Mad Pain and Martian Pain

David Lewiss theory of pain

Lewis argues for a two-level theory of pain,

according to which, for each population, pain for that population is the kind of physical state that, in that population, normally satisfies a certain functional description (given in terms of input- and outputconditions).

Two scenarios
His argument for this theory rests on the intuition that the

following two scenarios are both possible:

There might be a strange man who sometimes feels

pain, just as we do, but whose pain differs greatly from ours in its causes and effects. Our pain is typically caused by cuts, burns, pressure, and the like; his is caused by moderate exercise on an empty stomach. Our pain is generally distracting; his turns his mind to mathematics, facilitating concentration on that but distracting him from anything else. [] He is not in the least motivated to prevent pain or get rid of it. (p. 122) Also, there might be a Martian who sometimes feels pain, just as we do, but whose pain differs greatly from ours in its physical realization. [] When you pinch his skin you cause no firing of C-fibershe has nonebut, rather, you cause the inflation of many small cavities in his feet. When these cavities are inflated, he is in pain.

Desiderata
1. The theory should allow for both mad pain and

Martian pain.
This rules out simple identity theories, since these cant

allow for Martian pain. It also rules out simple functionalist theories, since these cant allow for mad pain.
2. If the theory claims that the concept of pain is

ambiguous, then the ambiguity should be widespread, of a sort we can believe in no matter what we thought about pain (p. 124), so that the theory does not end up being ad hoc.

Lewiss (and Armstrongs) proposal

The basic idea is to regard commonsense psychology as a

theory in which the term pain occurs as a theoretical term (like the term mass in a theory of physics). It is supposed that the meaning of this term is implicitly given by the theory itself. On the basis of this supposition, it is inferred that pain is synonymous with a description of a kind of physical state, where this description is given in causal terms, using such predicates as:

Is typically caused by cuts, burns, pressure, and the like; Is generally distracting; Causes groans and writhing; Makes you want to get rid of it and prevent it.

The meaning of pain is thus taken to be the same as that of a

physical state-type that , where the dots are replaced with a conjunction of such predicates. [The concept of pain] is the concept of [] a state apt for being caused in certain ways by stimuli plus other mental states and apt for combining with certain other mental states to jointly cause certain behavior. (p. 124)

Pain taken as non-rigid

Again: On Lewiss view, the theoretical term pain

means the same as a physical state-type that . But different physical states-types might have satisfied . So, on Lewiss view, the concept of pain is non-rigid: The physical state-type that is actually pain might not have been pain, and some other state-type that is actually not pain might have been pain instead.

From worlds to planets to populations

Lewis takes talk of possible worlds literally: our actual world is

just one of many possible worlds, and to say of it that its the actual world means only that it happens to be the one that we inhabit.
So, on Lewiss view, actually is an indexical expression, just like

here, now, or on this planet.

So far, we have talked of the concept of pain as being (on Lewiss

view) relativized to possible worlds: i.e., relative to different worlds, the concept corresponds to different state-types. But given his view of possible worlds, this sort of relativization is not fundamentally different from a relativization to (e.g.) planets or populations. Nonrigidity is to logical space [i.e., the space of possibilities] as other relativities are to ordinary space. If the word pain designates one state at our actual world and another at a possible world where our counterparts have a different internal structure, then it also may designate one state on Earth and another on Mars. Or, better, [] it may designate one state for Earthlings and another for Martians. (p. 126)

Pain for Earthlings, pain for Martians

Lewis can thus speak of human pain and Martian pain:

Human pain is the state that occupies the role of pain for humans. Martian pain is the state that occupies the role for Martians. (p. 126) But one wonders why he couldnt have gone so far as to distinguish between my pain and your pain as well. It seems a little ad hoc to stop at the level of populations. Yet he has to stop there, or else hed have to say that the madmans pain is just whatever physical state (if any) makes the madman groan and writhe, etc. So, to allow for the scenario of the madman, his theory cant quite avoid ad-hocness.

Pain simpliciter
Lewis suggests that

[w]e may say that X is in pain simpliciter if and only if X is in the state that occupies the causal role of pain for the appropriate population.
(p. 127)

He tentatively suggests some criteria that make a

population appropriate, given a particular X:

Perhaps the population should be us; 2. Perhaps it should be such that X belongs to it; 3. Perhaps it should be such that X is not exceptional relative to it; 4. In any case, the population should be a natural kind.
1.

No determinate fact of the matter

In cases where these criteria are in conflict, Lewis

suggests that it may simply be indeterminate whether a given subject feels pain or thirst. He thinks that this conclusion accords well with the fact that there seems to be no persuasive solution to the old problem of inverted spectra. (p. 128) He would say that, in a case of inverted spectra, too, its indeterminate whether the subject sees red or sees green.

The lone mad Martian

Another consequence of his view is that there can be

no pain in a lone mad Martian, i.e., a being in which

pain-states do not play the appropriate causal role, and

in which the physical nature of those pain states is not identical with that of our pain states nor with that of any normal specimens of his or her population.
Lewis admits that he might have thought off-hand

that such a case is possible, but he is willing to bite the bullet.

Ignoring what its like?

Lewis realizes that someone might think that his theory

doesnt address what pain feels like. His initial response is that this would have been an impossible mistake to make: Pain is a feeling, and what pain feels like is pain. So a theory of pain is ipso facto a theory of how it feels to be in pain. But his opponent might persist:
No amount of the information whereof materialists and

functionalists speak will tell us what its like to taste Vegemite, or how it feels to be in pain. Therefore, physical and functional descriptions cannot capture what pain feels like. This is basically Frank Jacksons Knowledge Argument.

Responding to the Knowledge Argument

Lewis responds to this by claiming that

knowing what its like is not the possession of information at all. It isnt the elimination of any hitherto open possibilities. Rather, knowing what its like is the possession of abilities: abilities to recognize, abilities to imagine, abilities to predict ones behavior by means of imaginative experiments. (p. 131) Does this suffice to answer the objection? Are there other things he might have said?