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Comprised of
$1.005 trillion
$2.076 trillion in derivatives, ie
$362 billion in outright forwards
$1.714 trillion in forex swaps
Currency Turnover
Exchange Rates
Forward premium
Options
Right to buy or sell at set price (strike price)
dollars
or
Ft et
i i*
et
1 i*
Ft et
et
C
B
-0.04
-0.04
i i*
1 i*
0.04
PU
Ft et
et
C
B
-0.04
-0.04
i i*
1 i*
0.04
CIPC
Take logs of both sides of CIPC
or, for small i
versus
CIPC involves no currency risk
UIPC bears currency risk
Holds only if agents are risk neutral
Risk averse agents may require a risk premium
Notice that if
Efficient Markets
Example of Efficient Markets Hypothesis
Investors use available information efficiently
Does not mean they are ex post correct, only
that prices reflect all available current
information in an efficient manner
Unbiased errors
If I am efficient my error pattern looks like that of
Tiger Woods
Of course, the variance of my pattern is greater, but we
are both on target on average
Market Efficiency
et 1
should be an
Ft
Testing UIPC
So if I estimate
et 1 Ft X t t
Xt
where
of, and
t
is any variable you can think
is a random error
I should find
That is, all the information valuable
et 1
for predicting
is incorporated in
Ft
the market
price,
Testing UIPC
Typically one actually regresses changes,
so
With null hypotheses
Notice this is a joint test
REH and UIPC
So rejection could mean either
Expectations are not rational
UIPC does not hold (perhaps agents are not risk neutral)
Tests of UICP
Most tests find forward premium puzzle
Not only is
1
negative
Central Banks
Central Banks move exchange rates in short
run
They could set policy based on observations of F
E.g., intervene when risk premium rises
Seems that when CBs intervene heavily the forward
discount increases
Longer Horizons
Risk Premium
But time varying risk premia hard to observe
To explain
Why would this be the case (assertion, see notes for explanation)?
DXY Index
With payoff
So if
my profit would be
Carry Trade
Suppose we did this via dollar-yen
September 1993 till August 2003
.6 to
Carry trade is a bet against arbitrage,
on1.1lower
volatility
Example
Example
Example: Japanese yen and Australian dollar
2001: steady increase in profits from carry trades.
Despite several months of positive carry profits, the
yen did not sufficiently appreciate against the
Australian dollar to offset these profits.
Summary
Obviously if large institutions do this
losses could be huge. Duh!
Even if expected returns from arbitrage
are equal to zero, actual profits are
often not equal to zero.
Returns (profits/losses) are persistent.
Returns are volatile/risky.
Price Pressure
Bid-ask spreads reduce size of profits
Large amounts of speculation needed to earn money
Speculator who be one pound on an equally-weighted portfolio
of carry-trade strategies (across the USA, Canada, Belgium,
France, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, Switzerland and the
euro) from 1976 to 2005 would earn an monthly payoff of
0.0025 pounds.
To earn an average annual payoff of 1 million pounds would
require a bet of 33.33 million pounds per month.
Is there an effect of such large trades?
Would they survive such speculation?
Prices rise with order flow
Could eat profits
You could break up trades, but this chews up profits as well
The marginal expected payoff can be zero, even when the
average payoff is positive
Speculators make profits but no money is left on the table
Limits of Arbitrage
Returns positive for
currencies
Very high volatility of
returns
Sharpe ratios < 1
Equal to 0.5 0.6 for
market portfolio of
currencies
Differs little from stock
market
Peso Problems
Example
Suppose peso is pegged to dollar
Let iUS .05
Then UIPC implies
Volatility Puzzle
so
RIPC
So, using the Fisher equation we obtain:
This implies that real interest differentials are equal
to expected changes in Q
Suppose people expect e
Q 0
Implies real value of the dollar will decline
Investors will demand a premium to hold US assets
RIPC Interpreted
Real interest differentials reflect nominal rates ' s
deflated by
over different consumption baskets
If agents were identical => PPP, so differences equalized
Because people in different countries consume different
baskets of goods, there is no way for them to arbitrage
away any difference.
Foreign Exchange
If CB does not intervene, then market price
of foreign exchange is
Suppose demand for foreign exchange
increases
Then if CB does nothing, e must rise
To keep e fixed CB must sell foreign exchange
So international reserves fall
Thus,
where
is the fixed exchange rate
Notice that exchange rate can also be affected by
policy
By affecting demand or supply
Time to Collapse
Suppose that the peg is unsustainable
When reserves run out the rate must
e%
collapse to
Collapse
Exchange rate collapses before reserves run out
Nobody wants to be the last person to exit
If agents are forward looking they anticipate capital
losses
So currency cannot collapse and then jump to shadow rate
No Sterilization
Start with the CBs balance sheet
Example
Central bank balance sheet
condition:
Example:
Suppose the government purchases 500
million in domestic bonds and 500 million in
foreign assets (reserves).
Money supply is therefore equal to 1000
million pesos.
4 cases
1. purchase from home-country banks:
Sterilization
Sterilization occurs when the CB moves to
insulate the domestic economy from foreign
reserve transactions
Typically an open market operation: if inflows of foreign
exchange are swelling the money supply then the CB
sells bonds to soak it up, e.g.,
Notice that to persist in sterilization requires large
stocks of both foreign reserves and domestic securities.
obviously difficult for debtor, what about for surplus
case?
Need to keep selling DS, but how much will the public
buy?
Depends on how financially developed the economy
Interest cost of sterilization can be large
IR
P
i0
i1
L(Y, i)
M/ P
Impossible Trinity
We see that a country cannot simultaneously have:
Independent monetary policy
Fixed exchange rate
Capital mobility
Time of Collapse
Reserve Flow