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Chapter 9

Oligopoly and Firm Architecture */

Oligopoly and Market Concentration


Oligopoly Models
Efficiency Implications of Oligopoly
The Sales Maximization Model
The Architecture of the Ideal Firm

*/ the way the firm is organized, operates, responds to changes


in markets: in core competencies, a flat structure, short lines of
Command, highly specialized, producing new products
Prepared by Robert F. Brooker, Ph.D.

Copyright 2004 by South-Western, a division of Thomson Learning. All rights reserved.

Slide 1

Bab 9
Oligopoli dan Bentuk Perusahaan */

Oligopoli dan Konsentrasi Pasar


Model Oligopoli
Dampak Efisiensi dari Oligopoli
Model Penjualan Maksimum
Pengembangan Perusahaan yg Ideal

*/ bagaimana perus. diorganisasi, bekerja menjawab perobahan di


pasar: kemampuan intinya, struktur datar, hubungan singkat dalam
komando. spesialisasi khusus, memproduksi produk baru.
Prepared by Robert F. Brooker, Ph.D.

Copyright 2004 by South-Western, a division of Thomson Learning. All rights reserved.

Slide 2

Oligopoly
Few sellers of a homogeneous (= pure
oligopoly) or differentiated product
Nonprice competition > based on advertising,
services, product differentiation

Barriers to entry
Duopoly: Two sellers only
Pure oligopoly : Homogeneous product
Differentiated oligopoly : Differentiated product
Prepared by Robert F. Brooker, Ph.D.

Copyright 2004 by South-Western, a division of Thomson Learning. All rights reserved.

Slide 3

Oligopoli
Sedikit penjual dari satu produk yang sama
atau berbeda (terdiferensiasi)
Persaingan non-harga > berdasarkan iklan,
pelayanan, pembedaan produk

Hambatan untuk masuk berusaha


Duopoly: hanya dua penjual saja
Pure oligopoly : produk homogen (baja, aluminium)
Differentiated oligopoly : produk terdiferensiasi (mobil,
rokok, sabun, minuman segar, deterjen)
Prepared by Robert F. Brooker, Ph.D.

Copyright 2004 by South-Western, a division of Thomson Learning. All rights reserved.

Slide 4

Sources of Oligopoly
Economies of scale
Large capital investment required

(automobiles,

aluminum, steel industries)

Patented production processes (own a patent)


Brand loyalty (based on quality & service)
Control of a raw material or resource
Government franchise ( to only a few firms = barriers)
Limit pricing (a low price to discourage entry)
Sacrifice SR profits in order to maximize LR profits

Prepared by Robert F. Brooker, Ph.D.

Copyright 2004 by South-Western, a division of Thomson Learning. All rights reserved.

Slide 5

Sumber Terjadinya Oligopoli


Skala ekonomi yang besar
Membutuhkan investasi modal besar

(industri mobil, aluminum,

baja)

Produksi dengan hak paten (memilik patent)


Pelanggan setia (berdasarkan mutu dan pelayanan)
Kontrol terhadap bahan baku
Pemerintah memberikan hak monopoly ( bag sedikit
perusahaan = hambatan)

Pembatasan harga (harga yg rendah utk menghambat masuk)


Mengorbankan laba SR untuk memaksimumkan laba LR.
Prepared by Robert F. Brooker, Ph.D.

Copyright 2004 by South-Western, a division of Thomson Learning. All rights reserved.

Slide 6

Measures of Oligopoly
Concentration Ratios: percentage of total sales
(4, 8, or 12 largest firms in an industry) p.367

Indeks Herfindahl (H)

p. 368

H = Sum of the squared market shares of all


firms in an industry H = 90 + 10 (if 2 firms 90% & 10%)

Theory of Contestable Markets


If entry is absolutely free and exit is entirely
costless then firms will operate as if they are
perfectly competitive > an airline leave the market > to
other routes

Prepared by Robert F. Brooker, Ph.D.

Copyright 2004 by South-Western, a division of Thomson Learning. All rights reserved.

Slide 7

Pengukuran Oligopoli
Rasio Konsentrasi: persentase dari total penjualan
(4, 8, atau 12 perus. terbesar di dalam industri) p.367

Herfindahl Index (H)

p. 368

H = Jumlah pangkat dua pangsa pasar dari seluruh


perus dalam suatu industri H = 90 + 10 (if 2 firms 90% & 10%)

Teori Pasar Bersaing


Jika masuk betul-betul bebas dan keluar biayanya
tidak ada maka perus. akan beroperasi selagi mereka
bersaing sempurna > sebuah penerbangan meninggalkan pasar >
ke rute lain

Prepared by Robert F. Brooker, Ph.D.

Copyright 2004 by South-Western, a division of Thomson Learning. All rights reserved.

Slide 8

Cournot Model
Proposed by Augustin Cournot
Behavioral assumption

(160 years ago)

Firms maximize profits under the assumption


that market rivals will not change their rates of
production. See Figure 9-1

Bertrand Model
Firms assume that their market rivals will not
change their prices.

Prepared by Robert F. Brooker, Ph.D.

Copyright 2004 by South-Western, a division of Thomson Learning. All rights reserved.

Slide 9

Model Cournot
Diusulkan oleh Augustin Cournot
Asumsi Tingkah-laku

(160 years ago)

Perus. memaksimumkan laba dengan asumsi


bahwa pesaing tidak merobah tingkat produksinya.
See Figure 9-1

Model Bertrand
Perus. mengasumsikan bahwa pesaing tidak
merobah harganya.

Prepared by Robert F. Brooker, Ph.D.

Copyright 2004 by South-Western, a division of Thomson Learning. All rights reserved.

Slide 10

Cournot Model
Example
Two firms (duopoly)
Identical products
Marginal cost is zero
Initially Firm A has a monopoly and then
Firm B enters the market

Prepared by Robert F. Brooker, Ph.D.

Copyright 2004 by South-Western, a division of Thomson Learning. All rights reserved.

Slide 11

Model Cournot
Contoh
Dua perusahaan (duopoli)
Produk sama
Marginal cost sama dengan nol
Awalnya Perusahaan A memonopoli dan
kemudian Perusahaan B masuk ke pasar.

Prepared by Robert F. Brooker, Ph.D.

Copyright 2004 by South-Western, a division of Thomson Learning. All rights reserved.

Slide 12

Cournot Model
Adjustment process
Entry by Firm B reduces the demand for
Firm As product
Firm A reacts by reducing output, which
increases demand for Firm Bs product
Firm B reacts by increasing output, which
reduces demand for Firm As product
Firm A then reduces output further
This continues until equilibrium is attained
Prepared by Robert F. Brooker, Ph.D.

Copyright 2004 by South-Western, a division of Thomson Learning. All rights reserved.

Slide 13

Model Cournot
Proses Penyesuaian
Masuknya Perus. B mengurangi permintaan produk
perus. A
Perus. A bertindak dengan mengurangi output, yang
menaikkan permintaan produk perus. B
Perus. B bertindak dengan manaikkan produksi,
yang mengurangi permintaan produk perus. A
Perus. A kemudian terus mengurangi output
Keadaaan ini berlanjut sampai tercapainya
keseimbangan.
Prepared by Robert F. Brooker, Ph.D.

Copyright 2004 by South-Western, a division of Thomson Learning. All rights reserved.

Slide 14

Figure 9-1

Cournot Model

p. 369

At point E each duopolist


Sells Q =4 and P = 4
Compet equil:
P=$0 & Q=12

MC = 0
Prepared by Robert F. Brooker, Ph.D.

Copyright 2004 by South-Western, a division of Thomson Learning. All rights reserved.

Slide 15

Figure 9-1

Model Cournot

p. 369

Pd titik E setiap duopolist


menjual Q =4 dan P = 4

P=$0 & Q=12

MC = 0
Prepared by Robert F. Brooker, Ph.D.

Copyright 2004 by South-Western, a division of Thomson Learning. All rights reserved.

Slide 16

Cournot Model
Equilibrium
Firms are maximizing profits
simultaneously
The market is shared equally among the
firms
Price is above the competitive equilibrium
($0) and below the monopoly equilibrium
($6) see Figure 9.1

Prepared by Robert F. Brooker, Ph.D.

Copyright 2004 by South-Western, a division of Thomson Learning. All rights reserved.

Slide 17

Model Cournot
Keseimbangan
Perus. Secara bersamaan memaksimumkan
laba
Pasar terbagi sama diantara perus.
Harga diatas keseimbangan bersaing ($0)
dan dibawah keseimbangan monopoli ($6)
see Figure 9.1

Prepared by Robert F. Brooker, Ph.D.

Copyright 2004 by South-Western, a division of Thomson Learning. All rights reserved.

Slide 18

Kinked Demand Curve Model


Proposed by Paul Sweezy (1939)
If an oligopolist raises price, other firms
will not follow, so demand will be elastic
If an oligopolist lowers price, other firms
will follow, so demand will be inelastic
Implication is that demand curve will be
kinked, MR will have a discontinuity, and
oligopolists will not change price when
marginal cost changes
Prepared by Robert F. Brooker, Ph.D.

Copyright 2004 by South-Western, a division of Thomson Learning. All rights reserved.

Slide 19

Model Kurva Demand Terpatah


Diajukan oleh Paul Sweezy (1939)
Jika satu oligopolis menaikkan harga,
perusahaan lain tidak mengikuti
permintaan jadi elastis
Jika harga diturunkan, perusahaan lain akan
mengikuti, sehingga permintaan jadi inelastis
Dampaknya kurva permintaan akan patah,
MR akan terputus, dan oligopolist tdk akan
merobah harga jika MC berobah.
Prepared by Robert F. Brooker, Ph.D.

Copyright 2004 by South-Western, a division of Thomson Learning. All rights reserved.

Slide 20

Figure 9-2

Kinked Demand Curve Model


Demand curve = ABC has a kink at $6 and Q = 40
MR = AGEHJ the best level of output = 40 units
at point E any shift in MC curve would leave
price and output unchanged.

Prepared by Robert F. Brooker, Ph.D.

Copyright 2004 by South-Western, a division of Thomson Learning. All rights reserved.

Slide 21

Figure 9-2

Model Kurva Permintaan Terpatah


Kurva oermintaan = ABC patah pd harga $6 dan Q = 40
MR = AGEHJ jumlah output terbaik = 40 units pada
titik E pergeseran kurva MC mengakibatkan
harga dan produksi tidak berobah.

Prepared by Robert F. Brooker, Ph.D.

Copyright 2004 by South-Western, a division of Thomson Learning. All rights reserved.

Slide 22

Cartels
Collusion

Milk, Air Transportation, Taxi

Cooperation among firms to restrict


competition in order to increase profits

Market-Sharing Cartel
Collusion to divide up markets: geograph. area

Centralized Cartel

OPEC

Formal agreement among member firms to set


a monopoly price and restrict output
See Figure 9-3

Prepared by Robert F. Brooker, Ph.D.

Copyright 2004 by South-Western, a division of Thomson Learning. All rights reserved.

Slide 23

Kartel
Kolusi

susu, angkutan udara, Taxi

Kerjasama diantara perus. Utk membatasi


persaingan dengan tujuan meningkatkan laba

Kartel Pembagian Pasar


Kolusi utk membagi pasar: wilayah geografis

Kartel Terpusat

OPEC

Kesepakatan formal diantara anggota perus. Utk


menentukan harga monopoli dan membatasi output
See Figure 9-3

Prepared by Robert F. Brooker, Ph.D.

Copyright 2004 by South-Western, a division of Thomson Learning. All rights reserved.

Slide 24

Centralized Cartel
D = total mkt demand curve; MR = for two firms; E MC = sum of two
MC centralized authority set P = $8 and Q = 50 1
see profit of Firm 1 and 2.

Prepared by Robert F. Brooker, Ph.D.

2a

Copyright 2004 by South-Western, a division of Thomson Learning. All rights reserved.

Slide 25

Kartel Terpusat
D = kurva total permintaan pasar, MR = utk kedua perus.; E MC = jumlah
Dari dua MC otoritas terpusat menetapkan P = $8 and Q = 50
Lihat laba perus.1 and 2.
1

Prepared by Robert F. Brooker, Ph.D.

2a

Copyright 2004 by South-Western, a division of Thomson Learning. All rights reserved.

Slide 26

Price Leadership
Implicit Collusion
Price Leader (Barometric Firm)
Largest, dominant, or lowest cost firm in
the industry
Demand curve is defined as the market
demand curve less supply by the followers

Followers
Take market price as given and behave as
perfect competitors
Prepared by Robert F. Brooker, Ph.D.

Copyright 2004 by South-Western, a division of Thomson Learning. All rights reserved.

Slide 27

Pemimpin Harga
Kolusi Implisit
Pemimpin Harga (Barometer Perus.)
Terbesar, dominan, atau biaya perus. terendah
dalam industri
Permintaan pasar ditentukan saat kurva
permintaan pasar rendahnya supply oleh
pengikut

Pengikut
Mengambil harga pasar apa adanya dan
bertindak sebagai pesaing sempurna.
Prepared by Robert F. Brooker, Ph.D.

Copyright 2004 by South-Western, a division of Thomson Learning. All rights reserved.

Slide 28

Price Leadership

Prepared by Robert F. Brooker, Ph.D.

Copyright 2004 by South-Western, a division of Thomson Learning. All rights reserved.

Slide 29

Pemimpin Harga

Prepared by Robert F. Brooker, Ph.D.

Copyright 2004 by South-Western, a division of Thomson Learning. All rights reserved.

Slide 30

Efficiency of Oligopoly
Price is usually greater then long-run
average cost (LAC)
Quantity produced usually does
correspond to minimum LAC
Price is usually greater than long-run
marginal cost (LMC)
When a differentiated product is
produced, too much may be spent on
advertising and model changes
Prepared by Robert F. Brooker, Ph.D.

Copyright 2004 by South-Western, a division of Thomson Learning. All rights reserved.

Slide 31

Efisiensi Oligopoli
Har ga lebih besar dari biaya rata-rata
LR (LAC)
Jumlah diproduksi umumnya
berhubungan dengan LAC terendah
Harga biasanya lebih besar dpd biaya
marginal LR (LMC)
Jika satu produk berbeda diproduksi,
terlalu banyak akan dikeluarkan untuk
iklan dan perobahan model .
Prepared by Robert F. Brooker, Ph.D.

Copyright 2004 by South-Western, a division of Thomson Learning. All rights reserved.

Slide 32

Sales Maximization Model


Proposed by William Baumol
Managers seek to maximize sales, after
ensuring that an adequate rate of return
has been earned, rather than to
maximize profits
Sales (or total revenue, TR) will be at a
maximum when the firm produces a
quantity that sets marginal revenue
equal to zero (MR = 0)
Prepared by Robert F. Brooker, Ph.D.

Copyright 2004 by South-Western, a division of Thomson Learning. All rights reserved.

Slide 33

Model Penjualan Maksimum


Diajukan oleh William Baumol
Manajer berupaya memaksimumkan
penjualan, setelah yakin bahwa tingkat
keuntungan yang cukup sudah tercapai,
dari pada memaksimumkan laba.
Penjualan (total penerimaan, TR) akan
pada tingkat maksimum jika perus.
Memproduksi suatu jumlah yang
menghasilkan penerimaan marginal sama
dengan nol (MR = 0)
Prepared by Robert F. Brooker, Ph.D.

Copyright 2004 by South-Western, a division of Thomson Learning. All rights reserved.

Slide 34

Sales Maximization Model


MR = 0
where
Q = 50
MR = MC
where
Q = 40

Prepared by Robert F. Brooker, Ph.D.

Copyright 2004 by South-Western, a division of Thomson Learning. All rights reserved.

Slide 35

Model Penjualan Maksimum


MR = 0
dimana
Q = 50
MR = MC
dimana
Q = 40

Prepared by Robert F. Brooker, Ph.D.

Copyright 2004 by South-Western, a division of Thomson Learning. All rights reserved.

Slide 36

Global Oligopolists
Impetus toward globalization
Advances in telecommunications and
transportation
Globalization of tastes
Reduction of barriers to international trade

Prepared by Robert F. Brooker, Ph.D.

Copyright 2004 by South-Western, a division of Thomson Learning. All rights reserved.

Slide 37

Oligopolis Global
Penggerak ke globalisasi
Majunya telekomunikasi dan transportasi
Globalisai selera
Pengurangan hambatan dalam
perdagangan internasional

Prepared by Robert F. Brooker, Ph.D.

Copyright 2004 by South-Western, a division of Thomson Learning. All rights reserved.

Slide 38

Architecture of the Ideal Firm

Core Competencies
Outsourcing of Non-Core Tasks
Learning Organization
Efficient and Flexible
Integrates Physical and Virtual
Real-Time Enterprise

Prepared by Robert F. Brooker, Ph.D.

Copyright 2004 by South-Western, a division of Thomson Learning. All rights reserved.

Slide 39

Cara Pengembangan Perusahaan Ideal


Kompetensi Inti
Mensubkontrakkan yg bukan tugas
utama
Pembelajaran berorganisasi
Efisen dan Fleksibel
Mengintegrasikan secra fisik dan maya
Perusahaan yag bisa segera bereaksi
Prepared by Robert F. Brooker, Ph.D.

Copyright 2004 by South-Western, a division of Thomson Learning. All rights reserved.

Slide 40

Extending the Firm


Virtual Corporation
Temporary network of independent
companies working together to exploit a
business opportunity

Relationship Enterprise
Strategic alliances
Complementary capabilities and resources
Stable longer-term relationships
Prepared by Robert F. Brooker, Ph.D.

Copyright 2004 by South-Western, a division of Thomson Learning. All rights reserved.

Slide 41

Perluasan Perusahaan
Perusahaan Maya
Jaringan kerja sementara dari perusahaan yang
tidak ada hubungan, kemudian bekerja sama untuk
mengambil keuntungan dari kesempatan yang ada

Perusahaan Saling-terkait
Aliansi Strategis dari perus independent utk
mengembangkan kemampuan
Saling melengkapi kemampuan & resources
Hubungan yang stabil dalam jangka pajang

Prepared by Robert F. Brooker, Ph.D.

Copyright 2004 by South-Western, a division of Thomson Learning. All rights reserved.

Slide 42