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WHAT ?
HAZOP is Hazard and Operability Analysis
WHEN ?
Hazop can be used at practically any stage. It is so widely used
that almost any form of process hazards analysis is referred to as
HAZOP
ADVANTAGE ?
HAZOP is very thorough , because you force yourself to examine
most aspect
DISADVANTAGE?
HAZOP is very time consuming and costly. If not setup correctly
and managed properly , it can be ineffective. Needs leadership
by an Expert in the field of Hazop
What Is PHA ?
Definition
a system to identify, assess &
mitigate potential hazards to a
tolerable level by addressing not only
technology but also facility and human
using specific tools
Objective :
To ensure that an adequate assessment of risk is carried out in order to
meet the
following :
1.
2.
3.
4.
To
To
To
To
PHA Tools
Which
technique?
It depends on:
The type of work
you are doing and
The type of potential
hazards
HAZOP Process
Hazard &
Operability Problems
Existing
Safeguards
Highly
Procedure
Method Selection
CAUSE
DEVIATION
CONSEQUENC
E
What-If Checklist
Failure Mode &
Effect Analysis
(FMEA)
HAZOP
Fault Tree
Analysis (FTA)
Conceptual
Design
Basic
Detailed
Existing process
Process change
Decommissioning
FMEA
HAZOP
FTA
Assurance
Prioritized?Review/challenge?
Assign action party
Follow-up/track
Communicate to employees
Planning
Identify area of study/set
boundary
Select Team comprises of
PHA leader, scribe & members
Supporting
Elements
Facilities Data
through PIMS, SAP
records, e-HSEMS, eCPA
Consequences Analysis
Hazard Identification
(HazId)
Field tour
Previous MOC & Incident?
Previous HazOp report?
Up-to-date
Information and
Documentation
e.g. P&ID, O&M,
MSDS, Area
Classification
Resources PHA
practitioners &
cross-functional
subject matter expert
What is
HAZOP?
OPerability study
It is a systematic method (team-based) for examining
Importance of
HAZOP
Outline of HAZOP
Technique
Outline of HAZOP
Technique
HAZOP Process
List Causes
Possible?
Yes
No
Consequence?
Yes
Yes
Existing
SAFEGUARD
sufficient?
No
Proposed Option
Node No: 3
AGI
PV-1100
Node No:1
Node No: 2
From LP fuel
gas
From V6-0207
From Glycol
From V6-0204
Process Deviation
Definition
NO, NOT or
NONE
MORE OF
LESS OF
AS WELL AS
PART OF
REVERSE
OTHER
THAN
Guide Word
Deviation
Flow
No/Less
No/Less Flow
Flow
More
More Flow
Flow
Reverse
Reverse Flow
Pressure
More
High Pressure
Pressure
Less
Low Pressure
Temperature
More
High Temperature
Temperature
Less
Low Temperature
Level
More
High Level
Level
Less
Low Level
Reaction
More
More Reaction
Reaction
Other
Other Reaction
Composition
Other
Off-specification
Contamination
Other
Contamination
Relief
Other
Relief
Sampling
Other
Sampling
Service
No
Power Failure
Service
No
Service
No
Service
No
Steam Failure
Service
No
Nitrogen Failure
Service
No
No Flushing Oil
Maintenance
Other
Maintenance
Compositio
n
Testing
Operation
: Operability / maintainability
Electrical
Instrument
Corrosion / erosion
Previous precaution
Accessibility
Materials of construction
Orientation
Quality, consistency & reliability
Efficiency and reliability
Ignition
Safety/ ESD
Engineering issues
Viscosity
Environmental
Examples of consequences
People
First aid injury, minor injury, major injury, fatality
Environment
Local spillage, effluent discharge to river, black
smoke
Asset
Equipment crack, valve damage, fire/explosion on
storage tank
Reputation
Media attention, public inquiry, disrepute to
international image
People (P)
Environment (E)
P0
No injury
E0
No effect
P1
Slight Injury
E1
Slight effect
P2
Minor Injury
P3
Major Injury
P4
Fatalities
P5
Fatalities
E2
Minor Effect
E3
Localised effect
E4
Major effect
E5
Massive effect
Assets
Loss (A)
A0
No loss
A1
Slight loss
< 10k
A2
Minor Loss
10k ~ 100k
A3
Local Loss
100k ~ 0.5 M
A4
Major Loss
0.5M ~ 10M
A5
Extensive
Loss
> 10 M
B
Has
happened in
the industry.
C
Has
happened
once in the
company
D
Has
happened
several times
per year in
the company.
E
Has
happened
several
times per
year in
company
Negligible
1 time in > 20
years
1 time
between 4 to
20 years
1 time
between 6
months to 4
years
1 time in < 6
months
Reputation (R)
R0
No Impact
R3
Considerable Impact
R4
National Impact
R5
International Impact
R1
Slight Impact
R2
Limited Impact
HAZOP Team
Selection
The team shall consist of
o HAZOP leader to facilitate the study
o Scribe to record the study
o Operation personnel
o Multi-disciplinary members, depending on the scope of
the study (e.g. instrument, electrical, mechanical,
inspection, piping, civil, HSE)
Balance of skills, knowledge and experience
Willing contributors, able to express thoughts
clearly
1.
Preparation
P&ID
PFD plus material and energy balances
Equipment specifications
Layout drawing
LA 7809
LALL 7809
LC
7810A
Steam
drum
LT 7810
LT 7809
LSLL 7809
BV
Water drum
FC 7810
Economizer
FC 7810
PI 7802
TI 7801
PI 7810
PT 7801
FT 7810
FY 7810
FV 7810
TI 7801
From BFW
Header
BV
BV
NC
Demin Water
TW-1"-7801-A1031-H(N20A)
NC
NC
PI 7801
NODE 1
BW-3"-7801-D6103-H(N20B)
BV
HAZOP Worksheet
NODE
1
Design intent:
Replacement of B/Valve at
D/ Stream & U/ Stream FV
7801
GUIDE
DEVIATION CAUSES
CONSEQUENC
ES
SAFEGUARD
S
WORD
More
No
More
Pressure
BV at
Econo
mizer
partial
ly
close
Less
pressure
RISK
RANKING
RECOMMENDATION
S
P
PI 7801
To install
L
, PI
vibration sensor
7802
to all ST pump
and PI
7810
(indicati
on only
Pressure
L
BV at
U/stream or
D/ Stream
FV 7810 is
fully close
Less
1.Increased
backpressure
on Steam
turbine
2.ST tripped
REMARKS &
NA
1.,No water
supply
to
steam drum
leading to low
level
2.Boiler tripped
3.Slow down the
process
LSLL 7809
To implement
Tagging system to
critical valve
E
L
A R
M L 1.
MTA
( Q3 Fy 2010/11)
M L
1.POA
( 1st May 2010 )
STAT
US