Faculty of Chemical

Engineering
Universiti Teknologi
MARA

Process Hazard
Analysis

Introduction
For each industrial process, the following
questions must be asked:
What are the hazards?
What can go wrong?
What are the chances?
What are the consequences?

Hazard Identification

Risk Assessment

Introduction
Risk assessment include:
Determination of the events that can produce an
accident
The probability of those events
And the consequences (e.g. human injury, loss of
life, damage to environment, loss of
production/capital equipment)

Introduction
Hazard Identification and Risk assessment are
sometimes combined into a general category
called hazard evaluation/ hazard analysis.
Can be done at any stage during the initial
design or ongoing operation or process.
The results of a hazard analysis are:
The identification of unacceptable risks and
The selection of means of controlling or eliminating
them

Hazards Identification
and risk assessment
procedure

System Descriptions
Hazards Identification
Scenario Identification

Accident probability

Accident consequence

Risk determination
Risk and/or
hazard
acceptance

No

Yes

Build and/or operate system

Modify system/
process

PHA Methodology

Process Hazards Checklists

Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PrHA)
What-if Analysis
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)
Hazards Surveys/ Hazards Indices
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
Event Tree Analysis (ETA)
Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) Analysis

Process Hazard Checklist

It is simply a list of possible problems and areas to be
checked.
The list reminds the reviewer or operator of the
potential problem areas.
Can be used during the design of a process to identify
design hazards, or it can be used before process
operation.
A systematic approach built on the historical knowledge
included in checklist questions.
Applicable to any activity or system, including
equipment issues and human factors issues

Process Hazard Analysis

(PHA)
PHA allows us to:
Determine types and locations of potential safety problems
Identify corrective measures to improve safety
Preplan emergency actions to be taken if safety controls fail
It must address
The hazards of the process
Engineering and administrative controls applicable to the
hazards and their interrelationship
Consequences of failure of engineering and administrative
controls, especially those affecting employees
The need to promptly resolve PHA findings and
recommendations.

Process Safety - CPE615

Activity
Propose a safety checklist for a
reactor

EQUIPMENT DESIGN
1.Design correct for maximum operating pressure?
2.Corrosion allowance considered?
3.Special isolation for hazardous equipment?
4.Guards for belts, pulleys and gears?
5.Dikes for any storage tanks?
6.Construction materials compatible with process chemicals?
7.Emergency standby equipment needed?
8.Relief valves or rupture disks required?
9.Emergency valves readily accessible?
10.Special explosion proof electrical fixtures required?

Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)

Originated in the aerospace industry.
Used extensively in the nuclear power
industry.
Becoming more popular in the chemical
process industries.
Provides a traceable, logical, quantitative
representation of causes, consequences
and event combinations.
Top-down approach
Starts with a well-defined event (top event)

Logical Functions in FTA

1. Top Event and Intermediate Events

The rectangle is used to

represent the TOP event and any
intermediate fault events in a
fault tree.
The TOP event is the accident
that is being analyzed.
Intermediate events are system

Logical Functions in FTA

2. Basic Event

The circle is used to represent

basic events in a fault tree.
It is the lowest level of resolution
in the fault tree.

Logical Functions in FTA

3. Undeveloped Event

The diamond is used to

represent events that cannot be
developed further in the fault
tree due to the lack of suitable
information.

Logical Functions in FTA

4. AND gate

Used when the resulting output

event requires the simultaneous
occurrence of all input events.

Logical Functions in FTA

5. OR gate

Used when the resulting output

event requires the occurrence of
any individual input event.

Example of FTA Flat Tire

Example of FTA Hot Water

Heater Explodes

Minimal Cut Sets

The minimal cut sets are the various sets of events that
could lead to the top event.
Some of the minimal cut sets have a higher probability
than others.
For instance, a set involving just two events is more likely
than a set involving three.
The higher probability sets are examined carefully to
determine whether additional safety systems are required.
AND gate increase the number of events in the cut sets,
whereas OR gates lead to more sets.

Quantitative FTA
Quantitative FTA determines the probability
of the tope event.
Probability versus Reliability
Reliability = 1 Probability
Probabilities are multiplied across an AND
gate.
Reliabilities are multiplied across and OR
gate.

Example of Quantitative FTA

Example
12Example
25on sss
page 556

Event Tree Analysis (ETA)

A bottom-up approach
ETA begin with an initiating event and
work toward a final result.
Provide information on how a failure can
occur and the probability of occurrence.
Explore how safeguards and external
influences, called lines of assurance, affect
the path of accident chains.

Example of ETA

Exercise
Company A produce liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) from a mixture
ofhydrocarbon gases. LPG is highlyused as afuel in heating
appliances and vehicles. LPG tanks are installed with pressure
controllers and high pressure alarms. The relief valves on top
of the tanks are designed to vent of excess gas in order to prevent
the tanks from rupturing. The high pressure alarms will alert the
operators to take necessary action to bring the plant back to normal
conditions or to shut down the plant. One of the possible incident
scenario is that accidental spilt of hydrocarbons may ignite and
the resulting fire may heat and LPG tank thus increasing its
temperature and pressure.
Construct and event tree analysis and identify four possible outcomes
that may arise from the accidental spillage of hydrocarbons.

Initiating
Event

Level of
Assurance

HP alarm
alerts
operator
Ye
Fire from the s

Operato Relief
r notice Valve
Ye
HP
operate
s
No

accidental
spilt of
Hydrocarbon

Outco
me
Operator
shutdown
reactor
Ye
s
No

No

Ye
s
No

Ye
s
No
Ye
s
No

Ye
s
No
Ye
s
No

Cont. operation
S/down
Tank rupture
(explosion)

Cont. operation
S/down
Explosio
n
Vapor
release
S/down
Explosio