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Cases for Succession: 1. Ajero vs CA 236 SCRA 488 Sept. 15, 1994 2.

Caneda vs CA 222 SCRA 781 May 28, 1993 3.Heirs of the Late Montinola-Sanson vs CA Feb.26, 1988 4. Acain vs IAC 155 SCRA 100 Oct. 12, 1987 5. Non et al vs CA 352 SCRA 658 February 15, 2000 6. Malo vs Malo - gr.no. L-2538 9/21/51 7. Merza vs Paras - gr. no.4888 5/25/53 8. Fernandez et al vs Dimagiba - gr. no. L-23638 9.Macam vs. Gatmaitan - gr no. 40445 8/17/34 10. Rabadilla vs CA - gr no. 113725 6/29/2000 11. SaludTeodoro de Perez vs. Tolete gr. no. 76714 12. Juan de la Cruz vs Sandoval - gr no. 179922 12/16/2000 13. Maglirong vs BAluta - 48phil551 14. heirs of Sps. Remedios & Eleodoro Sandyes Sr. vs Lina 351scra183 15. Francisco vs franciso alfonso - 354 scra 112 16. Emnace vs Ca - 370 scra 431 17. San Agustin vs CA 371 SCRA 348 18. Aluad et al vs Aluad - gr no. 176943 10/17/08 19. Lee vs TAmbago - AC no. 5281 2/12/08 20. Heirs of Doronio et al vs heirs of Doronio gr. no. 1699454 ..............bngin my sayup it mga ngran or no. ...... pakicorrect nla slamat.............

Ajero vs. CA Requirements under Art 813 and 814 on the authentication of changes and signing and dating of dispositions refer only to the validity of the dispositions, but not its probate. If the testator fails to sign and date some of the dispositions, the result is that these dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such failure, however, does not render the whole testament void. CASE 2 CANEDA vs CA G.R. No. 103554 May 28, 1993TEODORO CANEDA, LORENZA CANEDA, TERESA CANEDA, JUAN CABALLERO, AUREA CABALLERO,OSCAR LAROSA, HELEN CABALLERO, SANTOS CABALLERO, PABLO CABALLERO, VICTOR RAGA,MAURICIA RAGA, QUIRICA RAGA, RUPERTO ABAPO, represented herein by his Attorney-in-Fact, ARMSTICIA * ABAPO VELANO, and CONSESO CANEDA, represented herein by his heirs, JESUS CANEDA,NATIVIDAD CANEDA and ARTURO CANEDA, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and WILLIAM CABRERA, as Special Administrator of the Estate of Mateo Caballero, respondents. Two proceedings -- Special Proceeding No. 3899-R before Branch II of the then Court of First Instance of Cebu seeking the probate of his last will and testament and Special Proceeding No. 3965-R entitled "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Mateo Caballero" before Branch IX of the aforesaid Court of First Instance of Cebu which shall stand? ATTESTATION CLAUSE: We, the undersigned attesting Witnesses, whose Residences and postal addresses appear on the Opposite of our respective names, we do hereby certify that the Testament was read by him and the testator, MATEO CABALLERO; has published unto us the foregoing Will consisting of THREE PAGES, including the Acknowledgment, each page numbered correlatively in the letters on the upper part of each page, as his Last Will and Testament and he has the same and every page thereof, on the spaces provided for his signature and on the left hand margin, in the presence of the said testator and in the presence of each and all of us. ISSUE: whether or not the attestation clause contained in the last will and testament of the late Mateo Caballero complies with the requirements of Article 805, in relation to Article 809, of the Civil Code. HELD: NO. What is fairly apparent upon a careful reading of the attestation clause herein assailed is the fact that while it recites that the testator indeed signed the will and all its pages in the presence of the three attesting witnesses and states as well the number of pages that were used, the same does not expressly state therein the circumstance that said witnesses subscribed their respective signatures to the will in the presence of the testator and of each other. The phrase "and he has signed the same and every page thereof, on the spaces provided for his signature and on the left hand margin," obviously refers to the testator and not the instrumental witnesses as it is immediately preceded by the words "as his Last Will and Testament." On the other hand, although the words "in the presence of the testator and in the presence of each and all of us" may, at first blush, appear to likewise signify and refer to the witnesses, it must, however, be interpreted as referring only to the testator signing in the presence of the witnesses since said phrase immediately follows the words "He has signed the same and every page thereof, on the spaces provided for his signature and on the left hand margin." What is then clearly lacking, in the final logical analysis, is the statement that the witnesses signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another. It is our

CASE 1 Ajero vs. CA & Clemente Sand G.R. No. 106720September 15, 1994 FACTS: Petitioner submitted for probate the holographic will of the late Annie Sand who died on November 25,1982. Private respondent opposed the probate because t h e purported will was not Annies hand writing; it contained alterations and c o r r e c t i o n s w h i c h were not duly signed by decedent and it w a s p r o c u r e d b y petitioners through pressure and undue influence. The lower court allowed the will for probate as 3 witnesses were presented who testified on the authenticity and that the latter is of sound mind. ISSUE: Whether or not the holographic will executed by Annie Sand executed in the formalities prescribed by law. RULING: What assures authenticity of holographic will is the requirement that they totally autographic or hand-written by the testator himself, as provided in Art 810NCC: A person may execute a holographic will which m u s t b e e n t i r e l y w r i t t e n , dated and signed by the testator himself. It is subject to no other form and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed. Failure to strictly observe other formalities will not result in the disallowance o f holographic will that is unquestionably hand written by the t e s t a t o r . A holographic will may still be admitted for probate not with standing non-compliance with the provisions of 814 NCC.

considered view that the absence of that statement required by law is a fatal defect or imperfection which must necessarily result in the disallowance of the will that is here sought to be admitted to probate. Petitioners are correct in pointing out that the aforestated defect in the attestation clause obviously cannot be characterized as merely involving the form of the will or the language used therein which would warrant the application of the substantial compliance rule, as contemplated in the pertinent provision thereon in the Civil Code, to wit: Art. 809. In the absence of bad faith, forgery, or fraud, or undue and improper pressure and influence, defects and imperfections in the form of attestation or in the language used therein shall not render the will invalid if it is not proved that the will was in fact executed and attested insubstantial compliance with all the requirements of article 805" (Emphasis supplied.) While it may be true that the attestation clause is indeed subscribed at the end thereof and at the left margin of each page by the three attesting witnesses, it certainly cannot be conclusively inferred there from that the said witness affixed their respective signatures in the presence of the testator and of each other since, as petitioners correctly observed, the presence of said signatures only establishes the fact that it was indeed signed, but it does not prove that the attesting witnesses did subscribe to the will in the presence of the testator and of each other. The execution of a will is supposed to be one act so that where the testator and the witnesses sign on various days or occasions and in various combinations, the will cannot be stamped with the imprimatur of effectivity. It may thus be stated that the rule, as it now stands, is that omissions which can be supplied by an examination of the will itself, without the need of resorting to extrinsic evidence, will not be fatal and, correspondingly, would not obstruct the allowance to probate of the will being assailed. However, those omissions which cannot be supplied except by evidence aliunde would result in the invalidation of the attestation clause and ultimately, of the will itself. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the impugned decision of respondent court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The court a quo is accordingly directed to forthwith DISMISS its Special ProceedingNo. 3899-R (Petition for the Probate of the Last Will and Testament of Mateo Caballero) and to REVIVE SpecialProceeding No. 3965-R (In the matter of the Intestate Estate of Mateo Caballero) as an active case and thereafter duly proceed with the settlement of the estate of the said decedent. Case 3 G.R. No. 76648 February 26, 1988 THE HEIRS OF THE LATE MATILDE MONTINOLA-SANSON, Petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and EDUARDO F. HERNANDEZ, Respondents. FACTS: This case arose from a petition filed by private respondent Atty. Eduardo F. Hernandez with the CFI of Manila (now RTC) seeking the probate of the holographic will of the late Herminia Montinola. The testatrix, who died single, parentless and childless at the age of 70 years, devised in this will several of her real properties to specified persons. Private Respondent who was named executor in the will filed an urgent motion for appointment of special administrator. With the conformity of all the relatives and heirs of the testatrix except oppositor, the court appointed private respondent as Special Administrator of the testate estate of deceased. Petitioner Matilde Montinola Sanson, the only surviving sister of the deceased but who was not named in the said win, filed her Opposition to Probate of Will, alleging inter alia: - that the subject will was not entirely written, dated and signed by the testatrix herself and the same was falsely dated or antedated; - that the testatrix was not in full possession of her mental faculties

to make testamentary dispositions; - that undue influence was exerted upon the person and mind of the testatrix by the beneficiaries named in the win; and - that the will failed to institute a residual heir to the remainder of the estate. After a hearing on the merits, the probate court, finding the evidence presented in support of the petition to be conclusive and overwhelming, rendered its decision allowing the probate of the disputed will. Petitioner thus appealed the decision of the probate court to the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the decision. Petitioner filed with the respondent court a motion for new trial. Attached to her motion was the Affidavit of Merit of Gregorio Montinola Sanson, petitioner's son, alleging that witnesses have been located whose testimonies could shed light as to the ill health of the testatrix as well as undue influence exerted on the latter. The appellate court denied the motion for new trial of petitioner on the following grounds: (1) the Affidavit of merit attached to the motion alleged that efforts were exerted to locate unnamed witnesses only after the court's decision was handed down, and (2) the unnamed witnesses would allegedly shed light on the fact of grave illness of the testatrix as well as the undue influence exerted on her which are merely corroborative or cumulative since these facts were brought to light during the trial. The motion for reconsideration of petitioner was likewise denied by the appellate court on the ground that the affidavit of one Patricia Delgado submitted with the motion constitutes cumulative evidence and the motion being in reality a second motion for reconsideration which is prescribed by law. Hence the petition. ISSUES I : THE RESPONDENT CA ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONERS' MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL ON THE GROUND THAT THE EVIDENCE SOUGHT TO BE PRESENTED IS MERELY CUMULATIVE. II: THE SAID COURT ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONERS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE RESOLUTION DENYING THE AFORESAID MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL. III THE SAID COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL IN QUESTION WAS WHOLLY WRITTEN, DATED AND SIGNED BY THE LATE HERMINIA MONTINOLA. IV THE SAID COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE ALLEGED WILL WAS FRAUDULENTLY ANTEDATED TO CONCEAL ITS ACTUAL DATE OF EXECUTION AND TO SHIELD IT FROM PROBABLE DISPUTES AS TO THE TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY ON THE PART OF THE ALLEGED TESTATRIX AT THE TIME OF ITS ACTUAL EXECUTION. V THE SAID COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE LATE HERMINIA MONTINOLA WAS NOT SUBJECTED TO UNDUE PRESSURE AND IMPROPER IMPORTUNINGS ON THE PART OF THOSE STANDING TO BENEFIT FROM THE ALLEGED WILL. VI THE SAID COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL IN QUESTION TO PROBATE. RULING: 1st 2nd issues petitioners maintain that the appellate court erred in denying the motion for new trial insisting that the new evidence sought to be presented is not merely corroborative or cumulative. SC find the contention of private respondent is that the motion for new trial was a pro-forma motion because it was not in accordance with Sec. 1, Rule 53 of the Rules of Court. Section 1, Rule 53 provides Before a final order or judgment rendered by the Court of appeals becomes executory, a motion for new trial may be filed on the ground of newly discovered evidence which could not have been discovered prior to the trial in the court below by the exercise of the diligence and which is of such a character as would probably

change the result. The motion shall be accompanied by affidavits showing the facts constituting the grounds therefor and the newly discovered evidence. Said motion for new trial is not in substantial compliance with the requirements of Rule 53. The lone affidavit of a witness who was already presented said the hearing is hardly sufficient to justify the holding of new trial. The alleged new witnesses were unnamed without any certainty as, to their appearance before the court to testify. Affiant attests only on his belief that they would testify if and when they are subpoenaed by the court. Furthermore, the allegations in the affidavit as to the undue influence exerted on the testatrix are mere conclusions and not statement of facts. The requisite affidavits must state facts and not mere conclusions or opinions, otherwise they are not valid. The affidavits are required to avoid waste of the court's time if the newly discovered evidence turns out to be immaterial or of any evidentiary weight. Moreover, it could not be said that the evidence sought to be presented is new having been discovered only after the trial. It is apparent from the allegations of affiant that efforts to locate the witnesses were exerted only after the decision of the appellate court was handed down. The trial lasted for about four years so that petitioner had ample time to find said alleged witnesses who were admittedly known to her. The evidence which the petitioner now propose to present could have been discovered and presented during the hearing of the case, and there is no sufficient reason for concluding that had the petitioner exercised proper diligence she would not have been able to discover said evidence. In addition, SC agree with the appellate court that since the alleged illness of the testatrix as well as the charges of undue influence exerted upon her had been brought to light during the trial, and new evidence on this point is merely corroborative and cumulative which is generally not a ground for new trial. Accordingly, such evidence even if presented win not carry much probative weight which can alter the judgment. 3rd issue: During the hearing before the probate court, not only were three (3) close relatives of the testatrix presented but also two (2) expert witnesses who declared that the contested will and signature are in the handwriting of the testatrix. These testimonies more than satisfy the requirements of Art. 811 of the Civil Code 21 in conjunction with Section 11 of Rule 76, Revised Rules of Court, or the probate of holographic wills. 4th issue: As regards the alleged antedating of the will, petitioner failed to present competent proof that the will was actually executed sometime in June 1980 when the testatrix was already seriously ill and dying of terminal lung cancer. She relied only on the supposed inconsistencies in the testimony of Asuncion Gemperle, niece and constant companion of testatrix, which upon careful examination did not prove such claim of antedating. The factual findings of the probate court and the Court of Appeals that the will in question was executed according to the formalities required by law are conclusive on the Supreme Court when supported by evidence. SC have examined the records of this case and find no error in the conclusion arrived at by the respondent court that the contested will was duly executed in accordance with law. 5th issue: The contention of the petitioner that the will was obtained by undue influence or improper pressure exerted by the beneficiaries of the will cannot be sustained on mere conjecture or suspicion; as it is not enough that there was opportunity to exercise undue influence or a possibility that it may have been exercised. 28 The exercise of improper pressure and undue influence must be supported by substantial evidence that it was actually exercised. Finally, We quote with approval the observation of the respondent court There is likewise no question as to the due execution of the subject Will. To Our minds, the most authentic proof that decreased had

testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of the Will, is the Will itself which according to a report of one of the two expert witnesses (Exhibits X to X-3) reveals the existence of significant handwriting characteristics such as: 1. Spontaneity, freedom, and speed of writing 3. good line quality. 4. presence of natural variation... The characteristics of spontaneity, freedom and good line quality could not be achieved by the testatrix if it was true that she was indeed of unsound mind and/or under undue influence or improper pressure when she the Will. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit with costs against petitioner. lSO ORDERED. Case No. 4 ACAIN VS IAC GRN 72706 OCTOBER 27, 1987 FACTS: Constantitno filed for probate of the will of his decased brother Nemesio. The spouse and adopted child of the decedent opposed the probate of will because of preterition. RTC dismissed the petition of the wife. CA reversed and the probate thus was dismissed ISSUE: Whether or not there was preterition of compulsory heirs in the direct line thus their omission shall not annul the institution of heirs. RULING: Preterition consists in the omission of the forced heirs because they are not mentioned there in, or trough mentioned they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. As for the widow there is no preterit ion because she is not in the direct line. However, the same cannot be said for the adopted child whose legal adoption has not been questioned by the petitioner. Adoption gives to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he where a legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adopted person a legal heir hence, this is a clear case of preterition. The universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers and sisters to the entire inheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating the will because the nullification of such institution of universal heirs without any other testamentary disposition in the will amounts to a declaration that nothing was written. No legacies and devisees having been provided in the will, the whole property of the deceased has been left by universal title to petitioner and his brothers and sisters. Acain v. IAC GR No. 72706, October 27, 1987 Facts: In 1960, Nemesio Acain wrote a will giving all his properties to his brother Segundo, or, in case Segundo predeceases Nemesio, to Segundos children. Segundo died before Nemesio. Petitioner Constantino is one of Segundos children. In 1984, after the death of Nemesio, Constantino petitioned the court to have the will probated. This was opposed by Rosa Diongson, Nemesios wife, and Virginia Fernandez, a legally adopted child of Nemesio and Rosa.

The opposition was denied by the trial court, hence Diongson and Fernandez went to the SC, which transferred the case to the CA. The CA ordered the trial court to dismiss the probate petition since Diongson and Fernandez were preterited. Constantino went to the SC on certiorari, contending that the CA could not rule on the intrinsic validity of the will before it is admitted for probate. Diongson and Fernandez opposed, contending that certiorari is not a proper remedy. Issues: Whether or not certiorari is a proper remedy. Whether or not probate courts (the CA in this case) could rule on the intrinsic validity of a will before the will is probated. Whether or not Diongson was preterited. Whether or not Fernandez was preterited. Rulings: Yes, certiorari is a proper remedy. The existence of the remedy of appeal does not preclude certiorari, if appeal would not afford speedy and adequate relief.

participation) waived their rights and interests over their share of the property inherited from their mother Virginia. Thus, the property was titled in the name of the heirs of Nilo Viado. An action for partition was brought by Rebecca Viado-Non and Delia Viado in which the court ruled in favor of Alice and her children. ISSUE: WON the deeds were valid despite allegations of fraud, forgery, and undue influence. HELD: YES, on account of the following: First, while asserting the employment of fraud, forgery and undue influence in procuring the signatures of the parties to the deeds of donations and of extrajudicial settlement, Rebecca Non-Viado and Delia Viado are vague on how and in what manner those supposed vices occurred. Second, there no proof shown as to why Julian Viado should be held incapable of exercising sufficient judgment in ceding his rights and interest over the property to Nilo Viado. Third, the fact that the two deeds were registered only five (5) years after their execution would not affect their validity or point to fraud. 2. ISSUE: WON there was preterition in the deed of extrajudicial settlement with respect to the retardate Delia Viado. HELD: YES. The exclusion of Delia Viado has the effect of preterition. This kind of preterition, however, in the absence of fraud and bad faith, does not justify a collateral attack on the new life. Art. 1104 provides the remedy: where the preterition is not attended by bad faith and fraud, the partition shall not be rescinded but the preterited heir shall be paid the value of the share pertaining to her. Non v. CA Petitioners in this case are asserting co-ownership of the property while respondents claim that they are the absolute owners by virtue of a deed of donation executed in their favor. The SC ruled for respondents. When Virginia P. Viado died intestate in 1982, her part of the conjugal property was transmitted to her heirs her husband Julian and their children.. The inheritance, which vested from the moment of death of the decedent, remained under a coownership regime among the heirs until partition. Every act intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees would be a partition although it would purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, a donation or an extrajudicial settlement. The Court found the instruments executed showing donation were validly executed.

Yes. For practical considerations [???], the CA should be allowed to rule on the intrinsic validity of a will before the will was probated. If the probate of the will is allowed when on its face the will appears to be intrinsically void would have been an exercise in futility. It would have meant a waste of time, effort, expense, plus added futility. No. Insofar as the widow is concerned, Article 854 of the Civil Code may not apply as she does not ascend or descend from the testator, although she is a compulsory heir. Stated otherwise, even if the surviving spouse is a compulsory heir, there is no preterition even if she is omitted from the inheritance, for she is not in the direct line. Yes. Her legal adoption by the Nemesio has not been questioned by Constantino. Under Article 39 of P.D. No. 603, known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, adoption gives to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied that she has totally omitted and preterited in the will of the testator and that both adopted child and the widow were deprived of at least their legitime. Neither can it be denied that they were not expressly disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case of preterition of the legally adopted child. Case 5 NON VS. CA CASES FOR ARTICLES 854-856 FACTS: Deceased spouses Julian and Virginia Viado owned several properties, among them a house and a lot located at Isarog St., La Loma, Quezon City; they had four children. Leah Viado Jacobs and Nilo Viado both died in 1987, with Nilo leaving behind his wife, Alicia, and two children, herein respondents. The other two siblings, Rebecca Viado-Non and Delia Viado are the petitioners in this case. Alicia claimed absolute ownership as evidenced by a deed of donation in which the late Julian Viado donated his conjugal share of the property to Alicias deceased husband. There was also a deed of extrajudicial settlement where Rebecca Viado-Non and the late Leah Viado (without Delia Viados

CASE 6 MOLO VS. MOLO 90 Phil 37 FACTS: 1. Mariano Molo died on January 24, 1941 without leaving any forced heir either in the descending or ascending line.

2. His wife Juana Molo (petitioner) survived him, and by his nieces and nephew Luz, Gliceria and Cornelio, all surnamed Molo (oppositors-appellants). 3. Oppositors appellants were the legitimate children of a deceased brother of the testator. 4. Mariano left two wills, one executed on August 17, 1918 and another executed on June 20, 1939, 5. In both the 1918 and 1939 wills Juana was instituted as his universal heir. 6. The latter will contains a clause, which expressly revokes the will executed in 1918. 7. Juana Molo filed in the CFI a petition seeking the probate of the will executed in 1939. 8. The court rendered a decision denying the probate of said will on the ground that the petitioner failed to prove that the same was executed in accordance with law. 9. In view of the disallowance of the will, the widow filed another petition for the probate of the will executed by the deceased on August 18, 1918. 10. The oppositors filed an opposition to the petition contending that, notwithstanding the disallowance of the 1939 will, the revocatory clause is valid and still has the effect of nullifying the prior will of 1918. 11. Likewise, regardless of the revocatory clause, said will of 1918 cannot still be given effect because of the presumption that the testator himself deliberately revoked it. 12. The will of 1918 was admitted to probate. 13. Hence this appeal. ISSUE: Was the admittance into probate proper? What is the doctrine of dependent relative revocation? HELD: A subsequent will containing a clause revoking a previous will, having been disallowed, for the reason that it was not executed in conformity with the provisions of law as to the making of wills, cannot produce the effect of annulling the previous will, inasmuch as said revocatory clause is void. The doctrine of dependent relative revocation is usually applied where the testator cancels or destroys a will or executed an instrument intended to revoke a will with a present intention to make a new testamentary disposition as a substitute for the old, and the new disposition is not made or, if made, fails to effect for same reason. The failure of the new testamentary disposition, upon whose validity the revocation depends, is equivalent to the non-fulfillment of a suspensive condition, and hence prevents the revocation of the original will. But a mere intent to make at some time a will in place of that destroyed will not render the destruction conditional. It must appear that the revocation is dependent upon the valid execution of a new will. Even in the supposition that the destruction of the original will by the testator could be presumed from the failure of the petitioner to

produce it in court, such destruction cannot have the effect of defeating the prior will of 1918 because of the fact that it is founded on the mistaken belief that the will of 1939 has been validly executed and would be given due effect. The theory on which the principle of dependent relative revocation is predicated in that the testator did not intend to die intestate. And this intention is clearly manifest when he executed two wills on different occasions and instituted his wife as his universal heir. There can therefore be no mistake as to his intention of dying testate. MOLO VS. MOLO CASES FOR ARTS. 828-837 FACTS: Mariano Molo died and was survived by his herein petitioner wife and his herein oppositors nieces and nephews. He left two wills one dated 1918 and the other 1939. The second will contains a clause which expressly revokes the former will. Upon death, his wife filed a petition for probate of the 1939 will which was later on admitted. However, oppositors eventually filed a petition which resulted to the denial of probate of the said will. Petitioner wife then filed a petition for probate of the 1918 will, which was likewise denied by the oppositors in this case. 1. ISSUE: WON petitioner voluntarily and deliberately frustrated the probate of the 1939 will. RULING: SC held that she did not because if it was indeed her intention, she could have accomplished her desire by merely suppressing the will or tearing or destroying it, and then take steps in leading to the probate of the 1918 will. Had the oppositors in this case not filed an opposition and had limited their objection to the intrinsic validity of the will, their plan to defeat the will and secure the intestacy of the deceased would have been accomplished. If the said will was denied probate, it is due to oppositors fault and is unfair to impute bad faith to petitioner simply because she exerted effort to protect her own interest and prevent the intestacy of the deceased. 2. ISSUE: WON, notwithstanding the disallowance of the 1939 will, the revocatory clause is valid and still nullifies the 1918 will. RULING: SC held that the clause is likewise void because the Court held in Samson v. Naval that it cannot produce the effect of annulling the previous will since said revocatory clause is void. If it was really the intention of the deceased to revoke the first will, with the assumption that he in fact destroyed the original copy of the 1918 will since it cannot be found at present, he should also destroyed the duplicate copy of the said will which he had given to his wife. But he did not so. Hence, it is possible that because of the long lapse of 21 years since the 1st will was executed, the original will had been misplaced or lost and forgetting there was a copy, he deemed it wise to execute another. Granting that he did destroy the 1st will, the 1918 will can still be admitted under the principle of dependent relative revocation, which is predicated on the theory that the testator did not intend to die intestate. The doctrine of dependent relative revocation is established where

the act of destruction is connected with the making of another will so as fairly to raise the inference that the testator meant the revocation of the old to depend upon the efficacy of the new disposition intended to be substituted, the revocation will be conditional and dependent upon the efficacy of the new disposition; and if, for any reason, the new will intended to be made as a substitute is inoperative, the revocation fails and the original will remains in full force. Molo vs. Molo A subsequent will, containing a clause revoking a previous will, having been disallowed, for the reason that it was not executed in conformity with the formal requirements as to the making of wills, cannot produce the effect of annulling the previous will, inasmuch as said revocatory clause is void. Doctrine of Dependent Relative Revocation. It is the intention of the testator that the revocation of previous will is dependent upon the validity of a subsequent will. The failure of the new testamentary disposition, upon whose validity the revocation depends, is equivalent to the non-fulfillment of a suspensive condition, and hence prevents the revocation of the original will. The operation of the doctrine depends upon the intention of the testator at the time of the revocation of the first will. CASE 7 G.R. No. L-4888 May 25, 1953 JOSE MERZA, petitioner, vs. PEDRO LOPEZ PORRAS, respondent. FACTS: This case is an appeal from the Court of Appeals which affirmed an order of the Court of First Instance of Zambales denying the probate of the last will and testament and so-called codicil, identified as Exhibits A and B, of Pilar Montealegre, deceased. The testatrix was survived by the husband and collateral relatives, some of whom, along with the husband, were disinherited in Exhibit B for the reasons set forth therein. The opposition to Exhibit A was predicated on alleged defects of the attestation clause. Written in the local dialect known to the testatrix. The opponent objected that this clause did not estate that the testatrix and the witnesses had signed each and every page of the will or that she had signed the instrument in the presence of the witnesses. The Appellate Court dismissed the first objection, finding that "failure to estate in the attestation clause in question that the testatrix and/or the witnesses had signed each and every page of Exhibit A were cured by the fact that each one of the page of the instrument appears to be signed by the testatrix and the three attesting witnesses. However SC find merit on the second issue raised by the petitioner. ISSUE:

WON the testatrix had signed the instrument in the presence of said witnesses . WON Exhibit B partakes the nature of a will. HELD: It must be admitted that the attestation clause was very poor drawn, its language exceedingly ungrammatical to the point of being difficult to understand; but from a close examination of the whole context in relation to its purpose the implication seems clear that the testatrix signed in the presence of the witnesses. Considering that the witnesses' only business at hand was to sign and attest to the testatrix's signing of the document, and that the only actors of the proceeding were the maker and the witnesses acting and speaking collectively and in the first person, the phrase "in our presence," used as it was in connection with the process of signing, can not imply anything but the testatrix signed before them. No other inference is possible. The prepositional phrase "in our presence" denotes an active verb and the verb a subject. The verb could not be other than signed and the subject no other than the testatrix. The use of the word "also" is no less enlightening. It denotes that, as each of the witnesses sign in the presence of the testatrix and of one another, so the testatrix sign in similar or like manner in their presence. With reference of Exhibit B the Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court that the document having been executed one day before Exhibit A could not be considered as a codicil "because a codicil, as the word implies, is only an addition to, or modification of, the will." The Court of Appeals added that "the content of Exhibit B are couched in the language of ordinarily used in a simple affidavit and as such, may not have the legal effect and force to a testamentary disposition." Furthermore, the Court of Appeals observed, disinheritance "may not be made in any instrument other than the will of Exhibit A, as expressly provided for in article 849 of the Civil Code," and, "there being no disposition as to the disinheritance of the oppositor, Pedro Lopez Porras (the surviving spouse), in the said Exhibit A, it is quite clear that he can not be disinherited in any other instrument including Exhibit B, which is, as above stated, a simple affidavit." Exhibit B does partake of the nature of a will. Being of testamentary character and having been made with all the formalities of law, Exhibit B is entitled to probate as an independent testementary desposition. In the absence of any legal provision to the contrary and there is none in this jurisdiction it is the general, well-established rule that two separate and distinct wills may be probated if one does not revoke the other and provided that the statutory requirements relative to the execution of wills have been complied with. As seen, Exhibit B embodied all the requisites of a will, even free of such formal of literary imperfections as are found in Exhibit A. SC ruled that both Exhibits A and B be admitted to probate, subject of courts to the right of the disinherited person under article 850 to contest the disinheritance.

MERZA V. PORRAS: Facts:In this case the attes tation clause contained in the will did not clearly state that the testatrix and the witnesses had signed each and every page of the will or that the testatrix had signed the instrument in the presence of the witnesses. Issue:WON the will is correct in form Held:Yes. Indeed, the attestation clause is very poorly drawn but from a c l o s e e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e w h o l e c o n t e x t i n r e l a t i o n t o i t s purposes the implication seems clear that the testatrix signed in the presence of the witnesses. In consonance with the principle of liberal interpretation, the attestation clause was held by the Court as sufficient and valid. In ordinary wills, there is no statutory requirement of the date of execution. An undated will or one with erroneous date would not be invalidated. Neither is there a requirement as t o p l a c e o f execution.

that contrary to the claim of oppositors-appellants, there had been no legal revocation by the execution of the 1943 and 1944 deeds of sale, because the latter had been made in favor of the legatee herself, and affirmed the decision of the CA. 1. The probate had become final despite the non-resolution of the issue on estoppel and revocation. It is elementary that a probate decree finally and definitively settles all questions concerning capacity of the testator and the proper execution and witnessing of his last will and testament, irrespective of whether its provisions are valid and enforceable or otherwise. As such, the probate order is final and appealable; and it is so recognized by express provision of Sec 1 of rule 109, that soecifically prescribes that any interested person may appeal in special proceedings from an order or judgment where such order or judgment: a. allows or disallows a will. 2. Overruling the estoppel invoked by oppositors-appellants had likewise become final. The presentation and probate of a will are requirements of public policy, being primarily designed to protect the testators expressed wishes, which are entitled to respect as a consequence of the decedents ownership and right of disposition within legal limits. Evidence of it is the duty imposed on a custodian of a will to deliver the same to the court, and the fine and prescribed for its violation. It would be a non-sequitur to allow public policy to be evaded on the pretext of estoppel. 3. The 1930 will of Benedicta de los Reyes had not been impliedly revoked by her execution of deeds of conveyance in favor of the proponent on March 26, 1943 and April 3, 1944. The existence of such change or departure from the original intent of the testatrix, expressed in her 1930 testament, is rendered doubtful by the circumstances that the subsequent alienations in 1943 and 1944 were executed in favor of the legatee herself, appellee Dimagiba. In fact, no consideration whatever was paid by respondent Dimagiba on account of the transfers, thereby rendering it even more doubtful whether in conveying the property to her lagatee, the testatrix merely intended to comply in advance with what she had ordained in her testament, rather than an alteration or departure therefrom. Revocation being an exception on article 957 of the Civil Code which suggests that if the testator by any title or for any cause alienates the thing bequeathed or any part thereof, it being understood that in the latter case the legacy or devise shall be without effect only with respect to the part thus alienated. If after the alienation the thing should again belong to the testator, even if be by reason of nullity of the contract, the legacy or devise shall not thereafter be valid, unless the reacquisition shall have been effected by virtue of the exercise of the right of repurchase, does not apply to the case at bar. CASE 9 NICOLASA MACAM, Petitioner-Appellant, vs. JUANA GATMAITAN, oppositor-appellant. FACTS: On March 27, 1933, Nicolasa Macam filed a petition for her appointment as executrix without bond and the probate of the will dated July 12, 1932, and of the codicil (a written instrument wherein one declares his last will, in order to take form or add something to the will, or clarify the provisions thereof) thereof dated February 17, 1933, executed by Leonarda Macam who died on March 18, 1933, in the in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. When the petition was called for hearing, the clerk of the CFI, upon instructions of the judge, proceeded to take the evidence relative to the probate of the will without any opposition. Inasmuch as Juana Gatmaitan filed opposition to the probate of the codicil, said

CASE 8 Fernandez vs. Dimagiba GR L-23638 Facts: Isabela Dimagiba submitted to the CFI a petition for probate of the purported will of the late Benedicta de los Reyes. The will instituted the petitioner as sole heir of the deceased. The petition was set for hearing but a month later Mariano, Cesar, Leonor, and Pacencia filed oppositions to the probate asked claiming that they are all heirs intestate of the decedent. The CFI found the will genuine and properly executed but deferred resolution on the questions on estoppel and revocation. Oppositors filed for reconsideration but the court overruled the claim. CFI appointed Ricardo Cruz as administrator for the sole purpose of submitting inventory of the estate. After receiving further evidence on the issue whether the execution by the testatrix of deeds of sale of the larger portion of her estate in favor of the testamentary heir, made in 1943 and 1944, subsequent to the execution of her 1930 testament, had revoked the latter under Article 957(2) of the 1950 Civil Code (Art. 869 of the Civil Code of 1889), the trial court resolved against the oppositors and held the will of the late Benedicta de los Reyes unaffected and unrevoked by the deeds of sale. Whereupon, the oppositors elevated the case to the CA. The appellate court admitted the will to probate. Hence thius appeal. Issue(s): a. WON the decree of the CFI allowing the will to probate had become final for lack of appeal b. WON the order of the Court of Origin dated July 27, 1959, overruling the estoppel invoked by oppositors-appellants had likewise become final c. WON the 1930 will of Benedicta de los Reyes had been impliedly revoked by her execution of deeds of conveyance in favor of the proponent on March 26, 1943 and April 3, 1944 Ruling: SC held that the decree of June 20, 1958, admitting the will to probate, had become final for lack opportune appeal; that the same was appealable independently of the issue of implied revocation;

clerk did not take the evidence relative thereto and refrained from so doing. Consequently, Judge Hon. M. Rosauro entered an order allowing said will and appointing the petitioner Nicolasa Macam as executrix. On July 6, 1933, the codicil was called for hearing. After hearing counsel for the respective parties, Judge Francisco Enage, then presiding over the CFI of Bulacan, entered the order the dispositive part of which has been quoted at the beginning of this decision. In view of the neglect or abandonment by the interested parties of their claims during the proceedings for the probate of the will, and it appearing that the order allowing the will has already become final and executory, the court is of the opinion that it is now too late to consider the so-called codicil as well as the instrument from which Juana Gatmaitan derives her alleged right. Wherefore, the petition for the probate of the codicil as well as the opposition thereto filed by Juana Gatmaitan is dismissed, without prejudice to whatever right the latter may have in an appropriate proceeding before the committee on claims and appraisal, in accordance with law. So ordered. ISSUES: 1. Is the probate of a will by final judgment prior to that of a codicil thereof bar to the probate of said codicil? 2. Does the failure to file the opposition to the probate of a will constitute a bar to the presentation of the codicil for probate? RULING: The fact that a will has been allowed without opposition and the order allowing the same has become final and executory is not a bar to the presentation and probate of a codicil, provided it complies with all the necessary formalities for executing a will required by section 614 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by section 1 of Act No. 1934. It is not necessary that the will and the codicil be probated together, as the codicil may be concealed by an interested party and it may not be discovered until after the will has already been allowed; and they may be presented and probated one after the other, since the purpose of the probate proceedings is merely to determine whether or not the will and the codicil meet all the statutory requirements for their extrinsic validity, leaving the validity of their provisions for further consideration. The appeal taken by the petitioner Nicolasa Macam is, therefore, well founded and the court a quo erred in flatly, denying her petition for the probate of the codicil on the erroneous ground that said codicil should have been presented at the same time as the will. With respect to the opposition of the oppositor-appellant Juana Gatmaitan, the fact that she failed to file opposition to the probate of the will does not constitute an abandonment of a right, nor does it deprive her of the right to oppose the probate of said codicil, inasmuch as the will may satisfy all the external requisites necessary for its validity, but the codicil may, at the time of its execution, not be in conformity therewith. The court a quo, therefore, erred in dismissing the opposition filed by the oppositor-appellant Juana Gatmaitan to the probate of the codicil of the will of the deceased Leonarda Macam. Wherefore, the order appealed from is reversed and it is ordered that the petition for the probate of the codicil filed by the petitioner Nicolasa Macam, as well as the opposition to said probate filed by the oppositor Juana Gatmaitan, be reinstated, without special pronouncement as to costs. So ordered

Macam v. Gatmaitan Leonarda and Juana reciprocally assigned their respective property to one another conditioned upon who might die first, the time of death determining the event upon which the acquisition of such right by the one or the other depended. This contract, as any other contract, is binding upon the parties thereto. Inasmuch as Leonarda had died before Juana the latter thereupon acquired the ownership of the house, in the same manner as Leonarda would have acquired the ownership of the automobile and of the furniture if Juana had died first. (In this case, the court essentially sustained the validity of survivorship agreements.) CASE 10 RABADILLA VS. CA CASES FOR ARTICLES 854-856 FACTS: Aleja Belleza, in a codicil appended to her Last Will and Testatment, bequeathed a lot to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla subject to certain conditions: A. That should Jorge die before the testator, the property shall be inherited by the latters spouse and children B. That if the ownership of the property is finally transmitted to Jorge, he shall be liable to deliver until he dies 75 piculs of sugar a year to Maria Belleza while she is still alive C. That in case of Jorges death, his heirs shall also be imposed the same obligation. D. And that if the heir shall later sell, lease, mortgage this said lot, the buyer, lessee, mortgagee, shall have also the obligation to deliver yearly 100 piculs of sugar to Maria Belleza, provided that the buyer, lessor, mortgagor be near descendants and sister of the testator The will also provided that in case the buyer, lessor or mortgagor fails to fulfill said obligations, Maria Belleza is entitled to forfeit the lots in favor of the testators descendants. Jorge Rabadilla died, and his spouse and children succeeded him. Now, Maria Belleza filed a complaint against Jorges heirs due to alleged violations of the Codicil and asked for the property to be reconveyed to the near descendants of Aleja Belleza on the ground that: A. The lot was mortgaged to PNB, not a near descendants of the testator B. That the heirs failed to deliver the piculs of sugar beginning 1985 C. That PNB also did not comply with the obligation to deliver 100 piculs of sugar per year RTC dismissed the claim. On Appeal, the CA ruled that indeed the heirs violated the obligations imposed upon them and therefore the land should be seized and reconveyed to the estate of Aleja. However, they should file a separate proceedings to re-open the estate and have it distributed to Alejas heirs. Belleza Appealed. ISSUE: WON the Article 882 of the Civil Code on modal institutions govern the disposition rather than the provisions on institution through simple substitution.

CASE 11 Vda. De Perez vs Tolete HELD: The SC affirmed the decision of the CA in applying Art. 882 of the Civil Code. The Court held that the disposition in question in favor of Jorge Rabadilla could neither be simple substitution or fideicommissary. In simple substitution, the second heir takes the inheritance in default of the first heir by reason of incapacity, predecease or renunciation. In the case under consideration, the provisions of subject provides is that, should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the conditions imposed in the Codicil, the property referred to shall be seized and turned over to the testatrixs near descendants. It could not also be a fideicommissary because the element that the first heir is obliged to preserve and transmit the property to a second heir is not present. In this case, the instituted heir is in fact allowed under the Codicil to alienate the property provided the negotiation is with the near descendants of the sister of the testatrix. Without the duty to preserve, there is no fideicommissary substitution. Also, the second heir or the fideicommissary to whom the property is transmitted must not be beyond one degree from the first heir or the fiduciary. The disposition was in the nature of modal institutions. Here, the testator imposes a charge upon the instituted heir without, however, affecting the efficacy of such institution. In conditional substitution however, the efficacy of the inheritance is subject to the condition. In case of doubt, the institution must be considered as modal and not institutional. In simple substitutions, the second heir takes the inheritance in default of the first heir by reason of incapacity, predecease or renunciation. Elements in Fideicommissary Sub: A. The first heir is obliged to preserve and transmit the property to a second heir B. The second heir or the fideicommissary to whom the property is transmitted must not be beyond one degree from the first heir or the fiduciary. In modal institution, the testator states (1) the object of the institution, (2) the purpose or application of the property left by the testator, or (3) the charge imposed by the testator upon the heir. A mode imposes an obligation upon the heir or legatee but it does not affect the efficacy of his rights to the succession. G.R. No. 76714, June 2, 1994

PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: Extrinsic Validity of Wills of Non-Resident Aliens PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: Reprobate of Foreign Wills: Requirement of Notices

FACTS: Dr. Jose Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, who became American citizens and residents of New York, each executed a will also in New York, containing provisions on presumption of survivorship (in the event that it is not known which one of the spouses died first, the husband shall be presumed to have predeceased his wife). Later, the entire family perished in a fire that gutted their home. Thus, Rafael, who was named trustee in Joses will, filed for separate probate proceedings of the wills. Later, Evelyns mother, Salud Perez, filed a petition for reprobate in Bulacan. Rafael opposed, arguing that Salud was not an heir according to New York law. He contended that since the wills were executed in New York, New York law should govern. He further argued that, by New York law, he and his brothers and sisters were Joses heirs and as such entitled to notice of the reprobate proceedings, which Salud failed to give. For her part, Salud said she was the sole heir of her daughter, Evelyn, and that the two wills were in accordance with New York law. But before she could present evidence to prove the law of New York, the reprobate court already issued an order, disallowing the wills. ISSUE: Whether or not the reprobate of the wills should be allowed HELD: Extrinsic Validity of Wills of Non-Resident Aliens The respective wills of the Cunanan spouses, who were American citizens, will only be effective in this country upon compliance with the following provision of the Civil Code of the Philippines: Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place in which he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country, or in conformity with those which this Code prescribes. Thus, proof that both wills conform with the formalities prescribed by New York laws or by Philippine laws is imperative. Evidence for Reprobate of Wills Probated outside the Philippines The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills which have been probated outside of the Philippines are as follows: (1) the due execution of the will in accordance with the foreign laws; (2) the testator has his domicile in the foreign country and not in the

Philippines; (3) the will has been admitted to probate in such country; (4) the fact that the foreign tribunal is a probate court, and (5) the laws of a foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills (III Moran Commentaries on the Rules of Court, 1970 ed., pp. 419429; Suntay v. Suntay, 95 Phil. 500 [1954]; Fluemer v. Hix, 54 Phil. 610 [1930]). Except for the first and last requirements, the petitioner submitted all the needed evidence. The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon which the probate in the foreign country is based is impelled by the fact that our courts cannot take judicial notice of them. On Lack of Notice to Joses Heirs This petition cannot be completely resolved without touching on a very glaring fact - petitioner has always considered herself the sole heir of Dr. Evelyn Perez Cunanan and because she does not consider herself an heir of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, she noticeably failed to notify his heirs of the filing of the proceedings. Thus, even in the instant petition, she only impleaded respondent Judge, forgetting that a judge whose order is being assailed is merely a nominal or formal party (Calderon v. Solicitor General, 215 SCRA 876 [1992]). The rule that the court having jurisdiction over the reprobate of a will shall "cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an original will presented for allowance" (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 27, Section 2) means that with regard to notices, the will probated abroad should be treated as if it were an "original will" or a will that is presented for probate for the first time. Accordingly, compliance with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76, which require publication and notice by mail or personally to the "known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator resident in the Philippines" and to the executor, if he is not the petitioner, are required. The brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, contrary to petitioner's claim, are entitled to notices of the time and place for proving the wills. Under Section 4 of Rule 76 of the Revised Rules of Court, the "court shall also cause copies of the notice of the time and place fixed for proving the will to be addressed to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator, . . . " WHEREFORE, the questioned Order is SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge shall allow petitioner reasonable time within which to submit evidence needed for the joint probate of the wills of the Cunanan spouses and see to it that the brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan are given all notices and copies of all pleadings pertinent to the probate proceedings. SO ORDERED. SUCCESSION Vda de Perez vs. Tolete FACTS:Dr. Jose Cunanam and wife Evelyn Perez-Cunanam, both American citizens, executed will separately but containing almost the same provisions. The doctors will and testament bequeathed to his wife all the remainder of his real and personal properties at the time of his death. His likewise states that should

both of them die, i t s h a l l b e p r e s u m e d t h a t he predeceased his wife, and all e s t a t e s h a l l b e administered and distributed in accordance with such presumption. Evelyns will and testament contained her acknowledgement that in case both died, it shall be presumed she pre-deceased her husband. On January 9, 1982, the entire Cunanam family perished when their house was burned down. Salud, mother of Evelyn filed a petition for the probate of a wills, that were likewise admitted for probate in the US c o u r t . O n J u n e 2 3 , C o u r t g r a n t e d probate but Cunanam heirs opposed a n d petitioned the court to nullify proceedings, disqualify petitioner as administratix. Judge recalled the appointment of petitioner as administratix and disallowed the probate of the 2 wills. ISSUE:Whether or not the 2 wills may be probated at the 2 wills may be probated at the same time in a court. HELD:S i n c e t h e w i l l s o f t h e C u n a n a m s p o u s e w e r e a d m i t t e d f o r p r o b a t e , a s American citizens, NCC provision was satisfied: Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produce effect in the Philippines if m a d e w i t h t h e formalities by the law of the place in which he resides, or a c c o r d i n g i n h i s c o u n t r y , o r i n conformity with those which this C o d e prescribes. What the law prohibits is the making of joint wills either for the testators r e c i p r o c a l benefit or for the benefit of a third p e r s o n . T h e C u n a n a m s p o u s e s executed separate will. Since the wills contain essentially the same provisions and pertain to property which in all probability are conjugal in nature, p r a c t i c a l considerations dictate their joint probate we will always strive to settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation. CASE 12 CARLOS vs SANDOVAL Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos were brothers who each have three parcels of land by virtue of inheritance. Later Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by respondents Felicidad Sandoval and their son, Teofilo Carlos II. Upon Teofilos death, two parcels of land were registered in the name of Felicidad and Teofilo II. In August 1995, Carlos commenced an action against respondents before the court a quo. In his complaint, Carlos asserted that the marriage between his late brother and Felicidad was a nullity in view of the absence of the required marriage license. He likewise maintained that his deceased brother was neither the natural nor the adoptive father of Teofilo Carlos II. He argued that the properties covered by such certificates of title, including the sums received by respondents as proceeds, should be reconveyed to him. HELD: The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage must be proved. Neither judgment on the pleadings nor summary judgment is allowed. So is confession of judgment disallowed. Carlos argues that the CA should have applied Rule 35 of the Rules of Court governing summary judgment, instead of the rule on judgment on the pleadings. Petitioner is misguided. Whether it is based on judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment, the CA

was correct in reversing the summary judgment rendered by the trial court. Both the rules on judgment on the pleadings and summary judgments have no place in cases of declaration of absolute nullity of marriage and even in annulment of marriage. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage cases commenced before the effectivity of A.M. No. 0211-10-SC; and (2) Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code. Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may not be filed by any party outside of the marriage. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor, and, hence, can only question the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution. The Rule extends only to marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988. The advent of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages marks the beginning of the end of the right of the heirs of the deceased spouse to bring a nullity of marriage case against the surviving spouse. But the Rule never intended to deprive the compulsory or intestate heirs of their successional rights. While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, it does not mean that the compulsory or intestate heirs are without any recourse under the law. They can still protect their successional right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity but upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not apply to cases already commenced before March 15, 2003 although the marriage involved is within the coverage of the Family Code. This is so, as the new Rule which became effective on March 15, 2003 is prospective in its application. Petitioner commenced the nullity of marriage case against respondent Felicidad in 1995. The marriage in controversy was celebrated on May 14, 1962. Which law would govern depends upon when the marriage took place. The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its celebration. But the Civil Code is silent as to who may bring an action to declare the marriage void. Does this mean that any person can bring an action for the declaration of nullity of marriage?

True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time the respondents were married, or even in the Family Code, there is no specific provision as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage; however, only a party who can demonstrate proper interest can file the same. A petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest and must be based on a cause of action. Thus, in Nial v. Badayog, the Court held that the children have the personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage of their deceased father to their stepmother as it affects their successional rights. CASE 13 CASE 14 THIRD DIVISION [G.R. No. 141634. February 5, 2001] Heirs of Spouses SANDEJAS vs. LINA, respondent. Facts: Petitioners fault the CA Decision by arguing, inter alia, (a) jurisdiction over ordinary civil action seeking not merely to enforce a sale but to compel performance of a contract falls upon a civil court, not upon an intestate court; and (b) that Section 8 of Rule 89 allows the executor or administrator, and no one else, to file an application for approval of a sale of the property under administration. Issue: Whether or not the probate court has jurisdiction over the contract of sale of realty belonging to the estate of the decedent? Ruling: A contract of sale is not invalidated by the fact that it is subject to probate courts approval. The transaction remains binding on the seller-heir, but not on the other heirs who have not given their consent to it. Probate jurisdiction covers all matters relating to the settlement of estates (Rules 74 & 86-91) and the probate of wills (Rules 75-77) of deceased persons, including the appointment and the removal of administrators and executors (Rules 78-85). It also extends to matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of a probate courts recognized powers such as selling, mortgaging or otherwise encumbering realty belonging to the estate. Indeed, the rules on this point are intended to settle the estate in a speedy manner, so that the benefits that may flow from such settlement may be immediately enjoyed by the heirs and the beneficiaries. CASE 15 The compulsory heir can not be deprived of her share in the estate save by disinheritance as prescribed by law. (Francisco vs. FranciscoAlfonso, 354 SCRA 112).

FRANCISCO vs FRANCISCO-ALFONSO Pascual vs. Francisco-Alfonso G.R. No. 138774. March 8, 2001 May a legitimate daughter be deprived of her share in the estate of her deceased father by a simulated contract transferring the property of her father to his illegitimate children? Respondent Aida Francisco-Alfonso (hereafter Aida) is the only daughter of spouses Gregorio Francisco and Cirila de la Cruz, who are now both deceased. Petitioners, on the other hand, are daughters of the late Gregorio Francisco with his common law wife Julia Mendoza, with whom he begot seven (7) children. Gregorio Francisco (hereafter Gregorio) owned two parcels of residential land, situated in Barangay Lolomboy, Bocaue, Bulacan, covered by TCT Nos. T-32740 and T-117160. When Gregorio was confined in a hospital in 1990, he confided to his daughter Aida that the certificates of title of his property were in the possession of Regina Francisco and Zenaida Pascual. After Gregorio died on July 20, 1990, Aida inquired about the certificates of title from her half sisters. They informed her that Gregorio had sold the land to them on August 15, 1983. After verification, Aida learned that there was indeed a deed of absolute sale in favor of Regina Francisco and Zenaida Pascual. Thus, on August 15, 1983, Gregorio executed a Kasulatan sa Ganap na Bilihan, whereby for P25,000.00, he sold the two parcels of land to Regina Francisco and Zenaida Pascual. By virtue of the sale, the Register of Deeds of Bulacan issued TCT No. T-59.585 to Regina Francisco and TCT T-59.586 to Zenaida Pascual. On April 1, 1991, Aida filed with the Regional Trial Court, Bulacan a complaint against petitioners for annulment of sale with damages. She alleged that the signature of her late father, Gregorio Francisco, on the Kasulatan sa Ganap na Bilihan dated August 15, 1983, was a forgery. In their joint answer to the complaint, petitioners denied the alleged forgery or simulation of the deed of sale. After due proceedings, on July 21, 1994, the trial court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint. The dispositive portion reads: WHEREFORE, on the basis of the evidence adduced and the law applicable thereon, the Court hereby renders judgment: a) sustaining the validity of the Kasulatan Sa Ganap Na Bilihan executed on 15 August 1993 by the late Gregorio Francisco in favor of the defendants; b) affirming the validity of the Transfer Certificates of Title No. T59.585 issued to defendant Regina Francisco and No. T-59.386 issued to defendant Zenaida Pascual; and c) dismissing the complaint as well as the defendants counterclaim for damages and attorneys fees for lack of merit. In time respondent Alfonso appealed to the Court of Appeals.
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After due proceedings, on April 30, 1999, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision reversing that of the trial court, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 21, 1994 of the court a quo is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another rendered as follows: 1. The Kasulatan Sa Ganap na Bilihan dated August 15, 1983 is declared null and void from the beginning and TCT Nos. T-59.585 (M) and T-59-586 (M), both of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan (Meycauayan Branch) in the names of Regina Francisco and Zenaida Pascual, respectively, are annulled and cancelled; 2. The Register of Deeds of Bulacan (Meycauayan Branch) is ordered to cancel the aforementioned TCT Nos. T-59.585 (M) and T59.586 (M) and to reinstate Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T132740 and T-117160 both in the name of Gregorio Francisco. 3. Defendants-appellees Regina Francisco and Zenaida Pascual jointly and solidarily are ordered to pay plaintiff-appellant Alfonso the amount of P5,000.00 as moral damages, P5,000.00 as exemplary damages and P5,000.00 as attorneys fees. 4. The counterclaim of defendants-appellees is dismissed for lack of merit. Costs of suit against said defendants-appellees. Hence, this petition. The main issue raised is whether the Supreme Court may review the factual findings of the appellate court. The jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought before it from the Court of Appeals under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court is limited to review of pure errors of law. It is not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh evidence all over again, unless there is a showing that the findings of the lower court are totally devoid of support or are glaringly erroneous as to constitute grave abuse of discretion We affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals because: First: The kasulatan was simulated. There was no consideration for the contract of sale. Felicitas de la Cruz, a family friend of the Franciscos, testified that Zenaida Pascual and Regina Francisco did not have any source of income in 1983, when they bought the property, until the time when Felicitas testified in 1991. As proof of income, however, Zenaida Pascual testified that she was engaged in operating a canteen, working as cashier in Mayon Night Club as well as buying and selling RTW (Ready to Wear) items in August of 1983 and prior thereto. Zenaida alleged that she paid her father the amount of P10,000.00. She did not withdraw money from her bank account at the Rural Bank of Meycauayan, Bulacan, to pay for the property. She had personal savings other than those deposited in the bank. Her gross earnings from the RTW for three years was P9,000.00, and she earned P50.00 a night at the club. Regina Francisco, on the other hand, was a market vendor, selling nilugaw, earning a net income of P300.00 a day in 1983. She bought the property from the deceased for P15,000.00. She had no other source of income.

We find it incredible that engaging in buy and sell could raise the amount of P10,000.00, or that earnings in selling goto could save enough to pay P15,000.00, in cash for the land. The testimonies of petitioners were incredible considering their inconsistent statements as to whether there was consideration for the sale and also as to whether the property was bought below or above its supposed market value. They could not even present a single witness to the kasulatan that would prove receipt of the purchase price. Since there was no cause or consideration for the sale, the same was a simulation and hence, null and void. Second: Even if the kasulatan was not simulated, it still violated the Civil Code provisions insofar as the transaction affected respondents legitime. The sale was executed in 1983, when the applicable law was the Civil Code, not the Family Code. Obviously, the sale was Gregorios way to transfer the property to his illegitimate daughters at the expense of his legitimate daughter. The sale was executed to prevent respondent Alfonso from claiming her legitime and rightful share in said property. Before his death, Gregorio had a change of heart and informed his daughter about the titles to the property. According to Article 888, Civil Code: The legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half of the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother. The latter may freely dispose of the remaining half subject to the rights of illegitimate children and of the surviving spouse as hereinafter provided. Gregorio Francisco did not own any other property. If indeed the parcels of land involved were the only property left by their father, the sale in fact would deprive respondent of her share in her fathers estate. By law, she is entitled to half of the estate of her father as his only legitimate child. The legal heirs of the late Gregorio Francisco must be determined in proper testate or intestate proceedings for settlement of the estate. His compulsory heir can not be deprived of her share in the estate save by disinheritance as prescribed by law. CASE 16 EMNACE v. COURT OF APPEALSFACTS: Petitioner Emilio Emnace, Vicente Tabanao and Jacinto Divinagracia were partners in a business concern known as Ma. Nelma Fishing Industry.Sometime in January of 1986, they decided to dissolve their partnership and executed anagreement of partition and distribution of the partnership properties among them, consequent toJacinto Divinagracias withdrawal from the partnership.Among the assets to be distributed were five (5) fishing boats, six (6) vehicles, two (2) parcels of land located at Sto. Nio and Talisay, Negros Occidental, and cash deposits in the local branches of the Bank of the Philippine Islands and Prudential Bank.Throughout the existence of the partnership, and even after Vicente Tabanaos untimelyd e m i s e i n 1 9 9 4 , p e t i t i o n e r failed to submit to Tabanaos heirs any s t a t e m e n t o f a s s e t s a n d liabilities of the partnership, and to render an accounting of the partnerships finances.Petitioner also

reneged on his promise to turn over to Tabanaos heirs the deceaseds 1/3s h a r e i n t h e t o t a l a s s e t s o f t h e partnership, amounting to P30,000,000.00, o r t h e s u m o f P10,000,000.00, despite formal demand for payment thereof.Consequently, Tabanaos heirs, respondents herein, filed against petitioner an action for accounting, payment of shares, division of assets and damages.The trial court ruled in favor of private respondents. Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals which as dismissed.Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the surviving spouse of Vicente Tabanao has the legal capacity to sue even if she was never appointed as administratrix or executrix of his estate. HELD: YES. Petitioners objection in this regard is misplaced.The surviving spouse does not need to be appointed as executrix or administratrix of the estate b e f o r e s h e c a n f i l e t h e a c t i o n . S h e a n d her children are complainants in their own right a s successors of Vicente Tabanao. From the very moment of Vicente Tabanaos death, his rights i n s o f a r a s t h e partnership was concerned were transmitted to his heirs, for rights to t h e succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent.Whatever claims and rights Vicente Tabanao had against the partnership and petitioner were transmitted to respondents by operation of law, more particularly by succession, which is amode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to the extent of thevalue of the inheritance of a person are transmitted. Moreover, respondents became owners of their respective hereditary shares from the moment Vicente Tabanao died.WHEREFORE, petition is DENIED. CASE 17 SAN AGUSTIN vs CA Read Full Text CASE 18 ALUAD vs ALUAD CASE 19 Lee vs Tambago, 544 SCRA 393, February 12, 2008 digested by Ms. Charo L. Bayani Facts: Complainant, Manuel L. Lee, charged respondent, Atty. Regino B. Tambago, with violation of Notarial Law and the Ethics of the legal profession for notarizing a will that is alleged to be spurious in nature in containing forged signatures of his father, the decedent, Vicente Lee Sr. and two other witnesses, which were also questioned for the unnotated Residence Certificates that are known to be a copy of their respective voter's affidavit. In addition to such, the contested will was executed and acknowledged before respondent on June 30, 1965 but bears a Residence Certificate by the Testator dated January 5, 1962, which was never submitted for filing to the Archives Division of the Records Management and Archives Office of the National Commission for Culture and Arts (NCAA). Respondent, on the other hand, claimed that all allegations are falsely given because he allegedly exercised his duties as Notary Public with due care and with due regards to the provision of existing law and had complied with elementary formalities in the performance of his duties and that the complaint was filed simply to harass him based on the result of a criminal case against him in the Ombudsman that did not prosper. However, he did not deny the contention of non-filing a copy to the Archives Division of NCAA. In

resolution, the court referred the case to the IBP and the decision of which was affirmed with modification against the respondent and in favor of the complainant. Issue: Did Atty. Regino B. Tambago committed a violation in Notarial Law and the Ethics of Legal Profession for notarizing a spurious last will and testament? Held: Yes. As per Supreme Court, Atty. Regino B. Tambago is guilty of professional misconduct as he violated the Lawyer's Oath, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, Canon 1 and Rule 1.01nof the Code of Professional Responsibility, Article 806 of the Civil Code and provision of the Notarial Law. Thus, Atty. Tambago is suspended from the practice of law for one year and his Notarial commission revoked. In addition, because he has not lived up to the trustworthiness expected of him as a notary public and as an officer of the court, he is perpetually disqualified from reappointments as a Notary Public. Case 20 Heirs of Marcelino Doronio vs. Hrs. of Fortunato Doronio (G.R. No. 169454. December 27, 2007.] The rules on quieting of title expressly provide that any declaration in a suit to quiet title shall not prejudice persons who are not parties to the action. HEIRS OF DORONIO vs. HEIRS OF DORONIO[2008] Facts: S p o u s e s S i m e o n D o r o n i o a n d C o r n e l i a G a n t e , now both deceased, were the registered owners of a parcel of land located at Barangay Cabalitaan, Asingan, Pangasinan. M a r c e l i n o D o r o n i o a n d F o r t u n a t o Doronio, now both deceased, were the children of the spouses and the p a r t i e s in this case are their heirs. Petitioners are the heirs o f M a r c e l i n o D o r o n i o , w h i l e r e s p o n d e n t s a r e t h e h e i r s of Fortunato Doronio.E a g e r t o o b t a i n t h e entire property, the heirs of Marcelino Doronio and Veronica Pico filed before the RTC in Urdaneta, Pangasinana p e t i t i o n " F o r t h e R e g i s t r a t i o n o f a P r i v a t e D e e d o f D o n a t i o n " docketed as Petition Case No. U-920. No respondents were named in thesaid petition although notices of hearing were posted on the bulletinb o a r d s o f B a r a n g a y C a b a l i t a a n , M u n i c i p a l i t i e s o f A s i n g a n a n d Lingayen. During the hearings, no one interposed an objection to t he petition. After the RTC ordered a general default, the petition was eventually granted on September 22, 1993. This led to the registration of the deed of donation, cancellation of OCT No. 352 and issuance of an e w T r a n s f e r C e r t i f i c a t e o f T i t l e ( T C T ) N o . 44481 in the names of Marcelino Doronio and Veronica Pico. Thus, the entire property was titled in the names of petitioners predecessors. On April 28, 1994, the heirs of Fortunato Doronio filed a pleading before the RTC in theform of a petition in the same Petition Case No. U-920. The petition was for the reconsideration of the decision of the RTC that ordered the registration of the subject deed of donation. It was prayed in the p e t i t i o n t h a t a n o r d e r b e i s s u e d d e c l a r i n g

n u l l a n d v o i d t h e registration of the private deed of donation and that TCT No. 44481 be cancelled. However, the petition was dismissed on the ground that the decision in Petition Case No. U-920 had already become final as it was n o t appealed. Determined to remain in t h e i r p o s s e s s e d p r o p e r t y , respondent heirs of Fortunato Doronio (as plaintiffs) filed an action f o r r e c o n v e y a n c e a n d d a m a g e s w i t h p r a y e r f o r p r e l i m i n a r y i n j u n c t i o n a g a i n s t p e t i t i o n e r h e i r s o f M a r c e l i n o D o r o n i o ( a s defendants) before the RTC, Branch 45, Anonas, Urdaneta City,P a n g a s i n a n . A f t e r d u e p r o c e e d i n g s , t h e R T C r u l e d i n f a v o r o f petitioner heirs of Marcelino Doronio. Disagreeing with the judgment of the RTC, respondents appealed to the CA. the CA reversed the RTC decision.Issue: Can respondents be nd bound by the decision in Petition CaseNo. U920 even if they were not made parties in the said case? Ruling: P e t i t i o n e r s c a n n o t u s e t h e f i n a l i t y o f t h e R T C d e c i s i o n i n Petition Case No. U -920 as a shield against the verification of thevalidity of the deed of donation. According to petitioners, the said final decision is one for quieting of title. In other words, it is a case for declaratory relief under Rule 64 (now Rule 63) of the Rules of Court. Suits to quiet title are not technically suits in rem, nor are they, strictly speaking, in personam, but being against the person in respect of the res, these proceedings are characterized as quasi in rem. The judgment in such proceedings is conclusive only between the parties. Thus, respondents are not bound by th e decision in Petition C a s e N o . U - 9 2 0 a s t h e y w e r e n o t m a d e p a r t i e s i n t h e s a i d c a s e . T h e rules on quieting of title expressly provide that any declaration in a suit to quiet title shall not prejudice persons who are not parties to the action. That respondents filed a subsequent pleading in the same Petition Case No. U-920 after the decision there had become final did n o t c h a n g e t h e f a c t t h a t s a i d d e c i s i o n b e c a m e f i n a l w i t h o u t t h e i r being impleaded in the case. Said subsequent pleading was dismissed on the ground of finality of the decision. Thus, the RTC totally failed to give respondents their day in court. As a result, they cannot be bound by its orders. Generally accepted is the principle that no man s h a l l b e a f f e c t e d b y a n y p r o c e e d i n g t o w h i c h h e i s a s t r a n g e r , a n d strangers to a case are not bound by judgment rendered by the court. Case 20 G.R. No. 169454, December 27, 2007 Heirs of Marcelino Doronio vs Heirs of Fortunato Doronio FACTS: Spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante were the registered owners of a parcel of land covered by OCT No. 352. Marcelino Doronio and Fortunato Doronio were among their children. Petitioners are the heirs of Marcelino, while respondents are the heirs of Fortunato. A private deed of donation propter nuptias was executed by spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante in favor of Marcelino and the latters wife. One of the properties subject of said deed of donation was covered by OCT No. 352. However, there is a significant discrepancy with respect to the identity of the owner of

adjacent property at the eastern side. Based on the title, the adjacent owners are Zacarias Najorda and Alejandro Najorda, whereas based on the deed of donation, the owner of the adjacent property is Fortunato Doronio. According to petitioners, they are now the owners of the entire property in view of the private deed of donation propter nuptias in favor of their predecessors. The heirs of Marcelino filed a petition For the Registration of a Private Deed of Donation, which was granted. This led to the issuance of a new Transfer Certificate of Title. The heirs of Fortunato Doronio filed a petition before the RTC in the same PETITION, praying that an order be issued declaring null and void the registration of the private deed of donation and that the new TCTbe cancelled. However, the petition was dismissed. Respondent heirs of Fortunato filed an action for reconveyance and damages with prayer for preliminary injunction against petitioner heirs of Marcelino but the RTC ruled in favor of the heirs of Marcelino. Respondents appealed to the CA. They argued that the trial court erred in not finding that respondents predecessor-in-interest acquired one-half of the property covered by OCT No. 352 by tradition and/or intestate succession; that the deed of donation was null and void; that assuming that the deed of donation was valid, only one-half of the property was actually donated to Marcelino Doronio and the latters wife(they argued that that only half of the property was actually incorporated in the said deed of donation because it stated that FortunatoDoronio, instead of Zacarias Najorda and Alejandro Najorda, is the owner of the adjacent property at the eastern side. Respondents posit that the donors respected and segregated the possession of Fortunato Doronio of the eastern half of the land.); and that respondents acquired ownership of the other half portion of the property by acquisitive prescription. The CA reversed the RTC decision.It likewise ruled that the donation of the entire property in favor of petitioners predecessors is invalid on the ground that it impairs the legitime of respondents predecessor, Fortunato Doronio. Aggrieved by the decision, the heirs of Marcelino petitioned the SC. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that ONLY HALF OF THE DISPUTED PROPERTY WAS DONATED TO THE PREDECESSORS-ININTEREST of Marcelino (since the donation of the entire property in favor of petitioners predecessors could not have been valid on the ground that it impairs the legitime of respondents predecessor, Fortunato). The issue regarding the impairment of legitime of Fortunato Doronio must be resolved in an action for the settlement of estates of spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante. It may not be passed upon in an action for reconveyance and damages. A probate court, in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction, is the best forum to ventilate and adjudge the issue of impairment of legitime as well as other related matters involving the settlement of estate. Before any conclusion about the legal share due to a compulsory heir may be reached, it is necessary that certain steps be taken first. The net estate of the decedent must be ascertained, by deducting all payable obligations and charges from the value of the property owned by the deceased at the time of his death; then, all donations subject to collation would be added to it. With the

partible estate thus determined, the legitime of the compulsory heir or heirs can be established; and only then can it be ascertained whether or not a donation had prejudiced the legitimes. 2. Whether or not the deed of donation is valid. The Old Civil Code applies in this case as the donation propter nuptias was executed in 1919, while the New Civil Code took effect only on August 30, 1950. Under the Old Civil Code, donations propter nuptias must be made in a public instrument in which the property donated must be specifically described. The law likewise provided that the gift of real property, in order to be valid, must appear in a public document. It is settled that a donation of real estate propter nuptias is void unless made by public instrument. Logically, then, the cancellation of OCT No. 352 and the issuance of a new TCT in favor of petitioners predecessors have no legal basis. 3. Who then are the owners of the subject parcel of land? Direct reconveyance to any of the parties is not possible as it has not yet been determined in a proper proceeding who among the heirs of spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante is entitled to it. It is still unproven whether or not the parties are the only ones entitled to the properties of spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante. There are still things to be done before the legal share of all the heirs can be properly adjudicated. Respondents cannot be deemed the owners by acquisitive prescription of the portion of the property they have been possessing. The reason is that the property was covered by an OCT. A title once registered under the torrens system cannot be defeated even by adverse, open and notorious possession; neither can it be defeated by prescription. The issues as to who truly are the present owners of the property and what is the extent of their ownership remain unresolved. The same may be properly threshed out in the settlement of the estates of the registered owners of the property, namely: spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante. Thus, the decision of the CA has been REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The SC ordered the cancellation of the TCT in the names of Marcelino Doronio and his wife, and the restoration of the OCTin the names of Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante.