MANILA PRINCE HOTEL petitioner, vs.

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL, respondents. This is a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus on the grounds of "The Filipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution i.e., "in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos." Facts: The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent MHC. The winning bidder, or the eventual "strategic partner," is to provide management expertise and/or an international marketing/reservation system, and financial support to strengthen the profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel. In a close bidding, Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm edged Manila Prince Hotel, a Filipino firm by a margin of P2.42 per share for 15,300,000 shares. Prior to the declaration of the winning bidder, the petitioner matched the offer of Renong Berhad and sent a manager's check as bid security which the respondent GSIS refused to accept. Petitioners herein invoked Sec 10, par 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution and argued that the respondent hotel is part of the national patrimony as part of the tourism industry and is thus part of the national economy. Respondents on the other hand argued that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement of principle and policy since it is not a self-executing provision and requires implementing legislation(s) . . . Thus, for the said provision to Operate, there must be existing laws "to lay down conditions under which business may be done." Among other things, that even if such is the case, Manila Hotel does not fall under the term national patrimony. That, granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony, the constitutional provision invoked is still inapplicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the hotel building nor the land upon which the building stands. That, submission by petitioner of a matching bid is premature since Renong Berhad could still very well be awarded the block of shares and the condition giving rise to the exercise of the privilege to submit a matching bid had not yet taken place. And finally, the prayer for prohibition grounded on grave abuse of discretion should fail since respondent GSIS did not exercise its discretion in a capricious, whimsical manner, and if ever it did abuse its discretion it was not so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. Similarly, the petition for mandamus should fail as petitioner has no clear legal right to what it demands and respondents do not have an imperative duty to perform the act required of them by petitioner. Issues: 1. Whether or not Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision requiring implementing legislations. 2. Whether or not the Manila Hotel is part of the national patrimony. 3. Whether or not the matching bid is premature 4. Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondents in refusing the matching bid of the petitioner. Held: In their resolution of the case, the Supreme Court held that, "Since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract." A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an

examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action. Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. The SC further acknowledged that such provision is mandatory. And thus the petition is granted. KURODA VS JALANDONI 83 Phil 171 FACTS: Shinegori Kuroda, a former Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial Army and Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines was charged before the Philippine Military Commission for war crimes. As he was the commanding general during such period of war, he was tried for failure to discharge his duties and permitting the brutal atrocities and other high crimes committed by his men against noncombatant civilians and prisoners of the Japanese forces, in violation of of the laws and customs of war. Kuroda, in his petition, argues that the Military Commission is not a valid court because the law that created it, Executive Order No. 68, is unconstitutional. He further contends that using as basis the Hague Conventions Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare for the war crime committed cannot stand ground as the Philippines was not a signatory of such rules in such convention. Furthermore, he alleges that the United States is not a party of interest in the case and that the two US prosecutors cannot practice law in the Philippines. ISSUE: 1.Whether or not Executive Order No. 68 is constitutional 2.Whether or not the US is a party of interest to this case RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that Executive Order No. 68, creating the National War Crimes Office and prescribing rules on the trial of accused war criminals, is constitutional as it is aligned with Sec 3,Article 2 of the Constitution which states that The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy and adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the nation. The generally accepted principles of international law include those formed during the Hague Convention, the Geneva Convention and other international jurisprudence established by United Nations. These include the principle that all persons, military or civilian, who have been guilty of planning, preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the commission of crimes and offenses in violation of laws and customs of war, are to be held accountable. In the doctrine of incorporation, the Philippines abide by these principles and therefore have a right to try persons that commit such crimes and most especially when it is committed against its citizens. It abides with it even if it was not a signatory to these conventions by the mere incorporation of such principles in the constitution. The United States is a party of interest because the country and its people have been equally, if not more greatly, aggrieved by the crimes with which the petitioner is charged for. By virtue of Executive Order No. 68, the Military Commission is a special military tribunal and that the rules as to parties and representation are not governed by the rules of court but by the very provisions of this special law. Co Kim Chan v. Valdez Tan Keh 75 Phil 113 Nov. 16, 1945 Facts: Co Kim Chan had a pending civil case, initiated during the Japanese occupation, with the Court of First Instance of Manila. After the Liberation of the Manila and the American occupation, Judge Arsenio Dizon refused to continue hearings on the case, saying that a proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur had invalidated and nullified all judicial proceedings and judgments of the courts of the Philippines and, without an enabling law, lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines (the Philippine government under the Japanese).

Issues: 1. Whether or not judicial proceedings and decisions made during the Japanese occupation were valid and remained valid even after the American occupation; 2. Whether or not the October 23, 1944 proclamation MacArthur issued in which he declared that all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of the courts; 3. And whether or not if they were not invalidated by MacArthurs proclamation, those courts could continue hearing the cases pending before them. Ratio: Political and international law recognizes that all acts and proceedings of a de facto government are good and valid. The Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines under the Japanese occupation may be considered de facto governments, supported by the military force and deriving their authority from the laws of war. Municipal laws and private laws, however, usually remain in force unless suspended or changed by the conqueror. Civil obedience is expected even during war, for the existence of a state of insurrection and war did not loosen the bonds of society, or do away with civil government or the regular administration of the laws. And if they were not valid, then it would not have been necessary for MacArthur to come out with a proclamation abrogating them. The second question, the court said, hinges on the interpretation of the phrase processes of any other government and whether or not he intended it to annul all other judgments and judicial proceedings of courts during the Japanese military occupation. IF, according to international law, non-political judgments and judicial proceedings of de facto governments are valid and remain valid even after the occupied territory has been liberated, then it could not have been MacArthurs intention to refer to judicial processes, which would be in violation of international law. A well-known rule of statutory construction is: A statute ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains. Another is that where great inconvenience will result from a particular construction or great mischief done, such construction is to be avoided, or the court ought to presume that such construction was not intended by the makers of the law, unless required by clear and unequivocal words. Annulling judgments of courts made during the Japanese occupation would clog the dockets and violate international law, therefore what MacArthur said should not be construed to mean that judicial proceedings are included in the phrase processes of any other governments. In the case of US vs Reiter, the court said that if such laws and institutions are continued in use by the occupant, they become his and derive their force from him. The laws and courts of the Philippines did not become, by being continued as required by the law of nations, laws and courts of Japan. It is a legal maxim that, excepting of a political nature, law once established continues until changed by some competent legislative power. IT IS NOT CHANGED MERELY BY CHANGE OF SOVEREIGNTY. Until, of course, the new sovereign by legislative act creates a change. Therefore, even assuming that Japan legally acquired sovereignty over the Philippines, and the laws and courts of the Philippines had become courts of Japan, as the said courts and laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them have continued in force until now, it follows that the same courts may continue exercising the same jurisdiction over cases pending therein before the restoration of the Commonwealth Government, until abolished or the laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them are repealed by the said government. DECISION: Writ of mandamus issued to the judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, ordering him to take cognizance of and continue to final judgment the proceedings in civil case no. 3012. Summary of ratio: 1. International law says the acts of a de facto government are valid and civil laws continue even during occupation unless repealed. 2. MacArthur annulled proceedings of other governments, but this cannot be applied on judicial proceedings because such a construction would violate the law of nations. 3. Since the laws remain valid, the court must continue hearing the case pending before it.

***3 kinds of de facto government: one established through rebellion (govt gets possession and control through force or the voice of the majority and maintains itself against the will of the rightful government) through occupation (established and maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war; denoted as a government of paramount force) through insurrection (established as an independent government by the inhabitants of a country who rise in insurrection against the parent state). Ichong v Hernandez 101 Phil. 115 FACTS: Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of Republic Act No. 1180, brought this action to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional, and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance and all other persons acting under him, particularly city and municipal treasurers, from enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending among others that: it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives them of their liberty and property without due process of law; it violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines; and its provisions against the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary succession, and those requiring 100% Filipino capitalization for a corporation or entity to entitle it to engage in the retail business, violate the spirit of Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII and Section 8 of Article XIV of the Constitution. Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business." In effect it nationalizes the retail trade business. The main provisions of the Act are: (1) a prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations, partnerships, or corporations the capital of which are no t wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade; (2) an exception from the above prohibition in favor of aliens actually engaged in said business on May 15, 1954, who are allowed to continue to engage therein unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance with the law, until their death or voluntary retirement in case of natural persons, and for ten years after the approval of the Act or until the expiration of term in case of juridical persons; (3) an exception there from in favor of citizens and juridical entities of the United States; (4) a provision for the forfeiture of licenses (to engage in the retail business) for violation of the laws on nationalization, economic control weights and measures and labor and other laws relating to trade, commerce and industry; (5) a prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of additional stores or branches of retail business, (6) a provision requiring aliens actually engaged in the retail business to present for registration with the proper authorities a verified statement concerning their businesses, giving, among other matters, the nature of the business, their assets and liabilities and their offices and principal offices of juridical entities; and (7) a provision allowing the heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail business who die, to continue such business for a period of six months for purposes of liquidation. Held: The Court held that the Act was approved in the exercise of the police power. It has been said that police power is so far-reaching in scope, that it has become almost impossible to limit its sweep. As it derives its existence from the very existence of the State itself, it does not need to be expressed or defined in its scope; it is said to be co- extensive with self-protection and survival, and as such it is the most positive and active of all governmental processes, the most essential, insistent and illimitable. Especially is it so under a modern democratic framework where the demands of society and of nations have multiplied to almost unimaginable proportions; the field and scope of police power has become almost boundless, just as the fields of public interest and public welfare have become almost all- embracing and have transcended human foresight. Otherwise stated, as we cannot foresee the needs and demands of public interest and welfare in this constantly changing and progressive world, so we cannot delimit beforehand the extent or scope of police power by which and through which the State seeks to attain or achieve public interest or welfare. So it is that Constitutions do not define the scope or extent of the police power of the State; what they do is to set forth the limitations thereof. The most important of these are the due process clause and the equal protection clause.

The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation, which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exists for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not. The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of legislation enacted in pursuance of the police power, Is there public interest, a public purpose; is public welfare involved? Is the Act reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the legislature's purpose; is it not unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive? Is there sufficient foundation or reason in connection with the matter involved; or has there not been a capricious use of the legislative power? Can the aims conceived be achieved by the means used, or is it not merely an unjustified interference with private interest? These are the questions that we ask when the due process test is applied. The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of due process and equal protection of the laws is more apparent than real. Properly related, the power and the guarantees are supposed to coexist. The balancing is the essence or, shall it be said, the indispensable means for the attainment of legitimate aspirations of any democratic society. There can be no absolute power, whoever exercise it, for that would be tyranny. Yet there can neither be absolute liberty, for that would mean license and anarchy. So the State can deprive persons of life, liberty and property, provided there is due process of law; and persons may be classified into classes and groups, provided everyone is given the equal protection of the law. The test or standard, as always, is reason. The police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between purposes and means. And if distinction and classification has been made, there must be a reasonable basis for said distinction. The disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail business and free citizens and country from such dominance and control; that the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the State, thru which and by which it protects its own personality and insures its security and future; that the law does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due process of law clause, because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives appear to us to be plainly evident as a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but actually necessary and that in any case such matter falls within the prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power and discretion the Judicial department of the Government may not interfere; that the provisions of the law are clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers from no duplicity and has not misled the legislators or the segment of the population affected; and that it cannot be said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty obligations because no treaty has actually been entered into on the subject and the police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other conventional agreement. The Treaty of Amity between the Republic of the Philippines and the Republic of China of April 18, 1947 is also claimed to be violated by the law in question. All that the treaty guarantees is equality of treatment to the Chinese nationals "upon the same terms as the nationals of any other country." But the nationals of China are not discriminated against because nationals of all other countries, except those of the United States, who are granted special rights by the Constitution, are all prohibited from engaging in the retail trade. But even supposing that the law infringes upon the said treaty, the treaty is always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law, and the same may never curtail or restrict the scope of the police power of the State. Gonzales vs. Hechanova 9 SCRA 230

Facts: Respondent executive secretary authorized importation of 67,000 tons of foreign rice to be purchased from private sources. Ramon A. Gonzales, a rice planter and president of Iloilo palay and corn planters association filed and averring that in making or attempting to make importation of foreign rice are acting without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction because RA 2207, explicitly prohibits the importation of rice and corn by Rice and Corn Administration or any government agency. Issue: Whether an international agreement may be invalidated by our courts. Held: The power of judicial review is vested with the Supreme Court in consonance to Section 2 Art. VIII of the constitution. The alleged consummation of the contracts with Vietnam and Burma does not render this case academic. RA 2207 enjoins our government not from entering contracts for the purchase of rice, but from entering rice, except under conditions prescribed in said act. A judicial declaration of illegality of the proposed importation would not compel our government to default in the performance of such obligations as it mat have contracted with the sellers of rice in question because aside from the fact that said obligations may be complied without importing the said commodity into the Philippines., the proposed importation may still be legalized by complying with the provisions of the aforementioned law. In Re: Garcia 2 SCRA 985 Facts: Arturo E. Garcia has applied for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines without submitting to the required bar examinations. In his verified petition, he avers, among others, that he is a Filipino citizen born in Bacolod City, of Filipino parentage; that he had taken and finished in Spain the course of "Bachillerato Superior"; that he was approved, selected and qualified by the "Instituto de Cervantes" for admission to the Central University of Madrid where he studied and finished the law course graduating as "Licenciado en derecho"; and thereafter he was allowed to practice the law profession in Spain; and that under the provisions of the Treaty on Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Profession between the RP and Spain, he is entitled to practice the law profession in the Philippines without submitting to the required bar examinations. Issue: Whether treaty can modify regulations governing admission to the Philippine Bar. Held: The court resolved to deny the petition. The provision of the treaty on Academic Degrees and Exercise of Profession between the RP and Spain cannot be invoked by the applicant. Said treaty was intended to govern Filipino citizens desiring to practice thair profession in Spain, and the citizens of Spain desiring to practice their profession in the Philippines. Applicant is a Filipino citizen desiring to practice profession in the Philippines. He is therefore subject to the laws of his own country and is not entitled to the privileges extended to Spanish nationals desiring to practice in the Philippines. The privileges provided in the treaty invoked by the applicant are made expressly subject to the laws and regulations on the contracting state in whose territory it is desired to exercise the legal profession. The aforementioned Treaty, concluded between the RP and Spain could not have been intended to modify the laws and regulations governing admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, for the reason that the Executive Department may not encroach upon the constitutional prerogative of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, the power to repeal, alter or supplement such rules being reserved only to the Congress of the Philippines. Meyer vs Nebraska Brief Fact Summary. Plaintiff was convicted for teaching a child German under a Nebraska statute that outlawed the teaching of foreign languages to students that had not yet completed the eighth grade. Synopsis of Rule of Law. The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from creating legislation that restricts liberty interests when the legislation is not reasonably related to an acceptable state objective.

Facts: Robert T. Meyer, an instructor (teacher) at Zion Parochial School taught Raymond Parpart, a ten year old boy, how to read in the language of German. Plaintiff was convicted for teaching a child German under a Nebraska statute that outlawed the teaching of foreign languages to students that had not yet completed the eighth grade. The Supreme Court of Nebraska upheld the conviction. Issue: Does the statute as construed and applied unreasonably infringe on the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment? Held: The statute as applied is unconstitutional because it infringes on the liberty interests of the plaintiff and fails to reasonably relate to any end within the competency of the state. The Fourteenth Amendment encompasses more than merely the freedom from bodily restraint. The state argues that the purpose of the statute is to encourage the English language to be the native tongue of all children raised in the state. Nonetheless, the protection of the Constitution extends to those who speak other languages. Education is a fundamental liberty interest that must be protected, and mere knowledge of the German language cannot be reasonably regarded as harmful. Discussion: Liberty interests may not be interfered with by the states when the interference is arbitrary and not reasonably related to a purpose which the state may permissively regulate. OUTCOME: The court reversed the state supreme court's judgment, holding that the Nebraska statute was arbitrary and infringed on the liberty guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Pierce vs Society of Sisters 262 US 390 Brief Fact Summary. Appellees, two non-public schools, were protected by a preliminary restraining order prohibiting appellants from enforcing an Oregon Act that required parents and guardians to send their children to public school. Appellants appealed the order. Synopsis of Rule of Law. The 14th Amendment provides a liberty interest in a parents or guardians right to decide the mode in which their children are educated. States may not usurp this right when the questioned legislation does not reasonably relate to a viable state interest. Facts: Appellee the Society of Sisters, a corporation with the power to establish and maintain academies or schools and Appellee Hill Military Academy, a private organization conducting an elementary, college preparatory, and military training school, obtained preliminary restraining orders prohibiting appellants from enforcing Oregons Compulsory Education Act. The Act required all parents and guardians to send children between 8 and 16 years to a public school. The appellants appealed the granting of the preliminary restraining orders. Issue: Does the Act unreasonably interfere with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control? Held: The Act violates the 14th Amendment because it interferes with protected liberty interests and has no reasonable relationship to any purpose within the competency of the state. The Appellees have standing because the result of enforcing the Act would be destruction of the appellees schools. The state has the power to regulate all schools, but parents and guardians have the right and duty to choose the appropriate preparation for their children. Discussion. While the state has the right to insure that children receive a proper education, the 14th Amendment provides parents and guardians with a liberty interest in their choice in the mode in which their children are educated. People v. Lagman and Sosa 66 Phil. 13, July 13, 1938 Avancea, C.J. Facts: In these two cases (G.R. Nos. 45892 and 45893), the appellants Tranquilino Lagman and Primitivo de Sosa are charged with a violation of section 60 of Commonwealth Act No. 1, known as the National Defense Law. It is alleged that these two appellants, being Filipinos and having reached the age of twenty years in 1936, willfully and unlawfully refused to register in the military

service between the 1st and 7th of April of said year, notwithstanding the fact that they had been required to do so. The evidence shows that these two appellants were duly notified by the corresponding authorities to appear before the Acceptance Board in order to register for military service in accordance with law, and that the said appellants, in spite of these notices, had not registered up to the date of filing of the information. The appellants do not deny these facts, but they allege in defense that they have not registered in the military service because Primitivo de Sosa is fatherless and has a mother and a brother eight years old to support, and Tranquilino Lagman also has a father to support, has no military leanings, and does not wish to kill or be killed. Each of these appellants was sentenced by the Court of First Instance of Bataan to one month and one day of imprisonment, with the costs. In this instance, the validity of the National Defense Law, under which the accused were sentenced, is impugned on the ground that it is unconstitutional. Issue: Whether or not the National Defense Law is unconstitutional. Ruling: The Constitutionality of said law was upheld. The appellants do not deny the facts, but they alleged in defense that they have not registered in the military service because Primitivo de Sosa is fatherless and has a mother and a brother to support and Tranquilino Lagman also has a father to support, has no military leanings, and does not wish to kill or be killed. Under Sec. 2 of Article II of the Philippine Constitution, The defense of the State is a prime duty of government, and in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required by law to render personal military or civil service. The National Defense Law, insofar as it establishes compulsory military service, does not go against the constitution, but in the contrary, in faithful compliance therewith. The duty of the Government to defend the State cannot be performed except through an army, and to leave the organization of an army to the will of the citizens would be to make this duty of the Government excusable should there would be no sufficient men who volunteer to enlist therein. It was also held by the court that the right of the Government to require compulsory military service is a consequence of its duty to defend the State and is reciprocal with its duty to defend the life, liberty, and property of the citizen. Citing the case of Jacobson vs. Massachusetts, the court said that, without violating the Constitution, a person may be compelled by force, if need be, against his will, against his pecuniary interests, and even against his religious or political convictions, to take place in the ranks of the army of his country, and risk the chance of being shot down in its defense. In US vs. Olson, it was also said that this is not deprivation of property without due process of the law since in its just sense, there is no right of property to an office or employment. These justify that compulsory military service is the defense of the State, whether actual or whether in preparation to make it more effective, in case of need. The circumstance that the appellants have dependent families to support does not excuse them from their duty to present themselves before the Acceptance Board because, if such circumstance exists, they can ask for deferment in complying with their duty and, at all events, they can obtain the proper pecuniary allowance to attend to these family responsibilities. PP. VS LAGMAN GR 45892 July 13, 1938 FACTS: In 1936, Lagman reached the age of 20. He is being compelled by Section 60 of Commonwealth Act 1 (National Defense Law) to join the military service. Lagman refused to do so because he has a father to support, has no military leanings and he does not wish to kill or be killed. Lagman further assailed the constitutionality of the said law. ISSUE: Whether or not the National Defense Law is constitutional. HELD: The duty of the Government to defend the State cannot be performed except through an army. To leave the organization of an army to the will of the citizens would be to make this duty of the Government excusable should there be no sufficient men who volunteer to enlist therein. Hence, the National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes compulsory military service, does not

go against this constitutional provision but is, on the contrary, in faithful compliance therewith. The defense of the State is a prime duty of government, and in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required by law to render personal military or civil service. AGLIPAY VS RUIZ, 64 PHIL 201 GR 45459, March 13, 1937 Facts: Petitioner seeks the issuance of a writ of prohibition against respondent Director of Posts from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress. Petitioner contends that such act is a violation of the Constitutional provision stating that no public funds shall be appropriated or used in the benefit of any church, system of religion, etc. This provision is a result of the principle of the separation of church and state, for the purpose of avoiding the occasion wherein the state will use the church, or vice versa, as a weapon to further their ends and aims. Respondent contends that such issuance is in accordance to Act No. 4052, providing for the appropriation funds to respondent for the production and issuance of postage stamps as would be advantageous to the government. Issue: 1. Whether or Not there was a violation of the freedom to religion. 2. Is the sale of the stamps in support of a particular sect hence unconstitutional? Held: What is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious freedom and not mere religious toleration. It is however not an inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not a denial of its influence inhuman affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And in so far as it instills into the minds the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated. The phrase in Act No. 4052 advantageous to the government does not authorize violation of the Constitution. The issuance of the stamps was not inspired by any feeling to favor a particular church or religious denomination. They were not sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. The postage stamps, instead of showing a Catholic chalice as originally planned, contains a map of the Philippines and the location of Manila, with the words Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress. The focus of the stamps was not the Eucharistic Congress but the city of Manila, being the seat of that congress. This was to to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourists, the officials merely took advantage of an event considered of international importance. Although such issuance and sale may be inseparably linked with the Roman Catholic Church, any benefit and propaganda incidentally resulting from it was no the aim or purpose of the Government. The sale of stamps is not in violation of the Constitution. In fact, what was emphasized on the stamps was not the religious event itself but rather the City of Manila as being the seat of such event. Act No. 4052 on the other hand did not appropriate any public money to a religious event. It merely said that the director of posts may use such fund in a manner as often as may be deemed advantageous to the government. It is duly noted however that the elevating influence of religion is recognized here as elsewhere. Evidence would be our preamble where we implored the aid of divine providence to establish an ideal government. Religious freedom as a constitutional mandate is not an inhibition of profound reverence to religion. MAXIMO CALALANG, petitioner, vs. A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL., respondents G.R. No. 47800. December 2, 1940 Facts: The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of 17 July 1940, resolved to recommend to the Director of Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmarias Street, from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and from 1:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.; and along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street, from 7 a.m. to 11 p.m., from a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic. The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission, on 18 July 1940, recommended to the Director of Public Works the adoption of the measure proposed in the resolution, in pursuance of the provisions of Commonwealth Act 548, which authorizes said Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to

promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads. On 2 August 1940, the Director of Public Works, in his first endorsement to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, recommended to the latter the approval of the recommendation made by the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission, with the modification that the closing of Rizal Avenue to traffic to animal-drawn vehicles be limited to the portion thereof extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Azcarraga Street. On 10 August 1940, the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, in his second endorsement addressed to the Director of Public Works, approved the recommendation of the latter that Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue be closed to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles, between the points and during the hours as indicated, for a period of 1 year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced the rules and regulations thus adopted. Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and as a taxpayer of Manila, brought before the Supreme court the petition for a writ of prohibition against A. D. Williams, as Chairman of the National Traffic Commission; Vicente Fragante, as Director of Public Works; Sergio Bayan, as Acting Secretary of Public Works and Communications; Eulogio Rodriguez, as Mayor of the City of Manila; and Juan Dominguez, as Acting Chief of Police of Manila. Issues: 1) Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the Director of Public Works infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people? 2) Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative power? Ruling: 1) The promotion of social justice is to be achieved not through a mistaken sympathy towards any given group. Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extraconstitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex. Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest number." 2) There is no undue delegation of legislative power. Commonwealth Act 548 does not confer legislative powers to the Director of Public Works. The authority conferred upon them and under which they promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of is not to determine what public policy demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly in said Act, to wit, to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the Philippines and to close them temporarily to any or all classes of traffic whenever the condition of the road or the traffic makes such action necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest. The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the determination of what the law shall be, but merely the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon which the application of said law is to be predicated. To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of national roads and to determine when and how long a national road should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the traffic thereon and the requirements of public convenience and interest, is an administrative function which cannot be directly discharged by the National Assembly. It must depend on the discretion of some other government official to whom is confided the duty of

determining whether the proper occasion exists for executing the law. But it cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion is the making of the law. Association of Small Landowner vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform 175 SCRA 343 Equal Protection FACTS: These are 3 cases consolidated questioning the constitutionality of the Agrarian Reform Act. Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights includes a call for the adoption by the State of an agrarian reform program. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farm workers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farm workers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. RA 3844, Agricultural Land Reform Code, had already been enacted by Congress on August 8, 1963. This was substantially superseded almost a decade later by PD 27, which was promulgated on Oct 21, 1972, along with martial law, to provide for the compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify maximum retention limits for landowners. On July 17, 1987, Cory issued EO 228, declaring full land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of PD 27 and providing for the valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as the manner of their payment. This was followed on July 22, 1987 by PP 131, instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP), and EO 229, providing the mechanics for its implementation. After which is the enactment of RA 6657, Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, which Cory signed on June 10. This law, while considerably changing the earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory effect insofar as they are not inconsistent with its provisions. In considering the rentals as advance payment on the land, the executive order also deprives the petitioners of their property rights as protected by due process. The equal protection clause is also violated because the order places the burden of solving the agrarian problems on the owners only of agricultural lands. No similar obligation is imposed on the owners of other properties. The petitioners maintain that in declaring the beneficiaries under PD 27 to be the owners of the lands occupied by them, EO 228 ignored judicial prerogatives and so violated due process. Worse, the measure would not solve the agrarian problem because even the small farmers are deprived of their lands and the retention rights guaranteed by the Constitution. In his comment the Sol-Gen asserted that the alleged violation of the equal protection clause, the sugar planters have failed to show that they belong to a different class and should be differently treated. The Comment also suggests the possibility of Congress first distributing public agricultural lands and scheduling the expropriation of private agricultural lands later. From this viewpoint, the petition for prohibition would be premature. ISSUE: Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protection clause. HELD: The SC ruled affirming the Sol-Gen. The argument of the small farmers that they have been denied equal protection because of the absence of retention limits has also become academic under Sec 6 of RA 6657. Significantly, they too have not questioned the area of such limits. There is also the complaint that they should not be made to share the burden of agrarian reform, an objection also made by the sugar planters on the ground that they belong to a particular class with particular interests of their own. However, no evidence has been submitted to the Court that the requisites of a valid classification have been violated. Classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from each other in these same particulars. To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements: (1) it must be based on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class. The Court finds that all these requisites have been met by the measures here challenged as arbitrary and discriminatory. Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated alike both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. The petitioners have not shown that they

belong to a different class and entitled to a different treatment. The argument that not only landowners but also owners of other properties must be made to share the burden of implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a substantial distinction between these two classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not see. There is no need to elaborate on this matter. In any event, the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification. Its decision is accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice except only where its discretion is abused to the detriment of the Bill of Rights. Facts: Several petitions are the root of the case: a. A petition alleging the constitutionality of PD No. 27, EO 228 and 229 and RA 6657. Subjects of the petition are a 9-hectare and 5 hectare Riceland worked by four tenants. Tenants were declared full owners by EO 228 as qualified farmers under PD 27. The petitioners now contend that President Aquino usurped the legislatures power. b. A petition by landowners and sugar planters in Victorias Mill Negros Occidental against Proclamation 131 and EO 229. Proclamation 131 is the creation of Agrarian Reform Fund with initial fund of P50 Billion. c. A petition by owners of land which was placed by the DAR under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer. d. A petition invoking the right of retention under PD 27 to owners of rice and corn lands not exceeding seven hectares. Issue: Whether or Not the aforementioned EOs, PD, and RA were constitutional. Held: The promulgation of PD 27 by President Marcos was valid in exercise of Police power and eminent domain. The power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc. 131 and EO 228 and 229 was authorized under Sec. 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution. Therefore it is a valid exercise of Police Power and Eminent Domain. RA 6657 is likewise valid. The carrying out of the regulation under CARP becomes necessary to deprive owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title and the physical possession of said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favour of the farmer. A statute may be sustained under the police power only if there is concurrence of the lawful subject and the method. Subject and purpose of the Agrarian Reform Law is valid, however what is to be determined is the method employed to achieve it. PT&T vs. NLRC and Grace de Guzman G.R. No. 118978, May 23, 1997 FACTS: This is a case for illegal dismissal filed by Grace de Guzman against PT&T. Grace de Guzman is a probationary employee of PT&T. In her job application, she represented that she was single although she was married. When management found out, she was made to explain. However, her explanation was found unsatisfactory so she was subsequently dismissed from work. Grace thus filed a case for illegal dismissal against PT&T with RAB. According to the Labor Arbiter, Grace, who had already gained the status of regular employee, was illegally dismissed by PT&T. Moreover, he ruled that Grace was apparently discriminated against on account of her having contracted marriage in violation of company rules. On appeal to the NLRC, the decision of the Labor Arbiter was upheld. The Motion for Reconsideration was likewise rebuffed, hence, this special civil action. Petitioner argued that the dismissal was not because Grace was married but because of her concealment of the fact that she was married. Such concealment amounted to dishonesty, which was why she was dismissed from work. ISSUES:

Whether or not the company policy of not accepting married women for employment was discriminatory Whether or not Graces act of concealment amounted to dishonesty, leading to loss of confidence Whether or not Grace was illegally dismissed HELD: There was discrimination. Article 136 of the Labor Code explicitly prohibits discrimination merely by reason of the marriage of a female employee. Petitioners policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified from work any woman worker who contracts marriage runs afoul of the test of, and the right against, discrimination, afforded all women workers by our labor laws and by no less than the Constitution. Contrary to petitioners assertion that it dismissed private respondent from employment on account of her dishonesty, the record discloses clearly that her ties with the company were dissolved principally because of the companys policy that married women are not qualified for employment in PT&T, and not merely because of her supposed acts of dishonesty. Concealment did not amount to willful dishonesty. Verily, private respondents act of concealing the true nature of her status from PT&T could not be properly characterized as willful or in bad faith as she was moved to act the way she did mainly because she wanted to retain a permanent job in a stable company. In other words, she was practically forced by that very same illegal company policy into misrepresenting her civil status for fear of being disqualified from work. While loss of confidence is a just cause for termination of employment, it should not be simulated. It must rest on an actual breach of duty committed by the employee and not on the employers caprices. Furthermore, it should never be used as a subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal, or unjustified. However, SC nevertheless ruled that Grace did commit an act of dishonesty, which should be sanctioned and therefore agreed with the NLRCs decision that the dishonesty warranted temporary suspension of Grace from work. Grace attained regular status as an employee. Private respondent, it must be observed, had gained regular status at the time of her dismissal. When she was served her walking papers on Jan. 29, 1992, she was about to complete the probationary period of 150 days as she was contracted as a probationary employee on September 2, 1991. That her dismissal would be effected just when her probationary period was winding down clearly raises the plausible conclusion that it was done in order to prevent her from earning security of tenure. There was illegal dismissal. As an employee who had therefore gained regular status, and as she had been dismissed without just cause, she is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to full back wages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent. On Stipulation against Marriage. In the final reckoning, the danger of PT&Ts policy against marriage is that it strikes at the very essence, ideals and purpose of marriage as an inviolable social institution and, ultimately, of the family as the foundation of the nation. Petition dismissed. Laguna Lake Development Authority v. CA G.R. Nos. 120865- 71, December 7, 1995 Hermosisima Jr., J. Facts: RA 4850 was enacted creating the "Laguna Lake Development Authority." This agency was supposed to accelerate the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces, cities and towns, in the act, within the context of the national and regional plans and policies for social and economic development. PD 813 amended certain sections RA 4850 because of the concern for the rapid expansion of Metropolitan Manila, the suburbs and the lakeshore towns of Laguna de Bay, combined with current and prospective uses of the lake for municipal-industrial water supply, irrigation, fisheries, and the like.

To effectively perform the role of the Authority under RA 4850, the Chief Executive issued EO 927 further defined and enlarged the functions and powers of the Authority and named and enumerated the towns, cities and provinces encompassed by the term "Laguna de Bay Region". Also, pertinent to the issues in this case are the following provisions of EO927 which include in particular the sharing of fees: Sec 2: xxx the Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue permit for the use of all surface water for any projects or activities in or affecting the said region including navigation, construction, and operation of fish pens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like. SEC 3. Collection of Fees. The Authority is hereby empowered to collect fees for the use of the lake water and its tributaries for all beneficial purposes including but not limited to fisheries, recreation, municipal, industrial, agricultural, navigation, irrigation, and waste disposal purpose; Provided, that the rates of the fees to be collected, and the sharing with other government agencies and political subdivisions, if necessary, shall be subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines upon recommendation of the Authority's Board, except fish pen fee, which will be shared in the following manner: 20 percent of the fee shall go to the lakeshore local governments, 5 percent shall go to the Project Development Fund which shall be administered by a Council and the remaining 75 percent shall constitute the share of LLDA. However, after the implementation within the three-year period of the Laguna Lake Fishery Zoning and Management Plan the sharing will be modified as follows: 35 percent of the fish pen fee goes to the lakeshore local governments, 5 percent goes to the Project Development Fund and the remaining 60 percent shall be retained by LLDA; Provided, however, that the share of LLDA shall form part of its corporate funds and shall not be remitted to the National Treasury as an exception to the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1234. Then came Republic Act No. 7160. The municipalities in the Laguna Lake Region interpreted the provisions of this law to mean that the newly passed law gave municipal governments the exclusive jurisdiction to issue fishing privileges within their municipal waters because R.A. 7160 provides: Sec.149. Fishery Rentals; Fees and Charges (a) Municipalities shall have the exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges in the municipal waters and impose rental fees or charges therefore in accordance with the provisions of this Section. Municipal governments thereupon assumed the authority to issue fishing privileges and fish pen permits. Big fish pen operators took advantage of the occasion to establish fish pens and fish cages to the consternation of the Authority. Unregulated fish pens and fish cages occupied almost one-third the entire lake water surface area, increasing the occupation drastically from 7,000 ha in 1990 to almost 21,000 ha in 1995. The Mayor's permit to construct fish pens and fish cages were all undertaken in violation of the policies adopted by the Authority on fish pen zoning and the Laguna Lake carrying capacity. In view of the foregoing circumstances, the Authority served notice to the general public that: 1. All fish pens, fish cages and other aqua-culture structures in the Laguna de Bay Region, which were not registered or to which no application for registration and/or permit has been filed with Laguna Lake Development Authority as of March31, 1993 are hereby declared out rightly as illegal. 2. All fish pens; fish cages and other aqua-culture structures so declared as illegal shall be subject to demolition which shall be undertaken by the Presidential Task Force for illegal Fish pen and Illegal Fishing. 3. Owners of fish pens, fish cages and other aqua-culture structures declared as illegal shall, without prejudice to demolition of their structures be criminally charged in accordance with Section 39-A of Republic Act 4850 as amended by P.D. 813 for violation of the same laws. Violations of these laws carries a penalty of imprisonment of not exceeding 3 years or a fine not exceeding Five Thousand Pesos or both at the discretion of the court .All operators of fish pens, fish cages and other aqua-culture structures declared as illegal in accordance with the foregoing Notice shall have one (1) month on or before 27 October 1993 to show cause before the LLDA why their said fish pens, fish cages and other aqua-culture structures should not be demolished/dismantled. One month, thereafter, the Authority sent notices to the

concerned owners of the illegally constructed fish pens, fish cages and other aqua-culture structures advising them to dismantle their respective structures within 10 days from receipt thereof, otherwise, demolition shall be effected. The fish pen owners filed injunction cases against the LLDA. The LLDA filed motions to dismiss the cases against it on jurisdictional grounds. The motions to dismiss were denied. Meanwhile, TRO/writs of preliminary mandatory injunction were issued enjoining the LLDA from demolishing the fish pens and similar structures in question. Hence, the present petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction. The CA dismissed the LLDAs consolidated petitions. It ruled that (A) LLDA is not among those quasi-judicial agencies of government appealable only to the Court of Appeals; (B) the LLDA charter does vest LLDA with quasi-judicial functions insofar as fish pens are concerned; (C) the provisions of the LLDA charter insofar as fishing privileges in Laguna de Bay are concerned had been repealed by the Local Government Code of 1991; (D) in view of the aforesaid repeal, the power to grant permits devolved to respective local government units concerned. Issue: Which agency of the Government - the LLDA or the towns and municipalities comprising the region - should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its environs insofar as the issuance of permits for fishery privileges is concerned? Held: LLDA. Section 4 (k) of RA 4850, the provisions of PD 813, and Section 2 of EO 927, specifically provide that the LLDA shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the use or all surface water for any projects or activities in or affecting the said region, including navigation, construction, and operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like. On the other hand, RA 7160 has granted to the municipalities the exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters. The Sangguniang Bayan may grant fishery privileges to erect fish corrals, oyster, mussels or other aquatic beds or bangus fry area within a definite zone of the municipal waters. The provisions of RA7160 do not necessarily repeal the laws creating the LLDA and granting the latter water rights authority over Laguna de Bay and the lake region. The Local Government Code of 1991 does not contain any express provision which categorically expressly repeal the charter of the Authority. It has to be conceded that there was no intent on the part of the legislature to repeal Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendments. The repeal of laws should be made clear and expressed. It has to be conceded that the charter of the LLDA constitutes a special law. RA 7160 is a general law. It is basic is basic in statutory construction that the enactment of a later legislation which is a general law cannot be construed to have repealed a special law. It is a well-settled rule in this jurisdiction that "a special statute, provided for a particular case or class of cases, is not repealed by a subsequent statute, general in its terms, provisions and application, unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest, although the terms of the general law are broad enough to include the cases embraced in the special law. Where there is a conflict between a general law and a special statute, the special statute should prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly that the general statute. The special law is to betaken as an exception to the general law in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion. This is because implied repeals are not favored and as much as possible, given to all enactments of the legislature. A special law cannot be repealed, amended or altered by a subsequent general law by mere implication. Considering the reasons behind the establishment of the Authority, which are environmental protection, navigational safety, and sustainable development, there is every indication that the legislative intent is for the Authority to proceed with its mission. We are on all fours with the manifestation of LLDA that "Laguna de Bay, like any other single body of water has its own unique natural ecosystem. The 900 km lake surface water, the 8 major river tributaries and several other smaller rivers that drain into the lake, the 2,920 n2 basin or watershed the boundaries of Laguna and Rizal provinces, constitute one integrated delicate natural ecosystem that needs to be protected with uniform set of policies; if we are to be serious in our aims of attaining sustainable development. This is an exhaustible natural resource-a very limited one-which requires judicious management and optimal utilization to ensure renewability and preserve its

ecological integrity and balance. Managing the lake resources would mean the implementation of a national policy geared towards the protection, conservation, balanced growth and sustainable development of the region with due regard to the inter-generational use of its resources by the inhabitants in this part of the earth. The authors of Republic Act4850 have foreseen this need when they passed this LLDA law-the special law designed to govern the management of our Laguna de Bay lake resources. Laguna de Bay therefore cannot be subjected to fragmented concepts of management policies where lakeshore local government units exercise exclusive dominion over specific portions of the lake water. The implementation of a cohesive and integrated lake water resource management policy, therefore, is necessary to conserve, protect and sustainably develop Laguna de Bay." The power of the LGUs to issue fishing privileges was clearly granted for revenue purposes. This is evident from the fact that Section 149 of the New Local Government Code empowering local governments to issue fishing permits is embodied in Chapter 2, Book II, of Republic Act No. 7160 under the heading, "Specific Provisions On The Taxing And Other Revenue Raising Power of LGUs. On the other hand, the power of the Authority to grant permits for fishpens, fish cages and other aqua-culture structures is for the purpose of effectively regulating and monitoring activities in the Laguna de Bay region and for lake quality control and management. 6 It does partake of the nature of police power which is the most pervasive, the least limitable and the most demanding of all State powers including the power of taxation. Accordingly the charter of the Authority which embodies a valid exercise of police power should prevail over the Local Government Code of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay. There should be no quarrel over permit fees for fishpens, fish cages and other aqua-culture structures in the Laguna de Bay area. Section 3 of Executive Order No. 927 provides for the proper sharing of fees collected. In respect to the question as to whether the Authority is a quasi-judicial agency or not, it is our holding that, considering the provisions of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 4850and Section 4 of Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983, and the ruling of this Court in Laguna Lake Development Authority vs. CA, there is no question that the Authority has express powers as a regulatory a quasi-judicial body in respect to pollution cases with authority to issue a cease a desist order and on matters affecting the construction of illegal fishpens, fish cages and other aqua-culture structures in Laguna de Bay. The Authority's pretense, however, that it is co-equal to the Regional Trial Courts such that all actions against it may only be instituted before the Court of Appeals cannot be sustained. On actions necessitating the resolution of legal questions affecting the powers of the Authority as provided for in its charter, the Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction. In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Section 149 of RA 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, has not repealed the provisions of the charter of the LLDA, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended. Thus, the Authority has the exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the enjoyment of fishery privileges in Laguna de Bay to the exclusion of municipalities situated therein and the authority to exercise such powers as are by its charter vested on it. OPOSA VS FACTORAN GR 101083; July 30, 1993 Political Law Harmony in Nature FACTS: A taxpayers class suit was initiated by the Philippine Ecological Network Incorporated (PENI) together with the minors Oposa and their parents. All were duly represented. They claimed that as taxpayers they have the right to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resources of the countrys rainforests. They prayed that a judgment be rendered ordering Honorable Factoran Jr, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have a cause of action? HELD: Yes, petitioners have a cause of action. The case at bar is of common interest to all Filipinos. The right to a balanced and healthy ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. The said right implies the judicious management of the countrys forests. This right is also the mandate of the government through DENR. A denial or violation of

that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same givesrise to a cause of action. All licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. Tanada vs Angara GR 118295 Facts: the instant case is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus filed by petitioner to contest the constitutionality of joining the WTO which was concurred upon by majority of the Senate. Petitioner contends that it is in conflict with the provisions of our constitution, specifically Article 11 Sec. 19 and Article 12, Sec. 10. Issue: Whether or not such affiliation is prohibited by our constitution. Held: Article 2 of the constitution, the principles stated herein are not self-executing. They are used by the judiciary as aids or as guidelines in the exercise of its power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactments of laws. They are not sources for causes of action. Furthermore, the treaty is in harmony with the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and the adherence of the amity with all nations. The deliberation and voting of the senate, voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave its consent to the WTO agreement, thereby making it a part of the law of the land. The petition is dismissed for lack of merit. ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners, vs. SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT and CHAIRMAN and COMMISSIONERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES,respondents. GR 135385, December 6, 2000 Land Titles and Deeds IPRA Law vis a vis Regalian Doctrine FACTS: Cruz, a noted constitutionalist, assailed the validity of the RA 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act on the ground that the law amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution. The IPRA law basically enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over ancestral domains which may include natural resources. Cruz et al contend that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of ancestral domains and ancestral lands which might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of said law violate the rights of private landowners. ISSUE: Whether or not the IPRA law is unconstitutional. HELD: The SC deliberated upon the matter. After deliberation they voted and reached a 7-7 vote. They deliberated again and the same result transpired. Since there was no majority vote, Cruzs petition was dismissed and the IPRA law was sustained. Hence, ancestral domains may include public domain somehow against the regalian doctrine. Rev. Ely Velez Pamatong Vs. Commission on Elections G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004

Prefatory Statement: Last December 1 was the deadline for the filing of Certificate of Candidacies (COCs) for the 2010 Elections. In the end, a total of 99 filed their COCs for President. Among the lesser known presidentiables include someone called "Manok" (because apparently he can mimic a cock's crow), a

six-star general, and a future "emperor of the world." Considering that we would be having automated elections next year and the list of all candidates are to be written in the ballots while voters are supposed to shade the circles corresponding to their choices, would all 99 candidates be included? No. Aside from disqualification petitions filed against the aspirants, the Comelec can also motu propio deny due course to the COCs. Aside from the qualifications set forth under the Constitution, a candidate should also have the capacity and resources to launch a national campaign. Under the Constitution (Article II, Section 26), "the State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service xxx." Would the Comelec's act of disqualifying the so-called "nuisance" candidates violate this constitutional provision?
FACTS: Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for President. Respondent COMELEC declared petitioner and 35 others as nuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated by a political party or are not supported by a registered political party with a national constituency. Pamatong filed a Petition For Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court claiming that the COMELEC violated his right to "equal access to opportunities for public service" under Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, by limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those who can afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by political parties. The COMELEC supposedly erred in disqualifying him since he is the most qualified among all the presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses all the constitutional and legal qualifications for the office of the president, he is capable of waging a national campaign since he has numerous national organizations under his leadership, he also has the capacity to wage an international campaign since he has practiced law in other countries, and he has a platform of government. ISSUE: Is there a constitutional right to run for or hold public office? RULING: No. What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is merely a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. It neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggests such a thrust or justifies an interpretation of the sort. The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled "Declaration of Principles and State Policies." The provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-executing, and there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to the "equal access" provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause of action before the courts. Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive measures that would accommodate as many people as possible into public office. Moreover, the provision as written leaves much to be desired if it is to be regarded as the source of positive rights. It is difficult to interpret the clause as operative in the absence of legislation since its effective means and reach are not properly defined. Broadly written, the myriad of claims that can be subsumed under this rubric appear to be entirely open-ended. Words and phrases such as "equal access," "opportunities," and "public service" are susceptible to countless interpretations owing to their inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was not the intention of the framers to inflict on the people an operative but amorphous foundation from which innately unenforceable rights may be sourced. The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations. Some valid limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code on "Nuisance Candidates. As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without discrimination, however, the equal access clause is not violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the limitations are meant to be borne by any one who is minded to file a certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar, there is no showing that any person is exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they create. The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the disqualification of candidates who have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine. The State has a compelling interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into account the practical considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates, the greater the opportunities for logistical

confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of time and resources in preparation for the election. The organization of an election with bona fide candidates standing is onerous enough. To add into the mix candidates with no serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable campaign would actually impair the electoral process. This is not to mention the candidacies which are palpably ridiculous so as to constitute a one-note joke. The poll body would be bogged by irrelevant minutiae covering every step of the electoral process, most probably posed at the instance of these nuisance candidates. It would be a senseless sacrifice on the part of the State. The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal and factual. The basis of the factual determination is not before this Court. Thus, the remand of this case for the reception of further evidence is in order. The SC remanded to the COMELEC for the reception of further evidence, to determine the question on whether petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is a nuisance candidate as contemplated in Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code. Obiter Dictum: One of Pamatong's contentions was that he was an international lawyer and is thus more qualified compared to the likes of Erap, who was only a high school dropout. Under the Constitution (Article VII, Section 2), the only requirements are the following: (1) natural-born citizen of the Philippines; (2) registered voter; (3) able to read and write; (4) at least forty years of age on the day of the election; and (5) resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election. At any rate, Pamatong was eventually declared a nuisance candidate and was disqualified. North cotabato vs. GRP GR 183591 FACTS: The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) brought about by the Government of the republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) as an aspect of Tripoli Agreement of Peace in 2001 is scheduled to be signed in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. This agreement was petitioned by the Province of North Cotabato for Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. The agreement mentions "Bangsamoro JuridicalEntity" (BJE) to which it grants the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro; authority and jurisdiction over all natural resources within internal waters. The agreement is composed of two local statutes: the organic act for autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao and the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA). ISSUE: Whether or not the GRP violated the Constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation and the right to information when they negotiated and initiated the MOA-AD and Whether or not the MOA-AD brought by the GRP and MILF is constitutional. HELD: GRP violated the Constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation and the right to information when they negotiated and initiated the MOA-AD and it are unconstitutional because it is contrary to law and the provisions of the constitution thereof. REASONING: The GRP is required by this law to carry out public consultations on both national and local levels to build consensus for peace agenda and process and the mobilization and facilitation of peoples participation in the peace process. Article III (Bill of Rights) Sec. 7. The right of people on matters of public concern shall be recognized, access to official records and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. Article II Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law , that state adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest. LGC (1991), require all national agencies and officers to conduct periodic consultations. No project or program be implemented unless such consultations are complied with and approval mus be obtained.

Article VII (Executive Department) Sec. 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate. Article X. (Local Government) Sec. 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippinesare the province, cities, municipalities and barangays. There shall beautonomous regions on Muslim Mindanao and the Cordillera as hereinafter provided. Sec. 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines. Section 16. The President shall exercise general supervision over autonomousregions to ensure that laws are faithfully executed. Sec. 18. The creation of autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituents units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities and geographic areas voting favourably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region. Sec. 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers over: 1. Administrative organization; 2. Creation of sources of revenues; 3. Ancestral domain and natural resources; 4. Personal, family, and property relations; 5. Regional urban and rural planning development; 6. Economic, social, and tourism development; 7. Educational policies; 8. Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and 9. Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the people of the region. The President has sole authority in the treaty-making. ARTICLE XVII (AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS) Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by: 1. The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or 2. A constitutional convention. Section 4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution under Section 1 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the approval of such amendment or revision. MOA-AD states that all provisions thereof which cannot be reconciled with the present constitution and laws shall come into force upon signing of a comprehensive compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal framework. The presidents authority is limited to proposing constitutional amendments. She cannot guarantee to any third party that the required amendments will eventually be put in place nor even be submitted to a plebiscite. MOA-AD itself presents the need to amend therein.