The Kargil War

Saurabh Mandhanya Rajat Barve Shashank Gupta Deepak Bansal Padmini Narayan Lizanne Marie Raphael 11p164 11p157 11p166 11P133 11p152 11P025

Background: Kashmir Issue

Core issue between India and Pakistan Pakistan claims:
Muslim majority and hence should be part of Pakistan India has occupied this territory by force and fraud against the wishes of its people. The UN resolutions recognize the Kashmiri peoples right to selfdetermination. The Simla Agreement does not supersede UN resolutions. Pakistan is obliged to provide diplomatic and moral support to Kashmiris fighting for their freedom

Prisoners Dilemma
Pakistan Cooperate Defect Autonomy in Kashmir. This Pakistan gains control of is the Pareto Optimal Cooperate Kashmir solution. (0,5) (3,3) India

Defect

India gains control of Kashmir (5,0)

Disputes and conflicts in the form of wars, militancy etc (1,1)

Tit for Tat Strategy

In a prisoners dilemma, the players decide their play based on the other players move, resulting in both players switching their moves alternatively, e.g., defection follows defection etc
Pakistan and India had been doing this since 1947 Defection has resulted in several wars : 1947, 1965, 1971, 1999 apart from several skirmishes Peace usually follows in the intermediate periods with both countries promising to resolve issues through bilateral talks etc

Build Up to the Kargil War

Tit for Tat Strategy:
Cooperation: Peace talks during mid 90s (1994-1997) Defection: India defects by conducting nuclear tests in 1998, Pakistan responds with tests of its own Cooperation: Atal Bihari Vajpayee boards bus to Lahore, Lahore agreement is signed in February 1999 Defection: Pakistan infiltrates LOC and occupies several strategic peaks in Kargil and Drass. India responds though Operation Vijay

Players in the Game

Pakistan:
Pakistan Army played a dominant role in decision making and hence can be considered the main player from Pakistans side. The civilian government played a minor role

India:
Indian Government including the ruling party and the opposition Indian Army

Other players:
US and China (Pakistan Allies) United Nations

Game Tree
Withdraw Full Scale War Infiltrate INDIA Withdraw PAKSITAN

Not Withdraw

PAKSITAN

PAKSITAN
Not Infiltrate No Action PAKSITAN Not Withdraw Not Withdraw Withdraw

Kargil: Pakistans Strategy

Pakistan perceived higher payoffs and decided to infiltrate (defect) in Kashmir due to:
Element of surprise A war would reinforce Pakistan armys influence in Pakistan Information Asymmetry: Pakistan assumed the India had Outdated equipment Incompetent and tired military

Nuclear capability ensured a limited response from India Bring international attention to Kashmir issue

Game Tree
Withdraw Full Scale War Infiltrate INDIA Withdraw PAKSITAN

Not Withdraw

PAKSITAN

PAKSITAN
Not Infiltrate No Action PAKSITAN Not Withdraw Not Withdraw Withdraw

Indias Response
India chose to respond with limited war because:
Threat Tactics: Pakistans nuclear capability Costs associated with full scale conventional war India was looking to play a bigger role on the international stage and hence was looking to build its image as a responsible nuclear power International pressure (other players)

Game Tree
Withdraw Full Scale War Infiltrate INDIA Withdraw PAKSITAN Not Infiltrate No Action PAKSITAN Not Withdraw Not Withdraw Withdraw PAKSITAN

Not Withdraw

PAKSITAN

Pakistans Withdrawal
Washington agreement signed in July 1999 complete evacuation from India LOC
Pakistan decided to withdraw because:
Major defeats in the war - Indian military responded swiftly International criticism and US pressure (other players) Public opinion in Pakistan - Public felt guilty and embarrassed

Stability- Instability Paradox

The paradox states that nuclear weapons simultaneously induce stability at level of nuclear war and instability at lower intensity levels of violence.
Ultimately, nuclear weapons spurred conflict initiation but also limited the conflicts scope and duration. International involvement was also paradoxical US and China were enablers as well as resolvers of the war

Brinkmanship
A series of moves in which each player continues to escalate the risk of mutual destruction until one of them decides to back down
Initial status quo since both players were nuclear armed Pakistan escalated threat by infiltration and reached new status quo India decided to further escalate through limited war and reached status quo Pakistan further escalated by reiterating its first use doctrine (used due to disadvantage in conventional military power) India escalated by use of Air Force and massive deployment across entire Kashmir border Pakistan backed down

Indian Army Chief had intentions of further escalating through strikes inside PoK
Musharraf indicated they would have retaliated by responding with attacks to cutoff Kashmir completely

Results of the Game

Pakistan:
Diplomatic and strategic defeat Victory for Pakistan army as Musharraf seized power and Kashmir issue gained international attention

India
Diplomatic and strategic victory Reinforced its position in Kashmir

Learning
Tit for Tat strategy in a prisoners dilemma Nuclear Brinkmanship: Can be used to gain strategic advantage Stability- Instability Paradox: Although full scale war between India and Pakistan is highly unlikely, low scale conflicts become more likely Role of Other Players: Major role of international community in preventing escalation to nuclear war

Future Research
India and Pakistan involved in a zero sum game Ones gain is others loss Are Pakistans strategies rational? What is the reason for this irrationality? Players involved for deciding Pakistans strategy Is there a lack of co-operation? Internal conflict resulting in a competitive situation within In case either player wins, what are the payoffs for the citizens?

Future Research
Co-operative game theory to resolve the issue !
Pakistan Government and Army are the two players involved

What is each players marginal contribution?

Shapley value with higher payoffs for both to settle this internal conflict and result in a negotiation for maximizing the total payoff of the country as a whole? Potential solution for the issue of irrationality in Paks decisions leading to many disturbances in global relations

References
Ashok K. Behuria (2009): Pakistan's Approach to Kashmir Since the Lahore Agreement:Is There Any Change?, Strategic Analysis, 33:3, 433-449 V. P. Malik (2009): Kargil War: Reflections on the Tenth Anniversary, Strategic Analysis, 33:3, 349-356 B. G. Verghese (2009): Kargil War: Reflections on the Tenth Anniversary, Strategic Analysis, 33:3, 357-359 P. R. Chari (2009): Reflections on the Kargil War, Strategic Analysis, 33:3, 360-364

Thank You !