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Market Structure
Degrees of Power
Degrees of Power
Perfect
Competition
Monopolistic
Competition
Oligopoly
Number of firms
Very large
number
Many
Few
Barriers to entry
None
Low
High
Market power
(control over price
None
Some
Substantial
Type of product
Perfect
Competition
Duopoly
Monopoly
Number of firms
Very large
number
Two
One
Barriers to entry
None
High
High
Market power
(control over price
None
Substantial
Substantial
Type of product
of producers.
Size of each firm.
Barriers to entry.
Availability of substitute goods.
Concentration Ratio
Firm Size
Measurement Problems
Oligopoly Behavior
Initial Equilibrium
$1000
Market demand
Industry output
20,000
Quantity Demanded (computers per month)
Producer
Output
Market Share
Universal Electronics
8,000
40.0%
World Computers
6,500
32.5%
International
Semiconductor
5,500
27.5%
20,000
100.0%
Retaliation
up marketing efforts.
Cut prices on their product(s).
Retaliation
Retaliation
$1000
900
F
G
Market
demand
20,000
25,000
C
Demand curve facing
oligopolist if rivals
match price cuts but
not price hikes
M
A
Demand curve
facing oligopolist if
rivals don't match
price changes
8000
QUANTITY DEMANDED (computers per month)
Game Theory
Game Theory
Game Theory
value
rivals matching from price cuts
Probability of
Gain from lone
+
rivals
not
matching
price
cut
Reduce Price
Dont Reduce
Price
Reduce price
No change
Industry
average
cost
Market
demand
Profits
Average cost
at profitmaximizing
output
J
Industry marginal
revenue
Profit-maximizing output
0
Quantity (units per period)
Sticky Prices
Sticky Prices
Sticky Prices
A
F
d1
The MR gap
G
mr2
0
d2
mr1
8000 H
Quantity Demanded (computers per month)
Marginal revenue
MC2
MC1
MC3
Coordination Problems
Coordination Problems
Price Fixing
Price Leadership
Barriers to Entry
Patents
Distribution Control
Government Regulation
Nonprice Competition
Training
Network Economies
Antitrust Enforcement
Industry Behavior
Industry Behavior
Industry Structure
Objections to Antitrust
share of
HHI = firm i
i=1
2
share of share of
share of
HHI = firm 1
+
+
firm 2
firm n
Contestability