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Vaasha Ramnarine Delin Bixha Ralph Sylvain

On April 26, 1986, reactor four at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power plant in Ukraine exploded. This event was one of the worst nuclear events in history reaching level 7 on the international nuclear event scale.

Several accidents and emergency shutdowns before the major explosion. Most of these shutdowns were unscheduled shutdowns and errors made by several employee's. Some cases were covered up as well.

The reactor was scheduled for maintenance

and was temporarily shutdown.

During the examination of the turbines, one of the operators made a lethal mistake with the regulators which resulted in power crash. This lead to an increase in power beyond limits.

The shift supervisor attempted to control the situation, however several seconds later a series of explosions followed by braking pressure tubes, containment lids, and chunks of graphite and radioactive elements went flying causing as many as 30 roofs to catch on fire.

They considered that the set up of the plant as a model of the RBMK type plant, was to be worthy of copying and did so.

As a result, its operators felt that they are an elite crew and became overconfident and acted in a hazardous unethical manner.

The evaluation was realized as an electrical test only and so, the test was under the supervision of the

turbine manufacturer and not the regular operators

Effects on the reactor were not thought up carefully enough which to begin with

Displayed as an unethical act which contributed to the disaster.

Out of 71 technical breakdowns in 1980 to 1986, no investigation was carried out in search of the causes at

all in 27 cases.

Many cases of equipment malfunction had not been recorded in the operation logs.

In this disastrous case there is a breach of many ethical codes


but also in relation to the leading up of the Chernobyl disaster

There is a concealment of events which should have been

ethically taken into consideration

Whistle-blowing should have taken place to unravel the coverup of the many unresolved and unscrutinised dilemmas.

Tenets Code of Ethics no. 6 which asserts that Members shall, where relevant, take reasonable steps to inform themselves, their clients and employers, of the social, environmental, economic and other possible consequences which may arise from their actions has been breached in this catastrophe. Violation of Tenets Code of Ethics no. 5 which states that Members shall apply their skill and knowledge in the interest of their employer or client for whom they shall act with integrity without compromising any other obligation to these Tenets automatically leads to infringement of Ethical Code no. 3 which declares that Members shall act only in areas of their competence and in a careful and diligent manner. The operator error was probably due to their lack of knowledge of nuclear reactor physics and engineering, as well as lack of experience and training.

According to these allegations, at the time of the accident the reactor was being

operated with many key safety systems turned off, most notably the Emergency Core
Cooling System (ECCS), LAR (Local Automatic control system), and AZ (emergency power reduction system).

Personnel had an insufficiently detailed understanding of technical procedures involved with the nuclear reactor, and knowingly ignored regulations to speed test completion.

The developers of the reactor plant considered this combination of events to be impossible and therefore did not allow for the creation of emergency protection systems capable of preventing the combination of events that led to the crisis, namely the intentional disabling of emergency protection equipment plus the violation of operating procedures.

Thus the primary cause of the accident was the extremely improbable combination of rule infringement plus the operational routine allowed by the power station staff.

In this analysis of the causes of the accident, deficiencies in the reactor design and in the operating regulations that made the accident possible were set aside and mentioned only casually Serious critical observations covered only general questions and did not address the specific reasons for the accident.
Several procedural irregularities also helped to make the accident possible. One was insufficient communication between the safety officers and the operators in charge of the experiment being run that night. Once again, the human factor had to be considered as a major element in causing the accident.

The operating crew's deviation from the test program that was mostly to blame. "Most reprehensibly, unapproved changes in the test procedure were deliberately made on the spot, although the plant was known to be in a very different condition from that intended for the test. Deficiency in the safety culture was inherent not only at the operational stage but also, and to no lesser extent, during activities at other stages in the lifetime of nuclear power plants (including design, engineering, construction, manufacture and regulation). The poor quality of operating procedures and instructions, and their conflicting character, put a heavy burden on the operating crew, including the Chief Engineer. "The accident can be said to have flowed from a deficient safety culture, not only at the Chernobyl plant, but throughout the Soviet design, operating and regulatory organizations for nuclear power that existed at that time."

30km Radius had to be evacuated City of Pripyat and cities in the 30km radius had to be evacuated instantly after explosion and were never to return for belongings. 330,000 people were affected immediately after the explosion. Due to such a catastrophic event and evacuation many of the evacuees had mental health problems, alcohol and tobacco abuse, and etc 100,000 people are considered to be premanetly disabled as a result 7 million people receive compensation 5-7% of Ukraine and Belarus government spending is allocated to various Chernobyl related compensations. First generation of wildlife offspring had malformations Flourishing biodiversity Contamination of groundwater and downstream water-ecosystems

Cost of ensuring safety of nuclear facilities significantly lower than that of dealing with accident consequences. Caused psychological problems and deterioration in public health and quality of life. Importance of strict compliance with the basic and technical safety principles for nuclear power plants. Continuously checking on safety of operating nuclear power plants and their early upgrading in order to eliminate deviations. Need to establish and support a high level national emergency response system. Implementation of agricultural countermeasures has revealed even the smallest amount of radionuclides in the soil can make animals and plants contaminated.

Early clinical effects in the few months after were attributable to radiation and non radiation factors. (living conditions, ionizing radiation) Probability of nuclear accident will never be zero, therefore need to be prepared to minimize losses through timely response. Public needs to be informed immediately of the accident and needs to be taught precautions and effects of such a catastrophe.

THANK YOU!

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