Dynamic Pricing

and Queue
Stability in
Wireless Random
Access Games
Submitted by:
Meenakshi (2015EEZ8400)
PhD (Electrical Engineering)

Introduction
A Random Access Game is designed for the contention based wireless network with the optimization
algorithm in the presence of selfish users.
Aim of each user is to maximize its own performance.
In this non-cooperative game, strategy of each user is the selection of its channel access probability, and
the cost of the strategy is a function of utility gain, channel access price and queue size.
The motivation behind this work is to design a random access game that can achieve a steady state with
desirable features such as finite and stable user backlogs and/or maximum aggregate.
For achieving the equilibrium solution and unique Nash Equilibrium, gradient descent algorithm is used
that shows converges to the equilibrium point.

Literature Survey
Queuing theory is a mathematical model which is cap[able of providing models to estimate the behavior
of systems that attempt to offer service to the users for randomly arising demands.
The origin of queuing theory in 1909 and the queuing theory development are discussed in (Gross and
Harris (1985)).
In 2004, Palaniammal have discussed various queuing models and their performance measures are
derived. Bhat 2008 has defined open and closed network and explained about queues in series, queues
with blocking and Jackson network.
In 1965, J.Rosen discussed the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium points for concave n-person
games in which each person possess a pay-off function depending on their strategy.

Literature Survey
Paper Title

Description

Year

Stability of Multi
packet Slotted Aloha
with Selfish Users and
Perfect Information

In this paper, a game-theoretic model of multi-packet 2003

slotted Aloha is presented with perfect information. It is
shown that this model must have an equilibrium which is
characterized using the tools of stochastic processes, then
the equilibrium stability region is established for some
well-known channel models.

Stability region for

slotted Aloha Random
access method is
analyzed for selfish
users and perfect
information.

Efficient Power
control via Pricing in
Wireless Data
Networks

A power control solution is provided for wireless data in 2002

the analytical setting of a game theoretic framework. Here,
quality of service (QoS) of a wireless terminal receiver is
referred to as the utility and distributed power control is a
non cooperative power control game where users
maximize their utility. The outcome of the game results in
a Nash equilibrium that is inefficient. A linear pricing
function of transmit power is considered which allows a
distributed implementation where the price can be
broadcast by the base station to all the terminals.

A distributed power
control algorithm for
wireless data systems
is presented and a Non
cooperative power
control game
maximize the utility.

Literature Survey
A game-theoretic
approach to decentralized
optimal power
allocation for cellular
networks

Game theoretic technique for pricing in wireless communication system was studied. 2010
Interference affects the communication between the Base Station (BS) and a given user
which eventually affects the communication between the BS and all other users. Thus,
the power vector consisting of the transmission power in each BS-user link can be
viewed as a public good which simultaneously affects the utilities of all the users in the
network.

Selfish Users in Aloha: A In the work a game theory approach is used to analyze Aloha from the perspective of a 2001
game Theoretic Approach selfish user. An Aloha game is constructed and its optimal behavior of individual users
is analyzed. The performance of selfish Aloha system is examined with the
performance of a centrally-controlled slotted Aloha system. With some system
parameters performance is near the optimum performance obtained by a centrallycontrolled system. By utilizing a selfish-user assumption, it is possible to build systems
which are robust and scalable.

Objectives
Incorporate the game theoretic concept for defining the contention based wireless network with
minimized cost function keeping the queue size stable.
Design of the Gradient Descent based Algorithm and the convergence of algorithm to this
equilibrium is proven
Design of the Gradient Descent based Algorithm and the convergence of algorithm to this
equilibrium is proven.
Obtain an implicit relationship between individual access prices of the users for the stability of
user queues.
Under a partial knowledge assumption and under the use of equal prices, an adaptive pricing
algorithm is studied that shifts the NE point to the point where the maximum throughput is
achieved.
The robustness of the game with respect to changes in price and achievable channel rates.

Types of Random Access

Games
Pure Aloha

Slotted Aloha

CSMA-CD

CSMA-CA

ContentionTree,
Contention
Stack

Random Access Games

Random Access is the ability to access a sample of data at any given coordinates in a population of
elements. It works on an assumption that each element can be accessed quickly and randomly
irrespective of the number of elements in the population.
Aloha is one of the simplest random access method, ALOHA originally stood for Additive Links Online Hawaii Area . In Aloha, a user can transmit a frame whenever it has a packet in its queue, there can
be multiple collisions and hence efficiency is poor.
Slotted ALOHA is a refinement over the pure ALOHA. The Slotted ALOHA requires that time be
segmented into slots of a fixed length exactly equal to the packet transmission time. Every packet
transmitted must fit into one of these slots by beginning and ending in precise synchronization with the
slot segments.
The collided packets are retransmitted whenever a free slot is found.

System Model
The System Model comprises of three sections:
Existence and Uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium
Stability of User Queues
Optimization Through Pricing
A). Pricing for Global Optimization of User Utilities
B).Dynamic Equal Pricing for Throughput Maximization

Gradient Descent for

Convergence
In non-cooperative game, The dominant strategy of every user should always provide maximum
benefit and minimum cost function.
As, all users are assumed to be selfish, they all try to minimize their cost function.
,]
For the minimum cost function achieved, convergent value of each transmission probabilities can be
calculated for each user with gradient descent algorithm, where transmission probabilities are updated
on the basis of the update parameter from minimized cost function.
Update parameter:

Algorithm
Update parameter: ;
: Channel access price;

Stability of User Queues

In this non-cooperative game, the pricing parameter is is selected in such a way that the user queues are
stabilized.
For stable Queues, whenever the queue drifts becomes negative, the user queue tends to get empty.
Some of the users do not have sufficient number of packets to transmit and cannot guarantee an inner
point Nash Equilibrium solution.
Only and transmission probabilities vary to ensure the stable queue and can be solved for this
transmission probability

Continued .

In symmetric cases, two users N=2 are considered with identical set
of system parameters.
Symmetric
Channel pricing parameter is varied in order to achieve queue
Case
stability.

In asymmetric cases, two users N=2 are considered with different

set of system parameters like .
Asymmetric
Channel pricing parameter is varied in order to achieve queue
Case
stability.

Optimization through
Pricing

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ir ci loba tion s
P G za tie
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Optimization
for Maximizing
Utility Function
for each user

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Pr mi
Th ici c E
M r o ng q
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A). Pricing for Global Optimization of user

Utilities
Objective: Maximize the social welfare of user utilities
Optimal transmission Probabilities can be computed for known transmission
rates of users and channel preferences.
Optimal prices is calculated from the given user utility for maximizing the
throughput.
Optimal Pricing parameter:

B). Dynamic Equal Pricing for Throughput

Maximization
To obtain maximum Aggregate throughput with maintaining high social welfare,
a dynamic update algorithm is implemented.
Each user is charged equal access price k , access price is updated with respected
to the maximum throughput curve.
For high channel access price: Transmission probability will be too small and
channel will remain under-utilized.
For low channel access prices: Transmission probability will be high and
collisions will dominate the system.

Continued
Region I: Channel access price increases as the throughput increases
Region II: Channel access price increase lead to the decrease in aggregate
throughput.

Numerical Analysis
In
non-cooperative game framework, simulation results are analyzed under
following headlines.
Transmission Probabilities of a user versus time for different step sizes
Transmission Probabilities of a user versus time for different .
Aggregate Throughput versus pricing parameter.
Evaluation of Aggregate throughput of the system.
Simulation Tool used: Matlab R2013b

Transmission Probability v/s

different step sizes
For 50 users , convergence of transmission probabilities is observed under the effect of different values of . The value of
channel capacity is uniformly randomly chosen in [1,10] and channel access price in [1,20].Convergence is achieved with
ten updates or transmission probabilities, however, after convergence, transmission probabilities may oscillates.

Transmission Probability v/s

different step sizes
=0.02 ;

=0.01


Transmission
Probabilities
v/s different values
Effect of different values of on the convergence rate is studied. The convergence rate remains approximately
the same for different values of .


Transmission
Probabilities
v/s different values

=1

Click icon to add picture

Throughput Analysis
Effect of pricing parameter
aggregate
throughput shows that the throughput
increases only up to certain value of pricing
parameter and then starts decreasing.
If pricing parameter low : Throughput
increases from the lower value.
When is small, the users want to transmit
with high probabilities, which results in
higher number of collisions
When is high, the greedy behavior of user
get punished and hence channel is not fully
utilized.

Click icon to add picture

Evaluation of Throughput
for the System
In equal pricing dynamic update system, golden
section search method is implemented in this adaptive
pricing algorithm.
The algorithm successfully converges to the
maximum throughput point within a few iterations.
The aggregate throughput of the system on the choice
of pricing parameters. Nash Equilibrium is
characterized and gradient descent algorithm is used
to investigate the convergence properties.

Conclusion
A non-cooperative random access game is designed in a slotted aloha system.
Existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium is proved by showing convergence of transmission
probabilities with Gradient descent method.
The variation of channel access price is utilize effectively for the stability of user queues. Two cases have
been analyzed: Symmetric and Asymmetric.
The whole system is optimized for maximum throughput with social welfare benefits by equal pricing
technique.
The pricing parameter is adaptively changed for maximum throughput.

Thank You!!!!!!!!!