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DEVELOPING A SECURITY SECTOR REFORM FRAMEWORK AND AGENDA FOR THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

Top Level Dialogue with PNP & AFP Chiefs CHR

I. SECURITY & HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION: A snapshot


Redemocratization after the Marcos rule towards development: Are we still in transition mode?
Threatened by reason of major insurgencies, poverty, socio-economic inequality, large external debt and problems created by State economic regulation (Huntington, 1993): reinforces each other Economic polarization and class differences are deeply ingrained in popular consciousness Non-State violence in the hands of local politicians who maintain own forces to fight against insurgents and/or ensure political control (132 private armies in 2010) Oligarch democracy

I. SECURITY & HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION: A snapshot


Fundamental problems faced by the security forces:
Lack legitimacy Poor civil-military relations: alienated from the population, focus on fighting rather than earning the people's trust Weak civilian control over the military Abuses of power and corruption, even criminal behavior among the security forces; also contribute to increasing support for militant factions Continuing incidents of grave human rights violations

Fundamental problems faced by the security forces:

I. SECURITY & HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION: A snapshot

Lack capacity to address security issues Improving capacity focus on better and sophisticated weaponry, instead of gaining people's support and trust Low level of professionalism: failure to adhere to rule of law and human rights Use of unconventional forces without reliable command oversight and results in HRVs Strong correlation between government excess and extremism Philippines is a major arena for anti-terrorism

I. SECURITY & HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION: A snapshot


Fundamental problems faced by the security forces:
Politicized military and police Exemplified by the People Power revolts: a positive role but a dangerous precedent Lack of autonomous base of power since in the hands of self-interested elites and politicians Succeeded in merely moderating and displacing the system of loyalty to politicians Promotion of colonel or above by the President and confirmed by COA; No CHR clearance Diverts attention from military operations

II. SECURITY SECTOR REFORM: Constitutional & Legal Bases


CHR mandate:
Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights; Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to enhance respect for the primacy of human rights; Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty obligations on human rights; Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions; Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.

II. SECURITY SECTOR REFORM: Constitutional & Legal Bases


Security sector reform (SSR) is the transformation of the security system which includes all the actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions, so that it is managed and operated in a manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance, and thus contributes to a well-functioning security framework. Target Security Sector: PNP, AFP and other related security services actors

II. SECURITY SECTOR REFORM: Constitutional & Legal Bases


Standards of policing:
preservation of peace and order within the regions and defense and security of the regions (Article 10, Section 21) Section 3 of Republic Act 8551: relieves the police of the primary responsibility on matters involving the suppression of insurgency and other serious threats to national security PNP role is limited to information gathering and performance of its ordinary police functions and to support the AFP on matters involving suppression of insurgency, subject to calling out powers by the President (see PNP-OP)

II. SECURITY SECTOR REFORM: Constitutional & Legal Bases


Standards of policing:
Article 16, Section 6 mandates the State to establish and maintain one police force, which shall be national in scope and civilian in character, to be administered and controlled by a national police commission. Administrative control by the NAPOLCOM (RA 6975) Operational control and supervision by the Local chief Executives (RA 6975 & 7160): see NAPOLCOM Memo Circular 2002-011 Subject to civil service requirements and standards

Must project itself as civilian and not militarized

II. SECURITY SECTOR REFORM: Constitutional & Legal Bases


Standards of policing:
PNP-Operational Procedures defined the role of the police in internal security operations of the AFP:
The support role is described to require the following tasks:

To conduct sustained law enforcement actions against dissident terrorists (DTs) atrocities;
To collect intelligence information on DT activities; To conduct limited ISO, of a defensive nature, to flush DTs out of urban areas. The PNP is also required to coordinate with the AFP in the area at the first opportunity. Lastly, to conduct investigation and prosecution of ISO-related cases. On the other hand, the active role of the PNP entails the following: To conduct search and destroy operations against DT strongholds and concentrations

To conduct intelligence operations to neutralize guerilla safe houses in urban areas


To conduct civil-military operations to dismantle political machinery of the CPP/NPA in the area

II. SECURITY SECTOR REFORM: Constitutional & Legal Bases


Standards of military actions:
Article 2, Section 3: Civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military. The Armed Forces of the Philippines is the protector of the people and the State. Its goal is to secure the sovereignty of the State and the integrity of the national territory. supremacy of the sovereign people, NOT of any particular head of State protector of the people was not meant to give the military a political role; intended to correct the military abuses committed during martial law; its political role is found in the second sentence, a role defined and limited by the political power. Article 16, Section 4: The Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be composed of a citizen armed force which shall undergo military training and serve as may be provided by law. It shall keep a regular force necessary for the security of the State. well trained in military matters as well as in respect for human rights

II. SECURITY SECTOR REFORM: Constitutional & Legal Bases


Standards of military actions:
Article 16, Section 4: (1) All members of the armed forces shall take an oath or affirmation to uphold and defend this Constitution; (2) The State shall strengthen the patriotic spirit and nationalist consciousness of the military, and respect for people's rights in the performance of their duty; (3) Professionalism in the armed forces and adequate remuneration and benefits of its members shall be a prime concern of the State. The armed forces shall be insulated from partisan politics. No member of the military shall engage, directly or indirectly, in any partisan political activity, except to vote;

II. SECURITY SECTOR REFORM: Constitutional & Legal Bases


Standards of military actions:
Article 16, Section 4:
(4) No member of the armed forces in the active service shall, at any time, be appointed or designated in any capacity to a civilian position in the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations or any of their subsidiaries; (5) Laws on retirement of military officers shall not allow extension of their service; (6) The officers and men of the regular force of the armed forces shall be recruited proportionately from all provinces and cities as far as practicable; (7) The tour of duty of the Chief of Staff of the armed forces shall not exceed three years. However, in times of war or other national emergency declared by the Congress, the President may extend such tour of duty.

II. SECURITY SECTOR REFORM: Constitutional & Legal Bases


Standards of military actions:
National Security Policy on Security Sector Reform (2010-2016):
Strengthening civilian control and oversight of the security sector, to include reforms in the defense and law enforcement agencies, enhancing the oversight function of the legislative branch, and capacitating the civilians in Government and civil society organizations to oversee the security sector. Professionalizing the security forces to include, among other the establishment of programs designed to train the soldiers, police and other security sector personnel on their respective functions and responsibilities under the constitution or as provided for by law, and develop competencies on human rights, international humanitarian law, ethnic sensitivity and indigenous peoples rights, in accordance with the rule of law.

II. SECURITY SECTOR REFORM: Constitutional & Legal Bases


Standards of military actions:
AFP Internal Peace and Security Plan (Bayanihan) opens up space for the involvement of the Filipino people in defining, shaping, and ensuring our peace and security as a nation.
Bayanihan has four specific elements namely, (1) governance, (2) delivery of basic services,(3) economic reconstruction and sustainable development, and (4) security sector reform to ensure the protection of the state and the people. recognizes the equal importance of a noncombat approach and is focusing on involving other stakeholders and upholding human rights and peace talks to end the armed conflict.

II. SECURITY SECTOR REFORM: Constitutional & Legal Bases


Prohibition against private armies:
Article 17, Section 24: Private armies and other armed groups not recognized by duly constituted authority shall be dismantled. All paramilitary forces including Civilian Home Defense Forces not consistent with the citizen armed force established in this Constitution, shall be dissolved or, where appropriate, converted into the regular force. must be related to Article 16, Section 4 which requires members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to undergo military training.

II. SECURITY SECTOR REFORM: Constitutional & Legal Bases


Prohibition against private armies:
Civilian Armed Force Geographical Units (CAFGUS) Executive Order 264 signed by President Aquino on July 25, 1987 Organized by the Secretary of National Defense dismantling of CAFGU will be done under the framework of Bayanihan and is to be undertaken in 4 years

III. THEMATIC CONCERNS OF SSR: Focus on HR


Internal Security
Link with the peace process While clarification of roles and mandates (La Breza Declaration) is critical, ensuring compliance with rule of law is a matter of political will and institutional responsibility
AFP is relevant only in combat operations; law enforcement functions should rest upon the PNP

Informal processes or practices that contribute to HRVs must be eradicated (e.g. body count, blood money)

III. THEMATIC CONCERNS OF SSR: Focus on HR


Internal Security
Unclear protocols on the part of the AFP within the context of internal security operations, i.e., noncompliance with human rights and humanitarian law, particularly RA 9745, 9851, 10353, Geneva Conventions Internal oversight over paramilitaries & gendarmeries

Internal and external accountability mechanisms to ensure prosecution and disciplinary action for violations of human rights

III. THEMATIC CONCERNS OF SSR: Focus on HR


Politicization of the security forces
PNP: NAPOLCOM as administrative oversight while Local Chief Executives have operational control and supervision
Memorandum Circular No. 2002-011: prescribing the relationship between PNP and Local Chief Executives Role of the DILG in ensuring that the PNP is shielded from politics and actions by local chief executives conform with HR NAPOLCOM must ensure that the relationship will not compromise HR standards LGUs, as State agents, to be monitored in its actions relating to peace and order, as well as other security concerns

III. THEMATIC CONCERNS OF SSR: Focus on HR


Politicization of the security forces
AFP: Any political leader must not look at the military as its base of support.
Promotion to ranks of colonel and above is through the President and confirmed by the CoA: no vetting process from CHR Lack of professionalism
Need for meritocracy culture

Remove the military from non-military responsibilities


Caution in terms of participation of military in counter-terrorism decision-making Civilian positions relating to military, defense and security policy making are given to retired military officers

Address savior of the people mentality Role in private armies and support for the elite

III. THEMATIC CONCERNS OF SSR: Focus on HR


Defining a Culture of Human Rights Within the Security Sector
Focus on Human Rights Education
Reforming mindsets, enhancing skills and achieving behavioral and attitudinal change Participatory process of HRE development Participatory methodology

Managing Change from Within


Participation of the leaders or the Chiefs Champions of Human Rights Capacity building

III. THEMATIC CONCERNS OF SSR: Focus on HR


Defining a Culture of Human Rights Within the Security Sector
Strengthening Accountability Mechanisms
Access to information: prompt, true, accurate, complete Common language and understanding of HRVs System for case information sharing, verification and monitoring Sharpening institutional responsibility aspect (democratic accountability) Development of HR indicators CHR vetting of all security personnel

IV: OBJECTIVES OF SSR


To strengthen core security sector's capacity, organization and institutions to conform with human rights standards and norms, towards ending impunity, preventing systematic and grave human rights violations, and enabling civil oversight. To conduct participatory research on human research education with civil society and security members, leveling off on roles and mandates relating to internal security functions and development initiatives, as well as on security forces' conceptual understanding of human rights and humanitarian laws, and institutionalizing feedback systems, community-based dialogues or other accountability mechanisms to monitor compliance with human rights.

V: TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR ENGAGEMENT


WHAT ARE THE SECURITY BODIES THAT WILL BE COVERED BY THE PROJECT? WHAT ARE THE AREAS OF STUDY AND ENGAGEMENT? e.g. Rule of Law, Policy development, planning and implementation, Professionalism, Oversight, Budget WHO ARE THE OTHER STAKEHOLDERS?

WHAT PRINCIPLES SHALL GOVERN THE PROCESS? TRANSPARENCY HUMAN CAPACITY/EMPOWERMENT PARTICIPATION ATTENTION TO VULNERABLE GROUPS

VI: ACTIVITIES
Desk review of related literature Review of Rule of Law

Focus Group Discussions (10) NCR: Top Level Dialogues (2) Luzon: 1 CSO, 1 PNP/AFP (camp/station) (2) Visayas: 1 CSO, 1 PNP/AFP (camp/station); 1 regional director/commander level (3) Mindanao: 1 CSO, 1 PNP/AFP (camp/station); 1 regional director/commander level (3)
Validation with the PNP/AFP Presentation to the CHR en banc

References
Marcus Schulzke, Democratization and Military Reform in the Philippines, Journal of Asia Pacific Studies ( 2010) Vol 1, No 2, 320-337.

Carolina Hernandez, Restoring Civilian Control Over the Philippine Military, Journal of International Cooperation Studies Vol. 10, No. 1 (2002), pp. 25-48.
Arugay, Aries A. (2007), Civil Societys Next Frontier: Security Sector Reform (SSR) th Advocacy in the Philippines, Paper presented at the 5 ISTR Asia-Pacific Conference (Manila, Philippines) Bernas, Joaquin G. (2009), The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines: A Commentary, Rex Bookstore.

Constitutional Commission Record.


IHR, A Contextual Analysis of Law Enforcement in the Philippines, 2009.

Thank you for listening!

THE ZAMBOANGA CRISIS: SOME SEARCHING NOTES By: GRACE JIMENO REBOLLOS, Former President, WMSU
The following are the result of observations on various aspects of the crisis. We wonder and hope these thoughts are taken in the interest of seeking positive ways forward. 1 Intelligence: 2 Negotiations: 3 The Peace Process and Revisiting OPAPPs Role: 4 The Role of Media 5 IPSP and Bantay Bayanihan: Where do we draw the lines of engagement for Bantay Bayanihan (BB) as it has been acknowledged to be a partner of the AFPs Internal Peace and Security Program (IPSP)? The Zamboanga Crisis was a test for its implementation. We were not remiss in calling attention to the need for talking. Amidst the burning of the houses, our interlocutors were in no mood to meet us, and even exhorted us to forget Bantay Bayanihan. The relevance of the IPSP-BB partnership is weighed against extreme encounters like this, and when push comes to shove, the military will exercise what it does best fire the gun ostensibly under the orders of the commander-in-chief.

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