Participation Without Power

Malika Zeghal
Journal of Democracy, Volume 19, Number 3, July 2008, pp. 31-36 (Article)

Published by The Johns Hopkins University Press DOI: 10.1353/jod.0.0018

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Islamist Parties

participation without power

Malika Zeghal

Malika Zeghal, who was educated at the Ecole Normale Suprieure and the Institut dEtudes Politiques in Paris, is associate professor of the anthropology and sociology of religion at the University of Chicago Divinity School. Her books include Islamism in Morocco: Religion, Authoritarianism, and Electoral Politics (2008).

Over the last two decades, social and political movements ground-

ing their ideologies in references to Islam have sought to become legal political parties in many countries of the Middle East and North Africa. Some of these Islamist movements have been authorized to take part lawfully in electoral competition. Among the best known is Turkeys Justice and Development Party (AKP), which won a parliamentary majority in 2002 and has led the government ever since. Moroccos own Party of Justice and Development (PJD) has been legal since the mid1990s and commands a significant bloc of seats in Parliament. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) has never been authorized to form a political party, but in spite of state repression it has successfully run candidates as nominal independents in both national and local elections. Since the early 1990s, this trend has gone hand-in-hand with official policies of limited political liberalization. Together, the two trends have occasioned a debate about whether these movements are committed to democracy. A vast literature has sprung up to underline the paradoxes as well as the possible risks and benefits of including Islamist parties in the electoral process. The main paradigm found in this body of writing focuses on the consequences that might ensue when Islamists use democratic instruments, and seeks to divine the true intentions that Islamists will manifest if they come to power. Two possible outcomes are usually considered: The first and more optimistic scenario envisions the Islamists participation in free elections as leading to democratizationwith the Islamists themselves, regardless of their original commitment (now exposed as irrelevant),
Journal of Democracy Volume 19, Number 3 July 2008 2008 National Endowment for Democracy and The Johns Hopkins University Press

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becoming democrats by the mere virtue of their participation. The second and grimmer scenario sees Islamist inclusion in the system ending in the creation of an Islamist authoritarian regime by means of one man, one vote, one time, with the Islamists lack of commitment to democracy being the most crucial factor explaining the type of polity that they will shape. Supporters of the first alternative draw comparisons between Islamist groups and West European religious movements (Germanys Christian Democrats are often cited) that became more secular via inclusion in democratic electoral competition,1 or between Islamists and certain communist parties in Western Europe that embraced moderation after sustained participation in democratic elections.2 Those who predict the second scenario assess the ideology of Islamist parties as incompatible with democracy, putting at the center of the argument the intrinsic aversion of Islamists (or in some versions, Islam as such) to democracy, regardless of the institutional context. What has not been much in evidence so far are evaluations of this literature in light of the electoral authoritarianism prevalent in so many Muslim-majority countries. In my view, this entire debate takes too much for granted a sense that history necessarily aims at transitions to democracy. I will reformulate the question by focusing on the relationship between the electorally included, lawful Islamist opposition and authoritarian government, with particular reference to the example of Morocco.

The Islamists and Electoral Authoritarianism

To put my criticism of the two scenarios sketched above in a nutshell: The first is too teleological, while the second is too broad and abstract. To begin with, we must recognize that, although some countries in the Middle East and North Africa have been adopting institutional changes, in no case has there been a democratic transition. Rather than democratization, there has been official recognition and integration of legalized Islamist parties into the process of political competition through permission to participate in more regularly held elections. In most instances, along with this participation, incumbent regimes have decided to allow lawful Islamist parties access to larger spheres of publicity and public action, but without any concomitant access to policy making. In practical terms, this means that Islamists from legal parties can sit in parliament (where they have little law-making power) but not in the cabinet. In order to understand the evolution and strategies of Islamist parties and would-be parties, one must grasp precisely which rules they face (and to which they are supposed to commit or not commit themselves). Investigators of Islamist movements commitment to democracy would be well advised to move from large rhetorical questions to specific inquiries about institutional structures and practices. These include the nature and structure of government-opposition relations, how Islamist parties posi-

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tion themselves within the larger opposition, and the possibilities for opposition parties to communicate and negotiate with state elites. Given that the regimes in the region have turned to electoral authoritarianism in the form of unelected governments with elected legislatures, what are the implications for Islamist parties? Ideology matters, but is not likely to prove an accurate predictor of how these parties will behave in either the shorter or longer terms. At any rate, to analyze the significance of ideology with true thoroughness, one should consider it in combination with (rather than apart from) the institutional context within which legalized Islamist parties are operating. Although todays legal Islamist parties (and would-be legal parties) seldom refer explicitly to the Muslim Brotherhood, they all tend to belong to a so-called fr`eriste trend in terms of ideology and strategy. They refer to Islam as one of the bases of their ideology, and in general, characterize Islam as the normative framework that should organize society under the rubric of sharia (Islamic law). If they commit to democracy, they do so with an understanding of it that is explicitly in contrast with liberal democracy. They insist on the peoples will, as shown by their full commitment to electoral processes, and they also add that this popular will should ideally remain within the framework of the norms defined by Islam, whether through a putatively natural convergence or through educational and constitutional means. To narratives of public morality and social justice mixed with market-oriented economic principles and displays of pragmatism in their political behavior, these parties now add rejections of the use of political violencesomething that not all their members shunned in the past. Unlike the more radical Islamists who still embrace the use of force, the legalized or aspiring-to-legalization Islamists see education and lawful electoral mobilization as their tools and exhibit a strong will to participate in the political system as well as to change it through legal means, even if their conception of the nature and direction of this change remains unclear. They take electoral competition and political institutions seriously, and are eager to participate in policy making at the national and local levels. Morocco offers an interesting example because of its recent political liberalization and the presence of the PJD. In the mid-1990s, the Moroccan monarchy loosened restrictions on political life and legalized the PJD, which eschews the term Islamist but can nonetheless be defined as an Islamist party, since Islam avowedly forms its main ideological reference. In Morocco now, an authoritarian government engineers a process of electoral free choice that has no direct consequences for policy making. The legal opposition, including the PJD, can take part in running the stateif the monarchy permits. Although the PJD has compiled impressive electoral results,3 the palace to date has not included members of the legal Islamist party in the cabinet. The PJDs parliamen-

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tary presence compares with that of such traditional parties as Istiqlal and the Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP), but the PJD has no direct say in policy making at the national level. Within this new system, the PJD has played the game of electoral competition according to the palaces rules. The regime gets to portray itself (not least to key foreign allies and funders) as committed to democratic transition, since the PJD gets more political space within which to operate, more contact with domestic and foreign elites (PJD leaders often visit the United States), and more opportunities to call for certain changes while professing its loyalty to the system. However, the PJDs integration and consequent incentive to remain moderate (lest it lose the benefits that go with lawful status) go hand-in-hand with the regimes continued exclusion of other trends among Islamists that wish to become legalized parties but that state elites designate as too radical to be allowed to operate legally. Like other Islamist movements, the PJD is a modular organization that uses different public platforms for different purposes. The party has ties not only to its voter base, but also to a large set of Islamic charitable and educational associations. These are gathered together under the umbrella of the Movement of Unicity and Reform (MUR), which provides the PJD with intellectuals, activists, and constituents. Being both a conventional parliamentary formation and a grassroots social movement helps the party to stay flexible and to address different types of publics. The PJD, for instance, does not speak of the Islamic state, but the MURs official literature does. Despite what the PJDs foes charge, this is less a sign of inherent duplicity and more a token of how heavily contextual constraints weigh on the Islamists narratives.4 Rather than deliberate duplicity, what one encounters among the legalized Islamists seems more like a diversity of voices. They articulate diverse and sometimes vague ideas about political strategies and goals. Ambiguities and contradictions abound. Typically, they will declare their commitment to democracy and human rights along with their belief that Islam should be the organizing norm for public life. They are as one in affirming that the will of the people should be a central concern in policy making, but disagree on the right relationship to pursue with the current state. They recognize the current systems legitimacy, but differ among themselves as regards the best way for the state to function in relation to Islam and Islamic law.

A Paralyzing Compromise?
As the foregoing suggests, the most relevant question is not about Islam and democracy, but about the Islamists understanding of government and the state. The PJDs platform in Moroccos September 2007 legislative elections was mostly a list of proposals for social and eco-

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nomic improvement, but a few items concerned religious policies that differ little from those favored by a monarchy whose reigning king is constitutionally defined as the Commander of the Faithful. The policies affirm the states Islamic legitimacy and authority to regulate religious institutions. In short, the PJD ran on a center-right platform much like that of a traditional conservative party such as Istiqlal. Yet there are individual voices within the PJD and MUR that differ with this cautious stance and suggeston what they insist are Islamic groundsa more critical approach to the monarchy and its key institutions. Thus while the legalized Islamists agree with the monarchy that Islam is constitutive of the state, their understanding of precisely what this means is still in the making and depends largely on matters of context and on relationships between the PJD and the state elites. Ahmad Raysuni, the academic specialist in Islamic law who headed the MUR until 2003, has advocated the adoption of democracy as a mere procedure for political activity and choices. For him, Democracy is not a religion, has no religion, and is not against religion.5 Rather, he writes, it is an experiment, and one cannot impose conditions on the use of democracy. Hence, politics is not defined through the central principle of the sovereignty of God, but through the peoples will. Are elections Islamic, European, or nonreligious? Elections are a way . . . of expressing opinions . . . I say yes to unlimited democracy, even if it is possible that one day democracy will lead to a kind of exit from Islam. For Raysuni, all the usual institutions and instruments of democratic lifecampaigns, elections, political parties, and legislative bodiesare legitimate. As with the current reformist wing of the Muslim Brotherhood represented by Abu al-Futuh in Egypt, this trend distinguishes its political project from that of the Brotherhoods founder, Hassan al-Banna, who focused on trying to create an Islamic state. Raysuni writes:
As for the question of the Islamic state, regardless of what Hassan alBanna had in mind and regardless of his program, I say personally that thinking through the prism of the Islamic state is a mistake.[T]he state is a means among others, nothing more. I believe in the activism of society and not in the activism of the state. We have to rely on the umma [nation], not on the state.

The state is not to be confrontedhence the idea of taking part in the system and following its rules. Along with this may go a certain ineffectiveness that discourages serious thought about how to gain and use actual governing power. The monarchys current strategy, which lets some Islamists run (and win) but does not let them rule, entices them into a parliamentary sphere in which they can have little or no political effect. How will the Islamists cope, going forward, within the constraining compromise that they have accepted? Will they form new alliances in the highly fragmented Parliament? Would they ever accept a minority

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role in a coalition government, or will they prefer to act as critics of successive governments led by more or less the same parties? Will they always be willing to accept their lack of opportunities for consequential political action at the level of a national government? Within their new and larger sphere of public activity, what type of discourse about citizenship will they produce? Will they become, as their critics already call them, palace Islamists who play the patronage game in exchange for seats in Parliament? Speaking the language of democracy in concert with the rest of the political spectrum and the state elitesparticularly after September 11, and the new emphases that it has broughtis not at odds with the PJDs ideology. It harks back to older narratives that stress the idea of the peoples legitimate power within a Muslim society, as developed in the 1950s by Allal al-Fassi.6 But the legalized Islamists relationship with the state remains cloudyfor them and their constituents, as well as their opponents. What is that relationship to be? This question is crucial not only for the Islamists, but for the rest of Moroccos political parties as well. The PJD will feel pressed to become more precise on these issues as its presence in politics normalizes and its ability to win votes goes through the ups and downs that are typical in an electorally competitive system. The dynamics of government-opposition relationsas well as the complex forces encouraging various splits and alliances within opposition rankswill prove the most important factors in determining how Islamist parties develop within the competitive-authoritarian regimes of North Africa and the Middle East. NOTES
1. Stathis N. Kalyvas, Commitment Problems in Emerging Democracies: The Case of Religious Parties, Comparative Politics 32 (July 2000): 37999. 2. Sheri Berman, Taming Extremist Parties: Lessons from Europe, Journal of Democracy 19 (January 2008): 518. 3. On the PJD and Moroccos 2007 elections, see the January 2008 issue of the Journal of Democracy. 4. Khadija Mohsen-Finan and Malika Zeghal, Opposition islamiste et pouvoir monarchique au Maroc: Le cas du Parti de la Justice et du Dveloppement, Revue franaise de science politique 56 (February 2006): 79119. 5. The quotations in this and the following paragraph are my translations from Ahmad Raysuni, Al-haraka al-islamiyya, Suud am uful? (The Islamic movement: Ascent or collapse?) (Casablanca: Manshurat Alwan Maghribiyya, 2004), 52, 5051, 5455, and 45. 6. For a more comprehensive analysis, see Malika Zeghal, Islamism in Morocco: Religion, Authoritarianism, and Electoral Politics (Princeton: Markus Weiner, 2008).