Against Abortion

1ST YEAR ETHICS

LECTURE 17

A Common Structure to the Debate

A symmetry in the pro-choice and anti-abortion

views, which leads to a stand off:

For the pro-choice, the foetus is not a moral person (i.e. a person
in the sense of having the rights and interests of you or I); for the
anti-abortionist, it is.
That the foetus is (anti-abortion) or is not (pro-choice) a moral
person is a crucial part of the argument, and seems to lead pretty
quickly to the desired conclusion (if it is a moral person, dont kill
it; if it is not, it is permissible to end its life).
But because it is the crucial part of the argument how is either
side to establish their premise without begging the question?

Avoiding Begging the Question:

Avoiding Wrongdoing in Conditions of Uncertainty

Suppose we dont know that the foetus is a moral person and we dont

know that it is not (perhaps because any argument seems to beg the
question).

Avoiding Begging the Question:

Avoiding Wrongdoing in Conditions of Uncertainty

Suppose we dont know that the foetus is a moral person and we dont

know that it is not (perhaps because any argument seems to beg the
question).
What should we do in cases of such moral uncertainty?

Avoiding Begging the Question:

Avoiding Wrongdoing in Conditions of Uncertainty

Suppose we dont know that the foetus is a moral person and we dont

know that it is not (perhaps because any argument seems to beg the
question).
What should we do in cases of such moral uncertainty?
One plausible response: Moral risk aversion
If the foetus might be a moral person, so that ending its life would be

morally wrong, it would be wrong to end its life.

Compare: you dont know whether there is anybody in the building you
are about to blow up for fun, so it would be wrong to blow up the
building.
If you can check and find out, do it; but if there is no way of knowing,
dont take the risk!

Moral Risk Aversion and the Catholic Church

Perhaps surprisingly, Pope John Paul II endorses a risk aversion

argument:
[W]hat is at stake is so important that, from the standpoint of moral
obligation, the mere probability that a human person is involved would
suffice to justify an absolutely clear prohibition of any intervention
aimed at killing a human embryo. Precisely for this reason, over and
above all scientific debates and those philosophical affirmations to
which the Magisterium has not expressly committed itself, the Church
has always taught and continues to teach that the result of human
procreation, from the first moment of its existence, must be guaranteed
that unconditional respect which is morally due to the human being in
his or her totality and unity as body and spirit (Evangelium Vitae: 60)

Moral Risk Aversion and the Catholic Church

Perhaps surprisingly, Pope John Paul II endorses a risk aversion

argument:
[W]hat is at stake is so important that, from the standpoint of moral
obligation, the mere probability that a human person is involved would
suffice to justify an absolutely clear prohibition of any intervention
aimed at killing a human embryo. Precisely for this reason, over and
above all scientific debates and those philosophical affirmations to
which the Magisterium has not expressly committed itself, the Church
has always taught and continues to teach that the result of human
procreation, from the first moment of its existence, must be guaranteed
that unconditional respect which is morally due to the human being in
his or her totality and unity as body and spirit (Evangelium Vitae: 60)

Moral Risk Aversion: The Stalemate Returns?

But does moral risk aversion really lead to a moral

prohibition of abortion?
Suppose that if the foetus is not a moral person,

then it is all-things-considered best in some cases to

abort it
Then, it is morally risky to respect a prohibition.

The Marquis Approach

We all know that killing us is wrong;

The Marquis Approach

We all know that killing us is wrong;

There is a reason why killing us is wrong

The Marquis Approach

We all know that killing us is wrong;

There is a reason why killing us is wrong;
Terminating foetuses might be wrong for the same

reason

What Makes Killing Prima Facie Wrong?

What primarily makes killing wrong is neither its

effect on the murderer nor its effect on the victims
friends and relatives, but its effect on the victim.

The Deprivation View

What primarily makes killing wrong is neither its

effect on the murderer nor its effect on the victims
friends and relatives, but its effect on the victim. The
loss of ones life is one of the greatest losses one can
suffer. The loss of ones life deprives one of all the
experiences, activities, projects, and enjoyments that
would otherwise have constituted ones future. (p.189)

The Valuable Things in Life

The suggestion is not that (the purely biological

property of) simply being alive is of value to a person

Rather, it is the things one does and experiences, and

the things which happen in a life which are of value to

a person, either intrinsically or instrumentally

Something has intrinsic value iff it is valuable in itself

Something has instrumental value iff it is valuable as a means to
some valuable end [note the role for intrinsic value in blocking
regress here]
N.B. Something can have both intrinsic and instrumental value

The Valuable Things in Life

Some parts of my future are not valued by me now,

but will come to be valued by me as I grow older and as
my values and capacities change. When I am killed, I
am deprived both of what I now value which would
have been part of my future personal life, and also
what I would come to value. Therefore, when I die, I
am deprived of all of the value of my future. Inflicting
this loss on me is ultimately what makes killing me
wrong. (pp.189-90)

Value and Valuing

Marquis says:

Some parts of my future are not valued by me

now, but will come to be valued by me as I grow
older and as my values and capacities change.
implying that if I dont already value something, my
valuing it in the future explains its value

Value and Valuing: Noun/Adjective and Verb

Marquis says:

Some parts of my future are not valued by me

now, but will come to be valued by me as I grow
older and as my values and capacities change.
implying that if I dont already value something, my
valuing it in the future explains its value
But we dont need to think that something has value
iff it is valued.

We can value things which are not valuable;

And we can fail to value things which are valuable.

Value and Valuing: Noun/Adjective and Verb

So, perhaps being deprived of what I value or will

come to value is not the real problem with being

killed what really matters is being deprived of what
is valuable (whether or not I value it, and whether or
not anybody else values it).

Value and Valuing: Noun/Adjective and Verb

So, perhaps being deprived of what I value or will

come to value is not the real problem with being

killed what really matters is being deprived of what
is valuable (whether or not I value it, and whether or
not anybody else values it).
If you doubt that something can be valuable without being valued,

consider:
(a)

(b)

Something can be visible without being seen, desirable without being desired, so why not valuable
without being valued?
In order to block an infinite regress (or circle), there must be intrinsically valuable things as well as
instrumentally valuable things; why think that my attitudes (such as valuing) could be a source of
intrinsic value, but not other things?

Value and Valuing: Noun/Adjective and Verb

So, perhaps being deprived of what I value or will

come to value is not the real problem with being

killed what really matters is being deprived of what
is valuable (whether or not I value it, and whether or
not anybody else values it).
If you doubt that something can be valuable without being valued,

consider:
(a)

(b)

(c)

Something can be visible without being seen, desirable without being desired, so why not valuable
without being valued?
In order to block an infinite regress (or circle), there must be intrinsically valuable things as well as
instrumentally valuable things; why think that my attitudes (such as valuing) could be a source of
intrinsic value, but not other things?
What about when we stop valuing something? If it loses its value, nothing is valuable to us when we die
(and therefore stop valuing everything), so we lose nothing of value when we die; but if something is
always valuable once it is valued at any time, having the things we valued as children is still valuable for
us now, even though we have transcended valuing them cant we grow out of valuing things?!

The Deprivation View

[I]t would seem that what makes killing any adult
human being prima facie seriously wrong is the loss of
his or her future. (p.190)
First directly supporting consideration:

[T]his theory explains why we regard killing as one of

the worst of crimes. Killing is especially wrong,
because it deprived the victim of more than perhaps
any other crime.

The Deprivation View

[I]t would seem that what makes killing any adult
human being prima facie seriously wrong is the loss of
his or her future. (p.190)
Second directly supporting consideration:

This view makes good sense of what is particularly bad

about premature death.

The Deprivation View

[I]t would seem that what makes killing any adult human
being prima facie seriously wrong is the loss of his or her
future. (p.190)
Additional supporting considerations:
The Deprivation View allows that it might be wrong to

kill non-human animals and other sorts of beings if

they have valuable futures.

The Deprivation View

[I]t would seem that what makes killing any adult human being
prima facie seriously wrong is the loss of his or her future.
(p.190)
Additional supporting considerations:
The Deprivation View allows that it might be wrong to kill

non-human animals and other sorts of beings if they have

valuable futures.
According to the Deprivation View it is not necessarily wrong
to kill those whose futures are very bleak (so, euthanasia is
not yet ruled out, though there may be other reasons why it is
wrong).

A Worry about the Deprivation View

Can the Deprivation View account for what is wrong

with killing someone who would, in fact, have died

the next moment anyway?

A Worry about the Deprivation View

Can the Deprivation View account for what is wrong

with killing someone who would, in fact, have died

the next moment anyway?
E.g.: Maggie is shot dead at time t whilst crossing the
road; but if she had not been shot at time t, she would
have been run over and killed accidentally by a car at
time t+ (let t+ be as close as possible to t). Surely it is
still wrong to shoot Maggie, even if she was about to be
run over the shooter might not even know that she
was about to be run over!

A Worry about the Deprivation View Addressed

Can the Deprivation View account for what is wrong

with killing someone who would, in fact, have died

the next moment anyway?
There might be a serious worry here for the claim
that the Deprivation View describes a necessary
condition for killing to be wrong

A Worry about the Deprivation View Addressed

Can the Deprivation View account for what is wrong

with killing someone who would, in fact, have died

the next moment anyway?
There might be a serious worry here for the claim
that the Deprivation View describes a necessary
condition for killing to be wrong;
But Marquis, at least, does not endorse this strong
claim he requires only the weaker claim that the
Deprivation View describes a sufficient condition
for killing to be wrong.

Necessary vs. Sufficient Conditions

Deprivation of a valuable future as sufficient for the

wrongness of killing:
If killing A deprives A of a valuable future, then killing A is wrong.

Deprivation of a valuable future as necessary for the

wrongness of killing:
If killing A is wrong, then killing A deprives A of a valuable future.

Necessary vs. Sufficient Conditions

Deprivation of a valuable future as sufficient for the

wrongness of killing:
If killing A deprives A of a valuable future, then killing A is wrong.
There might be other conditions the meeting of which makes a
killing wrong so even if it doesnt deprive its victim of a
valuable future, a killing might still be wrong.

Deprivation of a valuable future as necessary for the

wrongness of killing:
If killing A is wrong, then killing A deprives A of a valuable future.
No killing which fails to deprive its victim of a valuable future
is wrong.

The Conclusion Derived

The future of a standard foetus includes a set of

experiences, projects, activities, and such which are
identical with the futures of adult human beings and
are identical with the futures of young children. Since
the reason that is sufficient to explain why it is wrong
to kill human beings after the time of birth is a reason
that also applies to fetuses, it follows that abortion is
prima facie seriously morally wrong. (p.192)

The Conclusion Derived

The future of a standard foetus includes a set of

experiences, projects, activities, and such which are
identical with the futures of adult human beings and
are identical with the futures of young children. Since
the reason that is sufficient to explain why it is wrong
to kill human beings after the time of birth is a reason
that also applies to fetuses, it follows that abortion is
prima facie seriously morally wrong. (p.192)

What the Conclusion Depends Upon

The argument is:

(P1) It is wrong to deprive anything which has one of a valuable future;

(P2) A foetus has a valuable future;
(P3) It is wrong to deprive a foetus of a valuable future [from (P1) & (P2)]
(P4) Ending the life of something is depriving it of its future;
-----------------------------------------------------------------(C) It is wrong to end the life of a foetus [from (P3) & (P4)

What the Conclusion Depends Upon

The argument is:

(P1) It is wrong to deprive anything which has one of a valuable future;

(P2) A foetus has a valuable future;
(P3) It is wrong to deprive a foetus of a valuable future [from (P1) & (P2)]
(P4) Ending the life of something is depriving it of its future;
-----------------------------------------------------------------(C) It is wrong to end the life of a foetus [from (P3) & (P4)

This argument does not depend upon assuming that

the foetus is a person in any particular sense it

assumes only that it has a valuable future.

Rivals to the Deprivation Account:

The Desire Account
Suppose that what makes it wrong to kill us is not

that it deprives us of a valuable future, but rather

that it blocks the fulfilment of a strong
fundamental desire.
Such an account of the wrongness of killing might

not have the consequence that it is wrong to end the

life of a foetus.

Rivals to the Deprivation View:

The Desire Account
Suppose that what makes it wrong to kill us is not

that it deprives us of a valuable future, but rather

that it blocks the fulfilment of a strong
fundamental desire.
But, firstly, what does the Desire Account have to say

about killing those who dont desire to live (perhaps

the suicidal, the comatose and/or non-human
animals)?

Rivals to the Deprivation View:

The Desire Account
Suppose that what makes it wrong to kill us is not that

it deprives us of a valuable future, but rather that it

blocks the fulfilment of a strong fundamental
desire.
And, secondly, it seems to be a consequence of the

Desire Account (taken as specifying a necessary

condition for wrongness) that it would not be wrong to
kill someone if you could get them to not desire to live
any longer (by drugging them?) which cannot be the
right result!

The Desire Account as Support for Pro-Choice

If the Desire Account is going to generate the result that it

is not wrong to abort a foetus because foetuses do not

have desires it will need to be specifying a necessary
condition for wrongness (not just a sufficient one).
For X to be prohibited or wrong, X just needs to satisfy a

sufficient condition for wrongness;

But for X to be permissible, X needs to fail every sufficient
condition for wrongness.
So the Desire Account could not give just one amongst
several sufficient conditions for wrongness, to derive a
permission from it even if abortion fails that condition, it
might still satisfy some other, so still be wrong.

The Desire Account as Support for Pro-Choice

So, the Desire Account needs to specify a necessary

condition for the wrongness of killing if it is to show

that abortion is wrong

The Desire Account as Support for Pro-Choice

So, the Desire Account needs to specify a necessary

condition for the wrongness of killing if it is to show

that abortion is wrong; but it is not plausible as
specifying a necessary condition for the wrongness of
killing, even if it is plausible as a specifying a
sufficient condition.

The Desire Account as Support for Pro-Choice

Also, if future desires are taken into account in the

Desire Account, the Desire Account will also

presumably say that abortion is wrong, because
foetuses have desires in the future (it surely doesnt
matter that they wont then be foetuses, does it?)

Rivals to the Deprivation Account:

The Continuation Account

Perhaps what is wrong with killing us is that it

prevents the continuation of projects, experiences

etc. which we already have.
Then, again if this is a necessary condition for the

wrongness of killing, since foetuses do not (yet) have

projects or experiences etc., ending their life is not
wrong.

Continuation [and Desire] and Value

But, what is attractive about the Continuation Account?

Surely it only matters if we discontinue something

valuable [and, indeed, it only really matters that a

desire is disappointed if what is desired is worth
something, perhaps].
So dont we end up appealing to the value of what is in

ones future in the end?