IRMS

Trust International for Industrial and Petroleum Services Limited (TIL)

Karim Nabih (IT), Mostafa Ibrahim (Engineering)

Company Profile
Trust International for Industrial and Petroleum Services Limited (TIL)

Sectors: Industrial and Petroleum Services: Engineering, IT, Technical, Automation, and HSE Location: Egypt, Abu Dhabi, India, UK Workforce: 140 people; Over 25 Years Experience Est.: 1984

RBI Case Study

Natural Gas Processing Drying Package Molecular Sieve

Introduction

Dehydration of natural gas is the removal of the water and H2S that are associated with natural gases in vapor form. Dehydration prevents the formation of gas hydrates and reduces corrosion. Several methods have been developed to dehydrate gases on an industrial scale: Direct cooling, Adsorption, Absorption.

Adsorption Process (Molecular Sieve)

Molecular sieve 1013-14-MS-01

Our Case Study Tower. Gathered data are shown below:

Material:

SA-516 G65 Commissioning date: 1982 35 Years Design Lifetime. Design standard: BS 5500. Design thickness: 107mm DxL: 2374mm x 16000mm Corrosion allowance 4mm.

Molecular sieve 1013-14-MS-01

Temperature:
max

design: 350C min design: 62C, max operation: 320C, min operation: 0C.
Pressure:
max

design 121 bar G, min design 0 bar G, max operating 115 bar G, normal operating 110 bar G.

Molecular sieve 1013-14-MS-01

Process stability: Continuous treatment process alternating between:
Absorption

at 6C. Regeneration at 310C.

Protection devices: Unit is protected by a pressure control valve High pressure trip primary relief valves and secondary relief valves sized in accordance with API 520. This vessel is protected by three relief valves.

Molecular sieve 1013-14-MS-01

Inspection Data: 1986 Partial visual internal good condition, light millscale in some isolated areas
1992

100% internal 19 surface breaking linear flaws in ground weld caps, removed by light grinding.
Upper internal support ring weld UT scanned 100% circumference and lower original ring 25% circumference and no defects were detected.

1992

Molecular sieve 1013-14-MS-01

Inspection Data: 2000 External. Insulation removed light surface corrosion, isolated areas of rust scaling. Pitting to 0.7mm depth.
2000

Internal. 23% surface area UT scans for internal pitting, no defects. Wall thickness measurements satisfactory (Uniform Corrosion 0.18mm).

Molecular sieve 1013-14-MS-01

Maintenance Data: 1992 Additional grid and support beams welded into vessel
2000

Vessel totally de-lagged for refurbishment of coating and insulation material.

Molecular sieve 1013-14-MS-01

Area Classification: Hazardous Area classification reduces the ignition probability of un-ignited vapor releases.
The

hazardous area classification zone 2 (H2S) covers the whole unit area.
surrounding area is categorized Zone 2 for hydrocarbon releases.

The

Molecular sieve 1013-14-MS-01

Failure Mitigation systems:

Firewater

for cooling. An auto deluge system is provided to process vessels. ESD and blow down facilities. H2S and flammable gas detection. There are a number of hydrants that may also be used. Firewater fed via electric and diesel fire pumps from site fire pond. Emergency response procedures..

Molecular sieve 1013-14-MS-01

Other Data:

Chemical data: Methane Gas Quantity: 8 tonnes Toxicity: Toxic fluids: >0.5 tonnes. Population: Remote. Chemical Composition:
C Si 0.0 4 Mn P S Al Cr Co Mo Nb Ni 0.02 0.01 0.25 0.3 5 8

0.2

1.7

0.03

0.1

0.3

0.04

The vessel has had full PWHT. H2S stream content less than 50ppm.

Molecular sieve

RBI Method

Molecular sieve 1013-14-MS-01

Failure Modes:
Internal

corrosion: was way below (0.01 mm/y) the allowed limits which was (0.115 mm/y on a 35 Years Designed Lifetime) (Low Probability).
Corrosion: was found to be less (0.038 mm/y based on a pitting corrosion of 0.7mm depth) than the designed limit (0.115 mm/y) (Low Probability).

External

Molecular sieve 1013-14-MS-01

Failure Modes:
Erosion:

Due to the lack of inspection data and based on the teams technical back ground and from the process point of view, it was concluded that the molecular sieve dust escapes from the tower with the output gas so erosion is expected in the bottom of the tank and through the outlet nozzle due to the high velocity of the output gas (Medium-High probability).

Molecular sieve 1013-14-MS-01

Failure Modes:
Creep:

Due to exposure of the sieve to high temperatures (320C) during the regeneration process, creep is expected although the design temperature limit is above the op. limit (350C) (Medium probability). Thermal Fatigue: Due to the process design of the molecular sieve each tower is exposed to a repeating heating cycle daily, thermal fatigue is probable (Medium-High probability)

Molecular sieve 1013-14-MS-01

Failure Modes:
SCC:

No agent available except H2S which is present in the inlet gas with low concentration (<50ppm) and high sulfur steel used in the vessel, therefore no SCC damage is assumed (Low Probability).
Temperature Embrittlement: Although high temperatures are recorded, they are still below the limits so (Medium Probability).

High

Molecular sieve 1013-14-MS01

Probability of Failure
According to the previous failure modes analyzed a probability of Medium-High is set based on the worst case.

Molecular sieve 1013-14-MS-01

Consequence of failure is based on:

Business

impact. Environmental impact. Workers safety. Population safety. Reputation safety.

Molecular sieve 1013-14-MS-01

Business Impact:

No Impact 0-125K 125K-2.5M >2.5M An average equipment cost for the plant is 7K/m2.

Environment:
No Impact

No-Minor Damage Moderate Damage Substantial-Serious Damage

Molecular sieve 1013-14-MS-01

Safety Workers

No-Minor

Injury Unlikly Lead to Fatality Lead to Fatality

Safety Popup

No-Minor

Injury Unlikly Lead to Fatality Lead to Fatality

Molecular sieve 1013-14-MS-01

Reputation

No-Slight

Impact Minor-Considerable Impact National-International Impact

Questions & Answers

Thank You