Strategy and Nuclear

Weapons
National
National Security
Goals Strategy
Global Environment
But: technology influences strategy

Developments and Debates

Early 20th century: Airpower
Mid to late 20th century: nuclear
weapons
21st century: cyberweapons

US Strategy to 1890s
Total War: Richmond 1865

1890s: Naval Power

Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840-1914)

The Rise of Airpower:

20th century
Two Views
Airpower is a novelty
Airpower is decisive
Giulio Douhet (Italy)
William Mitchell (US)

WW II Strategic Bombing
Tokyo May 9-19, 1945

Dresden (1945)

August 6, 1945 Hiroshima

Hiroshima
Before

After

August 9, 1945 Nagasaki

Nagasaki: Before and After

The Absolute Weapon

Bernard Brodie, The Absolute
Weapon, 1946

First Nuclear
Age, 1945-90s

Second Nuclear Age,

1990s to present

1. Bipolarity

1.Multipolarity

balance

asymmetry

2. Deterrence
vulnerability

3. Arms Control
Managing
rivalry

4. Rationality

2.Deterrence
missile defense

3.Arms Control
coercion

4.Rationality

First Nuclear Age 194590s

1.Bipolarity
balance

2.Deterrence
vulnerability

3.Arms Control
Managing rivalry

4.Rationality

1. Bipolarity
An Arms Race
Spiral theory

US and USSR rough equality

Balance of power
Triad
ICBMs
SLBMs
Bombers

ICBM
Intercontinental Ballistic
Missile

SLBM Submarinelaunched Ballistic Missile

Launch Tube Hatches on USS

Alabama

Strategic Bombers

Two Arms Races by

1960s
1. Offense-offense
2. Offense-defense

Early ABM Systems

Johnson Administration:
Sentinel

2. Deterrence
Strategies of Deterrence
1.Warfighting
JFK: Flexible Response
Nixon: Limited Nuclear Options:
NSDM-242
Carter: Countervailing Strategy:
PD-59
Reagan: Prevailing Strategy:
NSDD-13

MIRVs
Multiple Independently Targeted
Reentry Vehicles

Strategies of Deterrence
2. Assured Destruction
Deterrence = Second Strike
capability
Balance of Terror
Albert Wohlstetter, Foreign Affairs,
Vol. 37, No. 2 (January 1959): 211234

Soviet First Strike: Successful: USSR

wins

US Second strike

US

USSR

US Second Strike
Capability
Soviet First Strike
US Second strike
Scenario: Everyone Dies

US

USSR

US and Soviet Nuclear Arsen

US Strategic Nuclear Forces
als
ICBM
Bombers

SLBM

195 0launchers/warheads
0
0
0 launchers/warheads

0
462
launchers/warheads

330

1960 12

12

32

32

1515

3083

1970 1054

1244

656

1552

390

3339

1980 1054

2144

512

5056

376

3568

1990 1000

2440

608

5312

267

4648

2000 550

2000

432

3456

73

1376

2013 450

500

288

1152

60

300

US and Soviet Nuclear Arsen

USSR/Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces
als
ICBM
Bombers

SLBM

195 0launchers/warheads
0
0
6 launchers/warheads

launchers/warheads
0
40

120

1960 2

30

30

121

354

1970 1472

1472

317

287

157

568

1980 1338

5362

990

1558

157

568

1990 1297

6857

908

2900

127

1402

2000 756

3540

348

1576

112

790

2013 326

1050

160

624

72

810

Sources:
Bulletin of Atomic Scientists
Nuclear Notebook
Natural Resources defense Council
Archive of Nuclear Data

3. Arms Control

Management of the arms race

Cut costs
Increase predictability
Increase transparency
Essential equivalence

Strategic Nuclear Weapons

Treaties
Cold War Era
SALT I
Interim Agreement on Offensive Ar
ms 1972
ABM Treaty 1972

SALT II Agreement 1979

Strategic Nuclear Weapons

Treaties
End of the Cold War
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
(START) I 1991
START II 1993

Strategic Nuclear Weapons

Treaties
Post-Cold War Era
Strategic Offensive Reductions
Treaty (SORT) 2002
New START Treaty 2010

Critics of Arms Control

Soviet ICBM Superiority?
Window of Vulnerability
US

launche
rs

warhead Soviet launche

s
rs

warhea
ds

Titan

54

54

SS-17

108

432

Minuteman
II

450

450

SS-18

308

3,080

Minuteman
III

550

1,650

SS-19

330

1,980

Total

1,054

2,154

Total

746

5,492

Solutions to Window of
Vulnerability

Nixon to Reagan
1. Mobile Missiles

MX Multiple Protective Shelters

system

Solutions to Window of
Vulnerability

Reagan to present
2. Missile Defense
Reagans SDI speech,

March 23, 1983

4. Rationality
The logic of parity/equality
The logic of deterrence
The logic of management of the
arms race
STRATEGIC STABILITY