Flixborough Disaster 1974

By: Tan Yong Chai Lim Soon Yee

Lee Hon Kit

GEET GOVIND A/L ASOKUMAR SHIVANANDAA A/L CHANDRASEAGAR SITI NURZHAHIRAH BINTI GHUFRAN NURUL ADINA BINTI MOHAMED RAZIFUDDIN

Background Studies
The chemical plant, owned by Nypro UK and in operation since 1967, produced 70000tons per year of caprolactam, a precursor chemical used in the manufacture of nylon 6.

The process involved oxidation of cyclohexane with air in a series of six reactors to produce a mixture of cyclohexanol and cyclohexanone.

How did it happened?

Reactor 1 Reactor 1 Reactor 1 Reactor 4
Reactor 5 Reactor 6

Two months prior to the explosion, a crack was discovered in the number 5 reactor. It was decided to install a temporary 50 cm (20 inch) diameter pipe to bypass the leaking reactor to allow continued operation of the plant while repairs were made. The pipe connecting the reactor supposedly 28inch in diameter. Failure of bypass pipe in controlling the pressure and temperature causing the temporary pipe to crack and rupture. Operating condition at 155C and 7.9atm At 16:53 on Saturday 1 June 1974, the temporary bypass pipe ruptured, possibly as a result of a fire on a nearby pipe which had been burning for nearly an hour.

Within a minute, about 40 tonnes of the plant's 400 tonne store of cyclohexane leaked from the pipe and formed a vapour cloud 100200 metres in diameter. About 2.5 times the area of football field.

The cloud, on coming in contact with an ignition source (probably a furnace at a nearby hydrogen production plant) exploded, completely destroying the plant.
The fuel-air explosion was estimated to be equivalent to 15 tonnes of TNT. Blast Radius is about two football field in diameter. The blast can be heard and felt over 25km. 1800 buildings around 1.6km from the site 28 people died and seriously injured 36 including people in the control room and on site worker. The Plant Site contain excessively large inventory of dangerous chemical including 330,000 gallon of cyclohexane, 66000 gallon of naphtha, 11000 gallon of toluene, 26400 gallon of benzene and 450 gallons of gasoline. Resulting fire raged in the area for 10 days!

Consequences
The bypass pipe had failed due to unforeseen lateral stresses in the pipe during the a pressure surge. No Experience! No pressure Test! No proper support for the pipe!

No Plan nor Calculation!

These shortcomings led to a widespread public outcry over industrial plant safety and significant tightening of the UK governments regulations covering hazardous industrial processes.

What can be done to avoid the same disaster from happening?

Safety officer to carry out routine checking. Strict legislation. Professional engineer in plant design and modification. Use appropriate equipment and connection. Safety Test 24-hour monitoring. Shift work. Case studies.