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SAFANIYAH
Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA)
3
Scope of Study
4
Methodology
ACHIEVING ACCEPTABLE RISK
Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA)
5
Identify the hazardous scenarios & initiating causes
1. All the hazardous scenarios are developed from HAZOP Study. Additional
scenarios can be Developed through Brain Storming session ,Operating
Experience and Engineering Best practices.
2. All the initiating cause are taken from PHA/HAZOP study or through brain
storming.
3. Appendix F of SAEP-250 can used as a guideline to list scenario of
initiating causes.
6
Initiating Cause
Process Deviation
Initiating causes
Equipment failures
instrumentation
pumps
compressors
human errors
loss of mechanical integrity
Initiating cause frequency
Methodology
ACHIEVING ACCEPTABLE RISK Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA)
8
Express risk target frequency quantitatively
9
Unmitigated Risk
Unmitigated Risk
IS IT TOLERABLE?
Express risk target frequency quantitatively
11
Methodology
ACHIEVING ACCEPTABLE RISK Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA)
12
Demand Frequency Estimation
1. Estimate the demand frequency of the initiating event from SAEP-250
Appendix I Or Experience from field can determine empirically
2. Alternatively This frequency can be calculated/obtained from FMEDA
reports from EXIDA, OREDA etc.
13
Demand Frequency Estimation
14
Methodology
ACHIEVING ACCEPTABLE RISK Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA)
15
Identify all the Independent Layers
16
Identify all the Independent Layers
Identify all the Protection layers which can reduce the risk (reduce
frequency of occurrence or Severity)
Prevention Layers (PZV, ALARMS etc) Mitigation Layers
(Dikes etc)
17
Identify Independent Protection Layers (IPLs)
Unsafe, L
I n
Y2 P
Unsafe, L
I
Y1 P 3
Initiating L
I Safe/
event, X P 2 tolerable
L
1
Mitigated Risk Reduce Frequency Only
Mitigated Risk =
Unmitigated Risk = frequency *
reduced frequency * same
consequence
PFD1 PFD2 PFD3 consequence
IPL1 IPL2 IPL3 Mitigated Risk = reduced frequency *
Unmitigated
Risk same consequence
Scenario
Consequence
Preventive Preventive Preventive
Feature Feature Feature
Success REDUCE FREQUENCY TO
Safe Outcome ACHIEVE TOLERABLE RISK
Initiating Event Success
Safe Outcome
Success
Failure Safe Outcome
Failure
Consequences exceeding
Failure criteria
Key:
Thickness of arrow represents frequency of the Impact frequency
consequence if later IPLs are not successful Event
What are IPLs?
Process Design
Identify Independent Protection Layers (IPLs)
Mechanical design
Barricades
Identify Independent Protection Layers (IPLs)
Methodology
ACHIEVING ACCEPTABLE RISK Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA)
25
Reduce risk to meet target
The general approach is to
Set the target frequency for an event leading to an unsafe situation
Apply IPLs to reduce the frequency of occurrence of hazardous
events.
Calculate the mitigated frequency of Hazardous event and compare it
with target frequency.
If the mitigated event frequency is high than target , reduce it.
The first approach is to add other IPLs to further reduce the hazardous
event frequency.
Finally consider SIS to meet the target frequency and determine
the SIL level of the SIF.
Independent Protection Layer (IPL) Analysis Objective
Intolerable Risk
Drivethe consequence and/or frequency of
potential incidents to an tolerable risk
level
Tolerable Risk
Safety Layer of Protection Analysis
1. Express risk target quantitatively
The decision can be presented in a F-N plot similar to the one below.
(The coordinate values here are not standard; they must be selected by the professional.)
1.00E-07
Probability or Frequency, F
Unacceptable risk
(events/year)
1.00E-08
Acceptable risk
1.00E-09
1 10 100
Deaths per event, N
The design must be enhanced to reduce the likelihood of death (or serious
damage) and/or to mitigate the effects.
Safety Layer of Protection Analysis
Process examples
The Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) is performed using a standard
table for data entry. (SAEP-250 Appendix F)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Protection Layers
# Initial InitiatingCause Process BPCS Alarm SIS Additional
Mitigated Notes Event cause likelihood design
mitigation event
Description (safety valves, likelihood
dykes, restricted access,
etc.)
Appendix H (SAEP-250)
Safety Layer of Protection Analysis
Process examples
The Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) is performed using a standard
table for data entry. (SAEP-250 Appendix F)
Appendix I (SAEP-250)/EXIDA/TUV/OREDA
Safety Layer of Protection Analysis
Process examples
The Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) is performed using a standard
table for data entry. (SAEP-250 Appendix F)
Liquid In
LAH LT
Liquid Out
Process Vessel
HAZARD = OVERFILLING
SIL
Failure of Transfer Pump leading to
overfill of Process Vessel.
Potential release of material to the
environment requiring reporting or
remediation.
Potential personnel injury due to
exposure to material.