Working Some Problems

Telephone Game

Are there any pure strategy equilibria?

How about xexed strategies?

Let Winnie call with probability p and wait with probability 1-p.
For what values of w is Colleen indifferent?
Expected payoff for Colleen from calling is????
Expected payoff for Colleen from waiting is???

Listing the N.E

Let p be probability that Winnie calls and 1-p the probability
that she waits. Let q be the probability that Colleen calls and
1-q the probability that she waits.

Nash equilibria are strategy profiles.

The mixed strategy equilibria include:
a) p=0 and q=1
b) p=1 and q=0
c) p=1/4 and q=1/4

A Duel
Pitcher throws

Batter
prepares for

Fastball

Curveball

Fastball

.35,.65

.3,.7

Curveball

.2,.8

.5,.5

Does this game have any pure strategy equilibria?

A)Yes
B)No

A Duel
Pitcher throws
Batter
prepares for

Fastball

Curveball

Fastball

.35,.65

.3,.7

Curveball

.2,.8

.5,.5

In Nash equilibrium if Batter has positive probability

of using each strategy, what is the probability that
Pitcher throws a fastball?
A) 1/3
B) 2/3
C)
D) 4/7
E) 3/5

Lets go figure
In N.E, Batter will play each strategy with positive
probability only if the two strategies have the
same expected payoff for him.
Suppose Pitcher throws a fastball with probability p
and a curveball with probability 1-p.
Batters expected payoff from Prepare for Fastball is
.35p+.30(1-p)
Batters expected payoff from Prepare for curveball
is .2p+.5(1-p).
These payoffs are equal if .35p+.30(1-p)=.2p+.5(1-p).

Solve this equation for p.

A Duel
Pitcher throws
Batter
prepares for

Fastball

Curveball

Fastball

.35,.65

.3,.7

Curveball

.2,.8

.5,.5

In a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium what is the

probability that Batter prepares for a fastball?
A) 4/7
B) 3/7
C)
D) 6/7
E) 4/5

Does this game have a Nash equilibrium in which Kicker mixes left
and right but does not kick to center?

 If there is a Nash equilibrium where kicker

never kicks middle but mixes between left and
right, Goalie will never play middle but will
mix left and right (Why?)
If Goalie never plays middle but mixes left
and right, Kicker will kick middle. (Why?)
So there cant be a Nash equilibrium where
Kicker never kicks Middle. (See why?)

Problem 4: For what values of x is there a mixed strategy Nash

equilibrium in which the victim might resist or not resist and the
Mugger assigns zero probability to showing a gun?

Problem 7.7, Find mixed strategy Nash equilibria

A mixed strategy N.E. strategy does

not give positive probability
To any strictly dominated strategy
c dominates a and y dominates z
Look at reduced game without these strategies

Problem 7.7 Find mixed strategy Nash equilibia

For player 1, Bottom strictly dominates Top. Throw out Top

Then for Player 2, Middle weakly dominates Right. Therefore if
Player 1 plays bottom with positive probability, player 2 gives zero
Probability to Right.
There is no N.E. in which Player 1 plays Bottom with zero probability, (Why?)
(If he did, what would Player 2 play? Then what would 1 play?)

Problem 8, Chapter 7

A Nash equilibrium is any strategy pair in which the defense defends

against the outside run with probability .5 and the offense runs up the
middle with probability .75. No matter what the defense does,
The offense gets the same payoff from wide left or wide right,
So any probabilities pwl and pwr such that pwl+pwr=.25
will be N.E. probabilities for the offense.

Problem 10.
Each of three players is deciding between the pure
strategies go and stop. The payoff to
go is 120, where m is the number of players that
choose go, and the payoff to stop is 55 m
(which is received regardless of what the other players
do). Find all Nash equilibria in mixed strategies.
Lets find the easy ones.
Are there any symmetric pure strategy equilibria?

How about asymmetric pure strategy equilibria?

How about symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium?
Solve 40p^2+60*2p(1-p)+120(1-p)2=55
40p2-120p+65=0

What about equilibria where one guy is in for sure and other
two enter with identical mixed strategies?

For mixed strategy guys who both

Enter with probability p, expected payoff from entering is
(120/3)p+(120/2)(1-p). They are indifferent about entering or not if
40p+60(1-p)=55. This happens when p=1/4.
This will be an equilibrium if when the other two guys enter with
Probability , the remaining guy is better off entering than not.
Payoff to guy who enters for sure is:
40*(1/16)+60*(3/8)+120*(9/16)=92.5>55.

Advanced Rock-Paper-Scissors

Rock

Paper

Scissors

Rock

0,0

-1,1

2,-2

Paper

1,-1

0,0

-1,1

Scissors

-2,2

1,-1

0,0

Are there pure strategy Nash equilibria?

Is there a symmetric mixed strategy Nash equilibrium?
What is it?

Remember: Midterm on Thursday

Chapters 2-5 and 7
No need to bring bluebooks.
Calculators and phones not allowed