CSC M.C. No. 17 s. 2002. Resolution No. 021181 and M.C. No. 24 s. 2002/ Resolution No.

021480 Certain Modes of Separation

Documents Required For Record Purpose I. Resignation is the voluntary relinquishment or surrender of the office, and the acceptance thereof by competent authority
A. Requisites a. Tender must be in writing b. Voluntary c. Acceptance by competent authority

NOTES:
1. When procured by fraud or duress, resignation may be repudiated.

2. Courtesy Resignation lacks the element of voluntariness and is therefore not valid. Ortiz vs. Comelec 162 SCRA 812 3. Need for Acceptance a. Expressly b. Impliedly as in the appointment of a successor

4.

Mere tender of resignation, without acceptance by competent authority does not create a vacancy in public office; resignation is not complete until accepted by proper authority. Joson vs. Nacario 187 (SCRA 453)

5.

In the Philippines, acceptance of resignation is necessary because Art. 238 of the Revised Penal Code, penalizes any public office who before acceptance of his resignation, abandoned his office to the detriment of public service
If the public officer is mandated by law to hold over, the resignation, even if accepted, will not be effective until after the appointment or election of his successor.

6.

B. Effective date of Resignation

The date specified in the tender, and if no such date is specified, then resignation shall be effective when the public officer receives notice of the acceptance of his resignation, not the date of the letter or notice of acceptance. (Gamboa vs. Court of Appeals (1981)

II. Dropping from the Rolls

Sec. 2 Rule XII Omnibus Rules of the Civil Service. Officers and employees who are either habitually absent or have unsatisfactory or poor performance or have shown to be physically and mentally unfit to perform their duties may be dropped from the Rolls subject to the following procedures;

2.1 Absence Without Approved Leave a. An officer or employee who is continuously

absent without approved leave (AWOL) for at least (30) thirty working days shall be separated from the service or dropped from the rolls without prior notice. He shall however be informed of his separation from the service not later than five (5) days from its effectivity which shall be sent to the address appearing on his 201 files or to his last known address as amended by CSC MC no. 15, s. 1999

b. If the number of unauthorized absences

incurred is less than (30) thirty working days, a written Return To Work order shall be served on the official or employee at his last known address on record. Failure on his part to report for work within the period stated in the order shall be a valid ground to drop him from the rolls as amended by CSC M.C. no. 15 s. 1999

The Case in Point City Government of Makati vs. Civil Service Commission GR No. 131392 February 6, 2002 (Bellosillo, J.) This case, enunciates the rule on automatic leave of absence in case the employee is arrested and/or detained or by reason of some other forms of force majeure or other unfortunate event.

2.2 Unsatisfactory or Poor Performance

a. An official or employee who is given two (2) consecutive unsatisfactory ratings may be dropped from the rolls after due notice. Notice shall mean that the officer or employee concerned is informed in writing of his unsatisfactory performance for a semester and is sufficiently warned that a succeeding unsatisfactory performance shall warrant his separation from the service. Such notice shall be given not later than 30 days from the end of the semester and shall contain sufficient information which shall enable the employee to prepare an explanation.

b. An official or employee, who for one evaluation

period is rated poor in performance may be dropped from the rolls after due notice. Due Notice shall mean that the officer or employee is informed in writing of the status of his performance not later than the 4th month of that rating period with sufficient warning that failure to improve his performance within the remaining period of the semester shall warrant his separation from the service. Such notice shall also contain sufficient information which shall enable the employee to prepare an explanation.

2.3 Physically and Mentally Unfit a. An officer or an employee who is continuously

absent for more than one (1) year by reason of illness maybe declared physically unfit to perform his duties and the Head of Office in the exercise of his sound judgment may consequently drop him from the rolls.

b. An officer or employee who is intermittently absent

by reason of illness for at least two hundred sixty (260) working days during a 24-month period may also be declared physically unfit by the Head Office.

c. An officer or employee who is behaving

abnormally for an extended period which manifests continuing mental disorder and incapacity to work as reported by his co-workers or immediate supervisor and confirmed by the Head of Office, may likewise be dropped from the rolls.

For the purpose of the three (3) preceeding paragraphs, notice shall be given to the employee containing a brief statement of the nature of his incapacity to work;

2.4 The officer or employee who is separated from the service through any of the above modes has the right to appeal his case within fifteen (15) days from receipt of such order or notice of separation.

2.5 The order of separation is immediately executory pending appeal, unless the commission on meritorious grounds directs otherwise.

2.6 This mode of separation from the service for unauthorized absences or unsatisfactory or poor performance or physical and mental incapacity is non-disciplinary in nature and shall not result in the forfeiture or any benefits on the part of the official or employee nor in disqualifying him from reemployment in the government. 2.7 The written notice mentioned in the preceeding paragraphs may be signed by the person exercising immediate supervision over the official or employee. However, the notice of separation shall be signed by the appointing authority or Head of Office.

Sec. 3 Dismissal
A certified copy of the decision rendered where the penalty of dismissal was imposed shall be submitted to the commission.

II. Abolition of the Office

To be valid, abolition of the office must not constitute removal of the incumbent. It is within the legal competence of the city council to create, consolidate and re-organize city offices, and positions wholly supported by local funds. (Mama Jr. vs. Court of Appeals 196 SCRA 489). But, the abolition must be done in good faith, with the clear intent to do away with the office, not for personal or political reasons, and can not be implemented in a manner contrary to law. (Mendoza vs. Quisumbing, 186 SCRA 108).

IV. Conviction of a Crime

When the penalty imposed, upon conviction, carries with it the accessory penalty of disqualification, conviction by final judgment automatically terminates official relationship.

But, a plenary pardon extinguishes the accessory penalty of disqualification, it will not restore the public office to the officer convicted. He must be given a new appointment to the position. (Monsanto vs. Factoran 170 SCRA 190).

In Sabello vs. Department of Education 180 SCRA 623 for reasons of equity, the Supreme Court held that the former elementary school. Principal should not be re-appointed to a lower position than that which he formerly occupied.

But, when a person is given a pardon because he did not truly commit the offense, the pardon relieves him from all punitive consequences of his criminal act, thereby restoring him to his clean name, good reputation and unstained character prior to his finding of guilt. The bestowal of executive clemency in effect completely obliterated the adverse effects of the administrative decision which found him guilty of Dishonesty and ordered his separation from the service.

This can be inferred from the executive clemency itself exculpating petitioner from the administrative charge and thereby directing his reinstatement, which is rendered automatic by the grant of the pardon. This signifies that petitioner need no longer apply for reinstatement; he is restored to his office ipso facto upon the issuance of the clemency, and he is entitled to back wages. (Vicente Garcia vs. Chairman, Commission on Audit 226 SCRA 356).

V. Filing of Certificate of Candidacy

Sec. 66 BP 881 provides- any person holding a public appointive office or position including members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon filing of his Certificate of Candidacy. See also secs. 4,5 and 6 of Rule XIII Omnibus Rules.

Those who lost in an election (except Barangay Election) shall not be eligible for appointment or reemployment to any office within one (1) year following such election. This rule also applies to those whose certificate of candidacy has been filed and later on disqualified. Those who resign during the three (3) months period before any election to promote the candidacy of another shall not be re-employed during the next sixmonth period following such election.

THE CIVIL SERVICE LAW ON AUTOMATIC LEAVE OF ABSENCE SUSPENDED EMPLOYEEEMPLOYER RELATIONSHIP ABSENCE WITHOUT LEAVE DROPPING FROM THE ROLLS

CITY OF MAKATI VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, ET.AL., G.R. NO. 131392-February 6, 2002

The Facts of the Case:

Eusebia R. Galzote was a clerk in the Department of Engineering and Public Works in Makati City. On September 6, 1991, she was arrested and detained without bail for the crime of Kidnapping For Ransom. The city government through its municipal personnel officer, issued an order suspending her from the service effective September 9, 1991 until the final disposition of her case.

Later, and without informing her, the City Government dropped her from the rolls of municipal employees effective January 21, 1993 for having been absent without official leave for more than one year. On September 22, 1994, she was acquitted of the crime charged for lack of evidence that she conspired in the commission of the crime.

On October 19, 1994, she requested the municipal personnel officer and Mayor Jejomar Binay for the lifting of her suspension and reinstatement to her position in accordance with the September 6, 1991 Memorandum of the City Government. The City Government refused her. On August 4, 1995 she filed a letter-protest with the Civil Service commission, which ordered her immediate reinstatement and the payment of her back salaries from October 19, 1994, the day that she first reported for work until her actual resumption of duty. The city government filed a petition for review of the C.S. C .Resolution but the Court of Appeals denied it, thereby sustaining the CSC resolution.

ISSUES 1. Was Galzote properly dropped from the rolls of employees? 2. Was her suspension from September 9, 1991 until the final disposition of her case is terminated, valid or illegal?

RULING
The Court believes that Galzote can not be faulted for failing to file prior to her detention an application for leave and obtain approval thereof. The records show that on September 9, 1991, she was ordered as suspended until the final disposition of her case. This order for her suspension until her case is finally resolved should be taken as an equivalent of a prior approved leave of absence since it was her employer, the city government which placed her under suspension, and thus excused her from further formalities in applying for leave. Such arrangement bound the City government to allow her to return to work after the termination of her case.

Indeed, Galzote did not have the least intention to go on AWOL. AWOL means the employee leaving or abandoning her post without justifiable reason and without notifying his employer. In this case, Galzote had a justifiable reason, that is she was on jail without bail.

The City government cannot insist that the suspension order dated September 9, 1991 is illegal because there was no administrative charge against Galzote. The Supreme Court said we have no reason to nullify the city governments order of suspension. A void act though in law a mere scrap of paper nonetheless, it confers legitimacy upon past acts or omissions done in reliance thereof. Consequently, the existence of a statute, or executive order prior to its being adjudged void is an operative fact to which legal consequences are attached. It would be ghastly unfair to prevent private respondent from relying upon the order of suspension in lieu of a formal leave application.

Responsibility for such illegal act as in this case rests upon the employer, the city of Makati on ground of estoppel.

The court said, the suspension order dated September 9, 1991, had for its effect the temporary suspension of the employee-employer relationship until Galzotes case has been terminated.

The court went further by saying, that due to her detention in jail, Galzote was deemed to have been on an automatic leave of absence, because whether she likes it or not, she could not report for work due to her detention.

Finally, the court said, that true enough; leave of absence shall be dependent on the exigencies of the service, thus, one cannot go on leave outright, except of course due to illness, because one can not schedule her illness.

But, illness is not the only force majeur. There may be other eventualities that may prevent one from reporting for work such as, typhoon, war and other calamities and detention in jail. These later forms of force majeur, are considered as akin to illness, under which the employee may be excused from the formalities of applying for leave formalities. In these later instances of force majeur, it is enough that the employee informs his employer of his predicament to avoid being considered as absent without leave and avoid being dropped from the rolls.