Вы находитесь на странице: 1из 49

J2, JSOTF NAIL

TODAY IS:

21 MAR 13 C+4 D 8 (Ready to attack)

Climatology
This region is frequently traversed by storm systems. As a result temperatures can vary significantly depending upon strength of system and location within the region (lowlands generally being warmer than the highlands). These frequent storms also create long lasting cloud decks and restrictions to visibility. A mixture of rain and snow falls in the lowlands while mainly snow falls in the highlands.
TEMPERATURES

RECORD HIGH 91F AVERAGE HIGH 52F


AVERAGE LOW RECORD LOW 33F -2F

TYPICAL SKY CONDITIONS BROKEN CLOUDS LESS THAN 5000 FT VISIBILITY 2 MILES (FOG, BLOWING SNOW) 50% OF THE TIME LESS THAN 2 MILES 25% OF THE TIME GREATER THAN 2 MILES 25% OF THE TIME WINDS PREVAILING FROM SE @ 6 KNOTS STRONGEST WIND - 47 KNOTS

AVERAGE RH DAY 63% NIGHT 88% PRECIPITATION

RECORD MONTHLY - 3.5 INCHES (MAR) 1 INCH OF SNOW PER MONTH LOWLANDS MORE SNOW HIGHER ELEV. UP TO 7 FT AVERAGE MONTHLY - 1.1 INCHES

Weather Forecast
MAR22 MAR23 MAR24 MAR25 MAR26

55/38 57/37 63/38 66/40 63/41 10%P 40%P 10%P 10%P 10%P
Sunny Chm (+) Air (+) ISR (+) AM rain (-) (-) (-) Sunny (+) (+) (+) P/Cloudy P/Cloudy (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) (+)

Weather Forecast
MAR27 MAR28 MAR29 MAR30

63/41 0%P
P/Cloudy Chm (+) Air (+) ISR (-)

60/41 10%P
Cloudy (+) (+) (-)

54/43 60%P
Showers (-) (-) (-)

59/41 60%P
Showers (-) (-) (-)

Weather Effects / Not Considering Terrain


00L
AIRLIFT

06L

12L

18L

24L

HELO ATTACK
CAS GROUND RECCE AIR ASSAULT PERSONNEL OVHD RECON CHEM SMOKE TRAFFICABILITY UAV

CEILING/VISIBILITY

CEILING/VISIBILITY/ICING
VISIBILITY CEILING/ VISIBILITY

CLOUD COVER WIND DEPENDENT WIND DEPENDENT MARGINAL IF HEAVY RAINFALL/SNOW MELT CEILING/VISIBILITY/ICING

FAVORABLE

MARGINAL

UNFAVORABLE

CRITICAL FACTS
- AH is prepositioning forces along the border with AZ and occupying attack positions (EUCOM) - Can support OSC-E attack with 4 x DIVs with supporting IFC and Air - AH has already deployed 20 x SCUDs and 8 x Shehab missiles; most probably armed with Sarin gas (EUCOM) - AH forces have deployed mobile missile launchers near the NW part of the city of SALMAS; can range all of AZ and parts of GE/TR from all firing positions in AH

- Al Hussein variant of SCUD takes only five gallons of Sarin (AH variant RFId to JTF)
- Chemical capabilities: AH is producing Sarin gas in chemical production facilities in the southern city of QAZVIN - AH forces are no longer engaged in hostilities with Iran - AH internal opposition has been neutralized; suspension of internal media; imposition of Sharia law

CRITICAL ASSUMPTIONS
- AH Forces capable of launching offensive operations into AZ NET 290001Z13MAR - AH will disperse TELs for firing and, after launch, then move/use CC&D - AH strategic targets include AZ infrastructure (with WMD)
- SAPA and AH SPF operational targets include assembly areas and command centers i.e. airfields, JTF C-2, aircraft, SPODs, basing areas, logistics convoys, oilfields, pipelines - AH will protect TELs with mutually supporting air defense coverage - AH will insert SPF into rear areas approx. 24 hours prior to conventional invasion - AH will commit TBMs and accept risk in air operations to achieve air parity - AH will threaten use of chemical munitions against JTF forces and regional countries

- SAPA will conduct SR of terrain objectives and counter-reconnaissance missions to target SOF teams locations and identify missions/objectives
- AH will attempt to seize Baku and oil fields as primary objective

LIMITATIONS
Poor ability to track TELs following dispersal; subordinate units have less capability Undeveloped HUMINT network, country-wide (Mahmudali Chehregani) COMEUCOM approves cross-border R&S

IMPLIED TASKS
Detect/ track SSM FOBs Coordinate with JTF/JIACG to establish detainee facility; BPT to temporarily detain PUCs Coordinate for interpreter support

RISK TO SOF
Air infil/exfil, PR- AH IADS (overlapping coverage of Air AAs and HLZ/DZs) Collateral damage from attacks on Qazvin chemical production facility

SAPA interdiction of SOF airfields in AZ

S AH ATTACK MLCOA MDCOA: Chem

S S

SAPA Attacks
S

XX
AZ DEF Forces

XX

58
S S

XX

84

- 4x DIVs: 2 x up, 2 x back - ME: (Est.d) East coast towards oilfields and Baku - SE: Screens ME western flank - SAPA support with SPF

XX

88

XX

18

IFC

AH CONVENTIONAL FORCES CURRENT DISPOSITION (17 MAR 2013)

ADA Current Disposition

AH IADS Coverage- North

AH IADS Coverage

Air Defense System Ranges


SA-16/ SA-13 MR: 5 km
MA:3.5 km

Vertical Maximum Range, kms

SA-18
MR: 6 km MA: 3.5 km

2S6M
MR: 10 km MA: 3.5 km

SA-15
MR: 12 km MA: 6 km

CROTALE
MR: 8 km MA: 5.5 km

Maximum Range, kms

Maximum Range = MR Maximum Altitude = MA

Air Defense System Ranges


SA-10
MR: 200 km MA:30 km

SA-12

Vertical Maximum Range, kms

MR:75 km MA: 25 km

SA-11
MR: 35 km MA: 15 km

SA-6
MR: 25 km MA: 14 km

SA-8
MR: 15 km MA:12 km

KS-19:
MR: 12 km MA: 9.6 km

Maximum Range = MR Maximum Altitude = MA

Maximum Range, kms

ENEMY Air Current Disposition at airfields

AIR / TBM CAPABILITY

AIR

SCUD (3 x Brigades)
X

37/38/39
II II
II

6XSS1C/ 6XSS1C/ 6XSS1C/ SCUD SCUD SCUD

Impact
AIR
20 FIXED WING SORTIES/DAY

SCUD
18 x SCUD B 18 x SCUD C 18 x SHEHAB-3

Air Force Attack Aircraft


F A B

WOC: Tabriz

WOC: Rasht

WOC:

5 Hamadan

1
15 x MiG-29

11
15 x MiG-29

F-B

10
12 x MiG-31

12
12 x MiG-31

13
15 x Lightning

14
15 x Lightning

31
10 x Su-24

32
12 x Tu-22

15
15 x Zenith

19
15 x F6

16
15 x F-7M

17
15 x F-7M

18
15 x F-7M

21
20 x Su-25

22
15 x Lightning

51

10 x Su-24

System MiG-29

Total 30

*Radius-km 2450

Armament 6 Air-Air Missiles (AAMs)

MiG-31
Lightning Zenith F6
A = Attack F = Fighter I = Interceptor S = Strike B = Bomber R = Recon

24
45 15 15 45 20 20 12

1650
685 1650 1100 550 1250 2000 2450

6 AAMs
2 500lb bombs, 2 rockets & 2 AAMs 8 AAMs or 8 1,000lb precision bombs 2 500lb bombs & 2 AAMs 2 AAMs 8 1,000lb bombs & 2 AAMs 9 2,000 lb bombs and anti-ship 12 2,000lb bombs
*Radius = one-way of round-trip without air refueling

F-7M Su-25 Su-24 Tu-22

SCUD/TBM Current Disposition

SSM Ranges
0
SCUD

10

15

20

25

30

50

70

100

200

300 kms

Scud B Scud C Shehab 3

120 kms

300 kms
1300 kms

SCUD-C and NO-DONG Doctrinal TBM Template


RL

L H L L

RL

FOB

RL

H
AH TBM Threat 2 BDE 6 BN (FOB) 12 Cranes 12 Weather Vehicles 12 C 2 Vehicles 27 Launchers 50 Missiles

Critical Vulnerability Cranes & C2 Vehicles Time Line Hide Launch - Hide = 1 Hour FOBs in place = 24/48 Hours Reload 1-2 Hours FOB = C2 HQ RL = Reload H = Hide L = Launch

TARGET DEVELOPMENT
Chemical production site complex in the city of QAZVIN - Building plans - Security systems - Enemy ground and air strength, composition, weapons, response time - Intel on site security - human (guards, military), intrusion detection / early warning devices, obstacles, reinforcements
AH

TBM Sites and chemical production (current location in the city of SALMAS) -Location, composition, activity - HQ, resupply, transloader -AD coverage and force protection -Deception

Salmas

Insertions: - Intel supportability of ground infil - Status (feasibility / suitability) of airfields and HLZs (IADs, mines, etc.)

Chemical Plant

QAZVIN

Known nerve gas production site under Iranian control AH has capability to produce weaponized nerve gas

Situation Assessment: Qazvin DTG: 20MAR2013 SOURCE: National Intelligence NORMAL POPULATION: 200,000 Azeri, 120,000 Kurd, 10,000 Persian; 330,000 total CURRENT POPULATION: About 350,000 ROAD/RAIL CONDITIONS: Major roads and rail lines are intact. Secondary roads are in fair condition but difficult to travel in rainy season. FOOD DISTRIBUTION: No reports of shortages of Food supplies. HOUSING STATUS: Indications of over crowding in some suburban areas ELECTRICAL GRID. Has the largest electrical production capacity in Ahurastan. Main power feeds follow the trace of the highway up to Tabriz. Some brownouts observed. MAJOR BUILDINGS: Some damage from past earthquakes has not been repaired. WATER AND SANITATION: Reports of raw sewage in low lying regions in the more crowded areas of the city. MEDICAL SERVICES: No information available. EMERGENCY SERVICES: No information available. LAW ENFORCEMENT: No information available. AIRFIELD: Working condition C-17 capable

SCUD launchers parked near Salmas before dispersal

SCUD Launchers

Dissident Analysis
KDPA (AH) Leader Goal Mustava Hijri Independent Mahabad Republic (Ahurastan provinces of West AZ & Kurdestan) Iraq border Support from PUK (broke with KDP) Approx 10.5K KDPI Other affil w/ Shikak Confederacy 100 house =10-20 peshmerga SANAM Cherengalli Regime change Wants AH as semiautonomous region in Iran for econ prosperity Along AZ/AH border Russian support via Armenia Several 20-25PAX militia Several OSC-E key leaders (Influence increases w/time.. P(coup) incr) KDPI and Talysh territory claims from AH Can influence OSC-E commanders Mugan Military wing of Taylsh Ali Humbatov Separate state for Taylsh clan (in so. AZ & no. AH)

Support Liaison Borders Assets

No longer supports SAPA (unconfirmed) Along Caspian Sea

BN (3 companies) Squad-size militia in almost all villages Much local support No more SAPA support makes OSC-E eastern AA difficult Taylsh state would take territory from AZ & AH

Issue Liability Value

Support PKK in Turkey TU fears greater Kurdestan Occupies SCUD region (including Salmas)

Opposes SAPA; makes OSC-E eastern axis of advance more difficult

KDP/PUK/KDPI AOs
KDPI Ahurastan

ODA 051 & NILE

RECOMMENDED PIRs / IRs


PIRs

1. When will AH conduct an attack into AZ? 2. Will AH utilize WMD (TBM or chem) against AZ or regional countries? 3. What are the locations of the TBM FOBs? 4. Where and how will SAPA conduct operations to restrict mobility on coalition AAs?
IRs

Where are AMCITs and allies (potential NEO operation)?


Where will AH insert SPF into AZ? Which parts of the AZ population will offer active or tacit support SAPA/AH?

AH Strategic and Operational Capabilities Overview


Capabilities Strategic - SSM Capable (operational fires), Unconventional Warfare Operational- F-W Deep Strike capable of Combined Arms (short duration), Rotary Wing (operational lift/ ATK), and IADS capable
Strengths Strategic - Populace Support, Insurgency Forces established Operational- Conventional military is well-trained; modern equipment Weaknesses Strategic - C2 for long term offensive operations Operational - Logistics to refit 1st tier forces, Reserve forces 2 months to organize, Limited deep strike capable Other Strategic Familiar with the terrain, population, language, culture Operational Led by previous Iranian Western Commander, trained by Iran in Iranian doctrine Center of Gravity: National leadership

ISR Assets Available


JTF-C
UAV

National
RC-135V (RJ) U2 JSTARS EP-3 UAV (GH + Pred) OGAs

JSOTF J-2 RFIs/Issues


Is it possible to deploy SFODAs through Iran, north into AH? Will the JTF establish a Joint Detention Facility? Can JTF provide UAV coverage for JSOTFs ISR mission to locate TMBs? Can JTF allocate U-2 sorties for us to locate TELs?

QUESTIONS

BACKUP SLIDES

SAPA Military Component Front = Regiment C2 influence Column/ Region= Battalion C2 influence District= Company Platoon= Platoon
Adigozal Jamilov Insurgent Operations Front

Military Headquarters
1 x Deputy Commander 2 x Advisor/Counselor 2 x Admin Spec

Farhad Karimov

Agar Bilisovec

Staff

Recently promoted from Insurgent Regional Commander


Logistics/ Training Front Igor Smernoff

II
Agar Cragshilov NK Column

II
Tiem Maliko Region 1 Bardar Column

II
Mikal Paridue

II
Chechgan Polin SAPA Insurgent Camp in Azerbailan 1 Confirmed Template 3 5 additional Camps SAPA Cadre Training Center

Region 2 Baku Battalion Bilasuvar Column Mobile Urban Unit

II
Staka Ishma 1 x Commander 1 x Executive Officer Company 50+ PAX Region 3 Sadval Column

II
Ali Humbatov
Region 5 Mugan Column

SAPA Safe House

SAPA Cadre

1 x Advisor/ Counselor 1 x Insurgent

Force Protection Intel cell 1 x Leader 3-4 x Intel Spec Logistics cell 1 x Leader 3-4 x Logistics Spec Information Cell 1 x Leader 2-3 x Info Spec 1-2 x Civic Action Spec

Assessment

Comm cell
Insurgent Platoon

Training

SAPA Cadre Camps are unconfirmed & remain un-located, indicators from SIGINT and HUMINT assess that the SAPA has SAP for training its most dedicated informants, cadre and leadership inside Azerbailan -Currently intelligence suggests there is at least 2 camps in operation.
ANA is a less capable force, limited surveillance and only small unit direct action operations. The focus of the ANA is to prepare for Phase 3 operations of Maoist insurgency operations.

Logistics/ Transportation SAPA Camps EST. consist of 25-70 members Training 25 to 150 Combatants

Insurgent Squad 1 x Leader 6-10 x Insurgents

Direct Action Cell 1 x Leader 3-4 x Insurgents

Air Force Attack Aircraft


F A B

WOC: Tabriz

WOC: Rasht

WOC:

5 Hamadan

1
15 x MiG-29

11
15 x MiG-29

F-B

10
12 x MiG-31

12
12 x MiG-31

13
15 x Lightning

14
15 x Lightning

31
10 x Su-24

32
12 x Tu-22

15
15 x Zenith

19
15 x F6

16
15 x F-7M

17
15 x F-7M

18
15 x F-7M

21
20 x Su-25

22
15 x Lightning

51

10 x Su-24

System MiG-29

Total 30

*Radius-km 2450

Armament 6 Air-Air Missiles (AAMs)

MiG-31
Lightning Zenith F6
A = Attack F = Fighter I = Interceptor S = Strike B = Bomber R = Recon

24
45 15 15 45 20 20 12

1650
685 1650 1100 550 1250 2000 2450

6 AAMs
2 500lb bombs, 2 rockets & 2 AAMs 8 AAMs or 8 1,000lb precision bombs 2 500lb bombs & 2 AAMs 2 AAMs 8 1,000lb bombs & 2 AAMs 9 2,000 lb bombs and anti-ship 12 2,000lb bombs
*Radius = one-way of round-trip without air refueling

F-7M Su-25 Su-24 Tu-22

IFCs and Strategic


IFC-E
X 5 II 1 24 x 2S5 2 II 3 II 21 2 3,4 II 22 II 23 II 108 x SA-12

IFC-W
X

ADA
X
*100 Km

X
*90 Km

5,6 36 x SA-10

24 x 2S3 24 x TYPE 83 X 8

16 x 2S5 16 x 2S5 16 x 2S5 6 x FADJR-3 6 x FADJR-3 6 x FADJR-3 II 81 11,12


*43 Km

X
21,22 *36 Km 23,

*12 Km

84 x SA-11 X 17 40 x HIND-D 31,32 33,

32 x SA-15

II *43 Km 1 2

II *80 Km

18 x FADJR-3

*12 Km

72 x ZSU-23-4

18 x FADJR-3 18 x WM-80 II *43 Km TIER -2 II 251 X 24 TIER -2 252 25

X TIER -2

X 16 40 x HIND-D

481

Strategic
II 253 3 36 x 9A52 TIER -2 1 II *43 Km 482 483 II
*35 Km

12 x FADJR-3

II X
*90 Km

X *80 Km

18 x G5 18 x TYPE 83 18 x TYPE 83 X

4
36 x WM-80 X *120 Km 2 SS-21 SCUD-B X
*300 Km

II 241 18 x G5 242

II 243

48 II

18 x TYPE 83 18 x TYPE 83

12 x FADJR-3 12 x 9P140

SPF BDE
X
SPF

II
BDE HQ SPF

II

II
SPT

Parachute

I
SPF SPF TEAM

Parachute

X 10

TEAM LEADER ASSISTANT TEAM LEADER 2 X RADIO OPERATORS 2 X WEAPONS SPECIALISTS 2 DEMOLITION SPECIALISTS 4 X RECONNAISSANCE SPECIALSTS 2 PZF 3-T600 2 SA-18

COMMANDO BDE
X
CMDO

II
CMDO

54 X PZF 3-T600 9 X SA-18 9 X 82mm MORTAR 18 X RPG-29 6 X W-87 6 X Gill 9 X SA-18

I HQ
2 SA-18

I WPNS
CMDO
18 X PZF3-T600 3 X SA-18 3 X 82mm MORTAR 6 X RPG-29

HQ
2 SA-18 6 X W-87 6 X AT-7 9 X SA-18

COMMANDO WPNS CO

I
6 X W-87 6 X Gill 9 X SA-18

SAM 18 X PERSONNEL 9 X SA-18

AGL

AT

HQ

30 X PERSONNEL 6 X W-87

24 PERSONNEL 6 X Gill

COMMANDO COMPANY

I
18 X PZF3T600 3 X SA-18 3 X 82mm MORTAR 6 X RPG-29

HQ 6 PERSONNEL 1 SA-18

WPNS

45 X PERSONNEL 6 X PZF3T600 1 X SA-18 2 X RPG-29

45 X PERSONNEL 3 X 82mm MORTAR 1 X SA-18

COMMANDO PLATOON

45 X PERSONNEL 6 X PZF3T600 1 X SA-18 2 X RPG-29

HQ

2 X PZF3T600 10 X DISMOUNTED TROOPS

9 PERSONNEL 2 X RPG-29 1 X SA-18

STRENGTHS / CAPABILITIES
OBJECTIVES - Strategic: Seize AZ oil fields and control BAKU before U.S. TFPDD flow reverses departure and returns to AZ - Operational: Cross Kura and Araks River and bypass AZ units - Tactical: Supporting fires from OSC IFC; supporting air; direction of SAPA rear area activities; deny use of POE to any returning US forces COG - Strategic: SCUDS / TBMs - Operational: OSC IFC; Air - Tactical: Conventional - Maneuver forces; UW - SPF and Commando units - AH Homeland COG: IADS CULMINATING POINT: OSC-E and OSC-W denied river crossing of Araks and Kura; denied access to oil fields and to Baku

STRENGTHS
SCUDS and TBM: Coverage over entire country of AZ except for SPODs CHEM: Sarin Gas on SCUD-Bs and SHAHAB-3s Arty: Chem warhead delivery (130mm 27.5km, SCUDs) SOF: Up to 120x SPF Teams (6-12x PAX) in Rear Area w/small arms, demo (recon; DA) ADA: IADs SAPA: Recon, Intel, Targeting

VULNERABILITIES AND WEAKNESSES


WHAT AH MUST DO TO ACHIEVE SUCCESS: - Attrit and bypass AZ military forces south of Araks and Kura Rivers - Seize and Defend key terrain: Oil Fields - Delegitimize and/or defeat U.S. forces LIMITATIONS: - SCUDs: Vulnerable to IMINT detection when moving Resource Requirements: Must resupply after ~60x days (Est) days

150015ZMAR13
XX

77
XX

76
98

XX

XX

64
XX X AHURASTAN 821

78

831

- AH chem weapons move to Salmas - AH TBMs dispersing west of Tabriz near Salmas - Indicators: AH is moving chem warheads to LU with Shahab-3 missiles and SCUDs

811

IRAN

10

SPECIFIED and IMPLIED TASKS


Coordinate with JTF-A for Collection support: All disciplines - National; Targeting Integration of EAC and Theater assets into collection plan for I&W and targeting: SIGINT (NSA); IMINT (NSA, NGIC); HUMINT (IA) Targeting: Coordinate with JTF-A and subordinate elements Deconflict with: IA; JTF-A (for adjacent JSOTF teams) Need target fidelity with NRT intel inject for deep targets in AH (SCUDs, chem threats) Coordinate for language support: Interpreters - Farsi, Arabic

EPW: Coordinate for Interrogation Support; Coordinate for EPW evac


JSOAC Coordination: Targeting; ATO ISOPREPs

Вам также может понравиться