HAZARD AND

OPERABILITY STUDY

Brainstorming, Multidisciplinary Team Approach

Structured Using Guide Words
Problem Identifying
Cost Effective

When to Use?
Optimal from a cost viewpoint
1.when applied to new plants at the point
where the design is nearly firm and
documented or
2.to existing plants where a major redesign is
planned.
It can also be used for existing facilities.

Results
Types: The results are the team findings.
Which include: (1) identification of hazards
and operating problems, (2) recommended
changes in design, procedure, etc., to
improve safety; and (3) recommendations
for follow-on studies where no conclusion
was possible due to lack of information.
Nature: Qualitative.

Requirements
Data: The HazOp requires detailed plant
descriptions, such as drawings, procedures, and
flow charts. A HazOp also requires considerable
knowledge of the process, instrumentation, and
operation, and this information is usually provided
by team members who are experts in these areas.
Staff: The HazOp team is ideally made up of 5 to 7
professionals, with support for recording and
reporting. For a small plant, a team as small as two
or three could be effective.

Time and Cost

The time and cost of a HazOp are directly related to
the size and complexity of the plant being
analyzed. In general, the team must spend about
three hours for each major hardware item. Where
the system analyzed is similar to one investigated
previously, the time is usually small. Additional
time must be allowed for planning, team
coordination, and documentation. This additional
time can be as much as two three times the team
effort as estimated above

HAZOP STUDY - TEAM COMPOSITION

A Team Leader, an expert in the HAZOP Technique
Technical Members, for example

New Design

Existing Plant

Design or Project Engineer

Plant Superintendent

Process Engineer

Process Supervisor (Foreman)

Commissioning Manager

Maintenance Engineer

Instrument Design Engineer

Instrument Engineer

Chemist

Technical Engineer

Principles of HAZOP
Concept
Systems work well when operating under design conditions.

Problems arise when deviations from design conditions occur.

Basis
a word model, a process flow sheet (PFD) or a piping and
instrumentation diagram (P&ID)
Method
use guide words to question every part of process to discover what deviations
from the intention of design can occur and what are their causes and
consequences may be.

PRINCIPLES OF HAZOPS
GUIDE WORDS*
NONE
MORE OF
LESS OF
PART OF
MORE THAN
OTHER

CAUSE

DEVIATION
(from standard
condition
or intention)

CONSEQUENCES
(trivial, important,
catastrophic)
-hazard
-operating difficulties

*COVERING EVERY PARAMETER RELEVANT TO THE SYSTEM

UNDER REVIEW:
i.e. Flow Rate. Flow Quantity, Pressure, Temperature, Viscosity, Components

STUDY NODES
The locations (on P&ID or procedures) at which the process parameters are investigated
for deviations. These nodes are points where the process parameters (P, T, F etc.) have
an identified design intent.

INTENTION
The intention defines how the plant is expected to operate in the absence of deviations at
the study nodes.

DEVIATIONS
These are departures from the intension which can be discovered by systematically
applying the guide words.
Process conditions
activities
substances
time
place

GUIDE WORDS
Guide Words

Meaning

No, None

Negation of Intention

More Of

Quantitative Increase

Less Of

Quantitative Decrease

As Well As (More Than) Qualitative Increase

Part Of

Qualitative Decrease

Reverse

Logical Opposite of Intention

Other Than

Complete Substitution

Deviations Generated by Each Guide Word

Guide word
NONE
MORE OF
LESS OF
PART OF
MORE THAN
OTHER THAN

Deviations
No forward flow when there should be, i.e. no flow.
More of any relevant physical property than there should
be, e.g. higher flow (rate or total quantity), higher
temperature, higher pressure, higher viscosity, etc.
Less of any relevant physical property than there should be,
e.g. lower flow (rate or total quantity), lower temperature,
lower pressure, etc.
Composition of system different from what it should be,
e.g. change in ratio of components, component missing, ect.
More components present in the system than there should
be, e.g. extra phase present (vapour, solid), impurities (air.
Water, acids, corrosion products), etc.
What else can happen apart from normal operation, e.g.
start-up, shutdown, uprating, low rate running, alternative
operation mode, failure of plant services, maintenance,
catalyst change, etc.

REVERSE: reverse flow

EXAMPLE
C

The flowsheet shows that raw material streams A and B are transferred by
pump to a reactor, where they react to form product C. Assume that the
flow rate of B should not exceed that of A. Otherwise, an explosion may
occur. Lets consider the flow of A in line 1:

FB FA

NONE
MORE
LESS
AS WELL AS
PART OF
REVERSE
OTHER THAN

No flow of A
Flow of A greater than design flow
Flow of A less than design flow
Transfer of some component additional to A
Failure to transfer a component of A
Flow of A in a direction opposite to design direction
Transfer of some material other than A

Beginning

End

Select a vessel

Explain the general intention of the vessel and its lines

Select a line

Explain the intention of the line

Apply the first guide words

Develop a meaningful deviation

Examine possible causes

Examine consequences

Detect hazards

10

Make suitable record

11

Repeat 6-10 for all meaningful deviations derived from first guide words

12

Repeat 5-11 for all the guide words

13

Mark line as having been examined

14

Repeat 3-13 for each line

15

Select an auxiliary system (e.g. Heating system)

16

Explain the intention of the auxiliary system

17

Repeat 5-12 for auxiliary system

18

Mark auxiliary as having been examined

19

Repeat 15-18 for all auxiliaries

20

Explain intention of the vessel

21

Repeat 5-12

22

Mark vessel as completed

23

Repeat 1-22 for all vessels on flow sheet

24

Mark flow sheet as completed

25

Repeat 1-24 for all flow sheets

Figure 8.9 Hazard and operability studies : detailed sequence of examination

(Chemical Industry Safety and Health Council, 1977 Item 6)

HAZOP DISPLAY
Guide Word Deviation Possible Causes

Consequences Action Required

No

System Over- Shutdown

Heated
System

No Flow Pump Fail

Line Blockage
Operator
Stops Pump

More

More
Flow

Excessive
Over-Cooled
Pump Speed
Product
(Control System) (Incomplete
Reaction)

Product
Unacceptable;
Dump

EXAMPLE
An alkene/alkane fraction containing small amounts of
suspended water is continuously pumped from a bulk
intermediate storage tank via a half-mile pipeline into a
buffer/settling tank where the residual water is settled out prior
to passing via a feed/product heat exchanger and preheater to the
reaction, is run off manually from the settling tank at intervals.
Residence time in the reaction section must be held within
closely defined limits to ensure adequate conversion of the
alkene and to avoid excessive formation of polymer.

Results of hazard and operability study of proposed olefine

dimerization unit: results for line section from intermediate storage to buffer/settling tank
Guide word
NONE

Deviation
No flow

Possible causes
(1)No hydrocarbon available
at intermediate storage.

Consequences
Loss of feed to reaction section
and reduced output.
Polymer formed in heat exchanger
under no flow conditions.

Action required
(a)Ensure good
communications with
intermediate storage
operator
(b)Install low level alarm
on settling tank LIC.

(2)J1 pump fails (motor

fault, loss of drive,
impeller corroded away
etc.)

As for (1)

(3)Line blockage, isolation

valve closed in error, or
LCV fails shut.

As for (1)
J1 pump overheats.

Covered by (b)

Covered by (b)
(c)Install kickback on J1
pump.
(d)Check design of J1
pump strainers.

(4)Line fracture

As for (1)
Hydrocarbon discharged into
area adjacent to public highway.

(1)

Covered by (b)
(e)Institute regular
patrolling & inspection
of transfer line.

Results of hazard and operability study of proposed olefine

dimerization unit: results for line section from intermediate storage to buffer/settling tank
Guide word
MORE OF

Deviation
More flow

Possible causes
(5)LCV fails open or LCV
bypass open in error.

Consequences
Settling tank overfills.

Action required
(f)Install high level alarm
on LIC and check
sizing of relief opposite
liquid overfilling.
(g)Institute locking off
procedure for LCV
bypass when not in use.

More pressure

More
temperature

(6)Isolation valve closed in

error or LCV closes, with
J1 pump running.

Incomplete separation of water

phase in tank, leading to
problems on reaction section.

(h)Extend J2 pump suction

line to 12 above tank
base.

Transfer line subjected to full

pump delivery or surge pressure.

(j)Covered by (c) except

when kickback blocked
or isolated. Check line.
FQ and flange ratings
and reduce stroking
speed of LCV if
necessary. Install a PG
upstream of LCV and
an independent PG on
settling tank.

(7)Thermal expansion in an
Line fracture or flange leak.
isolated valved section due
to fire or strong sunlight.

(k)Install thermal expansion

relief on valved section
(relief discharge route to
be decided later in study).

(8)High intermediate storage

temperature.

(l)Check whether there is

adequate warning of
high temperature at
intermediate storage. If
not, install.

Higher pressure in transfer line

and settling tank.

(2)

Results of hazard and operability atudy of proposed olefine

dimerization unit: results for line section from intermediate storage to buffer/settling tank
Guide word
LESS OF

Deviation
Less flow

Possible causes
(9)Leaking flange of valved
stub not blanked and
leaking.

Consequences
Material loss adjacent to public
highway.

Action required
Covered by (e) and the
checks in (j).

Less
temperature

(10)Winter conditions.

Water sump and drain line

freeze up.

(m)Lag water sump down

to drain valve and steam
trace drain valve and
drain line downstream.

High water
concentration
in stream.

(11)High water level in

intermediate storage
tank.

Water sump fills up more quickly.

Increased chance of water phase
passing to reaction section.

(n)Arrange for more frequent

draining off of water from
intermediate storage tank.
Install high interface level
alarm on sump.

High concentration of lower

alkanes or
alkenes in stream.

(12)Disturbance on distillation
columns upstream of
intermediate storage.

Higher system pressure.

(p)Check that design of

settling tank and associated
pipework, including relief
valve sizing, will cope with
sudden ingress of more
volatile hydrocarbons.

MORE
THAN

Organic acids
present

(13)As for (12)

Increased rate of corrosion of

tank base, sump and drain line.

(q)Check suitability of
materials of construction.

OTHER

Maintenance

(14)Equipment failure, flange

leak, etc.

Line cannot be completely

drained or purged.

(r)Install low-point drain and

N2 purge point downStream of LCV. Also
N2 vent on settling tank.

PART OF

(3)

HAZOP PREPLANNING ISSUES

Preplanning issues addressed in a typical refinery unit HAZOP include the
following:

Verification of as-built conditions shown on the P&IDs

Line segment boundaries set; markup of P&IDs
List of support documents compiled
P&IDs (base study document)
Process flow diagrams (PFDs)
Process description
Operating manuals/procedures
Processing materials information
Equipment and material specifications
Tentative schedules of time to be spent per P&IDs sheet
Recording technique (computer program or data sheet) determination
List of standard abbreviations and acronyms compiled
Criticality rankings devised
HAZOP training given to all team members (one day)
Arrange for system or process briefings for team before work begins.

HAZOP STUDY LOGISTICS

Logistical development of this refinery unit HAZOP included the
following:

Preplanning issues were addressed the prior week.

The team include three core team members and four part-time members.
The study included 16 moderately busy P&Ids.
The study took three and one-half weeks.
The team met 4 hours per day in morning review sessions and spent 2 hours
per day on individual efforts for reviews, follow-ups, and field checks.
Dedicated space was required for storing the large number of documents.
The study resulted in 170 data sheets.
The team recorder used a personal computer to record, sort, and retrieve data.
The Stone & Webster proprietary program PCHAZOPa was used.
The plant operator was the key contribution plant member of the team.
Key operating procedures were reviewed relative to the P&Ids and safe
engineering practices.