Semi-plenary session:

Role of the state in reduction/amplification of inequality

State retrenchments and class dynamics:

the new middle class under strain
Louis Chauvel
Pr at Sciences-Po University Paris
and Institut Universitaire de France

Site : http://louis.chauvel.free.fr
chauvel@sciences-po.fr
1

Explaining (some of) the French problem(s)?

Political instability, extreme right wing candidate Jean-Marie Le Pen
qualification for the 2nd turn of presidential elections April 21 2002,
rejection of the European Treaty May 29 2005, anti-globalisation
movements, populist streams, xenophobia, fears,
Yes at two European referendums in France by socio-occupational group (%)
Maastricht treaty
referendum
20 September 1992

European constitutional
treaty referendum
29 may 2005

Change

Professionals & managers

66

67

Self employed

49

Semi prof. and lower managers

55

Routine white collars

47

37

-10

Blue collar workers

43

30

-13

Tot = 51%

Tot = 46%

Diff = 23%

53
46

Diff = 37%

4
-9

Source : My own computation of CEVIPOF 1995 microdata and CSA postelectoral survey 2005.
2

Plan
Europe as a middle-class exception in the world
Objective degree of inequality and class consciousness:
paradoxical dynamics
The middle class dynamics and welfare state retrenchments
Conclusion: post-affluent societies and the middle class(es)

1. The social specificity of Europe in the world

An affluent and relatively equal club
Europe as a strong middle class (median class)
Complex evolutions during the last 20 years

60

Lesotho
Bolivia

Inequality
(Gini coeff)

Honduras

55

Nicaragua

(World
Income
Inequality50
Database)

Brazil

Paraguay
Panama
Ecuador Colombia
Guatemala
El Salvador

Chile

Data 2000

Latin America
Gambia

45

Philippines

Mexico
Peru
Costa Rica
Georgia
y = -5,6712Ln(x) + 88,851
Dom.Rep.
Venezuela
R2 = 0,3085
Thailand
Ghana Cote d`Ivoire
Jamaica
Malaysia
Cameroon
Guyana
Iran
Cambodia
Sri Lanka
Moldova
Russia
Kyrgyz R.
Tunisia
China
Tajikistan
Turkey
Morocco
Mauritania
Estonia Korea R.
Egypt
U.S.
Portugal
India
Israel
Ukraine
Lithuania
SpainU.K.
Bulgaria
Azerbaijan
Italy
Latvia
Greece
Japan
Macedonia Croatia
Bangladesh Indonesia
Ireland
Kazakhstan
Australia
Taiwan
Canada
Switzerland
Hungary
Pakistan
Poland
France
Romania
Belgium
Germany
Belarus
Austria
Luxembourg
Czech R.
Sweden Netherlands
Denmark
Slovenia
Norway
Slovak Rep.

Liberal and
Mediterranean countr.

40

35

Corporatist countr.

30

Nordic countries

25

Transitional Eastern Europe

20
1000

Finland

Development (per capita GDP PPP)

10000

(Penn World
Tables Database)

100000

The strobiloid

Income

representation of income distribution

Higher income class = rich

200
Median income class =
middle class

100
median income

50
Lower income class = poor
6

Comparisons of national strobiloids : national median

US :
Median
disposable
income per year
per capita :
32.000 $PPP/an

Brazil :
Median
disposable
income per
year per capita
: 6.900
$PPP/an

Gini coef.:
25.2 %

Gini coef.:
34.5 %

Gini coef.:
59.8 %

Median class =
84 %

Median class =
58 %

Median class =
44 %

Sweden :
Median
disposable
income per year
per capita :
23.000 $PPP/an

Median
national income

Comparisons of national strobiloids : PPP exchange rate

US :
Median disposable
income per year
per capita : 32.000
$PPP/an

Brazil :
Median
disposable income
per year per
capita : 6.900
$PPP/an

Gini coef.:
25.2 %

Gini coef.:
34.5 %

Gini coef.:
59.8 %

Median class =
84 %

Median class =
58 %

Median class =
44 %

Sweden :
Median disposable
income per year per
capita : 23.000
$PPP/an

60

Lesotho
Bolivia

Inequality
(Gini coeff)

Honduras

55

50

45

40

35

30

25

Nicaragua

Gambia

Brazil

Paraguay
Panama
Ecuador Colombia
Guatemala
El Salvador

Chile

Data 2000

Philippines

Mexico
Peru
Costa Rica
Georgia
y = -5,6712Ln(x) + 88,851
Dom.Rep.
Venezuela
R2 = 0,3085
Thailand
Ghana Cote d`Ivoire
Jamaica
Malaysia
Cameroon
Guyana
Iran
Cambodia
Sri Lanka
Moldova
Russia
Kyrgyz R.
Tunisia
China
Tajikistan
Turkey
Morocco
Mauritania
Estonia Korea R.
Egypt
U.S.
Portugal
India
Israel
Ukraine
Lithuania
SpainU.K.
Bulgaria
Azerbaijan
Italy
Latvia
Greece
Japan
Macedonia Croatia
Bangladesh Indonesia
Ireland
Kazakhstan
Australia
Taiwan
Canada
Switzerland
Hungary
Pakistan
Poland
France
Romania
Belgium
Germany
Belarus
Austria
Luxembourg
Czech R.
Sweden Netherlands
Denmark
Slovenia
Norway
Slovak Rep.
Finland

20
1000

Development (per capita GDP PPP)

10000

100000

45

Malaysia

Inequality
(Gini coeff)

y = -16,122x + 101,38
R2 = 0,3387

Russia

Data 2000

Tunisia
Turkey

40

Korea R
Portugal
35

Israel
Spain
Greece

30

Taiwan

Hungary
Poland

U.S.

U.K.
Italy
Ireland
Japan
Australia
Canada

France
Switzerland.
Belgium
Germany
Czech R. Sweden Austria
Norway
Slovenia
Denmark
Slovak Rep.
Finland Netherlands

Romania
25

Development
log10(per capita GDP PPP)
20

10
3,6

3,7

3,8

3,9

4,1

4,2

4,3

4,4

4,5

4,6

45

Costa Rica

Inequality
(Gini coeff)

Mexico

Malaysia

Russia

Tunisia

From early 1980 to 2000

Venezuela
Tunisia
Turkey

40

Korea, Republic of
Greece

Korea, Republic of
Portugal

U.S.

Portugal
35
Greece
Ireland
Spain
Israel
Hungary
Poland

30

Hungary
Romania
Poland
Taiwan Russia
25

Israel
Spain

U.K.
Italy

Ireland
Japan
Canada
Australia
Switzerland.
Italy
Canada
U.S.
Taiwan
France
France
Australia
Switzerland.
Belgium
Japan

U.K.
Germany
Austria
Czech R.Netherlands
Denmark Sweden Norway
Slovenia
Netherlands
Germany
Slovak Rep.
FinlandDenmark
Luxembourg

Slovenia

Austria
Belgium
Norway
Sweden
Finland

Czech R.

Development
log10(per capita GDP PPP)

20

11
3,6

3,7

3,8

3,9

4,1

4,2

4,3

4,4

4,5

4,6

45

Costa Rica

Inequality
(Gini coeff)

Mexico

Malaysia

Russia

Tunisia

From early 1980 to 2000

Venezuela
Tunisia
Turkey

40
Korea R

Greece

Korea R
Portugal

U.S.

Portugal
35
Greece
Ireland
Spain
Israel
Hungary
Poland

30

Hungary
Romania
Poland
Taiwan Russia
25

Israel
Spain

U.K.
Italy

Ireland
Japan
Canada
Australia
Switzerland.
Italy
Canada
U.S.
Taiwan
France
France
Australia
Switzerland.
Belgium
Japan

U.K.
Germany
Austria
Czech R.Netherlands
Denmark Sweden Norway
Slovenia
Netherlands
Germany
Slovak Rep.
FinlandDenmark
Luxembourg

Slovenia

Austria
Belgium
Norway
Sweden
Finland

Czech R.

Development
(per capita GDP - PPP)

20

12
3,6

3,7

3,8

3,9

4,1

4,2

4,3

4,4

4,5

4,6

Construction europenne et croissance des ingalits

European
enlargement
step

European Gini
(exchange rate)

European
Gini
(PPP)

29%

28%

12

32%

30%

15

31%

30%

25

42%

33%

28

58%

43%

31

59%

43%

13

2. Objective intensity of inequality and class

consciousness: paradoxical dynamics
(in the French case)
Distinction between objective and subjective class systems
Class system without class consciousness
The spiral of social classes

14

Objective and subjective intensity of class system

Number of Book Titles in the catalogue of Bibliothque nationale de France (BNF) containing
classes sociales or classe ouvrire (20-years mobile average of per decade occurrences)
100
90
80

classe ouvrire or classes sociales

70
60
50
40
30
20

classes sociales

10
0
1810- 1820- 1830- 1840- 1850- 1860- 1870- 1880- 1890- 1900- 1910- 1920- 1930- 1940- 1950- 1960- 1970- 1980- 19901819 1829 1839 1849 1859 1869 1879 1889 1899 1909 1919 1929 1939 1949 1959 1969 1979 1989 1999

Source : Bibliothque nationale de France catalogue

15

1960 to 1980 decline in income inequality and stability after

Inequality measure : Interdecile ratio D9/D1 1954 to 2002

9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
1950

1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

2010

Older Source : Paper publications : Enqute revenus fiscaux ERF ; Newer source : INSEE reevaluation 16
ERF

Independence of objective and subjective dimensions :

a typology
Weak objective degree of
inequalities

Strong objective degree of

inequalities

Strong degree of
subjectivation of
inequalities

Victory of proletariat

Class Society

Weak degree of
subjectivation of
inequalities

Classless society

Alienation

Older Source : Paper publications : Enqute revenus fiscaux ERF ; Newer source : INSEE reevaluation 17
ERF

Subjectivity of class:
consciousness
movments, and class
struggle

Victory of proletariat

Class society

F 1970

F 1950

Decommodification

F 1982

F 1890

F 1830
F 1989

F 2000
classless society

The historical social classes spiral

Recommodification
Alienation

Objectivity of class: 18
Intensity of Inequalities

3. The middle class dynamics and

Welfare state expansions and retrenchments
Back to Schmoller : the state and the new middle class(es)
Post-affluent societies:
the lost paradise of the new middle class
The fate of generational dynamics

19

The state and the new middle class

SCHMOLLER G. 1897, Was verstehen wir unter dem Mittelstande? Hat er im
19. Jahrhundert zu oder abgenommen?, Gttingen, Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht.
Against the Marxist theory of absolute pauperization :
=> Late Nineteenth century and the expansion of large state and private technical,
managerial and expertise bureaucracies supported and institutionalized by increasing
social rights foster the constitution of a culturally educated and economically
comfortable neu mittelstand
New higher
middle class

Higher
strata Old higher

middle class
Economic
Ressources

Educational
ressources

New lower
middle class

=> The state is not simply an

equalitarian ruler, a provider of
decommodified resources,
it could be also a specific employer

Old lower
middle class
Lower
Strata

20

Post-affluent societies:
the lost paradise
of the new middle class

Educational
ressources
dominant

The Bourdieu scheme

Higher
strata
Professions librales

Professeurs,
professions
scientifiques
Cadres de la IngnieursCadres
Chefs d'entreprises
fonction
pub.
administratifs
Instituteurs ou
de 10 salaris et plus
d'entreprise
assimils
Professions
Professions
Professions
intermdiaires de laintermdiaires
intermdiaires
sant et du travail administratives
administratives de la
social
entreprises
Economic
Commerants
fonction publique Techniciens Employs
Contrematres,
Employs fonc pub,
Employs
entreprises
agents de matrise
Policiers et militaires
agents de service
Artisans
Personnels des
de
Ouvriers qualifis,Ouvriers qualifisservices
directs aux
particuliers
type
industriel
manutention,
Ouvriers qualifis de
magasinage,
Chauffeurs
Ouvriers non qualif
transport
industriel
artisanal

Ressources
dominant

Ouvriers agricoles

Lower
Strata

21

1992 to 2002 densification on the Bourdieu scheme

0,2-0,3
0,1-0,2
0-0,1
-0,1-0
-0,2--0,1
-0,3--0,2
-0,4--0,3

-0,
0,1
0,3
0,2
0
4
3
2
1

-0,
0,1
0,3
0,2
0
4
3
2
1

50 to 59 Years old

30 to 39 Years old
22

Available explanations ?
Decline in the return to educational assets (and not to
economic assets) is it really a knowledge society?
State as an employer is more and more a state as a pension
system for former civil servants (strong decline in hiring for
the newer generations)
The fate of generational dynamics: the newer generations
are the children of a gifted generation (first cohorts of the
baby-boom) which was massively new middle-class, but the
newer generations have little room in the new middle-class
23

The fate of generational dynamics

Upward and downward mobility rate (cohort diagrams) - male population
Upward mob rate
Downward mob rate
35

30
25

14
Age
30
35
40
45
50

12
10

20

15

10
5

their
parents

first cohorts
of the babyboom

Age
30
35
40
45
50

their
children2
Cohorte

Cohorte
0

0
1910

1920

1930

1940

1950

1960

1970

1910

1920

1930

1940

1950

1960

1970

24

4. Conclusion:
Farewell to the new middle class?
What is ever new with new middle class, 1 century later?
A social backlash after affluence?
Which consequences?
Which are the adequate social policies:
feeding the poor (bread and circuses),
or rehomogeneisation of Europe?
Were are sociologists in terms of new/old higher/lower
middle class : are we the next slice of the salami?
25

Semi-plenary session:
Role of the state in reduction/amplification of inequality

THE END
Louis Chauvel
Pr at Sciences-Po University Paris
and Institut Universitaire de France

Site : http://louis.chauvel.free.fr
chauvel@sciences-po.fr
26