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Chapter One
Sixth Edition
Prepared by Gady Jacoby University of Manitoba and Sebouh Aintablian American University of Beirut
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2003 McGrawHill Ryerson Limited
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Chapter Outline
1.1 What is Corporate Finance?
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Current Assets
Current Liabilities
Long-Term Debt
Shareholders Equity
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Current Assets
Shareholders Equity
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Current Assets
How can the firm raise the money for the required Fixed Assets investments? 1 Tangible
2 Intangible
Shareholders Equity
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Current Assets
Long-Term Debt
How much shortterm cash flow does a company need to pay its bills?
Shareholders Equity
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Capital Structure
The value of the firm can be thought of as a pie. The goal of the manager is to increase the size of the pie. The Capital Structure decision can be viewed as how best to slice up the pie. 70% 30% 25%50% DebtDebt Equity 75% 50% Equity
If how you slice the pie affects the size of the pie, then the capital structure decision matters.
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Treasurer
Controller
Cash Manager
Capital Expenditures
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Tax Manager
Financial Accounting
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Financial markets
Long-term debt
Equity shares
Government
The cash flows from the firm must exceed the cash flows from the financial markets.
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If the value of the firm Debt holders are promised $F. is more than $F, share If the value of the firm is less than $F, they holders get everything get whatever the firm is worth. above $F. Algebraically, the bondholders Algebraically, the shareholders claim is: Min[$F,$X] claim is: Max[0,$X $F]
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If the value of the firm is more than Payoff to debt holders $F, the shareholders claim is: Max[0,$X $F] = $X $F and the $F debt holders claim is: Value of the firm (X)
Min[$F,$X] = $F. The sum of these is = $X
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Liquidity
Voting Rights
Taxation Reinvestment
Liability
Limited liability
Continuity
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Perpetual life
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Managerial Goals
Managerial goals may be different from shareholder goals
Expensive perquisites Survival Independence
Increased growth and size are not necessarily the same thing as increased shareholder wealth.
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Assets
Debt Equity
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Control of the firm How do agency costs affect firm value (and shareholder wealth)?
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Do Shareholders Control Managerial Behaviour? Shareholders vote for the board of directors, who in turn hire the management team. Contracts can be carefully constructed to be incentive compatible. There is a market for managerial talentthis may provide market discipline to the managersthey can be replaced. If the managers fail to maximize share price, they may be replaced in a hostile takeover.
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Direct finance
Funds suppliers Financial intermediaries Funds demanders
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Financial Markets
Money versus Capital Markets Money Markets For short-term debt instruments Capital Markets For long-term debt and equity
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Financial Markets
Primary versus Secondary Markets Primary Market
When a corporation issues securities, cash flows from investors to the firm. Usually an underwriter is involved
Secondary Markets
Involve the sale of used securities from one investor to another. Securities may be exchange traded or trade overthe-counter in a dealer market.
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Financial Markets
Firms
money
Primary Market Secondary Market
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II.
V.
Long-Term Financing
VI. Options, Futures, and Corporate Finance VII. Financial Planning and Short-Term Finance VIII.Special Topics
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