (7.9, 3.0); Indonesia (7.0, 2.5); Malaysia (5.1, 5.8); New Zealand (3.5, 0.8); Philippines (5.7, 0.5); Singapore (5.3, -5.2); South Korea (5.0, -3.0); Taiwan (5.0, -5.0); Thailand (4.7, -3.0) Source: Nomura estimates

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China risk: Malaysia


Risks to our current overall view
Malaysia is the third most open economy in Asia after Hong Kong and Singapore with exports to GDP at 97% as at 2010. As part of the diversification strategy, Malaysias exports to Europe and the US have been tapering off with China becoming the largest export destination in August. If China has a hard landing, we would see Malaysias GDP growth falling to -5.8% in 2012. In such a world, Malaysia would end up in a vulnerable position. Its three key growth engines - the public/private sector economy, manufacturing exports and commodity resources - would be in much weaker positions.

Research analysts:

Wai Kee Choong


+60 3 2027 6893 waikee.choong@nomura.com And the Malaysia Research Team

Key areas of impact if China has a hard landing


The hardest hit sector would be palm oil. The direct impact of any ST disruption could be significant China is the 3rd-biggest consumer of CPO, and has contributed 17% of the growth in the past decade, with about a 60:40 split of usage for food and industrial. The increasingly realistic prospect of a hard landing would also affect a whole bunch of things: crude oil, currency, futures, all of which could cause CPO prices to move down sharply in the ST either directly or via its substitutes. That said, PO will always have the cost/yield advantage over soy oil (which the Chinese are also big consumers of and which is far more expensive), and in tough times, people are more likely to switch to cheaper oils, as was seen in 2009 veg oil consumption growth remained steady, but soy lost market share to palm. Industry average gross margin (upstream planters) has never dipped below 25% in the past 20 years. We are concerned about the impact on the banks too. In a severe slowdown, loans growth could contract, margins squeezed (from a lower overnight policy rate) and credit cost could rise. However, the direct impact is negligible. For example only 13% of Hong Leong Banks earnings are from China through Bank of Chengdu and 5% of Public Banks earnings are from its Hong Kong listed Public Financial Holdings.

IMPORTANT: The sensitivity table below does not assess just the impact of a China hard landing on the mentioned stocks, rather it takes a look at an extreme scenario including recessions in the US and Europe. None of this is in our macro or industry or company forecasts. Detailed assumptions are footnoted. See table in appendix for our current ratings.

Fig. 14: Earnings and target price sensitivity for most affected and least affected companies in coverage in the extreme case*
China Earnings share Ticker 2011% MAY MK CIMB MK n/a n/a Base case EPS 2012 0.66 0.57 % y-y (2) 4 Target price 6.85 6.00 Extreme case* EPS 2012 0.34 0.30 % y-y (49) (44) Target price Comments 3.24 Assuming 2012 credit cost rises to 100bps (base case: 47bps) and OPR cut to 2.0% 3.16 Assuming 2012 credit cost rises to 90bps (base case: 35bps) and OPR cut to 2.0% 4.72 TMs exposures to North Asia are under 2%, primarily from its global business and hence we believe impact should be limited.

(MYR) Most affected Maybank CIMB

Least affected Telekom T MK <2 0.15 12 4.80 0.147 10

Note: Base case represents our current forecasts and TP *Extreme case assumes (1) US real GDP falls 3% and euro area GDP falls 5%; (2) Chinas GDP growth falls to 5%; (3) Substantial commodity price declines by end 2012. Base case and extreme case real GDP growth % assumptions: Australia (4.3, 0.5); China (8.6, 5.0); Hong Kong (4.5, -6.0); India (7.9, 3.0); Indonesia (7.0, 2.5); Malaysia (5.1, 5.8); New Zealand (3.5, 0.8); Philippines (5.7, 0.5); Singapore (5.3, -5.2); South Korea (5.0, -3.0); Taiwan (5.0, -5.0); Thailand (4.7, -3.0) Source: Nomura estimates

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China risk: Singapore


Risks to our current overall view
We remain cautious about the outlook for the Singapore market. We recently downgraded our 2011 GDP forecast to 4.8% and are reviewing our 2012 number with a downward bias. We continue to recommend a defensive portfolio amidst on-going external risks and further pressure on earnings growth, especially for FY2012. We favor telcos, conglomerates and REITs. A hard landing scenario in China against the backdrop of a muted macro outlook for the US and EU could push Singapores 2012 GDP growth to minus 5%. China is important for Singapore as 9.5 % of its NODX is to China while 10.6% of tourist arrivals in 1H2011 were from China. In addition to the direct effects, Singapores trade with its regional trading partners could also be dampened if they also suffer from a China slowdown. Many Singapore companies, listed and unlisted, have operations in China. According to official statistics, the cumulative direct investments into China was S$58b as at end 2009. Losses by Singapore companies in China may have a dampening effect on Singapore.

Research analysts:

Jitsoon Lim, CFA


+65 6433 6969 jitsoon.lim@nomura.com And the Singapore Research Team

Key areas of impact if China has a hard landing


Singapores exports to China would likely be negatively affected The services sector could be impacted if Chinese tourist arrivals slow down sharply. With Chinese buyers forming an estimated 5-7% of property purchasers in Singapore over the past three quarters, a pullback in demand could affect the property sector. Companies who have direct exposure in China that could be negatively affected include Wilmar, Keppel Land, Capitaland and DBS Bank.

IMPORTANT: The sensitivity table below does not assess just the impact of a China hard landing on the mentioned stocks, rather it takes a look at an extreme scenario including recessions in the US and Europe. None of this is in our macro or industry or company forecasts. Detailed assumptions are footnoted. See table in appendix for our current ratings.

Fig. 15: Earnings and target price sensitivity for most affected and least affected companies in coverage in the extreme case*
China sales share Ticker 2011% CAPL SP Base case EPS 2012 Target price Extreme case* EPS 2012 Target price Comments 3.30 CMA is the biggest component of CAPL's NAV, representing 26.5% of which 32.4% is attributable to China. The China residential segment accounts for a further 14.1%. 3.21 KPLD has 32.5% of its NAV in China residential projects. A slowdown in China GDP will have direct impact and spillover effects on projects in SG as well. 4.40 Volumes could decelerate mainly in Palm & laurics, Oilseeds processing and consumer pack segments. PE multiples may contract. 12.0 #7-8% of assets in China, 28% of assets in Greater China. Loan growth could decelerate to 2% (from 12%) and credit charges rise to 100bps (from 45bps). Sustainable ROE reduced to 10% (from 11%), cost of equity edges up to 9.5% (from 9.1%). 3.35 None of SingTel's subsidiaries/ associates have presence in China. We expect the impact of 'worst case' GDP growths of countries where it is present on the subscribers' wallets to result in <1% decline in SingTel's consolidated revenue. 1.94 Minimal exposure to China. We believe that the REIT will hold resilient through a downturn. Its STB portfolio was fully occupied through the financial crisis whilst its MTB portfolio reached a low of 90.5% before quickly rebounding to 92.5% by end June 2011.

(SGD) Most affected Capitaland

% y-y (4.7)

% y-y (19.3)

25.0 15.35c

4.05 13.00c

Keppel Land

KPLD SP

40.7

24.5c

8.2

4.90 19.00c

(16.1)

Wilmar

WIL SP

52.0

35c

12.3

5.90

29c

3.7

DBS Bank

DBS SP

8#

130c

7.2

16.4

85.5c

(34.2)

Least affected SingTel ST SP 0.0 23.93c 0.3 3.45 23.53c (1.3)

A-REIT

AREIT SP

0.0

13.5c

3.7

2.10 12.50c

(3.7)

Note: Base case represents our current forecasts and TP *Extreme case assumes (1) US real GDP falls 3% and euro area GDP falls 5%; (2) Chinas GDP growth falls to 5%; (3) Substantial commodity price declines by end 2012. Base case and extreme case real GDP growth % assumptions: Australia (4.3, 0.5); China (8.6, 5.0); Hong Kong (4.5, -6.0); India (7.9, 3.0); Indonesia (7.0, 2.5); Malaysia (5.1, 5.8); New Zealand (3.5, 0.8); Philippines (5.7, 0.5); Singapore (5.3, -5.2); South Korea (5.0, -3.0); Taiwan (5.0, -5.0); Thailand (4.7, -3.0) Source: Nomura estimates

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Nomura | Asia Special Report

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China risk: Taiwan


Risks to our current overall view
Any hard landing in China would be rapidly transmitted into Taiwan through multiple channels. Still, we see low risk of a domestic financial crisis. Firstly, Taiwans banks now command the best balance sheet quality in decades. The NPL influx should likely be manageable, given Taiwanese banks have not started commercial operations in China, and are thus little directly exposed to corporate China. Secondly, corporate Taiwan is normally debt-averse, with strong balance sheets, despite historically-high dividend payouts. Lastly, thanks to the government policy of the intended economic isolation from the mainland during 1996-2008, China has yet to become a significant factor in Taiwans domestic economy. Chinese liquidity is little involved in Taiwans property market while Chinese tourists contribute to only low-single digits of Taiwans retail sales. That said, we would expect Taiwans property prices to experience a healthy correction of 10% on average, as Taiwans developers have mostly de-leveraged since the Lehman crisis and face little pressure of inventory liquidation in a low interest rate environment.

Research analysts:

Jesse Wang
+886 2 2176 9977 jesse.wang@nomura.com And the Taiwan Research Team

Key areas of impact if China has a hard landing


Earnings downgrades would soon unfold from the tech sector, as China now accounts for 20% of global tech end consumption. We note that the negative beta could be higher in the handset foodchains (China equals 25%+ of global demand), followed by PCs and TVs (20%+) and NBs (15%+). On the other hand, selective non-tech plays (i.e., Taiwan Cement, Asia Cement, Airtac, Taiwan Glass, Cheng Hsin Rubber, Gourmet Master), which normally derive over 50% of revenue from China, would also be significantly affected on the downside.

Where is potential for upside surprise?


With Presidential elections on January 14 2012, the KMT-led government will likely react promptly and aggressively to boost the domestic economy, taking advantage of its majority in the Legislative Yuan. We estimated that Taiwans four major government funds have maximum capacity of TWD1.2tn to engage in the share purchase program to support the Taiex. More importantly, with little contingent liability from stable banking system, Taiwan government also has well-reserved fiscal strength to launch countercyclical infrastructure investments. Last but not least, we expect Taiwan to consider a repeat of the issuance of shopping coupons to boost domestic consumption, if needed.
th

IMPORTANT: The sensitivity table below does not assess just the impact of a China hard landing on the mentioned stocks, rather it takes a look at an extreme scenario including recessions in the US and Europe. None of this is in our macro or industry or company forecasts. Detailed assumptions are footnoted. See table in appendix for our current ratings.

Fig. 16: Earnings and target price sensitivity for most affected and least affected companies in coverage in the extreme case*
China sales share 2011% 45 60 86 0 4 Base case EPS 2012 2.85 5.80 11.58 5.08 7.60 % y-y (10.0) 31.5 19.5 14.0 8.3 Target price 34.6 90.0 300.0 93.0 205.0 Extreme case* EPS 2012 2.21 3.53 7.27 4.28 6.60 % y-y (30.0) (20.0) (25.0) (4.0) (6.0) Target price Comments 22.5 Significant earnings exposure to China. 76.5 Significant earnings exposure to China. 240.0 Significant earnings exposure to China. 89.3 Diversified revenue stream. 192.7 Govt may support domestic consumption.

(TWD) Most affected Asia Cement Synnex AirTAC Least affected Taiwan Mobile President Chain Store

Ticker 1102 TT 2347 TT 1590 TT 3045 TT 2912 TT

Note: Base case represents our current forecasts and TP *Extreme case assumes (1) US real GDP falls 3% and euro area GDP falls 5%; (2) Chinas GDP growth falls to 5%; (3) Substantial commodity price declines by end 2012. Base case and extreme case real GDP growth % assumptions: Australia (4.3, 0.5); China (8.6, 5.0); Hong Kong (4.5, -6.0); India (7.9, 3.0); Indonesia (7.0, 2.5); Malaysia (5.1, 5.8); New Zealand (3.5, 0.8); Philippines (5.7, 0.5); Singapore (5.3, -5.2); South Korea (5.0, -3.0); Taiwan (5.0, -5.0); Thailand (4.7, -3.0) Source: Nomura estimates

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Nomura | Asia Special Report

November 2011

China risk: Asia banks


Risks to our current overall view
The financial sector will naturally be impacted by any seriously negative macro event because of its large market capitalization, direct linkage to capital-intensive and exportoriented industries and still fresh memories of the credit crunch in 2008-09. At the moment, we are on average sitting on bullish recommendations spreads within most markets in Asia, reflecting our house view that emerging markets should weather the macro situation better and would potentially rebound strongly in the event of a short-term shock. (We are Neutral in Australia where the drivers are different and bearish in Malaysia on valuations.) A hard landing in China, accompanied by possible recessions in the US and Europe, would subject to valuation, obviously see us turn very cautious. Numbers would have to come down across the board to reflect loan growth concerns and, especially in markets with high SME participation, rising credit costs. Our back-ofthe-envelope calculations are tabulated below:

Research analysts: The Asia Banks Team

IMPORTANT: The sensitivity table below does not assess just the impact of a China hard landing on the mentioned stocks, rather it takes a look at an extreme scenario including recessions in the US and Europe. None of this is in our macro or industry or company forecasts. Detailed assumptions are footnoted. See table in appendix for our current ratings.

Fig. 17: Earnings and target price sensitivity for most affected and least affected companies in coverage in the extreme case*
Base case Ticker Most affected Minsheng (HKD) BOC (HKD) Citic Bank (HKD) CCB (HKD) CRCB (HKD) ICBC (HKD) BEA (HKD) WHB (HKD) DSF (HKD) Woori FG (KRW) 1988 HK 3988 HK 998 HK 939 HK 3618 HK 1398 HK 23 HK 302 HK 440 HK 053000 KS 0.88 0.51 0.66 0.76 0.55 0.69 2.7 6.52 4.3 2,828 14.29 18.35 10 18.07 27.91 23.21 6% -4% 8% 12% 7.4 5.2 6.5 7.02 6.52 7.5 24 84 50 18,000 (1.2) (255.73) (0.51) (218.49) (0.71) (217.65) (0.51) (179.78) (0.33) (177.31) (0.28) (150.82) (0.33) (0.78) (0.09) 617 (113) (112) (102) (70) 3.7 589bps credit cost hike to 6.54% 2.3 539bps credit cost hike to 5.95% 2.8 527bps credit cost hike to 6.02% 3.28 599bps credit cost hike to 6.61% 1.52 694bps credit cost hike to 7.29% 3.5 529bps credit cost hike to 5.69% 18 Weak profitability and thus big swing in earnings 46 Weak profitability and thus big swing in earnings 18 Weak profitability and thus big swing in earnings 4,900 Due to inferior asset quality (high NPL and low coverage ratio), severe recession should result in greater provisioning 36.72 Our worst case estimates incorporate i) a significant increase in BDDs (175bps to NHL which is consistent with the GFC experience) and 17.4 we do not prescribe banks with any margin benefit 20.91 (as they achieved throughout the crisis) given we expect a significant slowdown in China will reduce 5,200 banks ability to re-price margins. 135bps higher credit cost to 1.8% 4,000 100bps higher credit cost to 3.5% 6,900 110bps higher credit cost to 3.5% 19.7 4-5% of assets in China, 7% of assets in Greater China. Loan growth could decelerate to 6% (from 12%) and credit charges rise to 65bps (from 44bps). Sustainable ROE reduced to 12% (from 13%) while cost of equity remains at 9.6%. 20.3 Domestic. Loan growth could decelerate to 8% (from 12%) and credit charges rise to 65bps (from 48bps). Sustainable ROE reduced to 14% (from 15%) while cost of equity remains at 11.2%. 120.0 Domestic. Loan growth could decelerate to 5% (from 10%) and credit charges rise to 85bps (from 59bps). Sustainable ROE reduced to 15% (from 16%) while cost of equity remains at 11.5%. 130.0 Domestic. Loan growth could decelerate to 8% (from 12%) and credit charges rise to 55bps (from 38bps). Sustainable ROE reduced to 16% (from 17%) while cost of equity remains at 10.5%. EPS 2012 % y-y Target price Extreme case* EPS 2012 % y-y Target price Comments

Least affected CBA (AUD) WBC (AUD) NAB (AUD) BCA (IDR) Danamon (IDR) BRI (IDR) UOB (SGD) CBA AU WBC AU NAB AU BBCA IJ BDMN IJ BBRI IJ UOB SP 4.43 2.13 2.63 416.2 440.8 630.6 186c 5.4 4.6 7.5 7.9 18.1 19.8 11.8 53 24.5 30 6,700 4,900 8,400 21.9 3.36 1.64 2.05 322.7 351.7 515.5 162c (20) (19.7) (16.1) (16.4) (5.8) (2) (12.9)

Krung Thai Bank (THB)

KTB TB

2.04

15.4

23.2

1.79

(12.3)

Kasikornbank (THB) KBANK TB

12.2

12.3

135.0

10.8

(11.5)

Siam Commercial Bank (THB)

SCB TB

9.7

13.5

145.0

9.0

(7.2)

Note: Base case represents our current forecasts and TP *Extreme case assumes (1) US real GDP falls 3% and euro area GDP falls 5%; (2) Chinas GDP growth falls to 5%; (3) Substantial commodity price declines by end 2012. Base case and extreme case real GDP growth % assumptions: Australia (4.3, 0.5); China (8.6, 5.0); Hong Kong (4.5, -6.0); India (7.9, 3.0); Indonesia (7.0, 2.5); Malaysia (5.1, -5.8); New Zealand (3.5, 0.8); Philippines (5.7, 0.5); Singapore (5.3, -5.2); South Korea (5.0, -3.0); Taiwan (5.0, -5.0); Thailand (4.7, -3.0) Source: Nomura estimates

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Nomura | Asia Special Report

November 2011

China risk: Asia consumer-related


Risks to our current overall view
Domestic consumption is generally expected to be resilient in most markets in Asia in the event of any negative macro event, reflecting our house view that emerging markets should weather the macro situation better and would potentially rebound strongly in the event of a short-term shock, aided by policy responses that would promote private consumption as we saw in the 2008-09 crisis. However, there would be short-term negative impact on earnings as consumer confidence will likely dip if markets go into a tailspin in anticipation of a hard landing in China. Our forecasts would have to come down across the board and we could see significant valuation multiple compression as well. However, as the table below shows, there could be plenty of relative value in the classic defensives of F&B, staples and tobacco. At the other end of the spectrum, highbeta names may see their valuations change more dramatically than their earnings.

Research analysts: The Asia Consumer Team

IMPORTANT: The sensitivity table below does not assess just the impact of a China hard landing on the mentioned stocks, rather it takes a look at an extreme scenario including recessions in the US and Europe. None of this is in our macro or industry or company forecasts. Detailed assumptions are footnoted. See table in appendix for our current ratings.

Fig. 18: Earnings and target price sensitivity for most affected and least affected companies in coverage in the extreme case*
China sales share 2011% 8 100 Base case EPS 2012 % y-y 0.51 0.15 (52) 174 Target price 8.90 17.5 Extreme case* EPS 2012 % y-y (0.09) (109) (0.02) (132) Target price Comments 4.60 European exposure hurts. 8.2 Extreme case assumes gaming revenue down 12%y-y in 2012, contracted target multiple of 10x across the board. MPEL has low margin VIP-skewed earnings model. 9,000 High operating leverage to palm oil price. 11 VIP-centric earnings stream. Assumptions same as Melco. 12.60 19.80 Asia/China growth story. Asia/China growth story.

Ticker Most vulnerable (earnings change) Esprit (HKD) Melco Crown (USD) 330 HK MPEL US

Astra Agro (IDR) Galaxy Entertainment (HKD) Samsonite (HKD) Prada (HKD) Noble (USD) Li & Fung (HKD) SJM Holdings (HKD) Want Want (HKD) Tsingtao Brewery (HKD) Woolworths (AUD) China Mengniu (HKD) Coca-Cola Amatil (AUD) China Yurun (HKD) Huabao International (HKD) KT&G (KRW) Treasury Wine Estates (AUD)

AALI IJ 27 HK 1910 HK NOBL SP 494 HK 880 HK 151 HK 168 HK WOW AU 2319 HK CCL AU 1068 HK 336 HK 033780 KS TWE AU

0 100 12 10 6 100

2,013 1.07 0.97 2.09 0.12 0.72 1.21

2 56 21 24 22.4 24 21 26.5

28,400 21 19.70 40.30 2.50 14.10 23

425 0.55 0.50 1.19 0.07 0.45 0.81

(69) (20) (36) (28) (30) (23) (18) 13.6

1913 HK 32 (Asia)

1.60 Global supply chain impact. 7.40 US exposure. 13.3 Assumptions same as Melco. HKD5.9 Not the most defensive as mainly discretionary foods (snacks). 29 Main impact likely to be on discretionary COGS.

Most resilient (earnings change) >90 USD0.038 97 n.a. >90 n.a. 100 100 3 n.m. CNY1.23 180 CNY1.58 80 1.66 0.58 6,380# 21 HKD6.6 USD0.034 CNY1.11 170 CNY1.55 76 1.62 0.57 6,577 22

1.9 HKD34.0 3.3 30

(8.3) HKD31.0 Beer. (2.9)

30 HKD34.0 11.1 13.4 11.8 10 26.7 13.00 21.0 11.7 66,000 3.30

27.3 HKD33.0 Liquid milk is becoming a daily habit for most of the Chinese people. 5.5 10.8 9.7 10 37.5 12 An affordable product in the key Australian market. 20.3 Pork is an essential item in Chinese daily meals. 11.4 Tobacco. 65,010 Tobacco. # Recent currency moves would imply 6,677. 3.4 Lower AUD/USD benefits transaction and translation, which should offset lower demand.

Note: Base case represents our current forecasts and TP *Extreme case assumes (1) US real GDP falls 3% and euro area GDP falls 5%; (2) Chinas GDP growth falls to 5%; (3) Substantial commodity price declines by end 2012. Base case and extreme case real GDP growth % assumptions: Australia (4.3, 0.5); China (8.6, 5.0); Hong Kong (4.5, -6.0); India (7.9, 3.0); Indonesia (7.0, 2.5); Malaysia (5.1, -5.8); New Zealand (3.5, 0.8); Philippines (5.7, 0.5); Singapore (5.3, -5.2); South Korea (5.0, -3.0); Taiwan (5.0, -5.0); Thailand (4.7, -3.0) Source: Nomura estimates

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Nomura | Asia Special Report

November 2011

China risk: Asia healthcare


Risks to our current overall view
Healthcare expenditure was RMD1,720bn in 2009. Reform of the public hospital system is one of the major policy targets of ongoing healthcare reform in China. China targets to invest approximately CNY850bn to reform the healthcare system from 2009 to 2011, of which about CNY100bn could be used to invest in the expansion of hospitals and basic healthcare institutions in rural areas. If China has a hard landing, we would see a potential slowing the reform agenda for China. We currently forecast as much as CNY60bn could be spent on purchasing of medical equipment in 2011-13. Healthcare in the rest of the region should be much more defensive, with Australia the most insulated.

Research analysts:

Dr David Stanton
+612 8062 8410 david.stanton@nomura.com

Gideon Lo, CFA


+852 2252 6190 gideon.lo@nomura.com And the Asia healthcare team

Key areas of impact if China has a hard landing


Supply-demand and pricing: According to a United Nations forecast, China's aging population is expected to increase at a 3.7% CAGR to more than 166mn over the age of 65 by 2020. Given the increased need for tests and treatments, we believe demand for medical devices will be strong. We think pricing declines are likely to be muted. Impact on funding: At the top of China's hospital system hierarchy, there are over 1,200 class-3 hospitals, of which over 760 are class-3A. Funding to these hospitals (which use relatively more devices) would likely be minimally affected. Policy and regulations: We continue to believe reform of the public hospital system is a major policy target of the Chinese government and hence is unlikely to be impacted to a great degree should China suffer a hard landing; Industry evolution/development: Should there be a Chinese hard landing, the medical equipment manufacturers, like Mindray (MR US), would likely face a higher risk of slowdown than other segments as some smaller hospitals with restricted financial positions may delay equipment investment or replacement cycles. However, a hard landing in the economy would accelerate market concentration, which should benefit the domestic market leaders at the expense of some smaller manufacturers.

Where is potential for upside surprise?


For 2011, we expect the market to benefit from the following major policy targets of the NDRC and MOH: 1) the increase of two BMIS coverage ratios to over 90%; 2) increase in per capital contribution in NRCMS to CNY200 a year; 3) increase in minimum reimbursement ratio for in-patient treatment of not less than 70%; and 4) increase in the maximum reimbursement amount equivalent to about 6x the average annual salary/disposal income/ farmer income in the respective cities or counties. All this should lead to volume growth in Chinese hospitals, and hence in Chinese medical device sales.

IMPORTANT: The sensitivity table below does not assess just the impact of a China hard landing on the mentioned stocks, rather it takes a look at an extreme scenario including recessions in the US and Europe. None of this is in our macro or industry or company forecasts. Detailed assumptions are footnoted. See table in appendix for our current ratings.

Fig. 19: Earnings and target price sensitivity for most affected and least affected companies in coverage in the extreme case*
China sales share 2011% 40 70 0 0 0 Base case EPS 2012 1.82 0.41 0.24 1.29 0.81 % y-y 20.1 (1.9) 16.9 18.7 6.4 Target price 34.0 6.4 3.8 21.0 11.0 Extreme case* EPS 2012 1.59 0.38 0.24 1.29 0.81 % y-y 7.0 (10.1) 16.9 18.7 6.4 Target price Comments 25.50 50% revenues from exports. 5.94 30% revenues from exports. 3.80 No exposure to China. 21.00 No exposure to China. 11.00 No exposure to China.

Ticker Most affected Mindray (USD) United Labs (HKD) Least affected Primary Healthcare (AUD) Ramsay Health Care (AUD) Sonic Health Care (AUD) PRY AU RHC AU SHL AU MR US 3933 HK

Note: Base case represents our current forecasts and TP *Extreme case assumes (1) US real GDP falls 3% and euro area GDP falls 5%; (2) Chinas GDP growth falls to 5%; (3) Substantial commodity price declines by end 2012. Base case and extreme case real GDP growth % assumptions: Australia (4.3, 0.5); China (8.6, 5.0); Hong Kong (4.5, -6.0); India (7.9, 3.0); Indonesia (7.0, 2.5); Malaysia (5.1, -5.8); New Zealand (3.5, 0.8); Philippines (5.7, 0.5); Singapore (5.3, -5.2); South Korea (5.0, -3.0); Taiwan (5.0, -5.0); Thailand (4.7, -3.0) Source: Nomura estimates

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Nomura | Asia Special Report

November 2011

China risk: Asia power


Risks to our current overall view
In Asia, power companies in HK, India and Thailand enjoy fuel cost pass through and fixed return on regulated asset bases, while firms in China, Korea and Malaysia do not have that luxury, with earnings subjected to tariff, coal, demand and interest cost. HK utilities should be defensive, whatever the economic situation. If China has a hard landing, we would see a fall in fuel costs as a benefit for China and Indian IPPs, though in general the fall in sales volume and margin in case of an unfavourable tariff response shall be expected, apart from Perusahaan Gas Negara, whose volume depends more on supply constraints, and Tenaga Nasional, which may be pleased to find itself relieved partially from costly distillates to supplement supply shortfalls. Exchange movements would pose a further impact on imported fuel, translated earnings and exports, to which Korea is highly sensitive. Also, interest rates may fall; this could help high gearing stocks like China IPPs and Korea Utilities, but the overall exposure on the sector appears to be limited. In such a world, the impact on our investment stance might be largely neutral.

Research analysts:

Ivan Lee, CFA


+852 2252 6213 ivan.lee@nomura.com

Daniel Raats
+852 2252 2197 daniel.raats@nomura.com

Anirudh Gangahar
+91 22 4037 4516 anirudh.gangahar@nomura.com

Keith Nam
+82 2 3783 2342 keith.nam@nomura.com

Joseph Lam, CFA


+852 2252 2106 joseph.lam@nomura.com And the Asia power team

Key areas of impact if China has a hard landing


Fall in fuel prices benefiting China IPPs exposed to domestic fuel supply, and Tenaga Nasional, Indian IPPs and Korea utilities exposed to imported fuel. Slowing economic growth reduces power usage, and thus demand and sales. Potential drop in interest rates: improve liquidity and cut interest expenses. Impact on ability to secure funding appears limited unless situation persists and growth impairs. Governments may hesitate to grant adequate tariff increases, leaving power generators with no relief against weakened demand. Little is expected to change in terms of the power industry and capacity structure. Government unlikely to adjust plans for or influence over the industry for long term stability. However if an economic slowdown persists, growth may be hurt as planned capacity growth may not be fully implemented if power demand does not recover.
IMPORTANT: The sensitivity table below does not assess just the impact of a China hard landing on the mentioned stocks, rather it takes a look at an extreme scenario including recessions in the US and Europe. None of this is in our macro or industry or company forecasts. Detailed assumptions are footnoted. See table in appendix for our current ratings.

Where is potential for upside surprise?


Favorable tariff, coal price and interest rate movements would offset impacts from decline in demand.

Fig. 20: Earnings and target price sensitivity for most affected and least affected companies in coverage in the extreme case*
China sales share Ticker 2011% 015760 KS ADANI IN LANCI IN 0 0 0 Base case (Local $) EPS 2012 52 15.7 3.7 % y-y Target price Extreme case* (Local $) EPS 2012 % y-y Target price Comments

(Local curr) Most affected Kepco Adani Power Lanco Infra Least affected Perusahaan Gas Negara Ratchaburi Generating Electricity Generating

NA 35,000 (1,330) NA NA 115 30 10.3 2.7

NA 15,000 Export-oriented Koreas power demand is highly sensitive to China and global economic slowdown. NA 110 Utilization levels would drop as we see a slowdown in industrial demand NA 29 Utilization levels would drop as we see a slowdown in industrial demand 3,900 Volumes vary as a function of supply constraints instead of demand-pull factors 41 Highly insulated power purchase agreements 110 Highly insulated power purchase agreements

PGAS IJ RATCH TB EGCO TB

0 252.24 0 0 3.97 11.82

NA NA NA

3,900 252.24 41 110 3.97 11.82

NA NA NA

Note: Base case represents our current forecasts and TP *Extreme case assumes (1) US real GDP falls 3% and euro area GDP falls 5%; (2) Chinas GDP growth falls to 5%; (3) Substantial commodity price declines by end 2012. Base case and extreme case real GDP growth % assumptions: Australia (4.3, 0.5); China (8.6, 5.0); Hong Kong (4.5, -6.0); India (7.9, 3.0); Indonesia (7.0, 2.5); Malaysia (5.1, -5.8); New Zealand (3.5, 0.8); Philippines (5.7, 0.5); Singapore (5.3, -5.2); South Korea (5.0, -3.0); Taiwan (5.0, -5.0); Thailand (4.7, -3.0) Source: Nomura estimates

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Nomura | Asia Special Report

November 2011

China risk: Asia property


Three risks to consider
While property is perceived to be a local industry and driven by local demographics, past crisis have shown that no markets are immune in the event of a system-wide correction. Further, with increasing globalization, if China were to have a hard landing, we believe demand across all asset classes and all regions would be affected. While demand would be hit across the board, we believe some property markets would fare worse than others. The three differentiating factors that would set the various markets apart are: (1) Balance sheet strength Would there be distress selling? (2) Supply outlook How much unproductive stock would need to be unloaded? and (3) Valuations Have stocks already priced in the downside?
Fig. 21: Gearing levels across the region
80%

Research analysts:

Paul Louie
+852 2252 6189 paul.louie@nomura.com And the Asia property team

60%
40%

Net gearing
16%

58%

62%

63%

20%
0%

12%

22%

27%

28%

33%

SG Developers

HK Landlords

HK Developers

Source: Nomura Research Note: net-debt-to-equity for traditional property companies. For REITs gearing is defined as total debt-to-total assets

10
Fig. 22: How big is the supply overhang?

Fig. 10
HK office MY housing HK retail HK housing TW housing ID office ID retail IN office SG housing ID housing IN housing CH housing SG office (mn sf) (units) (mn sf) (units) (Households) (mn sqm) (mn sqm) (mn sf) (units) (ha) (mn sf) (mn sqm) (mn sf)

Completion 2011 2012 0.86 1.01 72,054 86,733 0.61 1.11 10,670 13,700 70,610 63,549 7.40 7.96 5.27 5.56 47.00 38.00 9,469 10,407 181.96 185.46 250.00 250.00 704.49 826.96 2.80 1.41

Vs. 20 Yr Avg 8 Yr Avg 19 Yr Avg 14 Yr Avg 5 Yr Avg 4 Yr Avg 4 Yr Avg 2 Yr Avg 17 Yr Avg 4 Yr Avg 2 Yr Avg 6 Yr Avg 30 Yr Avg

Metric 2.40 172,861 1.23 19,064 102,690 6.63 4.67 41.50 8,269 148.86 198.50 523.61 0.60

Surplus/Deficit to Avg 2011 2012 -64% -58% -58% -50% -50% -10% -44% -28% -31% -38% 12% 20% 13% 19% 13% -8% 15% 26% 22% 25% 26% 26% 35% 58% 364% 134%

TW Property

MY Property

CH Property

-20%

ID Property

IN Property

-12%

HK REITs

SG REITs

Source: Nomura Research

23: Valuation: How much have current trailing PB already discounted? Fig. 11 Fig. 11
HK Landlords HK Developers CH Property SG Developers SG REITs IN Property ID Property TW Property MY Property Average 20 Yr Avg 20 Yr Avg 6 Yr Avg 10 Yr Avg 9 Yr Avg 11 Yr Avg 5 Yr Avg 15 Yr Avg 11 Yr Avg Avg PB 0.80 1.17 2.24 1.27 1.03 3.17 2.31 1.26 1.75 Hist. Avg SD (x) 0.14 0.28 1.15 0.61 0.20 4.25 0.57 0.64 0.68 Current P/B 0.58 0.78 1.25 0.91 0.96 1.73 2.22 1.28 1.80 Vs. Avg -28% -34% -44% -29% -7% -45% -4% 2% 3% +/- SD (x) -1.57 -1.40 -0.86 -0.60 -0.36 -0.34 -0.15 0.03 0.07

IMPORTANT: Our sensitivity analysis does not assess just the impact of a China hard landing on the mentioned stocks, rather it takes a look at an extreme scenario including recessions in the US and Europe. None of this is in our macro or industry or company forecasts. See table in appendix for our current ratings The extreme case assumes (1) US real GDP falls 3% and euro area GDP falls 5%; (2) Chinas GDP growth falls to 5%; (3) Substantial commodity price declines by end 2012. Base case and extreme case real GDP growth % assumptions: Australia (4.3, 0.5); China (8.6, 5.0); Hong Kong (4.5, -6.0); India (7.9, 3.0); Indonesia (7.0, 2.5); Malaysia (5.1, -5.8); New Zealand (3.5, 0.8); Philippines (5.7, 0.5); Singapore (5.3, -5.2); South Korea (5.0, -3.0); Taiwan (5.0, 5.0); Thailand (4.7, -3.0).

Source: Nomura Research Note: Current PB as of October 14, 2011

24: Most vulnerable, most resilient and best positioned Fig. 12 Fig. 12 China
HK India Indonesia Malaysia Singapore Taiwan Country Most vulnerable Guangzhou R&F (2777 HK) Wharf (4 HK) DLFLtd (DLF IN) Agung Podomoro (APLN IJ) Malaysian Resources (MRC MK) CapitaLand (CAPL SP) Huaku (2548 TT) Most resilient China Overseas (688 HK) SHKP (16 HK) Oberoi Realty (OBER IN) Bumi Serpong Damai (BSDE IJ) SP Setia (SPSB MK) A-REIT (AREIT SP) Farglory (5522 TT) Best positioned under base case China Overseas (688 HK) SHKP (16 HK) DLF Ltd (DLF IN) Ciputra Dev (CTRA IJ) Man Sing (MSGB MK) Keppel Land (KPLD SP) Farglory (5522 TT)

Source: Nomura Research

13 Fig. 13

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China risk: Asia renewables


Risks to our overall current view
Current views: bearish on solar; neutral on wind, nuclear and natural gas. Asia governments would likely not alter renewable capacity targets despite a slowdown, given strategic plans to diversify from coal. China wind, natural gas and nuclear industries are armed with a favorable fuel mix from FYP12 and capacity targets from NDRCs Roadmap. However, the solar industry has seen sharp falls in ASP and volume growth while near term upsides are limited from severe demand headwinds, likely subsidy cuts and new market penetration. If China has a hard landing, we would see tighter regulation of financing across the solar sector and a sharp cut in utilization, while with backing of government policy and limited exports, china wind and nuclear would meet with little impact. Therefore, FY12F earnings would likely fall 20~25% across the solar industry, with a potentially sharper impact in the event of worsening investor sentiments, but sectors like wind, natural gas and nuclear would not be affected.

Research analysts:

Ivan Lee, CFA


+852 2252 6213 Ivan.lee@nomura.com

Nitin Kumar
+65 6433 6967 Nitin.kumar@nomura.com And the Asia renewables team

Key areas of impact if China has a hard landing


Solar: Sharp utilization cuts at 30~40% for solar industry as demand declines continue amidst high channel inventories; Utilization cuts reduce supply in solar industry, but supply-demand mismatch persists with supply 20~30% over demand. Wind, nuclear and natural gas: FYP12 capacity/consumption targets would not be affected. Approvals for government subsidy program may slow down for solar industry, while it is unlikely for the government to revise wind installation capacity and FYP12 fuel targets. Tighter regulatory control on refinancing possible for all renewable companies.
IMPORTANT: The sensitivity table below does not assess just the impact of a China hard landing on the mentioned stocks, rather it takes a look at an extreme scenario including recessions in the US and Europe. None of this is in our macro or industry or company forecasts. Detailed assumptions are footnoted. See table in appendix for our current ratings.

Where is potential for upside surprise?


Sharper than expected drops in interest rates would favour valuation. Approvals for tariff increases may relieve demand declines. Supply-side consolidation as higher-cost producers are priced out of the market and demand elasticity may also remedy impacts to the solar industry, given lower ASPs enabling stronger demand from new regions, especially US, China, Japan, and India; albeit needs improved financing availability.

Fig. 25: Earnings and target price sensitivity for most affected and least affected companies in coverage in the extreme case*
China sales share Ticker 2011% Most affected LDK Solar (USD) Motech (TWD) JA Solar (USD) GCL (HKD) Trina (USD) Yingli LDK US 6244 TT JASO US 44 NA 52 (0.78) (5.30) (0.32) NM NM NM 2.6 39.0 2.0 (1.00) (7.00) (0.42) NM NM NM 1.30 We see LDKs financing issues getting exacerbated in the extreme case. 20.00 We expect pure play companies to bear the brunt in the extreme case. 1.05 We expect pure play companies to bear the brunt in the extreme case. 1.50 GCLs lowest cost structure should help it remain breakeven in the extreme case. 4.00 Trinas lowest cost structure and good balance sheet could help the company through the downturn. Base case EPS 2012 % y-y Target price Extreme case* EPS 2012 % y-y Target price Comments

Least affected 3800 HK TSL US YGE US >90 9 15 0.20 (50.80) (0.54) CNY (5.61) NM 2.5 7.0 0.16 (60.50) (0.70) CNY (7.00) NM

NM USD3.4

NM USD2.0 Yinglis lowest cost structure could help the company through the downturn.

Note: Base case represents our current forecasts and TP *Extreme case assumes (1) US real GDP falls 3% and euro area GDP falls 5%; (2) Chinas GDP growth falls to 5%; (3) Substantial commodity price declines by end 2012. Base case and extreme case real GDP growth % assumptions: Australia (4.3, 0.5); China (8.6, 5.0); Hong Kong (4.5, -6.0); India (7.9, 3.0); Indonesia (7.0, 2.5); Malaysia (5.1, -5.8); New Zealand (3.5, 0.8); Philippines (5.7, 0.5); Singapore (5.3, -5.2); South Korea (5.0, -3.0); Taiwan (5.0, -5.0); Thailand (4.7, -3.0) Source: Nomura estimates

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Research analysts:

China risk: Asia technology


Risks to our current overall view
Basically, we expect 2012F IT industry growth in China to continue to outperform other geographic markets due to still-low penetration of LCD TVs, PCs and smartphones. We forecast China PC shipments will grow 11% y-y to 82mn units in 2012F vs. 4.7% y-y for our global PC shipment growth forecast. We also expect 2012F LCD TV demand to grow 15% y-y to 49mn units in China, which is 5pps higher than global LCD TV demand growth. In terms of handset demand in China, we expect 15% y-y growth to 550mn units along with growing mobile subscribers. We expect 3G smartphone shipment volume to grow 45% y-y, driven by operators handset subsidy policies, accounting for 15% of market volume in 2012F. We expect the white goods market to still see ~20% y-y volume growth along with the rise of penetration rate in rural areas.

James Kim
+852 2252 6203 james.kim@nomura.com And the Asia technology team

Key areas of impact if China has a hard landing


We expect PC and handset shipment growth would be 9% y-y, and 5% (similar to 2008), respectively, which would extend the replacement cycle for PCs and handsets in matured cities, although we expect rising demand from tier-4 to tier-6 cities should help compensate. We see limited impact for smartphones in 2012 as the market is mainly driven by operators subsidy policies. LCD TV market growth could fall to 10%, the lowest over the past several years, in our view. We expect white-goods market growth could slow to around 10% due to the slower-than-expected income level growth. LGD, the global no. 1 LCD panel maker, has cancelled its 8G line schedule and Samsung has decided to move an existing 8G line in Korea to China rather than build a new one as planned earlier. We could see other capex cuts along the supply chain. We do not recommend any pure LCD names in the supply chain such as glass, polarizer, and LED companies. Two China LCD panel companies are ramping up their new 8G lines. However, we anticipate that they may delay the full ramp up and all panel makers profitability could be negative in 2012F, following the big loss in 2011F.
IMPORTANT: The sensitivity table below does not assess just the impact of a China hard landing on the mentioned stocks, rather it takes a look at an extreme scenario including recessions in the US and Europe. None of this is in our macro or industry or company forecasts. Detailed assumptions are footnoted. See table in appendix for our current ratings.

Where is potential for upside surprise?


Microsofts new OS Windows 8 official launch and rising interest in ultrabooks should help boost replacement demand in 2H12. China may introduce new subsidies to stimulate home appliance and TV demand in rural areas.

Fig. 26: Earnings and target price sensitivity for most affected and least affected companies in coverage in the extreme case*
China sales share Ticker 2011% Most affected TCL (HKD) ZTE (HKD) Lenovo LGD (KRW) Least affected Acer (TWD) 2353 TT 14 5 5 2.33 10,698 1,861 na 27 1.7 8,558 1,303 na 7.5 na 20 Small exposure to China. 120,000 Minimal exposure to China. 58,000 Minimal exposure to China. Samsung SDI 006400 KS (KRW) LG Innotek (KRW) 011070 KS 9.4 160,000 na 71,000 2618 HK 763 HK 992 HK 034220 KS 10 50 25 1.04 1.28 85 30 21 na 8 28 24,000 0.89 1 68 11 (6) 2 na 7 Smartphone sales are driven by operator subsidies rather than the macro environment. 22 Sells equipment and phones to operators. HKD4.0 75% earnings from China. 21,000 Supplies panels to Chinese set makers. Base case EPS 2012 % y-y Target price Extreme case* EPS 2012 % y-y Target price Comments

48 US3.4c

26 HKD5.1 USD2.8c

Note: Base case represents our current forecasts and TP *Extreme case assumes (1) US real GDP falls 3% and euro area GDP falls 5%; (2) Chinas GDP growth falls to 5%; (3) Substantial commodity price declines by end 2012. Base case and extreme case real GDP growth % assumptions: Australia (4.3, 0.5); China (8.6, 5.0); Hong Kong (4.5, -6.0); India (7.9, 3.0); Indonesia (7.0, 2.5); Malaysia (5.1, 5.8); New Zealand (3.5, 0.8); Philippines (5.7, 0.5); Singapore (5.3, -5.2); South Korea (5.0, -3.0); Taiwan (5.0, -5.0); Thailand (4.7, -3.0) Source: Nomura estimates

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China risk: Asia telecoms


Risks to our current overall view
Overall we believe the Asian telecom sector should be relatively resilient to a macro slowdown or a China hard-landing. YTD, Asian telcos is the only sector with positive returns (up 3%) although this may not continue (as the sector does not look inexpensive at 14-15x P/E currently), but outperformance relative to other sectors and markets would be likely. We continue to prefer liquid stocks, with stable yields and EPS resilience. Our bias is also for stocks with network advantages, especially as data economics can be challenging.

Research analysts:

Sachin Gupta, CFA


+65 6433 6968 sachin.gupta@nomura.com

Danny Chu, CFA


+852 2252 6209 danny.chu@nomura.com And the Asia telecoms team

Key areas of impact if China has a hard landing


Consumer spend on telcos could be adversely impacted telco spend as a percentage of GDP ranges from 3-6% across most Asian countries. The impact of a slowdown could be more pronounced in the mid to low end pre-paid segment, both on net adds and ARPUs. For China specifically, the impact could be more visible in factories along the coastal areas which has a larger migrant population. There could be downward revisions to capex, although we are already anticipating a drop in capex/sales from 20% in 2010 to 18% in 2012F. In the 2008 slowdown, there werent many downward revisions to capex or revenue/EBITDA guidance; however now the penetration rates are 10-20% higher. We think telcos in China, India, Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines could be more exposed, while the rest should be more resilient.
IMPORTANT: The sensitivity table below does not assess just the impact of a China hard landing on the mentioned stocks, rather it takes a look at an extreme scenario including recessions in the US and Europe. None of this is in our macro or industry or company forecasts. Detailed assumptions are footnoted. See table in appendix for our current ratings.

Fig. 27: Earnings and target price sensitivity for most affected and least affected companies in coverage in the extreme case*
China sales share 2011% 100 100 Base case EPS 2012 (CNY) 0.56 6.46 Target price % y-y (HKD) 79.5 2.7 18.50 90.00 Extreme case* EPS 2012 (CNY) 0.51 6.11 Target price % y-y (HKD) Comments 62.9 (3.0) 18.20 Revenue vulnerable due to low-ARPU. 89.60 Have more high-ARPU subscribers.

Ticker Most affected China Unicom Least affected China Mobile 941 HK 762 HK

Note: Base case represents our current forecasts and TP *Extreme case assumes (1) US real GDP falls 3% and euro area GDP falls 5%; (2) Chinas GDP growth falls to 5%; (3) Substantial commodity price declines by end 2012. Base case and extreme case real GDP growth % assumptions: Australia (4.3, 0.5); China (8.6, 5.0); Hong Kong (4.5, -6.0); India (7.9, 3.0); Indonesia (7.0, 2.5); Malaysia (5.1, 5.8); New Zealand (3.5, 0.8); Philippines (5.7, 0.5); Singapore (5.3, -5.2); South Korea (5.0, -3.0); Taiwan (5.0, -5.0); Thailand (4.7, -3.0) Source: Nomura estimates

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China risk: Asia transport


Risks to our current overall view
We currently have a negative view on shipping companies, a neutral to positive view on airlines, expressways, and ports, and a positive view on airports. Our positive position on airlines would be most at risk in a China hard landing scenario.

Research analysts:

Jim Wong
+852 2252 2195 jim.wong@nomura.com

Andrew Lee
+852 2252 6197 andrew.lee@nomura.com And the Asia transport team

Key areas of impact if China has a hard landing


Demand is expected to be impacted across the entire transport sector, nevertheless, the impact to earnings is expected to be the largest for shipping companies and airlines given thinner profit margins. Further, a hard landing may impact the pricing for both the shippers and the airlines. In contrast, a hard landing is not expected to have any price impact for airports and just minimal impact on the ports and expressways. While a hard landing may result in tighter funding, it is unlikely that the Chinese transport companies would run into solvency issues given that most are state-owned and historically had been bailed-out by the government in crisis situations. A hard landing may increase regulatory risk especially on pricing for the expressways.

Where is potential for upside surprise?


We believe that there is the possibility for an upside surprise for the expressways should toll-rate cuts (which have been at least partially priced in given the official announcement of a nation-wide toll-rate review at the beginning of this year) not materialize by May2012.

IMPORTANT: The sensitivity table below does not assess just the impact of a China hard landing on the mentioned stocks, rather it takes a look at an extreme scenario including recessions in the US and Europe. None of this is in our macro or industry or company forecasts. Detailed assumptions are footnoted. See table in appendix for our current ratings.

Fig. 28: Earnings and target price sensitivity for most affected and least affected companies in coverage in the extreme case*
Base case China sales share EPS 2012 2011% (CNY) % y-y 80 0.39 (0.065) Extreme case* Target price EPS 2012 (HKD) (CNY) 4.65 (0.69) Target price (HKD) Comments 0.86 Target price of extreme case based on 2008's trough valuation P/BV of 0.65x and assume CNY appreciation to remain flat y-y in 2012F 1.11 In a bear-case scenario, we assume overall 2012F freight rates would decline by a further 5% on a y-y basis while we assume all international freight rates in 2012F would decline by a further 10% from the base case in an extreme bearish case. TWD3.39 In a bear-case scenario, we assume overall 2012F freight rates would decline by a further 5% on a y-y basis while we assume all international freight rates in 2012F would decline by a further 10% from the base case in an extreme bearish case. 3.18 Assuming the toll rate to remain stable post the toll rate review in 2012 for calculating the extreme case's earnings, while target price of extreme case to be based on 2008's trough PE multiple of 11.2x and assume earnings to decline by another 20% to reflect the possible toll rate cut 2.86 Target price of extreme case to be based on historical trough P/BV of 0.7x 18.60 y-y chg% are calculated based on re-current earnings

Ticker Most affected CEA 670 HK

% y-y na

CSCL

2866 HK

na

(0.19)

na

1.20

(0.38)

na

Yang Ming

2609 TT

na -TWD2.91

na TWD7.10 -TWD7.01

na

Least affected HHI 737 HK 100 HKD0.34 (3.5) 5.69 HKD0.29 (19.1)

BCIA Hopewell

694 HK 54 HK

100 65

0.27 HKD2.00

53.6 52.3

5.85 32.60

0.17 HKD0.95

(39.0) (28.1)

Note: Base case represents our current forecasts and TP *Extreme case assumes (1) US real GDP falls 3% and euro area GDP falls 5%; (2) Chinas GDP growth falls to 5%; (3) Substantial commodity price declines by end 2012. Base case and extreme case real GDP growth % assumptions: Australia (4.3, 0.5); China (8.6, 5.0); Hong Kong (4.5, -6.0); India (7.9, 3.0); Indonesia (7.0, 2.5); Malaysia (5.1, -5.8); New Zealand (3.5, 0.8); Philippines (5.7, 0.5); Singapore (5.3, -5.2); South Korea (5.0, -3.0); Taiwan (5.0, -5.0); Thailand (4.7, -3.0) Source: Nomura estimates

14 Fig. 14

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This portion of the Report has been prepared by a Desk Analyst and is not a research report under U.S. law. The desk commentary portion of this report is not a product of the Fixed Income Research Department and is not covered by the research analyst certification provided in Appendix A-1. To our U.K. clients: this portion of the Report has been produced by and for the primary benefit of a trading desk. As such, we do not hold out this Desk Commentary as being impartial in relation to the activities of this trading desk. For additional information concerning the role of trading desk analysts, please see the important conflicts disclosures beginning at page 101 of this report.

Chinese credits already reflecting the risks of a China hard landing


From a credit perspective, when considering the direct consequences of a China hard landing, we believe the four key areas of focus are the impact on the sovereign and its ratings, the banks and the availability of credit, with implications for the HY property sector and industrials, and lastly, the repercussions for the Chinese SOE space. We believe the risks of a slowdown are already starting to show in the recent underperformance of Chinese credit across both HG and HY relative to the rest of the Asian credit universe. This underperformance has been seen right through the sell-off since August through September, and the much less convincing participation in the rally that subsequently followed. In our view, a China hard landing would have the following consequences for Chinese credit: Significant underperformance of highly levered SOEs, whose investment grade ratings have been underpinned by government support; Chinese HY industrials would underperform the large cap HY property credits; Significantly more scrutiny of the default risk of smaller cap property credits; and Hong Kong banks that have extended their balance sheets to Chinese banks and SOEs would likely be dragged to wider levels, though we believe the space could be unfairly penalized.

Desk Analyst Pradeep Mohinani +852 2536 7030


pradeep.mohinani@nomura.com

Ahead of a China hard landing playing out, we believe the signs would be borne through the ripple effects of the tightening of onshore credit with an explosion in shadow bank lending followed by a focus on the governments ability to manage the knock-on consequences. Another area that will be closely tracked will be the property sector, which has been on an uninterrupted upward trajectory in terms of supply and prices. The supply overhang that has been created is finally starting to result in prices and transaction volumes crashing, particularly in top-tier cities. On the back of the above views and backdrop we lay out our trade ideas on China: Sovereign We expect CDS to remain highly volatile and subject to macro headlines with likely buyers on any meaningful tightening as we saw at the end of last week, where CDS went from a recent peak of 207bp down to the current 140bp. We do not see much in terms of downward pressure on foreign credit ratings. If there is any pressure we would expect it to come from Fitchs

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local currency ratings, the agency having put its AA- rating on Negative outlook relative to its foreign currency rating of A+. In High Grade, a number of Chinese state-owned credits like Sinochem, China Metallurgical and China Resources Power have continued to benefit from investment grade ratings based on the expectation of government support. However, in a distressed macroeconomic scenario, we believe support will vary based on the companys relative importance to the government, especially as policy instruments, as well as the language of support used for outstanding debt. Of these issuers, we note that China Resources Power (Baa3/BBB-) and China Metallurgical (Baa2/BBB-) are both already on the verge of an S&P downgrade and being pushed into noninvestment grade territory. China Resources Power has had its outlook revised to Negative on the back of aggressive capex plans and a stressed balance sheet, while China Metallurgicals credit metrics are only marginally better than the downgrade triggers. Given that Citic Pacifics senior bonds traded in the low-70s in the recent sell-off after being downgraded to non-investment grade, we highlight the risk of these bonds seeing gappy downward movements. In High Yield, the larger-cap Chinese property and higher quality China industrial bonds are now trading between 12% and 15% yields, or at bond prices in the 70s-90s, while the more defensive Indonesian corporates now trade at 6-8%. With the recent market rally, we view high yield bond valuations as fair at current levels. That said, we still see pockets of relative value trade ideas, especially on longer-dated larger-cap Chinese property bonds and switch trades among the China industrial and small-cap property space. Switch ideas in China property: 1) Switch to SHIMAO 18s at 81.5 mid (15.7%) from AGILE 17s at 82.25 mid (13.6%) to take out 0.75 cash points and pick up 210bp. Agile is likely to miss its presales target on its underperformance in Hainan. In contrast, we see better sales execution and potential credit improvement in Shimao. 2) Switch to KWGPRO 17s at 79 mid (18.6%) from YLLG 17s at 82.75 mid (14.1%) to take out 3.75 cash points and pick up 450bp. Yanlords presales were slow in view of its perilous market position and its presales collection period is longer than its peers due to attractive installment terms (up to 1 year) offered to cash buyers. The groups recent RMB1.8bn land purchase in Zhuhai further adds pressure to its weakened liquidity profile. With a similar business size, similar market position but better liquidity profile, we believe KWGPRO trading 450bp back of YLLG id unjustified. 3) Switch to HPDLF 16s at 60 mid (28.7%) from PWRLNG 15s at 71 mid (26%) to take out 11 cash points and pick up 2.7% yield. Hopson has a longer operating history and thus has better sales execution than Powerlong, as evidenced by its 70% sales target achieved in 9M11 compared to the latters 36%. Despite marketing as a landlord, Powerlongs recurring income was not meaningful (7% of EBIT in 1H11) and our street check indicates low occupancy rates and poor traffic in its shopping mall. Switch out of some expensive industrial names (exposed to the infrastructure and property sectors) into property issues to pick up more yield at flat or lower bond prices: Sell CHOGRP 2015 at 93, LONKIN 2016 at 89.5 or SHASHU 2016 at 92.75, and Buy SHIMAO 2017 at 81.5 or 2018 at 81.75; Sell LIANSU 2016 at 84 or WESCHI 2016 at 82.75 and Buy ROADKG 2015 at 80.5. Switch trades among the industrial names: Sell CHOGRP 2015 at 93 and Buy HYVANL 2016 at 89 to pick up 165bp and 4 cash points, or Buy MIEHOL 2016 at 88 to pick up 310bp and 5 cash points; Sell FUFENG 2016 at 82 or WESCHI 2016 at 82.75 and Buy WINSWY 2016 at 83.5 to pick up 50bp or 65bp respectively; Sell LUMENA 2014 at 85.5 and Buy TEXTEX 2016 at 76 to pick up 9.5 cash points or Buy GJTLIJ 2014 at 84.5 to pick up 1 cash point and obtain better security. 92

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HK bank LT2 2020s will likely face high supply risk in the near term. A number of banks such as Bank of East Asia and Citic Bank International have T2 refinancing needs in 1H12 and they recently established MTN programs and/or conducted roadshows to prepare for any potential LT2 issuance to refinance once the market stabilizes. There was even market speculation that BOCHK was looking to issue a new 10yr LT2 earlier last week, according to Reuters, although we do not see the rationale for such a move in the near term given a solid total CAR of 17.6% and limited T2 refinancing needs until June 2013. The latest 3yr USD250 million CD issuance by China Merchant Bank (BBB; the sixth-largest commercial bank in China) at MS+300bp could open up the pipeline for more USD senior or LT2 issuance by other Chinese banks. Against this backdrop of heavy supply pressure, we suggest investors take advantage of the recent rally to switch out of the HK bank LT2 2020s (particularly BNKEA 2020, CINDBK 2020, ICBCAS 2020 and FUBON 2020) into short-dated HK bank UT2 Pnc12 or Pnc13 with reasonably attractive YTCs (including BNKEA GBP 6.125% Pc12, CINDBK 9.125% Pnc12 and WINHAN 9.375% Pnc13), which have lagged behind in the latest rally.

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References
Akerlof, G.(1970), The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 84, No. 2, pp. 488 500. Ash, R. F. (2011), Feeding Billions: Food Security in China, International Relations and Security Network/Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, 29 March 2011. Aziz, J. (2006), Rebalancing Chinas Economy: What Does Growth Theory Tell Us?, IMF Working Paper 06/291. Bai, C.; C. Hsieh and Y. Qian (2006), "The Return to Capital in China", NBER Working Paper No. 12755, December 2006. Borio C., P. Lowe (2002), "Asset Prices, Financial Monetary Stability: Exploring the Nexus", BIS Working Papers, No. 114, July 2002. Cai, Fang and M. Wang (2008), A Counterfactual Analysis on Unlimited Surplus Labor in Rural China, China & World Economy, Vol. 16, No. 1, pp.5165. Chellaney, B. (2011), Water: Asias New Battleground, Georgetown University Press. Conway, P., R. Herd and T. Chalaux (2010), Reforming Chinas Monetary Policy Framework to Meet Domestic Objectives, OECD Economics Department Working Papers No. 822, December 2010. Yang, D. and M. Wang (2010), Discussions on Potential Bias and Implications of Lewis Turning Point, China Economic Journal, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp.121-136. Eichengreen, B., D. Park and K. Shin (2011), "When Fast Growing Economies Slow Down: International Evidence and Implications for the People' Republic of China", ADB Economics Working paper Series No. 262, June 2011. Findlay, R. and K.H. O'Rourke (2008), Power and Plenty, Princeton University Press. FitchRatings (2011), Chinese Banks: Growth of Leverage Still Outpacing GDP Growth, China Special Report, July 2011. Fukumoto, T. and I. Muto (2011), Rebalancing Chinas Economic Growth: Some Insights from Japans Experience, Bank of Japan Working Paper Series No. 11-E-5, July 2011. Gan J.; Y. Guo and C. Xu (2008), "What makes Privatization Work? The Case Study of China, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, September 2008. Garnaut, R. (2010), Macro-Economic Implications of the Turning Point China Economic Journal, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp.181-190. Gleick, P. H. (2008), Water Conflict Chronology, Pacific Institute for Studies in Development, Environment and Security, 11 October 2008. Herd, R., C. Pigott, and S. Hill (2010), Chinas Financial Sector Reforms, OECD Economic Department Working Paper No. 747.

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Huang, Y. (2010), Chinas Great Ascendancy and Structural Risks: Consequences of Asymmetric market Liberalization, Asian-Pacific Economic Literature, Vol. 24, Issue 1. Hvistendahl , M. (2011), Unnatural Selection: Choosing boys over girls, and the consequences of a world full of men, Oxford University Press, 2011. IMF (2004), "Are Credit Booms in Emerging markets a Concern?", Chapter IV, World Economic Outlook. IMF (2011a), Peoples Republic of China: 2011 Article IV Consultation, Country Report No. 11/192, July 2011. IMF (2011b), Peoples Republic of China: Spillover Report of the 2011 Article IV Consultation and Selected Issues, Country Report No. 11/193, July 2011. IMF (2011c), "Gauging Financial Stability Risks in China", Box 1.5 in Global Financial Stability Report, September 2011. Johnson, B. (1998), "Sequencing Capital Account Liberalization", IMF Finance and Development Magazine, Vol. 35, No. 4, December 1998. Kaminsky G., C. Reinhart (1999), "The Twin Crises: The Causes of Banking and Balance-of-payments Problems", American Economic Review, Vol. 89, No. 3, June 1999, PP. 473-500. Kinoshita T. (2009), What Japans 1980s experience means for China", Nomura Asia Special Report, 19 October 2009. Knight, J., Q. Deng and S. Li (2011), The Puzzle of Migrant Labour Shortage and Rural Labor Surplus in China, China Economic Review (forth-coming). Kuijs, L. (2009), China Through 2020 : A Macroeconomic Scenario World Bank China Research Working Paper No. 9, June 2009. Lewis, A. (1954), Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour, Manchester School of Economics and Social Studies, Vol. 22. Minami, R. (1973), The Turning Point in Economic Development: Japans Experience, Economic Research Series No. 14, The Institute of Economic Research Hitotsubashi University. Minami, R. and X. Ma (2010), The Lewis Turning Point of Chinese Economy: Comparison with Japanese Experience, China Economic Journal, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp.163-179. Newton, A., R. Subbaraman (2002), China: Gigantic Possibilities, Present Realities, Lehman Brothers, 21 January 2002. OECD (2010), Economic Survey of China, OECD, Paris. OECD (2005), Economic Survey of China, OECD, Paris. Podpiera, R. (2006), Progress in Chinas Banking Sector Reform: Has Bank Behavior Changed?, IMF Working Paper No 06/71. Pozar, Z., T. Adrian, A. Ashcraft, H. Boesky (2010), Shadow Banking, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Report No. 458, July 2010. Prasad, E.S. (2007), Is the Chinese Growth Miracle Built to Last?, The Institute for the Study of Labor Discussion Paper No. 2995.

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Standard and Poors (2011), Stress Tests Show a Big Sales Slump Could Severely Strain the Liquidity of Many Rated Chinese Developers, Global Credit Portal, RatingsDirect, 26 September 2011. Wang, M. (2010), The Rise of Labor Cost and the Fall of Labor Input: Has China Reached Lewis Turning Point? China Economic Journal, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp.137-153. World Bank (2008), Mid-term Evaluation of Chinas 11th Five Year Plan, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit, 18 December 2008. World Bank (2011a), Securing the Present, Shaping the Future, World Bank East Asia and Pacific Economic Update 2011, Volume 1. World Bank (2011b), Global Economic Prospects: Maintaining Progress amid Turmoil, Volume 3, June 2011 Yeung, G. (2009), How Banks in China make Lending Decisions, Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 18, No. 59. Zhiwei, Z., C. Sun and W. Chen (2011), "China: The case for structurally higher inflation", Asia Special Report, Nomura Global Economics, 21 September 2011.

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Appendix: The Construction of Nomuras China Stress Index


From our analysis of Chinas macro challenges and risks, we identified 18 indicators to construct our China Stress Index, or CSI for short. The data are monthly and start in January 2000. For the indicators that are available only on a quarterly or annual basis, monthly series were interpolated from the longer frequency data. CSI is then defined as a weighted average of standardized indicators as follows:

Chien-Hua Chen +852 2536 7429


chien-hua.chen@nomura.com

Qilong Zhang +852 2252 6191


qilong.zhang@nomura.com

Where CSIt is the composite CSI level at month t; wi is the weight for the i-th indicator ; and i are the sample mean and standard deviation of the i-th indicator, respectively. Indicators 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 Gross capital formation, % of GDP Difference between year-on-year growth rates of nominal fixed-asset investment and retail sales Real estate investment, % of GDP Residential housing starts less sales, 12-month rolling sum 1 Return on capital less cost of capital Real 1-year bank deposit interest rate Domestic credit, % of GDP Bank reserve requirement ratio, % Funding from shadow banking sector, % of total social financing Property loans, % of total loans by official financial institutions Residential property price, % deviation from long-run linear trend Lending attitude of banks as perceived by industrial enterprises, survey diffusion index Industrial companies liability/asset ratio CPI inflation, % year-on-year Inflation expectations, survey diffusion index Industrial waste air emission per capita, cubic meters 3 A gauge of urban income inequality Number of nationwide labour disputes / total labor force
2

Data Frequency Annual Monthly Monthly Monthly Monthly Monthly Monthly Monthly Quarterly Quarterly Quarterly Quarterly Quarterly Monthly Quarterly Annual Annual Annual

Weighting 10.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 10.0% 4.0% 10.0% 8.0% 8.0% 3.0% 3.0% 5.0% 5.0% 3.0% 3.0% 3.0%

Direction of increased risk Up Up Up Up Down Down Up Up Up Up Up Down Up Up Up Up Up Up

Notes: 1) The return on capital is estimated by % year-on-year nominal GDP growth and the cost of capital is approximated by the benchmark 1yr bank lending rate in % pa; 2) The real 1yr bank deposit rate is calculated by subtracting % y-o-y headline CPI inflation from the nominal 1yr bank deposit rate; 3) Average urban household income of the top 20% income decile as a ratio to those in the bottom 20% income decile. Source: Nomura.

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Appendix: Companies mentioned and ratings


Company Name Primary Health Care Ramsay Health Care Sonic Health Care ANZ Commonwealth Bank National Australia Bank Westpac Banking Corp Boart Longyear Amcor AGL Energy Coca-Cola Amatil Telstra Woolworths Bluescope Steel Onesteel Orica Rio Tinto BHP Billiton Tabcorp Holdings Wesfarmers Myer Pacific Brands Treasury Wine Estates Hong Kong / China LDK Solar JA Solar Trina Solar Yingli Green Energy GCL Poly Energy China Unicom China Mobile TCL Communication Tech ZTE Corp Lenovo Group China Eastern Airlines China Shipping Container Lines Hopewell Highway Infrastructure Beijing Capital International Airport Hopewell Holdings Mindray Medical International United Laboratories Bank of East Asia Wing Hang Bank Dah Sing Financial BOC Hong Kong (Holdings) Hang Seng Bank China Minsheng Bank - H China CITIC Bank Bank of China - H ICBC Chongqing Rural Commercial Bank China Construction Bank-H Guangzhou R&F Properties China Overseas Land & Inv Wharf Holdings Sun Hung Kai Properties Melco Crown Esprit Samsonite Prada Li & Fung Galaxy Entertainment SJM Holdings Sands China Tsingtao Brewery Australia Bloomberg Ticker PRY AU RHC AU SHL AU ANZ AU CBA AU NAB AU WBC AU BLY AU AMC AU AGK AU CCL AU TLS AU WOW AU BSL AU OST AU ORI AU RIO AU BHP AU TAH AU WES AU MYR AU PBG AU TWE AU LDK US JASO US TSL US YGE US 3800 HK 762 HK 941 HK 2618 HK 763 HK 992 HK 670 HK 2866 HK 737 HK 694 HK 54 HK MR US 3933 HK 23 HK 302 HK 440 HK 2388 HK 11 HK 1988 HK 998 HK 3988 HK 1398 HK 3618 HK 939 HK 2777 HK 688 HK 4 HK 16 HK MPEL US 330 HK 1910 HK 1913 HK 494 HK 27 HK 880 HK 1928 HK 168 HK Price (LC) 26/10/2011 Rating Target Price (LC)

3.31 18.5 11.02 21.59 49.11 24.95 22.3


3.08 7.36 14.43 12.12 3.15 24.15 0.85 1.235 25.17 66.74 36.94 2.87 31.9 2.57 0.58 3.84

Buy Buy Neutral Neutral Neutral Buy Neutral Buy Neutral Buy Buy Neutral Buy Not Rated Not Rated Not Rated Not Rated Not Rated Not Rated Buy Neutral Neutral
Neutral

3.8 21 11 23.5 53 31 24.5 4.26 7.1 17.5 13 3.14 30 39 2.3 0.65 3.3

3.3 2.19 7.4 3.9 2.16 16.2 76.3 3.35 21.05 5.64 2.9 1.45 4.19 3.42 19.98 25.1 6.06 28.35 69.1 23.2 18.4 97.9 6.48 3.98 2.85 4.57 3.1 5.43 6.96 13.14 37.9 102.9
10.91 11.26 12.32 34.45 13.96 15.34 13.04 22.1 43.7

Reduce Neutral Neutral Neutral Neutral Buy Buy Buy Buy Neutral Buy Reduce Neutral Buy Buy Buy Neutral Reduce Neutral Buy Buy Neutral Neutral Buy Buy Buy Buy Neutral Reduce Buy Neutral Buy Buy Neutral Buy Neutral Neutral Neutral Buy Buy Reduce

2.6 2 7 3.4 2.5 18.5 90 8 28 5.1 4.65 1.2 5.69 5.85 32.6 34 6.4 24 84 50 28 120 7.4 6.5 5.2 7.5 6.52 7.02 10.46 21.3 53.1 166.5 17.5 8.9 19.7 40.3 14.1 21 23 30.55 34

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India

Indonesia

Malaysia

Singapore

Huabao International China Yurun L'Occitane Want Want China Mengniu Air China LTD - H China Southern Airlines CO - H Ping An Insurance Group Country Garden Holdings China Resources Land Alibaba.Com Tencent Holdings China National Building MA - H Aluminum Corp of China LTD - H China Oilfield Services - H Evergrande Real Estate Group Citic Pacific LTD Guangzhou Automobile Group - H Dongfeng Motor GRP CO LTD - H Belle International Holdings Tata Motors Tata Steel Crompton Greaves Dr Reddy's Laboratories ITC Infosys Adani Power Lanco Infratech DLF Ltd Oberoi Realty Perusahaan Gas Negara Bank Negara Indonesia Bank Mandiri Bank Central Asia Bank Rakyat Indonesia Bank Danamon Indonesia Bumi Resources Adaro Energy Harum Energy Astra Agro Lestari Astra Internation Gudang Garam Tbk Pt Telkom Indonesia Jasa Marga Agung Podomoro Bumi Serpong Damai Ciputra Dev Maybank CIMB Group Holdings Telekom Malaysia Public Bank Hong Leong Bank Malaysian Resources SP Setia Mah Sing Group Capitaland Keppel Land Wilmar International DBS Bank Singapore Telecom Ascendas REIT UOB OCBC

336 HK 1068 HK 973 HK 151 HK 2319 HK 753 HK 1055 HK 2318 HK 2007 HK 1109 HK 1688 HK 700 HK 3323 HK 2600 HK 2883 HK 3333 HK 267 HK 2238 HK 439 HK 1880 HK TTMT IN TATA IN CRG IN DRRD IN ITC IN INFO IN ADANI IN LANCI IN DLFU IN OBER IN PGAS IJ BBNI IJ BMRI IJ BBCA IJ BBRI IJ BDMN IJ BUMI IJ ADRO IJ HRUM IJ AALI IJ ASII IJ GGRM IJ TLKM IJ JSMR IJ APLN IJ BSDE IJ CTRA IJ MAY MK CIMB MK T MK PBKF MK HLBK MK MRC MK SPSB MK MSGB MK CAPL SP KPLD SP WIL SP DBS SP ST SP AREIT SP UOB SP OCBC SP

Noble (US$) mewah (US$) Olam

NOBL SP MII SP OLAM SP

4.53 12.2 16.5 7.09 25.1 6.15 4.48 53.95 2.86 10.34 9.42 177.1 8.74 4.05 12.54 3.04 13.44 7.82 12.84 14.5 191.8 451.3 139.15 1593.1 212.2 2838.65 84.65 15 229.75 231.9 2900 4025 6850 8000 6650 4950 2250 2000 7850 20400 68400 58250 7400 3900 330 920 500 8.27 7.26 4.23 12.48 10.36 1.91 3.85 1.94 2.52 2.69 5.19 12.25 3.19 1.98 17.03 8.35 1.48 0.42 2.4

Buy Buy Buy Neutral Buy Buy Buy Buy Neutral Neutral Neutral Buy Not Rated Not Rated Not Rated Not Rated Not Rated Not Rated Not Rated
Not Rated Buy Buy Buy Buy Buy Buy Neutral Buy Buy Buy Buy Buy Buy Reduce Buy Neutral Buy Buy Buy Buy Neutral Buy Buy Buy Neutral Buy Buy Reduce Reduce Buy Neutral Neutral Reduce Reduce Neutral Buy Buy Neutral Buy Neutral Neutral Neutral Buy Buy Reduce Buy

11.7 21 22.9 6.6 34 11.95 6.75 97 3.3 15.79 10 260 200 653 240 1911 229 3100 115 30 270 284 3900 4500 7900 6700 8400 4900 4750 2850 11000 28400 72000 65000 8700 4950 330 1200 690 6.85 6 4.8 11.5 10.7 1.75 3.45 2.46 4.05 4.9 5.9 16.4 3.45 2.1 21.9 11.1 2.5 0.5 3.5

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South Korea

Taiwan

Thailand

KEPCO LG Display Samsung SDI LG Innotek Woori FG KB Financial Group Industrial Bank of Korea Hana Financial Group KT&G Corp Dongbu Insurance SK Telecom KT Corp LG Uplus Corp Asia Cement Synnex Technology AirTAC Taiwan Mobile Formosa International Hotels President Chain Store Motech Industries Acer Inc Yang Ming Marine First FHC E. Sun FHC Chinatrust FHC Huaku Development Farglory Land Development Ratchaburi Generating Electricity Generating

015760 KS 034220 KS 006400 KS 011070 KS 053000 KS 105560 KS 024110 KS 086790 KS 033780 KS 005830 KS 017670 KS 030200 KS 032640 KS 1102 TT 2347 TT 1590 TT 3045 TT 2707 TT 2912 TT 6244 TT 2353 TT 2609 TT 2892 TT 2884 TT 2891 TT 2548 TT 5522 TT RATCH TB EGCO TB

Bangkok Bank (BBL) Krungthai Bank (KTB) Kasikorn Bank (KBank) Siam Commercial Bank (SCB)

BBL TB KTB TB KBANK TB SCB TB

25100 24200 139000 75200 10300 42150 14650 39400 76700 45900 161500 37700 7110 36.2 73.1 167 86.5 455 173 59.2 35.65 12.6 19.85 14.75 19.35 68.4 50 39.75 80 143.5 14.4 118.5 108

Buy Neutral Neutral Neutral Buy Buy Neutral Buy Neutral Buy Buy Buy Neutral Reduce Buy Buy Buy Buy Buy Reduce Reduce Reduce Buy Buy Buy Buy Buy Buy Buy Buy Buy Neutral Buy

35000 24000 160000 71000 18000 62000 16000 54000 66000 71000 178000 53000 6000 32.6 90 300 102 550 205 39 27 7.1 26.5 20 28.3 85 67 41 110 188 23.2 135 145

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Important Conflicts Disclosures Relating to Sales or Trading Desk Material


Investors should be aware that Nomura engages or may engage in the following activities, which present conflicts of interest: The person distributing sales or trading desk material may have previously provided any ideas and strategies discussed in it to Nomuras traders, who may already have acted on them. Nomura does and seeks to do business with the companies referred to in sales or trading desk materials. Nomura and its officers, directors, partners and employees, including persons involved in the preparation or issuance of this material (subject to company policy), may from time to time maintain a long or short position in, or purchase or sell a position in, hold or act as market-makers or advisors, brokers or commercial and/or investment bankers in relation to the products discussed in sales or trading desk materials or in securities (or related securities, financial products, options, warrants, rights or derivatives), of companies mentioned in trading desk materials or be represented on the board of such companies. For securities or products recommended by a member of a sales or trading desk in which Nomura is not a market maker, Nomura usually provides bids and offers and may act as principal in connection with transactions involving such securities or products. Nomura may engage in these transactions in a manner that is inconsistent with or contrary to any recommendations made in sales or trading desk material. Members of a sales or trading desk are compensated based on, among other things, the profitability of Nomuras underwriting, sales and trading activity in securities or products of the relevant asset class, its fixed income department and its overall profitability. The person who prepares trading desk material and his or her household members are not permitted to own the securities, products or financial instruments mentioned. Nomura, through different sales or trading desks or its fixed income research department, may have issued, and may in the future issue, other reports that are inconsistent with, and reach different conclusions from the information presented. Those reports reflect the different assumptions, views and analytical methods of the persons who prepared them and Nomura is under no obligation to bring them to the attention of recipients of this communication. Disclaimer Relating to Sales or Trading Desk Material This material has been compiled by a Nomura Group sales or trading desk, and is made available to you through one of Nomura Groups global securities affiliates. Nomura Group is the global marketing name of Nomura Holdings, Inc. (Tokyo) and its direct and indirect subsidiaries worldwide. This information is neither investment research nor a research recommendation, and may not be relied upon as such. The desks opinions may differ from views of Nomura Group's research department. This material is: (i) for your private information only, and we are not soliciting any action based upon it; (ii) not to be construed as an offer to sell or a solicitation to buy any security or financial instrument in any jurisdiction where such offer or solicitation may be illegal; and (iii) is based upon information that we consider reliable, however it should not be relied upon as such. All projections, valuations and statistical analyses are provided to assist the recipient in the evaluation of the matters described herein and, to the extent that they are based on historical information, should not be relied upon as an accurate prediction of future performance. Any prices, yields and opinions expressed are current opinions as of the date appearing on this material only and are subject to change without notice. Additional, important disclaimer information should be reviewed by following this link: http://www.nomura.com/americas/fidisclaimer.shtml.

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Disclosure Appendix A-1


Any Authors named on this report are Research Analysts unless otherwise indicated Analyst Certification Each research analyst identified herein certifies that all of the views expressed in this report by such analyst accurately reflect his or her personal views about the subject securities and issuers. In addition, each research analyst identified on the cover page hereof hereby certifies that no part of his or her compensation was, is, or will be, directly or indirectly related to the specific recommendations or views that he or she has expressed in this research report, nor is it tied to any specific investment banking transactions performed by Nomura Securities International, Inc., Nomura International plc or any other Nomura Group company.

Important Disclosures
Conflict-of-interest disclosures
Important disclosures may be accessed through the following website: http://go.nomuranow.com/research/globalresearchportal/pages/disclosures/disclosures.aspx . If you have difficulty with this site or you do not have a password, please contact your Nomura Securities International, Inc. salesperson (1-877-865-5752) or email grpsupporteu@nomura.com for assistance.

Online availability of research and additional conflict-of-interest disclosures


Nomura Equity Research is available on nomuranow.com, Bloomberg, Capital IQ, Factset, Reuters and ThomsonOne. Important disclosures may be accessed through the left hand side of the Nomura Disclosure web page http://go.nomuranow.com/research/globalresearchportal or requested from Nomura Securities International, Inc., on 1-877-865-5752. If you have any difficulties with the website, please email grpsupport-eu@nomura.com for technical assistance. The analysts responsible for preparing this report have received compensation based upon various factors including the firm's total revenues, a portion of which is generated by Investment Banking activities. Unless otherwise noted, the non-US analysts listed at the front of this report are not registered/qualified as research analysts under FINRA/NYSE rules, may not be associated persons of NSI, and may not be subject to FINRA Rule 2711 and NYSE Rule 472 restrictions on communications with covered companies, public appearances, and trading securities held by a research analyst account. Industry Specialists identified in some Nomura International plc research reports are employees within the Firm who are responsible for the sales and trading effort in the sector for which they have coverage. Industry Specialists do not contribute in any manner to the content of research reports in which their names appear. Marketing Analysts identified in some Nomura research reports are research analysts employed by Nomura International plc who are primarily responsible for marketing Nomuras Equity Research product in the sector for which they have coverage. Marketing Analysts may also contribute to research reports in which their names appear and publish research on their sector.

Distribution of ratings (Global)


The distribution of all ratings published by Nomura Global Equity Research is as follows: 49% have been assigned a Buy rating which, for purposes of mandatory disclosures, are classified as a Buy rating; 41% of companies with this rating are investment banking clients of the Nomura Group*. 41% have been assigned a Neutral rating which, for purposes of mandatory disclosures, is classified as a Hold rating; 50% of companies with this rating are investment banking clients of the Nomura Group*. 10% have been assigned a Reduce rating which, for purposes of mandatory disclosures, are classified as a Sell rating; 20% of companies with this rating are investment banking clients of the Nomura Group*. As at 30 September 2011. *The Nomura Group as defined in the Disclaimer section at the end of this report.

Explanation of Nomura's equity research rating system in Europe, Middle East and Africa, US and Latin America for ratings published from 27 October 2008
The rating system is a relative system indicating expected performance against a specific benchmark identified for each individual stock. Analysts may also indicate absolute upside to target price defined as (fair value - current price)/current price, subject to limited management discretion. In most cases, the fair value will equal the analyst's assessment of the current intrinsic fair value of the stock using an appropriate valuation methodology such as discounted cash flow or multiple analysis, etc. Stocks A rating of 'Buy', indicates that the analyst expects the stock to outperform the Benchmark over the next 12 months. A rating of 'Neutral', indicates that the analyst expects the stock to perform in line with the Benchmark over the next 12 months. A rating of 'Reduce', indicates that the analyst expects the stock to underperform the Benchmark over the next 12 months. A rating of 'Suspended', indicates that the rating, target price and estimates have been suspended temporarily to comply with applicable regulations and/or firm policies in certain circumstances including, but not limited to, when Nomura is acting in an advisory capacity in a merger or strategic transaction involving the company. Benchmarks are as follows: United States/Europe: Please see valuation methodologies for explanations of relevant benchmarks for stocks (accessible through the left hand side of the Nomura Disclosure web page: http://go.nomuranow.com/research/globalresearchportal);Global Emerging Markets (ex-Asia): MSCI Emerging Markets ex-Asia, unless otherwise stated in the valuation methodology. Sectors A 'Bullish' stance, indicates that the analyst expects the sector to outperform the Benchmark during the next 12 months. A 'Neutral' stance, indicates that the analyst expects the sector to perform in line with the Benchmark during the next 12 months. A 'Bearish' stance, indicates that the analyst expects the sector to underperform the Benchmark during the next 12 months. Benchmarks are as follows: United States: S&P 500; Europe: Dow Jones STOXX 600; Global Emerging Markets (ex-Asia): MSCI Emerging Markets ex-Asia.

Explanation of Nomura's equity research rating system for Asian companies under coverage ex Japan published from 30 October 2008 and in Japan from 6 January 2009
Stocks Stock recommendations are based on absolute valuation upside (downside), which is defined as (Target Price - Current Price) / Current Price, subject to limited management discretion. In most cases, the Target Price will equal the analyst's 12-month intrinsic valuation of the stock, based on an appropriate valuation methodology such as discounted cash flow, multiple analysis, etc. A 'Buy' recommendation indicates that potential upside is 15% or more. A 'Neutral' recommendation indicates that potential upside is less than 15% or downside is less than 5%. A 'Reduce' recommendation indicates that potential downside is 5% or more. A rating of 'Suspended' indicates that the rating and target price have been suspended temporarily to comply with applicable regulations and/or firm policies in certain circumstances including when Nomura is acting in an advisory capacity in a merger or strategic transaction involving the subject company. Securities and/or companies that are labelled as 'Not rated' or shown as 'No rating' are not in regular research coverage of the Nomura entity identified in the top banner. Investors should not expect continuing or additional information from Nomura relating to such securities and/or companies. Sectors A 'Bullish' rating means most stocks in the sector have (or the weighted average recommendation of the stocks under coverage is) a positive absolute recommendation. A 'Neutral' rating means most stocks in the sector have (or the weighted average recommendation of the stocks

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under coverage is) a neutral absolute recommendation. A 'Bearish' rating means most stocks in the sector have (or the weighted average recommendation of the stocks under coverage is) a negative absolute recommendation.

Explanation of Nomura's equity research rating system in Japan published prior to 6 January 2009 (and ratings in Europe, Middle East and Africa, US and Latin America published prior to 27 October 2008)
Stocks A rating of '1' or 'Strong buy', indicates that the analyst expects the stock to outperform the Benchmark by 15% or more over the next six months. A rating of '2' or 'Buy', indicates that the analyst expects the stock to outperform the Benchmark by 5% or more but less than 15% over the next six months. A rating of '3' or 'Neutral', indicates that the analyst expects the stock to either outperform or underperform the Benchmark by less than 5% over the next six months. A rating of '4' or 'Reduce', indicates that the analyst expects the stock to underperform the Benchmark by 5% or more but less than 15% over the next six months. A rating of '5' or 'Sell', indicates that the analyst expects the stock to underperform the Benchmark by 15% or more over the next six months. Stocks labeled 'Not rated' or shown as 'No rating' are not in Nomura's regular research coverage. Nomura might not publish additional research reports concerning this company, and it undertakes no obligation to update the analysis, estimates, projections, conclusions or other information contained herein. Sectors A 'Bullish' stance, indicates that the analyst expects the sector to outperform the Benchmark during the next six months. A 'Neutral' stance, indicates that the analyst expects the sector to perform in line with the Benchmark during the next six months. A 'Bearish' stance, indicates that the analyst expects the sector to underperform the Benchmark during the next six months. Benchmarks are as follows: Japan: TOPIX; United States: S&P 500, MSCI World Technology Hardware & Equipment; Europe, by sector Hardware/Semiconductors: FTSE W Europe IT Hardware; Telecoms: FTSE W Europe Business Services; Business Services: FTSE W Europe; Auto & Components: FTSE W Europe Auto & Parts; Communications equipment: FTSE W Europe IT Hardware; Ecology Focus: Bloomberg World Energy Alternate Sources; Global Emerging Markets: MSCI Emerging Markets ex-Asia.

Explanation of Nomura's equity research rating system for Asian companies under coverage ex Japan published prior to 30 October 2008
Stocks Stock recommendations are based on absolute valuation upside (downside), which is defined as (Fair Value - Current Price)/Current Price, subject to limited management discretion. In most cases, the Fair Value will equal the analyst's assessment of the current intrinsic fair value of the stock using an appropriate valuation methodology such as Discounted Cash Flow or Multiple analysis etc. However, if the analyst doesn't think the market will revalue the stock over the specified time horizon due to a lack of events or catalysts, then the fair value may differ from the intrinsic fair value. In most cases, therefore, our recommendation is an assessment of the difference between current market price and our estimate of current intrinsic fair value. Recommendations are set with a 6-12 month horizon unless specified otherwise. Accordingly, within this horizon, price volatility may cause the actual upside or downside based on the prevailing market price to differ from the upside or downside implied by the recommendation. A 'Strong buy' recommendation indicates that upside is more than 20%. A 'Buy' recommendation indicates that upside is between 10% and 20%. A 'Neutral' recommendation indicates that upside or downside is less than 10%. A 'Reduce' recommendation indicates that downside is between 10% and 20%. A 'Sell' recommendation indicates that downside is more than 20%.

Sectors
A 'Bullish' rating means most stocks in the sector have (or the weighted average recommendation of the stocks under coverage is) a positive absolute recommendation. A 'Neutral' rating means most stocks in the sector have (or the weighted average recommendation of the stocks under coverage is) a neutral absolute recommendation. A 'Bearish' rating means most stocks in the sector have (or the weighted average recommendation of the stocks under coverage is) a negative absolute recommendation.

Target Price
A Target Price, if discussed, reflect in part the analyst's estimates for the company's earnings. The achievement of any target price may be impeded by general market and macroeconomic trends, and by other risks related to the company or the market, and may not occur if the company's earnings differ from estimates.

Disclaimers
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