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COUNTER-TERRORISM
Counter-terrorism is the use of personnel and
resources to deter, preempt, disrupt, or
destroy terrorists and their support
networks. It can include diplomacy, law
enforcement, military and other options.
The prefix "counter" in words such as counter-terrorism,
counterintelligence, and counterespionage is intended to
mean that any effort taken will be proactive, aggressive
and offensive, as opposed to any reactive or simply
defensive strategy which might be implied by other terms
such as anti-terrorism or responding to terrorism.
BEING PROACTIVE
There are a variety of policy options in
counter-terrorism, but outside of
prevention (in the form of secondary target
hardening), few experts recommend
conciliation, restraint, isolationism, or
ignoring the problem.
Soft Approaches
Diplomacy
Negotiation
Social Reform
Good Intelligence Analysis
Hard Approaches
Law Enforcement Options
Military Options (including Preemption)
CIA style Black Bag Jobs (Black Ops)
DIPLOMACY
Diplomacy is defined as the ordered conduct of
relations between one group of human
beings and another group alien to
themselves.
The primary purpose of diplomacy is
communications, and the ultimate goal of
diplomacy is peace.
Diplomacy, as it is practiced today, can be
considered a method of conflict
transformation.
What is a Diplomat?
Diplomats carry letters of credentials and full
powers signed by a President or Secretary of
State to act on behalf of a nation (or group).
However, this does not bind their country until any
agreement has gone through an acceptance
process (like passage in a legislature, signature
by a President, Prime Minister, or dictator.
Uses of Diplomacy
The most common uses of diplomacy in counterterrorism
include:
1. Developing bilateral or multilateral anti-terrorist policies.
2. Arranging for the sharing of intelligence.
3. Arranging permission for law enforcement authorities from
one country to come in and arrest (or interrogate) a
suspected terrorist in another country; or rendition.
4. Establishment of appropriate sanctions on sponsors of
terrorism.
Evaluation of Diplomacy
Diplomacy is the most frequently used
and most successfully used form of
counterterrorism.
It requires the least amount of resources
among all the counterterrorism strategies.
Diplomatic Successes
Some famous cases where diplomacy worked in
the terrorist context include:
Ending the OPEC hostage crisis at Vienna in
1975.
Arranging a prisoner exchange with Lebanese
hijackers in 1985.
Catching Carlos the Jackal in 1994.
Getting the IRA to agree to a laying down of
arms in 1998 (and subsequent breakthroughs).
And numerous cease-fire agreements between
Israelis and Palestinians from 2001-2003
(although they always eventually failed).
NEGOTIATION AS COUNTERTERRORISM
Conventional wisdom holds that it is
never wise to negotiate with terrorists
or to concede to their demands, at least
while they are still engaging in
violence.
In fact, the U.S. and many of its allies are
formally committed to a policy of "no
negotiation" with terrorists (although they
have made exceptions, generally to their
regret).
Possible Concessions
Provision of top-notch legal services and a public court forum to air their cause
Examples of Negotiation
A countless number of ransom payments have been
made by governments, corporations, and families to
terrorists.
Numerous prisoner exchanges, prisoner releases,
and even mass releases of prisoners have been made
throughout history, and the U.S. has been party to it.
For all its tough talk, Israel has engaged in almost as
many concessions as crackdowns. It has gotten
them little.
It solves a short-term problem (like getting a hostage
released), but it contributes to the long-term problem
of terrorism.
The money from the gun sale was used to support anti-Sandinista forces
in Latin America. Iran, for its part, came through and successfully
pressured the terrorists to release the hostages in Lebanon.
Shortly after, however, more American hostages were seized by the same
terrorist group, among others, and the U.S. suffered a major credibility
problem in Latin America from which it has not since recovered.
Iran-Contra is just one example of things gone horribly wrong, but in all
fairness, it is up to history to decide if short-term expediency options are
worth the long-term costs.
Evaluating Negotiation
The best that can be said about negotiating
with terrorists is that concessions are
only marginally effective (and for the
most part, bad ideas), but they might be
conceivably useful under some very
specific historical circumstances where
they don't reward terrorism or create
credibility problems.
INTELLIGENCE
An Intelligence policy means to
increase intelligence budgets so as to
detect terrorist plots before they are
carried out and to help catch terrorists
should they succeed in an attack.
Human Intelligence
Signals (Electronic) Intelligence
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Capability Indicators
Lethal Agents:
1. Biological
2. Nuclear or radiological
3. Chemical
4. Conventional bombing/explosion
5. Hijacking
6. Hostage taking/kidnapping
7. Assassination
8. Firearms
10. Knives/blades
11. Computers
Delivery Methods:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
Ground based
Water vessel/scuba
Aircraft
Missile
Suicide/Human host
Mail/Postal service
Food/Beverage/Water supply
Gaseous
Intention Indicators
1. Weapons or material movement
2. Terrorist travel
3. Terrorist training
4. Significant events and dates
5. Increased Propaganda levels
6. Surveillance of targets
7. Tests of security
Vulnerability Indicators
1. Low current security posture
2. Number of people in a target area
3. Significance of target
4. Specific facility vulnerabilities
5. Inability to deter or disrupt
6. Level of cooperation with U.S.
7. Significant events and dates
Evaluation of Intelligence
Traditional law enforcement methods are not all that
effective when it comes to the investigation or
intelligence of terrorism.
"We should not be constrained by Boy Scout ethics in an
immoral world."
-Kenneth AdelmanWe must keep some muscle in the back alley, willing to do
some ugly business, if we are going to detect and
prevent terrorism.
DETERRENCE
Deterrence is about how to get an opponent to NOT do
something due to some threatened consequence for
doing it or minimizing chances of a successful
attack by the terrorists.
Building up fortifications
Improving security
Threatening retaliation (or carrying it out)
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How to do Deterrence
Creation of technology based barriers
Stricter Laws and Penalties
Hardening potential targets
Building up Military Defenses
All intended to reduce probability of a successful
terror attack.
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Evaluation of Deterrence
While ordinary street crime is often deterred by crackdowns,
target hardening, denying opportunity, and aggressive security
(with known displacement patterns), terrorism frequently
defies deterrence because they don't seek targets of
opportunity, but symbolic targets.
As a group, terrorists are very team-oriented, and often prepared for
suicide missions.
On the other hand, ordinary criminals are undisciplined, untrained, and
oriented toward escape. Terrorists are just the opposite. They have
prepared for their mission, are willing to take risks, and are attackoriented. If captured, they will usually not confess or snitch on
others as ordinary criminals do.
Traditional law enforcement methods are not all that effective when it
comes to the investigation or intelligence of terrorism.
PREEMPTION
Attacking the enemy before they strike us.
It need not mean that the enemys attack is
imminent.
Bush Preemption Doctrine (Eligibility):
Non-Democracy
Have or seeking WMDs
Ties to Terrorism
[Eligible nations in 2001: Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, North
Korea, Syria]
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Paul Wolfowitz
[Architect of the Bush Preemption Doctrine]
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EFFECTIVENESS of POLICIES
In Descending order of Effectiveness (According to
some studies):
1.
Diplomacy
2.
Intelligence
3.
Preemption
4.
SUBSTITUTION EFFECT
As one counter-terrorism policy (strategy or tactic)
becomes successful, the enemy will switch strategies
and tactics.
We call this a substitution effect. That is, the enemy will
substitute a different tactic once current one is no longer
effective for them. They may also change the structure
of their organization.
The US must be on guard and watch for this. We need to
stay one step ahead of the enemy.
We should not get complacent once it appears we are
winning.
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Terrorist Innovation
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INTERACTION EFFECT
The effect of X on Y will depend on the value of Z.
This means it is possible for a policy to become the victim
of its own success.
That is, the effect of preemption, and deterrence, will depend on
the effect of intelligence policy (which changes).
Intelligence effectiveness will decline eventually because
terrorists evolve, and as a result preemption and deterrence
will increase in effectiveness if we turn to it once intelligence
declines in effectiveness.
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Allocating Resources
As anti-terrorist resources become scarce, our
government should allocate more to intelligence
than to preemption, and more to preemption than
to deterrence.
But, we should be ready to quickly reallocate
resources as intelligence achieves success (we
should probably already be shifting resources to
some degree to stay one step ahead of the
enemy).
There is, however, a cost for preemption (EU,
China and Russia do not like it).
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